(a) the Practitioner poses a serious risk to persons; and

(b) if the Practitioner does pose a serious risk to persons, whether it is necessary to take immediate action against the Practitioner to protect public health or safety, and if so, whether that immediate action should be in the form of:

1. suspension of the Practitioner's registration; or
2. the imposition of conditions on the Practitioner's registration, and if so, what conditions; and

1. whether, under s 156(1)(e) of the National Law, we reasonably believe that it is in the public interest to take immediate action against the Practitioner in the form of:

(a) suspension of the Practitioner's registration; or

(b) the imposition of conditions on the Practitioner's registration, and if so, what conditions should be imposed.

1. It is not in dispute that the Practitioner has held registration as a medical practitioner since August 2010.
2. On 12 August 2025 the Practitioner was charged with three counts of unlawful and indecent assault contrary to s 323 of the Criminal Code. The Practitioner has pleaded not guilty to the offences and is due to stand trial in the Magistrates Court over two days in February 2026. The complainants are two of the Practitioner's female patients. It is alleged that the conduct occurred during separate consultations with the patients on 29 April 2025 and 4 July 2025.
3. On 1 September 2025 the Board suspended the Practitioner's registration under s 156(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e) of the National Law (Decision).
4. On 26 September 2025 the Practitioner commenced an appeal to the Tribunal under s 199(1)(h) of the National Law.
5. On 1 October 2025, by consent, the Tribunal made an order under s 31(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) inviting the Board to reconsider the Decision.
6. On 20 October 2025, the Board reaffirmed the Decision.

1. In determining the review application, we have had regard to the following material:
   1. the Practitioner's affidavit sworn 31 October 2025 (Exhibit 1);
   2. the Board's Bundle of Documents dated 24 October 2025 (Exhibit 2);
   3. the Board's Supplementary Bundle of Documents dated 5 December 2025 (Exhibit 3);
   4. additional information provided to the Tribunal by the Respondent's counsel at the hearing about:

(a) the Practitioner's practice being made up of approximately 50% female patients and 50% male patients;

(b) the fact that the Magistrates Court trial is listed for two days on 16 and 17 February 2026;

1. Respondent's written submissions dated 5 December 2025;
2. Applicant's written submissions dated 28 November 2025; and
3. Oral submissions made by both parties at the hearing on 12 December 2025.

1. The medical profession, among other health professions, is regulated under the National Law.
2. As the person the subject of the Decision, the Practitioner has a right to appeal the Decision to the Tribunal.[1] An appeal is conducted as a review.
3. The review is conducted by the Tribunal as a hearing 'de novo'; that is, afresh. The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision upon the review.[2] In conducting the review the Tribunal has the same jurisdiction, functions, and discretions as those which the Board had in making the Decision.[3]
4. The Board bears the persuasive burden of establishing that the preconditions for taking immediate action are met.[4]
5. Section 156(1) of the National Law relevantly provides that:

(1) A National Board may take immediate action in relation to a registered health practitioner or student registered in a health profession for which the Board is established if:

(i) because of the registered health practitioner's health, conduct or performance, the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons; and

(ii) it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health or safety; or

(e) the National Board reasonably believes the action is otherwise in the public interest.

Example of when action may be taken in the public interest -

A registered health practitioner is charged with a serious criminal offence, unrelated to the practitioner's practice, for which immediate action is required to be taken to maintain public confidence in the provision of services by health practitioner.

