1. The applicant gave oral evidence at hearing. That evidence confirmed the content of paragraph A of the 30 September Affidavit in that the applicant said that he was given the Tribunal Decision at the same time as he received the 8 September Letter. The applicant said that he had been phoning CASE for Refugees following the Tribunal hearing concerning his status, and that despite CASE for Refugees saying that the applicant would be contacted, he was not contacted concerning the progress of his matter. Consequently, he decided to terminate the authority of CASE for Refugees to act as his representative. When he did this he was given the 8 September Letter and with it was a copy of the Tribunal Decision, attached to two letters which were stapled together, one addressed to the advocate who represented the applicant and bearing CASE for Refugees' street address and seemingly sent by registered post, the other addressed to the applicant, but bearing no street or postal address.[18] In cross-examination it was put to the applicant that he had in fact received the Tribunal Decision earlier than the date on which he received the 8 September 2009 Letter, but he emphatically rejected that suggestion.

1. Section 477(2) of the Migration Act gives this Court a discretion to extend time in which to file an application for judicial review of a Tribunal decision. Thus, the Court may extend time if:
   1. the application for an order to extend time has been made in writing to the Court specifying why the applicant considers that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order extending time;[19] and
   2. the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending time for the filing of the application.[20]
2. The application satisfies the first limb under s.477(2)(a). The application has been made in writing, and it specifies in the Original Grounds, Amended Grounds and Further Amended Grounds why the applicant considers it to be in the interests of the administration of justice that an extension of time in which to file the application be granted.
3. The remaining issue is whether the Court is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time for filing of the application for judicial review of the Tribunal Decision.

Extension of time in the interests of the administration of justice

1. The Court can only extend time for filing of the application for judicial review if it is satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time.
2. In Genovese v BGC Construction Pty Ltd[21] the Court was considering an application for a transfer of proceedings to the Federal Court, and as a mandatory factor in that consideration had to consider "the interests of the administration of justice". Of that phrase the Court observed as follows:
   • 24. In BHP Billiton Ltd v Schultz (2004) 221 CLR 400, [2004] HCA 61, ("Schultz") the High Court considered the nature of the "interests of justice": Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Heydon JJ CLR at p.421, HCA at par [15] said:
     • The interests of justice are not the same as the interests of one party, and there may be interests wider than those of either party to be considered. Even so, the interests of the respective parties, which might in some respects be common (as, for example, cost and efficiency), and in other respects conflicting, will arise for consideration. The justice referred to in s.5 is not disembodied, or divorced from practical reality.
   • 25. Gummow J observed that the interests of justice "are even-handed"; CLR at p.445, HCA at par [100] while Callinan J referred to the requirement to "do equal justice": CLR at p.492, HCA at par [258].
   • 26. Some of the factors ordinarily considered when assessing the interests of justice are factors which it is mandatory for this Court to take into account under the Federal Magistrates Court Act and Federal Magistrates Court Rules: for example, costs and convenience of hearing and determination, earlier hearing of proceedings, availability of particular proceedings and pending proceedings in another court (in this case the Federal Court).

...

• 28. In assessing the "interests of the administration of justice" similar considerations to those in Schultz apply, with the qualification related to "administration of justice". Administration means "management": Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) at p.13. Thus, s.39(3)(d) of the Federal Magistrates Court Act is directed to a consideration of the interests of the management of justice, which must mean management by the Court of the proceedings pending before the Court.[22]

1. Factors relevant to a consideration of whether it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time on an application for judicial review of a Tribunal decision were identified in SZMFJ v Minister for Immigration & Anor[23] as follows:
   • 1. The extent of the delay and the reason for the delay.
   • 2. Whether there is any merit in the application.
   • 3. Whether there is any prejudice to the respondents.
   • 4. The impact on the applicant.
   • 5. The interests of the public at large.
   • 6. The Court's discretion itself.[24]
2. The Court considers that the factors identified in SZMFJ are proper factors for the purposes of assessing the interests of the administration of justice in an extension of time application for judicial review of a Tribunal decision, and proposes to apply them in this case.

1. The extent of the delay in this case is significant. The application has been filed 54 days outside of the 35 day time limit under s.477(1) of the Migration Act. Thus, the delay itself is approximately one and a half times longer than the specified statutory time for filing of the application. Were there no reason for the delay it would likely be a delay of a length fatal to the application to extend time.[25]
2. The extent of the delay must be balanced against the reason for the delay.
3. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that:

1. the applicant complained to CASE for Refugees about the progress of his case quite frequently; 2. he became frustrated by the lack of response from CASE for Refugees and therefore requested that they cease acting for him;

1. CASE for Refugees did cease acting for the applicant and gave the applicant the 8 September Letter confirming that they were no longer acting;

1. at the same time as he was given the 8 September Letter, the applicant was given a copy of the Tribunal Decision, and the two covering letters, stapled together, one addressed to the person with the conduct of the matter at CASE for Refugees, and the other addressed to the applicant by name but bearing no address for postal purposes; 2. the day after receiving the Tribunal Decision in the manner described above, the applicant filed the present application.
2. The applicant expressly rejected a suggestion that he had received the Tribunal Decision earlier than 8 September 2009. No evidence was led to support that suggestion, which was put to the applicant in cross-examination. Further, the first respondent was not able to explain why, if as suggested, the applicant had received the Tribunal Decision earlier (presumably from CASE for Refugees), no person from CASE for Refugees was called to give evidence in support of that suggestion.[26]
3. The evidence indicates that the Tribunal Decision was sent to CASE for Refugees on 12 June 2009 by registered post, and therefore would have been received by that organisation within two to three days of the date upon which it was sent. There is simply no evidence that CASE for Refugees passed on, or otherwise informed the applicant of, the Tribunal Decision earlier than 8 September 2009.
4. Where a litigant personally is not at fault, but those acting for the litigant are the cause of the delay, courts are traditionally reluctant to sheet home to the litigant the adverse consequences of any delay.[27]
5. The Court finds that the applicant did not receive the Tribunal Decision until 8 September 2009, and thereafter acted without delay to file the application for judicial review the next day.
6. The Court is of the view that the applicant has established a reasonable excuse for the delay in the filing of the application for judicial review, namely, that those acting for him did not inform him of the Tribunal Decision at any time prior to 8 September 2009.

