[2020] AATA 326
General information, not legal advice.
Administrative Appeals Tribunal of Australia
2020-02-24
Original judgment source is linked above.
42. On 13 October 2017 the Applicant was convicted of Grievous bodily harm arising from an incident on 6 April 2016. The Applicant was at a nightclub and was bumped into a number of times by the victim. The Sentencing Judge, Stavrianou DCJ, described the circumstances of the offence as follows:[30]
..essentially it was a Wednesday, you were at this nightspot in Leederville. You were dancing and you were bumped into on a number of occasions by the other person the victim. That person walked away. Both you and the victim were under the influence of alcohol. You, in fact, told the police later that you'd consumed alcohol and also had had some prohibited drugs.
The victim and two of his friends were outside the club, they stood outside the front entrance in the car park area. You went up to them and a verbal argument began. You then struck the victim once to the jaw using your right fist. You used an uppercut motion. The victim fell backwards and regrettably struck the back of his head on the asphalt pavement. You then left the scene without providing any assistance...
The victim was taken to hospital after being put in the recovery position. Obviously the victim went by ambulance. As a result of the incident that person received a fractured skull, a fractured jaw and a subdural haematoma requiring medical attention.
44. In sentencing the Applicant to a term of imprisonment of three years and three months, his Honour took account of the Applicant's cooperation with police and guilty plea. His Honour noted that the victim's injuries "were of such a nature as to endanger or be likely to endanger the life of the complainant."[31] His Honour noted that it was a single act of violence on the Applicant's part but although it was a single punch, it was "a hard punch".[32] His Honour noted that the Applicant's reaction and conduct outside the club "was out of all proportion to what had occurred earlier on during the evening".[33] His Honour noted that a term of imprisonment was a last resort and considered a submission by the Applicant's Counsel that he should suspend any term of imprisonment. Notwithstanding this, his Honour held that a term of three years and three months was appropriate. His Honour considered that it was not appropriate to suspend the sentence having regard to "the nature, gravity and extent of ... [the Applicant's] offending".[34]
45. The Applicant submitted that there were mitigating factors. This included that:[35]
The applicant did not intend to cause the victim the injuries he sustained. The applicant struck the victim once, and did not attempt to carry on with the assault, [sic] the applicant left as soon as he hit the victim.
The Applicant submitted that the Sentencing Judge accepted that he had left the scene because he had "panicked" and that his full admissions and immediate signs of remorse show that he did not intend to inflict the injuries that the victim suffered.[36]
46. Further, the Applicant submitted that at the time of the offending he was under the influence of alcohol and illicit drugs. In addition he was not coping with a personal crisis in around 2013 [edited for publication].[37]
21 October 2007 where the Applicant was observed by police fighting with another male in which he threw punches.[38] He pled guilty to this offence and was sentenced to a fine of $500. 3. On 18 June 2008 the Applicant was convicted of Disorderly behaviour in a public place in relation to events which occurred on 14 June 2008. On that occasion a friend of the Applicant was fighting with another male (the victim) when the Applicant intervened punching the victim to his head and body.[39] When the victim was on his knees, the Applicant kicked the victim's head twice and the victim's body once. The Applicant pled guilty to this offence and was sentenced to a fine of $500. 4. On 20 November 2012 the Applicant was convicted of Possess a prohibited drug relating to an offence on 14 October 2012 when the Applicant was found with 0.3 g of methamphetamine.[40] The Applicant pled guilty to this offence and was sentenced to a fine of a thousand dollars. 5. On 30 July 2015 the Applicant was convicted of the offences of Disorderly behaviour in a public place and Obstructing public officials in relation to events which occurred on
31 May 2015. In this instance the Applicant approached the police aggressively while they were attempting to make an arrest.[41] He verbally abused the police. The Applicant pled guilty to this offence. He was sentenced to fines of $500 and $600 respectively.
Breach of court orders and offences against police
The issues of going behind or impugning the convictions
(1) Where a previous conviction is the foundation for the exercise of power by the decision-maker, no challenge can be made to the fact that the conviction (or sentence, as the case may be) or to the essential facts on which it was based, but the circumstances of the conviction may be reviewed for a purpose other than impugning the conviction itself.