1. Subsection 155(a) of the National Law defines the term 'immediate action'. Relevantly, it includes the suspension or imposition of a condition on a health practitioner's registration.
2. As the Tribunal identified in GLP and Medical Board of Australia,[5] immediate action under Pt 8 Div 7 of the National Law allows for urgent action to be taken to protect against or ameliorate harm whilst the relevant regulatory board conducts investigations and any subsequent disciplinary allegations are determined.
3. Immediate action which consists of the suspension of or the imposition of conditions on registration applies until set aside on review,[6] or until revoked,[7] or until removed by the board.[8] Additionally, as the Tribunal noted in GLP and Medical Board of Australia,[9] because a board must give effect to the decision of another adjudication body, the decision of a board to take immediate action may be overtaken by a decision of the responsible tribunal in subsequent disciplinary proceedings.[10]
4. Before the Board, or the Tribunal on review, may take immediate action under s 156(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e) of the National Law, it must reasonably believe the matters identified in those subsections.
5. In coming to a view about those matters neither the Board, nor the Tribunal on review, is required to make any findings of fact as to the matters in s 156(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e). The Board, and the Tribunal on review, are only required to hold a reasonable belief as to the matters.[11] It is also not necessary for the Board or the Tribunal on review to determine what has occurred in relation to the matter or matters the subject of the allegations. The focus of the Board, and of the Tribunal on review, is on the nature and extent of the risks to persons and the steps to be taken to address such risks. It will ordinarily be enough for the Board, or Tribunal, to know what the allegation is, what material supports it, and whether the allegation is denied, without going into the merits of the allegation.[12]
6. As we have already noted above, the Practitioner does not dispute that in the context of what are properly accepted to be serious allegations of sexual misconduct involving patients, the Board could have formed a reasonable belief that some form of immediate action was necessary for the reasons set out in s 156(1)(a)(i) and s 156(1)(a)(ii). However, the Practitioner does dispute that the Board, and the Tribunal on review, could, in the circumstances, also form a reasonable belief that immediate action was justified under s 156(1)(e) of the National Law. However, irrespective of any concessions made by the Practitioner as to the matters set out in s 156(1)(a)(i) and s 156(1)(a)(ii), we must ourselves be satisfied as to those matters.
7. In GLP and Medical Board of Australia[13] the Tribunal identified the meaning of the expression 'reasonable belief' by reference to cases where the expression had been considered in other statutory contexts.[14] The Tribunal noted that those cases identify that there is both a subjective and objective element to holding a 'reasonable belief'. To hold a belief involves deciding to accept or reject a proposition of fact after weighing the probabilities by reference to the available information.[15] It amounts to more than a suspicion and less than 'positive knowledge' and may admit of doubt or a chance that the proposition of fact may not exist. One cannot hold a positive belief as to the existence of a fact if one is unable to arrive at a conclusion one way or the other.
8. Subjectively, we must actually hold the belief that the particular form of immediate action is either necessary to protect public health or safety (under s 156(1)(a) of the National Law), or in the public interest (under s 156(1)(e)).[16] Objectively, there must be a reasonable basis for any belief we hold.[17]
9. With respect to s 156(1)(a) of the National Law, Horneman-Wren DCJ said in Oglesby v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia:[18]

... In my view, a reasonable belief may be held that a practitioner poses a serious risk to persons if, based upon evidence of past conduct, there is a real possibility that the practitioner will engage in conduct which could be harmful to persons. If the possibility of engaging in the conduct was so remote as to be fanciful, or the possible harm trivial, then I would not think that a belief could reasonably be held that the practitioner posed a serious risk to persons.

1. An immediate action order might be based on material that would not conventionally be considered as strictly evidentiary in nature, for example, complaints and allegations.[19] However, the material must be scrutinised to determine what weight to give to it.[20]
2. In Lee and Medical Board of Australia,[21] the Tribunal said that the same set of facts may warrant action under both s 156(1)(a) and s 156(1)(e).[22] In relation to s 156(1)(e) the Tribunal said:[23]

[P]arliament plainly contemplated that an allegation that a health practitioner has committed a serious crime, albeit one that lacks an obvious connection to clinical practice, may, depending on the circumstances, warrant immediate action against the practitioner. Immediate action may be warranted having regard to various public interest considerations, including the protection of the public, or maintenance of public confidence in the medical profession. Other public interest considerations may also be relevant.

