GJF18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2026] FedCFamC2G 559

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585

Plaintiff M7/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 53

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24

SXRB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 14

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZMTJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2009] FCA 486

SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 297

SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500

SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319

TCWY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 804

Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533

Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819

Wang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 488

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075

WZASQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1726

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

1. The name of the First Respondent be amended to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship".
2. The name of the Second Respondent be amended to "Administrative Review Tribunal".
3. The Amended Application filed on 28 January 2026 be dismissed.
4. The Applicants pay the First Respondent's costs fixed in the amount of $4,553.02.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. Before the Court is an Amended Application filed on 28 January 2026 for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 9 June 2015. By that decision, the Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (Delegate) of the first respondent to refuse to grant the applicants Protection (Class XA) visas under s 65 of the Act.

1. The first applicant is the mother of the family unit (Applicant), and the second and third applicants are the Applicant's children (collectively, applicants).
2. The applicants are citizens of Egypt and are of Coptic Christian faith.
3. On 23 November 2012, the applicants arrived in Australia.
4. On 21 January 2013, the Applicant, with the assistance of a registered migration agent, applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa (Visa). The second and third applicant were included in the Visa application as members of the Applicant's family unit. The Applicant's claims were set out in a Statutory Declaration dated 18 January 2013 attached to the Visa application (First Statutory Declaration). Relevantly, the Applicant's claims for protection can be summarised as follows:

(1) the applicants are of Coptic Christin faith from Egypt;

(2) before the revolution in 2011 (Revolution), the applicants experienced persistent discrimination because of their Christian faith by Muslims who made up the majority of the Cairo population;

(3) the Applicant's sons were repeatedly bullied by both students and teachers at their school because of their religion. The Applicant's eldest son's arm was broken when he was intentionally hit by a car driven by one of his teachers. The Applicant made a complaint to the school and nothing was done. The Applicant's youngest son developed a stutter in response to his fear of going to school;

(4) after the Revolution in Egypt the treatment of Christians worsened. The Applicant was harassed when she walked down the street and on one occasion in May 2011, the Applicant was stopped on her way to church by five or six men she suspected were part of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Applicant had her hair pulled and the men said that if they saw her again they would cut her hair. The Applicant subsequently became frightened and avoided leaving the house in fear of harassment;

(5) sometime in 2011, when attempting to find a new house to rent a landlord refused the Applicant and her family's application due to their religion;

(6) in November 2011, the Applicant was followed and harassed by two Islamic women attempting to convert her to Islam. Following this incident the Applicant and her husband received threats via text message that sought for the Applicant and her family to convert and if they did not, they would be killed or their children kidnapped;

(7) the Applicant and her husband made numerous attempts to report the harassment but the police did not do anything about it;

(8) in July 2012, the Applicant's husband's shop was broken into and vandalised by Muslims (First Attack). In August 2012, the Applicant's husband's shop was again vandalised, and the husband was attacked physically, resulting in a broken jaw and bruises (Second Attack). Following the Second Attack, the husband was hospitalised for two weeks. The Applicant complained to the police but they did not investigate these reports;

(9) in September 2012, the Applicant's husband was attacked and kidnapped from his shop (Third Attack). Following the Third Attack, the Applicant stopped her sons from going to school as she was frightened that they would be harmed; and

(10) the day the applicants arrived in Australia, the Applicant called her father-in-law who informed her that on the morning of 24 November 2012, the concierge of their building had called him and advised that the Applicant's apartment had been burned down.

