FJY v Children's Guardian

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity|2022-09-16|Before: Emeritus Prof P, Foreman AM, Hodgson J

R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIRComm 101 R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott [1933] HCA 30 SL v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2016] NSWCA 124 Smith v Commissioner of Police [2014] NSWCATAD 184 T v H, Unreported, Supreme Court NSW, Hodgson J, 19 December 1985 VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice (Review and Regulation) [2013] VCAT 789 ZZ v Secretary of the Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267 Category: Principal judgment Parties: FJY (Applicant) Children's Guardian (Respondent) Representation: Solicitors: FJY (self-represented) Crown Solicitor (Respondent) File Number(s): 2022/00093592 Publication restriction: Pursuant to s 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 the Tribunal restricts disclosure of the name of the applicant, his victims or of evidence given and received in the Tribunal hearing or in relation to the proceedings which is likely to identify those persons.

The Hearing

The parties filed written submissions supporting the Tribunal determining the matter on the papers without the need for a hearing pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ('CAT Act'). We are satisfied that we could dispense with the hearing and order accordingly.

The Evidence

The applicant's evidence consists of:

Application filed 30 March 2022 and annexed documents;
Report of Dr Stephen Bradley forensic and clinical psychiatrist 24 June 2022;
Bundle of Lebanese documents;
Statement/submissions of the applicant 27 July 2022.

The evidence of the respondent included:

Bundle filed: 29 April 2022; and
Bundle filed: 13 July 2022.

The Tribunal received and was assisted by written submissions from the parties.

Legislative Provisions

The object of the Act is to protect children by requiring those persons engaged in child-related work to obtain a WWCCC, or an enabling order declaring that the person is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of granting such a clearance: see ss 3, 28 (1) of the Act.
The safety, welfare and well-being of children and, in particular, protecting children from child abuse, is the paramount consideration when making any decisions under the Act: see s 4 of the Act.
There is no relevant definition of "child abuse" contained in the Act.
However, as has been observed by the Tribunal in previous decisions, and in particular BFX v Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115 at [19]- [30], an offence of "child and young person abuse" has been included in s 227 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. The offence is as follows: "Child and young person abuse A person who intentionally takes action that has resulted in or appears likely to result in: (a) the physical injury or sexual abuse of a child or young person, or (b) a child or young person suffering emotional or psychological harm of such a kind that the emotional or intellectual development of the child or young person is, or is likely to be, significantly damaged, or (c) the physical development or health of a child or young person being significantly harmed, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units"
In BFX v Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 115 at [29], the Tribunal stated as follows: "The ordinary meaning of "child abuse" in section 4 of the Act taking into account its context in the Act and the protective purpose or objects underlying the Act is therefore considered to be aptly described as maltreatment of a child consisting of physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, neglect, or any combination of these, and includes exposure to harm caused by or being subjected to family violence: section 34, Interpretation Act 1987."
The disqualifying offence for which the applicant was charged with indecent assault pursuant to s 61L Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The offence with which the applicant was charged and 'convicted' is one which falls within Schedule 2 cl.1(1)(b) of the Act. Therefore, the applicant is treated as a "disqualified person". By reason of s 18 (1)(a) of the Act the Children's Guardian must not grant a WWCCC to a person convicted as an adult of such an offence, and such a person belongs to a group of people referred to as "disqualified persons", in the same section of the Act. The applicant is, relevantly for the purposes of the Act, an adult and was an adult, aged over 18 years, at the time of the offence.
An enabling order is sought by the applicant pursuant to s 28 of the Act, which provides: "28 Orders relating to disqualified and ineligible persons (1) The Tribunal may, on the application of a disqualified person, make an order declaring that the person is not to be treated as a disqualified person for the purposes of this Act in respect of an offence specified in the order (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor. (2) The Tribunal may, on the application of a person who is not eligible to apply for a clearance because the person has been previously refused a clearance, make an order declaring that the person is to be treated as a person who is eligible to apply for a clearance (an "enabling order"). Any such order has effect according to its tenor. (3) A disqualified person may make an application under this section only if: (a) the person has been refused a Working with Children Check clearance, or (b) the person's clearance has been cancelled, because the person is a disqualified person. (4) The Children's Guardian is to be a party to any proceedings for an order under this section and may make submissions in opposition to or support of the making of the order. (5) An applicant must fully disclose to the Tribunal any matters relevant to the application. (6) If the Tribunal makes an enabling order, the Tribunal may order the Children's Guardian to revoke an interim bar or to grant the person a clearance. (7) In any proceedings where an enabling order is sought, it is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. (8) An enabling order may not be made subject to conditions."
The respondent is a party to the proceedings pursuant to s 28 (4) of the Act.