1. The Tribunal in Lee went on to say, with reference to the decision in Farshchi v Chinese Medicine Board of Australia:[24]
   1. [I]t is well established, and the parties agreed, that the 'public interest' is not a 'one-sided construct'. Rather, the public interest is a multi-faceted concept. In Farshchi the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal referred to a variety of public interest considerations which may arise in cases such as this ...
2. Those public interest considerations identified in Farshchi were:

(a) the maintenance of a regulatory system which responds in a fair and proportionate manner when allegations are made;

(b) the ability of members of health professions, in whom training and expenditure have been made, to practise;

(c) 'area of need' professionals being able to practise;

(d) proportionality, particularly where a matter is unlikely to finalise quickly; and

(e) ensuring immediate action is only taken when it is necessary to do so.[25]

1. Those public interest considerations are not exhaustive. There may be other matters relevant to determining whether immediate action is in the public interest.
2. We can only determine a form of immediate action is warranted in the public interest if we believe that the particular form of immediate action is necessary or required.
3. As the Tribunal identified in GLP and Medical Board of Australia,[26] that view is consistent with the language used by Niall J in Leow,[27] who, when referring to s 156(1)(e) of the National Law said:

Ultimately, the question is whether or not the Board reasonably believes, in circumstances where none of the other sub-paragraphs of s 156(1) apply, that it is necessary in the public interest to take immediate action. The meaning of public interest is informed by the example. It is necessary for the Tribunal to proceed on the basis that public confidence in the provision of services by health professionals is an aspect of the public interest. However, the Tribunal does not need to apply the example as if it were a statutory test. Specifically, the Tribunal was not required to analyse the issue of whether public confidence would be maintained, as opposed to whether, and to what extent, public confidence would be impacted and whether the extent of any such impact would require, in the public interest, that immediate action be taken.

1. Section 3 is headed 'Objectives'. Of relevance in this matter is the objective of the national registration and accreditation scheme set out at s 3(2)(a), which is 'to provide for the protection of the public by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practise in a competent and ethical manner are registered'.
2. Section 3A came into effect in Western Australia on 15 May 2024.[28] It sets out what are said to be the 'guiding principles' of the national registration and accreditation scheme. Section 3A provides as follows:

(1) The main guiding principle of the national registration and accreditation scheme is that the following are paramount -

(b) public confidence in the safety of services provided by registered health practitioners and students.

(2) The other guiding principles of the national registration and accreditation scheme are as follows -

(a) the scheme is to operate in a transparent, accountable, efficient, effective and fair way;

(aa) the scheme is to ensure the development of a culturally safe and respectful health workforce that -

(i) is responsive to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples and their health; and

(ii) contributes to the elimination of racism in the provision of health services:

Example -

Codes and guidelines developed and approved by National Boards under section 39 may provide guidance to health practitioners about the provision of culturally safe and respectful health care.

(b) fees required to be paid under the scheme are to be reasonable having regard to the efficient and effective operation of the scheme;

(c) restrictions on the practice of a health profession are to be imposed under the scheme only if it is necessary to ensure health services are provided safely consistent with best practice principles.

1. Section 4 of the National Law provides that an entity exercising functions under the National Law, which includes the Tribunal on review, must have regard to the objectives and guiding principles set out in s 3 and s 3A of the National Law.
2. Subsections 3A(2)(a) and (c) reproduce what was previously contained in s 3(3) of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (WA) Act 2010 (WA) Sch 1 s 3. Section 3A(1) is new.
3. In this case the Board submits that, as a result of s 3A, when dealing with whether or not to take immediate action under s 156(1)(e), the focus of the Tribunal must be on the public confidence in health services provided by practitioners generally rather than whether the public can be confident in the safe provision of services by the relevant practitioner themself. In that respect the Court of Appeal in Medical Board of Australia v GLP said:[29]

[a]s a matter of construction, that view has much to commend it. The breadth of the main guiding principle, as a whole, and the variety of contexts in which it applies, are such that public confidence in the safety of health services provided by the medical profession as a whole, in our view, clearly forms part of that guiding principle. Indeed, while it is not necessary to decide in this case, we would be inclined to the view that public confidence in the medical profession generally is an aspect of the 'protection of the public' in s 3A(1)(a).

