Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1645

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389

Eros v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1061

Inderjit v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCAFC 217; (2019) 272 FCR 528

Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2026

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1436

Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 601

Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16; (2020) 274 FCR 646

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1

Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 27; (2022) 275 CLR 582

Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The judgment in Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 601 be set aside.
3. A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the second respondent of 6 October 2021.
4. A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to determine the appellants' application according to law.
5. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Ground 1: Alleged failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the material

Ground 2(a): Alleged unreasonableness and illogicality in the Tribunal placing significant weight on the first appellant having not returned to India when she could not, in fact, have travelled during Australia's border closures

Ground 2(b): Alleged illogicality in the Tribunal giving weight to the presence of the second and third appellants in Australia as an incentive for the first appellant to remain in Australia

Ground 2(c): Alleged illogicality in the Tribunal's use of its finding that the first appellant arrived on a Visitor visa and then changed her plans to study in Australia

Ground 2(d): Alleged error in assuming that Bachelor's degrees obtained in India were equivalent in standard to Australian Bachelor's degrees without evidence

Ground 3: Allegation that the Tribunal failed to consider and make findings on a number of factors set out in Direction 69

1. This is an appeal from the judgment in Kaur v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 601. By that judgment, the primary judge dismissed the appellants' application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal).
2. The appellants are citizens of India who arrived in Australia on 13 August 2019 on Visitor visas. On 29 October 2019, the first appellant applied for a Student visa. A delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (the Minister) refused the first appellant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Visa. That decision was affirmed by the Tribunal.
3. The first appellant was the primary visa applicant. The second appellant (her husband) and the third appellant (her son) are secondary visa applicants whose visas depended upon the outcome of the first appellant's visa application.

1. The appellants seek leave to file an Amended Notice of Appeal. The Minister does not oppose the appellants having leave to file that document, but contends that the appellants require leave to rely upon grounds that were not taken before the primary judge and opposes such leave being granted.
2. The Amended Notice of Appeal contains the following grounds:
   1. His Honour erred in finding the Second Respondent had given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the evidence.

Particulars

a) The Second Respondent took evidence in the hearing between 11.30am and 12.11pm.

b) After some introductory comments taking five minutes and questions to the First Appellant taking eight minutes, the Second Respondent started putting adverse information to the First Appellant.

c) The Second Respondent continues putting adverse information until the 39th minute. There were two further instances of asking questions. The Appellant's representative makes submissions for two minutes. The Appellants are not invited to give any further evidence.

d) The hearing comprised 10 minutes of asking questions.

e) The second respondent adjourned the hearing at 12.11pm and recommenced at 12.28 [pm] to give an oral decision, affirming the decision under review.

These periods indicate the Second Respondent did not give the application adequate consideration: see Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 69; (2018) 259 FCR 197 at paragraph 93.

1. The Second Respondent's findings were not capable of being reached on lawful grounds.

Particulars

a) In paragraph 25, the Second Respondent gives significant weight to the First Appellant not returning home to see her parents and finds this means her family ties are not a strong incentive to return to India. Travel restriction to foreign nationals were implemented on 1 March 2020 and the border was closed to non-citizens on 20 March 2020. It was reopened on 22 February 2022 to fully vaccinated people. If the First Appellant had left Australia during that period, she could not return to continue her studies. This finding was unreasonable and illogical.

b) In paragraph 26, the Second Respondent gives significant weight to the presence of the Second and Third Appellants in Australia as an incentive to remain in Australia, but they are holders of bridging visas who are also applying for the visa. It is illogical to find the presence in Australia of other visa applicants is an incentive for a visa applicant to remain in Australia.

c) In paragraph 31, the Second Respondent uses the onshore student visa application as adverse information: "She arrived in Australia on a visitor visa and then completely changed her plans to study in Australia." There was no evidence before the Second Respondent that the student visa programme was being used to circumvent the intentions of the migration programme: Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1436. The circular reasoning is illogical and the finding was unreasonable because it was based on no evidence.

d) In paragraph 31, the Second Respondent assumes the courses in India were at the equivalent level to a bachelor degree in Australia. The Second Respondent should have known, or not assumed without a simple inquiry, that Indian education standards are not the equivalent to those in Australia. There was no evidence before the Second Respondent, such as an assessment by the relevant Australian assessing authority, that the First Appellant's qualifications obtained in India were at an equivalent level to a bachelor degree in Australia. This finding is based on a fact which did not exist and is unreasonable.

1. The Second Respondent failed to consider and make findings on all the relevant factors, in italics below, in Direction No. 69 - Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications (Direction 69) as required by law: Kumar v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCAFC 16; 274 FCR 646. If the Tribunal had considered and made positive findings on any of these factors in Direction 69, the Decision may have been different.

Particulars

a) 11(e). The applicant's knowledge of living in Australia and their intended course of study and the associated education provider; including previous study and qualifications, what is a realistic level of knowledge an applicant is expected to know and the level of research the applicant has undertaken into their proposed course of study and living arrangements. The First Appellant lodged a statement with the Tribunal, dated 5 October 2021, and refers to these issues. The issues were squarely before the Tribunal. There was no reference to this statement in the Tribunal's reasons. There is a reference to an information form at but not the statement.

b) 14(a). Previous visa applications for Australia or other countries. The First Appellant had been granted three visas to Singapore between 2015 and 2018.

c) 14(b)(i). If the applicant previously travelled to Australia, whether they complied with the conditions of their visa and left before their visa ceased, and if not, were there circumstances beyond their control. The First Appellant was granted an Australian visitor visa and Bridging A visa.

d) 14(b)(ii). Whether the applicant previously held a visa that was cancelled or considered for cancellation, and the associated circumstances. The First Appellant was granted a visitor visa and Bridging A visa. There was no evidence of cancellation or consideration for cancellation.

e) 14(b)(iii). The amount of time the applicant has spent in Australia and whether the Student visa or Student Guardian visa may be used primarily for maintaining ongoing residence, including whether the applicant has undertaken a series of short, inexpensive courses, or has been onshore for some time without successfully completing a qualification. The First Appellant had been in Australia from August 2019 to October 2021 and had completed a Certificate IV and Diploma between October 2019 and August 2021.

f) 14(b)(iv). If the applicant has travelled to countries other than Australia, whether they complied with the migration laws of that country and the circumstances around any non-compliance. The First Respondent had been to Singapore three times including for 12 months as the holder of a work visa.