(2) Where the exercise of the power is not founded on the conviction, then the essential facts underlying the conviction are not immune from challenge and the conviction is only conclusive of the fact of the conviction itself, albeit there is a heavy onus on the person seeking to challenge the facts upon which the conviction is necessarily based**.**
As a matter of policy, it would be highly undesirable if [the] Minister or the Tribunal exercising a decision-making power that is founded on an earlier decision of a criminal court could, in effect, challenge the propriety or correctness of that decision, or reopen findings on which the decision was necessarily based ... The adjudgment of guilt, and the determination of the punishment to be imposed as a consequence (including a sentence of imprisonment), fall within the central concept of judicial power. It is inconsistent with this principle at the heart of the separation of powers to suggest that an administrative decision-maker could come to a factual conclusion contrary to that of a court when making an adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt which is, in turn, the precondition to that administrative decision-maker's power.
[2000] FCA 1385; 106 FCR 313 (Ali) at [43] supported the proposition that the heavy onus an applicant faces in challenging the facts on which a conviction is based will be more easily met where the applicant pleads guilty to an offence. Her Honour limited those comments to a conviction and sentence upon which the power to deport is not based. Her Honour noted:
in my view, the Act should be construed as requiring a decision-maker under s 200 of the Act[48] to treat a conviction and sentence (not being the conviction and sentence upon which the power to deport is based) as strong prima facie evidence of the facts upon which they are necessarily based so as to throw a heavy onus on a person who seeks to challenge such facts to show why they should not be accepted: see Spackman at 635_. This heavy onus will, as a matter of logic, be more easily satisfied where the criminal conviction and sentence followed a plea of guilty than where the conviction and sentence follow a contested factual hearing._
(Emphasis added.)
First primary consideration: Protection of the Australian community (para 13(2)(a) of Direction No. 79)
(1) When considering protection of the Australian community, decision-makers should have regard to the principle that the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens. Remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on noncitizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community...
(2) Decision-makers should also give consideration to:
(a) The nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date; and
(b) The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
Nature and seriousness of the conduct (para 13.1(2)(a) of Direction No. 79)
His offences of drink driving and unlicensed driving clearly point to an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong and to otherwise conform to the rules of Australian society insofar as operation of a motor vehicle on a public road is concerned. The catastrophic potential of losing control of a motor vehicle as a result of being affected by alcohol and/or prohibited substances is the subject of constant campaigns by governments at all levels. 2. I have similar concerns about the Applicant's failure to realise the potential adverse impact arising from unlicensed driving. This Applicant (as is the case with virtually all drivers) knew or ought reasonably to have known the potentially serious adverse consequences of unlicensed driving, or driving an unregistered/uninsured vehicle, for other road-users. Whilst no expert in the motor insurance industry, it is common knowledge that there are insurance implications for unlicensed drivers and/or drivers of unregistered/uninsured vehicles who become involved in motor vehicle accidents. Again, for the Applicant to ignore this obvious and serious consequence of his driving conduct demonstrates an incapacity to distinguish right from wrong and to otherwise conform to the insurance/registration regime of the Australian community as it relates to the ownership and operation of a motor vehicle.
The risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct (para 13.1(2)(b) of Direction No. 79)
(1) In considering the risk to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:
(a) The nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and
(b) The likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account available information and evidence on the risk of the non-citizen re-offending (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken).
The injuries, as appear from the medical evidence, were of such a nature as to endanger or be likely to endanger the life of the complainant.
Without medical treatment, the complainant's life would have been endangered by enlargement of the haematoma and the brainstem compression... the injuries were of such a nature as to cause or be likely to be cause permanent injury to health without medical treatment, the potential for permanent injuries, including hemiplegia, visual defects and neuro cognitive deficits, existed.
life-threatening physical injury to victims, as well as the potentially significant psychological and financial impacts which victims may suffer as the result of such injuries. Further risks include those associated with unlicensed driving including injuries to road users and the impacts on the good order and safety of the community caused by breaching court orders and obstructing police. 9. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the nature of harm that could result if the Applicant is to reoffend is very serious. 10. The Tribunal will now consider the likelihood of the Applicant reoffending if he were permitted to remain in the Australian community. [59] 11. In Stravrianou DCJ's Sentencing Remarks, His Honour noted that it could not be submitted that the Applicant had prior good character. His Honour made reference to a pre-sentence report which was not before the Tribunal. His Honour noted that the report observed that:[60]
[the Applicant] accepted responsibility for your offending and notes that you were aware you're most likely to receive a period of imprisonment for the current offence, and that demonstrates to me that you have insight, which is of considerable importance.
