[2026] NSWCATCD 104
NCAT Consumer and Commercial
2026-08-11
G Sarginson, Deputy President
Zoe will write a short plain-English summary of this judgment and email it to you for free: what it was about, what the court decided and why. It can take up to a minute.
General information, not legal advice.
Or create a free account to save it and ask Zoe follow-up questions.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Hang v The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261; Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd v The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261; The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 v Hang [2026] NSWCATCD 104
General information, not legal advice.
Original judgment source is linked above.
Hearing dates: 19-20 February 2024, 4-5 September 2024, 4 June 2025
Date of orders: 11 August 2026
Decision date: 11 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Consumer and Commercial Division
Before: G Sarginson, Deputy President
Decision: Case Number 2023/00381512
(1) The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 is to pay Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran the amount of $161,675.30 by 28 days from the date of this decision.
(2) The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 is to pay the costs of Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
(3) If any party seeks to vary the costs order, it is to make an application to vary by lodging with the Tribunal Registry and serving on the other party a miscellaneous matters application setting out the basis on which it seeks to vary the costs order by 14 days from the date of this decision. If such an application is made, the Tribunal will issue further procedural directions for costs submissions and documents to be lodged and served.
Case Number 2024/00065826
(1) The proceedings are dismissed.
(2) The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 is to pay the costs of Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
(3) If any party seeks to vary the costs order, it is to make an application to vary by lodging with the Tribunal Registry and serving on the other party a miscellaneous matters application setting out the basis on which it seeks to vary the costs order by 14 days from the date of this decision. If such an application is made, the Tribunal will issue further procedural directions for costs submissions and documents to be lodged and served.
Case Number 2023/00381302
(1) Pursuant to cl 6 of sch 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) the proceedings in Case Number 2023/00381302 are transferred to the Supreme Court.
(2) Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd is to pay the costs of The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 by reason of the transfer of the proceedings on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
Catchwords: LAND LAW – strata title – duty of owners corporation to maintain and repair common property – lot owner suing for breach of duty - whether duty excluded by common property rights by-law – commercial lots – termination of lease during fixed term – damages – economic loss - whether reasonably foreseeable – whether caused by failure of lot owners to take reasonable measures to avoid loss– principles applicable to assessment of damages – uncertainty of future events - Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) ss 106, 108, 142, 232
LAND LAW – strata title – Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) – former tenant suing for damages in negligence – Tribunal proceedings commenced after end of tenancy - jurisdiction of Tribunal – meaning of “interested person” – whether proceedings should be transferred to a court - Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) s 226 – Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) cl 6 sch 4
Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW)
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW)
Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW)
Home Building Act 1989 (NSW)
Home Building Regulation 1997(NSW)
Home Building Regulation 2004 (NSW)
Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW)
Retail Lease Act 1994 (NSW)
Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW)
Cases Cited: AAI Ltd v Kalnin Corporation Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 548
Advance Fitness Corporation Pty Ltd v Bondi Diggers Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd [1999] NSWSC 264
Alamado Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 224
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41
Bartlett v The Owners-Strata Plan No 12375 [2025] NSWCATCD 92
BKB Constructions Pty Ltd v Sawan [2022] NSWCATAP 103
Cao v ISPT Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 188
Carbone v Fowler Homes Pty Ltd; Carbone v Fowler Homes Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 192
Coscuez International Pty Ltd v The Owners-Strata Plan No 46433 [2022] NSWCATAP 147
Fasako Pty Ltd v TianyD Beauty & Hairdressing Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 49
Fasako Pty Ltd v TianyD Beauty & Hairdressing Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 112
Frampton v The Owners-Strata Plan No 35012; The Owners-Strata Plan No 35012 v Frampton [2019] NSWCATCD 15
Gigi Entertainment Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 17 BPR 32,611; [2013] NSWCA 287
Griffinchuk No 1 Pty Ltd ATF Griffinchuk Family Trust v The Owners-Strata Plan No 92745 [2025] NSWCATAP 273
Gumland Property Holdings v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 237; [2008] HCA 10
Hampson v Clyne (1967) 86 WN (NSW) 321
Holus Bolus Pty Ltd v The Wicko Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 497
Horan v The Owners – Strata Plan No. 68307 [2024] NSWCATAP 118
Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments-Bass Hill (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 481
ISPT Pty Ltd and AWFP Management No 2 Pty Ltd v Cao and Zhao [2023] NSWSC 1115
IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; 191 CLR 1
Luxner Holdings Pty Ltd v Glentham Pty Ltd (2007) 35 WAR 254
Malec v. J.C. Hutton Pty. Ltd. (1990) 169 CLR 638; [1990] HCA 20
Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd (2025) 418 ALR 639; [2025] HCA 25,
Metrolink Victoria Pty Ltd v Inglis (2009) 25 VR 633; [2009] VSCA 227
Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246
Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc [1994] HCA 54; (1994) 181 CLR 404
Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
Promina Design & Construction Pty Ltd v The Owners—Strata Plan No 97449 [2023] NSWCATAP 252
Sabouni v Revelop Building and Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 31
Selkirk v The Owners – Strata Plan No 2661 [2024] NSWCATCD 71
Selkirk v The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661; The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661 v Selkirk [2026] NSWCATAP 211
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; [1994] HCA 4
Silberstein v Strata Choice Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCATAP 375
Smith v The Owners-Strata Plan No 3004 [2022] NSWSC 1599
Stevenson v Ashton [2019] NSWSC 1689
The Owners – Strata Plan No 2661 v Selkirk [2024] NSWSC 760
The Owners - Strata Plan No 33368 v Gittins [2022] NSWCATAP 130
The Owners - Strata Plan No 55468 v Silberstein [2025] NSWCATAP 102
The Owners – Strata Plan No 74232 v Tezel [2023] NSWCA 35
The Owners of Strata Plan No 3397 v Tate [2007] NSWCA 207
The Owners SP 35042 v Seiwa Australia Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 272; 13 BPR 24,789
The Owners-Strata Plan No 33368 v Gittins [2022] NSWCATAP 130
The Owners-Strata Plan No 36613 v Doherty [2021] NSWCATAP 285
The Owners-Strata Plan No 37762 v Pham [2006] NSWSC 1287
The Owners-Strata Plan No 68307 v Horan (No 4) [2026] NSWCATAP 223
Vickery v The Owners-Strata Plan 80412 (2020) 103 NSWLR 352; [2020] NSWCA 284
Vojkoic v Bicioc [2020] NSWCATAP 128
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v The Owners-Strata Plan No 61618 [2022] NSWSC 1246
White House Developments Pty Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan No 70276 [2025] NSWCATAP 68
Texts Cited: None cited
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Case Number 2023/00381512
Tung (Kim) Quang Hang (first applicant)
Kien Xuan Tran (second applicant)
The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 (respondent)
Case Number 2023/00381302
Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd (applicant)
The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 (respondent)
Case Number 2024/00065826
The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 (applicant)
Tung (Kim) Quang Hang (first respondent)
Kien Xuan Tran (second respondent)
Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd (third respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
Case Number 2023/00381512
G Edwards (applicants)
D Knoll AM and C Purdy (respondent)
Case Number 2023/00381302
G Edwards (applicant)
D Knoll AM and C Purdy (respondent)
Case Number 2024/00065826
C Purdy (applicant)
G Edwards (respondents)
Solicitors:
Case Number 2023/00381512
JA Buda & Associates (applicants)
Holman Webb (respondent)
Case Number 2024/00381512
Holman Webb (applicant)
JA Buda & Associates (respondents)
File Number(s): 2023/00381512; 2023/00381302; 2024/00065826
Publication restriction: Nil
In this decision, any reference to “the owners corporation” is a reference to The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261; any reference to “the lot owners” is a reference to Tung (Kim) Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran; and any reference to “the tenant” or “Tornados” is a reference to “Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd”.
In various documents and submissions to the Tribunal, “Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd” has been referred to as “Tornados Smokehouse” and “Tornados Smokehouse Pty Ltd.” However, it is clear from the business records in this matter that the correct legal entity of the tenant is “Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd.” That is also the name of lessee on the lease between the lot owners and Tornados.
Regrettably, due to a number of factors including the complex procedural history of the proceedings; the extent of the evidence; and the complexity of the issues in dispute, the decision has taken more time than usual to complete.
In preparing the decision, the Tribunal has read and considered the tendered material and transcripts of hearing. The Tribunal has also listened to the sound recording of the closing oral submissions of the parties on 4 June 2025.
The dispute arises from the mechanical ventilation system of commercial lots of a strata scheme.
There is no dispute that, at the relevant time, the mechanical ventilation system fell into a state of disrepair, causing smoke and fumes to enter the strata building from the use of the mechanical ventilation system by Tornados, who operated a restaurant. This led to the local Council issuing orders that caused Tornados to cease trading, and order the owners corporation to conduct certain repairs. Some of the critical issues in the dispute involve who is responsible for the repair and maintenance of the mechanical ventilation system.
There are 3 sets of proceedings. One is by the lot owners against the owners corporation seeking damages under ss 106(5) and 232 of the Strata Schemes Management Act 2015 (NSW) (SSM Act). The second is the former tenant (Tornados) seeking damages under s 232 of the SSM Act against the owners corporation for the tort of negligence. The third is the owners corporation against the lot owners. The owners corporation seeks damages for reimbursement of monies expended to conduct repairs pursuant to orders of the local Council.
A jurisdiction issue has been raised by the owners corporation in respect of the proceedings by the former tenant against the owners corporation. In closing oral submissions, the former tenant sought that, if the Tribunal found the proceedings were outside its jurisdiction because the former tenant was not an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act who could take Tribunal proceedings, the former tenant’s proceedings should be transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction. That issue is one of the issues addressed in the decision.
The relevant property involves a kitchen ventilation system to commercial lots.
Both the lot owners and the former tenant are represented by the same Barrister, Ms Edwards of Council. She is instructed by a Solicitor in the lot owners proceedings against the owners corporation (Mr Buda), but acts on a direct access basis in respect of the tenant’s proceedings against the owners corporation.
The former tenant has not taken any proceedings against the lot owners for breach of the retail lease between the parties.
There are two registered strata schemes. They were registered on or about 11 December 2006.
Strata Plan No 77261 is the strata scheme for the commercial lots in the strata building. Strata Plan No 77260 is the strata scheme for the residential lots. Both are strata plans are registered separately in respect of lots 1 and 2 of deposited plan DP 1098478.
Strata Plan No 77260 has 35 lots. Strata Plan No 77261 has 7 lots. The residential strata scheme is also known as “TEMPO Residential.” The commercial strata scheme is also known as “TEMPO Commercial.”
In this decision, any reference to “the owners corporation” is a reference to the owners corporation for the commercial lots (i.e. The Owners Strata Plan No 77261) unless it is clear that reference is being made to the owners corporation for the residential lots (i.e. The Owners Strata Plan No 77260).
There is a Building Management Committee (BMC) that liaises between the two registered strata schemes.
The commercial strata scheme has registered by-laws. An important by-law is By-law 22, which the owners corporation submits places responsibility on the owners of lots 5 and 6 (i.e. Mr Hang and Ms Tran), rather than the owners corporation, for the maintenance and repair of the relevant parts of the kitchen exhaust system.
There are various registered easements applicable to the residential strata plan and the commercial strata plan. The are set out in the documents at pp 1588-1599 of the tender bundle lodged prior to the hearing on 19 February 2024. The relevant easement pertains to the dispersal of exhaust from the commercial lots in the building.
At all relevant times, the lot owners are and have been the owners of lots 5 and 6 in the commercial strata scheme (The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261). The lots are also known as shop 5 and shop 6. They are located on the grounds floor of the strata building. The lot owners purchased lots 5 and 6 on about 28 September 2015.
The relevant events prior to the local Council issuing orders in respect of works to the kitchen ventilation system in August 2022 will be set out in more detail later in the decision. However, at this juncture, it is appropriate to give a brief overview of the facts.
Between 2015 and 2020, lots 5 and 6 were leased from the lot owners by a business known as “Porticos Chicken”. There was very limited evidence as to what type of commercial cooking “Porticos Chicken” performed. However, it appears that business was primarily a take-away chicken store, with some seating.
In 2020, the lot owners entered into negation with another take-away chicken business, Frangos Chicken, to operate from lots 5 and 6. A lease was signed on about 7 December 2020. However, the owners corporation voted against a Motion to apply its seal to a Development Application in respect of proposed modification of the common property to facilitate the operation of Frangos Chicken. The lot owners did not make any application to the Tribunal for an order under s 232(6) of the SSM Act that the owners corporation consent to the Development Application. Rather, the lease with Frangos Chicken did not proceed, and Frangos Chicken found a different location to operate from in the same suburb.
On about 3 January 2022, the lot owners entered into a 5 year retail lease with Tornados to operate a “smokehouse” style restaurant and take-away. The affidavit of Mr Romanov, director of Tornados, dated 10 October 2023 included a menu of Tornados Smokehouse. According to Mr Romanov, the system of cooking of Tornados involved “cold smoking” meats.
Tornados commenced operating the restaurant (after fitting out the lot) on or about 4 April 2022.
A short period of time later, a resident and lot owner in the residential strata scheme complained to the owners corporation and the local Council about unpleasant and excessive odours and fumes allegedly emanating from the restaurant.
In June 2022, the owners corporation engaged Baratech Engineering Pty Ltd (Baratech) to conduct an investigation. Baratech issued a report dated 17 June 2022. Mr Lu was the author of the report.
On 27 June 2022, the local Council (City of Canada Bay Council) represented by Mr Oustambasidis, Co-ordinator, Building and Compliance, conducted an inspection of the strata building. The inspection revealed that smoke was detected in common, commercial and residential compartments of the building due to inadequate mechanical ventilation and associated inadequate fire separation/compartmentalisation measures.
On 17 August 2022, the local Council issued to the lot owners an Emergency Development Control Order under s 9.34(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) that Tornados cease operation until the mechanical ventilation system has been upgraded in accordance with an approved scope of works that is certified and approved by the local Council. The notice stated that significant financial penalties would be imposed if the order was not complied with.
On 25 August 2022, City of Canada Bay issued to the owners corporation a Development Control Order-Fire Safety Order under Item 1, Part 2 Schedule 5 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW). The Fire Safety Order directed that the kitchen mechanical ventilation system servicing the cooking operations of Tornados not be used until an approved scope of works that is certified and approved by the local Council. The notice contained a Fire Safety Schedule, and identified that the owners corporation was to:
Engage the services of an accredited practitioner (fire safety) and practicing mechanical ventilation engineer to perform and submit an audit of the mechanical ventilation system.
Engage the services of an appropriately qualified Accredited Certifier to audit the building and the findings of the mechanical ventilation audit to ensure compliance with the Building Code of Australia and recommendations regarding the mechanical ventilation system of the building, and if applicable, a new/updated Fire Safety Schedule.
Provide and obtain local Council approval prior to commencing work.
Obtain local Council certification for each stage as the works are progressing.
The notice contained the following:
“Reason for Issuing the Order
1. The provision for fire safety or fire safety awareness is inadequate to prevent fire, supress fire & prevent the spread of fire.
2. Mechanical ventilation, Dampers and Fire seals were not on the current fire safety schedule for the building and subsequently not maintained as required with the annual fire safety statement (AFSS).
3. Defective mechanical ventilation system servicing the occupancy know as Tornados Smoke House.
4. Preliminary maintenance works, investigation reports and recommendations of the mechanical ventilation system provided by Baratech Engineering revealed defects/unsafe conditions.
5. The Lack (sic) maintenance and certification of the mechanical ventilation system constitutes a significant fire hazard.
6. Evidence of smoke entering common areas, commercial and residential compartments of the building which are required to be separated with adequate fire safety measures, provisions and fire rated construction.
7. To ensure the safety of persons in the event of a fire.
8. For the reasons outlined above, it is considered appropriate for the Council to issue an emergency fire safety order pursuant to Section 9.34(1)(b) of the Act”.
The notice gave the owners corporation 21 days from the date of the order to complete and submit the mechanical ventilation audit; 28 days from the date of the order to complete and submit the Building Code of Australia (BCA) and incorporated mechanical ventilation audit strategy; and 42 days from the date of the order to commence and complete the approved audit strategy.
The notice also set out the significant financial penalties that may apply to non-compliance with the order.
At all relevant times, Mr Romanov was the sole director and shareholder of Tornados.
Immediately, or very soon after, Mr Romanov was provided with a copy of the City of Canada Bay notice of 17 August 2022, Tornados ceased to trade. It never recommenced trading from the site.
On or about 23 April 2023, the lease between Tornados and the lot owners was terminated by consent due to frustration. A written termination agreement was attached to the affidavit of Mr Romanov dated 10 October 2023. The security deposit was paid to Tornados and the premises was defitted.
Between 23 April 2023 and the conclusion of the Tribunal hearing in September 2024 (exclusive of the listing of the matter in June 2025 for oral closing submissions), lots 5 and 6 have remained vacant.
As at the date of the conclusion of the Tribunal hearing in September 2024, the owners corporation had performed some, but not all, of the works arising from the orders of the local Council on 17 and 25 August 2022.
The proceedings have an extensive procedural history, both before and after the hearing dates. That procedural history is based on numerous interlocutory disputes and extension of time for the lodging and serving of submissions after the conclusion of the hearing. It is unnecessary to set out in detail the procedural history of the proceedings, but it has increased the challenges of determining the proceedings.
Separate to listings for interlocutory disputes and procedural directions hearings, the main hearings were conducted in February and September 2024 when witnesses gave evidence. There was a directions hearing on 26 March 2025 and oral closing submissions were made on 4 June 2025, in circumstances where the Tribunal was compelled to list the proceedings for oral closing submissions because the legal representatives for the lot owners and Tornados had not complied with procedural directions for the lodging and serving of written closing submissions. Counsel for the lot owners and Tornados attributed this failure to comply with directions to medical issues faced by Counsel, that are unnecessary to detail.
The lot owners proceedings and Tornados proceedings were listed for hearing on 19 and 20 February 2024. The proceedings of the owners corporation were not listed for hearing on those dates, having been recently filed.
It is appropriate to set out the outline of written submissions of the parties as of the first hearing dates to identify their respective positions at that time.
On 1 February 2024, the lot owners and Tornados had lodged and served a written outline of opening submissions, prepared by Ms Edwards of Counsel.
The lot owners’ submitted that between 2015 (when the lot owners purchased lots 5 and 6 in the commercial strata scheme) and 2019 the lot was tenanted by Porticos Chicken, whose lease was terminated for non-payment of rent. In December 2020, the lot owners had signed a lease with Frangos Chicken, but the owners corporation had refused, at a general meeting of the owners corporation on 15 December 2020, to consent to the lodging of a Development Application with the local Council pertaining to the fit-out of Frangos Chicken.
The lot owners’ submit that, after the lease with Frangos Chicken did not proceed, they were “without a tenant for another year” and were “forced to offer 6 months’ rent free to attract another commercial tenant”.
In January 2020, the lot owners entered into a 5 year lease with Tornados. The rent was $10,000 plus GST per month, with a 3% annual increase “as of 2023”.
The lot owners submit that Tornados ceased to operate after the issue of the following orders from Canada Bay Council:
An Emergency Development Control Order under s 9.34(1)(b) of Schedule 5 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) to cease cooking operations and the use of the mechanical ventilation system servicing the cooking activities on 17 August 2022.
A Fire Safety Order “in relation to the defective mechanical ventilation system servicing Tornados” which “also found that the damper and fire seals were not on the current fire safety schedule for the building and not maintained with the annual fire safety statement” on 25 August 2022.
A further Fire Safety Order on the owners corporation dated 11 October 2022. This was issued despite the owners corporation making representations to Canada Bay Council on 20 September 2022 that orders only be issued upon the lot owners. The Fire Safety Order of 11 October 2022 “contained the same reasons” as the Order of 25 August 2022.
As a result of the orders of the local Council, Tornados lease was terminated. The lot owners cannot obtain another tenant until the owners corporation complies with the necessary works under the local Council orders, and had lost the tenancy of Tornados and the ability to rent the premises to a different tenant. As of the date of submissions, the owners corporation had not completed the compliance or rectification work to common property.
The lot owners submit the owners corporation had breached its duty under s 106(1) of the SSM Act and it was entitled to damages for reasonably foreseeable loss under ss 106(5) and 232(1) of the SSM Act. In respect of breach, the lot owners submit that the owners corporation failed to:
(a) Heed warnings that there were defects and faults in the system. (b) Conduct proper maintenance and certification. (c) Ensure the ventilation system, dampers and fire seals were on the current fire safety schedule for the building. (d) Ensure the ventilation system, dampers and fire seals were maintained as required by the annual fire safety statement. (e) Failed to comply with special by-law 22 in the period 2020-2022. (f) Failed to “find a solution to the issues in a timely manner” between April 2022 and August 2022.
The lot owners submissions refer to various authorities regarding breach of s 106(1) of the SSM Act and the awarding of damages under ss 106(5) and 232 of the SSM Act, including The Owners-Strata Plan No 33368 v Gittins [2022] NSWCATAP 130 (at [57]-[59]); Vickery v The Owners-Strata Plan 80412 (2020) 103 NSWLR 352; [2020] NSWCA 284; The Owners-Strata Plan No 36613 v Doherty [2021] NSWCATAP 285; and Smith v The Owners-Strata Plan No 3004 [2022] NSWSC 1599.
The lot owners seek damages. However, the submissions are silent as to the quantum of damages sought. The lot owners conclude by submitting that they seek a costs order; and that r 38 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules) applies to the proceedings, as the amount claimed or in dispute exceeds $30,000.
No submissions are made in respect of whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The submissions appear based on an assumption the Tribunal has jurisdiction.
Tornados submits that Mr Romanov, the sole director of Tornados, is a chef and “developed the concept for Tornados.”
In January 2022, Mr Romanov inspected the rangehood in the premises, and determined it required a deep clean. He engaged “G & J Filter to replace the filters in the rangehood every month thereafter from May -August 2022”.
Tornados fitted out the premises between January and April 2022. In April 2022, the restaurant had a “soft launch”. None of the fit out work involved any work on the rangehood; ducts; fans or mechanical duct serving the kitchen.
Shortly after cooking operations commenced, a resident in Unit 3 “reported ingress of smoke and fumes into his unit”.
On 27 June 2022, an officer of City of Canada Bay Council performed an inspection.
On 17 August 2022, the Council served Tornados with an Emergency Development Control order causing Tornados to cease operation as it could not use the kitchen mechanical ventilation system.
On 11 October 2022, City of Canada Bay Council issued a Development Control Order comprising a Fire Safety Order on the owners corporation. The effect of this order was that Tornados could not trade until the owners corporation performed the works pursuant to the orders.
Tornados identifies its causes of action against the owners corporation as breach of “its duty both at general law under s 106(1) of the SSM Act with respect to a claim in negligence against the respondent”.
Reference is made to the tort of negligence. No reference is made to the tort of nuisance.
Tornados submits that it was an “interested person” with standing to sue the owners corporation as it was “a legal occupier of the property as of 3 January 2022”.
The submissions refer to emails and reports of Baratech Engineering (Mr Luis Lu) in June 2022. According to Tornados, Mr Lu sent “an email and reports” to the strata manager Mr Castrogiovanni on 17 and 21 June 2022 advising that the cause of the kitchen ventilation system problem is “fire rating problems”. The report stated that “at the same time around April 2022 (as the restaurant opening) the building kitchen exhaust and car park exhaust shaft cover was changed”. Mr Lu had emailed the resident who complained (Mr Choi) on 21 June 2022 that “the fundamental problem seems fire rating failure of the shafts and other structures as I mentioned on my latest report”.
Tornados submits that from May 2022 there was an “internal dispute” between the commercial and residential owners corporation’s regarding the cost of repairs; Baratech Engineering was “replaced” and attempts were made to “shift liability” to the lot owners.
According to the submissions, there was “evidence that problems arose regarding the ventilation system as early as 2017 which required repairs”.
Tornados submits that special by-law 22 created an “additional duty” on the owners corporation “regarding the mechanical ventilation system” and that after the by-law was amended in 2020, the owners corporation had “additional duties with regard to the system when it was not in use”. There was no evidence that the owners corporation did any maintenance or repair works on the kitchen ventilation system in the period from 2019 to 2022.
Tornados seeks an award of damages under s 232 of the SSM Act. The amount of damages sought is not identified, other than Tornados relies on the evidence of Mr Nerjati, its accountant. Tornados submits that the damages were reasonably foreseeable, and that it had to close the business.
Tornados submits that its damages fall into “two general categories,” and damages are to be assessed to put Tornados “in the position they would have been had the negligence not occurred.” They are:
(a) The costs associated with the set up and closing down of the restaurant; and (b) The loss of profits of the business “as well as goodwill.”
On 14 February 2024, the owners corporation lodged and served an outline of written submissions by the owners corporation’s then Counsel, Mr Noll AM.
The owners corporation submitted that the pleadings and evidence raised the following issues:
Who is obliged pursuant to SSMA 106 when read together with by-law 22 to maintain and repair the Kitchen Exhaust System (KES) as defined in by-law 31?
Who is obliged to perform the works ordered by City of Canada Bay (Council)?
If the answers to the firs two questions places the maintenance and repair obligation on the respondent owners corporation, then has the obligation been breached?
If, however, the answers to the first two questions places the maintenance and repair obligation on the respondent owners corporation, has that obligation been breached?
Who is liable to pay for the remediation works now underway to repair the Kitchen Exhaust System and some adjacent internal walls?
Is the respondent liable to pay monies to each of the applicants?
Are the applicants liable to pay monies to the respondents?
The owners corporation submitted that by-laws 22 and 31 allocated responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the KES on the lot owners and Tornados rather than the owners corporation. It was submitted that the Tornados, as a tenant, did not have standing to claim damages under ss 106(5) and 232 of the SSM Act, and the Tribunal “does not have jurisdiction to decide a standalone common law negligence claim”, notwithstanding the “suggestion otherwise” in Silberstein v Strata Choice Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCATAP 375 at [30].
No submission was made that Tornados was not an “interested person” with standing to bring proceedings against the owners corporation for the tort of negligence; as distinct from a submission that the Tribunal had no power “to decide a standalone common law negligence claim.”
The owners corporation opening submissions briefly set out some of the events between 7 April 2022, when the “residents of unit 3” complained to the strata manager Mr Castrogiovanni about smoke ingress and the termination of the lease by Tornados in April 2023. The submissions included reference to the local Council issuing a “further Development Control Order” pursuant to the En**vironmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) on 11 October 2022, which:
“…mandated that the registered proprietors of SP 77261 engage an accredited fire safety practitioner and mechanical ventilation engineer audit the mechanical ventilation system; audit the building against the Building Code of Australia, particularly in respect of the mechanical ventilation system; and upgrade the mechanical ventilation system in accordance with a plan approved by the Council. The works were required to take place by 23 November 2022…”
“The use, and indeed abuse, of the Kitchen Exhaust System (whether by the lot owner or the tenant) caused damage to the residential lots and common property. Not only that, the damage necessitated repairs, which they should have, but did not, carry out…”
The owners corporation’s submissions set out extracts from the by-laws, particularly 2.1; 2.7; 22; and 31. It was submitted that, at all relevant times (including the original by-laws registered in March 2007 and amended and registered in 2015 and 2020) the maintenance and repair of the Kitchen Exhaust System was the responsibility of “each User of the Kitchen Exhaust System”, which meant the lot owners and Tornados.
