EVD18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 418

1. This is an Application for judicial review filed on 10 September 2018 (the Application), seeking review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) dated 6 June 2018 (the Authority's Decision), affirming a decision of a Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the Delegate) to refuse to grant the Applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class EX) (Subclass 790) Visa (the Visa).
2. The Applicant requires an Extension of Time (EOT) to seek judicial review (the Application for an EOT) pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).
3. The Court had regard to both the Application and the Application for an EOT at the hearing which occurred on 25 February 2026 (the Hearing).
4. For the reasons set below, the Application for an EOT should be granted, the Application should be upheld, and the matter remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration.

1. The Applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 3 November 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival.
2. On 14 January 2013, during his entry interview (the entry interview), the Applicant stated that he left Sri Lanka in 2012 after being questioned by the Sri Lankan Army (the SLA). The Applicant stated that the SLA believed his uncle was killed because he had assisted the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE), and they suspected that the Applicant had also supported the LTTE through his association with his uncle.
3. The Applicant lodged an application for the Visa (the Visa application) on 24 October 2016, claiming the following:
   • The Applicant's father had died from a shell attack in 2009, and his brother had been taken by the LTTE in 2008.
   • The Applicant had moved from Kilinochchi to Negombo to live with his uncle, as he felt he was under constant suspicion due to his young age and Tamil ethnicity.
   • The Applicant had not registered his identity with the police in Negombo, as was required of Tamils at the time. After neighbours reported him, the police questioned him and his family and assaulted his uncle.
   • While living with his uncle, young Tamil men frequently visited the house. The Applicant overheard that the authorities suspected them all of LTTE involvement.
   • In 2008, the Applicant overheard his uncle say that the LTTE had warned him to leave the area. The Applicant claims his uncle was subsequently abducted and killed. Weeks later, the Applicant was arrested, accused of being "a tiger", and was threatened unless he reported future visits to his uncle's home.
   • The Applicant lived in Galle from late 2008 to 2010, then returned to Kilinochchi, where, after registering with authorities, he was questioned by the SLA about the LTTE. The Applicant later learned that police in Negombo had made further inquiries about him in 2011.
   • In August 2012, the SLA came to the Applicant's home and told him to report to an army camp. The Applicant did not attend because he feared discrimination and harm as a Tamil. Feeling unsafe, the Applicant left Sri Lanka illegally in October 2012. The Applicant feared that, if returned, he would be arrested for illegal departure, detained due to suspected LTTE links arising from his uncle's activities, and killed because he had failed to report to the SLA.
4. As part of his Visa application, the Applicant provided an email address (the nominated email address) for the purpose of communication with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department). The Applicant did not subsequently contact the Department or the Authority to change the contact details provided.
5. On 30 January 2017, the Department invited the Applicant to attend a scheduled interview on 14 February 2017 (the Visa interview). At the Visa interview, the Applicant raised two additional claims. They are as follows:
   • The Applicant feared harm because, as a Hindu living in a predominantly Sinhalese area, he believed he would be suspected of being a terrorist and of supporting the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).
   • In 2010, the Applicant discovered weapons at the bottom of a well, reported the discovery to the SLA, and later posted bail for a friend who was arrested on suspicion of involvement with the LTTE in connection with the weapons. After the friend left Sri Lanka in 2013, the SLA approached the Applicant in 2016 seeking information about him.
6. On 8 August 2017, the Delegate refused to grant the Applicant the Visa.
7. On 11 August 2017, the Applicant applied to the Authority for review of the Delegate's decision.
8. On 6 June 2018, the Authority affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the Applicant the Visa.
9. On 7 June 2018, the Authority's decision was sent to the Applicant by email to the Applicant's nominated email address.