1. As we have already identified, the underlying facts giving rise to the reasonable belief do not need to be established, however there must be proven objective circumstances sufficient to justify the belief. In WD v Medical Board of Australia[30] the QCAT said:
   1. an immediate action order does not entail a detailed enquiry;
   2. immediate action requires action on an urgent basis because of the need to protect public health and safety;
   3. the taking of immediate action does not require proof of the conduct but rather whether there is a reasonable belief that the registrant poses a serious risk;
   4. an immediate action order might be based on material that would not conventionally be considered strictly evidentiary in nature, for example complaints and allegations;
   5. the mere fact and seriousness of the charges, supported by the untested statements of witnesses, in a particular case, might well be sufficient to create the necessary reasonable belief as to the existence of the allegations made against the Practitioner which are denied by him. He is entitled to the presumption of innocence.
2. In this case the allegations are made by two female patients about conduct which they say occurred in the course of a medical consultation with the Practitioner. Each consultation is said to have taken place in the absence of a chaperone or any other accompanying person. Each patient reported her allegations to authorities shortly after the consultation. Patient A went to the police the same day. Patient B, who is not an Australian citizen and for whom English is not her first language, reported her concerns to the Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency (Ahpra) within days after speaking with friends after the appointment with the Practitioner. She made a statement to police after Ahpra notified the police of the alleged conduct. The complainants' signed statements and Patient B's report to Ahpra form part of the Respondent's Bundles of Documents.
3. The alleged conduct is said to have occurred on 29 April and 3 July 2025 respectively. That is, on separate occasions reasonably close in time.
4. Each allegation involves the touching of the patient's genitals in the course of a massage, and in Patient A's case, the touching of her breasts, without any clinical justification under the guise of medical treatment where each patient had sought treatment for conditions unrelated to their genitalia or breasts. Each was alone with the Practitioner at the time. Each patient said that they could feel the Practitioner's erect penis pushing up against them at the time. If it occurred, it is conduct that is both criminal and, for disciplinary purposes, an egregious departure from a practitioner's obligations to their patients.
5. We have no difficulty in finding that these are very serious allegations. The Practitioner accepted as much.
6. Of course, we bear in mind that the Practitioner denies the allegations and is entitled to the presumption of innocence.

1. The Practitioner has been suspended since September 2025. This review application was listed for an expedited hearing because it was said that delay in resolving the matter would have serious consequence for the Practitioner and that it was likely that there would be a significant period of time before the criminal charges were likely to be resolved.
2. As it happens, at the hearing of this matter we were informed that the charges are now listed for hearing for two days in mid-February 2026 although the Practitioner's counsel indicated that two days may not be sufficient time in which to complete the trial. Whatever the case, it is clear that by the time the charges are heard the Practitioner will have been suspended from practice for at least five months. Even if he is acquitted in the Magistrates Court, disciplinary action involving the same allegations may still be commenced in the Tribunal by the Board and may take some time to be resolved. For so long as the suspension remains in place the Practitioner will be unable to earn an income from practising as a medical practitioner.
3. The impact on a practitioner of a particular course of immediate action may be relevant to determining what form of disciplinary action is necessary or warranted.[31] This is because immediate action must be proportionate, having regard to the reason for taking immediate action. The attainment of the purpose for which immediate action is taken is to be achieved with as little damage to the practitioner as is consistent with attaining that purpose.
4. We respectfully adopt the reasoning and conclusion reached by the Tribunal in GLP and Medical Board of Australia when it said:[32]

In our view, the adverse effects of the delay on the Practitioner if he is suspended are relevant under s 156(1)(e) in considering whether the proposed immediate action is a fair and proportionate response, which is a public interest consideration. Under either s 156(1)(a) or s 156(1)(e) it is necessary to carefully consider whether the immediate action taken is the minimum necessary action to address the identified risks. However, in either case, the fact that there will be an adverse impact on the Practitioner cannot result in us determining not to impose suspension if we reasonably believe suspension is the required response.