His Honour went on to note with respect to the report that:[61]
your previous compliance with community orders has been mixed but that you've not been the subject of an order since 2012.
Based on the current assessment [the Applicant] presents a high risk of general reoffending on the LS/RNR and a moderate risk of violent reoffending on the
VRS-SV. It is recommended that [the Applicant] complete the Medium Intensity Program to address his violent behaviour and substance use. [The Applciant] recognised his problem areas and expressed willingness to engage in treatment programs.
These reasons were in line with the Parole Assessment report which also noted the Applicant's good behaviour in prison and his immigration status.[71]
The Tribunal cannot, however, defer to the opinion of the PRB to the extent that the Tribunal fetters its own discretion. The Tribunal must undertake its own independent consideration of the Applicant's likelihood of reoffending, based on the merits of the Applicant's application before the Tribunal and the submissions and evidence before the Tribunal.
12 September 2018 to 5 February 2019). According to the Applicant's Program Completion Report, the aims of the program were:[76]
to gain a sound understanding of their general offending behaviour, recognise factors that contributed to their offending and develop a viable and manageable relapse prevention plan specific to their offending patterns and behaviour.
The report noted relevant factors of the Applicant's personal history including violent physical discipline by his step-father. The report notes that prior to the Grievous bodily harm offence his relationship broke down and he was "not in contact with his children'".[77] The report noted he had repaired his relationships since he was incarcerated.
showed emerging gains in ability to utilise adaptive coping skills to manage emotional regulation and interpersonal aggression ... made shifts in substance use goals and violence supportive beliefs, however remains in the contemplative stage. He articulated a desire to remain abstinent from substances on release, however at times maintained views permissive of substance use to manage stressors.
demonstrated insight into potential high-risk areas and recognised strategies to mitigate risks, however his ability to utilise these skills will be dependent on his emotional regulation.
[The Applicant] could not identify any other factors (other than alcohol) to explain the violence and therefore, appears to be seeking to deflect responsibility for his own violent behaviour.[84]
The report noted that the Applicant had indicated a number of instances of types of violence including:
being verbally aggressive, grabbing his partner; twisting her arm, pulling her hair, pushing her to the ground, throwing food and objects, threatening to destroy her property and breaking down a door.
The report noted that Mr Gage did not take direct responsibility for the act of violence against his then wife. The report notes the conclusion that:
Mr Gage uses his drunkenness as an explanation or a form of deflection of responsibility for his own violent behaviour.
It is anticipated that engaging in therapeutic interventions in relation to both Domestic Violence and Alcohol and other Drug Use, that [the Applicant] may well gain the insight and skills to meet his goals of gaining assistance to "Help [learn] how to deal with my emotions [and] how to react better to situations" and thereby reduce the chances or severity of offending behaviour in the future.
Towards his exit from the program [the Applicant] started to talk about circumstances and issues in his relationships which alerted facilitators to the fact he was using entitlement and ownership as a form of power and control. This mind-set relates strongly to his use of violence in the [Assault in circumstances of aggravation] offence.