1. As the Application was lodged outside the prescribed 35-day time limit, the Court must consider whether to grant an EOT.
2. In SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719, the following matters were held to be relevant as to whether an Extension of Time should be granted:

(a) the extent of the delay;

(b) the explanation for the delay;

(c) prejudice to the respondent due to the delay; and

(d) the merits of the proposed application.

1. The Court may extend the 35-day period if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make an order extending the time for filing an application.
2. The decision to grant an EOT is a discretionary one: DZAAD v Department of Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 204 at [28]:

The Application is brought under r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011. As the Minister has submitted, r 36.05 confers upon a court a broad discretion whether or not to grant an extension of time. The considerations generally relevant in determining whether an extension of time should be granted are well known. They include the length of the delay, whether the applicant has provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, whether there is any prejudice to the respondents and the merits of the appeal if an extension is granted (Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349 (per Wilcox J); Jess v Scott [1986] FCA 365; (1986) 12 FCR 187 (per Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ); Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] (per Spender, O'Loughlin and Dowsett JJ); Peck v Secretary, Dept of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 810 at [16]-[27] (per Foster J); SZQBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1388 at [16]-[25] (per Cowdroy J)).

1. To the above, the Court would add that the greater the delay, the more persuasive the explanation for the delay must be. In considering whether to grant an EOT, there are no mandatory relevant considerations: Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 at [12]:

On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court's satisfaction that an order extending time "is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice". Other than the "interests of the administration of justice", there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the "subject-matter, scope and purpose" of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. The Applicant has failed to make an application for an EOT in writing, as required by s 477(2) of the Act. In both the Originating Application (filed on 10 September 2019) and the Amended Application (filed on 16 December 2019), in response to the question "Does the applicant apply for an order that the time for making the application be extended under section 477 of the Migration Act 1958?", the Applicant had ticked "No". The proposed Application is therefore incompetent: SZRBN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 384 at [28].
2. At the Hearing, the Applicant sought and was granted leave to file a further amended application (the Further Amended Application). Accordingly, the Further Amended Application for judicial review and an EOT was accepted for filing on 28 January 2026 and backdated to 10 September 2018. The parties agreed that this meant the Further Amended Application was lodged 61 days outside of the 35-day time frame prescribed by s 477(1) of the Act. This is a moderate period of time, which, in and of itself, mitigates against granting an extension. As such, the reasons for the delay will need to be persuasive.
3. In relation to an EOT, the Applicant relies on the following ground:

It is in the interest of the administration of justice to extend time on the basis of the matters in the applicant's affidavit of 5 September 2018, the fact that the matter has substantive merit and that there is no relevant prejudice to the respondent.

1. The Applicant claimed that the delay was occasioned by a number of factors, including:
   • The Applicant did not receive a copy of the Authority's decision.
   • The Applicant received an email from the Authority in August 2017; however, the contents were in English, and the Applicant could not read them. Further Authority's language assistance scheme "proved to be useless".
   • The Applicant informed the Department in January 2018 that the nominated email address was "not working" and provided a new email address. The Applicant claims he was not aware that he had to also inform the Authority of any changes to his contact details.
2. The First Respondent submits that the Application should be dismissed due to the significant delay and the Applicant's inadequate explanation for that delay. The First Respondent further contends that public‑interest considerations weigh against granting an EOT. In addition, the Application lacks sufficient merit to justify an extension, as it does not disclose any arguable case of jurisdictional error in the Authority's decision.
3. The First Respondent submits that the delay in this case is significant, and the Applicant's explanation for failing to file his Application on time is inadequate. The First Respondent holds that the Applicant did not indicate when he became aware of the Authority's decision. Further, the Applicant had previously been able to communicate with the Department, as his Representatives contacted the Authority and provided material.
4. The First Respondent submits that the Applicant's claim of being unaware of the requirement to notify the Authority of any change to his contact details is undermined by the information sheet, provided to him in both English and Tamil, attached to his acknowledgment of referral letter dated 11 August 2017, as well as by the document titled "Practice Direction for Applicants, Representatives and Authorised Recipients".
5. Additionally, the First Respondent relies on CUX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1574 at [30], where it was stated that "...most applicants apply to this Court without the assistance or intervention of a lawyer". Therefore, the absence of assistance, for language or legal reasons, is not a sufficient explanation for delaying the Application.
6. The First Respondent submits that the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Minister) will experience prejudice due to the expiry of the review period and the loss of expectation that the matter was finalised: WZAUG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 771 at [33]. There is also a public interest in compliance with time limits, the finality of outcomes, and in the expeditious and well-organised disposition of matters: DZAEH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 83 at [33].