The owners corporation submitted that it had engaged DualTech Pty Ltd (Dual Tech) to perform the works ordered by the local Council, and that Dual Tech provided a scope of works in the amount of $64,207. After negotiation, Dual Tech agreed to an amount of $44,924.44 and the owners corporation resolved to accept that amount on 9 October 2023. As at the date of the submissions, the owners corporation had paid $31,447.11 and Dual Tech had “commenced” the works.
The lot owners Tribunal proceedings were lodged with the Tribunal Registry on 7 August 2023.
In Points of Claim dated 9 October 2023, the lot owners seek “damages, interest, costs and such further or other orders as the Tribunal deems appropriate” by reason of the owners corporation failing to comply with its duty under s 106(1) and (2) of the SSM Act. Although ss 106(5) and 232 of the SSM Act are not referred to, it is clear that the cause of action relied upon is the statutory cause of action under ss 106(5) and 232 of the SSM Act.
The Points of Claim dated 9 October 2023 do not quantify the amount of damages sought.
Tornados proceedings were lodged with the Tribunal Registry on 10 August 2023, approximately 5.5 months after termination of its lease with the lot owners.
In Points of Claim dated 9 October 2023, Tornados seeks “damages, interests, costs and such further or other orders as the Tribunal deems appropriate”. The cause of action is identified as “breach of duty of care” ([19] and [24]) and “negligence” ([25]). In substance, the Points of Claim identify the cause of action as the tort of negligence. No quantification of the amount of damages sought was identified in the Points of Claim.
On 8 November 2023, the owners corporation lodged Points of Defence in to Tornados Points of Claim. The Points of Defence deny or otherwise do not admit the allegations of Tornados. The Points of Defence admit the owners corporation is responsible for the control, management and administration of common property.
The Points of Defence do not plead that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the proceedings of Tornados because Tornados is not an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act.
In its application lodged on 14 February 2024, “Annexure A” to the application identifies the orders sought against the lot owners and Tornados as:
Indemnification of the owners corporation “for the costs of repairing the common property” under by-law 2.7.
Payment under s 120(5) of the SSM Act for the reimbursement of the amount expended by the owners corporation to repair damage to common property.
Payment of damages under s 132(1)(b) of the SSM Act for the amount expended to repair damage to the common property.
No procedural directions were made in respect of Points of Claim or Points of Defence being lodged and served in respect of the owners corporation’s proceedings.
On 14 March 2024, the Tribunal made an order that the owners corporation’s proceedings be listed for hearing with the lot owners proceedings and Tornados proceedings, and that evidence in each set of proceedings is to be regarded as evidence in the related proceedings.
The documentary materials relied upon by the parties were tendered into evidence subject to weight and relevance.
Prior to the hearing on 19 and 20 February 2024, the owners corporation lodged a Tender Bundle comprising of 5 volumes (1941 pages).
The documentary evidence included:
Affidavit of Mr Nathan Castrogiovanni (strata manager) dated 8 December 2023.
Affidavit of Mr Nick Screnci (strata committee member) dated 8 December 2023.
Report of Mr Michael Lawford and Mr James Doncas of Asset Property (real estate rental valuation) dated 1 December 2023.
Report of Mr Damien Beven (forensic accountant) dated 15 February 2024.
The Tender Bundle also contained a large amount of documentary materials which were not annexed to any affidavits, but comprised of separate documents in volume 5.
The lot owners also tendered a further bundle of documents produced under Summons by the local Council. This contained additional material that was not in the tender bundle of the owners corporation, although most of the documents lodged and served that the parties relied upon were contained in the owners corporation’s tender bundle.
Prior to the hearing on 3 and 4 September 2024, the parties lodged an Updated Tender Bunde.
The Updated Tender Bundle comprised 3 volumes (1204 pages).
The Updated Tender Bundle contained the following further documentary evidence:
Further report of Mr Nejati dated 5 March 2024.
Further report of Mr Beven dated 28 March 2024.
Joint Expert Report of Mr Nejati and Mr Beven dated 8 May 2024.
Affidavit of Mr Romanov dated 9 August 2024.
Affidavit of Mr Buda (Solicitor for the lot owners) dated 13 August 2024.
Affidavit of Mr Tripodina dated 29 August 2024.
Affidavit of Tung Quang Hang dated 29 August 2024.
Affidavits of Mr Castrogiovanni dated 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024.
Various company searches and documents produced under Summons in respect of business involving Mr Romanov.
A transcript of the hearing on 19 February 2024.
As discussed previously, the by-laws of the strata scheme are critical to the disposition of the dispute.
The By-laws are set out at pp 1662 to 1800 of the Tender Bundle lodged prior to the hearing on 19 February 2024.
It is appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of the by-laws as of registration on 2 November 2020, which included the amended by-law 22.
By-law 22 is headed “Kitchen Exhaust System” and states as follows:
21 (sic).1 Use of Grease Arrestor
You have the right to:
(a) use the Kitchen Exhaust System; and
(b) install an exhaust fan unit on the Common Property roof for the purpose of operating the Kitchen Exhaust System; and
(c) make minor alterations to Common Property and install pipes, wires, cables and ducts in Common Property necessary to connect the exhaust fan unit to the Kitchen Exhaust System.
22.2 Maintenance obligations
Each Owner or Occupier who uses the Kitchen Exhaust System (each a “User” and collectively the “Users”) must:
(a) Properly maintain the Kitchen Exhaust System (but not carry out any structural maintenance, repairs, or replacements) and
(b) properly maintain, repair and, where necessary, replace:
(i) the exhaust fan unit installed according to this by-law (whether or not installed by such User); and
(ii) any pipes, wires, cables and ducts installed according to this by-law (whether or not installed by such User) connecting such User’s Commercial Suite and exhaust fan unit to the Kitchen Exhaust System; and
(c) make good any Common Property the User interferes with while exercising its rights under this by-law to the satisfaction of the Owners Corporation (acting reasonably); and
(d) comply with the requirements of any Government Agencies in respect of the Kitchen Exhaust System; and
(e) comply with the reasonable requirements of the Owners Corporation when exercising its rights and complying with its obligations under this by-law.
22.3 Obligations of the Owners Corporation
(a) carry out any structural maintenance and structural repairs to the Kitchen Exhaust System as required and, where necessary, replace the Kitchen Exhaust System; and
(b) if there are not Users, maintain and repair the Kitchen Exhaust System.
22.4 Costs
(a) Subject to by-law 22.4(b):
(i) the Users must pay all costs incurred under by-law 22.2; and
(ii) the Users must pay all costs incurred by the Owners Corporation under by-laws 22.3(a) and
(iii) where there is more than one User, the costs incurred by the Users under this by-law 22 shall be apportioned equally between those Users (for example, where there are 3 Users, the costs shall be apportioned equally between those Users in 1/3rd shares).
(b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this by-law, by-laws 22.2(b); 22.2(c) and 22.2(e) shall be the responsibility of the individual User.
By-law 31 contains the “interpretation” definitions applicable to the by-laws.
There is no definition of “structural maintenance, repairs, or replacements” to assist with the interpretation of by-law 22 (a) and (b), nor a further definition of “user” beyond what is set out in the first sentence of by-law 22.
“Government Agency” under by-law 22.2(d) is defined as:
“…a governmental or semi-governmental administrative, fiscal or judicial department or entity.”
Kitchen Exhaust System means the Common Property kitchen exhaust system located in TEMPO Commercial and includes:
(a) any Common Property mechanical equipment for the operation of the kitchen exhaust system; and
(b) all Common Property pipes, ducts, vents and other services associated with the use, operation, maintenance and repair of the kitchen exhaust system.
Common Property means Common Property in TEMPO Commercial and personal property of the Owners Corporation. For the purposes of the by-laws, Common Property does not included Shared Facilities.
23 Damage to Common Property
23.1 What are your obligations?
Subject to the by-laws, you must:
(a) use Common Property equipment only for its intended purpose; and
(b) immediately notify the Owners Corporation if you know about damage to or a defect in Common Property; and
(c) compensate the Owners Corporation for any damage to Common Property caused by you, your visitors or persons doing work or carrying out Building Works in TEMPO Commercial on your behalf.
Neither party provided any comprehensive independent expert report identifying the kitchen exhaust system and how the smoke and fumes from Tornados use of the kitchen exhaust system emanated in such a manner that it caused a complaint by a resident and intervention by the local Council. Very little photographic or diagrammatic evidence of the building and kitchen exhaust system was provided by the parties.
Rather, the factual issues as to how the smoke emanated arise from the contemporaneous documentary evidence. In particular, the various expert reports obtained by the owners corporation and the contents of the various Council orders.
The owners corporation, at various times, obtained experts to conduct building inspections. To set out the relevant events, it is necessary to focus on the contemporaneous documentary evidence. The oral evidence of lay witnesses will be referred to later in this decision, but the primary source of evidence is the contemporaneous documentary evidence, that is either attached as annexures to affidavits or additional documents tendered at the hearing by way of business and public documents produced under Summons.
The best evidence of the structure of the building and the issues that caused or contributed to the emanation of smoke and odours from Tornados in April 2022 come from the expert reports engaged by the owners corporation after the occupant of unit 3 complained of smoke and odours (including a complaint of having experienced smoke and odours whilst in the basement car park) and the reports engaged as part of the process of responding to the local Council orders.
“…the smoke is quite random. It doesn’t happen all the time. But when it happens we can smell strong burning smell from both our bathrooms and ducted aircon vents.
Last Sunday was particularly bad and we could smell the smoke in the basement car park and also a little bit on foyer.”
“As I mentioned over the phone, Huey from HTL Air Conditioning and Electrical inspected our unit and the restaurant today regarding smoke ingress to our property.
He recommended that we look at the mechanical plan of the building to correctly diagnose the problem. He thinks the smoke is leaking from the riser and entering our unit. The riser is located just outside our unit entrance and I believe it runs through the rooftop.
As this has been ongoing for a few months now (since the opening of the restaurant) and related to serious health and safety issues, would you please escalate this to the property manager and/or the commercial strata committee for prompt action? Regrettably, we may have to report this use to Canada Bay Council for their intervention if the issue persists any longer.”
“…thank you for your email and escalating the issue. We really appreciate your help.
Yes, the yellow part of the diagram was what the technician referred to yesterday.
Also, I remember mid last year, the strata did some work on the riser. I am not sure what was done (I think they put a metal covering or something) but would that be the problem? Might be worth noting because I heard from Yeen that this problem didn’t happen when there was a Charcoal Chicken Shop (sic) before.”
There was a further email complaint by Mr Choi to Mr Castrogiovanni about “a really strong smoke smell coming into our unit” on 6 June 2022.
On 7 June 2022, Mr Castrogiovanni emailed Mr Choi stating that he had not had a response from the lot owners agent, and:
“…we have arranged for a separate technician to investigate the matter on behalf of the Commercial strata scheme. Baratech (specialising in mechanical air ventilation) will be in touch with you shorty to arrange an inspection. I have stressed the importance of this matter with them and understand they may have availability to arrange this tomorrow.”
On 7 June 2022 the owners corporation engaged Baratech Engineering (Baratech). Mr Luis Lu was the relevant person at Baratech who provided the services.
On 8 June 2022, Mr Lu emailed Mr Castrogiovanni as follows:
“Hi Nathan,
Our technician and I visited the site today. We climbed up into the plant room to inspect the kitchen exhaust fan and ducts. Also inspected the other areas to see how we could modify to rectify this issue. The following is our finding:
1. The fan is in a mezzanine level in the shop. It is quite a dirty fan, which really needs to be cleaned and serviced for the fire safety purpose and performance reasons.
2. The shaft and the fan belong in one fire zone. This requires the shaft needs to be airtight sealed and fire rated from the bottom of the roof. However, we could not inspect it without accessing the apartments and the roof.
3. The fan blows smoke into the shaft in 90 degrees, which probably runs through all the apartments to the roof. We did not get access to the apartments and roof unfortunately. We called but nobody was available. We must go back again for visiting those units.
4. Talked to the tenants on the phone. They basically told us there was leaks through the shaft into their units, which triggered the fire alarm and had a bit smell (sic).
5. Apparently, we were told there had been more apartments complaining about this issue besides Unit 3. This needs to be reported to us so we can help further.
We will arrange another time to visit the building and roof are for further inspection. Could you please check with the client about how many apartments have this issue, so far? Thanks!”
A further email exchange occurred between Mr Choi and Mr Castrogiovanni on 8 June 2022, with Mr Lu also involved. Mr Lu identified that he would need to conduct a further inspection “when everybody is home and the restaurant is in cooling process.” Mr Choi stated he was not aware if any other occupants or owners of other units in the strata scheme were affected or had complained, but continued to assert that the smoke ingress was a serious health issue.
On 15 June 2022, Mr Choi stated that although a technician was attending on 16 June 2022, he had complained to various authorities including the local Council, because the issue needed to be fixed as soon as possible and the smoke ingress was a serious health issue for Mr Choi and his family.
On 16 June 2022, Baratech conducted a further inspection and issued a report to the strata manager dated 17 June 2022.
The report is summarised as follows:
Unit 3 had report spoke smell and “smoke alarming occasionally”. According to the owner and occupants of Unit 3 “this did not happen before April 2022”, but after the “current chicken (sic) BBQ restaurant moved into Shop 5 and 6”.
There were also odour in the car park of the building “sometimes.”
In around April 2022, “the building kitchen exhaust and car part exhaust shaft cover was changed”; and the owner and occupier of Unit 3 “mentioned that the restaurant before the current chicken (sic) BBQ restaurant in the Shop 5 & 6 was also a chicken (sic) BBQ shop. However, there was not any smell or smoke alarming issues before April 2022”.
Baratech had, since 8 June 2022 “sent an engineer and technicians to the site for investigation” and found:
(a) The restaurant kitchen has two exhaust fans. One is in the ceiling plant room of the restaurant and the other is mounted on the roof. The restaurant kitchen exhaust is connected to the kitchen exhaust riser via the fire rated wall and runs all the way to the roof. It passes through a neighbouring office before connecting to the riser. The office is a “commercial office.” The length of duct through the neighbouring commercial office is fire wrapped. The fire wrap was dropped or torn in some of the areas, and they need to be re-wrapped or repaired to comply with fire requirements. (b) The car park exhaust riser runs in the same shaft of the kitchen exhaust riser. According to the “drawing,” there is a fire separation wall between the kitchen exhaust riser and the car park exhaust riser. That is a standard requirement for fire separation. (c) The kitchen exhaust riser comes out of the shaft and protrudes “a couple of meters from the shaft horizontally.” The car park exhaust outlet is “a direct opening on the riser without any protrusion of the shaft.” There is “several meters distance between the kitchen exhaust outlet and the car park exhaust outlet”.
Baratech also inspected Unit 3. Refrigeration pipes penetrate the toilet wall into the ceiling of the other side towards the shaft direction. The penetration has leak from the other side into the toilet ceiling. Mr Choi mentioned that “there was a strong smell in the toilet and ceiling.” Due to the ceiling restriction, Baratech was not able to see further or to the other side of the wall.
The smoke smell in Unit 3 “happens at the same time when the smell occurs in the basement”. The basement has opening to the car park exhaust shaft at the bottom. The smell is stronger around the opening bottom area of the shaft.
Mr Lu of Baratech had asked Mr Choi to turn on the car park exhaust fan when the smell occurs. Mr Choi had done that for two evenings. The “result is that the car park exhaust fan can clear the smell in the car park and also the smell in Peter’s apartment though the apartment is above the car park.”
Baratech concluded as follows:
Since the car park exhaust fan can clear the smoke smell from the apartment above, that “implicates (sic) there is a leak between the car (sic) and Peter’s apartment.” The architectural design does not arrange any opening connection between the car park and Unit 3. Baratech could not see any leak at any visible areas through the slab. The owner and occupier of Unit 3 “confirmed the smoke smell was not from the windows or doors. It was possible the leak is “through the shaft which connects the car park and adjoining Peter’s apartment. It also “implicates that the shaft separation walls probably are not sealed as per the fire rating requirements.”
The smoke smell “possibly crosses from the kitchen riser to the car park riser via the leaked ducts and shaft walls, which further cools and sinks down to the car park and penetrate into Peter’s apartment as well. However, if it was “true” the issue did not exist before April 2022 “then this possibility exists, but not too high”.
If there was no leak between the two risers, then the other possibility is that discharged smoke from the kitchen exhaust could cool on the roof and enters the outlet of the car park exhaust riser and further drops down along the riser to the car park.
Baratech provided “recommendations” as follows:
The “short term” solution was to turn on the car park exhaust fan to keep the smoke smell away from Unit 3. However, that was not a feasible permanent solution as it “consumers too much energy and pushes up the electricity bills.
The long term solution is “to do an overhaul investigation after cutting some of the ceiling areas” of Unit 3. If leaks are found “just seal them.” However, “the leaks between the two risers within the shaft will be very challenging to fix unless we knock off some walls.”
In addition to the above, if possible, lift the shaft roof cowl within the tiled top cover to give more shaft release space on top. This will “help lessen the restriction of the leaked smoke release.”
The report concludes by stating that “the above three solutions will help, but cannot guarantee 100% fixing the issue as there are areas we cannot reach or currently see”.
Between 20 June 2022 and 28 June 2022, Baratech provided the owners corporation with a number of quotations. The proposed works involved (a) installing a timer to run the exhaust fan during the operating hours of the restaurant; (b) cutting ceilings and possibly part of walls for testing purposes; (c) cleaning the kitchen exhaust ducts, which “have not been cleaned for a very long time.” The quote did not include cleaning kitchen range hoods or filters; (d) lifting or replacing the cowl on the roof to give more release of the leaking smoke. The quote noted that there had been a recently installed new shaft cowl to prevent water leaking into the building. The total amount of the quotations (when added together) was $27,533.
On 27 June 2022, Mr Oustambasidis, of Canada Bay Council, conducted an inspection of the strata building pertaining to the mechanical ventilation system.
On a date subsequent to the inspection of Mr Oustambasidis, the owners corporation approved the quote for Baratech to perform the cleaning of the kitchen exhaust ducts in the amount of $4,235 and that work was performed.
On 19 July 2022, the strata manager wrote to the lot owners stating that, although By-law 22 made the kitchen exhaust the responsibility of the lot owners; due to the urgency of the work the owners corporation had engaged Baratech to clen the kitchen exhaust ducts. The letter states that during the work “it has been revealed that there are several penetrations to the building exhaust system caused by the connection of shop 5 & 6 that are not complaint (photos attached), and Baratech had provided a quotation to repair the penetrations in the amount of $4,349.40”.
The letter stated that the owners corporation would engage Baratech to repair the penetrations, and would seek to recover $8,584.40 from the lot owners. The letter also stated that the lot owners should ensure the exhaust system booster was left on whilst the tenancy was in operation. The letter concluded by stating that the owners corporation had been “approached by the City of Canada Bay” after a complaint by the “residential owner of unit 3” and the owners corporation would seek to recover any “any additional costs as incurred by the Owners Corporation as a result of fire orders etc” under special by-law 2 from the lot owners.
On 17 August 2022, City of Canada Bay Council issued an emergency control order on the lot owners that cooking operations and use of the kitchen mechanical ventilation system cease within 24 hours, and not recommence until appropriate repairs are performed. The order states under the heading “reason for issuing the Order”:
1. The provision for fire safety or fire safety awareness is inadequate to- (a) prevent fire, (b) supress fire, and (c) prevent the spread of fire.
2. Mechanical ventilation, Dampers and Fire seals were not on the current fire safety schedule for the building and subsequently not maintained as required with the annual fire safety statement (AFSS).
3. Defective mechanical ventilation system servicing the occupancy known as Tornados (sic) Smoke House.
4. The Lack (sic) of maintenance and certification of the mechanical ventilation system constitutes a significant fire hazard.
5. Evidence of smoke entering the common areas, commercial and residential compartments of the building which are required to be separated with adequate fire safety measures and fire rated construction.
6. To ensure the safety of persons in the event of fire.
7. The Lack (sic) of maintenance and certification of the mechanical ventilation system constitutes a significant fire hazard.
8. For the reasons outlined above, it is considered appropriate for Council to issue an emergency fire safety order pursuant to Section 9.34(1)(b) of the Act.
On 25 August 2022, City of Canada Bay Council issued a Notice of Intention to Issue a Fire Safety Order and a Development Control Order on the owners corporation. The terms of these orders have been set out previously.
On 7 September 2022, the Annual General Meeting of the owners corporation occurred. Relevantly, it was resolved to engage a “competent fire safety practitioner” to prepare an Annual Fire Safety Statement for the building. The owners corporation had used Eagle Fire as its contractor. There was a notation in the Minutes about the “Kitchen Exhaust System-U 3 Smoke Penetration”. The Minutes state:
“It was noted that since the AGM agenda was issued, City of Canada Bay Council have intervened and issued and emergency control order requiring that Tornados (sic) Smokehouse cease operation until any required repairs/rectification upgrade works to the mechanical ventilation system are undertaken. A notice of intention issue a fire safety order has been issued to the building (both SP 77260 & 77261) and is being considered by the Building Management Committee. The Building Management Committee have authorised for an accredited practitioner and mechanical ventilation engineer to audit the mechanical ventilation system, including the kitchen exhaust system.”
On 7 September 2022, the Building Management Committee met. The Minutes of that meeting relevantly stated that as “the current terms of the proposed order require that all fire safety measures across the building be audited,” it was resolved that “further consideration be given to the pending Eagle Fire quotations and a change in fire service contractors be deferred until Council’s response is received”. Further, the Minutes state that “in the absence of Council’s response by 30/9/2022, the Building Management will reconsider the quotations and authorise a contractor to proceed with the 2022 annual fire inspection”.
On 20 September 2022, after instructions from or on behalf of the owners corporation for the residential strata scheme, Monti Lawyers, wrote to City of Canada Bay Council in respect of the “intention to issue a fire order” that had been made by the Council against the owners corporation and the lot owners.
That letter made a number of representations, which are summarised as follows:
The owners corporation for the residential lots requested that no order be issued on that owners corporation, and the only order be made against the lot owners. The basis of this submission was that it was the lot owners who were using the mechanical ventilation system and the terms of the easement imposed repair and maintenance obligations on the lot owners. The owners corporation submitted that the mechanical ventilation system used by the lot owners was only “partly” on the land of strata plan No 77260, and was “otherwise on the land” of strata plan No 77261, so the “SP 77260 does not and cannot use the mechanical ventilation system under the terms of the Easement and because the key operation parts of the system are not on its land”.
In the alternative, the owners corporation for the residential lots submitted that any order be issued against the lot owners and The Owners Strata Plan No 77261 (i.e. the owners corporation for the commercial lots) as The Owners Strata Plan No 77260 is not responsible for the mechanical ventilation system; or if any order is made against The Owners Strata Plan No 77260 it is delayed until the expiration of the time period for compliance against the lot owners and The Owners Strata Plan No 77261.
In about September 2022, the owners corporation engaged Baratech and Brentnall Certification Pty Ltd (Brentnall BCA) to investigate and report in response to the Orders that were issued by City of Canada Bay Council.
On 10 October 2022, Brentnall BCA issued a report addressed to Baratech. The report stated that Brentnall BCA had been engaged to provide advice regarding the requirements of the Building Code of Australia as they relate to the kitchen exhaust system; and also a fire safety audit “to satisfy the requirements of the proposed fire order to be issued by Canada Bay Council.” The fire safety audit report was issued under separate cover.
The report is 4 pages in length. It states that an inspection of the building was undertaken on 27 September 2022. On page 2 of the report, there is a detailed description of the kitchen exhaust system and what was observed at the inspection on 27 September 2022. The kitchen exhaust system is described as follows:
“(i) The kitchen exhaust form commercial tenancy 5 runs from the kitchen area of Tenancy 5, through the ceiling void over tenancy 6 and then into a shaft that extends to the roof.
(ii) The vertical shaft adjoins the front wall of Units 2 & 3 at the 1st floor level, and is then separated from apartments by a balcony on the 2nd and 3rd floor levels.
(iii) The kitchen exhaust runs in separate shafts, adjacent to each other. The carpark exhaust shaft runs form the basement soffit and the kitchen exhaust runs from the ground floor soffit. Both shafts extend beyond the roof covering.
(iv) The carpark exhaust is located in the eastern shaft, adjacent to Unit 2, with the kitchen exhaust located in the western shaft, adjacent to Unit 3.
(v) The shafts are of masonry construction, with the visible external walls rendered.
(vii) The construction of the affected apartments has a plasterboard internal lining. The original plans indicate masonry construction around the shafts, however, this couldn’t be confirmed by visual construction. It is assumed that if this masonry shaft does not exist, it wouldn’t be rendered.
(viii) There were no obvious defects apparent with the visible ductwork associated with the kitchen carpark exhaust systems or the shafts they were contained in.”
The masonry construction to the EDB cupboard to Level 3 contained numerous gaps that would enable the escape of smoke from what is required to be a fire rated wall.
The report states that Brentall BCA were informed there was “anecdotal evidence” that smoke from the commercial tenant (i.e. Tornados) had emanated from downlights on the lower and upper levels of Apartment 3; and a small gap outside the entry door to Apartment 3; and from a weephole in the outside wall of the masonry shaft at the 1st floor level; and a downlight at the entry of Apartment 2; and the bas of the carpark exhaust shaft at the basement soffit.
The report states that the “evidence provided” indicates:
“1.1. There is a significant leak occurring from the ductwork associate with the kitchen exhaust from Commercial Tenancy 5, allowing smoke to escape from the kitchen exhaust duct, into its containing shaft.
1.2 Smoke is leaking from the kitchen exhaust shaft into:
(a) Unit 3
(b) The external wall of the shaft in the vicinity of the entry to Unit 3;
(c) The adjacent carpark exhaust shaft.
1.3 Smoke is leaking via a secondary path into Apartment 2 and the carpark.
It is the opinion of this office that there is a very high probability, that the building contains the following defects relating to the building exhaust system:
2.1. The kitchen exhaust duct contains gaps that allow the escape of smoke.
2.2 The shaft containing the kitchen exhaust duct contains gaps that allow the escape of smoke.
Additionally, the defects identified also give cause for concern for the following construction elements, which will be more fully investigated in the BCA fire safety audit report for the building:
3.1 The masonry construction generally is likely to be substandard, on the basis of the escape of smoke from the kitchen and carpark exhaust shafts.
3.2 The construction of mechanical ductwork is likely to be substandard, on the basis of the escape of smoke form the kitchen exhaust duct.”
“1. Commercial Tenancy 5 must not be operated until such time as all defects identified in relation to the kitchen exhaust are rectified and approved.
2. Detailed inspection of the kitchen exhaust and carpark exhaust ductwork to identify the condition of ductwork and associated seals by a suitably qualified mechanical engineer.
3. Detailed inspection of the kitchen exhaust shaft and carpark exhaust shaft to determine the standard of construction and identify any elements of the shaft that may allow the passage of smoke. That inspection must be carried out:
(a) in the vicinity of Apartments 2 & 3,
(b) at the ground floor if in the vicinity of Commercial tenancies 4 and 6; and
(c) the intersection of the shafts with the roof structure.
