Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Limited - [2003] NSWCA 80 - NSWCA 2003 case summary — Zoe

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Glover v Australian Ultra Concrete Floors Pty Limited

[2003] NSWCA 80

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2003-04-24|Before: Sheller JA, Hodgson JA, Ipp JA, Newman J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2003-04-24

Before

Sheller JA, Hodgson JA, Ipp JA, Newman J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (15 paragraphs)

[1]

The application to lead fresh evidence 34 I now turn to the appellant's application to lead fresh evidence. The appellant sought to tender the evidence of many witnesses. On a first reading of the material, without any assistance from the appellant himself, it seemed that an extensive part of it related, at best, to issues of credibility that would not easily lead this Court to conclude that the decision of the trial judge should be overturned. However, the Court identified particular aspects of the evidence of certain witnesses that did seem to have an important bearing on the issues raised by the appeal. When the appeal commenced, the presiding judge explained to the parties that the Court, initially, wished to hear argument only in relation to the evidence it had so identified, and argument proceeded in relation to that evidence alone. Eventually the Court admitted the evidence of the witnesses it had so identified and did not give any further consideration to the evidence of the other witnesses (the latter evidence being held to be unnecessary for the decision of the Court).

[2]

The admission of fresh evidence: general principles 35 By s 75A(8) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 the Court shall not receive evidence as to matters that occurred before the trial except on special grounds. In regard to what "special grounds" may comprise, Clarke JA (with whom Sheller JA and Powell JA agreed) said in Akins v National Australia Bank (1994) 34 NSWLR 155 at 160: "Although it is not possible to formulate a test which should be applied in every case to determine whether or not special grounds exist there are well understood general principles upon which a determination is made. These principles require that, in general, three conditions need to be met before fresh evidence can be admitted. These are: (1) It must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; (2) The evidence must be such that there must be a high degree of probability that there would be a different verdict; (3) The evidence must be credible. 36 There is a general discretion under s 75A(9) to admit evidence as to matters occurring after the date of the trial, but this discretion is not at large and regard must be had "to the context in which [the discretion] arises and also to the general public interest in the finality of litigation" per Gleeson CJ in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital (1991) 22 NSWLR 284 at 296.

[3]

The fresh evidence concerning Mr Higgins 37 The evidence admitted was directed at the testimony of Messrs Higgins and Thompson. I shall first deal with that which concerned Mr Higgins. 38 The appellant tendered an affidavit dated 3 August 2001 by his former wife, Mrs Veronica Glover. In that affidavit she stated that on 1 May 1994 at about 6.00 am she and the appellant attended at the factory. At that stage, according to her, the appellant was fit and well. At about 9.30 am that morning, she noticed the appellant in a sitting position and a few minutes later he came up to her holding his back. His trousers were wet with concrete slurry. She said that she then "realised what had happened", that is, the appellant had been injured when falling into the slurry. She arranged for one of the men to take over his job and she took the appellant home. She returned a few minutes later and spoke to Mr Thompson. Mr Thompson asked her how the appellant was and she replied, "He should be OK, he's badly strained his back". Mrs Glover stated that she never pushed the appellant and hurt his back, whether at home or at work. 39 Mrs Glover's testimony, in effect, rebutted the inference that arose from Mr Higgins' evidence, namely, that the appellant's injuries had been caused by his wife pushing him over. 40 In her affidavit, Mrs Glover explained why she had not given evidence at the trial. She stated: "During the last two years [the appellant] and I have gone through an extremely stressing and hard fought divorce which has just culminated in our marriage annulment or decree absolute in February 2001. From around February 1999 I refused to have anything to do with David and would not help him with his compensation claim in Australia. All things were left to my solicitors to sort out. … Since finding out about the result of the Court's judgment in Australia and obtaining the decree absolute to our marriage I have reconsidered my position and am now prepared to help him present the real facts in the matters before the Court." 41 The appellant also sought to tender an affidavit by his former solicitor, Mr A E Noronha. In that affidavit Mr Noronha stated that, prior to the trial, the appellant instructed him that due to the break up of his marriage, Mrs Glover had no intention of giving evidence on his behalf. As Mrs Glover was overseas, Mr Noronha was not in a position to subpoena her. Mr Noronha explained further that Mrs Glover had obtained an injunction against Mr Glover using his funds and would not release sufficient funds for him to attend the trial. Eventually, Mr Glover was able to raise sufficient money to come to Australia and, according to Mr Noronha, "we were able to have urgent conferences on the Monday morning just prior to the hearing to prepare the case". He said that Mrs Glover refused to assist the appellant in any way.

