K [2026] WASAT 16 (11 March 2026)

1. Section 85 provides for guardianship or administration orders to be reviewed if the guardian or administrator:

(c) has been guilty of such neglect or misconduct or of such default as, in the opinion of the Tribunal, renders him unfit to continue as guardian or administrator; or

(d) appears to the Tribunal to be incapable by reason of mental or physical incapacity of carrying out his duties; or

(e) is, according to the Interpretation Act 1984 section 13D, a bankrupt or a person whose affairs are under insolvency laws; or

(f) being a corporate trustee, has ceased to carry on business, has begun to be wound up, or is under official management or subject to receivership.

1. Section 85(2) states that 'any person' can make an application under Section 85 to alert the Tribunal that orders need to be reviewed. As the GA Act is protective legislation, if the represented person is at risk because their substitute decision-maker is unable to act or has died, any person with relevant information or evidence can apply to the Tribunal under s 85(2) for a Section 85 review.
2. This contrasts with the other types of reviews available under Part 7 of the GA Act, being s 84 and s 86.
3. Section 84 of the GA Act provides that guardianship and administration orders must be reviewed at least every five years. Only the Tribunal initiates a review under Section 84.
4. Section 86 allows certain people, with a direct interest in the orders, to seek an early review. Only the represented person, the guardian, the administrator, the Public Trustee and the Public Advocate can seek a review under s 86 as of right.
5. Section 87 of the GA Act allows 'any person' to seek leave to review of orders if the Tribunal is satisfied there has been a change in circumstances or there is another reason a review should be held.
6. Tribunal proceedings can be disruptive. The represented person needs to be personally served and will likely need to attend the review hearing, which may cause them anxiety. The requirement for 'any person' to be granted leave to seek a review of the orders under s 87 protects the represented person by ensuring their lives will only be interrupted by a review if there has been a change of circumstances or another reason sufficient to warrant a review.[10]
7. The Tribunal takes a protective approach when assessing and programming applications to review existing GA Act orders. If there is any indication that a represented person may be at risk or the current orders are not working in their best interests, the Tribunal will list the matter for review. The section of the GA Act under which the review will be programmed will depend on the applicant, why they requested a review and the best interests of the represented person.

How does the Tribunal approach a Section 85 application?

1. When a Section 85 application is filed, the Tribunal must first decide if a precondition for a mandatory review has been satisfied. If not, the application must be dismissed.
2. When reviewing orders, the Tribunal will make findings in respect of the decision-making capacity of the person,[11] the need for orders,[12] who to appoint,[13] the decision-making functions required and when the orders will be reviewed.[14] A finding would also be made that the precondition had been satisfied for the Section 85 review based on the evidence provided.
3. Satisfying four of the six preconditions for the mandatory review is straightforward. All that is needed is documentary evidence such as a death certificate, evidence from the current guardian or administrator that they want to be discharged, or orders declaring bankruptcy or that a company has been wound up.
4. The two other preconditions, s 85(1)(c) and s 85(1)(d), require the Tribunal to first form a view about whether the guardian or administrator can or should continue in the role before a mandatory review will occur.
5. Subsection (c) requires the Tribunal to form an opinion that the guardian or administrator is guilty of such neglect, misconduct or default they are rendered unfit to continue.
6. Subsection (d) requires the Tribunal to form a view that the guardian or administrator appears to be incapable of carrying out their duties due to mental or physical incapacity.
7. These preconditions could be easily satisfied in certain circumstances. For example, if an administrator had been found guilty by a court of fraud in relation to the represented person, or if a guardian had been found by the Tribunal to be incapable of managing their own affairs. However, there are occasions where it may not be obvious or clear whether the precondition has been satisfied.
8. The Full Tribunal has stated that when considering an application under Section 85:[15]

... it is not the Tribunal's role to review the merits of the myriad of daily decisions which may be made by a guardian or administrator in the exercise of their decision making authority. That reflects the fact that reasonable minds may differ about the merits of individual decisions. The obligation on the guardian or administrator is to act in what they consider to be the best interests of the represented person. Consequently, a review in those circumstances is confined to cases of such serious neglect, misconduct or default as to render the guardian or administrator unfit to continue.

(my emphasis)

1. It may therefore be necessary for the Tribunal to hear evidence before deciding whether the alleged conduct or incapacity is of such a degree that the guardian or administrator is unfit or incapable of continuing. It is possible that the guardian or administrator may be guilty of neglect or misconduct, but not of a degree or seriousness to render them unfit to continue, or they may be affected by a physical incapacity but are still capable of carrying out their duties.

What do 'neglect', 'misconduct', 'default' and 'unfit' mean?

1. The terms 'unfit', 'neglect', 'misconduct' and 'default' are not defined in the GA Act. When interpreting legislation, the starting point is to consider the ordinary and natural meaning of the words to be interpreted having regard to the words used in the context of the Act as a whole and the legislative purpose.[16] If the legislative drafters intended that a word would be used in a way other than its ordinary usage, then that intention is usually reflected in a definition included in the statute.[17] Regard must also be had to the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA).
2. The Macquarie Dictionary provides the ordinary and natural meaning of:[18]

(a) 'neglect' is 'to pay no attention to; disregard', 'to be remiss in care for or treatment of' or 'to omit (doing something) through indifference or carelessness';

(b) 'misconduct' is, in relation to a person_,_ 'improper conduct; wrong behaviour'; and

(c) 'default' is a 'failure to perform an act or obligation legally required'.

1. The applicant has alleged numerous defaults. The Tribunal must therefore consider whether the Public Trustee and Public Advocate failed to perform an act or obligation they were legally required to perform in respect of each alleged default.
2. When considering the meaning of 'unfit', I have had regard to the interpretation of 'unfit' by the Tribunal in the context of a person being unfit to perform a role.
3. Under the Land Valuers Licensing Act 1978 (WA), there is proper cause for disciplinary action against a land valuer if 'any other cause exists that renders the valuer unfit to hold a licence'.[19] In Land Valuers Licensing Board,[20] Pritchard P discussed the definition of 'unfit' in relation to fitness to be a land valuer as meaning 'not fitted, qualified, or worthy; incompetent'.[21]
4. Her Honour noted that 'unfit' is a relative term, meaning that:[22]

... the question of fitness cannot be considered in isolation, but rather will drawn from the statutory context, from the activities in which valuers are engaged, and by the purposes to be served by those activities. Those matters will provide an indication of the personal attributes, abilities or knowledge which are required in order to be a valuer. A judgment may then be made as to whether there exists grounds for the conclusion that a person does not have the attributes, abilities or knowledge required to be a valuer.

1. Following her Honour's reasoning, to determine whether a guardian or administrator is 'unfit', the Tribunal must consider the statutory context, the activities guardians and administrators engage in and the purposes to be served by those activities.

1. Starting with the long title, the GA Act is an Act to:

... provide for the guardianship of adults who need assistance in their personal affairs, for the administration of the estates of persons who need assistance in their financial affairs ...

1. The GA Act sets out clear legislative statements as to the requirements for fitness of a guardian and administrator respectively. The GA Act provides, among other things, that the guardian and administrator will act in their opinion of the best interests of the person.[23] A guardian and administrator must be suitable for appointment and are only considered suitable if they can perform the functions vested in them.[24]
2. EM Heenan J examined the long title and the entire GA Act in Re The Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board and observed:[25]

... it is obvious that the legislation is designed for the protection of adult persons whose faculties may be impaired, for any reason, and who are therefore in need of protection and assistance so as to ensure that their financial affairs and other welfare is not jeopardised by improvident, or ill-considered personal decisions or action, or by unscrupulous or ill-advised influence of relatives, friends and others who may deliberately or inadvertently exploit the vulnerability of the person in need of assistance and protection.

1. The statutory context of the GA Act therefore requires guardians and administrators to act in the represented person's best interests and perform the functions vested in them to protect and assist the represented person, to ensure that their financial and personal affairs are not exploited by others or jeopardised by decisions of themselves or others.
2. The activities a guardian and administrator engage in depends on the express legal authority of the functions included in the order that appoints them and the opinion of the guardian and administrator in respect of the represented person's best interests. The purpose for their engagement in those activities is to protect and assist the represented person.
3. In terms of the abilities or knowledge required to be 'fit', the Tribunal makes a finding of suitability at the time of appointment based on the Tribunal being satisfied the guardian or administrator has the abilities and knowledge required to perform the functions vested in them.
4. An essential personal attribute of a guardian and administrator is their ability to advocate for the represented person. They must be able to engage in a constructive and cooperative manner, and manage disagreements or differences of opinion, with a range of third parties, for example, service providers, health professionals and financial institutions. They must be able to work within a network of providers to ensure that the represented person derives optimal benefit from the services they access.[26]
5. Based on the above, and noting it is not the Tribunal's role to review the myriad of daily decisions made by a guardian and administrator, as reasonable minds will differ, if the guardian or administrator is acting in their opinion of the represented person's best interests and performing the functions vested in them to a degree that satisfies the Tribunal the represented person is being assisted and protected, the Tribunal can be satisfied the guardian or administrator is fit to act in the role.
6. I will next explain the application of Section 85 to the Public Advocate and Public Trustee.