Standard of Proof

It is to be presumed, unless the applicant proves to the contrary, that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children (s 28(7) of the Act). It is well established that the standard of proof applied is the civil standard, that is, on the balance of probabilities: see s 140 Evidence Act 1995; BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 per Beech-Jones J at [33]; Children's Guardian v BQJ [2016] NSWSC 869, per Button J at [63]; CJT v Office of the Children's Guardian [2016] NSWSC 738, per Fullerton J at [34].

Relevant considerations

In making a determination under s 28 of the Act, the Tribunal must consider the matters under s 30 of the Act. Those matters are: "30 Determination of applications and other matters (1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part: (a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar, (b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred, c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred, (d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim, (e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person, (f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child, (g) the person's present age, (h) the seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred, (i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition, (i1) any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person, (j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application, (j1) any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A, (k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary. (1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the "affected person" ) to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that: (a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and (b) it is in the public interest to make the order. (2) On an application under section 28 or 29, the Tribunal may, by order, stay the operation of a determination by the Children's Guardian under this Act relating to the applicant pending the determination of the matter."

What must be determined

The Tribunal is to determine whether the applicant has discharged the onus identified in s 28(7) of the Act and whether there is sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he poses a risk to the safety of children: s 28(7) of the Act; BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, at [25]. The Tribunal will consider the totality of the evidence before it in order to assess whether the onus of proof has been discharged to rebut the presumption. Such evidence to be considered will include the evidence provided by the respondent as well as the evidence provided by the applicant.
In determining whether the applicant does pose a risk to children, it is accepted that the risk must be "a real and appreciable risk": see BYR v Children's Guardian [2013] NSWADT 310, at [38], [39]; AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69, at [37], [38]; Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476, at [42] per Young CJ in Eq (as he then was); BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian[2015] NSWSC 523 per Beech-Jones J esp at [26], [27].
In BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, His Honour Justice Beech-Jones referred to the issue of risk in the context of an application under s 28 of the Act as follows at [29], and [31]-[33]: [29] In Commissioner for Children and Young People v FZ [2001] NSWCA 111, Young JA (with whom Hodgson JA and Handley AJA agreed) expressed some concern about the reference to Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 ("Briginshaw") in the above passage from IK (at [68]). I share his Honour's misgivings. Briginshaw warns about the use of "inexact proofs" in the context of making serious findings of fact (at p 362 per Dixon J). It is difficult to envisage how it applies to a party seeking to disprove a negative assessment of the risk they pose to children in the future. Further, the principles in Briginshaw were enunciated in the context of civil proceedings in a court, not administrative review proceedings in a body that is not required to apply the rules of evidence (CAT Act, s 38(2); see [63]). It is not necessary to decide whether a failure by NCAT to have regard to Briginshaw's admonitions might give rise to an appeal on a "question of law". It suffices to state that NCAT would be well advised to have regard to them if it was considering making a positive finding that an applicant sexually abused a child in circumstances where they were not convicted of doing so (see R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Bott [1933] HCA 30; 50 CLR 228 at p 256 per Evatt J). ... [31] In M v M the High Court accepted that a positive finding that an allegation of sexual abuse is true should not be made "unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw" (M v M at p 76). The Court also stated (at p 77 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ): "It does not follow that if an allegation of sexual abuse has not been made out, according to the civil onus as stated in Briginshaw, that conclusion determines the wider issue which confronts the court when it is called upon to decide what is in the best interests of the child. No doubt there will be some cases in which the court is able to come to a positive finding that the allegation is well founded. In all but the most extraordinary cases, that finding will have a decisive impact on the order to be made respecting custody and access. There will be cases also in which the court has no hesitation in rejecting the allegation as groundless. Again, in the nature of things there will be very many cases, such as the present case, in which the court cannot confidently make a finding that sexual abuse has taken place. And there are strong practical family reasons why the court should refrain from making a positive finding that sexual abuse has actually taken place unless it is impelled by