The report recommended that the Applicant complete a men's domestic violence program or individual counselling in order to address issues of "entitlement and ownership". There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Applicant has completed a men's domestic violence program. There is evidence he has undertaken some individual counselling sessions in prison. However, it does not appear from the records of these sessions that they were to address domestic violence concerns or "entitlement and ownership" and concerns were expressed in the reports of those two sessions regarding his motivation for seeking treatment.[88]
the Applicant with supports on his release, these do not appear to be formal treatment programs and that they would depend on the Applicant's level of willingness to engage voluntarily with them. While the Applicant expressed a willingness to do so, he has been unsuccessful in completing at least one community based program in the past (the Relationships Australia Men's Domestic Violence Program) creating a concern about his commitment to attending programs of his own volition once back in the community. 8. Further, the Applicant clearly has strong family and social support on offer in the community. The Respondent submitted, and the Tribunal accepts, that this support was present in the past and did not prevent the Applicant from offending. Notwithstanding this the Tribunal accepts that the presence of a strong pro-social network may act as a support to the Applicant in maintaining a commitment not to reoffend and places weight on the level of family and community support demonstrated on the evidence before it. 9. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant is remorseful and has committed to not reoffending. The Tribunal acknowledges the commitment to rehabilitation the Applicant has made whilst in prison and detention. Those are very positive signs. 10. While the Applicant largely accepted the factual accounts of his offences put to him at the hearing and stressed that he accepted responsibility for his offending, there was information in both the Domestic Violence program material and in the Medium Intensity Program that suggested the Applicant has a tendency to minimise the seriousness of his offending or his culpability, particularly blaming his offending on intoxication and provocation. In the Tribunals' view, this material suggests a level of minimisation of his offending consistent with a lack of insight into at least some aspects of his offending. This gives rise to a concern regard the risk of re-offending. It remains the case that the Applicant has not completed a treatment for domestic violence offending and while he has attended voluntary meetings and programs which touch on substance abuse he has not undertaken a formal treatment program specifically to address substance abuse and did not appear to have a plan to do so in the future. It was unclear what plan he had in place to address substance abuse noting that his current commitment to not using illicit drugs or consuming alcohol is untested in the community. The Corrective Services parole notes indicate in a section considering the identified need of "substance use and emotional regulation" that the Applicant "expressed a desire to drink alcohol and claims it has never been a big problem". This is consistent with concerns raised in the Medium Intensity Program report. It is further reported that the Applicant "was resistant to possibly having to engage with a private psychologist and pay for this service."[95] 11. In the Tribunal's view, reports of minimisation of his offending suggests the Applicant lacks insight into some aspects of his offending, particularly the domestic violence offending, and that this contributes to a risk of reoffending. Further, there is evidence that the Applicant has not undertaken treatment to deal specifically with domestic violence offending and does not have a sufficient plan in place to deal with substance abuse. Accordingly, these remain a risk in terms of the Applicant's likelihood of reoffending. However, the Tribunal also accepts that the Applicant: is committed to maintaining a strong relationship with his children; has the support of his ex-wife, close friends and family; and has shown himself to be prepared to undertake rehabilitation. These are protective factors which may be said to reduce the risk of reoffending. 12. On any approach it must be said that all the assessments before the Tribunal acknowledge that the Applicant presents a risk of reoffending. At its highest that risk is expressed as a medium risk of general offending. The Tribunal considers that this represents his risk of offending generally, including for domestic violence offences. The Tribunal acknowledges, however, that the Applicant has since spent time in immigration detention and appears to have focused during that time on both the prospects of removal and strategies he can put in place to reduce the risk of reoffending such that he can avoid removal now, or in the future. In this regard the Tribunal found the Applicant's desire to reform for the sake of his children to be genuine. In the Tribunal's view, if the Applicant maintains this commitment, abstains from substance use (including alcohol) and engages in the counselling and other supports which have been offered to him through his support network his risk of reoffending would continue to drop into the medium to low range. In this regard the Tribunal notes that the Applicant would remain on parole for around another 11 months following the delivery of the Tribunal's decision. This affords the community an opportunity to monitor his commitment to abstinence and non-offending and for authorities to engage with him on counselling and other needs. The Tribunal places weigh on this as a mechanism for reducing the risk of reoffending in the short term. However, while the need for ongoing counselling or treatment has been identified as a need, there was a lack of evidence before the Tribunal of a plan for such treatment, including in the context of parole. Further, the Applicant's previous failure to complete treatment in the community even when subject to court orders and supervision causes a concern regarding his commitment to follow through on treatment where he is not compelled to do so. 13. Based on the above discussion, the Tribunal finds that there is a likelihood of the Applicant reoffending, should he be given a further chance to be released back into the Australian community. Based on the comments of the Sentencing Judge, the parole information and the material before the Tribunal, the Tribunal finds the Applicant's risk of reoffending to be moderate or medium. 14. With regard to paragraph 6.3(4) of Direction No. 79, the Tribunal finds that the circumstances of the Applicant's offending and the serious nature of the harm that can result to victims of this type of offending, mean that even a moderate or medium likelihood of reoffending in the future may be unacceptable. On balance, the Tribunal finds that this consideration weighs against the revocation of the cancellation of the Applicant's visa.
