The relevant principles
250 The words "aiding" and "abetting" are synonyms: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Investors Forum Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 53 ACSR 305; NSWSC 267 at [115]. They both mean helping, assisting or encouraging: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Somerville (2009) 77 NSWLR 110 at [41]. A person "procures" a contravention if the person causes the contravention to be committed, persuades the principal to commit the contravention or brings about its commission: Western Australia v Burke (No 3) [2010] WASC 110 at [19]; Truong v R (2004) 223 CLR 122 at [30]; Somerville at [41].
251 For para (a) to apply, an alleged accessory must have intentionally aided, abetted, counselled or procured the principal contravener and, in order to form the necessary intent, that person must have knowledge of the essential matters which make up the contravention: Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661 at 667-668 (Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). Yorke v Lucas was concerned with the operation of s 75B of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) which was in substantially identical terms to s 550(2) of the FW Act.
252 Similarly, in order to be knowingly concerned in, or a party to, a contravention within the meaning of para (c), a person must know the essential elements of the contravention: Yorke v Lucas at 667, 670 (Mason ACJ, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ).
253 Actual knowledge is required: Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 505 (Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ), followed in Yorke v Lucas. It is not enough that the person ought to have known. Knowledge may not be imputed or presumed: Giorgianni at 483 (Gibbs CJ), 505 (Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). Still, proof of actual knowledge may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. See, for example, Fair Work Ombudsman v South Jin Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1456 at [231] (White J). Where the alleged accessory is wilfully blind, that is to say, has deliberately shut their eyes to what was going on or deliberately abstained from inquiring, a court may infer actual knowledge: Giorgianni at 488 (Gibbs CJ), 507-8 (Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ). But nothing short of knowledge will suffice. In South Jin at [232] White J said:
The conclusion that a person has actual knowledge of the elements of a contravention by reason of that person's knowledge of suspicious circumstances coupled with a deliberate failure to make enquiries which may have confirmed those suspicions requires consideration of the person's knowledge of the matters giving rise to the suspicion, the circumstances in which the person did not make the obvious enquiry and the person's reasons, to the extent that they are known, for not having made the enquiry. It is not every deliberate failure to make enquiry which will support the inference of actual knowledge.
254 In neither case, however, is it necessary that the person knows that the essential matters or elements constitute a contravention. Put another way, it is unnecessary that the person appreciates that the conduct in question is unlawful: Fair Work Ombudsman v Devine Marine Group Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1365 at [176] (White J); Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2017) 249 FCR 167 at [15], [38] (Dowsett and Gleeson JJ); at [165] (Rares J). As Dowsett and Gleeson JJ observed in Gore at [15] and [38]:
[I]t is settled that in general, it is not necessary to prove knowledge of the law, or knowledge that a particular fact situation attracts legal consequences. That proposition applies to the proof of both principal and accessorial liability …
[N]either Giorgianni nor Yorke v Lucas required that it be proven that an alleged accessory knew of the relevant legal provisions which rendered the principal contravener's conduct unlawful. Those decisions establish only that it must be proven that the alleged accessory knew the relevant factual matters leading to illegality … To require more would be inconsistent with the long-established proposition that ignorance of the law is no defence.
255 Further, in EZY Accounting at [34] the Full Court endorsed my observation in Fair Work Ombudsman v Grouped Property Services Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1034; 152 ALD 209 at [957] that, where an alleged accessory is aware of a system producing certain outcomes which constitute contraventions, the person need not know the details of each of those outcomes in order to have the requisite knowledge. See also Australian Communications and Media Authority v Mobilegate Ltd a company incorporated in Hong Kong (No 8) [2010] FCA 1197; (2010) 275 ALR 293 at [172] (Logan J). Thus, as I explained in Grouped Property Services, a person who knows that an employee worked on weekends but does not know which weekends or the number of hours worked can be knowingly concerned in the employer's failure to pay weekend penalty rates.
256 In EZY Accounting the Full Court was concerned with the question of the involvement of an accountant (Mr Lau) in contraventions of s 45 of the FW Act by an employer (Blue Impression Pty Ltd, a fast food chain). The contraventions relevantly related to the failure to pay the minimum hourly rates, Saturday and Sunday loadings, as well as public holiday penalty rates; as required by the Fast Food Industry Award 2010. The Full Court concluded at [34] that:
It was open to the primary Judge to hold that Mr Lau was "knowingly concerned" in the contravening conduct of Blue Impressions based, as it was, on a system of payment where adult employees were invariably paid a flat hourly rate of pay which was below the Award base rate applicable for ordinary hours of work and insufficient to meet any additional requirement made by the Award for a penalty rate to be paid where applicable.
257 That was because, as the Full Court went on to explain:
Mr Lau knew that system of payment; he knew that the Award provided for a base rate; and he knew it contained provisions for the payment of penalty rates whenever applicable. He also knew that the inevitable result of his facilitation of Blue Impression's system would be that employees working ordinary hours would be underpaid the Award base rate of pay and that employees entitled under the Award to any additional penalty payments would not be paid the applicable penalty. That knowledge and involvement was sufficient to implicate Mr Lau in Blue Impression's contraventions of s 45 of Fair Work Act irrespective of the fact that Mr Lau did not know about the particular employment of Mr Zheng, or the particular hours that he worked or the particular provisions in the Award which gave rise to Mr Zheng's entitlement to be paid a particular penalty rate.