1. If the Court determines that the substantive application is without merit, then an extension of time may be refused.[28] This is because where, as here, a substantive right has vested in a party as a consequence of judgment (or in this case decision) and the time in which to appeal or apply further has gone, "the time for appealing [for making the application] will not be extended unless the proposed appeal [application] has some prospects of success"[29] nor, if it is "hopeless, unarguable or bound to fail."[30]
2. The necessary assessment of the merit of the case for these purposes is broad. It involves a consideration of the outline of the case, in relation to which the party seeking the extension (here, the applicant) bears the burden of persuasion.[31]
3. In making that broad assessment of merit the Court has regard to the fact that a decision of the Tribunal is only liable to be set aside upon review if it involves jurisdictional error.[32] An error by an administrative tribunal, such as the Tribunal, will only constitute jurisdictional error if the Tribunal:

1. identifies a wrong issue; 2. asks the wrong question;

in such a way that the Tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected resulting in a decision exceeding or failing to exercise the authority or powers given under the relevant statute.[33] Therefore, a factual finding of the Tribunal going to the merits of the application is not capable of being set aside as jurisdictional error.[34] Thus, a Tribunal decision turning entirely on assessment of an applicant's credibility will not be open to challenge because it amounts to "an impermissible attempt to undertake further merits review."[35]

1. Each of the Original Grounds are subsumed by one or more of the detailed Amended and Further Amended Grounds and therefore need not be considered separately.

1. Amended Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 6 seek to attack the decision of the Minister's delegate. The jurisdiction of this Court is limited to an examination of whether the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error.[36] These grounds are therefore unarguable and bound to fail. However, Amended Ground 6 also seeks to attack the Tribunal Decision. This aspect of the application is considered separately below.

1. Amended Ground 2 simply refers to "migration reg 866.221" which can be taken as being a reference to clause 866.221 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth).[37] Clause 866.221 simply refers to the Minister being satisfied that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as a criterion to be satisfied at the time of the delegate's decision. No submission was directed to this ground specifically, and even if it was, the ground appears, by reason of:
   1. the content of clause 866.221; and
   2. its placement in the grounds of appeal,

to relate to the delegate's decision, rather than any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. As such it is unarguable and bound to fail for the same reasons as Amended Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 6.

1. Amended Ground 5 relates to a submission made by "his defence lawyer" concerning the date the applicant arrived in Australia. This appears to be a reference to the submission made to the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant where, for reasons unknown, there is a reference to a different person arriving in Australia on 28 June 2007, followed by a reference to the applicant arriving in Australia on 1 December 2008 in the following paragraph.[38] That error, in a submission on behalf of the applicant, appears to have had no affect whatsoever in relation to the Tribunal Decision which correctly identifies the applicant as having arrived in Australia on 1 December 2008.[39] This ground is therefore hopeless and bound to fail.

1. Amended Ground 7 acknowledges that the Tribunal was fully aware of political violence in Nigeria, and in particular violence and killings in the Niger Delta region.[40] The amended ground does not expressly allege jurisdictional error, but complains that the Tribunal "failed to accommodate" the applicant's claims for protection in relation to the political violence and killings in the Niger Delta region.
2. The Tribunal did not "accommodate" the applicant in this regard because it found that the applicant was not:

1. a member of The Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force;[41] 2. a member of The Niger Delta Non-Violent Movement;[42] or

and that as a consequence there was no real chance that the applicant would be persecuted by reason of particular political opinions which might be imputed from membership of the NDPVF or NDNVM[43] or his membership of a particular social group of journalists or activity as a journalist.[44]

1. In considering whether the applicant was a member of the NDPVF the Tribunal had regard to evidence including:

1. the applicant's statement that he joined NDPVF in 1994, when country information indicated that it was not formed until around 2003;[45] 2. that at hearing the applicant was unable to identify or name the leader of NDPVF, and was evasive when questioned about him, notwithstanding previously referring explicitly to him in a written statement;[46]

1. the applicant's NDPVF membership card, which, in the circumstances, the Tribunal gave little weight to;[47] and

1. inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, and a lack of key detail, concerning the date and circumstances of certain events related to the arrest of the leader of NDPVF and subsequent protests which occurred in September 2005, a month after the applicant left Nigeria, and his involvement in them, and in particular the Tribunal's disbelief of the applicant's subsequent claim that he was involved electronically (that is via email) in attempting to solve a hostage crisis which arose in an oil pumping station following the leader's arrest.[48]
2. The Tribunal considered the available evidence, weighed that evidence, and arrived at a finding that the applicant was not a member of the NDPVF. That was a finding that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence. It was a finding of fact, which discloses no jurisdictional error, and which can not be reviewed by this Court.
3. In considering whether the applicant was a member of the NDNVM the Tribunal had regard to evidence including:

1. country information that indicated that the NDNVM was not formed until 2008, three years after the applicant left Nigeria;[49] 2. the applicant's claim to have a membership card of the NDNVM and to have submitted same to the Department, and that no such card was on the departmental file;[50] and

1. the applicant's refusal to directly answer a question concerning the non-violence movement's success in resolving conflict in the Niger Delta, and instead referring the Tribunal to the website.[51]
2. In the circumstances a finding that the applicant was not a member of the NDNVM was a finding that was open to the Tribunal on the evidence. Indeed, there was no evidence of membership of the NDNVM on the evidence available to the Tribunal, and the finding was inevitable.
3. The Tribunal found that journalists in Nigeria constituted "a particular social group" for relevant Convention purposes.[52]
4. The Tribunal considered the claim that the applicant was a journalist, setting out and evaluating the evidence in not insignificant detail,[53] as follows:

1. finding the applicant had a diploma in mass communication, obtained in 2004;[54] 2. finding the applicant held membership of the Nigeria Union of Journalists;[55]

1. finding the applicant may have worked as an "artist on a weekend TV show for the National TV Authority from 1994 to 1998 whilst still at school";[56] and