Does Section 85 apply to the Public Advocate and Public Trustee?

1. The Public Trustee accepts that Section 85 applies to him.[27] The Public Advocate submits, as a matter of statutory construction, that Section 85 does not apply when the Public Advocate is appointed guardian or administrator, as the Public Advocate is only appointed as guardian and administrator of last resort.[28]
2. The Public Advocate submits that if it were possible for the Public Advocate to be removed by the Tribunal on the grounds of unfitness, in most cases there would be no other suitable person to act as guardian for a represented person. This leads to an irrational outcome, which could not have been the intention of Parliament.
3. The Public Advocate notes only the Governor can remove the Public Advocate from office for neglect of duty or misbehaviour. The Public Advocate says that such allegations should be dealt with by the Governor or by bodies responsible for oversight of public officers such as the Corruption and Crime Commission, the Public Sector Commission and Ombudsman.

1. The task of statutory construction begins, as it ends, with the statutory text.[29] Section 85 refers to 'a guardian or administrator' without any exclusion of the Public Advocate or Public Trustee.
2. Section 3 of the GA Act defines a 'guardian' as a person appointed as a guardian or joint guardian, or the Public Advocate acting under s 99 of the GA Act.[30]
3. Section 3 defines an administrator as a person appointed as an administrator or a joint administrator, or the Public Advocate acting under s 99.
4. The Interpretation Act defines 'person' as:[31]

person or any word or expression descriptive of a person includes a public body, company, or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporate[;]

1. Accordingly, the Tribunal can appoint a person as a guardian or administrator, and the Public Advocate and Public Trustee, as public bodies, are defined as 'a person'. Section 85 therefore applies to both the Public Advocate and Public Trustee.
2. It is necessary to identify who the 'Public Advocate' is, because the Public Advocate is not the person who makes decisions for the represented person. The Public Advocate is the holder of a statutory office appointed by the Governor, who is authorised to delegate their functions as guardian or administrator to an officer.[32]
3. The person to whom those functions are delegated is often referred to as 'the delegated guardian'. When considering whether a guardian may be guilty of a default that would cause the Tribunal to consider that they are unfit, and if the guardian is the Public Advocate, it would be a decision or action of the delegated guardian, acting under the delegation of the Public Advocate, that would be considered by the Tribunal when deciding whether a mandatory review has been invoked. It is those decisions or actions that family members or interested persons may allege amounts to neglect, misconduct or a default that renders the guardian unfit to continue.
4. I accept the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to find the statutory office of the Public Advocate, exercising its statutory functions and authority to delegate to an employee, as unfit. If the Tribunal could make such a finding, then that would lead to an irrational outcome as there would be no guardian to act for all of the represented people that have no one else willing or suitable to be appointed as their guardian.
5. Section 92 of the GA Act sets out the circumstances under which the office of the Public Advocate may become vacant:
   1. Resignation, removal etc.

(1) The office of Public Advocate becomes vacant if the Public Advocate -

(a) resigns his office by written notice delivered to the Minister; or

(b) is, according to the Interpretation Act 1984 section 13D, a bankrupt or a person whose affairs are under insolvency laws; or

(c) is removed from office by the Governor under subsection (2).

(2) The Governor may remove the Public Advocate from office for neglect of duty, misbehaviour, incompetence, or mental or physical incapacity impairing the performance of his duties and proved to the satisfaction of the Governor.

1. The reasons the office of the Public Advocate may become vacant, being resignation, removal or bankruptcy, are similar to the reasons a Section 85 review might be triggered. The only irrelevant circumstances are where a guardian dies or is a corporate trustee.[33]
2. Section 92 demonstrates that Parliament turned its mind to situations where the office of the Public Advocate would become vacant and considered that if those same circumstances befell a guardian or administrator, the orders appointing them must be reviewed.
3. Section 85 requires the Tribunal to consider the circumstances identified by Parliament where it is appropriate to 'open the door' to review orders, even if the Public Advocate is the guardian or administrator,[34] because the Public Advocate delegates their functions to a person. There is a practical separation between the person who is making decisions and the statutory office of the Public Advocate because of the statutory delegation, but the decision of a delegated guardian is still a decision of the Public Advocate.
4. There are numerous channels available to make a complaint about the actions of the Public Advocate, including internal complaint resolution mechanisms, the Public Sector Commission, Ombudsman, Corruption and Crime Commission and the Governor. In addition, the GA Act provides for 'any person' to make an application to the Tribunal under Section 85. The legislation requires the Tribunal to consider whether the allegation made is sufficient to invoke the mandatory review jurisdiction under Section 85.
5. Section 13(d) of the GA Act vests the Tribunal with jurisdiction to review guardianship and administration orders and make consequential orders. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the myriad of decisions made by guardians or administrators.[35]
6. The Public Advocate or a delegated guardian is not above receiving criticism from the Tribunal or a Court if it is warranted.[36] Neither is the Tribunal.[37] When the ultimate consumer of a service is a vulnerable person who lacks decision-making capacity, no Government institution or statutory body exercising functions that impact on the human rights and dignity of that person should be immune from criticism, review or complaint through the appropriate channels.
7. I will next discuss the factual context of each Ground and decide whether the Ground will succeed.

1. The facts set out in [70] to [94] below are not controversial and I make findings in accordance with those facts.
2. K's family is her mother D and her two brothers, N and the applicant. Her brother R passed away in 2014 without a will. The family was aware that K was the beneficiary of a payment from R's CBUS superannuation (CBUS Funds).[38]
3. D was appointed as K's plenary guardian and plenary administrator in May 2015 for 5 years.[39] All private administrators are required to file annual accounts with the Public Trustee's Private Administrator's Support Team (PAS Team). In October 2018, the PAS Team applied to the Tribunal to review K's administration order due to concerns about D's suitability as administrator.[40]
4. The annual accounts D filed were incomplete and poorly presented and there was a significant amount of cash withdrawals and deposits that were not accounted for.[41] Further, the PAS Team reviewed correspondence from CBUS about K inheriting the CBUS Funds. The CBUS Funds were transferred to D in February 2017, but D did not include K's interest in the CBUS Funds in the annual accounts she prepared and lodged.
5. In April 2019, the Public Trustee advised the Tribunal that after considering further documents provided by D, they were no longer concerned and had exempted D from submitting future annual accounts. The Public Trustee was supportive of D's reappointment as K's administrator.
6. In May 2019, the Tribunal renewed the administration order appointing D as the plenary administrator for one year.[42] K's guardianship and administration orders were again reviewed in 2020 and D was reappointed in both roles for a further five years.[43]

1. In May 2024, the applicant applied to the Tribunal seeking revocation of the orders appointing D and his appointment as guardian and administrator.[44]
2. The applicant raised serious concerns about K's welfare in the application so the Tribunal referred the matter to the Public Advocate for investigation and report.[45] The Investigator filed a report (Investigation Report) stating that K was unable to contribute to or participate in the hearing due to her intellectual disability and confirmed that attempts had been made to ascertain her wishes.[46] The Investigation Report discussed the significant conflict in the family based on a complex past. The applicant's desire for K to move to Sydney to live with him was also explored.
3. On 22 July, the Tribunal appointed the Public Advocate as limited guardian with the functions of accommodation, services, medical treatment and travel. The Public Advocate was also appointed plenary administrator. The Public Advocate was directed to investigate whether K suffered any loss or damage:[47]

(b) as a result of any potential negligence or breach of duty by the Public Trustee in the performance of the duty to oversee accounts.

1. The orders were to be reviewed in one year. The next day, the Public Advocate filed an application to review the administration order as it was not possible for the Public Advocate to act as a plenary administrator.[48]
2. A hearing occurred shortly thereafter and the Public Trustee was appointed as the limited administrator with all the powers of a plenary administrator save for a function granted to the Public Advocate. The Public Trustee was directed to investigate whether K had suffered loss or damage by reason of any action or inaction of D while acting as administrator.
3. The Public Advocate was appointed as limited administrator of K's estate with the powers of a plenary administrator in respect of:[49]

... seeking legal advice on behalf of the represented person in relation to any claim of the represented person against the Public Trustee, and bringing and defending actions, suits, and other legal proceedings in the name of the represented person and, if appropriate, settling the same.

