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[2026] NSWCA 92
procedural. The court ordered that the $50,000 appeal security be paid out to Interslice by electronic funds transfer to an account it nominated in writing to the Registrar. No order was made as to the costs...
Interslice had paid $50,000 into court to protect CCA against the costs of the appeal. The appeal ended with each party bearing its own costs in that Court. Although CCA had separate first-instance costs, those were not what the $50,000 had been paid to secure. The Court of Appeal's separate first-instance costs orders did not change that. The court therefore ordered the $50,000 returned to Interslice.
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2,155 words · generated 08/10/2026
Interslice Pty Ltd had paid $50,000 into court as security for CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd's costs of an appeal. The immediate question before Mitchelmore JA was not a fresh assessment of the underlying lease dispute. It was whether the court should pay that security out to Interslice, or instead pay it to CCA towards CCA's costs at first instance.
The dispute arose from litigation about a commercial gymnasium lease at Bass Hill. Interslice had claimed damages arising from the alleged repudiation and termination of the lease. CCA brought a cross-claim for rent, outgoings and other sums. At first instance, Interslice's claims were dismissed except for repayment of the bond, while CCA's cross-claim succeeded for nominal damages of $10: [4]. The primary judge ordered costs against Interslice, reasoning that it had lost on the real issue, whether its termination of the lease was valid: [5].
Interslice appealed. CCA applied for security for costs, and Gleeson JA ordered $50,000 security payable into court in two instalments: [6]-[7]. The order was made in the context of CCA's application for security for costs of the appeal. In the later appeal judgment, the Court upheld Interslice's argument that it had validly terminated the lease. The appeal otherwise failed on other grounds, and CCA's notice of contention was dismissed: [10].
The appeal outcome also changed the first-instance costs position. The Court of Appeal said the original costs order rested on a premise that had been displaced by the appeal, and re-exercised the costs discretion. It ordered each party to bear its own costs in the Court of Appeal. For the first-instance proceedings, it ordered Interslice to pay CCA's costs of the statement of claim and CCA to pay Interslice's costs of the cross-claim: [11]. The High Court later refused special leave to appeal with costs: [12].
Interslice sought return of the $50,000. CCA opposed that request and asked for the funds to be paid to it in partial satisfaction of its first-instance costs. It argued, in substance, that it still needed the money to meet costs and that its overall costs exceeded the security available to it: [14], [18]. Mitchelmore JA rejected that proposed use and ordered payment out to Interslice: [23].
The governing question was the purpose for which the money had been paid into court. The parties accepted that payment out under UCPR r 41.3 was discretionary and that the discretion was broad. They also accepted that its exercise was informed by the nature and purpose of the original payment: [17]. Mitchelmore JA drew on Cellarit, which describes the court's role as the prudential management of funds to ensure their due administration and prevent abuse of court processes: [17].
That approach required attention to the actual order for security, not an abstract understanding of what security for costs generally does. CCA emphasised that the order said “provide security for costs of $50,000” and argued that the funds were security for its costs generally: [8]. Mitchelmore JA rejected that reading in context. Gleeson JA's order arose from an application for security for the costs of the appeal, and could not sensibly be read as covering first-instance costs as well: [6]-[8].
The wording of s 1335 of the Corporations Act did not alter the analysis. CCA relied on the fact that s 1335 has a broader application than UCPR r 51.50(1), which concerns security in appeals in the Court of Appeal. Mitchelmore JA accepted the difference in scope but held it did not assist in characterising the purpose of this particular payment into court: [9]. The question remained what these funds were ordered to secure.
A central part of the reasoning was that the Court of Appeal had made no order requiring Interslice to pay CCA's costs of the appeal. Instead, each party was to bear its own appeal costs: [11], [20]. The separate orders concerning first-instance costs did not bring those costs within the scope of the appeal security. The appeal court had distinguished between “costs ... at first instance” and “costs of the proceedings in this Court”. Modifying the earlier costs orders did not transform first-instance costs into appeal costs: [20].