1. not accepting that the applicant had worked as a TV and radio co-host for ITV Benin, or as a freelance journalist critical of the government, because: 1. there was no evidence of his claim to have worked as a journalist, in circumstances where the Tribunal considered it was reasonable to expect that there would be some evidence of his work, which he claimed had occurred over a period of eight years (1998 to 2005) in Nigeria as a TV and radio co-host, and as a freelance journalist in Asia for four years (from 2005);[57] 2. of inconsistencies in the dates that he said that he worked for ITV Benin;[58] 3. of a claim that he mediated and documented efforts to resolve the crisis following the arrest of the leader of the NDPVF whilst at ITV Benin, but which events occurred in September 2005, by which time the applicant had left Nigeria and was allegedly working as a freelance journalist in India;[59] and 4. of an inconsistency between the applicant's claim to have been working as a freelance journalist between 2003 and 2005 and the information provided in his protection visa application which indicated that he was working as: 1. a PA for a firm named Owah Unic from February 2003 to April 2003; and 2. an officer of a brewery, Juphil and Co, from June 2003 to April 2005.[60]
2. The Tribunal found that the applicant was not a co-host for ITV Benin or a freelance journalist, and therefore not a member of the particular social group of journalists in Nigeria. On the basis of the evidence referred to above, and considered by the Tribunal, this was a finding of fact open to the Tribunal. It does not disclose any jurisdictional error, and is not a finding which can be reviewed by this Court.
3. The Tribunal's finding that the applicant was not a journalist, at least whilst in Asia from 2005, was confirmed before the Court by the applicant who told the Court that "since leaving Nigeria" he was not able to "practise his profession."[61] A journalist is a person "who earns his [her] living by editing or writing for a public journal or journals."[62] In this case, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant any finding that the applicant is, or was, a journalist, or that he ever did, or endeavoured to, earn a living as a journalist at any relevant time.
4. The Tribunal also considered the applicant's claim to have been targeted by members of an organisation called The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.[63] The Tribunal noted in this regard:

1. that the applicant claimed he criticised MEND while co-host for ITV in the period from 1998 to 2001, but that: 1. independent country information indicated that MEND became active in September 2005 when the applicant was already in India;[64] and 2. the applicant's statutory declaration of 1 February 2009 "states that MEND came about in 2004/2005";[65] 2. conflicting evidence concerning MEND's alleged involvement in: 1. the death of a close friend of the applicant; and 2. the ransacking of the applicant's house;[66]

1. an email from a friend of the applicant dated 31 October 2008 referring to the members of MEND still looking to capture the applicant.[67]
2. On balance, and having regard to the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence concerning MEND, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant was not targeted by MEND in the past as a result of any criticism of that organisation, and that he would not be targeted in the future.[68] That was a factual finding which was open to the Tribunal on the available evidence. Again, it discloses no jurisdictional error, and is not a finding which this Court can review.
3. The Tribunal's reasons for decision show that it fully understood the nature of violence occurring in the Niger Delta region, but did not believe that the applicant was a likely target of that violence, and that there was not a real chance of his being persecuted because he had not been involved in activist movements and was not a journalist as he had claimed. These were findings that were open to be made by the Tribunal, and its fact findings to that effect are not matters which this Court can review. There is no jurisdictional error disclosed by Amended Ground 7, and it must fail.

1. In relation to Amended Ground 8 it is clear that the Tribunal did not fail, as the applicant claims it did, to understand that the applicant had already named the leader of NDPVF.[69] The amended ground is based on an incorrect factual premise, and therefore cannot succeed. Further, what seems to have concerned the Tribunal is the applicant's evasiveness when asked about the matter at the Tribunal hearing.[70] That is a matter which, in weighing the evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to have regard to. Amended Ground 8 therefore fails.

1. Amended Ground 9 claims that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant is a journalist. As indicated above,[71] the Tribunal considered the applicant's claim to be a journalist, and rejected it. That finding was, as also indicated above, open to the Tribunal on the evidence, and can not be reviewed by this Court. Amended Ground 9 must therefore fail.

1. Amended Ground 10 asserts that the Tribunal distorted the majority of the facts stated during the process of the oral interview (which presumably is a reference to the Tribunal hearing) as a consequence of the applicant's foreign accent. There is simply no evidence to support this ground. What facts were allegedly distorted have not been particularised, and there was no submission going to what facts were allegedly distorted. Further, although the applicant chose to play to the Court (and into the transcript) a short extract from the audio of the Tribunal hearing which he had downloaded onto his personal computer, that extract related solely to the safe third country issue. The applicant did not seek to play the remainder of the Tribunal hearing to the Court or to tender the audio record, or even a transcript, of the Tribunal hearing.[72] There is, therefore, no evidence to support the assertion made in Amended Ground 10. In the circumstances, Amended Ground 10 must fail.

1. Amended Ground 11, and Further Amended Ground G, assert that the Tribunal erred because it did not understand that the applicant was a broadcast journalist and not a print journalist.
2. It is manifestly apparent that the Tribunal understood that there was a claim by the applicant to be a broadcast journalist, in both TV and radio. The Tribunal referred to:
   1. the applicant's submission about the difference between print and electronic (i.e. TV and radio) journalists;[73] and
   2. the Tribunal's non-acceptance of the applicant's claim to have been a TV and radio co-host.[74]
3. The Tribunal observed that the applicant was unable to produce any evidence of his work as a journalist in Nigeria or elsewhere, and that it "would expect there to be some evidence of his work" as a journalist.[75] In the Court's view, the Tribunal's expectation of some evidence of the applicant being a journalist being able to be produced was validly held. Even electronic journalists are likely to leave evidence in their wake. It is apparent that the Tribunal understood the applicant's claim as to the nature of the journalism in which he said he was engaged. The absence of evidence was, correctly, a matter taken into account by the Tribunal in reaching its decision that the applicant was not a journalist. For reasons set out above, that is a factual finding which this Court can not review. Amended Ground 11 and Further Amended Ground G therefore fail.