[6]

The non-admission in the respondent's defence 49 My conclusion that there was no failure to exercise reasonable diligence in the omission to call Mrs Glover as a witness at the trial was reinforced on another ground. This other ground concerned the state of the pleadings and, in particular, the non-admission plea by which the respondent answered the appellant's detailed allegations as to how the accident occurred. This "non-admission" ground applied to all the witnesses identified by the court as providing evidence that was potentially relevant in the appeal. Although I considered that, irrespective of this ground, Mrs Glover's evidence should be admitted, it is convenient to deal with the non-admission plea at this stage. 50 The appellant pleaded in his statement of claim that the accident occurred on 1 May 1994, at approximately 10.30 am, when he slipped on the slurry on the concrete floor while assisting in the manufacture of concrete beams. The respondent's defence stated merely that it did not admit the allegations in question. 51 The respondent denied the allegations of negligence and, in the alternative, pleaded contributory negligence on the part of the appellant. The respondent did not admit the appellant's allegations as to the injuries suffered by him. 52 The respondent expressly raised payments it had made to the appellant under the Workers Compensation Act 1987. It alleged: "The defendant says that payments by way of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Workers Compensation Act, have been made by the defendant to, for and on behalf of the plaintiff and the defendant raises these payments and any further payments which it may make to, for or on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to the Act as a defence to this action". 53 The general impression the defence gave was that the main thrust of the respondent's resistance at trial was to be the denial of the allegations of negligence and a challenge to the extent of the damages suffered by the appellant. The non-admission of the accident, coupled with the assertion that worker's compensation had been paid, would have indicated to the appellant, at least prior to the commencement of the trial, that the proof that the accident occurred as asserted by him would largely be a formality and would not be contested with any vigour. 54 The respondent's case at trial, however, was a different kettle of fish. Mr Higgins' testimony that the appellant told him that he had been pushed by his wife and did not say to him that he had hurt his back at work, meant, if accepted, that the appellant was giving an entirely false version as to how he came to be injured. Mr Thompson's evidence, in substance, also was to the effect that the appellant was not injured as he had alleged. 55 Thus, the respondent's case at trial was that the appellant lied when he said that he had been injured by slipping and falling at work. This was tantamount to alleging fraud. 56 It was not incumbent upon the respondent to plead fraud in answer to the appellant's claim: Jazairy v Najjar (1998) 27 MVR 498 at 506 to 508; Ghazal v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1992) 29 NSWLR 336 at 347. But as Mason P (with whom Sheller JA and Powell JA agreed) pointed out in Jazairy v Najjar at 506, there is a duty, in fairness, to confront a plaintiff with such a contention before it is proper to rely upon it. In Ghazal v Government Insurance Office (NSW) Mahoney JA at 347 emphasised the necessity to make clear at an appropriate time that an allegation of the nature of fraud is to be made and that it will be a real issue at the trial. 57 I accept that in the cross-examination of the appellant it was made clear that the question whether the appellant was injured at work was going to be a serious issue at the trial. 58 It is also to be noted that this is not a case where it is said that the judge erred in failing to accept a plaintiff's version in circumstances where an allegation of fraud, or conduct akin to fraud, was not made clear at an appropriate stage (as in Ghazal and Jazairy v Najjar). The failure to plead the positive case asserted at the trial was, however, contrary to the surprise rule and goes a long way, on its own, in providing a satisfactory explanation for the appellant's failure to call more witnesses to bolster his case that an accident occurred as alleged by him. 59 The ambush theory of litigation was given its quietus by Heydon JA in Nowlan v Marson Transport Pty Limited (2001) 53 NSWLR 116. His Honour gave unqualified approval to the statement of Allsop J in White v Overland [2001] FCA 1333 at [4] that: "[I]t should always be recognised that in the propounding of issues for trial the parties should take steps to ensure that all relevant parties to the dispute are cognisant of what the issues are".