It is recommended that the inspection of the shaft in the vicinity of Apartments 2 & 3 involve the removal of plasterboard walls in those apartments, to identify the standard of construction of the walls separating the shafts and the apartments.
It will also be likely necessary to expose the wall junction between Apartments 2 & 3 and the shaft to identify the standard of construction at that junction. This is necessary to confirm whether or not the defective construction is limited to the shaft, or extends to other elements of the building.
4. Development of a detailed scope of rectification works to address any shortcomings identified with regard to the associated ductwork or the enclosing shafts.
5. Development and completion of a program of rectification works.”
On 20 October 2022, Baratech wrote to the strata manager stating that Baratech and Brentnall BCA had “worked together” to perform a BCA inspection. The letters states a copy of the “BCA report” was attached. However, it is not clear what report was attached to the letter of Baratech, as the Brentnall BCA assessment report in respect of the building contained in the Tender Bundle is dated 1 November 2022.
In any event, in the letter of 20 October 2022, Baratech makes recommendations that “focus” on the kitchen exhaust system, and “other fire safety inspection and rectification would be carried out separately upon instruction from Conti Strata”. The recommendations involved removing plasterboard lining of the walls adjoining the shaft; cutting holes into the ceilings of units 2 and 3 to inspect leaking points; removing ceiling tiles of the “Stellar office” (which appears to be a reference to the adjoining commercial tenant to lots 5 and 6) to inspect the kitchen exhaust ducts travelling to the kitchen exhaust shaft; and removing ducts within the carpark shaft and inspecting the leaks of the partition wall between the kitchen exhaust shaft and car park exhaust shaft.
On 11 October 2022, City of Canada Bay Council issued a Development Control Order (also known as Fire Safety Order) under the EPA Act to the owners corporation. The purpose of the order was identified as being to ensure fire safety.
The Development Control Order directed that the kitchen mechanical ventilation system serving lots 5 and 6 not be used until works were performed to the satisfaction of the Council. The Order directed that the owners corporation engage an Accredited Practitioner (Fire Safety) and practicing mechanical ventilation engineer to perform an audit of the premises in respect of compliance with standards and codes; and to engage “an appropriately qualified Certifier” to perform and submit an audit of whether “deemed to satisfy” fire safety provisions had been complied with. A strategy/recommendations was to be prepared and approved by Council. There would then be a “fire safety upgrade and mechanical ventilation works” performed. The Order set out the timeframe for compliance.
The Order sets out the “Reason for Issuing the Order” as follows:
“1. The provision for fire safety or fire safety awareness is inadequate to prevent fire, suppress fire, & prevent the spread of fire.
2. Mechanical ventilation, Dampers and Fire seals were not on the current fire safety schedule for the building and subsequently not maintained as required by with the annual fire safety statement (AFSS).
3. Defective mechanical ventilation system servicing the occupancy known as Tornados (sic) Smoke House.
4. Preliminary maintenance works, investigation reports and recommendations of the mechanical ventilation system provided by Baratech Engineering revealed defects/unsafe conditions.
5. The Lack (sic) of maintenance and certification of the mechanical ventilation system constitutes a significant fire hazard.
6. Evidence of smoke entering common areas, commercial and residential compartments of the building which are required to be separated with adequate fire safety measures, provisions and fire rated construction.
7. To ensure the safety of persons in the event of fire.
8. For the reasons outlined above, it is considered appropriate for Council to issue an emergency fire safety order pursuant to Section 9.34(1)(b) of the Act”.
On 27 October 2022, the strata manager Mr Castrogiovanni emailed Mr Lu of Baratech seeking clarification and costings in respect of the letter of Baratech dated 20 October 2022. Mr Lu responded to the email and his responses are, incorporated into a single email that contains the enquiry and the response (p 1405 of the Tender Bundle tendered at the first hearing date). Mr Lu estimated that wall and ceiling cutting would cost approximately $6,800 plus GST; inspection of ducts and risers inside the shaft would cost approximately $25,000 plus GST (excluding any repair works); and the “ballpark figure” for repairs (which could not be accurately quoted until the inspection was performed) was $90,000 plus GST in addition to $15,000 plus GST for the costs of inspection and certification.
The email of Mr Lu contained the following comment:
“It seems a lot of ducts and shaft walls have problems. The ducts in the Stellar office and in the shaft have problems. It is not only one or two ducts. The extent could not be determined at this stage. We must do a detailed inspection to decide.”
On 1 November 2022 (or by way of a report dated 1 November 2022) Brentall BCA completed its “assessment report” in respect of compliance with the Building Code of Australia pertaining to fire safety. That report comprises 41 pages. A number of instances of non-compliance with the BCA are identified in the report. Relevantly, the report states the following:
In respect of “existing site conditions,” the report states:
“…
The specific areas identified where the construction of masonry fire rated walls was not acceptable are:
(a) the construction of the kitchen exhaust shaft, including walls bounding Units 2 & 3, as evidenced by the ingress of smoke to those apartments from the kitchen of Commercial Tenancy 5; and
(b) the electrical enclosure in the lobby of Level 3 contains masonry walls separating it from Unit 15. The visible masonry are constructed with visible gaps between the bricks, which would not achieve the necessary fire resistance levels.
It is unclear if the substandard masonry construction identified was an isolated example, or systemic through the building. It was not possible to inspect other masonry walls as the construction of internal walls involved the installation of an internal layer of plasterboard, such that the masonry walls were not visible.”
“Recommendations: it is recommended that a detailed inspection of the kitchen exhaust shaft be carried out to determine the standard of construction and identify any elements of the shaft that may allow the passage of smoke. That inspection must be carried out in the following locations:
(a) in the vicinity of Apartments 2 & 3,
(b) at the ground floor in the vicinity of Commercial tenancies 4 and 6; and
(c) the intersection of the shafts with the roof structure
The inspection of the shaft in the vicinity of Apartments 2 & 3 must involve the removal of plasterboard walls in those apartments in the vicinity of the shaft, to identify the standard of construction of the walls separating the shaft and the apartments.
It is also necessary to expose the wall junction between Apartments 2 & 3 and the shaft to identify the standard of construction at that junction. This is necessary to confirm whether or not the defective construction is limited to the shaft or extends to other elements of the building.
The findings in this area will inform any recommendations for further investigation of the quality of the bounding construction throughout the building.”
On 2 November 2022, an Agenda was issued for an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of the owners corporation, scheduled for 9 November 2022. The Agenda contained a covering letter from the strata manager. That letter referred to the investigations conducted by Baratech and Brentall BCA. It stated that due to the “time restraints” of compliance with Council orders, lot owners should “immediately commence financial preparations” for a special levy. The letter stated that the cost of the remediation project was “unknown,” but that “on the basis that they may find a full replacement is required” a cost estimate was identified. That costs estimate identified a total amount of $138,600, of which the “commercial” scheme would be apportioned $106,200 and the “residential” scheme would be apportioned $32,340.
The Agenda for the EGM of 9 November 2022 included an “estimated quotation from Baratech Engineering for the required shaft & duct rectification works at the total cost of $115,000 inc. GST to be accepted ($88,550 considered to be commercial responsibility)”. There is reference to “Stage 1 & 2 of quote only”. There is an explanatory note that “The proposed works follow investigations completed by Baratech Engineering & Brentnall BCA in accordance with the Development Control Order issued by council, enforcing the closure of Tornados (sic) Smokehouse in shops 5 & 6”.
The Agenda for the EGM contained a resolution that that a special levy contribution be struck of $106,260 “for the purpose of shaft & duct remedial works”.
On 9 November 2022, an Extraordinary General Meeting of the owners corporation occurred. The Minutes state that it was resolved that “item 1 & 2 only of the quotation from Baratech Engineering for the required shaft & duct invasive inspections at the cost of $34,980 plus GST be accepted ($26,818 estimated to be commercial responsibility)”. The Minutes continue:
“It was noted that the Owners Corporation wish to take a staged approach to the required shaft & duct remedial works before committing to the proposed estimated budget based on full replacement being required. The staged approach being:
Stage 1: Invasive investigations & report on the condition of the shaft & duct.
Stage 2: Preparation of an appropriate scope of works for the required works to the shaft & duct.
Stage 3: Seeking additional tenders for the required works to the shaft & duct.”
There was also a “Notation” (but not a resolution passed) that the strata manager instruct Grace Lawyers to write to City of Canada Bay to request an extension of the time for compliance with the Council Orders; and to instruct Grace Lawyers to draft a letter to the lot owners (i.e. the owners of lots 5 & 6) for the strata committee’s consideration, advising that the owners corporation is actioning the Council Orders as required by Council, while reserving its rights to recover the cost of the works from the lot owners.
On 22 December 2022, Grace Lawyers, on behalf of the owners corporation, wrote to the Solicitor for the lot owners citing special by-law 22, and asserting that if the owners corporation is required to perform “any structural maintenance or repairs to, or replacement of the Exhaust System” (including works to comply with Council Orders) the owners corporation would do the works under s 120(2) of the SSM Act and seek to recover the cost of performing the works that the lot owners have failed to perform in compliance with special by-law 22.
In about March 2023, the owners corporation engaged a further expert consultant, EBS Consultants Pty Ltd (EBS), to perform an investigation into the kitchen exhaust system and provide a report. The report is dated 21 April 2023. The author is Mr Harriman, director of EBS.
The report of EBS dated 21 April 2023 states that EBS was engaged to “determine the kitchen exhaust leak, shaft construction and service penetrations passing through substrates required to maintain a fire resistance level (FRL) that require upgrading as part of the works”. An inspection was performed on 14 March 2023.
The report states:
“The aim of our assessment is to provide an upgrade strategy which will outline areas where it is considered appropriate to upgrade the existing building to an adequate level of occupant fire and life safety and to satisfy the existing mechanical exhaust system.”
The report comprises 15 pages but the body of the report is 9 pages.
The report states at pp 2-3 under the heading “observations” that the kitchen mechanical ventilation “for the Tornados (sic) Smoke House” consisted of a metal duct that was co-ordinated into the adjoining lot (Stellar Land). There was a Trafalgar fire rated board surrounding the mechanical ductwork penetrating through the Hebel into Stellar Land. The kitchen exhaust hood contained charcoal filters. There were two food heating bays within the kitchen area that connected to the exhaust duct, and a large fan located above the cool room. Mr Harriman states:
“Additionally, there were multiple service penetrations identified in the various locations throughout the tenancy that were poorly fire stopped or not fire stopped.”
“Furthermore, where the mechanical ventilation system penetrated through to the blockwork shafts, I identified numerous non-compliances regarding the blockwork construction of the shafts with unsealed perpends and construction joints between the concrete elements.”
Mr Harriman spoke to the occupant of the “Stellar Land” lot. The occupant told him that “smoke can be seen coming through the suspended ceiling during opening hours of the restaurant;” the smoke “was not consistent and happens at random times during the day;” and “smoke smell is more prominent that visual.”
Mr Harriman also spoke to the occupant of Unit 3. The occupant told him that “white misty smoke can be seen that fogs the entire unit”; the “smoke can be seen coming through the downlights and unit A/C ductwork during opening hours of the restaurant”; the “smoke was not consistent and happens at random times during the day”; the “smoke leaks through into the A/C ventilation and ceiling space and then spreads through the unit”; the smoke alarm “activates when smoke is entering the unit”; and the commercial lot “smokes certain foods as part of their menu”.
Mr Harriman, at p 4 of the report, identified the structure of the mechanical exhaust system. The carpark exhaust shaft and kitchen exhaust shaft “are co-ordinated parallel to each other and travel to the roof for discharge. The shaft is external to the building. One part of the shaft wall forms part of the Unit 3 wall”. Mr Harriman stated that ongoing repairs were in progress to address the water leak through the courtyard to the Stellar Land commercial lot. He removed a single downlight within Unit 3 and identified the brick shaft wall at the concrete interface “not to be sealed as required”. After removal of the downlight he observed the “brick shaft wall to be in reasonable condition with well-formed perpend joints.” Mr Harriman states he was not told there had been any smoke ingress to the Level 3 corridor.
Mr Harriman stated as follows at p 6:
“Comments and Recommendations
Based on my observations and the discussions held with various occupants, it appears that the smoke is entering the residential lots during operating hours and when the smoking process for certain foods occurs. Nonetheless, the mechanical duct itself and the shaft are both required to be sealed from exhausted products escaping containment.
Based on my inspection and the access afforded, I am unable to definitively identify the exact locations of smoke emanating through the ductwork and shafts. I note that the exhaust was not operational during my inspection.
However, based on my experience, I am of the assumption that the smoke is exhausting into the units and commercial lots as a result of lack of maintenance, unsealed sheet metal joints, a potential hole in the sheet metal and unsealed brickwork shaft joints and perpends.
The non-compliance are a combination of the following:
- Commercial Lot Owner: Lack of periodic maintenance and poor workmanship during the installation of the mechanical ductwork at the fit out stage.
- Base Building: The unsealed shafts to Unit 2 and 3 is attributed to a lack of poor workmanship at construction stage when the shaft was constructed.
- Uncontrollable damage: Ther is a water leak in the podium courtyard into Stellar Land. The water leak has resulted in a contractor damaging the Trafalgar Fyrewrap for investigation purposes. This is required to witness the source of the leak.”
Mr Harriman set out, at pp 6-8 of the report a scope of works for the cleaning of the kitchen exhaust system and shaft repairs. The scope of works for the shaft repairs includes sealing brickwork perpend joints and sealing the bottom of the brickwork as well as installation of plasterboard wall linings. If the works do not satisfactorily rectify, Mr Harriman advises that “the exhaust shaft at the podium level be exposed, and the mechanical duct inspections and rectifications be undertaken from the Level 1 podium to the roof”.
At pp 8-9 of the report, Mr Harriman refers to various other defect issues in walls and service installations. He states as follows:
“Openings in Floors and Walls For Service Installations
Tornados (sic) Smoke House (sic)
There are various other service penetrations through the building substrates and shafts with no fire stopping system. I observed a number of non-compliant service penetrations passing through fire rated elements that have not been satisfactorily fire stopped or have had the installation of a fire stopping system poorly installed. I observed unsealed electrical cables, unprotected PVC pipes penetrating through fire rated building elements required to maintain an FRL.
Generally, the services are located in oversized penetrations and have had the perimeter gaps filled with excessive mastic, with no other fire rated stopping system installed.
…
I identified a number of PVC pipes where they penetrate a fire rated element with no fire collars installed as required to fire stop the penetration…
…
There are a number of unsealed electrical cable service penetrations through the fire rated elements. Electrical cables are required to be suitably sealed and coned out with an approved fire rated mastic in strict accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.”
“Conclusion
Based on my observations, the mechanical ventilation system is non-compliant and may not be provided with periodic maintenance. In my opinion the kitchen mechanical ventilation system servicing the cooking operations of Tornados (sic) Smoke House (sic) is emanating into the commercial lots and Units 2 and 3 above through small leaks in the ductwork and the brickwork shaft. In my opinion, fire upgrade works must be undertaken to ensure the building is fit for its purpose, due to the increased risk of smoke and fire spreading through to the neighbouring commercial lots and the above units.
Furthermore, the PVC pipe work and electrical cable service penetrations throughout the building have not been satisfactorily fire stopped or had the installation of a fire stopping system poorly installed.”
“…
The meeting has been convened to consider raising an urgent special contribution to allow the required rectification works to the shaft and duct servicing the kitchen exhaust system, to comply with the Development Control Order issued by City of Canada Bay Council.
Following the previous General meeting held on 09/11/2022, concerns with variances to the agreed approach and costs for the invasive investigations of the shaft & duct were raised by the Building Management Committee with the selected contractor (Baratech Engineering). Accordingly, a building consultant (EBS Consultants) was engaged to inspect and provide independent advice.
New tenders to complete the required works in accordance with the scope of works prepared by EBS Consultants have been obtained for consideration. The proposed special contribution is based upon the following estimated project budget:
[the letter sets of a scope of works for duct cleaning; electrical works; repairs to Trafalgar Fyrewrap, and plasterboard works in the amount of $90,103.75. The table setting out and costing the works states that all of that amount is to be paid by the “commercial” strata scheme, and none by the “residential” strata scheme]
…
To assist with any queries that owners may have, please be advised that EBS Consultants will be attending the meeting from 10.30 am. We encourage owner sot take this opportunity to discuss any particular queries they may have.”
The Agenda for the meeting (which was to be conducted by Zoom) identified that a special levy Motion was listed for consideration. The Agenda states the scope of works had been prepared by EBS Consultants, and was for “shaft & duct remedial works.” Quotes were referred to form Dual-Tech Air-Conditioning and Evolution Built. A special levy was sought of $90,105 and there was a further Motion that the owners corporation be authorised to enter into a contract with any builder engaged to perform the remedial works.
On 11 July 2023, the EGM was adjourned as there were insufficient lot owners to form a quorum.
The EGM occurred on 18 August 2023. The Tender Bundle admitted on the first hearing date contained the Minutes of the EGM on 18 August 2023 (pp 1450-1451).
The Minutes state that resolutions for the raising of a special levy and entering into a contract to perform rectification works were defeated. Rather, it was:
“RESOLVED that EBS Consultants be instructed to amend the scope of works and obtain revised tenders for the required remedial works to ensure they are limited to the common property shaft & duct only, while still ensuring compliance with the terms of the Council’s development control order.
It was noted that the Strata Committee will review the revised tenders once available, and instruct the Managing Agent to convene a further General meeting of the Owners Corporation to consider proceeding a preferred quotation and additional funding as required.”
On 12 September 2023, the Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the owners corporation occurred. The meeting was conducted by Zoom.
The Minutes of the AGM state that a Resolution was passed in respect of the engagement of a “competent fire safety practitioner” to perform an inspection and make recommendations for the purpose of obtaining an annual Fire Safety Statement, with “any corrective actions report” to be submitted to the strata committee for consideration.
The AGM also, again, considered the works to be authorised to repair the kitchen exhaust system and comply with the Orders issued by City of Canada Bay Council. A special levy of $51,013.60 as raised, on the basis of the “Dual Teach quote”. The scope of works in the Minutes only refers to “duct cleaning; electrical works; Trafalgar Fyrewrap repairs (Stellar Land); Trafalgar Fyrewrap works; and U2 & 3 plasterboard works”.
The following Resolution was passed in respect of the kitchen exhaust system and City of Canada Bay Orders:
“Council Development Control Order: Shaft & Duct Remedial Works
a) It was noted that the revised scope of works and quotations requested following the General Meeting held on 18/08/2023 had not yet been received from EBS Consultants. It is expected that the revised quotations will be provided in the next couple of days.
b) RESOLVED that the Strata Committee be authorised to review and proceed with the revised quotation for the shaft & duct remedial works once received.
It was noted that the Strata Committee will request that an onsite meeting is held with EBS Consultants and the selected contractor prior to the works commencing.
RESOLVED that stage 3-6 of the quotation dated 02/05/2023 from EBS Consultants for the consultancy services for the shaft & duct remedial works at the const of $7,876 incl. GST be accepted.
…”
As discussed previously, there were hearing dates on 19 -20 February 2024 and 4-5 September 2024. On 19-20 February 2024 Mr Noll AM of Counsel appeared for the owners corporation and Ms Edwards of Counsel appeared for the lot owners and Tornados. On 4-5 September 2024, Mr Purdy of Counsel appeared for the owners corporation. Ms Edwards of Counsel again appeared for the lot owners and Tornados.
On the first day of the hearing (19 February 2024) only one witness was cross examined.
The Tender Bundle filed om respect of the first day of the hearing by the owners corporation contained two affidavits by “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang.” Those affidavits are dated 10 October 2023 and 31 January 2024.
The first witness who gave evidence on the first day of the hearing was a female witness who purportedly was “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang.”
However, as became apparent towards the end of questioning on the first day of the hearing, the person in the witness box was not “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang.” Rather, the person in the witness box was the female lot owner Kien Xuan Tran. She was the person who swore two affidavits under an incorrect name.
There is no dispute in the proceedings that the duly registered owners of lots 5 and 6 of The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 are Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran. There is also no dispute that the parties identified on the written lease dated 3 January 2022 are:
“Lessor: Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran
Lessee: Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd”
Considering Mr Buda, Solicitor, has (on the basis of the documentary evidence) acted for Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran for a number of years, dating back to at least the period in which the lot owners commenced negotiations with Tornados in late 2021 to enter into the lease, it is difficult to comprehend how two affidavits could be prepared, sworn and witnessed with the wrong name of the deponent. It is also difficult to comprehend how proceedings could be brought in the Tribunal in the name of “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang” as the sole applicant, but a Solicitor and, additionally, a Barrister acting for the lot owners in the proceedings would not have clearly identified and obtained clear instructions as to who were their clients.
Although some explanation is provided in an affidavit of Mr Buda Solicitor relied upon in the interlocutory application that was ultimately determined by way of written reasons of the Tribunal in August 2024, the explanation (confusion about who was the deponent and the lot owners having lived separately for a period of time), the reasons proffered were unconvincing when weighed against the responsibilities of legal representatives.
For the sake of simplicity, the Tribunal will refer to the female lot owner who gave evidence on the first day of the hearing as “Kim.”
The oral evidence of “Kim” was vague and non-responsive to many questions by the Counsel of the owners corporation who appeared at the first and second days of the hearing, Mr Knoll AM. It was during the course of cross examination that Ms Edwards of Counsel eventually raised, firstly the issue that she did not believe the witness was understanding questions likely due to medical reasons rather than any particular language difficulties, and secondly that although “Kim” was the person giving evidence in the affidavits, the name of the deponent of the affidavits was incorrect, and should have been Kien Xuan Tran.
That led to an application that “Kim” be excused from giving evidence.
The issue of “Kim” being excused was not pursued on the second day of the hearing (20 February 2024) because Ms Edwards of Counsel did not appear in person due to a COVID-19 infection. Mr Knoll AM of Counsel consented, on behalf of the owners corporation, to the second day of the hearing being adjourned.
Despite being sufficiently physically unwell to attend the hearing on 20 February 2024 in person, Ms Edwards of Counsel appeared by telephone to make submissions on appropriate procedural directions.
The issue of “Kim” being excused from further cross examination and her husband being joined as a part to the lot owners proceedings against the owners corporation was dealt with in reasons of the Tribunal (7 pages) dated 23 August 2024.
Those reasons arose from an interlocutory hearing on 16 August 2024. The procedural history of the interlocutory dispute (one of the many interlocutory disputes and applications during the course of the proceedings) is set out in the reasons, which include a dispute about setting aside a Summons to produce documents issued by the owners corporation on Mr Romanov. It is unnecessary to set out the outcome of the Summons dispute. However, in respect of the issue of the correct identity and parties to the proceedings, Ms Edwards had sought that (a) “Kim” be excused from giving further evidence in cross examination (based on medical reports) and (b) Kien Xuan Tran be joined as a party to the proceedings.
Relevantly to this decision, the Tribunal determined that (a) “Kim” not give further evidence; and (b) Kien Xuan Tran be joined a party to the proceedings. It is unnecessary to repeat the written reasons provided with the orders.
Considering that Tung Quang Hang (the male lot owner) and Kien Xuan Tran (the female lot owner) are the lot owners; and they are both parties to the proceedings taken by the owners corporation (Case Number 2024/00065826) the Tribunal determined it appropriate to join Kien Xuan Tran as a party to the proceedings under s 44 of the NCAT Act in Case Number 2023/00381512 and correctly identify “Tung Quang Hang” as the name of the first applicant, rather than “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang” in Case Number 2023/00381512”.
Tung Quang Hang (the male lot owner) swore an affidavit Case Number 2023/00381512 dated 29 August 2024. In that affidavit, he refers to “being one of the applicants in the proceedings herein and also a co-owner of the property…” If there was any confusion regarding the form of the orders of the Tribunal dated 23 August 2024, the affidavit of Tung Quang Hang acknowledges that he understood he is a party in Case Number 2023/00381512.
Tung Quang Hang was cross examined by the new Counsel for the owners corporation, Mr Purdy of Counsel, at the hearing on 4 September 2024. However, before returning to his evidence, it is appropriate to make further comment about Kien Xuan Tran.
Although the Tribunal does not accept that any significant weight can be given to the evidence of a person who cannot correctly identify their name as the deponent of an affidavit, and who is non-responsive to questions in cross examination, that does not mean that no weight can be given to the contemporaneous documentary evidence attached to the affidavits of “Tung (Kim) Quang Hang” dated 10 October 2023 and 31 January 2024. Most, if not all, of those documents are replicated in other affidavits or business documents of the owners corporation that deal with the issue of the state of repair of the kitchen exhaust system, or the terms of the lease with Tornados.
The affidavit of Tung Quang Hang dated 29 August 2024 states that he “did not take an active part” in the management of the commercial lot, and his wife was involved in decisions. The lot owners had engaged Raine & Horne Commercial Cabramatta (the agency of Mr Tripodina) to manage the commercial lot, and the “majority of everyday dealings” were left with the agent. Mr Tripodina also manages “other properties” of the lot owners.
Mr Hang states that after the “charcoal chicken shop” vacated the lease, his wife told him at some unspecified time that Frangos was interested in leasing the commercial lot. He was later told by his wife that Mr Tripodina had informed his wife that the owners corporation had “rejected” Frangos.
After the lease with Frangos Chicken did not proceed, Mr Hang and his wife “suffered extreme financial stress as a result of mortgage and fees.”
The lot owners offered a rent free period to attract a new tenant. In around “early 2022”, Ms Tran told Mr Hang a new tenant head been obtained.
According to Mr Hang, he was informed by his wife in about April 2022 that when the “new tenant started cooking” the premises was filled with smoke and the ventilation system was not working properly.
Mr Hang was unaware of any issue being raised about the ventilation system or smoke when the premises were rented to Portico Chicken.
Mr Hang asserts that he was informed by his wife in about August 2022 that the local Council had shut down the restaurant (i.e. Tornados) “due to smoke” and “strata management had refused to rectify…”
Mr Hang assert that he and his wife have suffered “mortgage and financial stress” to the premises not being let, as well as personal stress. At [21] there is a table of claimed losses.
It is asserted at [21] that the gross rental income involving Tornados (taking into account the six month period at the commencement of the lease when no rent was payable) was $366,978.74 in the period to 2 September 2024. That included interest “based at 8% outstanding monies” and the cost of agent letting fees to “Raine & Horne” ($23,570) and “Zorrick Metrowest Commercial ($19,800).
The table then refers to “addition (sic) and anticipated damages” as follows:
Anticipated 6 months for repairs to building: $71,500 inclusive of GST.
Anticipated rental incentive to any proposed tenant and time to find tenant (6 months based 2025 rental per month $11,168 plus GST): $73,711.31.
Sub-total $537,190.05.
Ongoing damages based on loss of monthly rent with interest at 8% per annum: $12,951.40 per month.
Bank Charges ($3,412; plus “new loan application” of $21,250, plus “La Trobe fees” of $3,062): $27,724.04.
Strata levies of $53,117.12.
“Total Damages” sought: $618,031.21
The affidavit contains some supporting documents. Relevantly, there is a copy of the lease with Tornados; some documents involving levies (including a notice of levies between July 2021 and January 2022); a “loan activity statement” of La Trobe Financial for the period 1 January 2024 to 30 June 2024; a tax invoice of $23,570.18 from Raine & Horne Cabramatta; a tax invoice of Metro Commercial Property Group dated 7 December 2021 in the amount of $19,800; a “duties statement” of NSW Office of State Revenue; and a settlement adjustment sheet in respect of purchase of the commercial lots by the lot owners in November 2015.