1. Amended Ground 12 and Further Amended Ground H assert that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant has since arriving in Australia written and published two articles as a journalist, and therefore erred in its decision.
2. The two articles referred to are apparently copies of a formal letter of complaint to the Minister for Immigration published "on Perth Indy-Media newspaper online and CASE for Refugee Magazine online edition".[76]
3. Even if the applicant has worked as a journalist in Australia, that is irrelevant to his claim which is based on events said to have occurred overseas and prior to his arrival in Australia. Even if it were relevant, it can hardly be said, having regard to the definition of a journalist,[77] that the publication of a formal letter of complaint to the Minister for Immigration in two online publications is journalism, or makes the writer a journalist.
4. Amended Ground 12 and Further Amended Ground H therefore must fail.

1. Amended Ground 13 asserts that the Tribunal failed to understand that the delegate accepted that the applicant was a journalist, which the Tribunal failed to acknowledge.
2. The Amended Ground 13 overstates the position arrived at by the delegate. All that the delegate said in relation to the applicant's journalism was that:
   • "In late 2005 the applicant arrived in Asia to embark on freelance journalism activities."[78]
3. The delegate did not conclude that the applicant was a journalist, merely that he arrived at a particular place and was going to embark on freelance journalism activities.
4. Even if the delegate had found that the applicant was a journalist the Tribunal is not bound by the delegate's findings.[79] The Tribunal was entitled, and indeed obliged, to make its own findings. For reasons set out above the Tribunal was entitled to find that the applicant was not a journalist, and did so. In the circumstances, Amended Ground 13 must also fail.

1. Amended Ground 6 seeks to attack the Tribunal Decision. It is asserted that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant had exhausted all legal means to reside permanently in Singapore on the basis of the evidence submitted to the delegate.
2. Section 36(3) of the Migration Act provides as follows:
   • Australia is taken not to have protection obligations to a non-citizen who has not taken all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in, whether temporarily or permanently and however that right arose or is expressed, any country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a national.
3. The delegate found that:
   • "The applicant has in the past, and remains able to, renew his Visit Pass (Long Term) through the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority in Singapore. The applicant is able to reside in Singapore with his wife and child.
   • The applicant has a right to enter and reside in a safe third country (being Singapore).
   • Finding
   • I find that the applicant does have effective protection in a third country either under common law or s.36(3) of the Migration Act."[80]
4. It was on the basis of the above finding that the delegate determined that the applicant was not owed protection obligations for the purposes of s.36 of the Migration Act, and the criteria set out in clause 866.221 of the Migration Regulations had not been met. Consequently, a protection visa was refused.[81] The delegate did not therefore consider the applicant's claims concerning Nigeria.
5. The Tribunal noted the delegate's refusal to grant a protection visa to the applicant on the basis that he had a right to enter and reside in a safe third country.[82] The Tribunal reviewed the delegate's decision as to the safe third country issue, as follows:
   • 82. During the review stage the Tribunal wrote to DFAT in Singapore seeking advice about the status of Social Visit Passes. On 17 April 2009 DFAT informed the Tribunal in writing that if the applicant's pass had expired he would be required to apply for a further long term Social Visit Pass, as the spouse of a Singaporean Permanent Resident.
   • 83. The Full Federal Court has held that the term 'right' in s.36(3) refers to a legally enforceable right: MIMA v Applicant C (2001) FCR 154. Gummow J has suggested in obiter dicta that the 'right' referred to in s.36(3) is a right in the Hohfeldian sense, with a correlative duty of the relevant country, owed under its municipal law to the applicant personally, which must be shown to exist by acceptable evidence: see MIMIA v Al Khafaji [2004] HCA 38; (2004) 208 ALR 201 at [19[-[20].
   • 84. Whilst the applicant held a valid Singaporean visa at the time of the delegate's decision, his visa expired on 4 March 2009. Although the applicant may be able to attain another visa on the basis of his marriage to a Singaporean resident, he has not yet exercised that right; it is something that he would need to attain in the future. Therefore the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not, at the time of this decision, have a legally enforceable right to enter and reside in Singapore.
   • 85. Accordingly the Tribunal finds that s.36(3) does not apply to the applicant with respect to Singapore.[83]
6. It is plain from that part of the Tribunal Decision quoted above that the Tribunal did not fail to understand the applicant's position for the relevant purposes of s.36(3) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal found that the applicant had no present right to enter Singapore, and therefore s.36(3) did not apply. There was information available to the Tribunal, in the form of the 17 April 2009 letter from DFAT,[84] that the applicant was entitled to apply for a further long term Social Visit Pass to enter Singapore because his spouse was a permanent resident of Singapore. That was a right that he had not yet exercised, and because he had no present right, the Tribunal concluded, correctly, that s.36(3) of the Migration Act did not apply to the applicant. It was a finding that was open to the Tribunal. Amended Ground 6 misstates the position when it says that "the applicant has exhausted all legal means to reside permanently in Singapore". However, even if the factual position put by the applicant is correct, the effect is the same: s.36(3) would not apply to the applicant because he would have no right to enter Singapore. And, therefore, the delegate was wrong to find that the applicant was entitled to enter Singapore, and to refuse him a protection visa in reliance upon s.36(3) of the Migration Act. But, the Tribunal finding was correct, and discloses no error, let alone jurisdictional error.
7. At hearing before this Court, the applicant asserted that the Tribunal finding that s.36(3) of the Migration Act did not apply to him required the Tribunal to remit the matter to the delegate for a decision on the remainder of the protection visa application claim, that is, the matters related to Nigeria, and that there was jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's failure to do so.[85] Indeed, the applicant said that this was the "focal point" of his argument.[86] However, the Tribunal is not so confined. In SZBEL the High Court observed that:
   • "The Tribunal is not confined to whatever may have been the issues that the delegate considered. The issues that arise in relation to the decision are to be identified by the Tribunal."[87]
8. Such an approach, however, is contingent upon the Tribunal identifying the other issues which might be dispositive of the application.[88]
9. It is evident that the Tribunal has complied with the requirements established by SZBEL to put to the applicant those matters it considers might be dispositive of the application. Looking broadly at the Tribunal Decision it is clear that the Tribunal sought information about issues which might be dispositive of the application, including:

1. information concerning the NDPVF and its head;[89] 2. the applicant's involvement in the NDPVF;[90]

1. what was meant by 'electronic journalist';[91]