1. In September, D was rushed to hospital. N arranged for K to stay with Ms CE on an emergency basis. Ms CE was K's support worker who is also deaf. N could not care for K himself as he is legally blind. N was aware K had known Ms CE for years and was comfortable in her home. Further, Ms CE could communicate with K in AUSLAN, although K did not know many signs. N decided that staying with Ms CE was the best arrangement available for K's care, being in a private home where she was comfortable.
2. N told the delegated guardian Ms GU about the arrangement in early October. Ms GU gave consent for K to live with Ms CE on a temporary basis.
3. When D was discharged from hospital in October, she sought a review of the guardianship and administration orders pursuant to s 17A of the GA Act, which is a review of a decision of a single member of the Tribunal.
4. During this time, the applicant arranged with Ms GU that K would travel to Sydney for a holiday with him for 16 days. Ms GU required that K be accompanied by a carer for the entirety of the trip. The applicant suggested a second cousin, L, to be the carer. Ms GU agreed and consent was granted.
5. On 27 December, K and L travelled to Sydney. On 30 December, L contacted the Public Advocate to request that she and K return to Western Australia immediately. L requested that the New South Wales Police attend the applicant's home to ensure they could leave safely. Consent was granted by the duty guardian for K to return to Western Australia. L communicated various allegations against the applicant to Ms CE.[50]

1. On 1 January 2025, Ms CE took K to see K's general practitioner. The doctor noted bruising and '[a]lleged physichal [sic] abuse'. He ordered an x-ray of K's ankle.[51] On 6 January, Ms CE took K to see a different doctor. This doctor recommended that Ms CE make a police report.[52]
2. Ms CE took K to the police station in January to report the allegation that the applicant harmed K.[53] The police investigated and no charges were laid. However, most of the service provider and medical reports filed with the Tribunal from January onwards mention the allegation that the applicant harmed K and was investigated by the police, or at the very least, that there is conflict between the applicant and K.
3. Ms CE took K back to the police in February to make further allegations against the applicant in respect of fraud and theft.[54] Again, no charges were laid.
4. The s 17A review was scheduled to be heard by a panel consisting of a Deputy President and two members on 19 March. On 14 March, the Tribunal informed the parties that the applicant would attend the hearing by video-link. This was because Ms CE advised the Tribunal that K did not want to be in the same room as the applicant.
5. On 17 March, after receiving legal advice, the applicant made a strategic decision to withdraw his nomination for appointment as K's guardian and administrator.[55]
6. In the hearing, the Deputy President asked K who she would like to live with. The Full Tribunal was satisfied that K could not respond or provide a view.[56]
7. Ms GU filed a report prior to, and gave evidence at, the hearing about her concern that Ms CE was making decisions and taking K to the doctor without discussion and delaying telling the guardian. Ms CE had also been making decisions about who K would have contact with, and K was not currently seeing D or the applicant. Ms GU made suggestions for how K could safely spend time with D and the applicant but Ms CE would not facilitate contact.[57]
8. Ms CE had a copy of the guardianship and administration orders but did not know what her role was. Ms CE knew that Ms GU had to give consent for some things and she was confused about what she could consent to.[58] Ms CE did not email Ms GU to ask her those questions, Ms CE wanted a face-to-face meeting which had not been arranged. Ms CE had not followed up with Ms GU about the meeting.[59]
9. The Orders were made appointing the Public Advocate the limited guardian with the functions of accommodation, services, medical treatment, contact, legal 'next friend' and travel. The Public Trustee was appointed as plenary administrator with the following direction:[60]

2.3. The Public Trustee is directed to investigate whether the represented person has suffered any loss or damage by reason of any action or inaction by:

(a) Cbus in paying the death benefit of [R] to [D] in accordance with Cbus Trustee's decision dated 9 October 2015; or

(b) any other person including [D] as administrator of the represented person's estate, after [D's] appointment on 6 May 2015.

1. In May 2025, the Applicant filed the first Section 85 application (Application One).[61] The applicant claimed that the Public Advocate was guilty of neglect or misconduct as he received a letter from the Ombudsman, in response to the applicant's complaint, which confirmed the Public Advocate did not have a 'contact' function at the time of K's travel to Sydney and return to Western Australia. The applicant's view was the Public Advocate had made decisions about contact, which was evidence the guardian had exceeded the statutory authority. The Senior Member explained that the Public Advocate made decisions using the accommodation and travel authorities included in the guardianship order.[62]
2. The Senior Member explained the Tribunal's role was not to question the operational decisions of the Public Advocate in a Section 85 application.[63] However, as the applicant wanted to be appointed as K's guardian, the Tribunal could determine that matter and the applicant consented to Application One being taken as a request to review the Orders.[64]
3. The matter was listed as a preliminary question as to whether leave would be granted for an early review to occur.[65] The Senior Member did not grant leave for the Orders to be reviewed as she was not satisfied there was a change in K's circumstances or any other reason to review the Orders. Application One was dismissed.[66]
4. Three days later, the applicant filed his second Section 85 application (Application Two) which was taken to be a s 17A review of the decision of the Senior Member.[67] The matter was heard in August 2025 by the Full Tribunal consisting of the President and two members.[68]
5. The President explained to the applicant his misunderstanding of the law, and that the Tribunal's role is not to evaluate the performance of the Public Advocate. The Tribunal's role is to focus on the suitability of anyone proposing themselves for appointment. The President explained to the applicant that the test of whether the Tribunal would find a person suitable to be appointed as a guardian is not whether or not the Public Advocate is suitable.[69]
6. The applicant raised the issues he considered relevant to Section 85. The Full Tribunal dismissed the Section 85 application as that issue did not need to be decided as the Tribunal would grant leave for the Orders to be reviewed under s 86 of the GA Act.[70]
7. In September 2025, the applicant filed a review of the Orders pursuant to s 86 as authorised by the Full Tribunal (Application Three).[71] The hearing was scheduled to occur on 28 November 2025.
8. The applicant sought a substantial number of documents be produced by the Public Trustee, the Public Advocate and various third parties.[72] The applicant's view was that documents concerning investigations, audits and correspondence demonstrated whether the Public Advocate and Public Trustee properly fulfilled their responsibilities.[73] The applicant further submitted:[74]

... the current appointees are not fit and proper to continue in office. The requested materials are required to test that proposition. Evidence of fiduciary breaches, concealment of financial irregularities, disregard of Tribunal orders, and neglect of investigative duties all bear directly on suitability - the core statutory criterion in a review under s 86. (original emphasis)

1. The documents sought by the applicant included, but were not limited to, the Public Trustee's investigation into D's performance as administrator,[75] the Public Trustee's decision to exempt D from filing annual accounts,[76] the Public Advocate's investigation into the Public Trustee,[77] medical and police referrals,[78] internal documents of the guardian relating to decisions about contact restrictions[79] and interpreter records.[80]
2. At an interlocutory hearing of 17 November 2025, the applicant asserted that for the Tribunal to consider his suitability, it was necessary for the Tribunal to perform a comparative analysis of the conduct of the Public Advocate with the 'family option' he could provide.[81]
3. The Senior Member explained to the applicant that a review under s 86 was not a review of the suitability of the Public Advocate or Public Trustee, and the member hearing the matter would not be comparing the performance of the current decision-makers with anyone proposing themselves for appointment.[82]
4. The applicant confirmed that he knew this hearing was not a Section 85 review but insisted it was necessary to examine the suitability of the Public Advocate and Public Trustee.[83] He asserted the documents he requested were necessary for that comparison to occur.
5. The Public Trustee submitted that the applicant was attempting to utilise Application Three as a vehicle to conduct an investigation and obtain records that were relevant to the operation of the Office of the Public Trustee. The Public Trustee described Application Three as misconceived.[84]
6. The Senior Member made orders that the Public Advocate produce only three documents on the basis that the other documents requested by the applicant had no legitimate forensic purpose.[85]
7. On 25 November 2025, the applicant sought to withdraw Application Three due to a change in his 'personal circumstances'. The Tribunal granted leave for Application Three to be withdrawn.[86]
8. Two weeks after the withdrawal, the applicant filed the current proceeding, which was his third Section 85 application (Application Four). The applicant sought to review the orders of 22 July 2024, 19 March 2025, 10 July 2025 and 29 August 2025 alleging, among other things, a denial of natural justice and multiple jurisdictional errors in respect of four hearings, in addition to apprehended bias as the Tribunal had repeatedly avoided the statutory inquiry required by Section 85.[87]
9. A directions hearing occurred on 19 December 2025 to program the matter and deal with the request of the applicant for the production of documents. The documents sought in this matter were similar to the documents sought in Application Three.[88] The Senior Member noted the allegations made in respect of the Public Advocate were also similar.[89] Counsel for the Public Advocate foreshadowed an application to dismiss Application Four and advised she would take further instructions from the Public Advocate.[90]
10. The applicant asserted the documents he sought were required as evidence to prove what he needed to prove at the Section 85 hearing.[91] The Senior Member explained that the production of documents is not a 'fishing expedition'.[92]
11. The Senior Member confirmed that a hearing under Section 85 is not about reviewing the merits of the daily decisions made by the guardian or administrator.[93]
12. I will next examine each Ground.