The transcript reference to the cross examination of Mr Hang by Counsel for the owners corporation on 4 September 2024 is pp 17-23. There was re-examination by Ms Edwards of Counsel at pp 23-25 and further cross examination (with leave granted) at pp 25-28.
Mr Hang stated that the “other property” he and his wife owned was a commercial property located in a south-western suburb of Sydney. The purchased that property in 2019. However, Mr Hang’s father in law “pays for everything…pretty much” in respect of the second investment property.
Mr Hang asserted that because the commercial lots the subject of this dispute were vacant, the lot owners could not afford to pay strata levies to the owners corporation.
In respect of marketing the premises to a potential tenant, the following evidence was given (T:4/9/24:P22:L272-291):
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: No just answer the question. Do you accept that those strata levies would be payable whether you had a tenant or not?
Hang: Yes
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: Now, do you and-do you personally have any knowledge of how the property, lots 5 and 6…is marketed to potential tenants?
Hang: No
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: Alright, so you don’t know whether it is marketed as a restaurant space?
Hang: Yes, it is mainly for restaurant space, it is set up for a restaurant, it is fit for a restaurant, so the if I ? lease it for restaurant business.
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: If a tenant-a potential tenant was interested space but didn’t want to run it as a restaurant?
Hang: Hmm
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: Then they could do a fit out of the premises.
Hang: Yes (up to?) the tenant.
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: And that fit out would not involve use of the kitchen exhaust, would it?
Hang: We would have prefer a new tenant to run the restaurant business.
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: But isn’t it-ah you’ve said you’re under financial stress, correct?
Hang: Yes
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: Wouldn’t any tenant be better than no tenant?
Hang: (inaudible)
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: But you’re unable to tell me whether you’re marketing the property to anyone but potential restaurateurs.
Hang: We advertised that as vacant so it’s up to the potential tenant to do whatever they like to do with it.
Owners Corporation’s Counsel: But you don’t know what goes into the marketing, the advertising-
Hang: No
In re-examination, Mr Hang was asked about ANZ bank charges. Mr Hang stated that ANZ asked them to refinance as the lot owners “could not afford to pay them for that valuation, for the valuation of the property.” Mr Hang was asked about whether the lot owners had any “enquiries” about renting the premises since the Council orders. Mr Hang stated that there was one “potential tenant” who operated a restaurant in close proximity who inspected the premises, and were “eager” to move in when their lease expired if “everything was sorted” before then. That occurred “in August last year.”
As the answer to the question introduced new evidence about a prospective tenant rather than clarifying previous evidence, the owners corporation’s counsel was granted leave for brief further cross examination. Mr Hang was questioned whether a new tenant could repair the kitchen exhaust system as part of its fit out before moving in an comply with the Council orders. It was also put to Mr Hang that the Council orders did not, of themselves, prevent a new tenant from moving in. Mr Hang stated that “we could not touch the building from the corporate owner.”
Mr Tripodina, the property manager who managed the commercial lots on behalf of the lot owners at the relevant times, swore an affidavit dated 29 August 2024. He gave evidence on 4 September 2024. His evidence (including cross examination) is at T:4/9/24:P28-54.
Mr Tripodina states in his affidavit that he had managed the commercial lots on behalf of the lot owners since 2015. Mr Tripodina does not seek new tenants on behalf of the lot owners, who engage other agents for that purpose. Most of the affidavit responds to assertions in the affidavit of Mr Castrgiovanni, the strata manager. Mr Tripodina denies that there were any delays caused by himself or the lot owners regarding repairs, and that repair of the kitchen exhaust system was the responsibility of the owners corporation.
Mr Tripodina asserts at [36]-[37] that he “feared” the lots would remain vacant until the owners corporation complied with the Council orders, and any new lease would have to have “incentives” that included a 36 months’ rent free period or discount in respect of the fit out costs of the tenant.
At [38]-[39] in response to Mr Castrgiovanni’s affidavit, Mr Tripodina states he does not understand why the owners corporation cleaned and sealed the kitchen exhaust in 2017, but now asserts it is not responsible for repairs. Mr Tripodina states he has no knowledge of what “modifications” to the kitchen exhaust system were completed before 2017.
At T:4/9/24:P30-33, Mr Tripodina was questioned about the fees charged by the agent. Different fees applied in respect of introducing a new tenant (Raine & Horne Cabramatta did not introduced Tornados). Gross fees for managing the property range between 7% and 10%. Some management fees were payable if there was no rent paid, but others were dependent upon there being actual rent paid by a tenant.
At T:4/9/24:P33-37, Mr Tripodina was questioned about inspections of the kitchen exhaust system and the complaints that commence in about April 2022. Mr Tripodina maintained that the “shaft is within common property” and the tenant’s responsibility was the “internal ducting unit and motor on the roof.” Mr Tripodina referred to an inspection by “HTL” and that the smoke issue was an “intermittent” issue which was a “structural issue.” Mr Tripodina stated at T:4/9/24:P37:549-550 that his “dealings pretty much ended around June when the matter was referred to the landlord’s legal representation”.
In respect of renting out the premises after the end of the lease with Tornados, Mr Tripodina stated at T:4/9/24:P:43: L645 that there had been “enquiries” with his agency about renting the commercial lost the subject of this dispute, but “we are unable to commit to a tenancy without having some form of sign off or confirmation that the lots are fit for purpose”.
At T:4/9/24:P44-50 Mr Tripodina was questioned about whether, in his opinion, the defects in the mechanical ventilation system were due to the “ductwork” or “structural”. Mr Tripodina asserted on a number of occasions that he believed that the defects were structural and the responsibility of the owners corporation to repair.
At T:4/9/24:P50-54, Mr Tripodina was re-examined. It is unnecessary to detail the re-examination as it did not clarify any of the evidence previously given.
The affidavit of 10 October 2023 contains relatively brief evidence (which, although it is not evidence, contains a further copy of Tornados Points of Claim dated 9 October 2023), but attaches a large number of documents. A number of those documents are duplicated in evidence of other witnesses.
Mr Romanov stated that Tornados was incorporated in 2021. He is a “trained chef” who has “worked in and operated restaurants for approximately 25 years”.
Mr Romanov states that Tornados was a “unique concept” that involved “cold smoking methods” which he had been “working on” for a long time, but crystallised during the COVID-19 lockdown.
Mr Romanov entered into the lease with the lot owners in January 2022 for a period of 5 years, and between January-April 2022 fitted out the premises. Tornados commenced trading on 4 April 2022. In about May 2022 a resident of the building complained to him about smoke odours from the restaurant. He immediately notified Mr Tripodina and the landlord. The affidavit then sets out briefly the events in between July 2022 and August 2022 involving local Council inspections and orders. In August 2022, George who was an owner of a different shop at the premises, told him there were complaints about smoke and fumes when Porticos Chicken was the tenant. From August 2022 the restaurant ceased to operate, causing stock to be lost and loss of profits.
Mr Romanov states that in April 2023, the lease between the lot owners and Tornados was terminated for frustration. The lease security deposit (bond) was repaid to Tornados.
Mr Romanov states he “tried to sell” equipment and stock, but received “much less than I (sic) paid for it.”
The affidavit contains a “spreadsheet” which purportedly summarised the loss of stock and equipment. That document asserts that the cost of stock and equipment was $125,190.95, with only $9,200 was sold, leaving a loss of $115,990.95.
The affidavit contains a different spreadsheet purportedly created by the accountant of Tornados which sets out a “monthly profit forecast” for the business over the course of the lease period.
The affidavit also contains a spreadsheet for the costs of fitting out and defitting the premises; and some tax invoices.
The affidavit contains reply evidence.
Mr Romanov states that during the fit out of the premises:
“…there was no work performed on the ceiling or anything beyond the ceiling as this was not part of our fit out plans. The fit out did not include any work on the rangehood, ducts or fans whatsoever. There was no installation or any work performed on the mechanical duct servicing the kitchen.”
Mr Romanov states that some cleaning of the rangehood and replacement of filters occurred. This was because the rangehood was greasy due to not having been properly cleaned by the former tenant, and the period during COVID 19 where the commercial lots were vacant.
Mr Romanov states that in January 2022, he arranged for G & J Filter cleaning to perform a deep cleaning of the rangehood. A copy of the relevant invoice is attached to the affidavit in the amount of $800. Mr Romanov states that he engaged G & J Filter to replace the filters in the rangehood every month. A copy a brief report by G & J Filters stating that they “cleaned the exhaust filer” every 4 weeks between May 2022 and August 2022, with the last service provided on 19 August 2022.
Mr Romanov states that neither he, nor anyone associated with Tornados inspected or performed any work on the ducts or other aspect of the mechanical ventilation system (other than cleaning and filter replacement of the rangehood) in the period from the fit out onwards, and as far as he was concerned there were “no issues with the building’s mechanical ventilation system…nor did I ever represent to anyone that I had.”
At [17]-[55] of the affidavit, Mr Romanov annexes and refers to various reports and correspondence involving the owners corporation; its contractors; the local Council and lawyers. Much of that correspondence, and the reports obtained by the owners corporation, has been set out earlier in this decision and does not bear repetition.
However, there is reference to events and reports prior to January 2022.
On 5 July 2021, the (then) strata managing agent for the commercial strata scheme (Whelan Property Group) wrote to commercial lot owners stating that “the kitchen exhaust in Shop 7 has recently been cleaned and seal (sic) as it was in require or repair and as per By-law 22”. The costs were charged back to the lot owners of Lots 1 to 7 on a pro-rata basis as they had “exclusive use of the kitchen exhaust system”.
On 16 September 2020, Beaver Willams (an air-conditioning and fire safety systems contractor) provide a quote addressed to “The Trustee for the Conti Property Group Trust” for repairs arising from the basement exhaust fan not working.
On 16 August 2018, Eagle Fire Protection Pty Ltd provided an “Annual Test Report” to the commercial owners corporation in respect of the fire safety of the building. That report referred to some repairs required. There is nothing in the report that explicitly refers to the mechanical ventilation system the subject of this dispute.
On 16 October 2020 Eagle Fire Protection Pty Ltd provided a tax invoice to the owners corporation for $385 for works due to “fire trip for A/C contractor”. There is reference in the invoice to “duct detector housing is incorrect/non-compliant.”
On 26 October 2020, Eagle Fire Protection Pty Ltd provided a quotation to the owners corporation for “duct detector issues and programming faults” which involved the “duct probe” affecting the smoke detector and alarm of shops 4 and 5.
On 16 October 2020, Beaver Williams provided a quotation to the owners corporation for “quarterly maintenance; 6 month call out service; and annual mechanical AFSS” that refers to the car park area.
In reports of 2 November 2020 and 12 November 2020, Altec Building Pty referred to be engaged by the owners corporation to inspect and provide a report in respect of a ceiling leak in Shop 7. The reports referred to a leak from a planter box, and also a potential leak from a “Colourbond carcass” of the “chicken shop ventilation system” which was directly above the ceiling where there was water ingress. In addition to re-waterproofing of the plantar box,
On 21 November 2020, Altec Building Pty Ltd provided a quotation to the owners corporation. In addition to repairs and re-waterproofing of the plantar box, the quote referred to “supply and install a new Colourbond carcass encasing the ventilation system.”
This affidavit was made “regarding the summons issued by the owners corporation before the Tribunal.” Relevantly, that Summons was for production of documents in respect of various businesses Mr Romanov operated and/or was a director of.
According to Mr Romanov, “Romanov Catering” was formed in November 2023 for the purpose of tendering for “RSL opportunities”. The company had never traded.
Enigma Catering Pty Ltd was formed in April 2023. Mr Romanov is a 50% shareholder with another person, Mr Alpha. It “has a one year contract for catering at the Overland Hotel in Penrith”. Mr Romanov asserts that he receives a salary of $789 per week as an employed chef, but Enigma Catering Pty Ltd has not made any profits.
The evidence of Mr Romanov at the hearing (including re-examination) is set out at T:4/9/24:P54-85.
Mr Romanov explained that the “cold smoking process” that Tornados used involved:
“…a box like a small fridge and we have a hot element inside the box and the racks. The racks we put all of our patties, our beef ribs, our-all the products, bacon in there and we have a small wood chip, that we put the element on so that creates cold smoking at 23 degrees just to infuse smoke into the process”.
Mr Romanov was questioned about the various businesses he has operated, or been involved in. Romanov Catering Pty Ltd was a “catering business through RSL clubs” that was “modern Australian western style food.” It went into a creditor’s voluntary winding up-liquidation in 2017. Mr Romanov asserted the liquidated was due to his divorce. It was pointed out to Mr Romanov that unsecured debts at the time of liquation were $346,346.05. Mr Romanov asserted that “99%” of creditors were eventually paid. According to Mr Romanov part of the process of paying creditors involved selling his house, but some of that money was paid to creditors and other money went to “settlement of my divorce.” One of the creditors (Foodlink) placed a caveat on the house.
Mr Romanov was questioned about Fresh Cut Veg Pty Ltd. Mr Romanov stated it is a “fruit and veg supplier” to restaurants. Mr Romanov held 50% of shares. He ceased to be a director of that company in 2023. Mr Romanov had “sold his share back” to his business partner in 2022 to “concentrate” on Tornados. Fresh Cut Veg Pty Ltd had provided stock to Tornados. Mr Romanov asserted that his business partner has paid him $400,000 by way of instalments to “buy out” Mr Romanov’s share of the business.
Mr Romanov was questioned about the kitchen exhaust system, including the duct work, shaft and rangehood. Mr Romanov explained his understanding of the cleaning process based on his experience as a “restaurateur of 25 years”. Mr Romanov stated he had cleaning performed both prior to commencing trading and on a regular basis thereafter. He described the difference between cleaning and replacing the rangehood and its filter, and cleaning the canopy and shaft that is connected to the rangehood.
Mr Romanov was questioned on the special conditions of the lease between the lot owners and Tornados. He agreed that there were terms of the lease that Tornados agreed to ensure the exhaust fan and rangehood are cleaned, serviced, and maintained at regular intervals no greater than 6 months. He agreed that it was a term of the lease that the lessor (i.e. the lot owners) did not warrant the exhaust fan’s suitability and the lessee would make its own enquiries into this. Mr Romanov agreed that, at the time Tornados entered into the lease, the exhaust fan and rangehood were operating “satisfactorily and properly.”
Mr Romanov was questioned on the fit out. He agreed there had been “substantial modifications” to fit out the premises, involving gyprocking, electrical and plumbing. He stated the gyprocking work did not involve demolition, but “we just put gyprock on gyprock.” Mr Romanov agreed that the fit out expenses were necessary for the business to commence trading, but only agreed “to a certain point” the expenses were a “sunk cost” that was an unrecoverable expense irrespective if the business traded for 4 months or 10 years.
Mr Romanov was questioned on “a couple of the fit out expenses” Tornados had claimed as damages. Mr Romanov had included invoices from his other business “Fresh Cut Veggies.” He asserted that such invoices were in respect of stock to Tornados. Mr Romanov had included an invoice from his “business accountant” A1 Accounting Corporation”. One was dated 10 October 2023, which Mr Romanov asserted was for advice given previously about terminating the lease. He agreed that was not a fit out expense. Another was an invoice in Mr Romanov’s own name dated 1 July 2023 for $30,000. Mr Romanov asserted this was his personal fees for overseeing and co-ordinating the fit out. It was put to Mr Romanov this was not a genuine invoice for a genuine business expense rendered in the normal course of business. Mr Romanov disagreed, asserting that he was entitled to be paid for his time and if he did not co-ordinate the fit out Tornados would have to hire a project manager.
The last topic of cross examination of Mr Romanov was the businesses he had been involved in since Tornados had ceased trading. He asserted that he had worked as a part-time chef on weekends at Henry’s Bar and Restaurant Pty Ltd in “April or May 2023”. Mr Romanov confirmed that he is the director of Romanov Investments Pty Ltd which owns a 50% shareholding in Enigma Catering Pty Ltd. He asserted that Enigma Catering Pty Ltd commenced trading in November 2023. Mr Romanov claimed that Enigma Catering Pty Ltd is yet to make a profit, but a share of any profits are paid back to Romanov Investments Pty Ltd. Mr Romanov stated it was speculative as to whether Enigma Catering Pty Ltd would be successful, but he would “prefer” that Tornados was still trading.
Mr Romanov was re-examined at T:4/9/24:P85. There were only two questions relating to the difference between the activities of Tornados and Enigma Catering; and Mr Romanov’s work at “Henry’s Bar.” It is unnecessary to set out those answers.
Mr Castrogiovanni is the strata manager employed by Conti Strata with management of the strata scheme. He has been managing the strata scheme since about 22 April 2020. Prior to Conti Strata, Beaumont Strata Management Agency was the strata manager.
Mr Castrogiovanni affirmed affidavits dated 8 December 2023; 21 March 2024 and 2 September 2024.
The affidavit of 8 December 2023 attaches a large amount of documentation in respect of the complaints about smoke and odours from Tornados; the response of the owners corporation; and the intervention of the local Council. It is unnecessary to repeat the narrative and detail of contemporaneous documents previously set out in these reasons.
However, the following salient evidence was contained in the affidavit:
On 7 April 2022, the occupiers of unit 3 complained by telephone to Mr Castrogiovanni of smoke and odours.
Between 7 April 2022 and 7 June 2022 the strata manager made efforts to contact the lot owners and get the lot owners to engage a contractor to investigate and repair. As discussed previously, Mr Tripodina has a different version of events.
On 7 June 2022, the strata manager wrote to Mr Tripodina stating that because the lot owners had not engaged a contractor to investigate and repair, the owners corporation would do so. The owners corporation subsequently engaged Baratech.
Mr Castrogiovanni believes the kitchen exhaust system was “cleaned and sealed in 2017 based on the records of the previous strata manager. At Annexure D to the affidavit if a copy of the administrative fund accounts of the owners corporation from November 2017, which indicates that monies were paid to Stallion Air Conditioning Pty Ltd in June 2017 for “kitchen exhaust cleaning and sealing”.
The affidavit of 21 March 2024 simply attaches a series of tax invoices. Mr Castrogiovanni asserts that the owners corporation had incurred “costs” due to the some and fumes emanating from Tornados of $122,529.
It is unnecessary to refer to all of the accounts. Many of them are tax invoices from the strata manager, and appear to be normal expenses incurred by the owners corporation in respect of strata management services from the strata manager. No evidence is provided as to how such expenses are different to, and in addition to, normal expenses incurred pursuant to the strata managing agency agreement.
One invoice is from Grace Lawyers dated 30 November 2022 in the sum of $4,175.72. Those fees were for providing legal advice and attending the general meeting of the owners corporation on 9 November 2022.
The other invoices are from Baratech; EBS Consultants and Dual Tech Air Conditioning Pty Ltd.
Notably, the tax invoices demonstrate the following works:
Kitchen exhaust duct cleaning by Baratech (invoice dated 26 July 2022).
Repairs to penetrations in the kitchen exhaust system duct and fan repair by Baratech (invoice dated 1 August 2022).
Various invoices for inspection and reporting on the kitchen exhaust system by EBS Consultants Pty Ltd between March 2023 and November 2023.
Rewrap of “new Trafalgar fyrewrap to sheet metal ductwork run through the Stellar Land tenancy” by Dual Tech in February 2024 (tax invoice 16 February 2024).
The affidavit of 2 September 2024, and documents attached to that affidavit, focusses upon events from 25 August 2022.
The affidavit sets out various correspondence and reports from Baratech. Mr Castrogiovanni asserts that Baratech had been engaged without prejudice to the owners corporation’s rights of recover from the lot owners.
According to Mr Castrogiovanni, after Baratech was first engaged (providing a first report of 17 June 2022) it “advised there were several defects in the kitchen exhaust system”.
Mr Castrogiovanni attaches the meeting agenda and minutes of the EGM of the owners corporation on 9 November 2022. Those documents are referred to previously in this decision. Some works by Baratech were approved at that meeting.
Mr Castrogiovanni states that “shortly after” the meeting on 9 November 2022, he was instructed:
“…not to proceed with (Baratech’s) proposed works and instead instruct EBS Consultants to inspect the Premises and to report to the Respondent in relation to the nature and causes of the defects in the kitchen exhaust system…and the appropriate method of rectification of these defects.”
The owners corporation then obtained the report of EBS Consultants dated 21 April 2023, and a fee proposal. An EGM of the owners corporation was scheduled from 11 July 2023 to consider the fee proposal, but was “ultimately held on 18 August 2023 as there had not been a quorum on 11 July 2023.
At the EGM on 18 August 2023, the owners corporation resolved to “have the initial EBS scope of works amended so it is limited to common property shaft and duct only, following discussions with EBS”.
On 12 September 2023 there was another EGM. The Minutes have been discussed previously in this decision. The owners corporation resolved to accept stages 3-6 of the EBS fee proposal dated 2 May 2023, but authorise the strata committee to review, and if appropriate, proceed with the “revised quotation of EBS Consultants once received”.
On 9 October 2023 there was a strata committee meeting. The affidavit contains the agenda and minutes of the strata committee meeting. Relevantly the strata committee resolved to accept the DualTech Air Conditioning quotation dated 13 September 2023, other than items 2 (duct cleaning) and 2.6 (electrical works).
The affidavit attaches the agenda for the owners corporation’s AGM on 27 September 2024. That agenda contained a Motion regarding acceptance of Dual Tech’s quotation of 11 July 2024 for duct cleaning and electrical works; and the striking of a special levy to fund the works.
The affidavit concludes with the following:
“At this stage, my understanding as to the shaft and duct remedial work is:-
Works to seal leakages in the kitchen exhaust vertical shaft have been carried out successfully;
The kitchen exhaust ducting in lots 5, 6 and 7 is still being rectified by Dualtech and those works are partially complete;
The final element, that is cleaning of the ducts and the electrical work recommended by EBS is the subject of a proposed resolution at the impending AGM on 27 September 2024;
The expenses incurred to date and ongoing on the shaft and duct remedial work should, in the commercial strata scheme’s view, be met by lot owners 5 and 6 themselves. At this stage, other than the ‘cross claim’ by the respondent, no steps have been taken to recover those amounts.”
The cross examination of Mr Castrogiovanni is set out at T:4/9/24:P88-120 and T:5/9/24:P:123-163.
Notably, Mr Castrogiovanni stated (T:4/9/24:P91:L1507-1509) that, in his time of managing the strata scheme in his capacity as strata manager he had been to the building “on one occasion”.
Mr Castrogiovanni stated that he usually received instructions on behalf of the strata committee and the Building Management Committee from Mr Screnci.
Mr Castrogiovanni confirmed that he had no direct knowledge of works to the kitchen exhaust system in 2017, and his knowledge was based only upon the records of the strata committee.
Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about reports involving the kitchen exhaust system prior to 2022, including reports of Eagle Fire Protection Pty Ltd. Eagle Fire Protection Pty Ltd (Eagle Fire), at the relevant time, was the contractor who performed fire safety testing for the strata building. Mr Castrogiovanni was shown the annual building test report and quotation from Eagle Fire that include a comment that the “exhaust is leaking and filling the pump room with fumes.” Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about other documents, including reports of Beaver Williams and Altech Building. One of the issues the subject of questions involved the water ingress into Shop 7 in 2020, which affected the ventilation system carcass. Mr Castrogiovanni agree that, if repairs had been conducted, there would be documentation in the records of the owners corporation to confirm this.
The following exchange occurred at T:4/9/24:T:99:L1634-1642:
Ms Edwards of Counsel: But you’ll accept that there were problems with the ventilation system.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And in 2020 when you were there and the Porticos Chicken shop was not operating, the other commercial shops, they were offices, medical, nail salon, eye optometrist, type (sic) of things.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
Ms Edwards of Counsel: So the restaurant, when it was Porticos Chicken and then eventually Tornados, that was the only restaurant in the whole commercial premises.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And you would agree with me that if there’s no tenant in shops 5 and 6, and no user of the ventilation system, that the responsibility falls back to the owners corporation.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And during 2020 and 2021 there was no one using the ventilation system.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
Mr Castrogiovanni was question about the circumstances in which the owners corporation refused to consent to the Development Application (DA) that would allow the lease with Frangos Chicken to proceed. It was put to Mr Castrogiovanni that the reason the owners corporation refused to consent to the DA being lodged was that the owners corporation knew the kitchen exhaust system was in a state of disrepair, and the owners corporation did not want to spend the necessary monies to repair it. This question was objected to. After legal argument, some questioning on this issue was allowed, to the extent to what Mr Castrogiovanni might have known based on what he was told or instructed by strata committee members.
Mr Castrogiovanni stated that he did not have direct knowledge and the meeting “wasn’t held with discussions” as to why consent to the lodging of the DA was refused. He stated he “can’t make that comment,” but then stated it was “potentially” a reason for the refusal to consent to the DA (T:4/9/2024/P105-106).
Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about delay between the local Council ‘shut down and rectify’ orders in August 2022, and the performance of rectification works. Mr Castrogiovanni was asked “What took so long for the works to start” (T: 4/9/24:P111:L1828). Mr Castrogiovanni replied that the owners corporation had initially engaged Baratech to perform repairs, but that after Baratech “scheduled” the works “there were a number of variances that came about from their initial engagement,” so the owners corporation “elected to move on from Baratech and get independent advice from EBS Consultants.”
Mr Castrogiovanni was again questioned about the works performed to the kitchen exhaust system by Stallion Air Conditioning in 2017. He had no information as to what works had been performed, and no documents could be found identifying the work.
Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about Eagle Fire, and an email of June 2022 where reference is made about items requiring rectification. Mr Castrogiovanni stated that Eagle Fire was the contractor who inspected the strata building for the purpose of completing the annual fire safety inspection report for submission to the local Council, but that Eagle Fire were “terminated” by the owners corporation because the owners corporation believed they made recommendations for expensive work that was not justified.
At T:5/9/24:P129-136, further questions were asked about the works performed by Altech Building in 2020 arising from the ceiling water leak. Mr Castrogiovanni accepted that it was “potentially” possible that there was a pre-existing defect prior to 2022 that had not adequately been repaired, but the manner in which the questions were put does not allow for a conclusion that there was any clear concession.
At T:5/9/2024:P137-138, Mr Castrogiovanni accepted that in March 2022 Eagle Fire had recommended “$35,000 worth of repairs for defects” and this occurred approximately 2 weeks before the smoke and odour complaint by the occupants of unit 3.
At T:5/9/2024:P141-157 there was extensive questioning of Mr Castrogiovanni about the various expert reports and quotations obtained by the owners corporation (in particular, Bartech and EBS) and the contemporaneous emails that have been referred to previously in these reasons. Much of that questioning involved it being put to Mr Castrogiovanni what was in the documents, but there were a number of occasions when Mr Castrogiovanni was asked about specific events, and he answered that he could not recall.
At T:5/9/24:P157-158 Mr Castrogiovanni was briefly questioned about the letter from Monti Solicitors on behalf of the residential owners corporation seeking that the residential owners corporation not be liable for the cost of repairs. No answers were given that affect the weight to be given to the evidence beyond what is set out in the letter.