1. when MEND was founded;[92] 2. whether he was involved with NDPVF from 2000 to 2003, and whether anyone was leading NDPVF at that time;[93] 3. asking the applicant to describe the NDNVM;[94] 4. who Mr Asari was and what group he led;[95] 5. asking whether the applicant had become a target of MEND because of a specific incident or generally because he had been critical of their operations;[96] 6. how the applicant had documented and mediated efforts to help resolve the hostage crisis;[97] 7. seeking an explanation of the circumstances of his purported arrest and detention on two occasions;[98] 8. asking for details about a friend who was allegedly killed;[99]

1. whether there was a specific catalyst which made the applicant leave Nigeria in August 2005 or whether it was a number of things;[100]

1. why the applicant had returned to Nigeria twice from Asia since August 2005;[101] 2. whether the applicant had thought about moving to other parts of Nigeria and what his fears were if he returned to Nigeria now;[102] 3. what the current situation was in the Niger Delta;[103] and 4. if the applicant had published any articles or reports as a freelance journalist in Asia.[104]
2. The applicant was given an opportunity to respond to each of the issues put to him by the Tribunal, and on most occasions did respond, either orally or by way of subsequent written submission to the Tribunal.
3. That part of Amended Ground 6 which goes to an alleged failure by the Tribunal to understand the issue raised must therefore fail. It is apparent that the Tribunal understood the safe third country issue, decided it in the applicant's favour, and then went on to deal with, and put to the applicant, other issues that it considered might be dispositive of the application. The Tribunal was entitled to act in that manner and there was no jurisdictional error in this regard.[105]

1. Further Amended Grounds G and H are dealt with above.[106]

1. Further Amended Ground L alleges that the Tribunal failed to understand that the applicant had been in trauma since leaving Nigeria, whilst trying to settle in Asia, and before finally arriving in Australia. It is asserted that this trauma impacted upon him in relation to his recollection of events, and that there was no need to put evidence of trauma before the Tribunal because the Tribunal should have been aware that a person seeking asylum is a vulnerable person.[107]
2. The Trauma Letter was not before the Tribunal - indeed it was not obtained until eight days after this application was filed. It is therefore irrelevant to whether there is jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision. In any event, no conclusions concerning the symptoms cited and their connection with the applicant's alleged experiences in Nigeria can be drawn from the Trauma Letter (which is brief and reproduced above in its substantive totality)[108] because the Trauma Letter says nothing of the causes of the symptoms set out or for how long the applicant has had those symptoms. The Trauma Letter is therefore of no assistance to the Court in determining the relevant issue of alleged jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
3. No evidence has been led to support the assertion of suppression by the Tribunal of matters related to the alleged trauma, and the impact of the alleged suppression on the applicant's recall of events before the Tribunal. There is nothing in the very short Trauma Letter which suggests that the applicant has problems with his recall, or that he had them at the time of the Tribunal hearing. It is also noteworthy that the applicant took the Court to the audio of the Tribunal hearing in an attempt to make his argument on the safe third country issue. That the applicant did not take the Court to the audio of the Tribunal hearing in relation to the trauma issue entitles the Court to infer that it would not have assisted his case, and does not support the assertion of suppression of these matters by the Tribunal.
4. Nothing on the face of the Tribunal records speaks of, or indicates any, suppression by the Tribunal in relation to the applicant's alleged trauma. Rather, it appears that the Tribunal had regard to alleged "previous torture/inhumane experiences". Specifically, the Tribunal had regard to allegations that:

1. MEND issued threats to kill the applicant;[109] 2. the applicant's friend was killed by MEND;[110]

1. the applicant's home was ransacked by supporters of MEND;[111] and

1. the applicant was arrested and detained twice.[112]
2. The MEND allegations have been dealt with above: essentially MEND was not active until the applicant had left Nigeria, and the Tribunal accordingly did not believe the applicant's account of alleged harassment by MEND.[113] Those findings were, as indicated above, open to the Tribunal and are not open to review in this Court.
3. The Tribunal noted conflicting accounts from the applicant, of how his friend died,[114] and it appears that it did not accept that the applicant's friend was killed by MEND.[115] On the evidence, that was a finding that was open to the Tribunal and is not open to review in this Court.
4. The Tribunal also noted conflicting evidence concerning the ransacking of the applicant's house, and having regard to that evidence, refused to accept that his house was ransacked by MEND supporters. Again, on the evidence, that was a finding that was open to the Tribunal and is not open to review in this Court.
5. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's account of his arrest and detention. The Tribunal said the details were "vague and at times conflicting".[116] Further, the Tribunal detailed relevant vague reasons and inconsistencies, as the Tribunal saw it, in the applicant's evidence concerning the circumstance of his arrest. Coupled with the fact that the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was an activist as claimed, the Tribunal did not believe that the applicant had been arrested as he claimed.[117] Again, those findings, ultimately based on the credibility of the applicant's account, were open to the Tribunal to find as facts, and can not be reviewed by this Court.
6. Therefore, the Tribunal did not ignore the alleged events, but rather, made factual findings based upon the applicant's credibility, that the alleged events did not occur. It follows, therefore, that the applicant could not have been traumatised by them.
7. It was not for the Tribunal to assume that these events occurred, as the applicant suggested in his submissions. The applicant was required to satisfy the Tribunal that they had occurred, or at least, satisfy the Tribunal to a sufficient degree to enable it to make findings in favour of the applicant. The applicant did not do so.
8. In this case, there was no evidence of the alleged trauma. Even if there had been the applicant did not, in this respect, provide to, or put before the Tribunal the claim he now makes. The Tribunal was not obliged to make the applicant's case for him, and the relevant claims had to be detailed by the applicant.[118] To the extent that the applicant asserts that the Tribunal ought to have known or ought to have been aware of the alleged trauma, either generally because the applicant was an asylum seeker, or specifically in the circumstances of this case, that submission is misconceived in law,[119] and, for reasons set out above, fails in fact.[120] No jurisdictional error in respect of the Tribunal's factual findings arises on this issue.
9. Further Amended Ground L must therefore fail.