(Emphasis and underlining in original. Transcript and Court Book references omitted.)

1. The particulars set out in the Amended Notice of Appeal substantially reflect the submissions made on behalf of the appellants at the hearing of the appeal.
2. It may be noted that the appellants were represented by senior counsel before the primary judge but were represented by a new solicitor in the appeal.

1. Section 65(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) provides, relevantly, that the Minister, if satisfied that the "other criteria" for a visa prescribed by the Act or the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) have been satisfied, is to grant the visa; or if not so satisfied, is to refuse to grant the visa.
2. Clause 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations required that:

The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:

(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:

(i) the applicant's circumstances; and

(ii) the applicant's immigration history; and

(iii) if the applicant is a minor - the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and

(iv) any other relevant matter; and

(b) the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted, having regard to:

(i) the applicant's record of compliance with any condition of a visa previously held by the applicant (if any); and

(ii) the applicant's stated intention to comply with any conditions to which the visa may be subject; and

1. The Tribunal conducted a hearing on 6 October 2021 and delivered an oral decision on the same day. The Tribunal decided to hold the hearing by telephone for reasons including that it was being conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic.
2. The Minister's delegate refused to grant the first appellant a Student visa because the delegate was not satisfied that the first appellant, "intends genuinely to stay temporarily in Australia". That was the only issue in dispute before the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal noted that under Ministerial Direction No. 69, "Assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for Student visa and Student Guardian visa applications" (Direction 69), made under s 499 of the Act, it was required to have regard to the following factors:

• the applicant's circumstances in their home country, potential circumstances in Australia, and the value of the course to the applicant's future;
• the applicant's immigration history, including previous applications for an Australian visa or for visas to other countries, and previous travel to Australia or other countries;
• if the applicant is a minor, the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and
• any other relevant information provided by the applicant, or information otherwise available to the decision maker, including information that may be either beneficial or unfavourable to the applicant.

1. The Tribunal also noted that Direction 69 indicated that the enumerated factors should not be used as a checklist, but, rather, were intended only to guide decision makers when considering the appellants' circumstances as a whole.
2. In view of the number and discursiveness of the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to set out the Tribunal's reasons for decision at some length:
   1. Before coming to Australia the applicant completed a Bachelor of Arts in India between 2004 and 2007 and a Bachelor of Education in India between 2008 and 2010.
   2. Prior to coming to Australia the applicant worked in domestic help between 2015 and 2016 in Singapore.

17. Since arriving in Australia the applicant has completed the following courses:

1. a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery between October 2019 and March 2021, and

2. a Diploma of Hospitality Management between April 2021 and August 2021.

3. the applicant is presently studying an Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management that will commence in November 2021 and is scheduled to conclude in March 2022.

4. The applicant has undertaken the following work since arriving in Australia: she's worked as a cook between October 2020 and June 2021, and as an assistant chef between July 2021 and the present.

5. The Tribunal asked the applicant about the circumstances in her home country. In the information form the applicant submitted to the Tribunal, she was asked to respond to the following:

If there are similar courses available in the main applicant's home country or region to the courses they are currently studying and/or propose to study in Australia, please give details of the main applicant's reasons for not undertaking the courses in their home country or region.

