Fair Work Ombudsman v Sushi Bay Pty Ltd
[2024] FCA 76
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2024-02-14
Before
Katzmann J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (92 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION 1 This is a case about the conduct of four companies (Sushi Bay Pty Ltd, Sushi Bay ACT Pty Ltd, Auskobay Pty Ltd and Auskoja Pty Ltd (the corporate respondents)) and one person, Ms Yi Jeong (also known as Rebecca) Shin (collectively the respondents), all of whom are said to have contravened the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) and the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) (FW Regulations) in numerous respects. 2 The corporate respondents are members of the Sushi Bay group of companies (Sushi Bay Group). At all relevant times they employed staff to run, and serve in, restaurants in New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. Ms Shin was the sole director and shareholder of each of the corporate respondents throughout that time. She was also their Chief Executive Officer. 3 The Fair Work Ombudsman alleges that the respondents contravened the FW Act and Regulations by paying some 163 employees (the Employees) below award rates; failing to pay annual leave or annual leave loading; unreasonably requiring employees to repay or refund money paid to them by the corporate respondents; making and keeping records which were false or misleading in a material particular; giving pay slips to employees which they knew to be false or misleading; and providing the Ombudsman or a Fair Work Inspector information or documents which they knew to be false or misleading. Some of the alleged contraventions are said to be "serious contraventions" within the meaning of the FW Act because they were committed knowingly and as part of a systematic pattern of conduct. The Employees represent about 73% of the corporate respondents' workforce. Approximately 85% of them were temporary visa holders. 4 The contraventions are said to have occurred over a period of nearly four years, from 29 February 2016 to 26 January 2020 (the Contravention Period). 5 The Ombudsman seeks declaratory relief, orders requiring the corporate respondents to reimburse the affected employees (with interest), and pecuniary penalties. This judgment is concerned with liability only. 6 Separate defences were filed by the corporate respondents on the one hand and Ms Shin on the other. At the time the defences were filed, all respondents were represented by Hillard & Berry Solicitors. 7 Thousands of pages of evidence were filed and served by the Ombudsman. None of the respondents filed any evidence. 8 After the Ombudsman filed and served her evidence and the time for the respondents to file their evidence had expired, each of Sushi Bay, Sushi Bay ACT and Auskoja was wound up in insolvency and a liquidator appointed. Auskobay was wound up earlier, about two weeks before its evidence was due to be filed. After Auskobay was wound up, Hillard & Berry served notices of ceasing to act. The liquidator informed the Ombudsman that he did not intend to defend the proceeding or file any evidence and that he did not require any witnesses for cross-examination. On 1 June 2023, Wigney J granted the Ombudsman leave to proceed against the corporate respondents under s 471B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth): Fair Work Ombudsman v Sushi Bay Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 548. 9 On 31 May 2023, Ms Shin advised the Ombudsman that she did not intend to appear at the hearing. Accordingly, the hearing proceeded in the absence of all respondents. In considering whether the Ombudsman's allegations have been made out, I have borne in mind that she carries the onus of satisfying the Court that the contraventions have been committed, that the allegations she makes are serious, and that findings against her will in all likelihood result in the imposition of civil penalties. For this reason, although she only needs to prove that the allegations are made out on the balance of probabilities, the necessary state of satisfaction should not be produced by "inexact proofs, indefinite testimony or indirect inferences": Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 362 (Dixon J). See, too, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 140. 10 On the other hand, the fact that Ms Shin did not adduce evidence or make submissions is not without consequences. 11 Ms Shin had every opportunity to answer the Ombudsman's allegations. If they were contestable, she could have filed evidence disputing some or all of the allegations and answering the Ombudsman's evidence. She could have appeared by a lawyer or in person. A document entitled "Statement of facts and legal issues" filed on her behalf by her then lawyers, MathasLaw, and prepared by a principal of that firm, includes the following assertions. First, the reason she did not give evidence is a concern that she may make admissions that could be used against her in criminal proceedings as contemplated by s 554 of the FW Act, which provides that criminal proceedings may be commenced against a person for conduct that is substantially the same as conduct constituting a contravention of a civil remedy provision. Second, she cannot give evidence of this concern because in so doing she may be open to be cross-examined on other grounds and that reason is sufficient to displace a Jones v Dunkel inference that might otherwise be drawn against her. 