[7]

Heydon JA at [127] observed that it is no longer open to practitioners, even practitioners in personal injury work, "to maintain poker faces, to keep their guards up at all times, and to let opponents who are proceeding in ignorance continue in that course". His Honour stated further at [128] that: "[E]ven in personal injury litigation the ambush theory of life has been abandoned in District Court trials as much as in Supreme Court trials". Heydon JA presciently warned at [129] of the prospect of ambushed parties seeking to tender further evidence. 60 The "cards on the table" approach is now common practice in many jurisdictions: See Boyes v Colins (2000) 23 WAR 123 at 143 to 144; Southwell v Tomomoto (1992) 109 FLR 12 at 17; Khan v Armaguard Limited [1994] 1 WLR 1204 at 1209,. The public interest in requiring the full disclosure of a party's case before trial is recognised by Pt 15 r 13 which requires parties to plead specifically any matter which, if not so pleaded, may take the other party by surprise. 61 In my opinion, the respondent's non-admission plea in answer to the appellant's detailed description of the accident contained in the statement of claim, together with reliance by the respondent on the workers compensation payments made by it, would have resulted in the appellant being taken by surprise when, during the course of the trial, it was first made plain that the respondent was seeking to make an affirmative case in regard to the question whether the appellant was injured by an accident at work in the manner asserted by him. 62 In Crook v Derbyshire [1961] 1 WLR 1360 a plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of a fall which she alleged occurred because of the insecurity of a hand rail. At the date of the trial the hand rail was in a secure position. The plaintiff and other witnesses alleged that a board, securing the hand rail, had been affixed after the accident. This was denied by the defendant and two other witnesses. The last witness for the defence was the previous occupier of the premises who was positive that the board was in position at the date of the accident because he had instructed a firm of joiners a few years previously to insert it. The joiners were not called at the trial. The trial judge accepted the evidence for the defence and dismissed the plaintiff's action. Subsequently the plaintiff's solicitors ascertained from the joiners that they had not inserted the board at any time. The plaintiff's statement of claim had asserted that the hand rail had not been safely affixed. The defence amounted to a general traverse of the allegations of negligence. The fact that no real indication had been given to the plaintiff that the date of the repair work to the hand rail was material weighed with Ormerod LJ in concluding (at 1365) that it did not appear to him "that there was anything unreasonable in the conduct of the plaintiff or those advising her in not searching so diligently that this evidence might possibly have been discovered". Harman LJ (at 1366) and Pearson LJ (at 1368) were of a similar mind. 63 In my view, having regard to the state of the pleadings, due diligence did not require the appellant to go further, prior to him being cross-examined, to attempt to obtain the evidence of Mrs Glover. Having regard to the pressures on the appellant, both financial and otherwise, to complete the trial once it had commenced, and having regard to the apparently insuperable problems of obtaining any co-operation from Mrs Glover, I did not regard his failure to seek an adjournment for the purposes of obtaining her evidence as demonstrating any lack of diligence on his part. 64 In the circumstances, I concluded that special grounds existed for the admission of Mrs Glover's evidence.

[8]

Reasonable diligence and the evidence of Mr Swan 65 The appellant also sought to lead new evidence bearing upon the trial judge's (erroneous) finding that Mr Thompson had stated that he was unaware that the appellant had had an accident on 1 May 1994. 66 The appellant tendered an affidavit by himself, dated 21 March 2003, in which he referred to the conversation that he had had with Mr Allen Swan, a former employee of the respondent. According to this affidavit Mr Swan was away from the respondent's factory from 25 April to 17 May 1994 as he was then on three weeks holiday. Thus, he was not at work when the appellant had his accident. The appellant said that he therefore did not think it necessary to call Mr Swan as a witness at the trial. 67 On 3 October 2000 (after Newman J had delivered his judgment) the appellant met Mr Swan by chance. The appellant told Mr Swan that Mr Thompson had testified that he had not seen the accident. According to the appellant Mr Swan then replied, "can you remember me coming around to visit you just after the accident? Well it was Scott Thompson who I'd bumped into at the shops who told me how your accident happened". 68 Mr Swan refused to provide the appellant with an affidavit setting out his account of his conversation with Mr Thompson as recounted to the appellant. The appellant explained to Mr Swan that he could subpoena him to testify and Mr Swan replied that that would be preferable. 69 Mr Dodd referred the Court to a memorandum of advice dated 10 September 2001 by junior counsel then acting for the appellant in which he referred to an affidavit by the appellant in which the following was stated: "At the time of the hearing of my case before his Honour Judge Newman J despite my best efforts I was unable to locate either Mr Allen Swan or Mr Craig Carter". 70 I have not been able to find an affidavit by the appellant in which this was said. However, even if the appellant did attempt to locate Mr Swan, it is apparent that it could not have been for the purposes of finding out what Mr Thompson had said to him as the appellant could not have known about the conversation on 3 October 2000, that having taken place after judgment had been delivered. 71 Accordingly, the admission of the evidence relating to Mr Swan's conversation with Mr Thompson fell to be decided under s 75A(9) of the Supreme Court Act, as being a matter occurring after the date of the trial. The approach in Doherty v Liverpool District Hospital (1991) 22 NSWLR 284 at 296 applied to this evidence.