Ground 1 - the Public Trustee has not finished the investigation

1. The applicant contends that the Public Trustee is in default as he has failed to complete the investigation as directed by the Tribunal on 23 August 2024 and reconfirmed on 19 March 2025. However, the Tribunal did not impose a time limit on completion of the investigation.
2. The progress of the investigation was discussed at the hearings of 17 November and 19 December 2025, where the Tribunal was advised the investigation was ongoing.[94] The evidence shows that the Public Trustee is waiting to receive documents in relation to K's art sales and information from CBUS in relation to the basis upon which the CBUS Funds were paid to D.
3. I am satisfied, and I find, this is not a default because there is no failure to perform an act that is legally required. This Ground fails.

Ground 2 - the documents required to complete the investigation do not exist

1. The applicant contends the investigation described in Ground 1 is 'structurally impaired' because certain documents are unavailable or do not exist because the Public Trustee exempted D from complying with the annual reporting requirements in 2019.
2. This assertion is without merit for two reasons. The first is that the accounts D provided were poorly presented and incomplete, as D would withdraw cash and later be unable to account for what it was spent on. The Public Trustee has copies of K's bank statements which evidence the cash withdrawals. Any further annual accounts prepared by D would be unlikely to be helpful in progressing the investigation.
3. The crux of Ground 2 appears to be the applicant's criticism of the Public Trustee for exempting D. The second reason this Ground is without merit is because the decision of the PAS Team to exempt D was made in the performance of the Public Trustee's functions pursuant to s 80 of the GA Act.[95] That is an operational decision of the Public Trustee made when supervising a private administrator.
4. I am satisfied, and I find, there is no default. The Ground predominately relates to a decision that was made when the Public Trustee was not the administrator. This Ground fails.

Ground 3 - the Public Advocate did not obtain legal advice

1. The applicant refers to the appointment of the Public Advocate as K's limited administrator in March 2025 as set out in [94] and asserts the Public Advocate is in default as legal advice has not been obtained.
2. The legal function granted to the Public Advocate allowed the limited administrator to take the steps considered necessary to perform the function, including seeking legal advice in relation to any claim K may have. There is no requirement to obtain legal advice; the requirement is for the limited administrator to use their abilities, knowledge and judgment when deciding how to exercise the legal function, in their opinion of what was in K's best interests.
3. I am satisfied, and I find, there is no default. This is a daily decision of an administrator. This Ground fails.

Ground 4 - The Public Advocate has not maintained 'exclusive statutory authority'

1. The applicant submits the guardian failed to maintain exclusive statutory authority. He described Ms CE as an unappointed intermediary who made decisions for K because the guardian was absent and abdicated her authority. The applicant contends that Ms CE was left unsupervised and unprepared to be making decisions for K about medical treatment and contact with the police.
2. The applicant asserts K's brother N made decisions about who K would live with while D was in hospital and who K would have contact with. The applicant submits there was uncertainty about who held the statutory authority to make these decisions due to the involvement of N and Ms CE.
3. I do not accept there was any uncertainty. The orders were clear that the Public Advocate held the relevant authorities.
4. After Ms GU was made aware that Ms CE had taken K to the doctors and police, Ms GU appropriately spoke with the relevant doctors and police to ensure that she was appraised of all important information and clarified whether any decisions were required to be made in K's best interests.
5. When N arranged for K to live with Ms CE on an emergency basis, that was the only option open to him at the time. N contacted the guardian to explain those arrangements and the guardian provided consent.
6. This is how a guardianship order often works. A public guardian does not necessarily find accommodation for a person; usually a family member, support coordinator or other professional will identify appropriate accommodation. The guardian then decides whether they will provide consent or not based on the represented person's best interests.
7. At the core of this alleged default is the actions of Ms CE in taking K to see doctors and the police in January 2025, which started the cascade of negative comments about the applicant in service provider and medical reports, and the associated impression of unsuitability. However, a guardian is not vicariously liable for the actions of a carer. The guardian is required to take appropriate steps once they become aware of the actions of the carer. I am satisfied, and I find, based on the evidence before me, that Ms GU took appropriate steps to assist K and ensure her health, safety and welfare was protected.
8. I am satisfied, and I find, there is no default. The guardian performed the acts and obligations legally required. This Ground fails.

1. The applicant alleges the guardian exercised 'non-conferred statutory authority' when making decisions about who K would have contact with prior to the contact function being included in the Orders on 19 March 2025. However, for the reasons I will now explain, the applicant is mistaken.
2. The applicant characterises Ms GU's decisions in respect of K traveling to Sydney, how long she would stay and insisting K travel with a carer, as decisions about who K would have contact with.
3. This is incorrect. The guardian was exercising her authority to make decisions about accommodation in terms of where K will live temporarily, while on holiday. The guardian was also making decisions about the terms and conditions of K's travel, as she needs 24/7 supervision when travelling to ensure her safety. This was explained to the applicant in Application One.[96]
4. In response to Ms CE making decisions about contact prior to 19 March 2025, Ms GU attempted to make suggestions to Ms CE about how K could spend time with D and the applicant in a way that addressed any perceived risks.[97] Advocating for K is part of the guardian's role when acting in K's best interests to maintain the supportive relationships she has.[98]
5. The applicant raised the issue of N making decisions about contact without authority as N told D not to contact Ms CE at home, which meant D could not have contact with K while she was living with Ms CE. K lived with Ms CE up until April 2025 when she moved into supported accommodation. Prior to March 2025, D was telephoning Ms CE and leaving abusive messages which was disruptive to Ms CE's family. N told D she should stop calling and not go to Ms CE's home, as Ms CE told N she was very distressed about D's conduct and worried about the safety of herself and K.
6. Prior to 19 March 2025, there was no contact function included on the guardianship order. As there was no guardian with legal authority to make decisions about who K would have contact with, those decisions could be made informally, as they always had been. I characterise N's conduct, in explaining to D why her behaviour could not continue, as it was causing distress and safety concerns, as a sensible action taken by a responsible family member in K's best interests.
7. I am satisfied, and I find, that this Ground is not a default. The applicant has misunderstood the actions of a guardian making day-to-day decisions about matters under their authority. This Ground fails.

Ground 6 - the Public Advocate has not completed a s 97 GA Act investigation

1. The applicant asserts that the Public Advocate is in default as the Public Advocate refused to investigate the conduct of her office pursuant to s 97 of the GA Act. This section confers a function on the Public Advocate 'to investigate any complaint or allegation that a person ... is under an inappropriate guardianship or administration order'.[99]
2. The applicant believes that a s 97 investigation must occur when an allegation is made that a guardian is unfit in the context of a Section 85 review. This is not correct as there would be a clear conflict of interest whenever the Public Advocate was the appointed guardian.
3. The applicant was aware of, and had pursued, the proper, independent channels of complaint in respect of the conduct of the Public Advocate multiple times since early 2025.[100] His assertion that a s 97 investigation should be performed when the Public Advocate is alleged to be unfit is not supported by the provisions of the GA Act.
4. I am satisfied, and I find, this Ground is not a default. It therefore fails.