1. The applicant answered, "No, going to school in 30s in India is a task in itself. It is not encouraged much or you can say look down on, hence studying here is more easier and I believe I can concentrate on my studies better. There are no courses of the same calibre which are recognised in India. Most of the courses are a Bachelor's Degree and there is an entrance exam to enter those course [sic]."
2. The applicant told the Tribunal that her parents and her sister presently reside in India and she last saw them in August 2019. The applicant said she speaks to them almost every day via WhatsApp and FaceTime. The applicant says she has no brothers so she and her sister have to look after her parents.
3. Since the applicant arrived in Australia she has not returned to India. The applicant said she has no community ties in India and no property in her name in India, however there is a property in her parents' name worth A$80,000. The applicant said she is not concerned about military service commitments or political and civil unrest in India.
4. The Tribunal asked the applicant about her potential circumstances in Australia. The applicant said her husband and four-year-old child presently reside with her in Australia. The applicant said her husband works as a trolley pusher.
5. The applicant said her husband's brother and his wife live in Brisbane and that her husband's brother is a citizen of Australia and he's been in Australia since 2009. The applicant said they have two children and although they lived with the couple for about two months when they first arrived in Australia, otherwise they have only seen them once in March or April last year. This is partly because of the COVID-19 restrictions and the fact that the applicant and her husband and child live in Cairns. The applicant said that in Australia she attends the Sikh temple when she's free and she has no property in her name in Australia.
6. Based on all this evidence the Tribunal finds that the applicant's family ties to India do not of themselves constitute a strong incentive for the applicant to return to India. In making this finding the Tribunal has placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant has been in Australia for over two years and has not returned and has managed to keep in touch with her family in India via electronic means during this time.
7. Similarly, based on all of this evidence the Tribunal finds that the applicant's family ties to Australia do constitute a strong incentive for the applicant to remain in Australia, and in making this finding the Tribunal has placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant is living in Australia with her husband and child.
8. The Tribunal asked the applicant when she plans to leave Australia if her current course finishes in March 2022 and the applicant said when she gets her Certificate.
9. The Tribunal asked the applicant why she had swapped the focus of her studies from arts and education in India now to cookery and hospitality management. The applicant said that when she was studying arts and education she was not sure about her career, and she would do anything in her life for her parents. The applicant said her parents found her a good groom, but she had goals she wants to achieve and she wants to do something different. The applicant said once the opportunity to explore Australia came up and she saw Australian cafés she saw there were more opportunities in Australia and if she goes back to Singapore or India she will get a good job.
10. The Tribunal asked the applicant why she is now studying lower level courses, being Certificates and Diplomas, when she already has Bachelor's Degrees from India. The applicant said she met a girl and talked to her about the Certificate course. She then talked to a lawyer about this course and took the admission in that course.
11. The Tribunal asked the applicant why she decided to study in Australia if she arrived in Australia on a visitor visa. The applicant said that here, there are no restrictions; if she wants to study or work, she can. The applicant said she was studying in Australia to achieve her goals and she was undertaking the study in Australia to achieve something for her parents.
12. Based on all of this evidence the Tribunal is concerned that the applicant may be attempting to use the student visa system to stay in Australia for longer. In making this finding the Tribunal has placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant has swapped the focus of her studies significantly since arriving in Australia. She arrived in Australia on a visitor visa and then completely changed her plans to study in Australia. She is completing lower level courses to the Bachelor's courses she's completed in India, and she has now been in Australia for over two years.
13. The Tribunal asked the applicant about the value of her current course to her future. The applicant told the Tribunal in the information form that her plan was to seek work in a five-star hotel in northern metropolitan India and then start her own Aussie star café business.
14. In the genuine temporary entrant statement the applicant submitted to the Department, the applicant indicated that she could work as a bar manager, café manager, chef patisserie, club manager, executive housekeeper, front office manager, kitchen manager, motel manager or restaurant manager with her qualifications.
15. The Tribunal asked the applicant what her current future plans are. The applicant said that she plans to study her Advanced Diploma in November and once she finishes this course she's going back to try and get a new job in a five-star hotel and she plans to work for three or four years there before opening her own restaurant.
16. The Tribunal asked the applicant if she had applied for any jobs back in India and the applicant said not yet because she needed her Certificate and that she got her Certificate IV today, and in India you cannot apply for any jobs without a Degree and all the applications you need to show good qualifications.
17. The Tribunal asked the applicant if she has a business plan for her future business. The applicant said "Not yet" and that she wants to do the job first.
18. The Tribunal asked the applicant why she needs her current course, the Advanced Diploma, to complete her future plans if she already has a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery and a Diploma of Hospitality Management and has been working in the industry since October 2020. The applicant said that her previous courses taught her how to cook, whereas the Advanced Diploma will teach her how to manage the business side of things. The applicant said that when she wants to open her own restaurant she will have to know everything about how to run her own business and restaurant.
19. Based on all of this evidence the Tribunal finds the applicant has provided only vague details about her future plans and has failed to explain in any meaningful detail why she requires her current course in order to complete her future plans. In making this finding the Tribunal has placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant does not have a written business plan for her future business, and she has [sic] already has a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery and a Diploma of Hospitality Management, and the Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management is an extra course over and above the courses the applicant was planning to complete when she first applied for the student visa.
20. The Tribunal has taken into account the applicant's immigration history insofar as the applicant arrived in Australia on a visitor visa that was valid until May 2020 and the applicant is now attempting to extend her stay in Australia to March 2022.
21. The applicant told the Tribunal that prior to coming to Australia she was earning the equivalent of approximately A$6,600 per year working in domestic help in Singapore, but that role also provided her with everything including her accommodation and food. The applicant said that she is presently earning approximately A$22,000 per year as an assistant chef in Australia.
22. The applicant said she expects to earn between A$12,000 and A$36,000 per year when she returns to India. Based on the Tribunal's earlier findings in relation to the applicant's future plans the Tribunal places little weight on this evidence.
23. The Tribunal considers that an applicant who is a genuine temporary entrant will have circumstances which support a genuine intention to remain in Australia temporarily, recognising the possibility that this may change over time, to utilise lawful means to remain in Australia. When the findings and evidence that I have just summarised are considered together, on balance the Tribunal is concerned that a student visa may be used primarily for maintaining ongoing residence.
24. On this basis, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily. Accordingly, the applicant does not meet cl.500.212(a).

Ground 1: Alleged failure to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the material