Second primary consideration: The best interests of minor children in Australia (paragraph 13(2)(b) of Direction No. 79)
(1) Decision-makers must make a determination about whether revocation is in the best interests of the child.
(2) This consideration applies only if the child is, or would be, under 18 years old at the time when the decision to revoke or not revoke the mandatory cancellation decision is expected to be made.
(3) If there are two or more relevant children, the best interests of each child should be given individual consideration to the extent that their interests may differ.
decision-maker must consider when determining the best interests of the child:
(4) In considering the best interests of the child, the following factors must be considered where relevant:
(a) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen. Less weight should generally be given where the relationship is non-parental, and/or there is no existing relationship and/or there have been long periods of absence, or limited meaningful contact (including whether an existing Court order restricts contact);
(b) The extent to which the non-citizen is likely to play a positive parental role in the future taking into account the length of time until the child turns 18, and including any Court orders relating to parental access and care arrangements;
(c) The impact of the non-citizen's prior conduct, and any likely future conduct, and whether that conduct has, or will have a negative impact on the child;
(d) The likely effect that any separation from the non-citizen would have on the child, taking into account the child's or non-citizen's ability to maintain contact in other ways;
(e) Whether there are other persons who already fulfil a parental role in relation to the child;
(f) Any known views of the child (with those views being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child);
(g) Evidence that the non-citizen has abused or neglected the child in any way, including physical, sexual and/or mental abuse or neglect; and
(h) Evidence that the child has suffered or experienced any physical or emotional trauma arising from the non-citizen's conduct.
Third primary consideration: Expectations of the Australian community (paragraph 13(2)(c) of Direction No. 79)
The Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is an unacceptable risk that they will breach this trust, or where the non-citizen has been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere, it may be appropriate to not revoke the mandatory visa cancellation of such a person. Non-revocation may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences are such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not hold a visa. Decision-makers should have due regard to the Government's views in this respect.
The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they commit serious crimes in Australia or elsewhere.
A non-citizen who has committed a serious crime, including of a violent or sexual nature, and particularly against women or children or vulnerable members of the community such as the elderly or disabled, should generally expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.
he does not believe that, although his offending was serious, that the community would feel the need to remove him from the country he and his family call home, and separate his whole family unit, as a direct result of the removal process.
The Applicant accepted this consideration must weigh against revocation but submitted that it was outweighed by the best interests of his children, his low risk of reoffending and other considerations.
To the extent that cl 11.3 contains a statement of the expectations of the Australian community, the clause is "deeming", in the sense explained by Mortimer J... It is not for the decision-maker to make his or her own assessment of the community expectations and to give that assessment weight as a "primary consideration"... For my part, I prefer to describe the clause as imputing or ascribing to the whole of the Australian community an expectation that wholly aligns with the expectation of the executive government of the day in respect of its subject matter.
... the government of the day may wish to set the norms by which decisions to refuse or cancel visas are made. Where those norms are expressed, at least in part, as reflecting "community expectations" then, in that sense, they might accurately be understood as "deeming" what the community expectations are. That is because, as indicated, as a matter of practical reality there is no one or even necessarily dominant set of community expectations in this field.
...
The above contextual factors lead to two guiding considerations to the proper construction of Direction 65_._ First_, "community expectations" as expressed normatively are what the Government says they are, even though in actual fact if they were ascertainable community expectations might be quite different._ Second_, "community expectations" as expressed by the Government do not speak to the outcome of any particular case - they are to be understood and applied normatively._
(Original emphasis.)
decision-maker's exercise of discretion. It follows that the ultimate decision may differ from community expectations. Community expectations are merely one of the three primary considerations to be taken into account. Further, both majority Justices note that if a decision-maker were to take account of every factor relevant to the decision to inform the content of community expectations this would render the process of weighing those other factors together with and against community expectations to be unworkable.[154] 2. Justice Charlesworth notes that it is necessary to determine the content of the deemed expectation not by reference to some factual inquiry but by reference to the paragraph itself (at [68]). The task of the decision-maker is to identify the Government's view of community expectations and to have due regard to it (at [74]). Her Honour notes that the paragraph (at [73]):
does not purport to preclude the decision-maker from reaching his or her own view as to whether the non-citizen should or should not be granted a visa, as the decision-maker must necessarily do ... The clause implicitly recognises that the decision-maker's assessment as to whether or not a visa should be granted may differ from the expectations of the Australian community, as the government has deemed those expectations to be.
should be understood as expressing a deemed community expectation that all persons who have committed serious criminal offences giving rise to character concerns should have their visas applications refused. The nature of the character test is such that the deemed expectation will arise in most if not all cases falling for consideration...