Ground 7 - the Public Trustee is not exercising the supervisory function

1. The Public Trustee prepared a report to the Tribunal in March 2025 that stated K was living with D, when in fact, she was living with Ms CE.[101]
2. The applicant believes an administrator, acting in a person's best interests and protecting them from financial neglect, abuse and exploitation, must know where they live. This is not correct.
3. The administrator's role is to manage the represented person's estate in their best interests, including to pay for accommodation and other essential expenses to assist the represented person and ensure their estate is protected. The report of March 2025 states the Trust Manager, the person who manages K's estate, had not been contacted or asked to pay for K's accommodation.[102]
4. At the Hearing, the applicant asserted that the Trust Manager was also in default as he had not had any contact with K. However, K cannot speak on the telephone, read or respond to emails, and her intellectual disability means she is unaware of her estate.
5. In The Public Trustee v Baker,[103] the Court of Appeal observed:

... whether it is appropriate to consult the represented person, and the extent to which any wishes the person may have manifested can be taken into account, will depend upon the particular circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the contemplated action and the capacity of the represented person to participate in any consultation. There will inevitably be many cases where the mental capacity of the represented person is such that consultation would be impossible. There will also inevitably be cases where the circumstances are such that the wishes of the represented person cannot be acted upon.

1. This is such a case as K is unable to express her wishes due to the combination of her intellectual disability and communication difficulties.
2. I am satisfied, and I find, this Ground is not a default. It therefore fails.

Ground 8 - the Public Trustee is not exercising the fiduciary function

1. The applicant spoke with K's support worker on Sunday 21 December 2025 who advised that K had run out of spending money. K's new bank card could not be used as they were waiting for the new PIN to arrive.
2. The applicant emailed the Trust Manager the next day to demand the reasons for delay with receiving K's new bank card and PIN number. The applicant's email asserted K had not had usable funds for several weeks and had not been to swimming lessons for two weeks. He further alleged that K had not been able to participate in paid community activities and had no money for discretionary spending.
3. The Trust Manager responded to the applicant's email that afternoon to say he had not received any communication from K's supports to advise she had run out of money.
4. At the Hearing, Ms JB explained the applicant regularly calls on the weekend so he was informed about the situation with K's money and the late PIN number. Ms JB knew K was running low on cash and as they were not sure when the PIN number would arrive, she decided to contact the guardian and the Trust Manager.
5. On Monday 22 December, Ms JB updated the guardian and emailed the Trust Manager to advise that K previously had some cash in her wallet, but she must have spent it. Ms JB requested funds be transferred as K would need money in the lead-up to Christmas. The funds were transferred by the Trust Manager and received on Tuesday 23 December.
6. Counsel for the Public Trustee checked the records during the Hearing. She confirmed receipt of Ms JB's email on 22 December and the Trust Manager transferred the funds on 23 December.
7. The applicant 's portrayal of this incident alleged the Public Trustee failed to provide funds to K and her lifestyle had suffered for weeks. The applicant claims the issue was only resolved due to his intervention.
8. Ms JB explained K may not have attended ten-pin bowling for a week, but she still went out on community-based activities.
9. I prefer the evidence of Ms JB. Her evidence was corroborated by the information provided by Counsel for the Public Trustee in terms of the timing and type of communication between the Trust Manager and Ms JB. I am satisfied, and I find, K was not left without funds for weeks.
10. I am satisfied, and I find, this is not a default. The evidence provided supports the conclusion that the Public Trustee has diligently complied with the obligation to assist K and protect her estate.

Ground 9 - Public Advocate did not ascertain K's views and wishes

1. The applicant contends that the Public Advocate is unfit because Ms GU has not ascertained K's views and wishes. He asserts the GA Act 'contemplates a process of ascertainment capable of identification and scrutiny'.[104] This is not correct and is not supported by the text of the GA Act or case law.
2. The applicant refers to s 4(7) and s 51(2)(e) as the sections of the GA Act that require the guardian to ascertain views and wishes. However, these sections have quite different purposes.
3. Section 4(7) of the GA Act directs that the Tribunal, when considering any matter related to a represented person or a person for whom an application has been made under the GA Act, shall as far as possible, seek to ascertain the views and wishes of the person concerned as expressed, in whatever manner, at the time, or as gathered from the person's previous actions.
4. In GS,[105] the Tribunal observed that the requirement to obtain the views and wishes of the person concerned is an inquiry to ascertain certain facts. If the Tribunal can obtain the views and wishes of the person concerned, then those views and wishes are to be taken into account by the Tribunal when making a decision.[106] If the Tribunal cannot obtain the views and wishes of a person, they cannot be taken into account.
5. Section 51(2)(e) of the GA Act states that the guardian acts in the represented person's best interests if the guardian acts 'in consultation with the represented person, taking into account, as far as possible, the wishes of the person as expressed, in whatever manner, or as gathered from the person's previous actions'.
6. I refer to the comments of the Court of Appeal mentioned above in The Public Trustee v Baker in terms of the appropriateness of consulting with certain people, as sometimes the capacity of the person means consultation is impossible.[107]
7. Ms GU stated in her report filed prior to the 19 March 2025 hearing:[108]

The guardian has found is difficult to gather information independently from [K], in relation to her views and wishes, as [Ms CE] interprets despite [K's] very limited ability with Auslan, making it difficult to ascertain whether these views are actually those of [K].

1. The other information Ms GU has about K's ability to communicate her wishes is contained in the Investigation Report. Further, Ms GU attended the hearing of 19 March 2025 and was aware of the findings of the Full Tribunal made that day that that K could not respond or provide a view.[109]
2. In terms of K's wellbeing, as Ms GU cannot ask K her views, Ms GU relied on observations of her colleagues and service providers to assess K's circumstances. For example, in December 2025, a Senior Guardian visited K at her home. The Senior Guardian advised that K participates in activities in the community which she enjoys and she was keen to show off her room. The staff at the home confirmed to the Senior Guardian that K is quite independent and was comfortable to help herself to the things she wanted at home.
3. I am satisfied, and I find, that it was reasonable for Ms GU to rely on the Investigation Report, the findings of the Full Tribunal and the more recent observations of her colleague in December 2025, in terms of K's ability to express her wishes. It is reasonable, in my view, that Ms GU did not take steps to personally meet with K due to the clear evidence before the Tribunal and within Ms GU's knowledge about K's communication difficulties, and that she does not understand the matters being discussed due to her intellectual disability.
4. It is important to note that a guardian's role is not to give effect to a represented person's wishes. That is not why the GA Act refers to the represented person's wishes. The role of the guardian is to give the person's wishes weight and balance, if they can be ascertained, when considering decisions within the limits of the guardian's authority.
5. This Ground is not a default. This is an unfounded criticism of daily, operational decisions of the guardian. This Ground fails too.

1. None of the Grounds are made out. The application made pursuant to Section 85 fails and must be dismissed.

1. I will dismiss this application pursuant to s 47 of the SAT Act as I am satisfied, and I find, the application is an abuse of process.
2. Section 47 provides:

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding -

(a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or

(2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceeding be dismissed or struck out and make any appropriate orders.

(3) The Tribunal's powers to act under subsection (2) are exercisable only by a legally qualified member.

(4) The Tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party or on its own initiative.

1. Subsections 47(1)(a) - (c) have been described as 'species of abuse of process'.[110] I will clarify each of the terms shortly although there is significant overlap in the case law due to the similar characteristics of each.
2. Parliament authorised the Tribunal in s 47(4) of the SAT Act to dismiss or strike out a proceeding on its own initiative if it believes a species of abuse is disclosed. This jurisdiction is one way the Tribunal can control its own processes and ensure compliance with its objectives.
3. Section 9 of the SAT Act contains the objectives of the Tribunal when dealing with all matters, which are:[111]

(a) to achieve the resolution of questions, complaints or disputes, and make or review decisions, fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case; and

(b) to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable and minimise the costs to parties; and

(c) to make appropriate use of the knowledge and experience of Tribunal members.

1. It has been suggested, in the context of the Supreme Court, that if the factual and legal basis for an abuse of process is made out, the court has a duty to intervene, not merely a discretion.[112] In McKechnie, Owen J stated:[113]

A court will not sit idly by and allow its processes to be abused by litigation that is not brought for a purpose which falls within the range of purposes for which the processes exist. It is a doctrine that has its roots in public policy considerations. The proper functioning of the justice system and the administration of its processes is very much a matter of public interest.

1. The term 'frivolous' is not defined in the SAT Act. The meaning of this term was considered by Vaughan J (as he then was) who observed:[114]

An action is frivolous when it is not worthy of serious consideration, is insupportable in law, discloses no cause of action or is groundless. So too a matter that is without substance or is fanciful is frivolous. The term is apt to describe proceedings in which the plaintiff's claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed or in which there is no serious question to be tried.

(footnotes omitted)

1. The term 'vexatious' is defined in s 4 of the SAT Act in the context of 'vexatious proceedings' as follows:
   1. What it means to bring or conduct proceeding vexatiously

A person brings or conducts a proceeding vexatiously if it would result in the proceeding being vexatious proceedings as defined in the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 section 3.