The court also addressed CCA's broader hardship and costs arguments. It accepted that CCA's first-instance costs substantially exceeded the separate $20,000 security ordered below, and noted the estimate of those costs provided by CCA's solicitor: [18]. But the amount of CCA's costs, and the fact that they remained to be assessed, did not change the purpose of the $50,000 appeal security. Nor did the alleged impecuniosity of Interslice or the source of the funds alter that characterisation: [18]-[19].
Finally, the court considered the institutional consequence of CCA's position. Paying the appeal security to CCA for unrelated first-instance costs would retrospectively give it a secured position in relation to those costs, despite the separate security order made at first instance. Mitchelmore JA distinguished prospectively ordering security for particular proceedings from using security already ordered for one proceeding to satisfy costs in another: [21]. Such repurposing would not accord with the due administration of funds paid into court. The proposed general pool of funds was inconsistent with purpose-specific security: [21]-[22].
The judgment did not announce a new test for every payment-out application. It applied the accepted position that UCPR r 41.3 confers a broad discretion, while emphasising that the discretion is informed by the nature and purpose of the payment into court: [17]. It relied on Cellarit for the prudential-management character of that discretion and referred to JKB Holdings for the importance of recognising the rights and expectations associated with property held under the court's jurisdiction: [17].
Before this ruling, the security order at issue had a defined procedural setting: it was made after CCA applied for security for costs of the appeal, and required $50,000 to be paid into court: [6]-[7]. A separate first-instance order had provided CCA with $20,000 security: [2], [18]. Those two orders related to different stages of the litigation. The motion required the court to decide whether the funds associated with one order could be used for liabilities associated with the other.
After the ruling, the practical result in this case was that appeal security could not be used to satisfy CCA's first-instance costs. The court treated the purpose of the security as spent when the appeal concluded without an order that Interslice pay CCA's appeal costs: [20]. That is a case-specific application of the purpose-based discretion, not a statement that security must always be paid back immediately when an appeal ends. The reasons turn on the wording and context of the order, the appeal costs disposition, and the distinction between the two sets of costs.
The judgment also indicates that the breadth of s 1335 of the Corporations Act does not itself broaden the purpose of security already paid into court under a particular order: [9]. It does not resolve the full relationship between that provision and the UCPR in other contexts. Its point is narrower: differences in statutory and rule drafting did not answer what the $50,000 in this case had been ordered to secure.
At [17], the judgment adopts the description of payment-out decisions as an exercise in “prudential management” of funds. In plain English, the court is not simply deciding who has the largest unpaid bill. It must administer the money consistently with why it was paid into court and with the court's proper role.
At [19], Mitchelmore JA identifies the purpose of this payment as security for CCA's costs of the appeal. That characterisation is important because it rejects CCA's attempt to describe the fund more generally as security for all costs arising from the litigation. The source of the money did not change its legal purpose.
At [20], the court says that, without an order requiring Interslice to pay CCA's appeal costs, the purpose of the security “was at an end”. The paragraph also explains why the first-instance costs orders did not keep that security in place: those costs remained costs of the first-instance proceedings, not costs of the appeal.
At [21], the court contrasts ordering security prospectively with applying existing security retrospectively to costs from different proceedings. The plain-English point is that a fund set aside for one defined costs risk cannot simply be reassigned to cover another risk because the recipient would benefit from it. The separate first-instance security order reinforced the distinction.
At [22], the court describes CCA's proposal as treating appeal security as a general pool available to reduce its broader costs exposure. It rejects that approach because it would disregard the purpose-specific nature of each security order.
The reasoning is most directly relevant where money has been paid into court under a security-for-costs order tied to a particular proceeding, and a party later seeks to use that money for costs arising elsewhere. In this case, the fund was ordered as security for appeal costs, while CCA sought it for first-instance costs: [7]-[8], [18]-[21].
The judgment is also relevant where costs orders are varied after an appeal. A later order concerning costs at first instance does not, without more, convert those costs into costs of the appeal. The court relied on the express separation in the appeal orders between costs “at first instance” and costs “in this Court”: [11], [20].