1. On 7 March 2013, the Applicant was invited to attend an interview with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Department) to discuss her Visa application and her claims for protection on 3 April 2013. The Applicant attended the interview and participated with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages (Visa Interview).
2. On 28 March 2013, the applicants' migration agent provided the Department with copies of police reports, accompanied by their official translations, dated 18 August 2012 and 15 September 2012.
3. On 1 May 2013, the applicants' migration agent wrote to the Department and provided written submissions in response to the Department's credibility concerns regarding the Applicant's evidence at the Visa Interview. The Applicant also provided a further Statutory Declaration dated 29 April 2013 in which the Applicant stated that her husband had since returned to the family home in Egypt (Second Statutory Declaration).
4. On 21 May 2013, the applicants' migration agent provided copies of police reports which had been obtained by the Applicant's father-in-law following the Visa Interview.
5. On 27 February 2014, the Delegate refused to grant the applicants the Visa. The Delegate was not satisfied that the applicants were persons in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
6. On 14 March 2014, the Applicant, with the assistance of the migration agent, applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision. The second and third applicants were included in the application for review as members of the Applicant's family unit.
7. On 5 January 2015, the Tribunal emailed the Applicant enclosing an invitation for the applicants to attend a hearing scheduled for 11 February 2015 at 12.00pm (Hearing Invitation). The Hearing Invitation also requested that the applicants provide a written submission setting out all claims made and maintained by 4 February 2015.
8. On 4 February 2015, the applicants' migration agent provided the Tribunal with further written submissions (4 February Submissions), a response to the Hearing Invitation and a further Statutory Declaration of the Applicant dated 23 January 2015 (Third Statutory Declaration).
9. On 9 February 2015, the applicants' migration agent provided the Tribunal with a number of additional documents in support of the Applicant's claims including a letter from the church which the Applicant attended and the schools that the second and third applicants attended (Letters in Support).
10. On 11 February 2015, the Applicant appeared before the Tribunal with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. The applicants' migration agent also attended the hearing.
11. On 25 March 2015, the Tribunal invited the applicants to comment or respond to information which it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review pursuant to s 424A(1) of the Act (s 424A Invitation). The s 424A Invitation identified the following three categories of information which it sought a response to:

(a) the police reports;

(b) information provided by Bishop Suriel; and

(c) the consent to travel form.

1. On 15 April 2015, the applicants' migration agent provided a written statement in response to the s 424A Invitation and supporting documents, including a copy of:

(1) an email dated 28 March 2015;

(2) an official translation of an article originally published in Arabic; and

(3) a letter in Arabic from the Applicant's father.

(s 424A Response).

1. On 23 April 2015, the applicants' migration agent provided the Tribunal with an official translation of the letter from the Applicant's father provided to the Tribunal in the s 424A Response and a letter from the Applicant's general practitioner.
2. On 17 June 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant the applicants the Visa.

1. The Tribunal issued its statement of decision and reasons on 17 June 2015 (Tribunal Decision). On 19 June 2015, the Tribunal sent a copy of the Tribunal Decision to the applicants' migration agent.
2. At paragraphs [4] - [43] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal summarised the Applicant's claims and referred to a number of submissions and documents to which it had regard, including:

(a) at paragraphs [38] - [40] the Tribunal noted the police reports and their translations that the Applicant provided to the Department on 28 March 2013, the further police report provided by the Applicant at the Visa Interview dated 24 November 2012 and its translation and the cover letter annexing police reports said to be provided by the Applicant's father-in-law on 21 May 2013 (May Police Reports). The Tribunal further noted that the May Police Reports were provided to the document examination unit of the Department;

(b) at paragraph [41] the Tribunal noted submissions provided on 4 February 2015 that included the Third Statutory Declaration;

(c) at paragraph [42] the Tribunal noted the further submissions provided on 9 February 2015 which contained the Letters in Support; and

(d) at paragraph [43] the Tribunal noted the s 424A Response provided by the applicants, in addition to further submissions provided on 23 April 2015 which included a translation of a letter authored by the Applicant's father and a letter from the Applicant's general practitioner.

1. At paragraphs [44] - [49] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal noted the relevant legislation to which it had regard in determining the matter. The Tribunal identified that the issue before it was whether the Applicant was credible in the claims she made about the harm she and her family suffered and her fears of harm should she be required to return to Egypt.
2. At paragraphs [50] - [67] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal made a number of findings as to the Applicant's credibility and ultimately found that the applicant had provided inconsistent evidence about the First Attack in July 2012, the Second Attack in August 2012, and the Third Attack in September 2012 that led to the kidnapping, and that such inconsistencies were significant. The Tribunal did not accept any of the claims made by the Applicant and found that such significant inconsistencies meant that the events did not occur as claimed by the Applicant.
3. At paragraphs [68] - [78] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered the police reports, the consent to travel form and the Applicant's credibility in this context. The Tribunal made a number of findings including:

(a) at paragraph [71] the Tribunal found that the Applicant's explanation as to the authenticity of the police reports was implausible, that the Applicant had provided non-genuine documents, none of the complaints were made to the Egyptian police as claimed, and that therefore the events did not happen; and

(b) at paragraphs [75] - [77] the Tribunal found the Applicant had not been truthful about signing the consent form and that her response did not explain the concerns the Tribunal had. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant had consistently claimed that it was her father-in-law that signed the form, the Tribunal highlighted that this was a provision of false information on a form to the Department which she failed to mention until it was raised and found this to be another cause for significant concern.