At T:5/9/24:P159-163 Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about the owners corporation’s engagement of Baratech, Brentnall; and how that interacted with the obligations of Eagle Fire. The following evidence was given at T:5/9/24:P159:L2561-2568:
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And on page 165 there are backgrounds about them providing a Fire Safety Audit regarding the building. My question is that what’s the difference between what Brentnall was doing and what Eagle Fire was doing?
Mr Castrogiovanni: Um, well, Brentall were, so we asked Baratech as we got the fire order to help us attend to it and he said well we need to get Brentnall BCA to give us some advice, so their reports were more targeted towards the development control order and then Eagle Fire’s Annual Fire Safety Statement.
Ms Edwards of Counsel: So Eagle Fire was not tasked with helping the committee with regard to the Fire Safety Orders issued.
Mr Castrogiovanni: No
Ms Edwards of Counsel: That was Brentnall.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes, and Baratech
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And Baratech. And Brentnall did a more thorough investigation, is what I’m trying to get at because I’m looking, for instance ,at page 166 of their inspection and they inspected the car park and the kitchen exhaust shafts, the basement and then also some masonry gaps are noted in the report as well. They did a full investigation and that’s more than what Eagle Fire were doing.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes
Ms Edwards of Counsel: And there was substandard masonry construction at 3.1 and construct of mechanical duct work was substandard as well. And was this discussed with the committee.
Mr Castrogiovanni: Yes.
At T:5/9/24:P160-161, Mr Castrogiovanni was questioned about the owners corporation determining not to proceed with the proposed Baratech works. Mr Castrogiovanni stated the strata committee had “concerns” about “the way in which Baratech were going to go about the works and the cost.”
Mr Castrogiovanni was re-examined at T:5/9/24:P163-165. Nothing of note was clarified in the re-examination and it is unnecessary to set it out in detail.
Mr Screnci affirmed an affidavit dated 8 December 2023.
He and his wife co-own lot 3 (shop 3) of the commercial strata scheme. It is leased to a nail salon. Mr Screnci stated he has been a member of the strata committee for “a number of years.”
Mr Screnci’s affidavit of 8 December 2023 is relatively brief. He asserts the lot owners did not provide “relevant information” including plans, for the owners corporation to consent to the application of its seal to the Frangos Chicken development application. That was the reason the Motion at a general meeting to consent to the lodging of the development application was not passed.
According to Mr Screnci, there were “no previous issues with smoke and fumes” when Porticos Chicken was operating. The only issue was a number of false fire alarms which caused the fire brigade to attend. This issue was rectified.
Mr Screnci states that he had not met the lot owners, and they had not participated in the management of the owners corporation.
Mr Screnci assert that when “Stellarland” purchased lot 7 (which occurred prior to June 2018) they had “some fire safety concerns” regarding the “chicken shop exhaust system”. Works were performed by Total Ventilation & Hygiene Services to clean and seal the kitchen exhaust proximate to lot 7. The tax invoice of Total Ventilation & Hygiene Services dated 3 May 2017 was attached to the affidavit, as was the letter of the then strata manager (Whelan Property Group) dated 5 July 2017 stating that because the owners of lots 1-7 have exclusive use, under By-law 22 they have been charged a contribution “per their unit entitlements”.
The cross examination of Mr Screnci is at T:5/9//24:P166-201.
Mr Screnci stated that he did not know what modifications has been performed to the kitchen exhaust system in 2017.
Mr Screnci was questioned about ceiling water leak into lot 7 (Stellar Land) in 2020. Mr Screnci stated he did not have a specific recall, but that the issues with the damage caused by the water leak “went on for a while.”
In respect of decisions of the strata committee and the owners corporation, Mr Screnci stated that only two other lot owners had taken any interest in the management of the owners corporation.
Mr Screnci was not able to recall what, if any, repairs were conducted to the kitchen exhaust system in response to the Altec Building report.
Mr Screnci was questioned about the owners corporation’s refusal to agree to consenting to the owners corporation’s seal being applied to the Development Application for the Frangos Chicken store. Mr Screnci stated the 3 member strata committee had discussions and “concerns”. One was an increased fire risk. Mr Screnci stated at T:5/9/2024:P185-186 that he did not know whether Frangos Chicken was planning to install a new kitchen exhaust system.
Mr Screnci stated that the owners corporation had been “burnt” by the fire false alarms during the tenure of Porticos Chicken’s tenancy, and want to “have a dialogue” before the owners corporation faced “a whole new set of problems.” Mr Screnci stated that Porticos Chicken and the lot owners were “difficult to deal with” during the tenure of the tenancy because they did not respond to communications.
At T:5/9/2024:P187-189, questioning returned to the ‘rejection’ of Frangos Chicken and Mr Screnci’s “fire safety concerns”. At T:5/9/2024:P189:3089, Mr Screnci stated that there was a concern that if Frangos Chicken commenced operation there may have been “reason to suggest that the infrastructure wouldn’t cope with whatever they were doing”.
At T:5/9/2024:P189-192 Mr Screnci was questioned about Eagle Fire and their various quotations and recommendations for repairs to obtain the annual fire safety approval for the building. Mr Screnci stated that he was concerned that Eagle Fire had made “extravagant” recommendations and were difficult to work with because they would “come in without notice…and give these hefty bills that hold a gun to our heads…” On that basis, Mr Screnci instructed Mr Castrogiovanni to obtain alternative quotations. Mr Screnci denied that the owners corporation refused any “necessary” repairs to obtain annual fire safety certification.
At T:5.9/2024:P192-196, Mr Screnci was again questioned about reports and quotations from Eagle Fire, including one identifying approximately $41,000 proposed fire safety repairs a short period of time prior to the complaints of smoke and odour ingress from the owners of lot 3. Mr Screnci asserted that Eagle Fire “came up with those type of bills pretty regularly” and that the strata committee and owners corporation did not know and could not have reasonably known of any defects in the kitchen ventilation system prior to April 2022.
At T:5/9/2024:P196-197, Mr Screnci was questioned about (a) whether it was the owners corporation’s responsibility to perform repairs and maintenance to the kitchen exhaust system in the period when the lot was unoccupied; and (b) whether the works the Council had ordered the owners corporation perform had been completed. Mr Screnci accepted that it was the owners corporation’s responsibly to perform maintenance and repairs to the kitchen exhaust system while the relevant lots were unoccupied, but stated the strata committee and owners corporation did not know and could not reasonably have known that any repairs were needed.
On the issue of whether the works directed by the local Council had been completed by the owners corporation, Mr Screnci stated that the “current status” was that the works were “almost done” and it was his understanding that they would be completed “within the next month or two.”
At T:5/9.2024:P198-199, Mr Screnci was asked questions about the lots not having been rented out to another tenant subsequent to the end of the lease with Tornados. Mr Screnci asserted that, in his opinion, the lots could be rented out to a different tenant, such an office, irrespective of whether the local Council orders had been performed.
At T:5/9/2024:P200-201 the questioning returned to the recommendations of Eagle Fire and the local Council orders. Mr Screnci agreed that in the local Council orders of August 2022 there were items identified that needed to be performed in regards to fire safety and the issue of a “fire safety statement”.
As discussed previously, the expert accountancy evidence was in respect of the purported losses of Tornados, rather than the purported losses of the lot owners.
Mr Nejati is the accountant who performed accountancy services for Tornados, and prepared expert evidence. Mr Beven is the expert forensic accountant engaged by the owners corporation, who prepared expert evidence.
Both experts prepared a joint expert report.
Both experts gave joint expert evidence at the Tribunal on 5 September 2024.
Mr Nejati’s report is dated 5 March 2024. It comprises 64 pages, including the tax returns and company reports of Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd and spreadsheets prepared by Mr Nejati.
Mr Nejati divides his report into three issues. The first is the “total costs associated with the setting up and closing of the restaurant. The second is “EBITDA” from period from the date when the restaurant was forced to close (19 August 2022) until the end of the lease (2 January 2027). EBITDA is the account anacronym for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. The third is “goodwill at the end of the lease.”
In the report, Mr Nejati states that during the period that Tornadoes traded between April 2022 and August 2022 its “sales” income was as follows:
(a) April 2022-$32,391. (b) May 2022-$44,926. (c) June 2022-$38,095. (d) July 2022-$36,972. (e) 1 August 2022-18 August 2022-$29,163.
Mr Nejati asserts the “costs associated with opening and closing the restaurant” were $317,918.39. At Appendix 2 of the report, there is a spreadsheet. That spreadsheet purports to identify every expense Tornados incurred in operating the business, including fitting out expenses; stock; wages; de-fitting expense and legal costs. In respect of legal costs, there are two items referring to “Johnsons Law Group” and “ASP Legal Pty Ltd” for “lease dispute” expenses in October and December 2023.
Mr Nejati’s report does not contain copies of the invoices referred to in Appendix 2.
Mr Nejati asserts the “EBITDA” of Tornados from 19 August 2022 to 4 January 2027 is $346,883. That is based on a series of assumptions set out at 5.1.1 to 5.4.5 of the report. Those assumptions include that, as of September 2023 and onwards, the restaurant would have average sales of $100,000 per month.
In respect of the value of goodwill at the end of the lease, Mr Nejati provides an estimated value of $400,000 to $700,000. That evidence is contained in Mr Nejati’s affidavit of 5 February 2024. However, his affidavit was superseded by the expert report and joint expert report.
Mr Beven’s report is dated 28 March 2024.
Mr Beven is critical of the methodology adopted by Mr Nejati and the lack of contemporaneous documents to support his assumptions. Mr Beven believes that Mr Nejati’s opinion is flawed because it assumes Tornados would have been a very successful business, which does not take into account the risks of restaurant/small business failing or otherwise being unsuccessful or moderately successful in generating a profit. Mr Beven adopts a discount rate for the risk of the business being unsuccessful.
At 4.1.1-4.1.13 of the report, Mr Beven asserts that “recovering three heads of losses would overcompensate Tornados”, because “recovering both the costs associated with setting up and closing down the restaurant and calculating forgone profits would result in double-counting losses”. According to Mr Beven, to adopt this approach would mean that Tornados would be treated as a profit generating enterprise without “the need to make any initial investment.”
Mr Beven states that any loss to Tornados should be assessed as either the costs of setting up and closing down the business; or the profits made during the course of the period in which the business would have operated.
On the issue of the setting up and closing down costs, Mr Beven stated at 4.2.4 after calculating the “verified expenses” and “partially verified expenses” and disregarding the expenses where no evidence or supporting documentation has been provided, the cost of setting up and closing down the business was $176,792.
At 4.3.1-4.4.10 Mr Beven addresses “forecast EBITDA”, which can also be expressed as loss of profits. Mr Beven takes a diametrically opposed view to Mr Nejati on the issue of the success of Tornados. Mr Beven does not believe the business would have been a success such that it generated any loss of profits. On the contrary, Mr Beven believes the business would have a “projected trading loss” such that it would have required “substantial and continuous working capital funding without any prospects of a return.” Accordingly, Mr Beven believes there is no loss of profit by reason of the business closing in August 2022.
On the issue of value of goodwill, Mr Beven believes there was no goodwill value attached to the business such that the business would have been able to be sold with a goodwill value component.
The experts conferred pursuant to orders of the Tribunal dated 20 February 2024 and prepared a joint expert report setting out areas of agreement and disagreement. That report comprises 14 pages. The report does not clearly indicate any significant agreement between the experts, and both experts set out in that report why they regard Tornados as having either having high prospects of success (Mr Nejati) or low prospects of success (Mr Beven).
In the joint expert report, Mr Beven revised his figure for the cost of setting up and closing Tornados. The revised figure was $129,385 (p 11 joint expert report).
At the hearing on 5 September 2024 when the experts gave joint expert evidence, there were further spreadsheets prepared by the experts and discussed between them, that were admitted into evidence (Exh. JTB 3).
Mr Nejati and Mr Beven gave joint evidence on 5 September 2024. Their evidence is at T:5/9/2024:P204-240.
There was questioning about the various specific expenses and assumptions. However, most of the questioning involved the positions of the respective experts as to whether Tornados would be successful or unsuccessful. Mr Nejati took the view that there was a high probability of Tornados being successful due to its location; its unique menu as a selling point; and Mr Romanov’s experience in the hospitality industry. Mr Beven continued to assert that such factors were overstated by Mr Nejati.
Mr Beven stated (T:5/9/24:P228) that if Mr Nejati’s methodology was adopted, the loss of profit of the course of the lease was $262.683. However, he did not accept that this was the net loss of profit, and there were other factors that needed to be considered. Further, Mr Bevan continued to assert that his methodology was the correct one, and that the business would not have generated any profit.
At the hearing on 5 September 2024, there was an issue raised by Mr Nejati whether his figure of $247,616 for loss of profit required revision (T:5/9/2024:P236-241). The manner in which the Tribunal dealt with this issue was to direct the experts further confer and prepare a supplementary joint report, and if any party wished to make an application to further question the experts in respect of that supplementary report, they could apply in writing to the Tribunal by a specified date.
The experts prepared a supplementary joint expert report dated 12 September 2024. That report is 6 pages in length.
The supplementary joint expert report does not materially alter the position of either expert. In conclusion, Mr Nejati states that he believes the “total loss sustained” is “between Scenario 2 of $659,665 and Scenario 3 of $799,373”. Those “scenarios” are set out at page 2. Mr Beven continues to assert that Tornados would not have been a profitable business, and there is no compensable loss in respect of loss of profit.
Neither party made an application to re-open and question the expert witnesses on the supplementary joint report dated 12 September 2024.
The owners corporation obtained an expert report of Asset Property Consultants & Valuers Pty Ltd (Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas) dated 1 December 2023. That report was admitted into evidence with the tender bundle. The lot owners and Tornados did not seek to cross examine the expert valuers.
The report states the valuers inspected lots 5 and 6 on 1 December 2023. The expert valuers set out the attributes of the lots, and review comparable commercial lots in the same local area.
The valuers state that the rental value of the 141sqm. area of lots 5 and 6 is a yearly value of $925 per square meter, and extrapolate that into a yearly amount of $130,000 (exclusive of GST).
At page 12-13 of the report (pp 431-432 of the bundle) the expert valuers answer specific questions posed by the Solicitors for the owners corporation. That part of the report is as follows:
“In your opinion, how long do you expect it would take to secure for the Premises:
(i) a retail restaurant tenant
It is our opinion that the subject property should be able to secure a tenancy (restaurant) within 120 days (3 months) from advertising date noting that the current commercial market, and in particular along Majors Bay Road is tightly held. Conversations with local commercial real estate agents have confirmed the commercial property market if price sensitive and it is important the subject property be offered to the market at a fair asking price to meet tenant expectations.
(ii) a retail (non-restaurant) tenant:
It is our expert opinion that the subject property should be able to secure a tenancy (non-restaurant) within 60 days (2 months) from advertising date noting that the current commercial market, and in particular along Majors Bay Road is tightly held. Conversations with local commercial real estate agents have confirmed the commercial property market is currently price sensitive and it is important the subject property be offered to the market at a fair asking price to meet tenant expectations.
(iii) two retail tenants (one in each shop)
It is our expert opinion that two retail tenants should be able to be secured within 90-120 days (3-4 months) from advertising date noting that along Majors Bay Road there are 4 commercial properties currently being offered for lease, as advertised on Real Commercial which range in floorplate of 38m2-100m2. The lack of current (sic) is a contributing factor with prices to remain stable under current economic pressures.
It is our expert opinion that (sic)
(b) What is the estimated rental income in respect of the Premises in respect of :
(i) a retail tenant leasing both shops:
We have adopted a rate of $700/m2 to the subject property based on the letting scenario being for a retail tenant. Therefore, 700/m2 x 141m2 = $98,700 per annum plus GST.
(ii) two retail tenancies (one in each shop)
We have adopted a rate of $700m2 and $750/m2 (economy of scale) to the subject property based on the letting scenario being for two a (sic) retail tenants.
Therefore:
Shop 5 (Lot 5)=96m2 x $700/m2
$97,200 (allows for car accommodation)
Shop 6 (Lot 6)=45m2 x $750/m2
$33,750 (allows for car accommodation)
(ii) commercial tenant leasing both shops; and
As per valuate amount stated at $130,000 per annum plus GST
(iii) two commercial tenancies (one in each shop)
We have adopted a rate of $850/m2 and $900/m2 (economy of scale) to the subject property based on the scenario for two commercial tenants.
Therefore:
Shop 5 (Lot 5) = 96m2 x $850/m2
$81,600 (allows for car accommodation)
Shop 6 (Lot 6) = 45m2 x $900/m2
$40,500 (allows for car accommodation)
(c) Would be necessary for the owner to provide a 6 month rent free period in order to secure a tenant? If not, why not?
Under current market conditions it is our professional opinion to offer free rent periods subject to the agreed lease term as below:
Agreed 2 year term = 2 months free rent
Agreed 3 year term = 3 months free rent
Agreed 5 year term = 5 months free rent
(c) Any of (sic) comments you may have on the claim.
Nil”
At the conclusion of the hearing on 5 September 2024, the Tribunal made procedural directions for the parties to lodge and serve a jointly agreed transcript; and written submissions. A transcript was provided.
Regrettably, Counsel for the lot owners and Tornados requested a number of extensions of the timetable. Reasons included medical issues that are unnecessary to detail. Those delays led to a directions hearing on 29 April 2025, and the matter being listed for oral closing submissions on 4 June 2025.
At the closing submissions hearing date of 4 June 2025, Ms Edwards of Counsel provided a “rough” written outline of submissions, in addition to making oral submissions. Without intending to convey unnecessary personal criticism, the written and oral submissions of Ms Edwards of Counsel could have been organised in a much more coherent and detailed way. The failure to provide detailed and organised submissions by the lot owners and Tornados has not made the task of the Tribunal in determining these complex proceedings any easier.
Mr Purdy of Counsel provided a 5 page written outline of closing submissions dated 28 May 2025, in addition to making oral submissions.
The closing submissions of the low owners are summarised as follows:
The defects in the kitchen exhaust system were “structural” and thus the responsibility of the owners corporation to maintain and repair under s 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act and special by-law 22.3.
Pursuant to special by-law 22.3(b) the owners corporation had to maintain and repair the kitchen exhaust system when there were no “users” of the KES. The lots were vacant for approximately 2 years between when the tenancy of Porticos Chicken ended and the tenancy of Tornados commenced. The owners corporation performed no repairs or maintenance during this period.
There was evidence of pre-existing structural defects in the kitchen ventilation system and building prior to the commencement of Tornados tenancy, as set out in the report of Altec Building dated 26 October 2020 and the “recommendations” of Eagle Fire in about March 2022 for fire safety repairs.
The orders of the local Council; the reports of Baratech; and the reports of EBS all referred to structural building defects that were not limited to ducts of the kitchen exhaust system. Those defects pre-existed the tenancy of Tornados.
Tornados did not modify the kitchen exhaust system. The extent of its actions were to clean it.
The owners corporation had not repaired the building or the kitchen exhaust system such that the local Council orders had been complied with.
The lot owners were not able to rent out the lot as the local Council orders had not been complied with. There were not reasonable measures they could have taken to mitigate their loss when it is the owners corporation’s duty to repair the common property.
The lot owners sought damages according to the schedule previously provided. The amount was $670,744.71, plus “ongoing monthly damages” of $13,366.32 per month; plus “bank charges” of $27,724.04; plus “strata levies” of $63,151.64.
On the issue of jurisdiction, s 226 of the SSM Act should be interpreted that an “interested person” is at the date of the breach, not the date the proceedings were commenced. That interpretation is consistent with the policy and statutory intent of the SSM Act, so that the Tribunal has the power to hear strata scheme disputes.
If the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, the proceedings should be transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction.
A tenant can sue an owners corporation in negligence for pure-economic loss.
Tornados was vulnerable and could not take reasonable measures to protect its own interests from the owners corporation’s failure to keep and maintain common property in a state of good repair.
The Tribunal should accept the quantification of loss by Mr Nejati, whose assumptions and methodology should be accepted over Mr Beven.
The closing submissions of the owners corporation are summarised as follows:
The definition of “kitchen exhaust system” in special by-law 22 “…include not only pipes and ducts from hoods etc which extract the smoke but also the vertical shaft over which the easement exists.”
Tornados was a “user” within the meaning of clause 2 of special by-law 22 at the time the local Council order was made on 17 August 2022, and “was therefore responsible for rectifying the operational defects in the KES (except to the extent that “structural” maintenance or repairs were required) and for the various other obligations set out in cl. 22.2”.
The fact that the local Council order caused Tornados to cease “operation” of the KES does not mean it was not a “user” of the KES within the meaning of special by-law 22. There is a distinction between “use” and “operation.”
When Tornadoes vacated, the lot owners became “users” of the KES because “they have been seeking alternative tenants while maintaining the existing fit out including the connection of the kitchen range hoods to the KES and holding the premises out as suitable for a restaurant.”
The works recommended by EBS Consultants on 31 May 2023 included sealing of the masonry vertical shaft. The meaning of “structural” in “normal parlance denotes a function of load bearing or resisting.” The submissions cite AAI Ltd v Kalnin Corporation Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 548 at [75]-[93] for that definition of “structural”. The masonry shaft “perhaps” had a structural function, but also a “fire separation function” that was not structural. The repairs to the masonry shaft “addressed the fire separation function not any structural function which the shaft may have fulfilled.”
Based on the expert valuation report of Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas (which was not challenged) the lots had a “realistic rental market potential return” of $130,000 per annum. There was no evidence that the lots could not be let for the purpose of a restaurant or for some other use, and the report of Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas was consistent with the ability to rent the lots, irrespective of the local Council orders. The lot owners had made no reasonable efforts to obtain a new tenant after the lease ended, and there was no reason that a new tenant (if the lots were rented as a restaurant) could not have made their own fit out such that the lots could be used for commercial purposes. The lot owns should only be awarded damages of “at most a few months loss of rental income.”
In respect of Tornados claim, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction because Tornados was not an “interested person” within the meaning of s 226 of the SSM Act. The plain meaning of the words meant that “interested person” was not a formerly “interested person,” but an “interested person” as at the date that proceedings were commenced.
In oral submissions on 4 June 2026, the owners corporation opposed the proceedings being transferred to a Court, and submitted they should be dismissed in circumstances where Tornados and chosen to take proceedings in the Tribunal and it was the owners corporation who pointed out the jurisdiction issue. There was no limitation impediment for Tornados commencing a proceedings in a court for negligence. If the proceedings were transferred, Tornados should be ordered to pay the owners corporation’s costs thrown away by having to defend Tribunal proceedings that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear.
If the Tribunal had jurisdiction because Tornados was an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act, the owners corporation accepted that the Tribunal had the power under s 232 of the SSM Act to consider a claim in negligence. However, there were “formidable obstacles” in establishing the existence of a duty of care and breach of duty under the principles set out by the Hough Court in Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advata Seeds Pty Ltd [2024] HCA 25 at [29]-[41]. Tornados was not “vulnerable” in the relevant sense, because there were measures that Mr Romanov could have taken if he had turned his mind to the risk of a defective exhaust system. He “could have made enquiries of the lot owners, undertaken his own investigation of its efficacy and negotiated a lease casting responsibility upon the landlord lot owners.” No negligence giving rise to damages for pure economic loss is established.
If a claim for damages is upheld, the qualification of the loss should be on the basis of Mr Beven’s evidence, not Mr Nejati’s evidence.
The Tribunal should, in the owners corporation’s claim against the lot owners, award compensation for the cost of the owners corporation repairing the kitchen exhaust system in circumstances where it was the lot owners’ responsibility and the lot owners’ had failed to do so.
It is not disputed that the lot owners are “interested persons” under s 226(1)(d) of the SSM Act with standing to seek damages under ss 106(5) and 232(1) of the SSM Act. They were lot owners when the alleged breach of statutory duty occurred; were lot owners when the application was lodged with the Tribunal; and were lot owners as at the conclusion of the Tribunal hearing.
The lot owners proceedings were commenced within the applicable time period under s 106(6) of the SSM Act. At the time the proceedings were commenced, the applicable time period under s 106(6) of the SSM Act was 2 years from the date the lot owner first becomes aware of the type loss they are entitled to recover that is the subject of the claim (The Owners – Strata Plan No 74232 v Tezel [2023] NSWCA 35 at [12]; [29]; [41]-[42]). That limitation period has subsequently been extended to 6 years by way of statutory amendment. It is unnecessary to discuss the operation of the statutory amendment, because the lot owners proceedings in the Tribunal were commenced within 2 years of the date the lot owners first became aware that Tornados ceased paying rent by reason of the alleged breach of the owners corporation’s duty under ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act.
As discussed previously, the lot owners’ claim against the owners corporation is based on damages under ss 106(5) and 232(1) of the SSM Act for reasonably foreseeable loss caused by the owners corporation’s breach of statutory duty to keep and maintain common property in a state of good repair. The cause of action is statutory rather than in tort or contract (The Owners – Strata Plan No 2661 v Selkirk [2024] NSWSC 760 (Selkirk-Supreme Court) at [138]; Vickery v The Owners – Strata Plan No 80412 [2020] NSWCA 284 at [19]; and [168]-[169]).
Section 232(1) of the SSM Act empowers the Tribunal, when it has jurisdiction, to make orders that “settle” complaints or disputes of a type set out in s 232(1)(a)-(f). Awarding damages by reason of the operation of s 106(5) of the SSM Act is within the remedial powers of the Tribunal, which has been settled law since the NSW Court of Appeal decision in Vickery.
Section 106 of the SSM Act stated at the date of commencement Tribunal proceeding as follows:
106 Duty of owners corporation to maintain and repair property
(1) An owners corporation for a strata scheme must properly maintain and keep in a state of good and serviceable repair the common property and any personal property vested in the owners corporation.
(2) An owners corporation must renew or replace any fixtures or fittings comprised in the common property and any personal property vested in the owners corporation.
(3) This section does not apply to a particular item of property if the owners corporation determines by special resolution that—
(a) it is inappropriate to maintain, renew, replace or repair the property, and
(b) its decision will not affect the safety of any building, structure or common property in the strata scheme or detract from the appearance of any property in the strata scheme.
(4) An owners corporation may defer compliance with subsection (1) or (2) in relation to damage to common property until after the taking of action if—
(a) the action is taken by the owners corporation against an owner or another person in relation to the damage, and
(b) the deferment will not affect—
(i) the safety of buildings, structures or common property in the strata scheme, or
(ii) a person’s access to or use of the common property or a lot in the strata scheme.
(5) An owner of a lot in a strata scheme may recover from the owners corporation, as damages for breach of statutory duty, any reasonably foreseeable loss suffered by the owner as a result of a contravention of this section by the owners corporation.
(6) An owner may not bring an action under this section for breach of a statutory duty more than 2 years after the owner first becomes aware of the loss.
(7) This section is subject to the provisions of any common property memorandum adopted by the by-laws for the strata scheme under this Division, any common property rights by-law or any by-law made under section 108.
(8) This section does not affect any duty or right of the owners corporation under any other law.
The scope of the duty of an owners corporation under s 106 of the SSM Act has been the subject of much judicial discussion. A relatively concise summary of salient principles is contained in The Owners - Strata Plan No 33368 v Gittins [2022] NSWCATAP 130 (Gittins) at [57]-[58]; with further detailed consideration of what is “reasonably foreseeable loss suffered by the owner as a result of the contravention” under s 106(5) in Selkirk-Supreme Court; Horan v The Owners-Strata Plan No 68307 [2024] NSWCATAP 118; and Selkirk v The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661; The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661 v Selkirk [2026] NSWCATAP 211.