...
The Tribunal must in all cases determine whether it is appropriate to refuse to grant the visa. In an appropriate case, the Tribunal may make a decision that does not give effect to community expectations as the government has assessed them to be. In such cases, the decision-maker would depart from the relative ascription of weight for which cl 8(4) "generally" provides, as he or she is permitted to do.
Understood in this way, community expectations are simply, and informally, expressed as follows: "If you break the law it will be held against you, the more serious the breach the more it will be held against you, and it may even be decisive."
Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by people who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct in relation to a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
(1) In deciding whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa, other considerations must be taken into account where relevant. These considerations include (but are not limited to):
(a) International non-refoulement obligations;
(b) Strength, nature and duration of ties;
(c) Impact on Australian business interests;
(d) Impact on victims;
(e) Extent of impediments if removed.
The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia. Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to:
(a) How long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non-citizen arrived as a young child, noting that:
(i) less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; and
(ii) More weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community.
(b) The strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia, including the effect of nonrevocation on the non-citizen's immediate family in Australia (where those family members are Australian citizens, permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely).
Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by people who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time. However, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct in relation to a non-citizen who has lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
The length of time a non-citizen has been making a positive contribution to the Australian community, and the consequences of a visa refusal or cancellation for minor children and other immediate family members in Australia, are considerations in the context of determining whether that non-citizen's visa should be cancelled, or their visa application refused.
Impact on Australian business interests of the non-citizen's visa cancellation is not revoked, noting that an employment link would generally only be given weight where non-revocation would significantly compromise the delivery of a major project, or delivery of an important service in Australia.
were in the process of getting a patent for the revolutionary new water safety product we both have invented that will save countless Australian lives yearly...
He noted that if the Applicant were deported it would be too hard to achieve the product's potential. While the Tribunal accepts the Applicant may have been working on a project with Mr Freeman he did not offer any further evidence regarding the device or mention it in his evidence or submissions. In such circumstances, on the evidence available the Tribunal is unable to find that non-revocation would compromise the delivery of a major project, or delivery of an important service in Australia.
Impact of a decision not to revoke on members of the Australian community, including victims of the non-citizen's criminal behaviour, and the family members of the victim or victims where that information is available and the non-citizen being considered for revocation has been afforded procedural fairness.
The extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account:
(a) The non-citizen's age and health;
(b) Whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and
(c) Any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country.
(3) Both primary and other considerations may weigh in favour of, or against, refusal, cancellation of the visa, or whether or not to revoke a mandatory cancellation of a visa.
(4) Primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.
(5) One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations.
29 November 2019 not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of the Applicant's visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 251 (two hundred and fifty-one) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Member S Burford
......[sgd]..................................................................
[5] R2, G3, pages 9-13; R2, G8, page 47.
[14] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Reg 2.55(5).
[16] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, Direction No. 65 - Migration Act 1958 - Direction under section 499: Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s501CA (22 December 2014).
[27] The Statement of Material Facts contained conflicting dates for this event which the parties both submitted occurred on New Year's Eve 2010. The statement refers to the event occurring on 31 December 2011 however this appears to be a typographical error.
[44] See HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202, per McKerracher J at [77]). See also the survey of Bromberg J HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1803 and consideration of the issues by this Tribunal in Rehman and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 4424 (31 October 2019) and Toki and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 742 (17 April 2019)
[45] Upheld on appeal in HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202.
[46] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele (1981) 39 ALR 649; Minister for Ethnic Affairs v Gungor [1982] FCA 99; (1982) 42 ALR 209; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385; (2000) 106 FCR 313; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v SRT [1999] FCA 1197; (1999) 91 FCR 234; Degerli v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1981] FCA 250 (23 December 1981); Beckner v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1991] FCA 264; (1991) 30 FCR 49; Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155.
[47] Noting in particular the principles espoused by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Secretary to the Department of Justice and Regulation v LLF [2018] VSCA 155.