1. The appellants' first ground asserts that the primary judge erred in finding the Tribunal, "had given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the evidence".
2. The hearing was conducted between 11.30 am and 12.11 pm on 6 October 2021. The appellants note that the Tribunal asked questions of the appellants for eight minutes and put "adverse information" to the first and second appellants for 26 minutes. The Tribunal member then adjourned before returning 17 minutes later at 12.28 pm to give an oral decision affirming the decision under review. The appellants assert that some of the time was taken up with the Tribunal asking irrelevant questions about whether the second appellant was working and the age of the third appellant.
3. The appellants submit that the short length of the hearing indicates the Tribunal did not give the application adequate consideration. They submit the Tribunal, "could have asked more questions about all the relevant factors in Direction 69".
4. The appellants rely on the judgment of Charlesworth J in Burgess v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 69; (2018) 259 FCR 197 (Burgess) at [93], but it is convenient to begin with an earlier decision of the Full Court.
5. In Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352 (Carrascalao), the Minister had made two decisions under s 501(3) of the Act to cancel the visas of two non-citizens. The Minister's decisions were subsequently quashed by a Full Court. After the decisions were quashed, the Minister was provided a Departmental Submission seeking a decision as to whether the visas should again be cancelled. There were hundreds of pages of material accompanying the submission. Less than an hour later, the Minister again cancelled the two visas. The Full Court held at [128] that there was insufficient time for the Minister to have given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the decisions.
6. The case of Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112 (Chetcuti), also involved circumstances where the Minister had cancelled a visa under s 501(3), the decision was quashed, and the Minister then made another decision to cancel the visa. A majority of the Full Court found that the Minister had taken no more than eleven minutes to make the decision, and could not have given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case. The majority observed at [54] to [58] that the principles that emerge from Carrascalao include the following:

(1) The phrase "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" can, if taken out of context, encourage a slide into impermissible merits review. However, the phrase can permissibly be used to describe a contention that the Minister was under a legal obligation to consider the merits of a particular case and that such consideration had to be meaningful.

(2) The obligation to give "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" to the exercise of the power under s 501(3) of the Act requires the Minister to engage in an "active intellectual process" in assessing the merits of the case.

(3) The Court's assessment of whether the Minister engaged in such an active intellectual process requires an evaluative judgment, taking into account the available evidence and reasonable inferences. Each case necessarily turns on its own particular facts and circumstances as established by the evidence.

(4) Several features of the statutory framework, including the requirement that the Minister make the decision personally, the displacement of the requirements of natural justice and the limited scope of the representations that may be made in seeking to have the Minister revoke a cancellation decision, highlight the need for the Minister to exercise the power under s 501(3) of the Act with appropriate care and attention.

(5) A finding that the Minister has not engaged in an active intellectual process will not lightly be made and must be supported by clear evidence, bearing in mind that the applicant for judicial review carries the onus of proof.

1. In Burgess, the Minister had cancelled a visa under s 501(3) of the Act before that decision was quashed and the Minister made another decision cancelling the visa. Justice Charlesworth found that the Minister had devoted no more than 15 minutes to his consideration of the matter and that the Minister could not have engaged in the necessary intellectual process of actively reviewing the material.
2. In Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 27; (2022) 275 CLR 582, the High Court held:

[24] Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations...[T]he decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate.

...

[26] Labels like "active intellectual process" and "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating "a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any [decision-maker's] decision can be scrutinised". That is not the correct approach.

(Footnotes omitted.)

1. In the present case, the appellants' submission is that because the hearing took only 41 minutes, and the Tribunal only asked a limited range of questions, and then gave an oral decision some 17 minutes after the hearing, the Tribunal must have failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to its decision. However, that submission pays insufficient attention to the facts of the case and the relevant statutory provisions.
2. Section 359A(1) of the Act required that the Tribunal give the appellant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considered would be a reason for affirming the decision, and that the Tribunal invite the appellant to comment on that information. The provision contemplated the Tribunal reading the written material that had been placed before the Tribunal prior to conducting a hearing. In Chetcuti, the majority observed at [65] that, "In the absence of some statutory requirement to the contrary, there is no restriction upon when the decision-maker may commence his or her consideration of the material relevant to the making of a decision".
3. In this case, it is apparent that the Tribunal had read the filed material prior to the hearing. That is evident from the Tribunal's questioning of the first appellant about information contained in her application, her written statements and other documents and raising of matters which it evidently considered could be adverse to the appellants' application.
4. The appellants were represented by a migration agent at the hearing before the Tribunal. The agent had taken the opportunity to file material in support of the appellants' case prior to the hearing. The agent also had the opportunity to ask questions of the first and second appellants to address the Tribunal's concerns and to make submissions to the Tribunal. Contrary to a suggestion made by the appellants' legal representative in the appeal, the Tribunal was not under any obligation to ask the appellants questions to help them to make out their case.
5. The circumstances of this case are quite different to the circumstances in Carrascalao, Chetcuti and Burgess. There was evidence in each of those cases that allowed a finding to be made about the length of time between the Minister being given the relevant material and making the decision, allowing a conclusion that the Minister could not have given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of each decision.
6. In the present case, it is apparent that the Tribunal had undertaken the preparatory work of reading the material prior to the hearing. The evidence does not demonstrate how long the Tribunal had taken, but the Tribunal's questioning was direct and relevant and demonstrated a good understanding of the material. The questioning was, in part, designed to comply with the Tribunal's obligation under s 359A(1) of the Act. Compliance with that obligation required the Tribunal to have formed a preliminary view as to what information could form part of the reasons for affirming the decision.
7. There was a single issue in contention. It can be inferred that the hearing was shortened in length by the Tribunal having read the material prior to the hearing.
8. In these circumstances, the length of the hearing and the nature of the questioning do not give rise to any inference that the Tribunal failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the material.
9. The appellants also submit that since the Tribunal only took 17 minutes after the hearing to commence giving its oral decision, it could not have given genuine, proper and realistic consideration to the material presented in writing and at the hearing.
10. Section 368D(1) of the Act allowed the Tribunal to give its decision orally. I have found that the Tribunal read the filed material prior to the hearing. The additional evidence adduced during the hearing was of limited scope. In the appeal, the appellants' legal representative conceded (correctly) that it would have been open to the Tribunal to draft its reasons prior to embarking on the hearing, subject to keeping an open mind about what evidence might emerge and the submissions that may be made during the hearing.
11. In these circumstances, it cannot be inferred that the limited time taken by the Tribunal after the hearing to give its oral decision meant the Tribunal could not have given genuine, proper and realistic consideration to the material.
12. The appellants' first ground must be rejected.