1. At paragraph [80] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal accepted a number of claims made by the applicants, including that the applicants are Coptic Christians and that over their lives they have suffered discrimination and harassment that was consistent with country information about the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt.
2. At paragraphs [81] - [82] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal set out the Applicant's claims of past harm, which it did not accept on the basis of its earlier adverse credibility findings.
3. At paragraphs [83] - [96] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal considered what would happen to the applicants should they be required to return to Egypt. The Tribunal found, on the basis of its previous findings, that there was no real risk that the applicants would be harmed by the people who the Applicant claimed attacked and abducted her husband, the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic extremists, the authorities or anyone else for the reasons of the applicants' religion or any of the other claims which were not accepted.
4. At paragraphs [97] - [98] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not satisfy the criteria set out in ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act nor did the applicants satisfy the criteria contained in ss 36(2)(b) or 36(2)(c) of the Act. Consequently, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate not to grant the applicants the Visa.

1. Section 477(1) of the Act requires that an application to this Court be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision.
2. The Tribunal Decision was made on 17 June 2015. An application for judicial review of that decision in this Court was therefore required to be filed by 22 July 2015. The originating application for judicial review was not filed until 6 December 2018.
3. Accordingly, the originating application was filed in excess of three years and four months after the expiry of the statutory timeframe.

Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time?

1. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of the 35-day period within which an application must be made if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.
2. The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in "the interests of the administration of justice" to grant an extension.
3. The principles regarding an application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation "to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time - although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:

(1) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(2) any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted;

(3) the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended;

(4) the interests of the public at large; and

(5) the merits of the substantive application.

1. In the Amended Application filed 28 January 2026, the applicants specified the following grounds as to why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time, in the following terms (without amendment):
   1. The applicant was not legally represented when filing her first or second applications to the Federal Circuit Court.
   2. The applicant received advice that she could not maintain judicial review proceedings and a ministerial application simultaneously.

1. The delay is exceptionally lengthy, being in excess of three years and four months, or some 1,233 days. The Court has, in other cases, described a delay of 74 days as "substantial" and a delay of 54 days as likely to be fatal to an application for an extension of time where there is no reason for the delay: WZASQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1726 at [14]; and WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075 at [28].
2. Typically, the longer the delay, the more persuasive the explanation needs to be: Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 (Tran) at [38]. The absence of any satisfactory explanation of itself may be a sufficient basis to refuse an extension of time in a case of long delay: Tran at [38]. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 96 ALJR 819 at [18] the majority observed that "if the delay is lengthy and unexplained, the applicant may be required to show that their case is strong or even "exceptional".
3. The applicants submit that the entirety of the delay is adequately explained.
4. Notwithstanding that the current Application before the Court is filed out of time, the applicants submit that their application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision was initially filed within the statutory timeframe.
5. On 9 July 2015, the Applicant filed an application seeking judicial review of the Tribunal Decision (First Review Application). The Applicant deposes that in or around October 2015 she engaged a migration agent who advised her "that it would be better if I was to instead make an application direct to the Minister for a carer's visa", as the Applicant could not raise the care of her niece (who is an Australian citizen) in the context of the First Review Application. She also deposes that she was advised that she could not maintain an application for judicial review simultaneously with a request for ministerial intervention. There is no dispute that this advice was incorrect. The applicants submit that it was on that incorrect advice that the Applicant discontinued the First Review Application on 12 November 2015. On 7 December 2015, the Applicant gave an undertaking to the Minister to pay an amount of $680.00 in full and final satisfaction of her liability for costs in the First Review Application.
6. On or about 1 December 2015, the Applicant applied for ministerial intervention which was refused on 13 October 2016.
7. On or about 27 October 2016, a second application for ministerial intervention was made. This request was refused on or about 4 November 2016.
8. On 2 December 2016 the Applicant filed a second application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision (Second Review Application). On 29 November 2018, the Applicant discontinued the Second Review Application. On 17 January 2019, a Registrar of this Court made orders that the applicants pay the Minister's costs of the Second Review Application fixed in the amount of $3,000.00.
9. The applicants filed a third, and the current, application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision on 6 December 2018, seven days following the Notice of Discontinuance being filed in the Second Review Application.
10. The First Review Application was filed in time. As to the period of the delay arising from the discontinuance of that application, I accept the Minister's submission that to the extent that the Applicant's choice to apply for ministerial intervention was made based on being informed that it would "be better" to pursue this option, that is a forensic decision. I also have some reservations about the veracity of the Applicant's evidence that she was given the incorrect advice as she contends. In her affidavit filed on 6 December 2018 she says "Hany did not charge me for this advice as I was unable to pay". However, in an email dated 28 November 2018 annexed to her further affidavit filed on 28 January 2026 (Further Affidavit) at MG-25 she is asked "Did Hany charge you for the Ministerial Application or any other services?, to which she replies "He asked for the cost but because of my situation I didn't pay". Accordingly, her evidence about these matters is inconsistent. Notwithstanding this, I am prepared to accept that the Applicant was given incorrect advice that she could not maintain an application for ministerial intervention simultaneously with an application for judicial review, and that this provides an explanation for the period of the delay until the lodgement of the Second Review Application.
11. However, I do not consider that the remainder of the delay is satisfactorily explained. The Second Review Application was filed on 2 December 2016. The applicants submit that the Second Review Application suffered from a "technical defect" as it did not comply with s 486D of the Act. In oral submissions it was submitted that the Applicant "made a mistake" in the Second Review Application. The applicants further submit that the only way to remedy a defect of that nature is to withdraw the application and lodge a fresh application. The Applicant deposes to being unrepresented, unfamiliar with the Australian legal system and having only a basic understanding of English. She also deposes to telling Registry staff that she had made a previous application and that she was not told she needed to disclose this.
12. I reject those submissions.
13. Firstly, page five of the relevant originating application contains the heading "Other Court Proceedings" in bold and provides the following text:

1. Accordingly, the originating application makes it clear that prior proceedings must be disclosed. The Applicant's limited English, self-representation and lack of familiarity with the Australian legal system cannot provide an adequate explanation for the delay arising from the Second Review Application and the failure to disclose the First Review Application. The vast majority of applicants in this Court's migration jurisdiction are unrepresented and have limited English language skills or speak a language other than English as their first language. Further, it is well established that an inability to obtain legal advice or representation does not, of itself, provide a sufficient explanation for the delay: WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 at [37]. In addition, ignorance of the law is not an adequate explanation: SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 at [8] - [9]; SZSDA v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319 at [38]. As to the Applicant's evidence that the Registry staff did not inform her that she had to disclose the First Review Application, as set out above, firstly, this is expressly set out on page five of the originating application and secondly, whilst Registry staff assist unrepresented litigants in so far as is possible, it is not the role of the Registry to provide legal advice.
2. Secondly, s 486D(1) of the Act, provides as follows:

A person must not commence a proceeding in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) in relation to a tribunal decision unless the person, when commencing the proceeding, discloses to the court any judicial review proceeding already brought by the person in that or any other court in relation to that decision.

1. Non-compliance with s 486D of the Act renders an application incompetent, and a failure to comply with s 486D of the Act cannot be cured by an applicant amending their second application so as to include information disclosing the existence of the earlier application: TCWY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 804 at [4], [26] - [34] and [48]. In those circumstances, I do not consider that the failure to disclose the First Review Application is properly characterised as a "technical defect" nor a "mistake", nor can it be cured by a further application including the previously undisclosed proceedings.
2. Thirdly, on 9 February 2017 the Minister filed and served its response to the Second Review Application. The Response included the following grounds of opposition:
   1. The application should be dismissed as incompetent pursuant to s 486D of the Migration Act 1958 by reason of the applicants' failure to disclose previous judicial reviewing proceedings MLG1568/2015 in respect of the decision of the second respondent dated 17 June 2015, which was discontinued by the applicant on 12 November 2015.
   2. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the second respondent dated 17 June 2015. Subsection 477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) applies and the application in this Court was not filed within 35 days of the date of the decision.
   3. The application for judicial review does not establish any jurisdictional error in the decision of the second respondent dated 17 June 2015.
3. Accordingly, the Applicant was on notice from 9 February 2017 that the Second Review Application was incompetent for failure to disclose the First Review Application proceedings. However, the Applicant did not discontinue the Second Review Application until 29 November 2018, nearly 22 months later and only 18 days before the Second Review Application was listed for hearing. The Applicant deposes to obtaining legal representation in April 2017. Annexed to the Applicant's Further Affidavit are a number of pieces of correspondence and other documents from and to the Applicant's then legal advisers. The Applicant relies on an email from her legal representative on 22 November 2018 to a solicitor at Refugee Legal which, relevantly, says:

...

This morning Kylie Hall, a Special Counsel at Holding Redlich, and I met with [the Applicant] to discuss the judicial review of her RRT decision. We advised [the Applicant] that her current judicial review proceeding would need to be withdrawn, by no later than Friday, 30 November 2018, and a fresh proceeding reissued in the Federal Circuit Court.