1. The applicant argued that the Tribunal erred because it failed to assess credit in accordance with:
   1. what it said were UNHCR "guidelines"; and
   2. the Tribunal's own guidelines on assessment of credibility.
2. The UNHCR "guidelines" relied upon by the applicant are administrative comments made by the UNHCR on the proposed introduction in Australia of a complimentary visa protection model.[121] They are not part of the law to be applied here. Further, as the comments relate to the Complementary Protection Bill which was not law at the time of the Tribunal's decision, and is not yet law,[122] it is not necessary to consider those comments further for the purposes of these reasons for judgment.
3. The applicant also relied upon a document prepared by the Tribunal entitled "Guidance on the Assessment of Credibility".[123] The Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines provide "general guidance",[124] and do not appear to have any legal status. They were "inspired by comments and suggestions from migration practitioners",[125] and express the hope that "the contents ... will be well understood and made use of by Members, Applicants and representatives."[126] An overall reading of the Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines reveals that, generally, it contains a number of statements which are broadly reflective of the law as it has been established by the Courts. However, it remains the case that credibility is to be assessed by the Tribunal in each case having regard to the evidence given in that case, and in accordance with principles established by decisions of the federal courts. That is what the Tribunal did in this case.
4. In relation to the assessment of credibility in SZJEH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,[127] the Federal Court said that:
   1. "disagreement with findings of fact made by a Tribunal does not support a contention that the Tribunal failed to consider the evidence properly or fairly";[128] and
   2. "it is well established that findings of credit are a matter for the Tribunal and absent some error going to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the decision of the Tribunal is not open to judicial review".[129]
5. As is often said "[c]redibility findings are a matter par excellence for the Tribunal".[130] The Tribunal is not required to hold a positive state of disbelief before making credibility findings.[131]
6. Ultimately, many of the Tribunal's findings were based on the applicant's lack of credibility.
7. In this case the Tribunal concluded that there were many inconsistencies in the evidence of the applicant which affected his credibility.[132] Many of these inconsistencies were not "minor discrepancies" warranting a lack of weight or further consideration in the protection visa application context.[133] Rather, they were significant inconsistencies, such as:

1. the applicant's statement that he joined NDPVF in 1994, when country information indicated that it was not formed until around 2003; 2. the applicant's claim to have been involved in a hostage crisis in Nigeria at a time when he had left the country, and his subsequent claim to have then been involved in mediation of that crisis by email from India;

1. the applicant's claim to have been involved with the NDNVM which was not formed until 2008, three years after the applicant left Nigeria; and

1. the applicant's claim to have been working as a journalist when he was working as a PA and brewery officer, and the almost complete lack of evidence that he worked as a journalist.

Such significant inconsistencies, together with other more minor inconsistencies found by the Tribunal, entitled the Tribunal to make the findings of fact that it did make about the applicant's credibility.

1. In SZNOX the Federal Court observed as follows:
   • It is generally understood that the primary decision-maker in considering an application such as that made by the appellant, and the Tribunal on an administrative review application, is not obliged to consider whether the applicant has discharged some onus of proof: Yao-Jing Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 289; (1997) 74 FCR 275. Rather it is for the applicant to provide evidence and argument sufficient to enable the decision-maker to establish the relevant facts: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Lat [2006] FCAFC 61. The decision-maker is not required to make out the applicant's case for him or her: Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155. There is then no obligation, or onus that governs the Tribunal's decision-making such that it may only make findings where it has no doubt, or that it must give the applicant "the benefit of the doubt" when making findings. In some situations, however, as in Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437, an applicant may be entitled to the benefit of the doubt, for example, where they are generally credible but unable to substantiate all of their claims. The question of "doubt" may also be considered relevant in some other decision-making contexts, as discussed in Minister for Immigration and Indigenous Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220.
   • In Rajalingam, at [67], Sackville J explained, by reference to such cases as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259, the circumstances in which the Tribunal might need to take account of doubt, in the following terms:
     • [67] In general, however, the question of whether the RRT should have considered the possibility that its findings of fact might not have been correct is to be determined by reference to the RRT's own reasons. If a fair reading of the reasons as a whole shows that the RRT itself had "no real doubt" (to use the language in Guo claimed events had not occurred, there is no warrant for holding that it should have considered the possibility that its findings were wrong. Reasonable speculation as to whether the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution does not require a possibility inconsistent with the RRT's own findings to be pursued. A "fair reading" of the reasons incorporates the principle that the RRT's reasons should receive a "beneficial construction" and should not be "construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": Wu Shan Liang at 271-272, quoting Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287. Only if a fair reading of the reasons allows the conclusion that the RRT had a real doubt that its findings on material questions of fact were correct, might error be revealed by the RRT's failure to take account of the possibility that the alleged events might have occurred (or the possibility that an event said not to have occurred did not in fact occur). If the fair reading allows of such a conclusion, the failure to consider the possibilities might demonstrate that the RRT had not undertaken the required speculation about the chances of future persecution.[134]
2. In this case the Tribunal did not entertain any real doubt as to its conclusions on material questions of fact. A fair reading of those reasons indicates that the findings made, and especially those as to credibility, were open to the Tribunal.

1. The Tribunal considered the ultimate question of satisfaction: namely, whether it was satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal considered the ultimate question in proper form, having regard to:

1. the prescribed criteria; 2. sections 36(2) and 65(1) of the Migration Act and Clause 866 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations;

1. that element of the definition of "refugee" as to whether there was a well-founded fear based on a "real chance" of persecution for a Convention reason.[135]
2. The Tribunal considered the applicant's claims based on all of the information available, and in particular the written and oral testimony, and written submissions, of the applicant. The Tribunal's failure to be satisfied that the facts required to be established to satisfy the criteria for the grant of the protection visa had been established was based on:
   1. factual findings from information provided by the applicant, and country information referred to by the Tribunal; and
   2. a belief that the applicant had not been truthful in a number of his claims,

the latter being a factual finding as to credibility. The above findings do not amount to a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal was therefore entitled to reject the applicant's claims. In the absence of jurisdictional error it is not the task of this Court to review the merits of the Tribunal Decision.[136]

1. In the circumstances, it is clear that the Tribunal was not able to reach that level of satisfaction necessary to grant the applicant a protection visa.[137] It was for the applicant to establish his case to the satisfaction of the Tribunal,[138] and in this case, the applicant failed to do so, in circumstances where the Tribunal, on the evidence available to this Court, comprehensively reviewed the facts and made findings in respect of each issue. The Tribunal's findings revealed no jurisdictional error, and it is not the task of this Court to review the merits of the Tribunal Decision. Each of the Original Grounds, Amended Grounds and Further Amended Grounds fail for the reasons set out above.
2. The applicant has therefore failed to establish that there is any, or any sufficient, merit in his application which would warrant a finding that it had some prospect of success. In the Court's view, the applicant's substantive application has, on a broad assessment, no prospects of success.