the particular circumstances of the case to do so. In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child's welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of the risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access. Even in such a case, however, there may be a risk of disturbance to a child who is compulsorily brought into contact with a parent who has sexually abused her or whom the child believes to have sexually abused her. But that is not the issue in this case." [32] The Court held that the relevant test was that access to a child by a parent will be denied if there exists "an unacceptable risk that the child would be exposed to sexual abuse if the husband were awarded custody or access" (M v M at p 78). [33] The above passage from M v M contemplates a court finding that a risk of abuse exists but that the possibility of it materialising can be mitigated by measures such as supervised access, with the result that the risk is not unacceptable and the parent is not denied access. As I have observed no such mechanism is proffered by the Working with Children Act. It is not concerned with "unacceptable risks" but "real and appreciable" risks (V supra). Further, in cases such as this the onus is upon the plaintiff. However subject to those two matters and the caveat about the applicability of Briginshaw noted in [29], the reasoning in M v M is applicable to fact finding and the process of risk assessment that NCAT undertakes. Thus in such cases it may be that NCAT can be satisfied that an allegation of sexual abuse against an applicant is established. Equally, NCAT may be affirmatively satisfied that the relevant incident did not occur, in which case it can be put aside. However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven.
More recently, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in CXZ v Children's Guardian [2020] NSWCA 338 has affirmed the decision of Beech-Jones J in BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523 at [33] concerning the method to be used in assessing risk.
The Court of Appeal in CXZ describes the assessment of risk as being a single process, instead of what was incorrectly described previously as, a mandatory three-step process (see CXZ at [55]). Simpson JA, describes that process in CXZ at [57], as: "…The task of the Tribunal is, to expand on what Beech-Jones J said in BKE, to determine, even if it is unable to be satisfied one way or the other as to the truth of all or any of the allegations, whether, by reason of the possibility that the alleged conduct occurred, the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children. If so, the Tribunal must refuse to grant a clearance. Of course, in that process the Tribunal will give consideration to the strength of the evidence supporting the allegations and will, inevitably, reach conclusions about the truth or falsity of some. If it finds any allegation to be without foundation it will discard it from further consideration. If it is satisfied that the allegation is well-founded, it will assign to it such weight as it sees fit, in the consideration (inter alia) of the circumstances listed in s 30. It is the allegations between those two extremes, those that are neither proved nor disproved, that the Tribunal must address in determining whether the applicant for a clearance poses a risk to children."
Where there are multiple considerations, the Tribunal is to evaluate the accumulated weight of the allegations in terms of risk. This will include consideration of factors including the seriousness of the allegations, the strength of any evidentiary support, and the relevance of the conduct to the risk to the safety of children.
When determining an application for administrative review, s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 is apposite: (1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following: (a) any relevant factual material, (b) any applicable written or unwritten law.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under s 28 of the Act is protective and not punitive in nature: AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 69, at [34]; Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, per Young JA at [61], and R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101 at [130].

Discussion of the evidence

The evidence received by the Tribunal is required to be considered under each of the eleven subsections of section 30 (1) of the Act: BCS v NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126. Some of the subsections may be thought less relevant and may be given less weight than others. However, each of the subsections is to be considered. That evidence is now set out below.
In addition, if the Tribunal concludes that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children, it must also consider the remaining criteria as set out in s 30(1A) of the Act.

The seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar

The applicant's disqualifying conduct cannot be condoned. However, in his favour it lies at the lower end of the scale of seriousness of indecent assaults.

The period of time since those matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred

The disqualifying offence occurred twenty-six years ago and, other than two minor drink driving convictions and a minor drug possession conviction, there is no evidence that the applicant has been charged or convicted of any offences in Australia or Lebanon.

The age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred

The applicant was 20 years of age at the time of the disqualifying offence.

The age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim

The victim was a 29 year-old woman.

The difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person

The victim was 9 years older than the applicant. The applicant and the victim appear to have been strangers.

Whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child

The victim was not a child.