[48] Her Honour was considering an earlier version of the Act, however as s 200 was a precursor to s 501 her comments are equally applicable to the current application.
[50] Para 13.1.1(1)(e) of Direction No. 79.
[51] Para 13.1.1(1)(f) of Direction No. 79.
[52] Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VSCA 213; (2013) 41 VR 359 cited with approval by Mortimer J in Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424, 444 [95], as well as Gilmour J in WAD 230/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 705; (2015) 148 ALD 117, 124[42]-[43]. See also Senior Member Evans in CZCV and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 91 at [56].
[58] See XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 2385; QGMJ and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1537; QSBL and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 2074 at [59]; and ZTGP and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 3518 at [99].
[59] Para 13.1.2(1)(b) of Direction No. 79.
[73] The Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA) at s 5B provides that the Board "must regard the safety of the community as the paramount consideration".
[102] Para 13.2(4)(a) of Direction No. 79.
[105] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(e).
[106] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(c).
[107] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(b).
[108] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(d).
[109] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(g).
[110] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(h).
[111] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(f).
[114] For example the statement of his mother at A11.
[115] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(f).
[116] For example the statement of his mother at A11
[120] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(b).
[121] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(c).
[122] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(d).
[123] Direction No. 79, paragraph 13.2(4)(e).
[124] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(f).
[125] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(g).
[126] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(h).
[128] A4; Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(f).
[129] A25; R2, G17, page 97: Transcript, pages 45-48.
[131] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(a).
[132] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(b).
[133] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(c).
[134] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(d).
[135] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(e).
[136] Direction No. 79, paras 13.2(4)(g) and (h).
[137] Transcript, page 51; A3; see Statement of Aaron Marsters, R2, G17, page 103. The Tribunal notes Mr Marsters' statement makes reference to his 11-year-old son but no other mention has been made to that child and the Tribunal has considered Mr Marsters' family ties to the Applicant under the considerations of his ties to Australia and impediments to removal.
[139] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(a).
[140] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(f).
[145] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(b).
[146] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(c).
[147] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(d).
[148] Direction No. 79, para 13.2(4)(e).
[149] Direction No. 79, paras 13.2(4)(g) and (h).
[152] While the case of FYBR (FC) concerns Direction No. 65 and in particular paras 6, 8 and 11.3 of that Direction, the text of the relevant provisions is largely unchanged in Direction No 79. The Tribunal considers that the Court's consideration of the issue of "community expectations" is directly applicable to paras 6, 8 and 13.3 of Direction No. 65 which are applicable to applications under Direction No. 79. Further, although the Justices in FYBR (FC) were considering the provisions with respect to visa refusal their comments are, in the Tribunal's view, equally applicable to the cancellation of a visa (though the other considerations and weighing exercise may differ).
[153] Charlesworth J at [73]-[74]; Stewart J at [93] and [103]
[154] See Charlesworth J (at [74]), Stewart J (at [91]-[93]).
[155] See for example Direction No. 79 paras 13.1.1(1)(a), (b) and (c).
[160] Including Perth Brother's Touch Association, A15; R2, G17, page 105; Fremantle Rebels Touch Association, R2, G17, page 120.
[161] See for example R2, G17, pages 93, 113 and 116; A14.
[165] Para 14.4(1) of Direction No. 79.
[168] Paras 13.1 and 13.1.1 of Direction No. 79.
[169] Paras 13.1 and 13.1.2 of Direction No. 79.
[170] Paras 13.1, 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 of Direction No. 79.
[173] Para 14.2(1) of Direction No. 79.
[175] Para 14.5(1) of Direction No. 79.
Bartlett and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1561
CZCV and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 91
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 500
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185
HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1803
HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ali [2000] FCA 1385; (2000) 106 FCR 313
Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VSCA 213; (2013) 41 VR 359
QGMJ and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 1537
QSBL and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 2074
Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424
Varley and Minister for Home Affairs [2019] AATA 376
WAD 230/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2015] FCA 705; (2015) 148 ALD 117
XFKR and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] AATA 2385
YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466
ZTGP and Minister for Home Affairs [2018] AATA 3518
(2000) 106 FCR 313
(2013) 41 VR 359
(2014) 225 FCR 424
(1981) 39 ALR 649
(1982) 42 ALR 209
(1999) 91 FCR 234
(1991) 30 FCR 49