Ground 2(a): Alleged unreasonableness and illogicality in the Tribunal placing significant weight on the first appellant having not returned to India when she could not, in fact, have travelled during Australia's border closures

1. The appellants' Ground 2(a) concerns the Tribunal's attribution of significant weight, in the context of finding that the first appellant's family ties were not a strong incentive to return to India, to the first appellant having not returned to India to see her parents.
2. The first appellant's evidence was to the effect that she intended to use the skills she acquired from the courses she had done or proposed to do in Australia to work in India or Singapore. The Tribunal did not accept that evidence and, for a number of reasons considered cumulatively, was not satisfied that the first appellant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily. Ground 2(a) challenges the reasonableness and logicality of one of the reasons given by the Tribunal.
3. The first appellant's evidence was that her parents and her sister resided in India and she had last seen them in person in August 2019, but that she spoke to them almost every day via WhatsApp and FaceTime. The Tribunal found that, "the applicant's family ties to India do not of themselves constitute a strong incentive for the applicant to return to India". The Tribunal also stated that it had, "placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant has been in Australia for over two years and has not returned and has managed to keep in touch with her family in India via electronic means during this time".
4. The appellants submit that travel restrictions for foreign nationals were implemented on 1 March 2020 and that the Australian borders were closed to non-citizens on 20 March 2020, before being reopened in February 2022 to people who were fully vaccinated. They argue that if the first appellant had left Australia during that period, she could not have returned to continue her studies. It may be noted that the appellants sought to adduce evidence of the dates of the closure and reopening of Australia's borders, but s 144(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) provides that proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or generally. It is common knowledge, and I find, that Australia's borders were generally closed to non-citizens from early 2020 to early 2022.
5. The appellants accept that as they arrived in Australia in August 2019, it was possible for them to visit India up until February 2020, but they submit that the Tribunal's finding covers the entire period up to the date of the hearing on 6 October 2021 and makes no allowance for the period when the border was closed. The appellants contend that the Tribunal's finding was therefore unreasonable and illogical.
6. It is fundamental that the Tribunal's reasons are not read with "an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272. Yet the appellants' argument proceeds by finely parsing the Tribunal's reasons in an attempt to discern error.
7. The appellants seek to read the Tribunal's statement that it had, "placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant has been in Australia for over two years and has not returned", as indicating it had taken into account her failure to return to India, even during the period when the borders were closed. However, the sentence must be read as a whole and in the context of the reasons as a whole. The reasons demonstrate the Tribunal was well aware of the restrictions on movement caused by the pandemic. In that context, the Tribunal must be understood to have been saying that the fact that the appellant had not returned to India to visit her parents and sister in the period before the border closures, and was able to keep in touch with them through electronic means, indicated that she did not have a strong incentive to return to India. The Tribunal was not suggesting that the appellant could have visited India in the period after early 2020 when the border was closed.
8. The appellants' Ground 2(a) must be rejected.

Ground 2(b): Alleged illogicality in the Tribunal giving weight to the presence of the second and third appellants in Australia as an incentive for the first appellant to remain in Australia

1. The appellants' Ground 2(b) alleges it was illogical for the Tribunal to give significant weight to the presence of the second and third appellants in Australia as an incentive for the first appellant to remain in Australia, in circumstances where they were holders of temporary bridging visas and were applying as secondary applicants under the first appellant's Student visa application.
2. The Tribunal found that, "the applicant's family ties to Australia do constitute a strong incentive for the applicant to remain in Australia, and in making this finding the Tribunal has placed significant weight on the fact that the applicant is living in Australia with her husband and child".
3. The appellants submit that the second and third appellants were secondary visa applicants whose lawful status relied on the main applicant. They submit that the logical extension of the Tribunal's finding is that significant weight could also be given to the presence of the first appellant as an incentive for her to remain in Australia. It is submitted that the Tribunal's finding makes no sense.
4. Again, the appellants' argument parses the Tribunal's language too finely. The Tribunal was considering whether the first appellant intended "genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily" and, in that context, was considering whether her family ties to India would provide an incentive for her to return to live there. The Tribunal's language in saying that, "the applicant's family ties to Australia do constitute a strong incentive for the applicant to remain in Australia", was somewhat loose and could have been more precisely phrased. That is understandable in the context of the Tribunal delivering its reasons ex tempore. In the context, it is clear enough that the point being made was the first appellant lacked incentive to return to India since her husband and son were with her in Australia. The Tribunal did not fail to understand that the second and third appellants' ability to remain in Australia depended on the success of the first appellant's application.
5. The appellants' Ground 2(b) must be rejected.

