was entitled to take into account 1n considering the facts which
led to the conviction. See s.33 of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal Act 1975. Moreover, a conviction for an offence is not
only evidence of the facts underlying the conviction but
ordinarily strong evidence of those facts. In the present case,
the conviction was strong evidence for the conviction was reached
after a trial at which the appellant had been represented and at
which evidence from himself and other witnesses on his behalf had
been adduced. As no further evidence of the crime was adduced
before the Tribunal on behalf of the appellant, there was,
indeed, in our view, no ground upon which the learned Deputy
President could have come to any conclusion but the conclusion
reached which we have stated above. It was submitted that the
conviction and the acquittal were inconsistent and that for that
reason the conviction should not have carried weight. In our
view, the verdicts were not inconsistent. But even if they
were, the appellant stood convicted of the offence of
trafficking. His Honour was therefore not in error in relying