1. The Practitioner has set out the impact that the suspension will have upon him and his family in his affidavit of 31 October 2025. In it he attests that:
   1. without his income the family has had to rely on his wife's income which is not sufficient to meet their expenses which include the provision of financial support to his parents;
   2. as a consequence they have purchased and moved into a smaller home and are in the process of selling what was the family home in order to reduce the mortgage repayments on the new home;
   3. he owns a rental property which is mortgaged and they are not certain they will be able to continue to pay the mortgage and might be forced to sell the home;
   4. his family is relying on his wife's income and their savings at the moment but he expects these savings will be exhausted shortly;
   5. he will be unable to continue to pay his children's private school fees if he is unable to practise. He also says that the children's extracurricular activities have been ceased for the moment in order to preserve his savings;
   6. the suspension is placing great strain upon his relationship with his wife and his own mental wellbeing; and
   7. if the suspension remains in force he and his family will suffer 'substantial and irreparable financial consequence' and that he is concerned that he could lose his ownership share in his medical centre.[33]
2. The Board correctly points out that the financial impact of the suspension upon the Practitioner is unable to be quantified because the Practitioner has not provided any evidence of:
   1. the value of his (former) family home;
   2. the value of the rental property that might be sold;
   3. the extent that his income is derived from his own work as a medical practitioner as opposed to from his ownership of the medical practice at which he, together with at least one other practitioner, works; or
   4. the extent of his savings.
3. While the extent of the financial impact of suspension is therefore unknown, we are satisfied and find that suspension of the Practitioner's registration for any significant period of time will have a material impact upon his financial circumstances.

Section 156(1)(a) - reasonable belief that the practitioner poses a serious risk to persons and that it is necessary to take immediate action to protect public health and safety

1. In our view, the Practitioner rightly conceded that the Board, and the Tribunal on review, could, on the basis of the allegations, reasonably hold the belief that the Practitioner poses a serious risk to patients. Given the nature of the allegations we reasonably believe that the Practitioner poses a serious risk to patients. The magnitude of harm which is done to a patient who is sexually assaulted by a medical practitioner to whom they entrust their care, while likely to differ for every patient, is always likely to be significant.
2. However, we are not satisfied, based on the nature of the allegations and the conduct surrounding them, and the Practitioner's previously unblemished disciplinary history, that the Practitioner poses a serious risk to all patients. There is no indication that he has acted, or is likely to, act inappropriately to male patients who may seek medical treatment from him. In our view, there would be no objective basis for a belief that the Practitioner poses a serious risk to male patients. In our view, the serious risk is to female patients who may attend on him for treatment unaccompanied.
3. Accordingly, while we find that immediate action is necessary to protect public health and safety, we are not satisfied that suspension of the Practitioner's entitlement to practise is necessary to achieve that objective. Rather, in our view, the imposition of a condition or conditions on the Practitioner's registration which prohibit him from treating female patients is sufficient to guard against the identified risk to public health and safety posed by the Practitioner.
4. We have considered whether there is a real risk to females who may attend to accompany a male patient: for example, a mother of a male child. However, we do not consider that to be a real risk in this case. There is no suggestion that the Practitioner has been alleged to have acted inappropriately to anyone other than patients. Accordingly, we do not think the conditions need to exclude the Practitioner from treating male patients who are accompanied by a female in the consultation.