At [57]-[58] in Gittins, the Appeal Panel stated:
“[57] The scope of the duty of an owners corporation to maintain and keep in a state of good repair common property has been the subject of extensive judicial consideration (e.g. Seiwa Australian Pty Ltd v Owners Strata Plan 25042 [2006] NSWSC 1157; Ridis v Strata Plan 10308 [2005] NSWCA 246; Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 & Ors [2009] NSWSC 589; Stolfa v Hempton [2010] NSWCA 218; The Owners Strata Plan No 50276 v Thoo [2013] NSWCA 270; and Glenquarry Park Investments Pty Ltd v Hegyesi [2019] NSWSC 425 (‘Hegyesi’)).
[58] In The Owners-Strata Plan SP 20211 v Rosenthal; Rosenthal v The Owners-Strata Plan No 20211 [2018] NSWCATAP 243 (“Rosenthal”) and Loneragan v The Owners-Strata Plan No 16519 [2020] NSWCATAP 177 (“Loneragan”), the Appeal Panel summarised the principles applicable to the duty of an owners corporation under s 106 (1) and (2) of the SSM Act as follows (Rosenthal at [35]-[36]; Loneragan at [29]-[41]). The pertinent principles (excluding authority references) are:
(1) The owners corporation has a strict duty under s 106 (1) of the SSM Act to maintain and keep in a state of good and serviceable repair the common property. That duty is not merely to take reasonable steps or use best endeavours.
(2) The duty under s 106 (1) of the SSM Act includes keeping common property in order by acts of maintenance before it falls out of condition. The duty includes taking preventative measures to ensure there is not a malfunction. The duty also includes remediation of defects in the original construction of the common property.
(3) As soon as something in the common property is no longer operating effectively or at all, or has fallen into disrepair, there has been a breach of the s 106 (1) duty.
(4) Breach of the duty under s 106 (1) of the SSM Act gives each Lot owner a statutory cause of action.
(5) Repairs to common property (including renewal or replacement of common property) that does not involve alteration or addition for the purpose of improving or enhancing the common property does not require a special resolution of the owners corporation under s 108 of the SSM Act.
(6) Renewal or replacement of common property under s 106 (2) of the SSM Act is only engaged when the item of common property is no longer operating effectively, or at all, or has fallen into a state of disrepair.
(7) Renewal or replacement of common property under s 106 (2) of the SSM Act is limited by a concept of reasonable necessity.”
“[21] It is convenient to describe the duties imposed upon an owners corporation by ss 106(1) and (2) as “strict”. That adjective conveniently captures the fact that they are not discharged by the exercise of reasonable care. Nor, consequently, does Part 1A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) apply. Obviously, they are neither universal nor unqualified. The duties may be disapplied by s 106(3), and they may be qualified by s 106(4) and (7)…”
However, the duty under ss 106(1)-(2) is subject to the operation of any common property rights by-law or by law made under s 108 of the SSM Act (s 106(7)).
Section 108(1) of the SSM Act states:
108 Changes to common property
(1) Procedure for authorising changes to common property An owners corporation or an owner of a lot in a strata scheme may add to the common property, alter the common property or erect a new structure on common property for the purpose of improving or enhancing the common property.
(2) Any such action may be taken by the owners corporation or owner only if a special resolution has first been passed by the owners corporation that specifically authorises the taking of the particular action proposed.
Note.
If the special resolution is a sustainability infrastructure or accessibility infrastructure resolution fewer votes may be needed to pass it. See section 5(1)(b)
…
142 Common property rights by-law
For the purposes of this Act, a common property rights by-law is a by-law that confers on the owner or owners of a specified lot or lots in the strata scheme—
(a) a right of exclusive use and enjoyment of the whole or any specified part of the common property, or
(b) special privileges in respect of the whole or any specified part of the common property (including, for example, a licence to use the whole or any specified part of the common property in a particular manner or for particular purposes),
or that changes such a by-law.
A critical issue in this matter is the interpretation and operation of by-law 22. The owners corporation submits that it is a common property rights by-law that imposes obligations upon the lot owners and tenant in respect of the use, operation, repair and maintenance of the kitchen exhaust system such as to relieve the owners corporation from the duty to maintain and repair common property. The lot owners submit that the factual circumstances of the failure of the kitchen exhaust system to prevent smoke and odours from the operation of the kitchen exhaust system by Tornados does not fall within By-law 22 such that there was no obligation on the owners corporation to maintain and repair the relevant parts of the kitchen exhaust system.
The principles for interpretation of By-laws of a strata scheme (which bind all lot owners, occupants and the owners corporation) are well established.
In The Owners of Strata Plan No 3397 v Tate [2007] NSWCA 207, McColl JA (with whom Mason P agreed) stated at [71] (references omitted):
“1. By-laws are the “series of enactments” by which the proprietors in a body corporate administer their affairs; they do not deal with commercial rights, but the governance of the strata scheme: Bailey ;
2. By-laws have a public purpose which goes beyond their function of facilitating the internal administration of a body corporate; cp, Parkin, Lion Nathan;
3. Exclusive use by-laws may be inspected by third persons interested in acquiring an interest in a strata scheme, whether, for example, by acquiring units, or by lending money to a lot proprietor; such persons would ordinarily have no access to the circumstances surrounding their making; their meaning should be understood from their statutory context and language: NRMA ; Lion Nathan .
4. By-laws may be characterised as either delegated legislation or statutory contacts: Dainford ; Re Taylor ; Bailey ; North Wind ; Sons of Gwalia;
5. Whichever be the appropriate characterisation, exclusive use by-laws should be interpreted objectively by what they would convey to a reasonable person: Lion Nathan ;
6. In interpreting exclusive use by-laws the Court should take into account their constitutional function in the strata scheme in regulating the rights and liabilities of lot proprietors inter se : Parkin ; Lion Nathan .
7. Unlike the articles of a company, there does not appear to be a strong argument for saying exclusive use by-laws should be interpreted as a business document, with the intention that they be given business efficacy: cf NRMA (at [75]). That does not mean that an exclusive use by-law may not have a commercial purpose, and be interpreted in accordance with the principles expounded in cases such as Antaios Cia. Naviera S.A . , but due regard must be paid to the statutory context in so doing;
8. An exclusive use by-law should be construed so that it is consistent with its statutory context; a court may depart from such a construction if departure from the statutory scheme is authorised by the governing statute and if the intention to do so appears plainly from the terms of the by-law: Re Taylor ;
9. Caution should be exercised in going beyond the language of the by-law and its statutory context to ascertain its meaning; a tight rein should be kept on having recourse to surrounding circumstances: Lion Nathan.”
By reason of the operation of s 106(7) of the SSM Act, the obligation of the owners corporation to keep and maintain common property (which includes common infrastructure) in a reasonable state of repair under ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act is qualified to the extent that a common property rights by-law imposes liability for repairs and maintenance on a lot owner or occupier. In other words, if by-law 22 does not impose liability on the lot owner or occupier for repairs and maintenance, it is the owners corporation who has the legal responsibility. No issue has been raised by either party that ss 106(3) or (4) of the SSM Act is relevant to the dispute.
Under By-law 22.2(a), a lot owner or occupier who “uses” the Kitchen Exhaust System must properly maintain the system, but “not carry out any structural maintenance, repairs or replacements.”
The logical objective interpretation of By-law 22.2(a) is that responsibility for structural maintenance, repairs or replacements of the Kitchen Exhaust System (which includes, but is not limited to mechanical equipment for the operation of the kitchen exhaust system; and pipes, ducts vents and other services associated with the use, operation, maintenance and repair of the kitchen exhaust system by reason of the definition under by-law 31.1) is the responsibility of the owners corporation.
Accordingly, the starting point is to determine what is meant by “structural maintenance, repairs or replacements” of the Kitchen Exhaust System, and what are the particular defects or failures of common property.
Regrettably, the lot owners and Tornados referred to no legal authorities on the interpretation of “structural maintenance, repairs and maintenance” to support the submission that the defects in the building and kitchen exhaust system were “structural.” The only authority that the owners corporation referred to in written submissions was AAI Ltd v Kalnin Corporation Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 548 (Kal**nin). However, Kalnin involved the statutory warranty provisions of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) (HB Act) and the (then applicable) statutory definition of “structural defect” and “structural element of a building”.
No party referred to any authorities dealing with similar by-laws; or authorities referring to the contractual definition of “structural repairs” in commercial or retail leases.
There is reference to the concept of “structural changes” in the SSM Act. Under s 110 of the SSM Act, a lot owner can perform “minor renovations” to common property authorised by a resolution passed at a general meeting of the owners corporation. However, this does not apply to work involving “structural changes” under s 110(7)(b) of the SSM Act. Neither party referred to any authorities dealing with the meaning of “structural changes” under s 110(7)(b) of the SSM Act, or how (if at all) any analogy could be drawn to assist interpretation of by-law 22.
Authorities dealing with the responsibility for “structural repairs” in the context of commercial and retail lease clauses (i.e. whether the landlord or the tenant was responsible for structural repairs) were discussed by Harrison AsJ in Fasako Pty Ltd v TianyD Beauty & Hairdressing Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWSC 49 (Fasako-Supreme Court).
Fasako involved a dispute between a lessor (landlord) and lessee (tenant) about modification of the building fire safety system. The tenant sought to fit out the premises to include a number of partitioned beauty rooms. That could not occur in a manner compliant with building safety standards unless the fire sprinkler system was upgraded. Under cl. 9.3 of the lease (entitled “structural repair”), the lessor was responsible for keeping the building in “sound structural condition.” The words “structural” was not defined in the lease. The tenant asserted the landlord was responsible for the works and the landlord asserted the tenant was responsible. The tenant sought to terminate the lease for the landlord’s breach of cl. 9.3. The tenant argued it could not complete its fit out until the landlord repaired the fire safety system. Both parties took proceedings in NCAT.
At first instance in NCAT found the works fell outside cl. 9.3; the termination notice was invalid; and the lease remained on foot. The tenant appealed to the Appeal Panel of NCAT. That appeal succeeded and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal. The landlord appealed the Appeal Panel decision under s 83(1) NCAT Act to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court (Harrison AsJ) dismissed the appeal. The landlord appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal. The NSW Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal (Fasako Pty Ltd v TianyD Beauty & Hairdressing Australia Pty Ltd [2022] NSWCA 112).
At [179]-[182] Harrison AsJ cited with approval the Appeal Panel’s reasoning that relied upon the principles in Holus Bo**lus Pty Ltd v The Wicko Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 497 (Holus Bolus); Advance Fitness Corporation Pty Ltd v Bondi Diggers Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd [1999] NSWSC 264; Hampson v Clyne (1967) 86 WN (NSW) 321; and Alamado Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Window Furnishings (NSW) Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 224. At [180]-[181], Harrison AsJ stated:
“[179] In construing cl 9.3, the Appeal Panel applied Holus Bolos, in which the impugned cl 12.2 has some textual similarity with cl 9.3 of this lease. Summarising Holus Bolos; Nicholas J at [31] stated that the phrase “of structural nature” is of wide generality. It concentrates the mind upon the condition, state or quality of the building. It suggests something which is associated with, related to, or affects the structure considered as a whole. I agree with the Appeal Panel that the reasoning in Holus Bolus is the most relevant authority in relation to cl 9.3 in these proceedings. In this regard, one must consider the words of Nicholas J in Holus Bolus at [30]:
“There are many cases which discuss the meaning of “structure,” “structural alteration,” and “structural repairs,” but all are with regard to the legislation, lease, or agreement in the particular case. Sometimes they afford helpful, but not determinative, guidance for the approach to be taken.”
[181] In Blantic where Paine J adopted the decisions of Advance Fitness and Alamdo SC, the phrase “structural alterations” was said to refer to work which is substantial, meaning not de minimis or minor. At [32] in Holus Bolus, Nicholas J was of the opinion that these cases establish that the determination of the question whether or not, for example, amendments or alterations are of a structural nature, is largely a matter of fact and degree. In particular, the court should apply a practical, “common-sense [person]-of-the-world view.” His Honour further stated at [33] that the questions must be determined with regard to the whole of the works to be done rather than to the component parts of the works individually. It is my view that that here under cl 9.3 Fasako must keep this building in sound structural condition. It seems that under Fasako’s interpretation of cl 9.3, no one is responsible for the problem with the fire sprinklers and it is only if there is a fire that cl 9.3 comes into play.”
“[27] The question is whether or not the works, or part of them, are within the meaning of “amendments alterations reparations and additions of a structural nature”. Under the lease, the lessee’s obligation to carry out works which are “structural” (cl 7.2) or “of a structural nature” (cl 9.12) is expressly excluded.
[28] The term “amendments” is ordinarily understood to include improvements, or rectifications, or corrections of a fault. The term “alterations” is ordinarily understood to include changes or modifications. Meanings of “reparations” given in the Macquarie Dictionary include “3. restoration to good condition; 4. repairs”. The natural and ordinary meaning of “structural” given in the Macquarie Dictionary is “1. of or relating to structure; relating or essential to a structure.”
[29] In context in cl 12.2, the term “of a structural nature” is intended to be descriptive of works carried on in and upon the hotel building. As a structure is something consisting of component parts, it follows that the description is not limited to works which affect only those parts which are load bearing such as the main walls.”
“[33] As the Appeal Panel correctly noted, the question was not whether the water pump and piping were part of the “structure” of the building, but whether an inadequate fire protection system involved a breach of an obligation to “keep the building in sound structural condition”. [28] The Appeal Panel held that:
“[103] … In this regard, ‘sound’ connotes the concept of being substantially free from flaw, defect, decay or deterioration to the extent that the building or structure is capable of adequately or safely accomplishing the purpose for which it was intended or designed.”
[34] The Appeal Panel found that a fire system complying with the relevant standards was necessary, concluding:
“[106] A different interpretation of cl 9.3 would mean that if the building could not be lawfully occupied because of inadequate fire safety systems and was susceptible to structural failure in the event of fire due to non-compliance with fire safety requirements, the landlord would have no obligation to provide or repair such systems and the tenant (which itself has no obligation [to] keep the building in a sound structural condition) would have no recourse.”
…
[41] If the primary judge had commenced her consideration with the statement that “many of the propositions presented by Fasako were at best of peripheral relevance to the issue to be determined”, there could have been no complaint. Yet that was implicit in the first sentence of the judge’s consideration of the submissions:
“[178] Returning to the text of cl 9.3 of the Lease, it states that the Lessor must keep the building in sound structural condition except for structural damage caused… which the Lessor must, subject to its rights under cl 11, promptly repair.”
[42] The question is not what is the connection between the physical elements of a fire protection system, being the pumps and piping, and the physical structure of the building; rather, it is the connection between the function of the fire protection system and the integrity of the building. The latter question was addressed by the Appeal Panel and the primary judge.”
[37] Because the condition of areas 1 to 3 went beyond reasonable wear and tear, AWF had an obligation to repair them unless this would amount to structural maintenance, replacement or repair. Both the referee and the primary judge found that it would do so.
[38] The primary judge gave the following reasons:
39… The first thing to be said is that, as I view matters, maintenance, replacement or repair that is “structural” can be undertaken only in relation to something that is a “structure” although, of course, not everything done by way of maintenance, replacement or repair in relation to a “structure” is properly classified as “structural.” I regard as apposite, in this connection, a passage in the judgment of Brereton J in Hampson v Clyne (1967) 86 WN (NSW) 321:
Structure’ of course is a word of which the meaning varies considerably according to the context, and the phrase ‘structural character’ or ‘defect of a structural character’ varies correspondingly. Literally ‘structure’ means something which has been constructed and ‘defect of a structural character’ means either a fault in putting the structure together or some subsequent failure on the part of the structure to remain satisfactorily put together. With particular reference to buildings in common parlance we refer to the bare building as the structure. We refer to fixtures and fittings attached to the structure although these may themselves as individual units be technically ‘structures.’ We refer also to installations, such as gas and water piping and electrical circuits. Each of these may, however, independently be in certain contexts regarded as a ‘structure’ in that it is something which has been constructed within another structure.
40 Applying the same concepts, maintenance, replacement or repair is “structural” when its purpose and effect are to remedy some “failure on the part of the structure to remain satisfactorily put together”. This is, I think, consistent with the approach taken to the meaning of “structural repairs” in relation to buildings as such in cases such as Granada Theatres Ltd v Freehold Investment (Leytonstone) Ltd [1959] 1 Ch 592 and Advance Fitness Corporation Pty Ltd v Bondi Diggers Memorial & Sporting Club Ltd [1999] NSWSC 264 to which counsel for both parties referred. Reference may also be made to what was said by Balmford J — again in relation to a building — in Carbure Pty Ltd v Brile Pty Ltd [2002] VSC 272:
‘the structure’ is that part of the total building that supports the loads and stops the building falling down. It should be emphasised that a building may be structurally sound notwithstanding that it shows signs of movement; as by the opening of cracks. Unless such cracks indicate a real and present threat to load bearing integrity, of building failure or collapse, they may be treated as simply cosmetic defect — susceptible of patching, painting or other straight-forward repair.
41 Also instructive, in this connection, is the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in J F Hillam Pty Ltd v Mooney (1988) 48 SASR 381. That case concerned an indoor swimming centre which included two heated pools built into the ground but inside a building. They had on their inside surfaces a particular coating akin to concrete (described as “marblesheen”) to “make them safe and acceptable to swimmers.” The marblesheen deteriorated and one of the issues for determination was whether its replacement was “a major repair of a structural nature to the premises.” King CJ (with whom Jacobs and von Doussa JJ agreed on this aspect) answered the question in the affirmative:
The swimming pools were undoubtedly part of the structure of the premises. The marblesheen which rendered them usable as swimming pools by providing an appropriate surface must be regarded, to my mind, as part of the structure. The repair or replacement of that marblesheen is therefore a repair of a structural nature.
42 Returning to the particular case of the pavements, I am satisfied that they are properly to be regarded as “structures”. They were put upon the land by a process of construction. Their character, as consisting of a skin or coating of asphalt placed upon a prepared land surface to which a basecourse of aggregate or blue metal had first been added, makes them similar to, although lesser in degree than, the “low attractive brick fence” considered in Durkin v Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia (unreported, Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, 30 November 1990) where a fence “in which the bricks are cemented to a cement base and to one another by mortar” was held to be a “permanent domestic improvement of a structural nature”. In the same way pavements constructed in the way I have described should be characterised as being improvements “of a structural nature.” Furthermore, the replacement of the asphalt skin and any missing basecourse that, to adapt the words in the JF Hillam case, made them usable as pavements by providing the necessary hard surface and its support, and, as stated in Hampson v Clyne, was necessary for them to “remain satisfactorily put together,” must, in my judgment, amount to maintenance, replacement or repair that is “structural.”
[39] Mr McHugh submitted that bitumen paving, as distinct from reinforced concrete paving, could not be a structure because it was flexible and did not distribute its load to the ground; and because it lacked the inter-connectedness of parts which could make it analogous to a building.
[40] In my opinion, the concept of structure is not limited to this extent. In my opinion it was well open to the referee and the primary judge to find that the areas of bitumen paving were structures and that, as the experts agreed, the repairs needed to areas 1 to 3 were structural repairs.”
The authorities referred to previously support the principle that what is repairs or maintenance of a “structural” nature, in the context of interpretation of commercial and retail leases, is a matter of fact and degree that involves consideration of the structural integrity of the building.
No authorities the Tribunal is aware of dealing with “structural works” under s 110(7)(b) of the SSM Act are of assistance in determining what is “structural” and “non-structural” in the context of interpreting the words of a by-law. As discussed previously, no such authorities were referred to in submissions.
As discussed previously, the owners corporation cites Ka**lnin as authority for the proposition that works to the Kitchen Exhaust System stipulated by the local Council orders and expert reports obtained by the owners corporation are “non-structural” and thus the responsibility of either (or both) the lot owner and Tornados.
Kalnin involved a claim by an insurer to recover monies paid under a policy of insurance. The insurer could only recover those monies if they were paid in respect of “structural defects” as defined in the HB Act and its Regulation. That involved consideration of Reg. 57AC of the (then applicable) Home Building Regulation 1997(NSW). That provision is no longer applicable, having been superseded. The definition was as follows:
57AC Meaning of ‘structural defect’
(1) For the purposes of section 103B (2) of the Act, structural defect means any defect in a structural element of a building that is attributable to defective design, defective or faulty workmanship or defective materials (or any combination of these) and that:
(a) results in, or is likely to result in, the building or any part of the building being required by or under any law to be closed or prohibited from being used, or
(b) prevents, or is likely to prevent, the continued practical use of the building or any part of the building, or
(c) results in, or is likely to result in:
(i) the destruction of the building or any part of the building, or
(ii) physical damage to the building or any part of the building, or
(d) results in, or is likely to result in, a threat of imminent collapse that may reasonably be considered to cause destruction of the building or physical damage to the building or any part of the building.
(2) In subclause (1):
structural element of a building means:
(a) any internal or external load-bearing component of the building that is essential to the stability of the building or any part of it, including things such as foundations, floors, walls, roofs, columns and beams, and
(b) any component (including weatherproofing) that forms part of the external walls or roof of the building.”
Regulation 57AC of the HB Regulation was superseded by Reg. 71 of the Home Building Regulation 2004 (NSW) and was applicable to the then distinction in s 18E of the HB Act between limitation periods for “structural defects” and other defects in respect of breach of the statutory warranties owned by a builder to an owner under s 18B of the HB Act. Eventually, that distinction was changed to the current distinction in s 18E of the HB Act to “major defects” and “non-major defects”. Section 18E of the HB Act, and what constitutes a “major defect” and “major element of a building” was discussed in Stevenson v Ashton [2019] NSWSC 1689.
However, this decision does not involve a dissertation on ss 18B and 18E of the HB Act. The salient point is that Kalnin involved interpretation of a statute that had a specific definition of “structural defect” and “structural element of a building” in its statutory context. No authorities are referred to that support the proposition that it is appropriate to import the statutory definition in repealed home building legislation into the meaning “structural repairs or maintenance” in by-law 22.2 and 22.3, as distinct from the authorities referred to previously that interpret clauses of retail and commercial leases.
It is incontrovertible that the kitchen exhaust system failed in the sense that it did not prevent smoke and odours escaping into lot 3 and the car park of the building. That led to the local Council orders of August-October 2022.
Whether there were other repairs to common property required that fall outside the definition of the kitchen exhaust system.
In the absence of either party assisting their own case, and the Tribunal, by obtaining independent expert evidence that clearly addresses the nature of the defects and whether they involve “structural repairs or maintenance,” the Tribunal is left with the task of sifting through the contemporaneous expert reports (and the local Council orders) to determine whether the lot owners have proved breach of duty under s 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act. In that regard, for a tribunal of fact to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, of the existence of a fact, it must feel an actual persuasion of the existence of that fact and consider whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to draw a reasonable and definitive inference beyond mere conjecture (Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 at [44]-[54]).
At the hearing, a number of lay witnesses were questioned about whether the repairs and maintenance was “structural,” or not. However, the opinions of a strata manager, a real estate agent, a strata committee member, or a lot owner on a technical issue is of limited relevance, and those opinions are not given any significant weight.
Critical evidence of the condition of the kitchen exhaust system and building are contained in the following (although these are not the only relevant documents, with the documents about building repairs and proposed building repairs by Altec Building and Eagle Fire prior to April 2022 also being relevant):
The Baratech report dated 17 June 2022.
The local Council orders of 17 August 2022.
The Brentnall BCA report of 10 October 2022.
The local Council orders of 11 October 2022.
The email of Mr Lu of Baratech to Mr Castrogiovanni dated 27 October 2022.
The Brentnall BCA report of 1 November 2022.
The EBS Consultants report of 21 April 2023.
The Baratech report of 17 June 2022 relevantly refers to the possibility of the leak is “through the shaft which connects the apartment and adjoining Peter’s apartment” which “implicates that the shaft separation walls probably are not sealed as per the fire rating requirements”.
The local Council order of 17 August 2022 referred to dampers and fire safety seals being “not on the current annual fire safety schedule for the building and subsequently not maintained as required with the annual fire safety statement (AFSS)”. As well, the mechanical ventilation system was “defective;” there was “inadequate” separation; and a “lack of maintenance and certification” of the mechanical ventilation system that “constitutes a significant fire hazard.”
The Brentall BCA report of 10 October 2022 identified a “very high probability” that the kitchen exhaust duct; and the shaft containing the kitchen exhaust duct “contains gaps”. Further, there were additional “defects” that gave “cause for concern” in respect of: the “masonry construction generally is likely to be substandard” such that it allows the escape of smoke from the kitchen and carpark exhaust shafts” and “the construction of mechanical ductwork is likely to be substandard” (emphasis added).
The local Council orders of 11 October 2022 contain, in substance, the same basis as the orders of 17 August 2022, but further note the “investigation reports and recommendations of the mechanical ventilation system” provided by Baratech “revealed defective/unsafe conditions” and the provision fire safety measures in the building is “inadequate”.
The email of Mr Lu of Baratech to Mr Castrogiovanni dated 27 October 2022 states that it “seems a lot of ducts and shaft walls have problems. It is not only one or two ducts” (emphasis added). That indicates that the defects go beyond merely the exhaust fan unit (by-law 22.2(b)(i)) or ducts (by-law 22.2(b)(ii)), which are matters that the lot owner or occupier who “uses” the kitchen exhaust system” are obliged to maintain and repair.
The report of Brentnall BCA dated 1 November 2022 states that “the construction of masonry fire rated walls” (emphasis added) was “not acceptable”. That is elaborated in the report as involving “the construction of the kitchen exhaust shaft” (emphasis added); the masonry walls in the electrical enclosure of the lobby of Level 3 were “constructed with visible gaps between the bricks, which would not achieve the necessary fire resistance levels” (emphasis added); that there may be other masonry walls in the building that were inadequate; and that further inspection is required.
However, the Brentall BCA report does not state that further inspections are required to determine whether there are defects. Rather, further inspection is to determine the extent of the defects, and what scope of works is necessary to repair them.
The report of EBS Consultants dated 21 April 2023 is comprehensive. Separately to defects identified in the exhaust duct (“multiple service penetrations…in the various locations throughout the tenancy that were poorly fire stopped or not fire stopped), Mr Harriman of EBS Consultant identified defects. He stated that “where the mechanical ventilation system penetrated through the blockwork shafts, I identified numerous non-compliances regarding blockwork construction of the shafts with unsealed perpends and construction joints between the concrete elements” (emphasis added).
Mr Harriman of EBS Consultants concludes that the smoke ingress was caused “as a result of lack of maintenance, unsealed sheet metal joints, a potential hole in the sheet, and unsealed brickwork shaft joints and perpends.” He further asserts that “non-compliance” (presumably meaning non-compliance with fire safety standards) is caused by a combination (emphasis added) of:
Lack of periodic maintenance, and poor workmanship during the installation of the mechanical ductwork at the installation stage;
The “unsealed shafts” to Unit 2 and 3 are attributable to “a lack of poor workmanship at construction stage when the shaft was constructed”.