The decision may be pertinent where a party argues that unpaid costs, financial hardship, or the original applicant's impecuniosity justify retaining security for a different purpose. Those matters were raised or acknowledged here, but did not override the order's purpose: [18]-[19]. The ruling does not establish that such considerations can never matter; it shows that they did not justify repurposing this fund in this procedural setting.
The reasoning depends on the actual terms and context of the security order. Mitchelmore JA rejected reading the phrase “security for costs” in isolation from the reasons and procedural context in which the order was made: [8]. Accordingly, questions about the scope of a differently worded order, an order covering multiple proceedings, or an outstanding appeal-costs liability would require separate consideration. This judgment does not decide those scenarios.
The supplied judgment contains no information about later judicial treatment of this decision. It was delivered on 20 May 2026, and the text provided does not identify any subsequent case that followed, distinguished, or otherwise considered it.
The judgment itself relies on earlier authorities. It cites Cellarit for the breadth and purpose-informed character of the payment-out discretion, and quotes the prudential-management formulation at [17]. It refers to JKB Holdings for the need to recognise the rights and expectations of persons claiming an interest in property affected by the court's jurisdiction: [17]. It also refers to Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments for the accepted breadth of the discretion: [14], [17]. These are authorities used by Mitchelmore JA, not later treatments of the present decision.
The underlying appeal decision, Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 175, is discussed as procedural and factual context. It explains the changed costs orders that gave rise to the dispute, but the present ruling concerns the later payment-out motion: [10]-[11]. No claim about how courts have treated the 2026 ruling can be made from the supplied material.
The judgment does not decide how the discretion would apply if the original security order expressly covered both appeal and first-instance costs, or more than one proceeding. Its reasoning depends on the purpose of the specific order made for appeal costs: [8], [19]-[20].
It also does not decide what would happen if the appeal resulted in an order that the appellant pay the respondent's appeal costs, or if an appeal-costs assessment remained outstanding. Here, the Court of Appeal ordered each party to bear its own costs in that Court: [11], [20]. The reasons establish the result on those facts, rather than a general rule for every possible appeal-costs outcome.
The relationship between UCPR r 41.3, r 51.50 and Corporations Act s 1335 is not comprehensively analysed. The court held only that the difference in drafting did not assist in characterising the purpose of the particular fund: [9]. Other questions about the operation of those provisions remain outside the decision's stated reasoning.
Nor does the judgment determine the priority of CCA's first-instance costs claim against other assets or creditors. It says that paying this fund to CCA would improperly elevate it to the position of a secured creditor in relation to costs for which this particular security had not been ordered: [21]. It does not decide any broader insolvency or creditor-priority dispute.
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments - Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2026] NSWCA 92
Hearing dates: 18 May 2026
Date of orders: 18 May 2026
Decision date: 20 May 2026
Before: Mitchelmore JA
Decision: (1) Pursuant to Part 41 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the sum of $50,000 paid into court by the Appellant as security for costs of the appeal be paid out to the Appellant, Interslice Pty Ltd.
(2) The Registrar be authorised to pay the said sum to the Appellant by electronic funds transfer to the bank account nominated in writing by the Appellant to the Registrar.
(3) No order as to the costs of this motion.
Catchwords: COSTS — security for costs — payment out of court — where moneys paid into court as security for costs of appeal — no order made as to costs of appeal — whether to release amount of security in partial satisfaction of costs at first instance — not the purpose of security ordered — purpose of security spent — order for payment out made
Legislation Cited: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1335
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 41.3, 42.21, 51.50
Cases Cited: Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 266
JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501
Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1929
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Interslice Pty Ltd ACN 601 103 226 (Appellant)
CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd ACN 634 907 369 (First respondent)
Danka Bakic (Second respondent)
David Robinson (Third respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
DM Robinson (authorised officer) (Appellant)
R Clark (First respondent)
Solicitors:
Mitry Lawyers (First respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/00202851
Publication restriction: Nil
“1. Pursuant to Part 41 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), the sum of $50,000 paid into Court by the Appellant as security for the costs of the appeal be paid out to the Appellant, Interslice Pty Ltd.
