GRY24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or

grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2)

(General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to

r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law)

1. These are the reasons for judgment delivered ex tempore on 27 February 2026, revised from transcript only to include extracts of cited documents and to make corrections of typographical errors or minor matters to reflect the intention of the Court as presently constituted.
2. Before the Court is an application for review of a registrar's decision filed on 13 February 2026. Because the application was late, the Applicant seeks an extension of time. The application before the Registrar was an application by the First Respondent (Minister), for summary judgment of the Applicant's application for judicial review. The application for judicial review was filed on 3 September 2024.
3. On 4 December 2025, the Registrar made orders that there be judgment for the Minister. The substantive application was dismissed pursuant to rule 23.08(1)(a) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules). The Registrar further ordered that the Applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the amount of $4,363.64.
4. The hearing today was a de novo hearing,[1] the Court is not concerned with correcting any error on behalf of the Registrar.[2] The Court conducted a fresh hearing and brought an independent mind to the outcome. Before the Court can determine whether to summarily dismiss the application for judicial review, the Court must first consider whether to grant an extension of time. It is necessary to understand the background to this matter.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of Indonesia who arrived in Australia on 29 October 2022. On 24 January 2023, the Applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa).
2. The Applicant's protection claims as summarised by a delegate of the First Respondent (Delegate) are as follows:[3]
   • The Applicant claims they left Indonesia because they have a lot of debts and are facing financial hardship.
   • The Applicant claims their whole family facing financial hardship.
   • The Applicant claims they borrowed money from bank and loan shark and are unable to pay back.
   • The Applicant claims they are harmed and troubled by loan shark for not paying back their debts.
   • The Applicant claims they tried to ask help from their close friend and family but they could not help.
   • The Applicant claims they tried to relocate within their country by they got caught by the loan shark.
   • The Applicant claims the loan shark will kill them and their family if they return to their country.
3. On 14 February 2024, the Delegate refused the application for a Protection Visa. The Delegate found that the Applicant's claims were not credible and was not satisfied that the Applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations. This Court cannot review the decision of the Delegate.[4] After the Delegate refused the Protection Visa, the Delegate notified the Applicant of the decision by email on 14 February 2024. That email also attached a letter which explained the Applicant's time-sensitive review rights.
4. On 10 April 2024, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Delegate's decision. On 13 August, the Tribunal decided it did not have jurisdiction to review the Delegate's decision. It did so because the Tribunal application had been made after the 28-day time limit. On 27 February 2026, before the Court, the Applicant conceded that her application to the Tribunal was late. She further conceded that there was no error in the Tribunal determining that it had no jurisdiction to hear her review application.

1. Notwithstanding, on 3 September 2024, the Applicant filed an originating application seeking a writ of certiorari and mandamus. The application was filed within the 35-day time limit prescribed by the Act[5] and brought pursuant to section 476 of the Act, which confers upon this Court in relation to migration matters the same jurisdiction as the High Court under section 75(v) of the Constitution.[6] The Originating Application contained one ground of review (reproduced without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal's decision was unjust and was made without taking into account the full gravity of my circumstance and the consequences of the claim
2. On 12 December 2024, the Minister filed a response which sought, amongst other orders, that the matter be summarily dismissed.
3. On 31 October 2025, a registrar of this Court made orders programming the summary dismissal application for hearing.
4. On 14 November 2025, the Minister filed written submissions and a bundle of documents, including the Court Book. The Applicant did not comply with the Registrar's orders, did not file any additional materials. The Applicant confirmed the same before this Court.
5. On 4 December 2025, a registrar acceded to the Minister's application to summarily dismiss the originating application.
6. On 13 February 2026, the Applicant applied to have the Registrar's use of the delegated summary dismissal powers reviewed. The review application sought, amongst other things, an order to set aside the orders of the Registrar. The application before this Court was brought 71 days after the summary dismissal decision. It was therefore made outside the 21-day time limit. To be clear, by operation of rule 1.22(5), the application was 28 days late.
7. On 23 February 2026, the matter was allocated to the Court as presently constituted.
8. On 24 February 2026, the parties were sent a notice listing the matter for hearing on 27 February 2026. The parties were invited to file further submissions. Only the Minister availed themselves of that opportunity.
9. Dismissal powers are conferred on registrars of this Court. The delegation of such rules through the Court Rules is authorised by s 254 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act). However, s 256(1) of the FCFCOA Act permits a party to a proceeding in which a delegate has exercised any powers of the Court to apply to the Court for review. Such an application must be made within the time prescribed by the rules. Rule 3.06 of the Rules governs the time limits:

3.06 Time for application for review

(1) The application for review of the exercise of a power by a Registrar must be made within 21 days after the day on which the power is exercised.

(2) The applicant must serve a sealed copy of the application on each other party to the proceeding within 7 days after the application is filed.

(3) The application must be listed for a hearing as soon as possible and, unless it is impracticable to do so, within 28 days after the date of filing.

1. The Registrar summarily dismissed the application on 4 December 2025. That means the Applicant had until 25 December 2025 to lodge the review application. It was not lodged until 13 February 2026. Therefore, it is necessary to consider whether the Court should extend the time prescribed by the Rules.

1. The broad discretion to extend time under the rules should be exercised in the context of well-established factors. Those factors are found in the cases of Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[7]and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs.[8] Those factors include the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice suffered by the respondent, the impact on the Applicant, and whether the proposed substantive application for judicial review has merit.
2. When determining if a proposed application has merit or an arguable prospect of success, the Court will do so at a reasonably impressionistic level.[9] Importantly, the Applicant need only identify an arguable case which may not yet be fully developed. In this regard, the Court will remain astute and alert to the possibility of reasonably arguable error, which may warrant an extension of time being granted.[10] The discretionary power to extend time is broad, In Tu'uta Katoa at [18], the High Court provided the following examples of such circumstances (references omitted):

For example, if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the Applicant may be required to show that the case is strong or even "exceptional". In such a case, a proper exercise of the power conferred by s 477A(2) will not require the judge to confine their consideration of the merits to an assessment of what is "reasonably arguable" or some similar standard. In other cases, the proposed ground of review may be hopeless, but it may be necessary to examine the proposed application in some detail to reach that conclusion.

1. Coming then to the extension of time considerations, the first matter the Court must consider is the extent of the delay. As the Court previously stated, the delay was 28 days. The Court's view is that the delay is substantial. This factor weighs against granting the Applicant an extension of time.
2. Coming then to the explanation for the delay, in her application for review, the Applicant set out the following explanation for the delay (reproduced without amendment):

The Applicant respectfully seeks an extension of time to file this application. The delay was not intentional. The Applicant has made several attempts to submit the application previously but the applications were rejected due to errors and lack of understanding of the Court's procedures. The Applicant is self-represented, has limited knowledge of legal processes, and has experienced difficulty ensuring that the documents were completed correctly. The Applicant has now made every effort to ensure that this application complies with the Court's requirements and respectfully hopes that the Court will accept this application.

1. The Court observes, however, that there is no evidence to support the contentions advanced by the Applicant. When asked about the explanation for the delay this morning, the Applicant did not repeat the matters contained in the application for review. Rather, the Applicant submitted that she was not aware of the 21-day timeframe. Her ignorance of that time frame is not a reasonable explanation for the delay. Consequently, the Court is not satisfied that the application was satisfactory, and this factor weighs against granting the extension of time.
2. Turning then to the matter of prejudice, the Minister accepts that there is no substantial prejudice in this matter. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of time.[11] The Court has decided to give this factor neutral weight in deciding whether to grant an extension of time.
3. The next factor is the impact on the Applicant of not granting the extension of time. The impact on the Applicant would be substantial. This is because she would lose the right to challenge the decision of the Tribunal. This factor weighs in favour of granting the Applicant's request for an extension of time.
4. The last matter the Court must consider are the merits of the matter. This is the final and most significant factor in determining whether to grant the Applicant an extension of time. This requires considering whether the originating application disclosed any reasonable, arguable case of jurisdictional error. It did not. The Court refers to the reasons of the registrar, which were correct (reproduced without amendment:[12]

...