1. The Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA) states:[115]

(a) which are an abuse of the process of a court or a tribunal; or

(b) instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for any other wrongful purpose; or

(c) instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; or

(d) conducted in a manner so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve any other wrongful purpose.

1. In Granich Partners v Yap,[116] Heenan J commented as follows in terms of this definition of 'vexatious proceedings':[117]

This definition has the effect of characterising proceedings as vexatious if they are actively or intentionally instituted or pursued by the litigant for any of the identified or other wrongful purposes, so making the subjective intention of the litigant a material factor. However, proceedings will also be vexatious by an objective standard, if they constitute an abuse of the process of the court or are brought or pursued without a reasonable grounds or they are conducted in a manner set out in subpar (d) of the definition. Hence, proceedings may be vexatious if they have any of these objective characteristics regardless of the personal intention, motive or state of mind of the litigant.

'Misconceived and lacking in substance'- s 47(1)(a)

1. These terms are not defined in the SAT Act. The term 'misconceived' connotes a misunderstanding of legal principle.[118] The term 'lacking in substance' connotes an untenable proposition of law or fact.[119] An allegation is lacking in substance if is so untenable it cannot possibly succeed. In Ambrus, Chaney J stated that an application that lacks substance is one where after very careful consideration of the case, 'it is clear that there is no realistic prospect of success'.[120]

1. There are no set rules or criteria to identify a matter that is an abuse of process as they depend on the facts and history of each proceeding. Certain principles can be ascertained from the case law. Gaudron J observed in Ridgeway v The Queen:[121]

Abuse of process cannot be restricted to 'defined and closed categories' because notions of justice and injustice, as well as other considerations that bear on public confidence in the administration of justice, must reflect contemporary values and, as well, take account of the circumstances of the case. That is not to say that the concept of 'abuse of process' is at large or, indeed, without meaning. As already indicated, it extends to proceedings that are instituted for an improper purpose and it is clear that it extends to proceedings that are 'seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging' or 'productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment'.

1. In Packer v Meagher, Hunt J explained:[122]

The legal process of a court is being abused when it is used to exert pressure to effect an object not within the scope of the process ... or where it is used for a purpose other than that for which the proceedings are properly designed and exist ...

1. The authorities note that when determining whether there is an abuse of process, it is:[123]

... crucial to determine the purpose for which the process is sought. It is the illegitimacy of the purpose that makes the abuse. If this is the root from which the principle grows, the reason why repeated applications may be an abuse of process is that the process was not intended to be used to achieve the purposes involved in some cases of repeated applications.

1. In Walton v Gardiner, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ observed that:[124]

... abuse of process extends to all those categories of cases in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness.

... may be characterised as proceedings which constitute an abuse of the process of the court or tribunal concerned, not because of a wrongful motive on the part of the respondent, but because of their character. They are repetitious and seek, time and again, to ventilate matters upon which there have been clear decisions showing that whatever process is employed to bring the matter before the court, the matters sought to be ventilated are without merit.

1. The Court of Appeal held that it is ordinarily an abuse of process to make repeated applications where there has been no material change of circumstances and where there is no fresh evidence available between hearings.[126]

Is an abuse of process different when the GA Act is the enabling Act?

1. The concept of an abuse of process must be modified to reflect the protective jurisdiction of the Tribunal as compared to the adversarial nature of a court.[127] Cases that concern disciplinary proceedings, a purpose of which includes protecting the public from professionals that have departed from proper professional standards, refer to the modification of the concept.
2. When considering applications filed in GA Act matters, EM Heenan J observed:[128]

... It is the true rights and interests of disabled persons or persons who are the subject of proceedings under the G & A Act which must be identified, evaluated and determined not some mistaken or ill-considered version of them. Accordingly, in the guardianship jurisdiction, the SAT should be astute to ensure that no matter how garbled, ill-advised or inappropriate may be the approach adopted by a party, the true nature of the relief sought is properly identified and jurisdiction is exercised according to the statutory obligations imposed by the legislation.

1. When considering the protective jurisdiction of the GA Act, the power to dismiss or strike out a proceeding as an abuse of process may be required to protect the represented person and ensure the Tribunal's processes are not abused by proceedings brought for a purpose unrelated to the purposes for which the Tribunal's processes exist.

1. To summarise the decisions I have referred to above, an abuse of process may be identified in GA Act matters that include one or more of the following elements:

(a) when the true nature of the relief sought is properly identified, the proceeding was not commenced in the best interests of the represented person or the person for whom the application was made;

(b) the process and procedures of the Tribunal, which exist to speedily make or review decisions fairly and in accordance with the substantial merits of the case, are used for a purpose other than that for which the proceedings were properly designed or exist;

(c) the proceeding is seriously and unfairly burdensome or productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment;

(d) the character of the proceeding is repetitious and seeks to reventilate matters upon which there have been clear decisions; or

(e) the proceeding does not accord with an efficient and economical use, of public resources, and avoids waste, when considering contemporary values and notions of justice and injustice, and how they bear on public confidence in the administration of justice.

1. At the Hearing, K's brother N, who attended all directions hearings and substantive hearings in 2025, stated that the applicant had continuously repeated the same allegations with no evidence in support and there was no purpose to the repeated applications filed by the applicant in 2025.[129]
2. Having had the opportunity to review all the evidence held by the Tribunal, including the transcripts of relevant hearings and documents sought by the applicant, such as the documents from doctors and the police, and having met the applicant at the Hearing and clarified the Grounds, I was satisfied I could identify the applicant's subjective intention in making Application Four in the context of his conduct in filing all four Applications.[130]
3. During Application One, the applicant was told that the Tribunal's role was not to review the daily decisions of a guardian and that the guardian was using the accommodation and travel functions in respect of K's holiday to Sydney. In Application Two, the applicant was explicitly told by the President that the Tribunal's role was not to evaluate the performance of the Public Advocate to decide whether the Public Advocate is suitable for appointment. The Tribunal's role is to focus on the suitability of anyone proposing themselves for appointment.[131]
4. At the interlocutory hearing of 17 November 2025 in Application Three, the applicant was clearly told by the Senior Member that a s 86 review was not about reviewing the suitability or comparing the performance of the Public Trustee or the Public Advocate with a family member.[132] The applicant was advised that the member hearing the matter would not be interrogating the conduct of the Public Advocate and Public Trustee. The Senior Member ordered the production of only three of the documents sought by the applicant, being satisfied those documents had a legitimate forensic purpose. Shortly thereafter, the applicant withdrew Application Three.
5. Two weeks later, he filed Application Four and raised the same allegations against the Public Advocate and Public Trustee. I am satisfied that the reason the applicant withdrew Application Three was because the documents he needed to prove his allegations against the Public Advocate and Public Trustee in a 'comparative analysis' were not ordered to be produced by the Tribunal, meaning that the comparison he viewed as necessary to prove his suitability could not be performed.
6. The directions hearing of 19 December 2025 in Application Four dealt with, among other things, the applicant's repeated request for the production of documents. The Senior Member noted the documents sought in Application Four, and the allegations made against the Public Advocate, were similar to those in Application Three.[133]
7. Counsel for the Public Advocate advised that the Public Advocate was likely to seek that Application Four be dismissed under s 47 of the SAT Act and raised the possibility of scheduling an interlocutory hearing to deal with a strike out application.[134] Counsel for the Public Advocate sought a copy of the transcript of the hearing of 29 August 2025 in Application Two to further consider the application to strike out.[135]
8. Counsel for the Public Advocate asserted, among other things, that:[136]

(a) Application Four dealt with matters that had already been considered and decided by the Tribunal in earlier proceedings;

(b) Application Four included matters relating to the daily decisions of a guardian, which are not matters the Tribunal will review; and

(c) the issue of the provision of documents had already been decided by the Senior Member at the interlocutory hearing of 17 November 2025 in Application Three.

1. The applicant asserted that an application to strike out would be incorrect because:[137]

... this is a fresh review under section 85 of an existing guardianship arrangement and ongoing exercise of delegated power. It's not an appeal of a prior refusal. It's not a rerun of [Application Three]. The issues include post-order conduct, new evidence and non-production of ordered primary records that go directly to statutory compliance...

1. The Senior Member asked whether there was fresh evidence since Application Three was filed. The applicant asserted there was new evidence as the three documents that were ordered to be produced by the Public Advocate in Application Three had been filed.[138]
2. The applicant continued:[139]

The fact that some topics are overlapping does not make this the same proceeding as well. The question is a - is a section 85 review - is whether the current orders and the current arrangements remain appropriate on the current evidence, including how powers have been exercised since earlier hearings ...