...

1. This does not provide an acceptable explanation for the delay. It does no more than confirm that on 22 November 2018 the Applicant was advised of the need to discontinue the Second Review Application by 30 November 2018. In this context, I note that the final hearing was listed on 17 December 2018 and pursuant to r 13.1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), being the relevant rules of the Court at that time, provided that absent leave of the Court being granted, a notice of discontinuance must be filed at least 14 days before the date fixed for final hearing. It does not evidence that this was the only, or the first time, that the Applicant was informed of the need to discontinue, nor does she contend that this is so in any of her affidavit material. I also consider it may be inferred from the above that the Second Review Application was not discontinued earlier due to the impact that may have on the Applicant's visa status. Further, whilst a number of communications and documents are annexed to the Further Affidavit, nowhere does the Applicant depose to those documents comprising the entirety of the correspondence or advice from her legal advisers. I also find it implausible that the issue of the competency of the Second Review Application was not identified to the Applicant by her legal advisers in the approximately 19 months in which they acted for her between April 2017 and November 2018, most particularly in light of the matter being expressly identified in the Response filed by the Minister.
2. Accordingly, whilst I am prepared to accept the Applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the delay until the Second Review application was made, I do not consider the remainder of the period of delay is adequately explained.
3. This weighs against the granting of an extension of time.

1. The Minister contends that there is some prejudice if an extension of time is granted as there are outstanding costs in the amount of $3,680.00. This amount is the combination of the undertaking given by the Applicant on 7 December 2015 and the costs ordered against the applicants in relation to the Second Review Application. The Applicant concedes these costs are outstanding.
2. The Minister also contends that there is a general prejudice in that the Court is burdened with resolving the matter much later than would have been the case had the Court heard and determined the matter in the 2015 when the applicants filed the First Review Application. It is to be noted that the Tribunal Decision was made more than a decade ago.
3. I accept those submissions but give them little weight and consider these matters to be of little significance in determining whether it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for time to be extended.

1. There is a public interest in ensuring that decisions of the Executive are made lawfully. The merits of the substantive grounds relied upon by the applicants, which are considered below, will of course be relevant to this. However, it has also been recognised that there is a public interest in the finality of administrative decisions: Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491 at [15] - [17]. In this context it is to be noted that the Tribunal Decision was made more than a decade ago.
2. As to the impact upon the applicants, if the extension of time is refused then the Tribunal Decision will stand. Although an alternative route of review might be available, under s 476A(3)(a) of the Act, the refusal of an explanation for an extension of time forecloses any right of appeal: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [65].
3. I consider this to be a neutral consideration.

1. While the discretion of the Court is broad, the Court should not permit an application to proceed if it is bound to fail, and should accordingly decline to extend time.
2. The Amended Application, as pressed at hearing, provides the following grounds for judicial review (without amendment):
   1. The Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act in failing to give "clear particulars" to the applicants of the report of the Document Examination Unit.
   2. The Tribunal failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act in failing to give adequate notice of the content of the Document Examination Unit.

1. Both Ground 1 and Ground 2 turn on the report prepared by the Department's document examination unit (DEU Report) in relation to the police reports.
2. It is useful to first set out in a more fulsome manner the findings of the Delegate, the relevant submissions contained in the 4 February Submissions, the relevant content of the s 424A Invitation and the Tribunal's findings in relation to the police reports.
3. The Delegate's decision under the heading "Attacks on the first named applicant's husband's business", relevantly, provided as follows:

The [Applicant] asserts that her husband's shop was vandalised three times by Muslim extremists from July 2012 to September 2012, which resulted in her husband being physically assaulted and hospitalised on one occasion and eventually being abducted and disappeared in September 2012. She advises that although these incidents were reported to the police, the police investigation was futile. In her post interview submission, the [Applicant] instructs that her husband has since returned home. He however refused to discuss in detail about his abduction and captivity. Nor has he approached the police about his experience due to the family's past experience with the police.

In support of her claims, the [Applicant] submitted photocopies of three police reports and their translations. At interview, she agreed to provide the original copies of the police reports, which were received on 22 May 2013.

It is noted that the original police reports later provided look very dissimilar to the photocopies of the reports initially provided. The [Applicant] instructs through her representative that it is not possible to obtain original police report from Egypt. As the original copies of the first set of police reports were misplaced, her father-in-law sought further copies of these reports directly from the police, which have been hand copied from the police record book.