The water leak in the ceiling proximate to the Stellar Land occupied lot leading to the contractor damaging the Trafalgar Fyrewrap insulation.
Further, Mr Harriman identified “various other service penetrations through the building substrates and shafts with no fire stopping system” (emphasis added); “a number of PVC pipes” without fire collars; and “a number of unsealed electrical cable service penetrations through the fire rated elements” (emphasis added). Mr Harriman concludes that the smoke has emanated “through small leaks in the duct work and brickwork shaft” (emphasis added) as well as there being “penetrations” through the “fire rated elements of the building” (emphasis added).
The Tribunal is satisfied that the defects which caused and contributed to the smoke egress into the strata building whilst the kitchen exhaust system was used by Tornados went beyond non-structural maintenance, repair and replacement of the components of the kitchen exhaust system.
When the evidence is considered in its totality, the defects involve structural maintenance, repair or replacement that fall outside the scope of by-law 22.2. The defects involve the structural integrity of the building, particularly as it pertains to fire safety. Further, there are defects in the building identified in the contemporaneous evidence that are not the kitchen exhaust system, including walls and penetrations. To the extent those defects involve the kitchen exhaust system, the owners corporation is obliged to maintain and repair under by-law 22.3(a).
The Tribunal does not accept the submission of the owners corporation that the defects and repairs required to the strata building are not structural, because they involve a “fire separation function” rather than load bearing or resisting. That submission is predicated on the Tribunal limiting the concept of “structural maintenance and structural repairs” in by-law 22.2 and 22.3 to only those elements of the building that are load bearing. That distinction incorporates principles from now repealed home building legislation. As discussed previously, the Tribunal does not apply that definition to by-law 22.2 and 22.3.
The definition of structural maintenance and structural repairs for the purpose of by-laws 22.2 and 22.3(a) is whether the maintenance and repairs affects the structural integrity of the strata building to a sufficient degree that it is regarded as structural rather than non-structural. The nature and extent of the defects identified in the contemporaneous expert reports and local Council orders, which clearly involve the fire safety of the building and the structure of the building, are of a sufficient degree that they are structural for the purpose of by-law 22.2(a) and by-law 22.3(b). There are also defects to parts of the building that are not part of the kitchen exhaust system, and cannot fall within by-law 22.2. Those defects are, irrespective of by-law 22.2, the responsibility of the owners corporation.
According, it is the obligation of the owners corporation to conduct repairs under by-law 22.3(a) and s 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act, not the obligation of the lot owners or Tornados under by-law 22.
It is noted that some of the defects involve the ductwork of the kitchen exhaust system, which arguably falls within by-law 22.2(b)(ii). However, the defects go well beyond the pipes, wires, cables and ducts installed, or the exhaust fan unit. The defects involve a constellation and combination of different elements of the building. When considered in totality, they are structural. There is no evidentiary or legal basis for attempting to separate out, for example, repairs to the ductwork from the other defect items. Even if that artificial exercise was attempted, the other items are structural. However, the better approach is to consider the defects in their totality.
The lot owners and Tornados submit that by reason of by-law 22.3(b) the owners corporation was obliged to maintain and repair the kitchen exhaust system when the lots were unoccupied in the period between the tenancies of Portico Chicken and Tornados. The owners corporation opposes that on the basis of its definition of the word “Users” in the by-law. It is unnecessary for the Tribunal to determine that aspect of the dispute by reason of its previous findings regarding the nature and extent of the defects in the building and the operation of by-law 22.3(a).
The owners corporation has been in breach of its duty to keep and maintain common property in a state of good repair since (at least) the reports of smoke ingress into unit 3/lot 3 of the residential strata scheme; and the car park of the strata building.
That breach had not been rectified by the close of evidence on 5 September 2024.
The damages recoverable are only for “reasonably foreseeable” damage caused by the breach. Otherwise, the loss is too remote from the breach.
Damages are reasonably foreseeable if the type or kind of damage is reasonably foreseeable, as distinct from a specific component of the type of damage, or the extent of the damage.
In Smith v Owners-Strata Plan No 3400 [2022] NSWSC 1599, Mitchelmore J stated at [34] and [41]:
“[34] In its terms, the right of recovery in s 106(5) of the SSM Act is dependent upon characterisation of the loss as “reasonably foreseeable” and “suffered by the owner as a result of a contravention of this section”. The terminology is consistent with the approach to assessing damages in tort, consistently with the cases before Thoo which had approached damages on that basis. There is no suggestion in the text of s 106(5) that the enactment of a statutory right to damages which the Supreme Court had previously considered to be available was intended to depart from the basis on which damages had previously been assessed.
…
[41] In the present case, it was common ground between the parties, consistently with settled principle, that damages in negligence are available for loss or injury of a kind that is reasonably foreseeable as a possible result of the breach of duty, citing Overseas Tankships (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering Co Ltd (The Wagon Mound No 1) [1961] AC 388 (see at 423, 426). As summarised in McGregor on Damages (21st ed, Thomson Reuters, 2021) at [8-065], “… the bar is only to recovery for unforeseeable types of damage: if the damage is of a type that is foreseeable, then recovery is still available even if the degree of damage is unforeseeable or if the precise manner in which the damage occurs is unforeseeable”. Reasonable foreseeability also limits damages in nuisance, whether the conduct constituting the nuisance be intentional or negligent: Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Tweed Shire Council (2013) 85 NSWLR 514; [2013] NSWCA 382 at [218] per Emmett JA (Leeming JA agreeing at [276]-[279], Sackville AJA at [284]).”
“[48] It was common ground between the parties that the test for remoteness of damage is that established in The Wagon Mound36 and applied by this court in National Australia Bank Ltd v Nemur Varity Pty Ltd,37 namely, whether the damage claimed by the appellant is “of such a kind or genus that a reasonable person should have foreseen”.
[49] As identified by his Honour on the appeal, this involves a two stage process. First, it is necessary to identify the particular kind or genus, to which the loss belongs (“the categorisation question”). Second, once the particular kind or genus has been identified, it is necessary to determine whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant ought to have foreseen loss of that particular kind or genus.”
“[94] More generally, this is not a case where the plaintiffs should fail on the basis that they had not proven loss. The principles were summarised by Black J in Sabouni v Revelop Building and Developments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWSC 31 at [41]-[42]. In short, the Court must do the best it can to make a reliable assessment of damages, where damages are difficult to assess, including where a party has failed to lead the best evidence of damages: Commonwealth of Australia v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 83, 125, 153; [1991] HCA 54. In Uszok v Henley Properties (NSW) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 31 at [135], Beazley JA with whom Basten JA agreed said that:
Where there has been an actual loss of some sort, the common law does not permit difficulties of estimating the loss in money to defeat the only remedy it provides for breach of contract, an award of damages …. Such damages should not be nominal only, notwithstanding that the award may be difficult to assess. …
[95] That said, where damages were susceptible of evidentiary proof, but there is an absence of raw material to which good sense may be applied, “[j]ustice does not dictate that … a figure should be plucked out of the air”: Troulis v Vamvoukakis [1998] NSWCA 237. Likewise, in McCrohon v Harith [2010] NSWCA 67 at [128], this Court said that an estimate of damages, in the nature of a “guess”, should not be made where precise evidence of the damages suffered could have been adduced but was not.
[96] Thus the law draws a distinction between cases of mere difficulty in proving damages, which must often be assessed on a counter-factual basis, and cases where damages are refused because the position is too speculative. In such cases it is important to have regard to the capacity of the plaintiff to adduce evidence, and how truly speculative the loss is…”
However, damages in this matter are assessed in an analogous manner to tort rather than contract, subject to the limitation of remoteness of damage (the concept of reasonable foreseeability) and the concept of causation (the loss must be “as a result of” the breach by the owners corporation of its statutory obligation under s 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act, rather than caused by the actions of the lot owners).
When future events involve uncertainty and speculation, the principles in Malec v. J.C. Hutton Pty. Ltd. (1990) 169 CLR 638; [1990] HCA 20 (Malec) apply. Those principles are often referred to the in the context of assessing damages in tort, contract, or breach of statutory obligation when assessing damages for the loss of a future opportunity (e.g Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332; [1994] HCA 4 (Sellars); Horan v The Owners – Strata Plan No. 68307 [2024] NSWCATAP 118 (Horan) at [59]-[67]; Selkirk v The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661; The Owners-Strata Plan No 2661 v Selkirk [2026] NSWCATAP 21 at [185]-[188]).
However, the principles in Malec are not limited to assessing damages for loss of opportunity, although that is a type of loss that is inherently uncertain and speculative. As the plurality of the High Court stated in Sellars at [22]-[24] and [38]:
“[22]. Damages in tort have also been assessed by reference to the probabilities or possibilities of what will happen or what would have happened. That approach has been frequently adopted in the assessment of damages for personal injuries where a court has been called upon to assess future possibilities and past hypothetical situations. In Malec v. J.C. Hutton Pty. Ltd. ((20) [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638.), this Court drew a distinction between, on the one hand, proof of historical facts - what has happened - and, on the other hand, proof of future possibilities and past hypothetical situations. The civil standard of proof applies to the first category but not to the second, particularly when it is necessary to determine future possibilities and past hypothetical situations for the purpose of assessing damages ((21) ibid at 639-640 per Brennan and Dawson JJ., 642-643 per Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.).
[23]. In Malec, Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. explained the way in which the matter is to be approached in these terms ((22) ibid at 643.):
“If the law is to take account of future or hypothetical events in assessing damages, it can only do so in terms of the degree of probability of those events occurring. ... But unless the chance is so low as to be regarded as speculative - say less than 1 per cent - or so high as to be practically certain - say over 99 per cent - the court will take that chance into account in assessing the damages. Where proof is necessarily unattainable, it would be unfair to treat as certain a prediction which has a 51 per cent probability of occurring, but to ignore altogether a prediction which has a 49 per cent probability of occurring. Thus, the court assesses the degree of probability that an event would have occurred, or might occur, and adjusts its award of damages to reflect the degree of probability.”
The same approach has been adopted in England ((23) Mallett v. McMonagle (1970) AC 166 at 174; Davies v. Taylor (1974) AC 207 at 212, 219.) and Canada ((24) Janiak v. Ippolito (1985) 16 DLR (4th) 1.).
[24]. Neither in logic nor in the nature of things is there any reason for confining the approach taken in Malec concerning the proof of future possibilities and past hypothetical situations to the assessment of damages for personal injuries. The reasons which commended the adoption of that approach in assessments of that kind apply with equal force to the assessment of damages for loss of a commercial opportunity, as the judgments in Amann acknowledge.
…
[38]. Notwithstanding the observations of this Court in Norwest, we consider that acceptance of the principle enunciated in Malec requires that damages for deprivation of a commercial opportunity, whether the deprivation occurred by reason of breach of contract, tort or contravention of s.52(1), should be ascertained by reference to the court’s assessment of the prospects of success of that opportunity had it been pursued. The principle recognized in Malec was based on a consideration of the peculiar difficulties associated with the proof and evaluation of future possibilities and past hypothetical fact situations, as contrasted with proof of historical facts. Once that is accepted, there is no secure foundation for confining the principle to cases of any particular kind.
In this matter, the tenancy ended prematurely in April 2023. However, there was a 5 year tenancy that commenced in January 2022. Damages in this matter are not assessed merely on the loss of opportunity to obtain a new tenant after April 2023, as there was an existing tenant under a fixed term lease. However, as will be discussed further, the vicissitudes and uncertainties of having a commercial tenant who pays rent throughout the duration of the tenancy are matters to be appropriately considered when assessing damages under Malec principles.
The principles for assessing damages to a landlord when a commercial tenant repudiates a lease causing termination were discussed by Nixon J in ISPT Pty Ltd and AWFP Management No 2 Pty Ltd v Cao and Zhao [2023] NSWSC 1115 (Zhao) at [180]-[184] and Richmond J in Interslice Pty Ltd v CCA Investments-Bass Hill (No 2) [2024] NSWSC 481 at [130]-[132]. Zhao was appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal (Cao v IS**PT Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 188, but on different grounds, and it is unnecessary to refer to that decision).
When assessing damages to a landlord for a tenant repudiating during the period of the fixed term, the landlord’s measure of damages is assessed by reference to the difference between future rental payments and the benefits the landlord will received from re-letting the premises-see also: Gumland Property Holdings v Duffy Bros Fruit Market (Campbelltown) Pty Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 237; [2008] HCA 10 (Gumland Property Holdings); Luxner Holdings Pty Ltd v Glentham Pty Ltd (2007) 35 WAR 254; Gigi Entertainment Pty Ltd v Schmidt (2013) 17 BPR 32,611; [2013] NSWCA 287 (Schmidt).
However, in such circumstances, the landlord still bears the onus of proving loss, and whether the landlord has taken reasonable steps to ‘mitigate’ loss by obtaining (or attempting to obtain) a new tenant is relevant.
As Leeming JA stated in Selkirk-Supreme Court at [127]-[130] the issue of ‘mitigation’ is misdescribed, and there is no “duty to mitigate”. Rather, what measures the lot owner has taken to avoid loss is relevant to whether, at a point in time, the actions of the owners corporation are no longer an operative cause of the loss (or no loss is established) because a lot owner is regarded as having, by its actions or inaction, caused its own loss, or the type of loss is no longer reasonably foreseeable.
In Smith, Mitchelmore J took a similar approach and stated at [39]-[40] and [45]-[46]:
“[39] In The Owners – Strata Plan No 76674 v Di Blasio Constructions Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1067, which concerned a breach of statutory warranties under the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW), Ball J stated that the principle “is that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover losses attributable to its own unreasonable conduct”: at [42]. In Karacominakis at [187], Giles JA (Meagher JA and Stein JA agreeing) said of mitigation:
“This is often misleadingly referred to as a duty to mitigate, although the plaintiff is not under a positive duty. The plaintiff does not have to show that he has fulfilled his so-called duty, and the onus is on the defendant to show that he has not and the extent to which he has not (TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Hayden Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 130). Since the defendant is a wrongdoer, in determining whether the plaintiff has acted unreasonably a high standard of conduct will not be required, and the plaintiff will not be held to have acted unreasonably simply because the defendant can suggest other and more beneficial conduct if it was reasonable for the plaintiff to do what he did (Banco de Portugal v Waterlow and Sons Ltd (1932) AC 452; Pilkington v Wood (1953) Ch 770; Sacher Investments Pty Ltd v Forma Stereo Consultants Pty Ltd (1976) 1 NSWLR 5).”
[40] The above principles have been cited with approval in subsequent cases, including Doppstadt Australia Pty Ltd v Lovick & Son Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 158 at [211] per Gleeson JA, Ward and Emmett JJA agreeing; and recently in Krolczyk v Winner t/as J Winner Building Services [2022] NSWCA 196 at [185] per Griffiths AJA, White and Kirk JJA agreeing.
…
[45] In relation to the issue of mitigation, the Smiths relied on the decision in Lubrano v Proprietors Strata Plan No 4038 (1997) 6 BPR 13,308 (“Lubrano”) in submitting that there was no room for the principle of mitigation to operate in this case. I disagree that Lubrano supports that submission. In that case, Young J was addressing whether the duty in the cognate provision to s 106 of the SSM Act and s 62 of the 1996 Act, namely, s 68 of the Strata Titles Act 1973 (NSW), was a strict one. The defendant had submitted that characterising the duty as strict would have absurd results, giving as an example it being liable to the owner of premises at the top of the building who deliberately threw a metal ball on the roof, breaking the tiles so that rain could come in. Young J rejected the submission, observing that the strictness of the duty had been decided in a series of earlier cases: at 13,310. However, it does not follow from a conclusion that the duty in s 106 applies irrespective of contributory negligence on the part of a lot owner that an owners corporation cannot raise mitigation when the duty is breached and damages are claimed. Lubrano does not say anything about that circumstance.
[46] Having regard to the description of the loss for which s 106(5) makes provision, her Honour did not err in reducing the amount of damages to be awarded to the Smiths for loss of rent. The Smiths accept that it is not open to them to challenge the factual findings on which the Magistrate relied in reaching that result in an appeal under s 39 of the Local Court Act.”
Returning back to in breach of contract in commercial lease matters where the tenant had repudiated during the fixed term, a landlord can only obtain loss of bargain damages for loss of rental income if it establishes that it tried unsuccessfully to obtain a new tenant at the rent stipulated in the terminated lease (Gumland Property Holdings at [55]-[56]; Schmidt at [71]-[73]). That is a separate issue to whether there was ‘mitigation’ by the landlord (Schmidt at [73]).
In Gumland Property Holdings, the plurality of the High Court stated at [56]:
“[56]…If landlords obtain possession, they can only recover loss of bargain damages if they have tried unsuccessfully to obtain a new tenant at the rent stipulated in the terminated lease. The monetary equivalent of what they would have got if they had not taken possession of the property reflects the fact that they cannot obtain tenants, or cannot obtain tenants who promise to pay as much as the defaulting tenants promised.”
“Mr Gerzilis’ evidence does not disclose any attempt by him to ascertain the existence of any alternative lessee: no marketing of the premises; no instructions to agents as to the re-leasing of the premises or the like. This may be contrasted with what had apparently occurred in the Luxer Holdings case and in Buchanan v Byrnes. Nor was there any expert opinion from a real estate agent as to the market value of the lease or the likely time that might be required in order to find an alternative tenant for the premises.
…
[92] Although I accept that exhaustive evidence of attempts to locate other tenants would not have been necessary in order to raise a prima facie case of loss, so as to support the potential relevance of Mr Bell’s evidence, here there was a paucity of evidence of that kind. Insofar as reliance was placed by Mr Pritchard on the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in McGlone v Kalgold [2011] QCA 215, where a landlord terminated a lease, took possession of the premises and operated the coffee shop business itself, it appears that there was in that case some evidence of attempts to let the premises ([3]-[4] per McMurdo J, [18] and [22] per Dalton J), so as to make good the landlord’s claim to have suffered loss as a consequence of the termination of the lease, the onus then falling on the defendant to prove failure to mitigate ([5] per McMurdo J, [21], [24]-[25] per Dalton J). That is not the case here.”
“[102] The Landlord’s claim for damages faced fundamental difficulties. On the primary Judge’s findings, the Landlord made no attempt to re-let the premises after taking possession in consequence of the Tenant’s default. Nor did it adduce any evidence of the rental value of the premises at the date it terminated the lease or indeed of the rental value at any time between that date and the scheduled expiration of the lease. The Landlord’s belated attempt to claim damages equivalent to the rent for a period of three months after termination of the lease, on the ground that it would have taken that long to secure a tenant, was rejected by the primary Judge for both procedural and evidentiary reasons (at [82]).”
In Schmidt, all of the judges of the Court of Appeal accepted that there was a conceptual difference between the landlord proving loss (where the landlord bore the onus); and ‘mitigation’ of loss (where the tenant bore the onus). The Tribunal acknowledges that this matter is not a breach of contract for loss of bargain case by a landlord against a tenant, but rather a statutory cause of action for foreseeable loss caused by the owners corporation’s breach of duty under s 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act.
However, in both situations, a critical enquiry is whether or not the landlord/lot owner has sustained loss by reason of the cessation of a commercial tenancy. That enquiry involves consideration of what measures, if any, the landlord/lot owner has taken to rent out the premises and any reasons why the premises cannot be re-let.
Whether through the auspices of the issue of causation, or the issue of whether loss is established, or reasonable foreseeability of loss, the measures taken by the landlord to obtain a new tenant after the termination of the lease with Tornados are relevant, as is the evidence contained in the valuation report of Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas.
In closing submissions, the lot owners provide a schedule of damages that exceeded $670,000. In the affidavit of Mr Hang, a similar schedule exceeded $618,000.
The kinds of damages claimed not only included loss of rent; but “agents letting fees;” “interest;” “bank charges” and “strata levies.”
Leaving aside whether there was sufficient documentary evidence to establish loss beyond the mere assertion of the lot owner regarding a number of these purported kinds of damages, other than loss of rental income, they are not reasonably foreseeable.
“Bank charges” are not a reasonably foreseeable loss. There is no evidence the owners corporation knew, or should reasonably have known, there was a mortgage on the lots 5 and 6. That issue was not put to Mr Screnci in cross examination, nor Mr Castrogiovanni. In any event, there is no clear evidence of any loss by reason of the lot owners having to pay an increased amount on their mortgage by reason of the owners corporation’s breach of ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act. The limited documentation regarding mortgage payments is insufficient evidence of actual loss, even if it were a type of loss that is reasonably foreseeable (which, in the circumstances of this matter, it is not).
“Strata levies” are not a loss for which damages can be awarded, because strata levies are paid by all lot owners under the SSM Act to the administration and capital works funds of the owners corporation in accordance with unit entitlements. That is not a “loss” incurred by the lot owners as a result of the owners corporation’s breach of ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act.
There is no provision in the SSM Act or the NCAT Act to award interest, nor would the Tribunal incorporate it into an award of damages for the same reasons as expressed by Robertson PM in Selkirk v The Owners – Strata Plan No 2661 [2024] NSWCATCD 71 at [234]-[240].
“Letting fees” are also not a reasonably foreseeable type of loss. In any event, as was put in cross examination to Mr Hang by the owners corporation’s Counsel, that is an expense that would have been incurred in any event at the end of the lease with Tornados; or if Tornados vacated the property for other reasons during the lease and a new commercial tenant was obtained. No loss is established.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the only type of reasonably foreseeable loss in the circumstances of this matter is loss of rental income. There is no evidence of any loss of outgoings. However, calculating the loss of rent amount has to take into account the expenses that would have been incurred by the lot owners in any event by reason of the management fees they would have to have paid their agent to manage the tenancy.
As discussed previously, it also needs to take into account the issue of what measures the lot owners took (and could reasonably have taken) to obtain a new tenant after April 2023; and the uncertainties and vicissitudes of obtaining a new tenant.
(a) There was a rent free period for the first 6 months; (b) The lessee was liable to pay GST (item 13); (c) The rent was set out in Items 13 and 16. The first year of rent for the “term of the lease” was $120,000 plus GST (payable in monthly instalments of $10,000); the second year rent was $125,000 plus GST per year; the third year was $130,000 plus GST per year; and thereafter a fixed annual increase of 3%. (d) The fixed term (commencing 3 January 2022) was 5 years. There was an option at the end of the lease for a further 5 years.
The evidence of Mr Romanov was that Tornados had paid a rent instalment of $22,000 for the rental period of July and August 2022. No rent was paid after that date.
The period from 3 September 2022 to 4 April 2023 (the date of termination of the lease) is 7 months.
The unpaid rental amount (exclusive of GST, which the tenant was liable to pay) was $30,000 (i.e. $10,000 x 3 months) to January 2023; and $41,667 from January 2023 to April 2023 (i.e. $10,416.67 x 4 months).
From that amount, there needs to be deducted the amount of management fees the lot owners were liable to pay their agent for managing the tenancy. Raine & Horne Cabramatta (Mr Tripodina) was the managing agent who managed the commercial lease on behalf of the landlord. Other expenses paid to a different agent to find Tornados as a tenant are not taken into account.
The evidence as to what fees the lot owners were liable to pay Raine and Horne Cabramatta is less than satisfactory. No managing agency agreement setting out fees has been referred to in submissions. There is an affidavit of the female lot owner that contains a tax invoice of Raine & Horne Cabramatta dated 10 May 2023 for $23,570.18, but this amount includes “re-leasing fees”; “unpaid management fees on rent; and providing advice.
Mr Tripodina was cross examined on what fees his agency charges to manage the lease on behalf of the landlord (T:4/9/24:P31-33). He gave evidence that the agency charges between 7-10% of the gross rent as a management fee.
For the purpose of calculating damages, the Tribunal adopts the figure of 8.5% of rent as the management fee figure.
Accordingly, the loss of rental income for the period between September 2022 and April 2023 is $71,667 less the amount payable to the agent as a management fee ($6,091.70).
The amount of loss of rent for the period September 2022 to April 2023 is $65,575.30.
The Tribunal is not satisfied that there was any unreasonable conduct of the lot owners to terminate the lease earlier than 4 April 2023. The are entitled to loss of rental income (less agency management expenses) for that period.
This is the more challenging aspect of calculation of damages, by reason of uncertainty, vicissitudes and the lack of action of the lot owners in attempting to find a tenant who, while not operating a restaurant of the type that Tornados was operating, could still fit out the commercial lots and operate a business that was not in breach of the local Council orders.
By the time of close of evidence in this matter (5 September 2024) the owners corporation had not completed repairs, although there was evidence from the owners corporation the repairs would be completed within a few months of 5 September 2024.
There was no evidence that the local Council had taken any action against the owners corporation after the issue of the Notices in August-October 2022; nor that the building had not been certified by the local Council as failing to comply with fire safety measures such that no annual Certificate was issued. There is also no evidence that other commercial tenants in the building were unable to trade.
The Tribunal is satisfied that there is significant uncertainties and vicissitudes as to the length of time Tornados would have remained a tenant, as well as the uncertainties of when a new tenant would have been obtained after the termination of the lease with Tornados.
In respect of the uncertainties of Tornados remaining as a tenant, the evidence of Mr Beven identifies that Tornados would not have been profitable. Had it not been profitable, it would likely have defaulted on its lease, and the lot owners would have to have obtained a new tenant. Although Mr Nejati takes a different view regarding the profitability of the Tornados, for the purpose of assessing damages to the lot owners the Tribunal accepts there is a probability that Tornados would not have been profitable at a relatively early point in time during the lease period. Mr Beven provided a clear and detailed methodology and relied upon less speculation as to the abilities of Mr Romanov than Mr Nejati.
The Tribunal makes clear that this finding is only in respect of the issue of calculation of damages to the lot owners, and what methodology to apply. Calculation of damages to Tornados for negligence (if any) is not what is being considered at this juncture. The substantial divergence between Mr Beven and Mr Nejati demonstrates just how speculative and uncertain the success of a commercial tenant operating a restaurant is. That uncertainty is magnified by the fact that Mr Romanov had operated a previous business that had went into liquidation. Although Mr Romanov asserted its failure was due to his divorce, that again is demonstrative of uncertainty as to future success.
The evidence of the expert valuers, Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas, was not challenged in cross examination. Their report supports a finding that the lot owners could have obtained a tenant (or tenants, if the lots were let out separately) for different types of uses and obtained rent of an equivalent amount. Again, this is subject to the uncertainties and vicissitudes of commercial leasing.
The evidence of the lot owners and Mr Tripodina as to what measures the lot owners had taken to advertise the premises and obtain a new tenant was unsatisfactory. As discussed previously, the female lot owner’s evidence in cross examination was vague and unresponsive to questions. The male lot owner’s evidence was that, primarily, it was his wife who made critical decisions regarding leasing the lots. Both he, and Mr Tripodina, appeared to adopt the position that the lots could not be rented out until the owners corporation had completed repairs.
However, this view is predicated upon the only use for the commercial space being a restaurant of the type that Tornados was operating. Porticos Chicken had been able to operate its business without difficulty, and notwithstanding the responsibility of the owners corporation to conduct repairs to common property, it appears that little or no marketing of the commercial lots with a view to ascertaining if a tenant operating a different type of business has occurred.