1. At the directions hearing, the Senior Member did not make the extensive orders for the production of documents requested by the applicant and adopted the reasons she gave on 17 November 2025.[140] The Senior Member's view was that many of the requests for documents related to the daily decisions of the guardian, and that to require production of the documents sought by the applicant, which were set out over seven pages, would impose an unreasonable and prejudicial burden on the numerous parties and entities involved.[141] The Senior Member continued:[142]

To require the production from numerous sources of such a broadly described range of documents would not be reasonable and would prevent the efficient and fair conduct of the proceedings by requiring the parties to view and consider in forensic detail vast amounts of documentation, some of which appear to be, with no disrespect, a fishing expedition by [the applicant] to substantiate his allegations against the Public Advocate and Public Trustee to investigate the minutiae of daily funding charges and decisions.

1. On 14 January 2026, the applicant sought to withdraw Application Four because, among other things, he believed that limiting the documents produced to those with a legitimate forensic purpose meant he did not have access to the material he required to advance the allegations of unfitness.[143]
2. I am satisfied, and I find this proceeding, Application Four, to be an abuse of process for the following five reasons.
3. First, Application Four was not commenced in K's best interests. I am satisfied, and I find, the applicant's intention in making Application Four was to prove the Public Advocate and Public Trustee as unfit to be K's guardian and administrator, so the Tribunal could compare their conduct to his hypothetical future performance, which would reveal him to be a better, more suitable option. This approach is misconceived.
4. The repeated applications to the Tribunal have caused K to incur costs relating to her service providers preparing reports and other matters related to attending Tribunal hearings. Applications One to Four have provided no benefit to K, as the Orders have not changed, but have directly reduced the NDIS funding available for her use, which is against her interests.
5. Second, Application Four is part of a course of conduct, comprising Applications One, Two and Three, that demonstrate the applicant has employed the Tribunal's processes for a purpose other than that for which the proceedings were properly designed or exist.
6. Section 85 exists to allow for any person to advise the Tribunal that guardianship and administration orders need to be reviewed because the guardian or administrator cannot continue. The applicant has been clear about his intention in filing the Applications. He has filed submissions and made statements in numerous hearings in respect of the requirement to prove the Public Advocate and Public Trustee as unsuitable by comparing their conduct to the arrangement he can offer, so he can then be found suitable for appointment as K's guardian and administrator. The position at law was explained to him on numerous occasions, but he appears to be impervious to any proper appreciation of the true legal position.
7. The applicant also raised the issue that as the Public Trustee is the administrator, they are exempted from filing annual accounts.[144] Therefore, he views Tribunal oversight under Section 85 as the only effective safeguard for the decisions being made for K.[145] This is also not a purpose for which Section 85 exists and is vexatious. The performance of the Public Trustee's role of administrator, and that of the Public Advocate as guardian, would be untenable if every decision making process was subject to review.[146]
8. Third, the proceedings brought by the applicant throughout 2025 were 'seriously and unfairly burdensome'. The applicant filed well over 1,500 pages of submissions, documents and applications in Applications One to Four.[147] The volume of material filed did not attempt to readily identify the basis for Application Four, which placed an undue burden on the Tribunal's resources to identify the issues for hearing in terms of preparation. The Senior Member that heard Application One noted that the extensive written submissions filed by the applicant referred to legislation that was not the GA Act. Nevertheless, the Senior Member had done her best to understand the spirit and intention of his submissions.[148]
9. Numerous directions hearings were required to narrow the scope of documents sought by the applicant and make detailed programming orders, requiring the Public Advocate and Public Trustee to prepare submissions in response and attend hearings. Despite the numerous allegations made in the documents filed with the Tribunal, the applicant has not disclosed anything of substance that would persuade me that Application Four had any prospect of success. The applicant has not provided any evidence to support any of his allegations and has attempted to use the Tribunal's processes as a 'fishing expedition' to find evidence to prove his allegations.[149] The 'new evidence' the applicant claimed existed at the directions hearing on 19 December 2025 was merely documents filed by the Public Advocate as per the orders made at the interlocutory hearing of 17 November 2025.
10. Fourth, the applicant sought to reventilate matters upon which there had already been clear decisions, such as the assertion that the Public Advocate did not maintain exclusive statutory authority or acted beyond power. These matters were explained to the applicant repeatedly, as was his misunderstanding of the requirement for the Tribunal to assess a person's suitability without performing a comparative analysis with the actions of the Public Advocate or Public Trustee.
11. Because the welfare of a vulnerable person was in issue, the Tribunal made every effort to understand the applicant's claim and the allegations made. Having taken the time to examine all claims and all the available evidence, I have determined that not a single allegation made by the applicant has been made out in any meaningful way or supports any legal basis to review orders. Application Four was lacking in substance and was so untenable, it could not succeed.
12. Fifth, Application Four does not accord with an efficient and economical use of the public resources of the Tribunal in hearing, or preparing to hear, the same or similar application four times. Each of Applications One to Four have been carefully and methodically heard, considered and determined by the Tribunal in K's best interests but with no discernible benefit to her.
13. The applicant repeatedly sought significant amounts of documents to be disclosed by various third parties in order to 'prosecute' his Section 85 application. GA Act proceedings in the Tribunal are inquisitorial and the powers of the Tribunal to seek information from a wide variety of sources is to serve the best interests of the represented person. It is not to search for evidence to be used against decision-makers to prove their unsuitability, which is vexatious and misconceived.
14. The proceeding is dismissed as an abuse of process within the meaning of s 47(2) of the SAT Act.

1. Pursuant to s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) the proceeding is dismissed as it is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance and is otherwise an abuse of process.
2. The written reasons for the decision of the Tribunal will be published.
3. Pursuant to order 8 of the orders of 19 December 2025:

(a) the orders of 19 March 2025 will be reviewed pursuant to s 84 of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) at 10 am on Thursday 5 March 2026 at 565 Hay Street Perth Western Australia with the parties to attend in person, by videolink or by telephone; and

(b) the Tribunal is substituted as the applicant in the review.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] The preconditions for a Section 85 review are set out in s 85(1)(a) - (f) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) cited at [17] herein.

[2] State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), s 32(2) and 32(4).

[3] I attempted to clarify the Grounds with the applicant in the Hearing, but it is possible he will not agree with my categorisation. I am satisfied that in substance, the categorisation is correct.

[4] The applicant's submissions filed on 14 January 2026 in respect of his withdrawal filed on GAA 6943 of 2025 (Withdrawal Submissions), page 1.

[5] On 27 January 2026, the applicant was provided with the transcripts of the hearings of 19 March 2025, 29 August 2025, 17 November 2025 and 19 December 2025.

[8] Male pronouns are used because the current Public Trustee is a man.

[9] Female pronouns are used because the current Public Advocate is a woman.

[10] RK [2022] WASAT 112 (RK) at [38] - [40].

[11] GA Act, s 43(1)(a) and s 43(1)(b) in respect of a guardian and s 64(1)(a) in respect of an administrator.

[12] GA Act, s 43(1)(c) in respect of a guardian and s 64(1)(b) in respect of an administrator.

[13] GA Act, s 44(1) in respect of a guardian and s 68(1) in respect of an administrator.

[16] Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27.

[17] Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group Pty Ltd v Director of Liquor Licensing [2012] WASC 463 at [22] (Hall J).

[19] Land Valuers Licensing Act 1978 (WA), s 28(2)(d).

[20] Land Valuers Licensing Board and Nevermann [2010] WASAT 38 (Nevermann).

[21] Shorter Oxford English Dictionary cited in Nevermann at [23].

[23] GA Act, s 70(1) in respect of administrators and s 51(1) in respect of guardians, although this is conditional in relation to guardians as it is subject to any direction of the Tribunal.

[24] GA Act, s 44(1)(c) and s 44(2)(d) in respect of guardians and s 68(1)(d) and 68(3)(c) in respect of administrators.

[25] Re The Full Board of the Guardianship and Administration Board [2003] WASCA 268 at [43].

[26] GG [2021] WASAT 133 at [97].

[27] Submissions of the Public Trustee dated 3 February 2026 in GAA 6943 of 2025 and NE [2023] WASAT 30.

[28] Submissions of the Public Advocate dated 3 February 2026 in GAA 6943 of 2025 and GA Act, s 44(5).

[29] SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34 at [37] (Gageler J).