A forensic examination was conducted on the later provided original police reports by the Department's Document Examination Unit. The examination report observes:

"All pages have a paper substrate that has no security features present. It is consistent with commercial office copy paper.

All of the black print is produced by toner printing. The handwriting is not original. The black horizontal lines and the vertical black line on the far left are also toner printed. These pages are consistent with being photocopies of another document".

...

"All of the pages have a blue circular eagle symbol that is an original wet stamp.

These document/s production methods are consistent with a document/s that have been copied and then authorised with a wet stamp".

Notwithstanding the implausibility that the Egyptian police force is said to manually transcribe police records when a request for a duplicate police report is received, the finding reached in the Document Examination Report that the later provided original police reports were in fact produced by toner printing contradicts the assertion that the reports were hand copied from the original police file. I therefore cannot accept uncritically that the police reports provided are from a reliable source and have therefore placed little weight on these reports.

1. In the 4 February Submissions the Applicant's migration agent addressed, amongst other things, the Delegate's credibility findings under the heading "Issues arising from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection interview and decision" saying:

...

In the Departmental decision, the Delegate concluded that [ the Applicant's] claims were not "trustworthy" on the basis of:

"the unreliableness of the documentary evidence provided by the [Applicant], her untruthfulness in her dealings with the department in the past and her dishonest interactions with the spiritual leader of the Coptic community in Melbourne".

We reiterate our previous submissions addressing these credibility issues. It is submitted that to the best of her knowledge, the documents provided by [the Applicant] are official police reports obtained by her father-in-law after her departure from Egypt. Importantly these reports restate the incidents outlined in [the Applicant's] oral and written evidence.

...

1. One of the particulars of the s 424A Invitation sent to the applicants concerned the police reports. In that context, the s 424A Invitation noted that:
   • on 28 March 2013, the applicants provided copies of Egyptian police reports and their translations;
   • at the Visa Interview, originals of these documents were requested and agreed to be provided; and
   • on 21 May 2013, the applicants provided copies of the police reports and referred to the observations of the DEU Report and those of the Delegate under the heading "Issues arising from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection interview and decision", set out above.
2. The s 424A Invitation set out the Applicant's explanation at the hearing as follows:

• At the hearing you first said that these reports were scanned. When it was pointed out that this could not be the case as the document examination report states that they have wet stamps, you then said that your father in law went to the police station where they have the book, they wrote and stamped the new reports, they were issued from the same police station but with different handwriting and stamp.

1. The s 424A Invitation then set out why the information in relation to the police reports contained in the Section 424A Invitation was relevant as follows:

...

This information is relevant because, subject to any comment or response you make, it may indicate that these are not genuine reports, because they do not match the earlier copies provided, and are not handwritten as you claim, and that therefore these may non-genuine, calling into question whether these or the previous reports are genuine. If the Tribunal relies on this information it may find that you have provided non-genuine documents, and that these complaints have not been made to the Egyptian police. The Tribunal may therefore find that these events have not happened. Further, the Tribunal may find that your provision of non-genuine documents leads the Tribunal to doubt your general credibility, which may lead the Tribunal to disbelieve any or all of the claims made, and to place little or no weight on any documents or other evidence provided. This, subject to any comment or response you make, would be the reason, or a part of the reason for affirming the decision that is under review.

...

1. The relevant findings of the Tribunal are set out in paragraphs [70] - [71] of its decision as follows:

In the post hearing submission of 15 April 2015 in relation to whether the reports are genuine, the representative emphasises that at no stage has the applicant claimed to have obtained the reports herself and has consistently stated that her father-obtained Shem. The submissions states that the representative is instructed by the applicant that since the hearing the applicant has contacted her father-in-law and clarified that the reports are genuine and have been officers copying out the contents of the permanent record book on two separate occasions. The applicant instructs that the police are not permitted to stamp their handwritten copy, but only a photocopy of their handwritten copy. It is then submitted that just because this differs from police practices in Australia this does not mean her account of police procedure is not accurate and that the account should be accepted, citing a paper from Academic Michael Kagan and the Tribunal credibility guidelines.