1. A mere absence of prejudice would not be sufficient of itself to justify the grant of an extension of time.[139] However, in this case, there is prejudice to the first respondent. The prejudice to the first respondent in granting an extension of time is that identified in SZMFJ, namely "the burden and cost of additional litigation in circumstances where there is a lack of merit in the substantive application."[140]

1. The rejection of the extension of time application will no doubt have a significant impact upon the applicant. It will probably mean that at some point in time he will be required to leave Australia, and possibly return to Nigeria. However, given the findings of the Tribunal, there is nothing to suggest that there would be adverse consequences for the applicant in any return to Nigeria. Therefore, there would be no adverse impact on the applicant if the extension of time application were not to be granted.

1. This Court has observed that:
   • "The interests of the Australian public at large would plainly not be served with the refoulment of a refugee to a country of claimed persecution."[141]
2. But, as in SZMFJ where that observation was made, this is not the case here. The Tribunal, on the basis of findings that were open to it on the evidence and information before it, has found that the applicant is not a refugee. There is otherwise nothing in the applicant's circumstances which, in the Court's view, would excite the interests of the public at large. However, the interests of the public at large might be said to be affected by the grant of an extension of time in circumstances where the Court has found that the substantive application lacks merit. It cannot be said to be in the interests of the public at large for this Court to embark upon a merit hearing of an application which, even on the broad assessment required for the purposes of an extension of time application, has been found to have no merit. Furthermore, that rationale is supported by the objects of the FM Act and the FMC Rules which, for relevant purposes, have been summarised by this Court as follows:
   • "21. Reading together the objects of the FM Act in s.3, the mode of operation in s.42, and having regard to the objects of the FMCA Rules in r.1.03, it is apparent that the Court is intended to operate in a manner:
     • (a) as informal as possible in the exercise of judicial power;
     • (b) which is not protracted in its proceedings;
     • (c) which resolves proceedings justly, efficiently and economically;
     • (d) uses streamlined procedures; and
     • (e) avoids undue delay, expense and technicality."[142]
3. Delay, expense and protraction of the proceedings would be the result of an extension of time, and those outcomes are not in the interests of the public at large where the substantive application has no merit.

1. The exercise of the Court's discretion requires the Court to look objectively at the various factors and balance them, but does not require the Court, absent statutory direction, to give equal weight to all of the factors to be considered in the exercise of the discretion.[143] In this case, the applicant has an acceptable reason for the delay in filing the application. However, that is the only factor which weighs directly in his favour. Other factors weigh against him: such as prejudice to the respondents and the interests of the public at large. The most significant factor weighing against the applicant is that the Court has found that the substantive application has no prospect of success. In the circumstances, the exercise of the Court's discretion to extend time would therefore be an exercise in futility and the Court has come to the view that it ought not exercise its discretion so as to grant an extension of time.

1. In his written submissions in relation to Amended Ground 7 the applicant has asserted that the Tribunal "could not hide its reasonable apprehension of bias against the applicant."[144] The assertion is not directly particularised, but the submission goes on to say:
   1. that if there was adequate proof through country information, that should have solved the matter and any other findings by the Tribunal could constitute an error of judgment; and
   2. that the fact that the Tribunal accepted that there was adequate proof of certain militants operating in the Niger Delta meant "It should realise too on the basis of probability that the applicant may suffer such fate."[145]
2. In the final paragraph of the applicant's written submissions he says that "clear injustice and jurisdictional error has occurred" because the matter was not remitted and that there was "inconsistencies in interpretation of the audio tapes, suppressing the vital part of the applicant's position, acknowledging country information and rejecting the status of the applicant purely on the basis of bias without foundation.". The grounds of the application were not amended to include the allegation of bias, but the first respondent did respond to it, and the Court will consider the issue.
3. It is not apparent whether the allegations are meant to encompass actual bias in addition to the express reference to reasonable apprehension of bias.
4. To prove actual bias on the part of the Tribunal requires evidence of a state of mind such that the Tribunal is so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.[146] A reasonable apprehension of bias requires a reasonable apprehension of such prejudgment.[147]
5. The Tribunal Decision does not demonstrate prejudgment, nor does it give rise to reasonable apprehension of prejudgment. The fact that the Tribunal was prepared to reverse the delegate's finding with respect to the safe third country issue clearly demonstrates a lack of bias. Further, the Tribunal's detailed questioning of the applicant demonstrates that the Tribunal gave the applicant every opportunity to persuade the Tribunal (to the requisite degree of satisfaction) that he had a well founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. There is no evidence of pre-judgment. The fact that the applicant was unable to do so does not amount to bias. The applicant's allegation of bias has not been made out.

1. The Court has concluded that it ought not exercise its discretion to extend time for the filing of the application, primarily because the merits of the application are such that it does not have any prospect of success.
2. It follows from the above conclusion that the applicant's application for an extension of time in which to file the application must be dismissed. The application must therefore also be dismissed.
3. The Court will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding 120120one hundred120120twentyeighty-eightone hundred and twenty (120) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Lucev FM

[1] "Migration Act".

[3] "Tribunal Decision"; Court Book ("CB") 256-281.

[10] Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s.3(2)(a) and (b); see also s.42; Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth), r.1.03(1), (2) and (4).

[13] 30 September Affidavit, para.K referring to annexure B to that affidavit.

[16] "Complimentary Protection Bill".

[17] Senate, Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Report on Migration Amendment (Complimentary Protection) Bill 2009, October 2009, paras.1.1 and 1.2.

[19] Migration Act, s.477(2)(a).

[20] Migration Act, s.477(2)(b).