2. The Registrar be authorised to pay the said sum to the Appellant by electronic funds transfer to the bank account nominated in writing by the Appellant to the Registrar.
3. There be no order as to the costs of this motion.”
The first respondent on the appeal, CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd (CCA), opposed the order for payment out. Instead, it sought an order, also pursuant to Pt 41 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), that the sum the subject of Interslice’s application be paid out to it, in partial satisfaction of its costs at first instance. CCA separately had the benefit of an order for security for its costs at first instance in the amount of $20,000: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 1578.
On 18 May 2026, I heard argument on the notice of motion and, at the conclusion of argument, I made the orders that Interslice sought. These are my reasons for making those orders.
Interslice brought an appeal from the decision of Richmond J in proceedings it commenced against CCA, seeking damages for the alleged repudiation and termination of a lease and equitable lease of premises in Bass Hill, which were used as a commercial gymnasium. CCA, in turn, cross-claimed against Interslice, seeking arrears of rent, outgoings and other monies and damages. The primary judge dismissed Interslice’s claims save for repayment of the bond, and upheld the cross-claim, awarding CCA nominal damages of $10: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 481 at [143].
As McHugh JA (Ward P and Leeming JA agreeing) described on appeal, the primary judge awarded the costs of the proceedings below (on both the claim and the cross-claim) against Interslice on the basis that it had been unsuccessful on the real issue in dispute, namely, whether Interslice’s termination of the lease was valid: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 175 at [300].
Interslice appealed from the decision of the primary judge. By notice of motion filed 6 September 2024, CCA applied for security for costs: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 247 at [2]. Interslice did not dispute that the jurisdictional ground in s 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was established, or that an order for security should be made. However, it disputed the quantum of security sought: at [10].
On 15 October 2024, Gleeson JA made the following orders:
“1. The appellant provide security for costs of $50,000 in the following tranches:
(a) $35,000 to be paid by 22 October 2024; and
(b) $15,000 to be paid by 15 November 2024.
- The security to be paid into Court.
3. The proceedings be stayed in the event of non-compliance with order (1) above.
4. The costs of the motion filed 7 August 2024 be each parties’ costs in the cause.”
On the present application, CCA accepted that Gleeson JA’s orders were based on an assessment of the likely costs of the appeal. Nonetheless, it sought to make something of the fact that the order for security did not refer, in terms, to the costs of the appeal. Focusing on the words in order 1, “provide security for costs of $50,000”, CCA submitted that the purpose for which the funds were paid into court “was to provide security for CCA’s costs”. I do not accept CCA’s submission at the level of generality at which it was put, which involved reading order 1 divorced from Gleeson JA’s reasons. In the context of a judgment in which his Honour determined CCA’s application for security for costs of the appeal, the purpose of order 1 of his Honour’s orders cannot sensibly be construed as being for costs generally, including costs incurred in the proceedings at first instance. Contrary to CCA’s submission, Interslice’s position, that the security ordered by Gleeson JA was for the purpose of the appeal, did not involve an unduly narrow construction of the purpose for the payment of that amount into court.
CCA’s reliance on the terms of s 1335 of the Corporations Act also did not assist its submissions in this regard. CCA sought to emphasise that s 1335 is drafted more broadly than r 51.50(1) of the UCPR, indicating that s 1335 is more flexible in so far as it is not limited to appellate litigation. True it is that s 1335 is a provision of more general application, applying to proceedings where a corporation is the plaintiff, and that the terms of r 51.50(1) are more confined, consistently with the limited application of the latter to appeals in this Court. However, the drafting difference does not relevantly assist in the proper characterisation of the purpose for which the funds the subject of the present application were paid into court.