Ground 2(c): Alleged illogicality in the Tribunal's use of its finding that the first appellant arrived on a Visitor visa and then changed her plans to study in Australia

1. Clause 11(b) of Direction 69 stated that the Tribunal should have regard to, "evidence that the student visa programme is being used to circumvent the intentions of the migration programme". Apparently applying that clause, the Tribunal stated at [31] that it was, "concerned that the applicant may be attempting to use the student visa system to stay in Australia for longer". The Tribunal placed significant weight on factors including that she, "arrived in Australia on a visitor visa and then completely changed her plans to study in Australia". The other factors were that the first appellant had swapped the focus of her studies significantly since arriving in Australia, that she was completing lower-level courses compared to the Bachelor level courses she had completed in India, and that she had now been in Australia for over two years.
2. The appellants submit there was no evidence that they were using the Student visa program to circumvent the intentions of the migration programme. They submit that the first appellant was entitled under the Act to lodge an onshore Student visa application, and it was not illegal to change her plans. They submit it is difficult to see how applying for another temporary visa could be using the Student visa program to stay longer in Australia, particularly where there was no evidence the first appellant was not studying, not completing courses or not complying with visa conditions.
3. The appellants contend that the Tribunal's, "circular reasoning is illogical and the finding was unreasonable because it was based on no evidence".
4. The appellants rely on Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1436, where Judge Kendall stated:

[69] It is "problematic" that the Tribunal appears to have taken issue with the first applicant applying for a visitor visa to come to Australia and that any findings or concerns in relation to whether there was any evidence that the student visa programme was being used to circumvent the intentions of the migration programme appear to have stemmed from the first applicant's visitor visa application, information that the first applicant may have provided the Department as a part of that visa application and the first applicant's intentions and thought process at the time that she applied for that visitor visa.

[70] It strikes the Court as inherently contradictory that the Tribunal could make findings about the student visa programme being used to circumvent the migration programme because of the way in which the first applicant lawfully arrived in Australia (having made a valid application for, and being granted, a visitor visa in the tourist stream).

[71] It is difficult to see how making an application for a visitor visa (in the tourist stream) could in any way amount to evidence that the student visa programme was being used to circumvent the intentions of the migration programme.

(Emphasis in original.)

1. It may be noted that her Honour was addressing a matter that had not been raised by the parties and ultimately acknowledged this was, "not one of the questions that is currently before the Court". Nevertheless, her Honour's reasoning is persuasive.
2. The appellants' argument as presented seems to be a combination of assertions that the Tribunal contravened s 359A of the Act; that there was no evidence to find that the Student visa program was being used to circumvent the intentions of the migration program; and illogicality in making that finding.
3. The transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal specifically asked the first appellant, "And, if you arrived in Australia on a visitor's visa, why did you completely change your plans and decide to stay in Australia to study?". The first appellant accepted that she had changed her plans, explaining, inter alia, that she had seen the restaurants and really liked them and that there were fewer restrictions on studying in Australia than existed in India. The Tribunal's questioning was adequate to comply with s 359A(1) of the Act and the applicant's submission to the contrary must be rejected.
4. After reserving judgment, I sought submissions about whether the Tribunal had misunderstood the phrase, "the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily...", in cl 500.212 of Schedule 2. The appellants and the Minister each provided further written submissions addressing that issue.
5. It is appropriate to commence by examining what is meant by the word "temporarily" in the phrase, "the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily", in cl 500.212. In particular, while it is apparent (and the Tribunal seemed to accept) that a person who obtains a Visitor visa evinces an intention to stay in Australia temporarily, can it logically be concluded that a person who subsequently applies for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa while in Australia evinces, by the making of that application, an intention to stay in Australia other than temporarily?
6. In Inderjit v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCAFC 217; (2019) 272 FCR 528, the Full Court was concerned with the Tribunal's affirmation of a decision by a delegate to refuse to grant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa on the basis that cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 was not satisfied because the principal applicant, "intends to pursue permanent residency if an opportunity presents itself". The Full Court held:

[41] A person's intention is a question of fact for the decision-maker, applying cl 500.212, based on all of the material before it. A person may genuinely wish to return home after a course of study and thus entertain a genuine intention to stay temporarily, even though, at the same time remaining open to pursuing in the future, what the person considers to be unlikely, an opportunity, if it presents itself, to seek a permanent visa to do so...

[42] Here, the Tribunal stated at [37] that it was not satisfied on the evidence that the wife unqualifiedly, genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily. That factor was a matter that it took into account, as it was bound to do under cl 500.212(a)(iv), in coming to its conclusion that, overall, it was not satisfied that she genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily. Rather, as it found in numerous places in its reasons, it considered that she was using the student visa program to maintain residence in Australia until an opportunity presented itself for her and her husband to pursue a legitimate pathway to permanent residency. That finding was open to the Tribunal, and we are not able to perceive any jurisdictional error in its reasons for that conclusion.

1. In Eros v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1061 (Eros), Allsop CJ was concerned with a decision affirming a decision to refuse a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa, on the basis of a lack of satisfaction that the applicant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student within cl 500.212 of Schedule 2. The Chief Justice held:

[12] In Saini v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 858; 245 FCR 238, Logan J dealt with cl 572.223...As shall be seen from the discussion of the Tribunal's reasons shortly, that decision, and this appeal, turn on the meaning of, and what can be used to inform a conclusion about the question whether, "the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily" in subcl (a). In Saini 245 FCR at [28] Logan J said the following about that part of the equivalent provision in subcl 572.223(1)(a) (with which I agree in relation to the equivalent words in subcl 500.212(a)):

The words ... are concerned with how long the visa applicant intends to stay in Australia and nothing else.

...

[21] The express finding is that Ms Eros intends to remain in Australia while her daughter is here. The evidence was that this was for two years: see [20] of the reasons. On any view that is a temporary stay, by reference to the accepted meaning of the word "temporary" referred to by Wilcox J in the context of construing the phrase "temporarily absent from Australia" in Hafza v Director-General of Social Security [1985] FCA 201; 6 FCR 444 at 451, applied by Logan J in Saini 245 FCR at [19] and [20]:

The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines "temporary" as "Lasting for a limited time; existing or valid for a time (only); transient; made to supply a passing need". The Macquarie Dictionary definition is to similar effect, with the addition of "not permanent".

...