[21] [2006] FMCA 1507 ("Genovese").

[22] Genovese at paras.24-26 and 28 per Lucev FM; see also Young & Ors v The Neil Jenman Group Pty Ltd & Anor [2009] FMCA 947 at para.62 per Barnes FM.

[23] [2009] FMCA 771 ("SZMFJ").

[24] SZMFJ at para.44 per Nicholls FM.

[25] SZMFJ at para.76 per Nicholls FM; WZANX v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 1010 at para.13 per Lucev FM where the Court observed, in refusing an application for extension of time, that there was "a long delay, more than twice the specified statutory period".

[27] Christie v Harvey & Hayward (1900) 2 WALR 146 at 150 per Hensman J: "...it is very hard that a party should suffer because of the blunder of a solicitor, his clerk, or of counsel"; Sophron v Nominal Defendant [1957] HCA 27; (1957) 96 CLR 469 at 474 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Fullagar and Taylor JJ: "No one, of course, doubts that such a consideration as the blamelessness of the claimant and the responsibility of his solicitor is very material", although (at 474-475) the High Court said that there is no fixed rule to that effect and every case must be determined on its merits; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 351 per Wilcox J: "It would be erroneous to treat the fault of the solicitors as if it were the direct default of the client" ("Hunter Valley Developments").

[28] WAJU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCA 150 at para.18 per Moore J; an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court from this judgment was refused: WAJU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCATrans 282; SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797 at para.33 per Barker J.

[29] Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 521 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J; [1998] HCA 27 at para.7 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J ("Jackamarra").

[30] Jackamarra CLR at 540 per Kirby J; HCA at para.66 per Kirby J.

[31] Jackamarra CLR at 519 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J and 540 per Kirby J; HCA at para.3 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J and para.66 per Kirby J; each citing R v Secretary for the Home Department; ex parte Mehta [1975] 1 WLR 1087 at 1091 per Lord Denning MR; [1975] 2 All ER 1084 at 1088 per Lord Denning MR.

[32] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 at 506 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ; [2003] HCA 2 at para.76 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.

[33] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; [2001] HCA 30 at para.82 per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ; WZANI v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 129 at para.24 per Lucev FM; WZANI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 526 at paras.19-21 per Barker J ("WZANI - Federal Court").

[34] NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at para.10 per Gray, Tamberlin and Lander JJ: "Whatever be the boundaries of jurisdictional error, they do not comprehend errors of fact as to the merits of the case put to the Tribunal."; WZANI - Federal Court at para.23 per Barker J.

[35] WZANI - Federal Court at para.22 per Barker J and cases there cited.

[36] Migration Act, s.476; and see para.38 above and authorities there cited.

[37] "Migration Regulations".

[62] The Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Principles, 3rd Edn, Volume 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p.1138.

[65] CB 279. At CB 181 the Statutory Declaration refers to: "giving rise to the movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta MEND in 2004/2005": CB 181.

[72] The applicant had the audio CD of the Tribunal hearing: see para.11 above quoting from para.A of the 30 September Affidavit.

[79] SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152 at 163 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 63 at para.35 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ ("SZBEL").

[84] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

[86] Transcript at 8. See also Transcript at 18, and at 19: "The main issue was Singapore."

[87] SZBEL CLR at 163 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; [2006] HCA 63 at para.35 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; SZMFJ at para.153 per Nicholls FM.

[88] SZBEL CLR at 163 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.35 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

[104] CB 266. It might be noted the answer was that the applicant had not, although he had a blog and had contributed to Wikipedia it would appear that evidence did not necessarily assist him in persuading the Tribunal that he was in fact a journalist: as to which see para.52 above.

[105] SZBEL CLR at 163 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.35 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.

[106] See paras.59-61 and 62-65 above.

[118] Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 576 per Gummow and Hayne JJ; [1999] HCA 14 at para.187 per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1985] FCA 47; (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 170 per Wilcox J; SZNOX v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1233 at para.18 per Barker J ("SZNOX").

[119] See the cases referred to in the previous footnote.

[123] Exhibit 1; "Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines".

[124] Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines, para.1.1.

[125] Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines, para.1.2.

[126] Tribunal's Credibility Guidelines, para.10.2.

[127] [2007] FCA 1706 ("SZJEH").

[128] SZJEH at para.14 per Jacobson J.

[129] SZJEH at para.17 per Jacobson J.

[130] SZKHV & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2009] FMCA 264 at para.56 per Emmett FM, citing Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at 423 per McHugh J; [2000] HCA 1 at para.67 per McHugh J.

[131] Kopalapillai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1126; (1998) 86 FCR 547 at 559 per O'Connor, Branson and Marshall JJ.

[133] WAAI v MIMA [2002] FCA 293 at para.14 per Wilcox J; with whom Black CJ agreed (at para.1).

[134] SZNOX at paras.18-19 per Barker J_._

[136] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 274-275 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu & Anor (1999) 197 CLR 611 at 650-651 per Gummow J; [1999] HCA 21 at paras.128, 130 and 131 per Gummow J ("Eshetu"); SJSB v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 225 at para.15 per Ryan, Jacobson and Lander JJ; SZGZQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2007] FCA 62 at paras.13-14 per Greenwood J; SZJAO v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1102 at paras. 28-30 per Lucev FM; WZANI at paras.39 and 40 per Lucev FM.

[137] Migration Act, ss.36(2) and 65.

[138] SZBEL CLR at 164 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; HCA at para.40 per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ; SZMFJ at para.83 per Nicholls FM.

[139] Hunter Valley Developments at 349 per Wilcox J.

[140] SZMFJ at para.195 per Nicholls FM.

[141] SZMFJ at para.194 per Nicholls FM.

[142] Goodall v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2007] FMCA 218 at para.21 per Lucev FM.

[143] Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Cummins [2007] FMCA 1841 at para.47 per Lucev FM.

[144] Applicant's written submissions.

[145] Applicant's written submissions.

[146] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 at 532 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J; [2001] HCA 17 at para.72 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J.

[147] Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H [2001] HCA 28; (2001) 179 ALR 425 at 434 per Gleeson CJ; Gaudron and Gummow JJ; [2001] HCA 28 at para.27 per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ_._