The amount of security that Gleeson JA ordered was paid into court. On 16 December 2024, the appeal was heard, and on 4 August 2025 the Court of Appeal handed down its decision: Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd [2025] NSWCA 175. The Court upheld ground 4 of Interslice’s amended notice of appeal, by which Interslice contended that it had validly terminated the lease. McHugh JA stated that it followed from Interslice’s success on this ground that CCA’s cross-claim must be dismissed: at [298]. The Court otherwise dismissed the grounds of the amended notice of appeal, and dismissed CCA’s notice of contention.
The Court made orders which included a declaration as to Interslice’s valid termination of the lease, as well as judgment for Interslice against CCA in the sum of $10. In relation to the costs of the proceedings below, McHugh JA noted that the premise of the primary judge’s costs order had been upset on appeal, requiring the discretion to be re-exercised: at [300]. His Honour stated (referring to Interslice as the “Tenant” and CCA as the “Landlord”):
“[301] The Tenant failed both at first instance and in this Court on two issues which occupied much time and evidence: the planning consent issue and proof of substantial damages. However, the Tenant has succeeded on appeal on a third substantial issue, repudiation, and the appeal should be allowed to that extent. It is appropriate in the circumstances that each party bear its own costs in this Court.
[302] As to the costs at first instance, in the result the Tenant’s claim has succeeded (but only to the extent of nominal damages and return of its bond), and the Landlord’s cross-claim has wholly failed. The practical effect is that the Tenant has failed in the main object of its claim, obtaining substantial damages. That is in substance the ‘event’ for present purposes. On the other hand, it is difficult to see why the Landlord should not pay the Tenant’s costs of the cross-claim, to the extent that they are separately identifiable.
[303] In the circumstances (1) each party should pay its own costs in this Court; (2) the Tenant should pay the Landlord’s costs of the proceedings on the statement of claim at first instance; and (3) the Landlord should pay the Tenant’s costs of the cross-claim at first instance. There is no occasion to make costs orders with respect to the second or third cross-defendants, who submitted in this Court.”
Interslice sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. On 4 December 2025, the High Court refused special leave to appeal with costs: Interslice Pty Ltd ACN 601 103 226 v CCA Investments – Bass Hill Pty Ltd ACN 634 907 369 [2025] HCADisp 301.
The correspondence between the parties in relation to payment out of the $50,000 following the Court of Appeal’s decision was annexed to the affidavit of Danka Bakic, the sole director and shareholder of Interslice, affirmed 28 April 2026. On 5 August 2025, being the day after the Court of Appeal’s judgment, Interslice’s solicitors wrote to CCA’s solicitors seeking consent to the payment out of court of the $50,000 paid into court pursuant to the orders of Gleeson JA.
CCA’s solicitors responded by letter dated 8 August 2025, stating that the Court has a wide discretion as to the release of this amount, citing the decision of Sackar J in Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1929 (“Golden Destiny Investments”) at [151]. It also relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cellarit Pty Ltd v Cawarrah Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 266 (“Cellarit”) at [81] for the proposition that when considering how to disburse the monies, the Court takes account of the purpose of the payment into court. Asserting that the $50,000 was paid into court “to provide our client ‘security for costs’”, CCA’s solicitors stated that CCA sought payment of the $50,000 to it, as well as the $20,000 ordered by way of security at first instance, “in order to achieve that purpose”. The letter continued:
“The fact that no costs order has been made in the Court of Appeal proceedings does not mean that our client does not continue to need the benefit of that security to pay its costs. Even when the $50,000 is added to the $20,000 from the proceedings below, the amount of security is far less than our client’s net costs position from this misguided litigation brought by Interslice.”
“The $50,000 was ordered as security for the costs of the appeal proceedings. Once the Court of Appeal determined there would be no order as to costs in the appeal, the purpose for which that security was provided was spent. Any discretion must be exercised consistently with the orders under which the funds were paid in. It cannot now be repurposed to satisfy any costs orders from the proceedings below.”
By email dated 23 February 2026, Interslice’s solicitors repeated their request for consent and foreshadowed the present application.