3.The Applicant's ground of review says that the Tribunal's decision was "unjust" and "was made without taking into account the full gravity of [the Applicant's] circumstance[s] and the consequences of the claim". The Applicant has expanded upon this complaint in her affidavit. She says that the Tribunal should have considered her Protection Visa claims. This complaint does not have reasonable prospects of success. The Tribunal was clearly correct to conclude that it did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision because of the lateness with which the Applicant's Tribunal application was filed. The Minister has explained why that is so in his written submissions and the Applicant did not argue against any part of that analysis during today's hearing. Because the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision, there would have been no point to it considering the Applicant's protection claims. The Tribunal had no power to extend the 28-day application period (DAP17 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 801 at [49] per Judge Kendall and the cases cited therein).

4. At the summary judgment hearing, the Applicant said that she had attempted to file a Tribunal application on 17 February 2024, but she said that she did not complete and send that application. It was not until 28 March 2024 that she realised she had not submitted the 17 February 2024 application. She made this discovery when she checked her MyVevo and realised her visa had expired. She then went on to properly lodge a Tribunal application on 10 April 2024. I accept that this is what had occurred given that the Applicant was not challenged on that account today by the Minister, and I note also that the Applicant said effectively the same thing to the Tribunal (CB 66). However, the Applicant does not have a reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting her application by reference to this matter. This is because, as I have previously explained, the Tribunal simply does not have power to extend the application period. In addition to DAP17, there are also many Full Federal Court authorities standing for that proposition (two of which are cited at [29] of the Minister's submissions), and the Applicant does not have a reasonable prospect of persuading the High Court to overrule them.

1. The Court also refers to the Tribunal's decision of 13 August 2024. That decision noted that the decision of the Delegate was made on 14 February 2024. It noted that the review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 10 April 2024. It noted that the Tribunal wrote to the Applicant and invited her to comment on the potential finding that her application for review was made outside the prescribed time limit. The Tribunal decision notes that on 4 May 2024, the Applicant responded that she forgot to check her emails and that she did not get the emails from the Tribunal. Those are matters which the Applicant is entirely responsible for herself.
2. The Tribunal concluded that the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 10 April 2024, that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation, and that the Tribunal therefore did not have jurisdiction in the matter. Because the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction in relation to the matter, it was not required to consider anything further in respect of the application for review of the Delegate's decision.
3. In the face of the late application by the Applicant for review of the Delegate's decision, the Tribunal made the only decision that was open to it, that is, it found it had no jurisdiction to review the Delegate's decision. There was no error in that decision. The Tribunal had simply no power to extend the application period. This is unfortunate for the Applicant. However, the Tribunal could not go on to consider her protection claims.
4. The Court has considered the grounds for review contained in the review application. On an impressionistic level, none of them, either individually or cumulatively, disclosed jurisdictional error. Mindful of the Court's obligation to unrepresented litigants, as outlined in MZAIB at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the Applicant's grounds as broadly as possible, so as to remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal. Notwithstanding, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that a reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error arises in respect of the substantive application.
5. Taking into account all of the considerations relevant to an extension of time, in particular, the extent of the delay, the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay and the lack of any reasonably arguable case of jurisdictional error on behalf of the Tribunal, the Court is not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice that time be extended in this matter. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is dismissed, and to the extent necessary, the application for judicial review is summarily dismissed.
6. The Court is further satisfied that costs should follow the cause, that is to say, that the Applicant should pay the costs of the Minister. The Court is further satisfied that the costs sought by the Minister are reasonable.

I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[1] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) r 3.08(1).

[2] BIM21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 307, [11]. See also Bechara v Bates [2021] FCFAFC 34; [2021] FCAFC 34; (2021) 286 FCR 166, [1]-[7].

[4] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338, 474, 476(2)(a), 476(4)(a).

[5] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477(1).

[6] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[8] [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579, [12].

[9] MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391, [61].

[10] MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392, [113] ('MZAIB').

[11] EYY18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 947, [49], citing SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86, [6].

[12] GRY24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 2012.