The uncertainties and vicissitudes of leasing the premises is also demonstrated by the period of time it was unoccupied between the tenancy of Porticos Chicken and Tornados. Much was made in submissions and cross examination regarding the aborted lease with Frangos Chicken. However, irrespective of who (if anyone) was at fault as to why Frangos Chicken did not become a tenant and perform its own fit out of the premises, the fact that the commercial lots were vacant for a considerable period of time before Tornados entered into a lease shows that obtaining a commercial tenant is not a straightforward task. However, that task is dependent on the premises being advertised, and a landlord being proactive and flexible in obtaining a new tenant.
When all of the above uncertainties are taken into account, the Tribunal assesses loss of rental income after April 2023 based upon the following different scenarios.
The first is that the ability of the lot owners to rent out the lots to a commercial tenant was affected by the owners corporation’s failure to repair the premises in accordance with the local Council orders.
If that approach is taken, then considering the evidence of Mr Screnci and Mr Castrogiovanni regarding the status of the repairs as of September 2024, the repairs were likely to be completed by December 2024. Although the matter was listed for oral closing submissions in June 2025, the evidence closed at the conclusion of the hearing on 5 September 2024, other than in respect of the further supplementary joint expert report by the accounting experts, which is separate to the issue of the date on which the repairs were complete.
The monthly rent was, from the period 4 April 2023 to 2 January 2024, $10,416.67 (exclusive of GST, which the tenant was liable to pay). The monthly rent from 2 January 2024 to the end of December 2024 was $10,833.33.
The period from April 2023 to January 2024 is 8 months (total: $83,333.36).
The period from January 2024 to December 2024 is 12 months (total: $130,000).
The periods added together total: $213,333.36.
From that amount, there needs to be a deduction for managing agency fees (8.5%). When that amount is deducted, the amount is $192,200.02.
From the amount of $192,200.02, there needs to be a percentage deduction for the uncertainty of Tornados remaining a tenant during that period, and the time it would take (if the premises were adequately advertised and marketed) to obtain a new tenant within that period. After repairs had been completed, there is no appropriate reason why the lot owners could not have obtained a commercial tenant within a short period of time, and taking into account that to attract a new tenant a rent free period is likely to have been a term of the lease.
In all the circumstances, it is appropriate to adopt a discount of 50%. The discounted amount is $96,100.
If that methodology is applied, the amount of economic loss is as follows:
Period to April 2023: $65,575.30.
Period April 2023 to December 2024: $96,100.
Total: $161,675.30.
The alternative approach is to consider whether, even in circumstances where the common property was not completely repaired to satisfy the local Council orders, the lot owners could have rented the commercial lots for purposes other than operating a restaurant of a type that involved using the kitchen exhaust system in the manner that Tornados did.
That approach is supported by (a) the evidence contained in the valuation report of Mr Lawford and Mr Doncas; and (b) the evidence of Mr Hang and Mr Tripodina (and the absence of any cogent evidence from Ms Tran) as to the lack of measures the lot owners had taken to advertise and market the commercial lots to obtain a new tenant after April 2023. That approach would not involve applying a discount for uncertainties and vicissitude, but determining at what point the owners corporation was not liable for any loss incurred by the lot owners because the lot owners had, as a matter of legal principle, caused their own loss.
If that approach was taken, the Tribunal remains satisfied that the lot owners should be awarded damages of $65,575.30 for the period to April 2023, because the lot owners could not rent the premises to an alternative tenant when the lease with Tornados was still on foot, and there is no basis for finding that the lease should have been terminated earlier than April 2023.
The issue then becomes what is the appropriate amount of loss of rent in the period after April 2023 considering the (a) the lack of concerted effort to market the commercial lots to other tenants; and (b) the difficulty in attracting a new commercial tenant for a different use of the premises when the premises had been operating previously with a rangehood/ventilation system; and the premises would need to be fitted out differently for a different tenant. There is also possibility that premises which were the subject of a local Council order would not be attractive to a new commercial tenant until the new tenant was satisfied the orders had been complied with.
If the alternative approach was taken, the lot owners would still be entitled to an award for loss of rental income for some amount after April 2023. The Tribunal does not accept that, in all the circumstances of the mater, had the lot owners taken proactive measures to market the commercial lots for a different type of tenant they would likely have obtained such a tenant within a short period of time after April 2023.
If the alternative approach was taken, it would not make any difference to the amount awarded to the lot owners. The amount of $96,100 is equivalent to approximately 10 months loss of rent for the period after April 2023 (the rent amount, after deduction for the management fee, being $9,531.26). That period of time is an appropriate period of time for the lot owners to obtain a new, different type of tenant to Tornados such that any loss after that period of time is caused by the actions of the lot owners. It is unnecessary to make a finding as to whether the owners corporation has proved ‘failure to mitigate’ at any earlier period of time.
The amount “claimed or in dispute” in the lot owners proceedings against the owners corporation, and the owners corporation’s proceedings against the lot owners, exceeds $30,000. There was a monetary amount claimed in both sets of proceedings, and in both sets of proceedings that amount exceeded $30,000.
Accordingly, r 38(2)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules) applies. Applicable principles are discussed in The Owners-Strata Plan No 68307 v Horan (No 4) [2026] NSWCATAP 223 at [24]-[33]. When r 38(2)(b) of the NCAT Rules operates, it displaces the principles in s 60(1)-(3) of the NCAT Act. In those circumstances, the principle that “costs follow the event” applies such that the successful party obtains an order of costs in their favour to compensate the successful party in the proceedings for the legal costs and disbursements incurred, subject to well established exceptions such as Calderbank offers and disentitling conduct.
The lot owners are the successful party in Case Number 2023.00381512 and Case Number 2024/00065826. It is appropriate that the Tribunal make a costs order in their favour. The Tribunal’s orders allow a party to make an application to vary that costs order if there is an appropriate basis to do so, such as a Calderbank offer having been made.
In their application, the lot owners sought “other orders as the Tribunal sees fit.” Under s 232(1) of the SSM Act, the Tribunal has the power to order that a lot owner, who has received damages by reason of the owners corporation’s breach of duty to keep and maintain common property in a reasonable state of repair; and/or that the owners corporation pay the legal costs of the lot owner, be quarantined from contributing to those orders by way of levy payments (The Owners Strata Plan No 74698 v Jacinta Investments Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 387; The Owners – Strata Plan No 62713 v Liberant [2022] NSWCATAP 80).
In circumstances where the lot owners are the successful party and have obtained damages for the owners corporation’s breach of its duty under ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act, it is appropriate the Tribunal make such orders.
As discussed previously, Tornados commenced Tribunal proceedings on 10 August 2023, approximately 6 months after the date of termination of the lease with the lot owners.
Section 226 of the SSM Act states:
226 Interested persons
(1) The following persons are interested persons for the purpose of making an application to the Tribunal under this Act—
(a) the owners corporation,
(b) an officer of the owners corporation,
(c) a strata managing agent for the scheme,
(d) an owner of a lot in the scheme, a person having an estate or interest in a lot or an occupier of a lot,
(e) if the strata scheme is a leasehold strata scheme, the lessor of the scheme.
(2) The interested persons for the purpose of making an application to the Tribunal under this Act relating to a strata scheme for a part strata parcel also include the following—
(a) the owners corporation or a strata managing agent for, an owner of a lot in, a person having any other estate or interest in a lot in, or an occupier of a lot in, any other scheme affecting the building,
(b) any other person for the time being bound by any strata management statement for the building.
232 Orders to settle disputes or rectify complaints
(1) Orders relating to complaints and disputes The Tribunal may, on application by an interested person, original owner or building manager, make an order to settle a complaint or dispute about any of the following—
(a) the operation, administration or management of a strata scheme under this Act,
(b) an agreement authorised or required to be entered into under this Act,
(c) an agreement appointing a strata managing agent or a building manager,
(d) an agreement between the owners corporation and an owner, mortgagee or covenant chargee of a lot in a strata scheme that relates to the scheme or a matter arising under the scheme,
(e) an exercise of, or failure to exercise, a function conferred or imposed by or under this Act or the by-laws of a strata scheme,
(f) an exercise of, or failure to exercise, a function conferred or imposed on an owners corporation under any other Act.
(2) Failure to exercise a function For the purposes of this section, an owners corporation, strata committee or building management committee is taken not to have exercised a function if—
(a) it decides not to exercise the function, or
(b) application is made to it to exercise the function and it fails for 2 months after the making of the application to exercise the function in accordance with the application or to inform the applicant that it has decided not to exercise the function in accordance with the application.
(3) Other proceedings and remedies A person is not entitled—
(a) to commence other proceedings in connection with the settlement of a dispute or complaint the subject of a current application by the person for an order under this section, or
(b) to make an application for an order under this section if the person has commenced, and not discontinued, proceedings in connection with the settlement of a dispute or complaint the subject of the application.
(4) Disputes involving management of part strata parcels The Tribunal must not make an order relating to a dispute involving the management of a strata scheme for a part strata parcel or the management of the building concerned or its site if—
(a) any applicable strata management statement prohibits the determination of disputes by the Tribunal under this Act, or
(b) any of the parties to the dispute fail to consent to its determination by the Tribunal.
(5) The Tribunal must not make an order relating to a dispute involving a matter to which a strata management statement applies that is inconsistent with the strata management statement.
(6) Disputes relating to consent to development applications The Tribunal must consider the interests of all the owners of lots in a strata scheme in the use and enjoyment of their lots and the common property in determining whether to make an order relating to a dispute concerning the failure of an owners corporation for a strata scheme to consent to the making of a development application under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 relating to common property of the scheme.
(7) Excluded complaints and disputes This section does not apply to a complaint or dispute relating to an agreement that is not an agreement entered into under this Act, or the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a function conferred or imposed by or under any other Act, if another Act confers jurisdiction on another court or tribunal with respect to the subject-matter of the complaint or dispute and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction under a law (other than this Act) with respect to that subject-matter.
The Tribunal cannot consider and determine the proceedings by Tornados for damages due to alleged negligence of the owners corporation unless it has jurisdiction, because the Tribunal only has power to determine disputes if enabling legislation, or the NCAT Act, gives it power (s 28(1) NCAT Act).
As discussed previously, the issue of jurisdiction was only clearly raised at the hearing on 4 September 2024, and the party raising the issue was the owners corporation. The Tribunal did not regard it as appropriate, at that stage, to transfer Tornados proceedings to a court of competent jurisdiction under cl 6 of sch 4 of the NCAT Act.
Clause 6 of sch 4 of the NCAT Act states as follows:
6 Transfer of proceedings to courts or to other tribunals
(1) If the parties in any proceedings for the exercise of a Division function so agree, or if the Tribunal of its own motion or on the application of a party so directs, the proceedings are—
(a) to be transferred to a court (in accordance with the rules of that court) that has jurisdiction in the matter, and
(b) to continue before that court as if the proceedings had been instituted there.
(2) If the parties in any proceedings that have been instituted in a court so agree, or if the court of its own motion or on the application of a party so directs, the proceedings are, if the proceedings relate to a matter for which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to exercise a Division function—
(a) to be transferred to the Tribunal in accordance with the procedural rules (if any), and
(b) to continue before the Tribunal as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Tribunal.
In closing submissions, Tornados submitted that (a) the Tribunal had jurisdiction, because the relevant time when the Tribunal had jurisdiction was when the cause of action arose; and (b) the Tribunal should award substantial damages to Tornados. However, if the Tribunal was to find there was no jurisdiction, Tornados sought the matter be transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The owners corporation submitted the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, because who is an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act was limited to an “interested person” as at the date the proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal, and at that point in time Tornados was not an interested person. If the Tribunal found that there was no jurisdiction, the owners corporation sought that the proceedings be dismissed rather than transferred, because Tornados had chosen to litigate in the Tribunal notwithstanding the Tribunal has no jurisdiction.
In respect of “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act, the only potential categories Tornados falls into is “a person having an estate or interest in a lot or an occupier of a lot” under s 226(1)(d). A lessee has, during the term of the lease, a legal interest in the lot (by reason of its legal rights as a lessee to occupy the lot) and, further, is an “occupier.”
There is no doubt that during the period of time the lease was on foot between January 2022 and April 2023, Tornados was an “interested person” under s 226, such that the Tribunal had the power to “make an order to settle a complaint or dispute”.
Once a person or entity has standing to bring proceedings in the Tribunal because they are “an interested person, original owner or building manager” under s 232(1), the Tribunal may, or may not, have the power to consider the cause of action. That issue has been considered in Coscuez International Pty Ltd v The Owners-Strata Plan No 46433 [2022] NSWCATAP 147 (Coscuez International) at [133]-[134]; White House Developments Pty Ltd v The Owners - Strata Plan No 70276 [2025] NSWCATAP 68 (although in the context of the causes of action and remedies of a lot owner against an owners corporation for breach of the duty in s 106(1)-(2), rather than an occupier); and The Owners - Strata Plan No 55468 v Silberstein [2025] NSWCATAP 102 at [111]-[117].
In this matter, a party who was an occupier, or had a legal interest in a lot, as at the date of the cause of action (negligence) has commenced Tribunal proceedings against an owners corporation in the Tribunal on a date after their occupation and legal interest in the lot (as compared to legal interests generally) has ceased.
The critical first issue for determination is whether ss 226(1)(d) and 232(1) of the SSM Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to consider proceedings brought by a former commercial tenant in the tort of negligence. In respect of that issue, if “interested person” is defined as an “interested person” as at the date of the cause of action, then Tornados has standing in the Tribunal. If “interested person” is defined as “interested person” as at the date proceedings are commenced in the Tribunal, it does not. As at the date proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal on 10 August 2023, Tornados was not “an occupier” of the lot. It also did not, on the evidence before the Tribunal have an estate or interest “in the lot.” There may be situations were a commercial tenant has an estate or interest in the lot at the date of commencement of proceedings even though the lease has ended or they are not in occupation. For example, the commercial tenant may have loaned monies to the landlord with the lot as security for the loan. That may be an “estate or interest” in the lot that continues after occupation has ceased, but it is unnecessary to further explore that issue. In this matter, the only evidence of Tornados having an interest “in the lot*”* (emphasis added) was the rights it had under the terms of the lease to occupy the lot which may have been able to be protected, for example, by relief against forfeiture if the lot owners sought improperly to take possession of the lot while the lease was on foot.
However, “an estate or interest in the lot” (emphasis added) cannot be interpreted so broadly that it includes any cause of action that a commercial tenant may have against an owners corporation (or a lot owner/landlord) that has arisen at any time during the course of the commercial tenancy. That is not an “estate or interest in the lot” but rather a potential right the party may have against owners corporation (or lot owner, for example, to sue for damages under the terms of the lease).
The issue of whether a person who is no longer a lot owner or occupant at the time Tribunal proceedings have been commenced has been given some Tribunal and Appeal Panel consideration.
In Vojkoic v Bicioc [2020] NSWCATAP 128 (Vojk**oic) a person who was never a lot owner and was no longer an occupant of the lot at the date Tribunal proceedings were commenced sought orders that relevantly included an order removing persons as strata committee members (s 238 of the SSM Act). The application was dismissed at the former occupant appealed to the Appeal Panel. The Appeal Panel raised, but did not determine (at [26]) whether the former occupant had standing to bring the Tribunal proceedings in the first place.
Rather, the Appeal Panel took into account that the former occupants “belief in the mismanagement of the scheme nor his alleged financial interest are sufficient for him to have an ongoing interest as an interested person” as a basis for refusing leave to extend time to bring the appeal (at [27]-[28]). The appeal was dismissed.
In Bartlett v The Owners-Strata Plan No 123**75 [2025] NSWCATCD 92 (Bartlett), the Tribunal (Burton SM) considered an application by a former lot owner involving retrospective variation of levies paid by the former lot owner in circumstances where the former lot owner argued the levies should not have been imposed because they were in respect of costs of the owners corporation in former Tribunal proceedings against the former lot owner were the former lot owner was the successful party, having achieved consent orders in its favour.
At the time Tribunal proceedings were commenced, Mr Bartlett was the owner of the lot. However, during the course of the proceedings, he sold the lot. Burton SM held (at [16]-[28]) that because Mr Bartlett was an “interested person” at the date Tribunal proceedings were commenced, the Tribunal did not lose jurisdiction because the lot owner had subsequently sold the lot. However, Burton SM was not, as in this matter, dealing with a situation where the party bringing Tribunal proceedings was not a lot owner, occupant or had an interest or an estate in the lot as at the date proceedings were commenced.
In Griffinchuk No 1 Pty Ltd ATF Griffinchuk Family Trust v The Owners-Strata Plan No 92**745 [2025] NSWCATAP 273 (Griffinchuk) the Appeal Panel considered an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal where the Tribunal had dismissed a claim for compensation or damages brought by a lot owner under ss 106(5) and 232(1) of the SSM Act because the Tribunal proceedings had been commenced after the lot owner had sold the lot. The Tribunal determined the former lot owner was not an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act because they were not a lot owner or occupier at the date proceedings were commenced in the Tribunal. Accordingly, they had no standing to bring proceedings in the Tribunal. The Tribunal decision at first instance referred to the decision of Wilson SM in Frampton v The Owners-Strata Plan No 35012; The Owners-Strata Plan No 35012 v Frampton [2019] NSWCATCD 15 (Frampton) as supporting the finding of absence of jurisdiction.
The Appeal Panel held at [49]-[57] that there was no error of law in the Tribunal’s finding that the former lot owner was not an “interested person” under s 226 of the SSM Act, because as at the date Tribunal proceedings were commenced they were no longer a lot owner.
The Tribunal, in this matter, acknowledges that the decisions of Bartlett and Griffinchuk were delivered after 4 June 2025. However, the decisions of Frampton and Vojkoic pre-dated the last date of submissions. Both parties have had the opportunity to make submissions on the issue of jurisdiction. It is the task of all courts and Tribunals to determine whether they have jurisdiction in the matter. Calling on further submissions on the parties by reason of the decisions in Bartlett and Griffinchuk has no utility, in circumstances where both parties have addressed the issue of jurisdiction and the Tribunal has to determine the issue of jurisdiction.
Tornados submits that the powers of the Tribunal under the SSM Act are broad and should not be interpreted in an unduly restrictive way on the issue of jurisdiction. It’s position, in substance, is that it is sufficient that Tornados was an occupier of a lot and had an interest in the lot as at the date its cause of action in negligence arose.
The Tribunal does not agree with that interpretation.
Principles of statutory interpretation are well established. The Tribunal must interpret all the words of a statute to give them meaning, in the context of the purpose of the statute and the provisions of the statute as a whole (Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28 at [69]-[78]). In respect of a grant of power, it is inappropriate to read words conferring jurisdiction or making powers to a Court (or Tribunal) by making implications or imposing limitations that are not found in the express words (Owners of “Shin Kobe Maru” v Empire Shipping Company Inc [1994] HCA 54; (1994) 181 CLR 404 at 421).
Further, the High Court (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ ) stated in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41 at [47]:
“[47] This court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy. (footnotes omitted)”
The phrase “interested person” and its definitions in s 226 of the SSM Act does not use the words or words to the effect of “former”. To elaborate, it does not state that “interested persons” includes a “former lot owner” or “former occupier;” or person who “formerly” had an estate or interest in a lot. In that regard, the SSM Act is significantly different to other legislation that gives the Tribunal jurisdiction, such as the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) and the Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW). Section 71(1) of the Retail Lease Act 1994 (NSW) states that a “party or former party to a retail shop lease or former retail shop lease may lodge a retail tenancy claim in respect of the lease with the Tribunal for determination of the claim” (emphasis added). Section 190(1)-(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) makes clear that a tenant or landlord can make an application to the Tribunal for an order in respect of breach of a residential tenancy agreement after (emphasis added) the residential tenancy agreement has ended.
Section 232(1) refers to applications by, relevantly “an interested person” it does not state a “formerly interested person”. The language of s 232(1) regarding the types of complaints or disputes the Tribunal has the power to make orders to “settle” does not clearly identify that it extends to a complaint or dispute involving a party who was not an “interested person” at the date they commenced proceedings in the Tribunal.
Tornados submits that the SSM Act should be interpreted liberally to give the Tribunal jurisdiction. However, even beneficial legislation has to be interpreted in an orthodox way. The High Court (Brennan and McHugh JJ) stated in IW v City of Perth [1997] HCA 30; 191 CLR 1 that when interpreting beneficial legislation:
“The injunction contained in s 18 of the Interpretation Act is reinforced by the rule of construction that beneficial and remedial legislation, like the Act, is to be given a liberal construction[12]. It is to be given “a fair, large and liberal” interpretation rather than one which is “literal or technical”[13]. Nevertheless, the task remains one of statutory construction. Although a provision of the Act must be given a liberal and beneficial construction, a court or tribunal is not at liberty to give it a construction that is unreasonable or unnatural. But subject to that proviso, if the term “service”, read in the context of the Act and its object, is capable of applying to an activity, a court or tribunal, exercising jurisdiction under the Act, should hold that that activity is a “service” for the purpose of the Act.”
The Tribunal does not regard the language of ss 226 and 232(1) as to being so broad that, when considered in a manner that is consistent with the purpose and policy of the SSM Act, it allows a person who was only an “interested person” at the date the cause of action arose, but is not an “interested person” at the date proceedings are commenced, to fall within the statutory definition. As Rothman J stated in The Owners-Strata Plan No 37762 v Pham [2006] NSWSC 1287 at [63], the Tribunal does not have the power to make orders to “settle” any type of dispute involving a strata scheme, and the Tribunal must have jurisdiction to determine the dispute.
A claim by a commercial tenant who is not a commercial tenant of the strata scheme (and thus, not an occupant or a person with an estate or interest in a lot) can take proceedings in a court to sue for the tort of negligence. This is not a cause of action where the legislature has clearly identified a statutory right to bring proceedings in the Tribunal, such as s 106(5) of the SSM Act. Nor has the legislature identified a statutory right to which the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction. In the absence of clear words that identify an “interested person” to include a “formerly interested person” there is no appropriate basis to interpret s 226 and 232(1) as giving standing to sue in the Tribunal to a person who, at a date prior to commencement of proceedings, is no longer an “interested person”.
Accordingly, had Tornados commenced proceedings in the Tribunal on or before date the lease ended, it would be an “interested person” and the Tribunal would have the power to consider (a) whether or not the tort of negligence against the owners corporation falls within s 232(1)(a)-(f) of the SSM Act; (b) if so, whether negligence is established; and (c) if so, whether loss or damage is established. However, as Tornados was not an “interested person” at the relevant time to bring proceedings in the Tribunal, it is inappropriate to consider those issues.
It is also unnecessary to consider whether, if Tornados was an “interested person” at the relevant time, time would be extended under s 41 of the NCAT Act to bring the proceedings in the Tribunal (Coscuez International at [108]-[111]).
The principles regarding transfer of proceedings by the Tribunal to a court where considered by the Appeal Panel in decision including BKB Constructions Pty Ltd v Sawan [2022] NSWCATAP 103 and Promina Design & Construction Pty Ltd v The Owners—Strata Plan No 97449 [2023] NSWCATAP 252. The Tribunal needs to be satisfied that there is a “sufficient cause;” “sound ground;” or “good reason” for the transfer to be made. A basis for transferring proceedings is that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in the matter. However, that does not mean that in every matter the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction it is appropriate to transfer proceedings to a court, simply because an applicant makes that application.
In this matter, the owners corporation did not raise that Tornados was not an “interested person” until the hearing on 4 September 2024. That is certainly not a criticism of Mr Purdy of Counsel, who quite appropriately raised the issue. The Tribunal accepts that the issue of jurisdiction is, ultimately, a matter for an applicant to establish and there is no doubt that when the issue of jurisdiction was raised, the primary position of Tornados was that the Tribunal had jurisdiction. It was the alternative position of Tornados that the proceedings be transferred.
Considering the period of time Tornados proceedings were in the Tribunal without the issue of jurisdiction being raised; and that Tornados had an arguable case on the Tribunal having jurisdiction, the Tribunal is satisfied that, in the particular circumstances of this matter, it is appropriate to transfer Tornados proceedings to a court of competent jurisdiction.
Considering the legal issues involved in Tornados negligence claim; the nature of the evidence; and the amount claimed, the Tribunal is satisfied that the proceedings should be transferred to the Supreme Court rather than the District Court (although acknowledging that the quantum of Tornados claim is less than $1,250,000).
In transferring the proceedings, by reason of cl 6(1)(b) of sch 4 the proceedings, once transferred, are to “continue before that court as if proceeding had been instituted there”. In those circumstances, the Tribunal has avoided making factual and legal findings in Tornados proceedings. The findings that were made in respect of the accountancy expert evidence were in respect of damages awarded to the lot owner under ss 106(5) and 232(1) of the SSM Act. However, it is sufficient to observe that (a) the legal principles discussed by the High Court in Mallonland Pty Ltd v Advanta Seeds Pty Ltd (2025) 418 ALR 639; [2025] HCA 25, (b) what the owners corporation knew, or reasonably should have known, about the state of repair of the kitchen exhaust system prior to April 2022 will be relevant; and (c) the legal test for negligence is far different to the test for breach of duty under ss 106(1)-(2) of the SSM Act.
The owners corporation submits that, if the Tribunal transfers the proceedings, Tornados should pay its costs of the Tribunal proceedings.
That submission is rejected.
As the proceedings have been transferred, the proceed in the court as if the proceedings had been commenced there. It is a matter of speculation as to whether Tornados will succeed and what costs orders will be made by the court. To award costs against Tornados for the entirety of the proceedings in the Tribunal would not compensate the successful party in the proceedings (because Tornados proceedings are yet to be determined) and there is no disentitling conduct of a type that would justify compensating the owners corporation for the entire costs of the Tribunal proceedings brought by Tornados. To make such an order would be punitive, not compensatory.
However, the costs of the transfer are a different issue. The Tribunal has the power to make such an order and the Tribunal is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so. However, to make clear, that costs order is only in respect of the costs incurred to transfer the Tribunal proceedings to the Supreme Court; not the costs of the Tribunal proceedings involving the owners corporation and Tornados, nor the proceedings involving the lot owners and the owners corporation.
(1) The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 is to pay Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran the amount of $161,675.30 by 28 days from the date of this decision.
(2) The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 is to pay the costs of Tung Quang Hang and Kien Xuan Tran on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
(3) If any party seeks to vary the costs order, it is to make an application to vary by lodging with the Tribunal Registry and serving on the other party a miscellaneous matters application setting out the basis on which it seeks to vary the costs order by 14 days from the date of this decision. If such an application is made, the Tribunal will issue further procedural directions for costs submissions and documents to be lodged and served.
(1) Pursuant to cl 6 of sch 4 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) the proceedings in Case Number 2023/00381302 are transferred to the Supreme Court.
(2) Tornados Smokehouse Concord Pty Ltd is to pay the costs of The Owners-Strata Plan No 77261 by reason of the transfer of the proceedings on the ordinary basis as agreed or assessed.
**********
I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar
[2008] HCA 10
(2009) 239 CLR 27
(2008) 234 CLR 237
(2007) 35 WAR 254
(1990) 169 CLR 638
(2025) 418 ALR 639
(2009) 25 VR 633
(1994) 181 CLR 404
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1994) 179 CLR 332
(2020) 103 NSWLR 352
(1988) 48 SASR 381
(2013) 85 NSWLR 514
(1991) 174 CLR 64
(1989) 16 NSWLR 130
(1976) 1 NSWLR 5