It was common ground before me that payment out under r 41.3 of the UCPR is discretionary, and that the discretion is broad: Golden Destiny Investments at [151]; Cellarit at [80]-[81]. In Cellarit at [81], Macfarlan JA stated that in making decisions about the payment out of funds, “the court engages in an exercise of prudential management of the funds to ensure their due administration and to ensure that the processes of the court are not abused”. Both parties also accepted that the discretion is informed by the nature and purpose of the payment into court: Cellarit at [81]; JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 at [14]. In the latter case, Lindsay J observed that inquiring into the nature and purpose of the antecedent payment in to court “is necessary to ensure that the Court acts within its mandate, judicially, and in a manner that gives due recognition to the rights and expectations of persons who may claim to be ‘entitled’ to property affected by an exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction”.
It may be accepted, as CCA’s solicitors wrote in their correspondence with Interslice’s solicitors, and as was submitted to me, that CCA incurred costs at first instance that substantially exceeded the amount of security in the court below ($20,000). Those costs have yet to be assessed. Emma Brianne Watt, CCA’s solicitor with day-to-day conduct of the proceedings, deposed in her affidavit affirmed 15 May 2026 that she estimated the costs at first instance, excluding the costs of the cross-claim, as being in the order of $356,626. CCA submitted that in circumstances where Interslice’s impecuniosity was the basis for CCA’s application for the security that Gleeson JA ordered, release of the $50,000 to CCA would still be for the purpose of costs, and would go some way to meeting its costs. By contrast, it submitted, if the security were to be released to Interslice, its director Ms Bakic, who, together with her husband, Mr Robinson, at least partially funded the security, would obtain a benefit whilst being shielded from the downside of CCA pursuing its costs against the company.
I have referred above to the purpose for which Interslice paid the $50,000 into court, namely, as security for CCA’s costs of the appeal. This purpose was narrower than the description of the purpose of providing security per se that CCA asserted, in both its letter of 8 August 2025 and on the present application. The source of the funds paid into court on behalf of Interslice, and what may happen to the funds after they are paid out to Interslice, does not relevantly affect the proper characterisation of that purpose.
I accept Interslice’s submission that in the absence of any order of the Court of Appeal that Interslice pay CCA’s costs of the appeal, the purpose for which those funds were paid into court was at an end. Insofar as CCA submitted that the orders that the Court of Appeal made in relation to the costs of the proceedings below operated to engage the security that Gleeson JA ordered, I reject that submission. It is apparent that the Court made those orders “in lieu” of the primary judge’s orders, so as to disentitle CCA from its costs of the cross-claim, in respect of which Interslice succeeded on appeal, while maintaining the overall costs position from the court below, which was in CCA’s favour. The Court’s orders as to costs distinguish between “costs … at first instance” and “costs of the proceedings in this Court”. Interslice was correct in its submission that the re-making or modification of first instance costs orders does not convert the subject costs into costs of the appeal.
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Interslice Pty Ltd
CCA Investments - Bass Hill Pty Ltd
The court ordered that the $50,000 appeal security be paid out to Interslice by electronic funds transfer to an account it nominated in writing to the Registrar. No order was made as to the costs of the motion.
Moreover, the order sought by CCA goes further than merely facilitating the receipt of costs to which it is entitled. It would serve to elevate CCA to the position of a secured creditor, without proper regard to the ordinary rules of prioritisation and administration. It is one thing to order such security prospectively, under rr 42.21 or 51.50 of the UCPR or s 1335 of the Corporations Act; it is another thing to do so retrospectively by applying security ordered for the costs of certain proceedings to satisfy costs incurred in different proceedings, in which a separate order for security for costs was made. The due administration of funds paid into court, which guides the exercise of the discretion in Pt 41, would not be served by releasing funds that were paid by way of security in order to meet costs that they were not paid in to secure.
As Interslice submitted in its written reply, CCA’s submissions amounted to an invitation to the Court to treat appeal security as providing a general pool of funds that were available to CCA to reduce its broader costs exposure. As Interslice further submitted, that invitation was inconsistent with the purpose-specific nature of the security for costs that were ordered at first instance and, separately, on appeal. It should be refused.
Accordingly, I made the orders that Interslice sought in its notice of motion.