This explanation does not in any way explain the identified concerns with the differences between the two sets of documents or why the later set are photocopies wet stamped. The explanation provided by the applicant is, I find, completely implausible. She has not explained why police officers would go to the laborious effort of copying out a report, and then photocopying their copied out report and stamping the photocopy rather than photocopying the permanent record book and stamping this. This is not a differing police practice, this is an illogical and implausible one. I reject this explanation on this basis. Whilst I accept that she herself has not obtained them, she on multiple occasions sought explanations from her father-in-law who did obtain them. She has consistently maintained that they are genuine. As noted to the applicant at hearing, there are reports that fraudulent documents including official documents are able to be obtained in Egypt. I find that the second set of police reports is not genuine because they do not match the earlier copies provided, and are not handwritten as the applicant claimed, and given the concerns expressed above and the inability of the applicant to explain how they were obtained. I give these documents no weight. Given this finding, I find that the first set of police reports provided by the applicant are also non-genuine, given my concerns with the second set, my concerns with her recounting of these claimed events, the country information about document fraud and my general credibility concern and I give these reports no weight. I find that the applicant provided non-genuine documents, and that none of these complaints have been made to the Egyptian police, and further to the findings set out above that therefore these events have not happened. Further, I find that the applicant's provision of non-genuine documents leads me to doubt her general credibility

1. By Ground 1 the applicants submit that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 424A of the Act by failing to provide clear particulars to the applicants of the DEU Report.

1. At the relevant time, s 424A of the Act provided as follows:

424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(2A) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.

(3) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

1. The applicable legal principles are not in dispute and were summarised by Wheelehan J in DYI16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 612 (DYI16) at [70]. I respectfully adopt his Honour's distillation of those principles as follows.
2. The terms of s 424A(1) of the Act do not require the Tribunal to do other than give "clear particulars" of information, and therefore do not in terms require the Tribunal to give the documents from which the information is derived: SXRB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCAFC 14 at [9] (Kiefel, Kenny and Graham JJ). The degree of clarity of the particulars may affect the extent to which the Tribunal may separately be required to convey the relevance of the information to the review, and the consequences of it being relied upon: SZMTJ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2009] FCA 486; 232 FCR 282 at [52] (Flick J). In some cases, the relevance of the information may be self-evident from the particulars provided: Wang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 488 at [29] (Besanko J). In other cases, compliance with the obligations under s 424A(1) may require that actual documents be given to the applicant so that there is an opportunity for a meaningful comment or response: Plaintiff M7/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 53 at [44] (Gordon J). Therefore, in some cases in order for the Tribunal to comply with s 424A(1), the information may not be capable of being clinically divorced from the context in which it appears, and it may be necessary to identify the source from which the information has been obtained. How much has to be disclosed and in what form must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case: SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 297; 184 FCR 505 at [23] (Flick J).
3. In addition, there is no dispute that a breach of s 424A constitutes jurisdictional error: DYI16 at [67]; SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24 at [77] per McHugh J, [173] per Kirby J, [206] - [208] per Hayne J.

1. The applicants submit that clear particulars required the entire DEU Report to be put to the Applicant. In written submissions the applicants contend that the applicants' "knew only of the conclusions of the DEU report" and that knowing only the conclusions of the report was "useless to them if they were to undermine these conclusions".
2. In oral submissions the applicants submitted that the s 424A Invitation selectively quotes from the DEU Report and provides a summary of the report. It was also submitted that a summary which excludes the findings, limitations and qualifications to the report does not provide "clear particulars" for the purposes of s 424A of the Act. In particular, it was submitted that the summary in the s 424A Invitation failed to identify that the examination was restricted to process identification and did not include the information in the report that the examiner's opinion "does not verify whether or not [the police reports] were obtained legitimately." It was submitted that these omissions are important because they qualify the report's findings and allow the process to be understood so as to enable the report to be challenged.

1. It is uncontested that the entire DEU Report was not put to the Applicant and that a summary of the report is included in the s 424A Invitation. However, I do not accept the submission that the Tribunal failed to give clear particulars of the information as required by s 424A of the Act.
2. Under s 424A(1)(a) of the Act the Tribunal was required only to give clear particulars of information that it considered would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The Tribunal's consideration of what information fell within that criterion may be inferred from the conduct of the hearing, from the terms of the s 424A Invitation, and from the Tribunal Decision: DYI16 at [77]. The Tribunal identified that the information may indicate that the police reports provided on 21 May 2013 were not genuine and that the provision of non-genuine reports may lead to the Tribunal to doubt the Applicant's credibility. The Applicant's credibility was the dispositive issue before the Delegate and therefore the dispositive issue in the decision under review.
3. I reject the submission that the applicants "knew only of the conclusions of the DEU Report." The DEU Report contains six sections, headed, respectively, "Submission information", "Examination method", "Observations", "Results", "Attachments" and "Additional Information". Under section three headed "Observations" the DEU Report provides as follows:
   1. All of the pages are all 210 x 297 mm (A4) in size and are in average condition They have been folded and are slightly creased.
   2. All pages have a paper substrate that has no security features present. It is consistent with commercial office copy paper.
   3. All of the black print is produced by toner printing. The handwriting is not original. The black horizontal lines and the vertical black line on the far left are also toner printed. These pages are consistent with being photocopies of another document.

d. Two of the pages contain original blue ball point pen handwriting.

e. All of the pages have a blue circular eagle symbol that is an original wet stamp.