12 Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 is authority for several propositions. The first is that the unexplained failure of a party to give evidence or call witnesses may lead to an inference that the missing evidence or absent witness would not have assisted that party's case (at 308 (Kitto J), 312 (Menzies J) and 321 (Windeyer J)). The second is that a court may take that circumstance into account in deciding whether to accept particular evidence that relates to a matter on which the absent witness could have spoken: Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (12th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2021) at [1215]. It does not matter that the party who could have called the evidence does not carry the onus of proof: O'Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 921 (Gillard J); Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 at 367 (Hutley JA). The third is that evidence the witness might have contradicted can be accepted more readily: Jones v Dunkel at 312 (Menzies J). And the fourth is that any inference favourable to the other party for which there is a foundation in the evidence can more comfortably be drawn: Jones v Dunkel at 308 (Kitto J); at 312 (Menzies J). While a Jones v Dunkel inference cannot fill gaps in the evidence and cannot convert conjecture or suspicion into inference, if the inference is drawn it can "weigh the scales, however slightly, in favour of the opposing party": Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131; 21 ACLC 1810; 46 ACSR 504; 179 FLR 1 at [649] (Giles JA, Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing at [1] and [2] respectively). 13 In his textbook, Cases and Materials on Evidence (Butterworths, 1975) at 62, Heydon observed: [A] party's failure to give any satisfactory explanation of a prima facie case against him may suggest that the case is sound, either because silence is assent - an implied admission, or because it shows a consciousness of guilt or liability, or because inferences from the prima facie case, being unchallenged, are thereby strengthened. The presumption is the stronger where the facts are particularly within his knowledge. 14 The fact that the proceedings are proceedings for a pecuniary penalty is not a satisfactory explanation: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171; 41 ACSR 72; 20 ACLC 576; 168 FLR 253 at [504] (Santow J); Adler at [664]-[669]. The proceedings are still civil proceedings. The Court is expressly charged with applying the rules of evidence for civil matters when hearing proceedings relating to a contravention of a civil remedy provision: FW Act, s 551. 15 It is not clear whether in the Statement Ms Shin was referring to any inference that may be drawn from her failure to give evidence, but I will proceed on the basis that she was. 16 There are difficulties with both her assertions she makes. 17 As to the first assertion a concern that she might make admissions that could be used against her in subsequent criminal proceedings is not a legitimate explanation: Cross on Evidence at [1215]. 18 If, by the first assertion, Ms Shin is to be taken to have been invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, that can only be claimed by a witness and then only under oath or affirmation: Chong v CC Containers Pty Ltd (2015) 48 VR 402 at [236] (Redlich, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA). Besides, that is not an explanation sufficient to displace a Jones v Dunkel inference if it is otherwise available. As Hill J said in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442 at [33]: Where the proceedings are criminal (and the present proceedings are not; they are proceedings, inter alia, for the recovery of a civil penalty) it might be thought that the failure of the accused to go into evidence should not lead to the drawing of Jones v Dunkel inferences. After all it is clear that a witness can not be compelled to give evidence which is likely to incriminate the witness or expose the witness to a penalty. However, even in criminal cases it has been held that the failure of the accused, who is in a position to deny, explain or answer the evidence adduced by the prosecution, to give evidence will permit the jury to draw inferences adverse to the accused more readily: see Azzopardi v The Queen (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349, affirming Weissensteiner v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 217. A fortiori, therefore, the failure of a respondent to proceedings for recovery of a pecuniary penalty to give evidence on a matter relevant to an issue in the proceeding and deny, explain or answer the evidence adduced against the respondent will permit the Court more readily to draw the inferences to which the decision in Jones v Dunkel refers. 19 In any case, as Ms Shin acknowledged, s 555 of the FW Act would generally prevent the use in any subsequent criminal proceedings of any evidence she might give or documents she might produce in this proceeding where the conduct alleged to constitute the offence is substantially the same conduct. The only exception is where the criminal proceeding relates to the giving of false evidence in this proceeding. 20 The second assertion, it will be recalled, was that if Ms Shin were to give evidence on oath or affirmation about her concern, she would expose herself to the risk of cross-examination. That is obviously so. But fear of cross-examination is also an unsatisfactory explanation.