[30] GA act, s 99 appoints the Public Advocate as the guardian or administrator immediately upon becoming aware that a sole guardian or administrator has died. This section of the Act applies without a Tribunal order or any other formality.

[31] Interpretation Act, s 5.

[33] GA Act, s 85(1)(a) and s 85(1)(f) respectively.

[34] MS [2020] WASAT 66.

[36] Prescott and Oleary [2025] FCWA 103 at [36] - [46] per O'Brien J.

[37] S v State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASC 306.

[38] Submissions filed by the applicant on 21 June 2024 and 21 July 2024 in GAA 2640 of 2024.

[39] Orders were made on 6 May 2015 in matters GAA 207 of 2015 and GAA 208 of 2015.

[40] Application filed on 3 October 2018 in GAA 3197 of 2018.

[41] PAS Team report dated 3 October 2018 attached to application in GAA 3197 of 2018.

[42] Orders made on 22 May 2019 in GAA/3197/2018. That order and the guardianship order were reviewed in May 2020.

[43] Orders of 7 May 2020 in GAA 820 of 2020.

[44] GAA 2640 of 2024. The application was made pursuant to section 86 GA Act and the applicant was granted leave to apply for the review under s 87 GA Act.

[46] Investigation report prepared by Ms H dated 18 July 2024 (Investigation Report).

[47] Orders 2 and 3 of the orders made on 22 July 2024 in GAA 2640 of 2024.

[48] Section 86 review of administration order filed by Public Advocate in GAA 3695 of 2024.

[49] Order 3 of the orders of 23 August 2024 in GAA 3695 of 2024.

[50] Western Australia Police incident report recording report made in January 2025.

[51] Notes of Medical Centre A of appointment with Dr M on 1 January 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[52] Notes of Medical Centre A of appointment with Dr T on 6 January 2025 and letter from Dr T to Ms GU dated 5 March 2025.

[53] Western Australia Police incident report recording report made in January 2025.

[54] Western Australia Police incident report recording report made in February 2025.

[55] The applicant waived privilege and disclosed the email of advice from his solicitor.

[56] ts 44, 19 March 2025 in matter GAA 6118 of 2024.

[57] Report of the delegated guardian dated 10 March 2025 from GAA 6118 of 2024 and ts 23, 19 March 2025 in GAA 6118 of 2024.

[58] ts 24, 19 March 2025 in GAA 6118 of 2024.

[59] ts 25, 19 March 2025 in GAA 6118 of 2024.

[61] The reasons for decision in this matter were published as K [2025] WASAT 67. The applicant also filed an application pursuant to s 40 of the GA Act which was GAA 2358 of 2025, but withdrew that application at the directions hearing of 22 May 2025.

[63] ts 7, 22 May 2025, presided over by Marillier SM in GAA 2358 of 2025.

[64] ts 11 - 15, 22 May 2025 in GAA 2358 of 2025. Application was taken as one made under s 87 GA Act.

[66] Application One was dismissed on 10 July 2025.

[67] GAA 3825 of 2025. The Applicant filed a further application on 24 July 2025 under s 86 of the GA Act being GAA 4101 of 2025. This application was dismissed and treated as a submission on Application Two.

[68] Hearing occurred on 29 August 2025.

[69] ts 24 - 25, 29 August 2025 in GAA 3825 of 2025.

[70] ts 40 and 45, 29 August 2025. Leave was granted pursuant to s 87 of the GA Act so the applicant could review the Orders under s 86.

[71] GAA 5427 of 2025. While this application was made pursuant to s 86, in substance, I categorise it is a further Section 85 application.

[72] 'Production of documents request' filed on 21 October 2025 of 6 pages and 'Other document erratum & supplementary request' filed on 1 November 2025 of 2 pages, in GAA 5427 of 2025

[73] 'Production of documents request' filed on 21 October 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025, pages 1 - 2.

[74] 'Production of documents request' filed on 21 October 2025, pages 2.

[80] Relevant to Ground 9 as the applicant's view was that interpreters should be present when the guardian is ascertaining K's views and wishes.

[81] ts 11, 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025.

[82] ts 34, 36, 37 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025 per Evans-Bonner SM. This issue was also canvassed extensively in submissions filed by Public Advocate on 6 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025, pages 8-10.

[83] ts 35 - 38, 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025.

[84] Submissions filed on 6 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025, page 5.

[85] ts 11 - 16, 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025 (transcript of reasons) citing Forrest and Forrest Pty Ltd and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs [No 2] [2025] WASAT 101.

[87] The applicant's submissions filed 8 December 2025.

[88] ts 5, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[89] ts 5, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025 per Evans-Bonner SM.

[90] ts 8 - 9, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[91] ts 25, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[92] ts 30, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[93] ts 25, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[94] ts 53, 17 November 2025 and ts 31 and 66, 19 December 2025.

[95] This section of the GA Act directs the Public Trustee to examine accounts submitted to the Public Trustee by private administrators unless the Public Trustee has exempted the administrator from submitting accounts.

[97] Report of the delegated guardian dated 10 March 2025 filed in GAA 6118 of 2024.

[101] Public Trustee report dated 13 March 2025, filed in matter GAA 6118 of 2024.

[102] Public Trustee report dated 13 March 2025, filed in matter GAA 6118 of 2024, page 3.

[103] The Public Trustee v Baker [2014] WASCA 23 (The Public Trustee v Baker) at [30].

[104] The applicant's submissions re the Public Advocate filed 17 February 2026 in GAA 6943 of 2025, page 18.

[105] GS [2018] WASAT 72 (GS).

[107] The Public Trustee v Baker at [30].

[108] Report of the delegated guardian dated 10 March 2025 filed in GAA 6118 of 2024.

[109] ts 44, 19 March 2025 in matter GAA 6118 of 2024.

[110] Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2019] WASAT 143 at [13] per Pritchard P.

[112] McKechnie v Campbell (1996) 17 WAR 62 at 75.

[113] McKechnie v Campbell at 74.

[114] Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Gates [2018] WASC 213 at [31].

[115] Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA), s 3.

[116] Granich Partners v Yap [2003] WASC 206 (Granich Partners).

[117] Granich Partners at [28] - [29].

[118] Laurent and Commissioner of Police [2009] WASAT 254; (2009) 68 SR (WA) 165 at [23] referring to State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel [1998] 1 VR 102; (1997) EOC 92-875 at VR 108-109 (Ormiston JA).

[119] Laurent and Commissioner of Police at [23] referring to State Electricity Commission of Victoria v Rabel at VR 108-109 (Ormiston JA).

[120] Ambrus and Churches of Christ Homes & Community Services Incorporated [2006] WASAT 141 at [44].

[121] Ridgeway v The Queen [1995] HCA 66; (1995) 184 CLR 19, [74] - [75] (Gaudron J).

[122] Packer v Meagher [1984] 3 NSWLR 486 at 492.

[123] Wiest v Director of Public Prosecutions [1988] FCA 450; (1988) 23 FCR 472, cited in Erujin Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2010] WASAT 29 at [38].

[124] Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77; (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393.

[125] Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7 at [140].

[126] Pastor v Aegis Aged Care Staff Pty Ltd [No 3] [2023] WASCA 128 at [45].

[128] S v State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASC 306 per EM Heenan J at [163].

[129] Hearing of 24 February 2026 from 4.19 pm to 4.21 pm.

[131] ts 24 - 25, 29 August 2025 in GAA 3825 of 2025.

[132] ts 34, 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025.

[133] ts 5, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025 per Evans-Bonner SM.

[134] ts 8, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[135] ts 40 - 41, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[136] ts 8 - 9, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[137] ts 10, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[138] ts 11, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[139] ts 12, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[140] ts 72, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025 referring to the reasons recorded in the transcript of the hearing of 17 November 2025 in GAA 5427 of 2025.

[141] ts 73, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[142] ts 73, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[145] ts 35, 19 December 2025 in GAA 6943 of 2025.

[146] TL v Office of the Public Advocate [2020] WASC 455 at [90] per Curthoys K.

[147] The applicant filed approximately 590 pages of documents in Application One. In Application Two, the applicant filed 728 pages of applications, submissions and documents. The hearing book for this review was 1,655 pages which was predominantly made up of the applicant's submissions and documents. In Application Three, the applicant filed 108 pages of submissions, applications and documents before he withdrew. In Application Four, he filed a further 125 pages of submissions, applications and documents and sought to rely on the hearing book from Application Two and another bundle of freedom of information documents.

[148] K at [22] per Marillier SM.

[149] Nurses and Midwives Board of Western Australia and Watson [2008] WASAT 59 at [10] and [11].