Section 156(1)(e) - otherwise in the public interest

1. The Practitioner submits that because s 156(1)(e) of the National Law applies to cases where immediate action is 'otherwise in the public interest', it cannot be used to justify immediate action that could be taken under s 156(1)(a). That is, in this case the Practitioner submits that where immediate action is necessary on public health and safety grounds, those same grounds do not allow immediate action to be taken on the basis that immediate action is in the public interest under s 156(1)(e). If that were not the case the word 'otherwise' in the opening of s 156(1)(e) would have no work to do.
2. In Leow, Niall J stated that the question was whether the Board believed 'in circumstances where none of the other sub-paragraphs of s 156(1) apply, that it is necessary in the public interest to take immediate action'.[34]
3. In Lee, the Tribunal said the same facts may justify immediate action under s 156(1)(a) or s 156(1)(e).[35]
4. We do not regard those statements to be inconsistent. The same facts may indeed justify action under either section for different reasons.
5. In this case, we have found that the protection of public health and safety from the Practitioner justifies immediate action that only involves, in effect, a gender-based restriction of the Practitioner's entitlement to practise.
6. While there is, in our view, some force in the Practitioner's submission that the reasons for taking immediate action under s 156(1)(a) of the National Law cannot also justify the taking of immediate action under s 156(1)(e), that issue does not need to be determined in this case because the Board says in this case that immediate action amounting to suspension of the Practitioner's registration is necessary under s 156(1)(e) in the public interest in order to ensure public confidence in the safety of services provided by health practitioners generally, which is a different reason to that for which immediate action is to be taken under s 156(1)(a).
7. The Board submits that, having regard to the guiding principles set out in s 3A of the National Law, and particularly the main guiding principles set out in s 3A(1)(a) and (b), it is necessary to suspend the Practitioner's registration in order to protect public confidence in the safety of medical services provided by health practitioners generally.
8. It is submitted by the Board that the public confidence in health services provided by medical professionals generally will be diminished if the Practitioner is not suspended. This is said to be because if the Practitioner's registration is not suspended, members of the public would not be able to have confidence that the profession is appropriately regulated in the public interest in a manner that ensures that only practitioners who practise with the appropriate skill, integrity and compassion are providing medical services.
9. As the Court of Appeal recognised in Medical Board of Australia v GLP[36] the main guiding principle is, as its name suggests, a guiding principle and not a free-standing test. It is:

... a broad precept (or norm) expected to be applied in a variety of differing circumstances and contexts. While there will no doubt be many different facets or aspects of the main guiding principle, it should not be approached as a collection of compartmentalised separate components, as if it were a checklist, or less still, an algorithm or calculus to be applied with mathematical precision.

1. As the Court of Appeal also said in Medical Board of Australia v GLP[37] 'those aspects of the main guiding principle that will assume most prominence in a particular case will depend upon the particular function being exercised'. In this case, as was the case in GLP and Medical Board of Australia, the Tribunal was concerned with immediate action against a particular practitioner. As the Court of Appeal recognised:[38]

The purpose of that immediate action was to put measures in place to protect against, or ameliorate, the risk of harm pending a final determination. In those circumstances it was inevitable that the Tribunal would focus on the risk and safety associated with the particular practitioner.

1. In that case the Court of Appeal recognised that while one important aspect of the main guiding principle set out in s 3A(1) of the National Law is the need for the public to have confidence in the responsiveness of the regulatory system itself, and that confidence comes in part from general deterrence in relation to the setting of appropriate standards, which is an aspect of the public confidence in the safety of services provided by registered health practitioners in a case of immediate action, general deterrence has less significance because the Tribunal is not required to make any final decision as to the conduct of a practitioner.[39]
2. We have already identified some other aspects of the public interest at [30]. In respect of those matters we find as follows:
3. It is in the public interest that the regulatory system responds in a fair and proportionate way when allegations are made.
4. It is in the public interest that immediate action is taken only when necessary.
5. It is in the public interest that the public have confidence in the regulatory system and in the safety of health services generally.
6. It is in the public interest that doctors who pose a risk to patients not treat patients.
7. In this case, it may be some time before the Practitioner's criminal proceedings are resolved and longer until any disciplinary proceedings which might be commenced are resolved. There is a public interest in the Practitioner, who has denied the allegations and is entitled to the presumption of innocence, being able to practise his profession if that can be done with little, if any, risk to patients.
8. It is not asserted by the Practitioner that he practises in an 'area in need' and therefore that the public interest favours him being allowed to continue to practise. That public interest consideration does not arise in this case.
9. It is in the public interest that the Practitioner, in whom training and expenditure has been made, should be entitled to practise while the allegations against him have yet to be tested and are denied.
10. It is an important aspect of the public interest that the public can be confident that services will be provided by people of sufficient skill and integrity.
11. Weighing all of those aspects of the public interest, we do not accept the Board's submission that suspension is required in the public interest in this case. Rather, we are satisfied and find that public confidence in the safety of medical services provided by the medical profession generally, will not be undermined if the immediate action taken is something less than suspension because, in our view, the public, properly informed of all of the facts currently known, including:

1. the nature of the allegations; 2. the fact that the Practitioner disputes the allegations and is entitled to the presumption of innocence; and

1. that there will be gender-based restrictions imposed on his registration under s 156(1)(a) of the National Law,

will not be unduly concerned about the safety of services provided by the Practitioner, or by medical practitioners more generally. Indeed, we find that a properly informed public should feel confident that the profession is being regulated in a way that, so far as possible, ensures that the Practitioner does not pose a risk to them in his provision of health services and that they can be confident in the safety of health services provided by medical practitioners generally.

1. The parties are to confer to endeavour to agree the condition or conditions which are to be imposed upon the Practitioner's registration to give effect to the reasons for decision on the review.
2. By 22 January 2026, the parties are to file an agreed minute of proposed consent orders giving effect to these reasons or, in the absence of agreement, each party is to file their own minute of proposed orders which are said to reflect the reasons for decision on the review.
3. The Tribunal will list the matter for a further hearing to deal with the making of orders if it is necessary to do so.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] A right of appeal to the appropriate responsible tribunal is provided by s 199(1)(h) and s 199(2)(a)(i) of the National Law. By s 19 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law Application Act 2024 (WA) (Application Act) the State Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) is the responsible tribunal in Western Australia. A reference to an appeal in s 199(1) of the National Law is a reference to a review of the decision under the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) Pt 3 Div 3: s 36 of the Application Act.

[3] Thekkekara and Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2020] WASAT 160 (Thekkekara) at [32].

[4] Gerstman v Medical Board of Australia [2020] VCAT 1367 at [74]; Syme v Medical Board of Australia [2016] VCAT 2150 (Syme) at [114].

[5] GLP and Medical Board of Australia [2024] WASAT 89 at [19] citing Syme at [22] and Medical Board of Australia v Leow [2019] VSC 532 (Leow) at [78].

[6] Pursuant to s 159(2)(a) of the National Law.

[7] In the case of suspension under s 159(2)(b) of the National Law.

[8] In the case of conditions under s 159(2)(b) of the National Law.

[9] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [20].

[10] Section 205 of the National Law, Bernadt v Medical Board of Australia [2013] WASCA 259 (Bernadt) at [298] (Murphy JA).

[11] Bernadt at [171] (Newnes JA).

[12] Medical Board of Australia v Adams [2023] WASCA 41 at [93].

[13] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [23] - [37].

[14] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [27] - [28].

[15] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [27], quoting Webb v Tang [2023] WASCA 119 at [95] (Buss P and Vaughan JA).

[16] GLP and Medical Board at [29].

[17] GLP and Medical Board at [20].

[18] Oglesby v Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia [2014] QCAT 701 at [20].

[19] WD v Medical Board of Australia [2013] QCAT 614 at [8].

[20] WD v Medical Board of Australia at [8].

[21] Lee and Medical Board of Australia [2022] WASAT 28 (Lee) at [30].

[24] Farshchi v Chinese Medical Board of Australia [2018] VCAT 1617 (Farshchi).

[26] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [37].

[28] On the commencement of the Application Act.

[29] Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 at [58].

[30] WD v Medical Board of Australia at [8].

[32] GLP and Medical Board of Australia at [136].

[33] We note that he provides no basis for that concern.

[36] Medical Board of Australia v GLP at [53].

[37] Medical Board of Australia v GLP at [63].

[38] Medical Board of Australia v GLP at [63].

[39] Medical Board of Australia v GLP at [55].