258 In Potter v Fair Work Ombudsman [2014] FCA 187 at [80]-[81] Cowdroy J held that to be an accessory to an underpayment contravention, the alleged accessory must have known that the particular award that was contravened applied to the relevant employees. In Fair Work Ombudsman v Al Hilfi [2012] FCA 1166 at [44] Besanko J expressed the (obiter) opinion that there was "a good deal of force" in the alleged accessory's submission that it was necessary for the Ombudsman to establish that it had actual knowledge, amongst other things, that the Cleaning Services Award 2010 applied to the employment of the relevant employees.
259 In Devine Marine at [188], in the absence of full argument (the respondents were unrepresented), White J followed Potter and Al Hilfi "because knowledge that there is an award which is applicable which prescribes minimum rates or entitlements is a factual element necessary for the establishment of the accessory's intention". Later, at [194], he clarified that it was not necessary for the Ombudsman to establish that the alleged accessory knew the name of the particular award that applied; it was sufficient for the Ombudsman to establish that he knew that "an award" was applicable.
260 In Grouped Property Services at [1019], I indicated that I was inclined to agree with the Ombudsman's submission that the test set by Potter was too high. I expressed the opinion, which was obiter in that case, that where the contravention is a failure to pay award rates, an accessory must know what rates are being paid but need not know that the rates which were paid were below the rates prescribed by the applicable award, since an accessory does not have to appreciate that the conduct is unlawful.
261 In Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Parker [2017] FCA 564; 266 IR 340; at [126]-[128] Flick J referred to these authorities in the context of a case involving contraventions of s 50 of the FW Act, which provides that a person must not contravene a term of an enterprise agreement. His Honour said at [128]:
Either approach, with respect, exposes a difficulty. Where the contravention in question is a contravention of s 50, that section does not require the person contravening a term of an enterprise agreement to have any knowledge of the existence of an enterprise agreement and does not require knowledge of the term being contravened or the fact that the act of contravention is in fact contravening conduct. If the "elements" of s 50 do not encompass those matters, it is - with respect - difficult to see why an accessory need have any greater knowledge. For a person to contravene s 50, it is sufficient to prove that conduct took place which was in fact a contravention of a term of an enterprise agreement. For the purposes of accessorial liability, all that need be proved is that the accessory had knowledge of the conduct.
262 With respect to Flick J, the view I expressed in Grouped Property Services was to the same effect as his.
263 In EZY Accounting the Full Court discussed these authorities at [11]-[15]. Unhelpfully for present purposes, however, it did not decide which approach was correct as it was unnecessary to do so (at [40]). Mr Fredericks of counsel, who appeared for Ms Handoko and Ms Parmenas, argued that the approach taken by White J in Devine Marine should be followed. He submitted that the Ombudsman must establish that the alleged accessories were at least aware that an award applied and that the amounts that were paid to the Employees were less than the rates prescribed by the award. I adhere to the view I expressed in Grouped Property Services. For more abundant caution, however, I will proceed on the basis Mr Fredericks urged.
264 Whatever the extent of the knowledge required, however, mere knowledge is not enough. To be knowingly concerned in, or party to, a contravention, the alleged accessories must also have engaged in conduct that implicates or involves them in the contravention: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Clarke [2007] FCAFC 87; 59 AILR ¶100-686; 164 IR 299 at [26] (Tamberlin, Gyles and Gilmour JJ); South Jin at [227].
265 On the other hand, while knowledge of a contravention is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis upon which to find that a person was knowingly concerned in the contravention, it is not necessary that the alleged accessory physically did anything to bring about the contravention. It is sufficient if that person, by what they said and agreed to do, or omitted to say or do, became associated with, and in that way involved in, the conduct constituting the contravention. See Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2006] WASC 144; 154 IR 228 at [29] (Le Miere J); R v Tannous (1987) 10 NSWLR 303 at 308 (Lee J, with whom Street CJ and Finlay J agreed at 304 and 310 respectively); Fair Work Ombudsman v Priority Matters Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 833 at [116]-[119] (Flick J); Amcor Packaging (Aust) Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union of Australia [2006] FCA 1265; 157 IR 32 at [15] (Middleton J).
266 Furthermore, to be a knowing participant in the contravention that person need not have participated in all the essential elements of the contravention: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Productivity Partners Pty Ltd (trading as Captain Cook College) (No 3) [2021] FCA 737; 154 ACSR 472 at [103]-[108] (Stewart J).
267 It is common ground that s 557C has no role to play here. Contrary to the submission advanced on behalf of Ms Handoko and Ms Parmenas, however, it does not follow that in order to prove her case against them the Ombudsman must "positively prove" each element of the relevant contravention and their knowledge of each element without the benefit of the reverse onus. The submission must be rejected. The sole question here is the involvement of Ms Handoko and Ms Parmenas in the Employers' contraventions, not whether the contraventions occurred. That question has already been decided.