The person's present age

The applicant is 46 years of age.

The seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred

The applicant has the following history of drink driving and possess a prohibited drug: 1. On 1 March 2005, the applicant was convicted in the Local Court of driving with a middle range prescribed concentration of alcohol. He was fined $500 and disqualified from driving for six months. 2. On 14 February 2006, the applicant was convicted in the Local Court of possessing a prohibited drug. He was fined $200. 3. On 9 November 2006, the applicant was convicted in the Local Court of driving with a middle range prescribed concentration of alcohol. He was fined $1000 and sentenced to a good behaviour bond for three years and twelve months supervision by NSW Probation Services.
The Applicant has not re-offended since his last conviction for drink driving in 2006. Since his disqualifying offence, the Applicant has become a father to four children. According to the report of Dr Bradley, since 2006 the Applicant has remained abstinent of alcohol and cannabis. There is no other evidence to suggest otherwise.

The likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition

The applicant has not committed any criminal offences since 2006, his disqualifying offence was committed in 1996 when he was relatively young, and he has no adverse records of a sexual or violent nature prior to, or since that time. The Respondent submits that there is a low risk of any repetition by the applicant of his previous criminal offences. In support of this submission, the report of Dr Bradley concludes that the Applicant is at low risk of re-offending.
We accept the applicant's evidence that the likelihood of him re-offending is low due to the time which has elapsed, he has not further offended.
We conclude that the likelihood of repetition concerning the applicant is low.

Any order of a court or tribunal that is in force in relation to the person

There is no evidence of an order of a court or Tribunal in force in relation to the applicant.

Any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application

Dr Bradley concludes that the applicant does not present a real or appreciable risk to the safety of children. In the Lebanese documents tendered on behalf of the applicant the record shows that the applicant has not been convicted of any crimes in Lebanon.
These matters weigh in favour of the applicant.

Any relevant information in relation to the person that was obtained in accordance with section 36A

No information was obtained in accordance with the section.

Any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary

The Department of Communities and Justice does not hold information relating to the applicant.
The Children's Guardian supports the application.

Consideration of the s 30 matters

We find that the applicant has displaced the presumption that he does pose a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children. This is because: 1. the disqualifying offence occurred twenty-six years ago; 2. the disqualifying offence did not involve a child and is on the lower end of the seriousness scale for offences of that kind; 3. the applicant's drink driving and drug possession offences occurred over sixteen years ago; 4. The applicant has expressed remorse with regards to the disqualifying offence; 5. There is otherwise no evidence to suggest that the applicant has behaved inappropriately towards children; and 6. The report of Dr Bradley concludes that the applicant does not present a real or appreciable risk to the safety of children.