[11]

The evidence of Mr Clay 79 The Court identified three other witnesses whose evidence was particularly relevant to the issues raised in the appeal. These were Mr Aaron Clay, Mr Craig Carter and Mr Julian White. 80 Mr Clay was an employee of the respondent at the time of the appellant's accident. On 1 May 1994 Mr Clay commenced work at about 5.45 am and during the course of the morning received instructions from the appellant as to work he was doing. According to Mr Clay, at that time there was nothing physically wrong with the appellant who appeared to be fit and well. At about 9.30 am Mr Clay saw the appellant limping. He could see that the appellant had been hurt and was in a lot of pain. The appellant told him that he had slipped in the slurry and hurt his back. 81 According to Mr Noronha, prior to the trial he issued a subpoena in respect of Mr Clay but the service was unsuccessful. Mr Clay could not be found at the address given. Mr Noronha stated that he could not locate Mr Clay prior to the conclusion of the trial. 82 In the circumstances, having regard to the attempts made by the appellant to find Mr Clay, and particularly the non-admission in the respondent's defence, I was of the view that, prior to the trial, due diligence did not require the appellant to take further steps to find Mr Clay. 83 Mr Dodd submitted that once it became plain to the appellant that his version of how he was injured was seriously contested, he should have applied for an adjournment. I was not persuaded by this argument. It is one thing to be apprised, properly and prior to the trial, of the case one has to meet. It is another to learn, midway through the trial, that the defence actually mounted is very different to that pleaded. In the latter event, circumstances may be such that it is readily understandable why a party takes a practical decision to proceed with the trial and not seek an adjournment. In the case of the appellant, he had waited several years for his day in court. In addition, he had had to struggle to obtain the costs necessary to pay for his travelling expenses from England to Australia. An adjournment would mean further delay and additional costs. He could not be certain whether he would find Mr Clay and whether Mr Clay would be a co-operative witness. I considered that in these circumstances the appellant's omission to seek an adjournment did not amount to a lack of due diligence on his part. 84 In my view, Mr Clay's evidence was credible and probative to a high degree (particularly when considered together with the evidence of Mr Swan and Mrs Glover). Accordingly, I concluded that the evidence of Mr Clay should be admitted.

[12]

The evidence of Mr Carter 85 In an affidavit dated 18 June 2001 Mr Carter stated that on 2 May 1994 he noticed that the appellant "was in a bad way" and required help from the men to do his work. The appellant told him that he, the appellant, had slipped on the wet slurry while cleaning the beams. 86 Mr Carter also stated that on 15 May 1994, Mr Thompson told him and some other men about the accident the appellant had had and said that it was a pity that it was the appellant, and not his wife, that had had the accident. 87 In an affidavit dated 7 June 2002, Mr Carter stated that he was told by a person to whom he had made a job application that the latter had been informed by Mr Thompson that Mr Carter was a trouble maker, very unreliable and always having time off work. This occurred in early November 2001 and shortly thereafter Mr Carter telephoned Mr Thompson and asked why he had said those things about him. Mr Thompson said "you must know the reason I stuck it up you. You're the one who spilt the beans about David Glover. I've seen the affidavit you signed, and Bill Saddington [a director of the respondent] passed it on to me. You put me right in it". 88 The appellant should have known prior to the trial that Mr Carter was in a position to testify about the accident. On the other hand, it was not clear from the material before the court whether the appellant had any discussion with Mr Carter prior to the trial through which the appellant might have learnt of his evidence concerning his conversation with Mr Thompson on 15 May 1994. The memorandum of advice dated 10 September 2001 by junior counsel (referred to above) indicated that the appellant attempted to find Mr Carter but could not. 89 I considered it reasonably arguable, particularly in the light of the non-admission in the defence, that the appellant's failure to call Mr Carter at the trial was not due to lack of diligence on his part. Mr Carter's testimony, when taken with that of Mrs Glover, Mr Swan, and Mr Clay, was probative and there was nothing to suggest that it was not credible. 90 In those circumstances, and having concluded that the appeal should in any event succeed on the strength of the evidence of Mrs Glover and the appellant's account of the evidence to be given by Mr Swan alone, and having decided that the evidence of Mr Clay should be admitted as well, I considered that there would be little point in refusing to allow the Mr Carter's evidence to be admitted on the appeal. I therefore formed the view that Mr Carter's evidence should be admitted.