1. It is not possible to tell whether any of the original text has been altered prior to the copying process.
2. There is no specimen or information available for comparison with these documents.

1. Section four is headed "Results" and provides as follows:

The 5 pages submitted for examination are toner copies. The blue circular eagle symbol on each page is an original wet stamp.

These document/s production methods are consistent with a document/s that have been copied and then authorised with a wet stamp.

My opinion does not verify whether or not they were obtained legitimately.

1. Accordingly, the salient matters contained in the DEU Report under the heading "Observations", are included in the s 424A Invitation. The "Results" of those observations, being that the "documents/production methods are consistent with a document/s that have been copied and then authorised with a wet stamp." is also included in the s 424A Invitation.
2. I do not consider that those matters contained in the DEU Report that are not included in the s 424A Invitation contain information that would be a reason or part of the reason for affirming the Delegate's decision. Specifically, I do not accept, and am unable to see how, the failure to identify that the examination was restricted to process identification would be a reason or part of the reason for affirming the Delegate's decision. Further, as set out above, that the DEU Report stated that the "documents/production methods are consistent with a document/s that have been copied and then authorised with a wet stamp" is included in the s 424A Invitation. Nor do I accept that the failure to include the information in the DEU Report that the examiner's opinion "does not verify whether or not [the police reports] were obtained legitimately" would be a reason or part of the reason for affirming the Delegate's decision. As set out above, at paragraphs [70] - [71] of its decision the Tribunal formed its own view as to the genuineness of the police reports and, consequently, on the credibility of the Applicant.
3. Accordingly, Ground 1 discloses no reasonably arguable jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

1. By Ground 2 the applicants submit that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Act by failing to give adequate notice of the DEU Report.
2. At the relevant time, s 425(1) of the Act provided as follows:

425 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear

(1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

1. The applicants submit that the Tribunal's failure to provide the entire DEU Report constitutes a breach of s 425 of the Act. The applicant submits that the information provided to the applicants did not ensure a fair hearing. In oral submissions the applicants submitted that without the entire DEU Report they were unable to make meaningful arguments about what weight ought be given to the report.

1. I reject those submissions and accept the Minister's submission that there was no procedural unfairness in how the Tribunal put the dispositive issue to the applicants for their response.
2. Section 425(1) requires the Tribunal to invite the applicant "to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" (Court's emphasis). The reference to "the issues arising in relation to the decision under review" is important: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [33].
3. The applicants were on notice that the dispositive issue before the Delegate was the Applicant's credibility, based in part upon the police reports (as set out in the Delegate's decision extracted at paragraph [67] above). This was the same dispositive issue before the Tribunal. I have found that the applicants were on notice of this issue and given clear particulars of the information in relation to the police reports that would be part of the reason for affirming the Delegate's decision. The applicants addressed the dispositive issue both before the Tribunal hearing, during and after it. Accordingly, the applicants were provided with an opportunity to make meaningful argument and there was no denial of procedural fairness.
4. Accordingly, Ground 2 discloses no reasonably arguable jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

1. The Amended Application in this case is 1,233 days outside the statutory timeframe. This is a delay of over three years and four months. The Court may only grant an extension of the time within which the Amended Application was to be made if satisfied such extension is in the interests of the administration of justice.
2. I have found that the applicant does not have a satisfactory explanation for the entirety of the delay and specifically, does not have a satisfactory explanation for the period from the lodgement of the Second Review Application. This period alone is lengthy. Most significantly, however, I have found that the grounds of review do not disclose reasonably arguable jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. Accordingly, I am not satisfied it is in the interests of the administration of justice that there be an extension of the period to make an application for judicial review.
3. The Amended Application is therefore dismissed.
4. The Minister seeks an order that the applicants pay its costs in accordance with sch 2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) for an application finalised at an interlocutory hearing in the amount of $4,553,02.
5. The Minister also seeks orders changing the name of the first and second respondents.
6. I shall make the orders sought by the Minister.

I certify that the preceding ninety-nine (99) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge J Young.