Consideration of the section 30(1A) matters

The Tribunal may not make an order which has the effect of enabling the applicant to work with children unless the Tribunal is satisfied that a reasonable person would allow their child to have direct, unsupervised contact with the applicant. The reasonable person test is modelled on the Working with Children Act 1995 (Vic) ("the Victorian Act").
The VQB v The Secretary to the Department of Justice (Review and Regulation), [2013] VCAT 789 at [36] (Macnamara J); affirmed as the correct approach when considering s 30(1A)(a) of the Act in Office of the Children's Guardian v EQE [2022] NSWSC 871, [52]; Judge Macnamara of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal said that: "…[the test] requires the application of an objective standard based upon the views of the reasonable person. The reasonable person would, in reaching his or her conclusions, acquaint himself or herself with all the matters that have been placed before me, giving the applicant for a positive assessment a right to be heard, as well as considering the material gathered by the Secretary. A reasonable person would not approach the task with a closed mind, thinking that once a person has offended, he or she can never be redeemed. The reasonable person, however, would not put aside all scepticism and reasonable caution in this most difficult area in some over-optimistic attempt to facilitate rehabilitation."
In CSW v Children's Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 326 at [136]-[137] Senior Member McAteer said: "In our view a reasonable person would acquaint themselves with all of the evidence and submissions (or matters) placed before the Tribunal. As in the Victorian cases in our view a reasonable person would not approach the matter with a closed mind but apply an objective test in consideration of all of the material. Additionally, in our view the reasonable person would approach the matter in the same manner as I have approached the section 30(1) issues and risk. Particular regard would be had to the unchallenged expert evidence (notwithstanding the respondent's submissions as to weight). A reasonable person whilst approaching the manner with some caution would in our view find that any risk was insufficient to cause them to have concerns about access to their child in the terms set out in section 30(1A).
The respondent makes the following submission in respect of section 30(1A)(a) of the Act: 'Is it submitted that a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the Applicant that was not directly supervised by another person whilst the Applicant was engaged in child-related work because: (a) The Applicant has not committed any offences against, or in the presence of, a child; (b) The Applicant's criminal offences are historical; (c) The Applicant has not committed a crime since 2006; (d) The Applicant is a father of four children and there is no evidence of any child protection concerns about the Applicant as a father; and (e) The Bradley Report concludes that the Applicant does not present a real or appreciable risk to the safety of children.'
We accept the submissions of the respondent and find accordingly.
Section 30(1A)(b) of the Act prevents the Tribunal from granting the applicant a WWCCC unless it is in the public interest to make the order. The public interest test is also based on the Victorian Act.
There is no definition of public interest under the Act or at law. In Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4 at [31] French CJ of the High Court of Australia said of public interest: "When used in statute, the term derives its contents from 'the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the enactment in which it appears. The court is not free to apply idiosyncratic notions of public interest'".
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act set out the scope and purpose of the Act being the protection of children by ensuring that those who engage in child-related employment have a Clearance.
In ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice, [2013] VSC 267 at [202] Bell J of the Victorian Supreme Court observed that: "While decisions of the Tribunal have correctly emphasised that the main purpose of the Working with Children Act is the protection of children from harm, they have also acknowledged the relevance and importance of rehabilitating offenders, their right to work and other similar situations."
The respondent contends that: "the application of the public interest test involves a balance of competing interests being the protection of children balanced against the right of the individual to be employed in and participate in the community. The protection of children is the paramount consideration." We accept these submissions.
While there is no evidence indicating that the applicant is required by law to hold a WWCC clearance to be involved in his children's school activities (it is subject to an exemption under ss 20(1)(e) and (f) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Regulation 2013), or to engage in work as a landscaper (it is not child-related work) the respondent submits that, "when balancing the public interest and the applicant's interests, the Tribunal should find that the applicant satisfies the public interest test as there is no evidence to suggest that it would be against the public interest to grant him a clearance."
We also accept these submissions and find accordingly.

Conclusion

We accept the applicant has provided a truthful and full explanation of his offending.
We have considered and accept the respondent's submissions which support a favourable finding by the Tribunal that the applicant has displaced the presumption that he does pose a real and appreciable risk to the safety of children.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act is protective, not punitive, and an assessment of risk should err on the side of caution whilst balancing all of the risks that may be posed to children. The paramount principle under the Act requires that the protection of children, particularly from child abuse, is the main focus. However, it is not the only factor that must be considered.
In all the circumstances, on the balance of probabilities, taking into account all the considerations required under section 30 (1) of the Act, and having regard to the material before me, we conclude that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children. The evidence establishes that the applicant has discharged the onus of proof as set out in 28(7) of the Act.
As set out above, we have found that in having all of the above and other information before them, a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the applicant that was not directly supervised by another person while the applicant was engaged in any child related work.
We have also found nothing contrary to the notion of the public interest in granting to the applicant a WWCCC.
The applicant should receive a Working with Children Check clearance.
The order of the Tribunal is that: 1. Pursuant to s 50(2) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) the requirement of a hearing is dispensed with. The matter is to be determined on the papers. 2. It is declared the applicant is not a disqualified person for the purposes of section 28(1) of Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) in respect of the offence of indecent assault under s 61L of the Crimes Act 1900 entered on 18 June 1996 at the Local Court of New South Wales at Sydney. 3. The application for an enabling order under section 28 Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) dated 30 March 2022 is granted. 4. The Children's Guardian is to grant a working with children check clearance to the applicant pursuant to section 28(6) of Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 (NSW) forthwith.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 16 September 2022

Child Protection (Prohibited Employment) Act 1998(NSW)

Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Regulation 2012(NSW)

Children Act 1995(Vic)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (26 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (11)

Cases Cited (26)