I think that the adjective "temporary" was used to denote an absence that was, both in intention and in fact, limited to the fulfilment of a passing purpose. The purpose might be of a business or professional nature; it might be for a holiday or for compassionate or family reasons. But, whatever the purpose, it seems to me to be implied in the concept of "temporary" absence that the absence will be relatively short and that its duration will be either defined in advance or be related to the fulfilment of a specific, passing purpose.

[22] What the Tribunal appears to have done in its reasoning is to raise doubts about the primary purpose or motivating purpose of staying in Australia (to be with her family, now specifically her daughter) and treat it as relevant to the meaning of "temporary stay". Of course, those matters could be so relevant. If they informed a finding that Ms Eros intended to stay indefinitely in Australia...then plainly she would not genuinely intend to stay temporarily in Australia. But no such finding was made...Subclause (a) is concerned and only concerned with the intention as to length of stay. The finding is not that she genuinely intends to stay indefinitely but for a defined, relatively short period related to an apparent desire to be near her daughter and to study. There is no finding (though there are hints) that Ms Eros is not a genuine applicant to stay as a student. To make that finding the Tribunal would have to deal with other considerations beyond the intended length of stay, and evaluate her evidence including the fact, if it is the case, as it appears to be, that Ms Eros has dutifully undertaken the various courses that she has enrolled in, and, if it be the case, that she genuinely wants to do the courses.

1. Accordingly, a visa applicant's intention to stay in Australia "temporarily" within cl 500.212 of Schedule 2 is an intention to stay for a limited time. That time will be limited by reference to the fulfilment of a passing purpose, namely completion of a course of study. An intention to stay in Australia "temporarily" may be contrasted with an intention to stay permanently or indefinitely. Clause 500.212(a) seems to have been aimed at preventing the grant of a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa to an applicant whose intention is to use the visa to remain in Australia permanently or indefinitely.
2. The Tribunal's reasoning at [31] commenced with the proposition that the first appellant's change of plans to study in Australia, rather than to merely visit Australia, demonstrated an intention to "stay in Australia for longer". That part of the Tribunal's reasoning was uncontroversial and obviously correct. Since the Visitor visa allowed the first appellant to stay in Australia for one to three months and the Student visa would allow her to stay for a longer period, she was using the Student visa system to stay in Australia for longer. That was envisaged and permitted by the Regulations allowing an onshore application for a Student visa to be made.
3. The Tribunal then went on to state that the first appellant's intention to stay in Australia for longer gave rise to a concern that the appellant intended to stay in Australia other than "temporarily". It is that part of the Tribunal's reasoning that is controversial.
4. The Minister submits that the Tribunal's statement that, "the Tribunal is concerned that the applicant may be attempting to use the student visa system to stay in Australia for longer", was merely a "statement of concern" and should not be construed as a finding that the first appellant had an intention to stay permanently. The very next sentence commenced with the words, "In making this finding...". It is possible to construe "this finding" as being a finding that it had a concern that the appellant may be attempting to use the Student visa system to stay in Australia for longer. However, the Tribunal's expression of concern was made in the context of its consideration of whether, for the purposes of s 65(1) of the Act, it was satisfied that the "other criteria" prescribed by the Regulations were satisfied. In my opinion, the Tribunal's "concern" was a factor that influenced its conclusion that the Tribunal was not satisfied the appellant intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily. If the Tribunal had misunderstood the phrase, "the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily...", then that may have contributed to its concern and to the ultimate outcome.
5. The Minister submits there was no finding, unlike in Eros, that there was an end-date to the intended stay. The Minister submits that the first appellant staying in "Australia for longer" was consistent with a finding of an intention to stay permanently (or not temporarily). However, the Tribunal did not make any finding that the first appellant intended to stay permanently or indefinitely. It merely concluded that, "the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily". It leaves open the question of what the Tribunal understood "temporarily" to mean.
6. In my opinion, the Tribunal's reasoning demonstrates a misconstruction of the word "temporarily" in cl 500.212(a) of Schedule 2. The issue for the Tribunal could only have been whether the first appellant's change of plans indicated an intention to stay permanently or indefinitely in Australia, not merely whether it indicated an intention to "stay in Australia for longer" than under a Visitor visa.
7. The visa the appellants applied for was a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa. As the name of the visa suggests, it would allow the appellants to stay temporarily in Australia. Clause 500.511 in Schedule 2 provided that the visa was a, "[t]emporary visa permitting the holder to travel to, enter and remain in Australia until a date specified by the Minister".
8. Since the grant of a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa would allow the appellants to stay in Australia for only a specified period, a mere change of plans to make an application for that kind of visa could not provide evidence of an intention to stay permanently or indefinitely in Australia.
9. In these circumstances, the Tribunal's use of its concern, "that the [first appellant] may be attempting to use the student visa system to stay in Australia for longer", as part of its reasoning in finding that it was not satisfied that she intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily was illogical.
10. Accordingly, Ground 2(c) succeeds.

Ground 2(d): Alleged error in assuming that Bachelor's degrees obtained in India were equivalent in standard to Australian Bachelor's degrees without evidence

1. One of the bases for the Tribunal's concern expressed at [31] of its reasons that the first appellant may have been attempting to use the Student visa system to stay in Australia for longer was that, "[s]he is completing lower-level courses to the Bachelor's courses she's completed in India...".
2. The appellants submit that the Tribunal was not entitled to assume that the first appellant's Indian Bachelor's degrees were equivalent in standard to Australian Bachelor's degrees and required evidence for such a finding.
3. The appellants' submission misstates the Tribunal's finding. The Tribunal did not assume the first appellant's Indian Bachelor's degrees were equivalent in standard to Australian Bachelor's degrees. Instead it found that the courses she was completing in Australia were lower in level than her Indian Bachelor's degrees.
4. The Tribunal asked the first appellant why she was studying "lower level courses, certificates and diplomas" when she already had "bachelor's degrees from India". In the first appellant's answer, she did not dispute the Tribunal's description of her courses in Australia as being at a "lower level". The Tribunal was entitled to draw an inference that her courses in Australia were at a "lower level" compared to her Bachelor's degrees from India.
5. Ground 2(d) must be rejected.

Ground 3: Allegation that the Tribunal failed to consider and make findings on a number of factors set out in Direction 69

1. Under Ground 3, the appellants submit that the Tribunal failed to consider and make findings upon a number of factors set out in Direction 69. They require leave to raise this ground as it was not raised before the primary judge.
2. The appellants were represented before the primary judge by senior counsel. The obvious explanation for particular grounds not being taken before the primary judge is that they lacked merit. That explanation is reinforced by the absence of merit revealed upon consideration of the ground sought to be raised by the appellants.
3. The factors the Tribunal allegedly failed to consider are set out in the Amended Notice of Appeal. The appellants do not submit that these factors were mandatory relevant considerations that the Tribunal was bound to consider: cf Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2026 at [30].
4. The appellants' submission is that the Tribunal was required to consider the factors it lists because they were substantial, clearly articulated claims squarely raised as part of the appellants' submissions: see, for example, Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389 at [24] and [95]; NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; (2004) 144 FCR 1 at [55] and [68]. The appellants rely upon the first appellant's statements dated 21 November 2019 and 5 October 2021.
5. The factor listed at paragraph (a) of Ground 3 is said to be the first appellant's knowledge of living in Australia, her intended course of study and the associated education provider, including previous study and qualifications; what was a realistic level of knowledge the first appellant is expected to know; and the level of research the first appellant had undertaken into her proposed course of study and living arrangements. It is said that these issues were raised in the first appellant's statement dated 5 October 2021 and the fact that there was no express reference to that statement indicates the information was not taken into account.
6. The first appellant set out the courses she had already completed and said she had almost completed all the study for which she had made her application for the Student visa. That seems to have been the only matter she squarely raised that was relevant to this ground. In fact, that matter was considered by the Tribunal at paragraphs [37] and [38] of its reasons.
7. The factor listed at paragraph (b) of Ground 3 is that the first appellant had been granted three visas to Singapore between 2015 and 2018. The Tribunal took into account that she had lived in Singapore (necessarily under the authority of one or more visas) and her evidence that she might return there. It must be concluded that the Tribunal did in fact consider this factor.
8. The factor listed at paragraph (c) of Ground 3 is said to be whether the first appellant complied with the conditions of her visa and left before the visa ceased, and if not, was this due to circumstances beyond the first appellant's control. The first appellant was granted an Australian Visitor visa and Bridging A visa. The Tribunal indicated at [8] that it would give its reasons for concluding that the decision under review should be affirmed. It did not purport to, and was not required to, set out its consideration of other matters: cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [235]. Given that the first appellant had not been required to leave the country before her Visitor visa ceased, whether she complied with the conditions of her visas seems of no significance in considering whether she intended to remain in Australia only temporarily. There is no basis for any inference that the Tribunal failed to consider the fact that the first appellant had complied with the conditions of her visas.
9. The factor listed at paragraph (d) of Ground 3 is whether the appellant previously held a visa that was cancelled or considered for cancellation, and the associated circumstances. This was not a matter squarely raised by the appellant and, in any event, seems of no significance in circumstances where she had not been required to depart Australia.
10. The factor listed at paragraph (e) of Ground 3 is that the first appellant had been in Australia from August 2019 to October 2021 and had completed a Certificate IV and Diploma between October 2019 and August 2021. Those matters were expressly considered by the Tribunal at paragraphs [17] and [38] of its reasons.
11. The factor listed at paragraph (f) is whether the first appellant complied with the migration laws of another country and the circumstances around any non-compliance. The first appellant's compliance with the laws of Singapore was not squarely raised.
12. There is no merit in Ground 3 and leave to raise the ground on appeal will be rejected.

1. I have upheld Ground 2(c) of the Amended Notice of Appeal, but rejected each of the other grounds.
2. The Minister declined to make any submission that the fulfilment of the purpose for which the first appellant had sought the visa some six years ago (namely to remain in Australia while studying a Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery and a Diploma of Hospitality Management) might provide a discretionary reason for refusal of relief.
3. The appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the primary judge set aside. I will order that a writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Tribunal. I will order that a writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to determine the appellants' application according to law.
4. It is relevant to the consideration of costs that while the appellants' initial argument concerning Ground 2(c) had the kernel of the successful ground, it was not developed, and further submissions had to be requested after the hearing.
5. In Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 16; (2020) 274 FCR 646, Logan J observed at [6]:

Much, perhaps too much, judicial time has been spent in judicial review and in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of merits based evaluations as to whether a particular person is a "genuine" student. I cannot help but think that this is in no small part due to a failure on the part of the profession to appreciate the nature of the evaluative criterion mentioned, the limits in relation thereto of judicial review, an overly narrow reading of the Minister's directions and an uncritical assimilation of them with subordinate legislation prescribing criteria relevant for the purpose of the making of a quite different administrative decision.

1. His Honour's comments are applicable to the grounds, other than Ground 2(c), of the present appeal.
2. In circumstances where numerous unmeritorious grounds of appeal were taken, and where further submissions had to be sought in respect of the only meritorious ground, it is appropriate to make no order as to the costs of the appeal.

I certify that the preceding ninety-two (92) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Rangiah.