1. The delay is moderate, being some 61 days outside the mandated 35-day time period. This somewhat mitigates against granting leave.
2. I do not consider the explanation for the delay to be adequate. This also mitigates against leave being granted.
3. However, I find there is no real prejudice to the Minister, other than the need for these types of matters to be finalised. I consider this factor to be neutral.
4. The final consideration for the grant of an EOT is the merits of the proposed Application. This is considered below.

1. At [3], the Authority considered the material before it, given by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Act.
2. At [4], the Authority accepted the May 2018 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Sri Lanka report as new information, as it was satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to warrant its consideration, noting that the report contained more recent and relevant material concerning the treatment of categories of persons to which the Applicant belonged.
3. The Authority noted that the Applicant's Representative provided submissions and new material, including media reports and documents relating to the uncle's death and burial in October 2008, which the Applicant claimed were omitted on the advice of his former Representative: [5]. The submissions referred to 2016 country information and asserted that the Applicant would have no family member available to bail him out if he pleaded not guilty to illegal departure: [5]. The submissions also contended that the Delegate's concerns about any inconsistencies in the Applicant's evidence should be given little weight. Further, the submissions asserted that Delegate failed to consider the Applicant's uncle's involvement in a 2001 airport incident, and the charges laid against him under the Sri Lankan Prevention of Terrorism Act: [6].
4. The Authority found that the media reports and documents concerning the Applicant's uncle's death could have been provided earlier, as they related to events predating the Delegate's decision: [7]. The Authority rejected the Applicant's explanation for the omission, noting that he had referred to the material at the Visa interview and said he possessed it, had confirmed that he understood the obligation to provide all relevant information, and had some English proficiency: [7]. Accordingly, at [7], the Authority was not satisfied that the requirements of s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act were met.
5. While accepting that the provided documents constituted personal information, having regard to country information concerning the prevalence of document fraud, together with identified anomalies, inconsistencies and the late provision of the material, the Authority found that the documents carried no corroborative weight: [8] - [15]. Accordingly, the Authority was not satisfied that the information was credible or that the requirements of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act were met: [16]. The Authority was also not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering the information: [17].
6. The Authority found that the Applicant's claim that he would have no one to provide bail could have been raised earlier: [18]. Noting the absence of any explanation or supporting material, the Authority was not satisfied that the information was credible personal information or that s 473DD(b) of the Act was met: [18].
7. At [19], the Authority found that the country information relied on by the Applicant pre‑dated the Delegate's decision, was not credible personal information, and did not satisfy s 473DD(b) of the Act. Further, as more recent independent material was available, the Authority was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering it: [19].
8. The Authority accepted that the Applicant was a young Tamil Hindu male from a formerly LTTE‑controlled area, that he moved from Kilinochchi to his uncle's home in Negombo to avoid suspicion, and that his father was killed in a 2009 shell attack: [23].
9. The Authority did not accept that the LTTE asked the Applicant to join them, finding the claim was raised at the Visa interview to enhance his claims: [24]. The Authority also rejected the Applicant's claim of being questioned by the SLA: [24].
10. The Authority rejected the Applicant's claims about his uncle's LTTE involvement, noting it was implausible he would move to live with the uncle if the uncle were involved with the LTTE, that his knowledge of the uncle derived only from overheard conversations, and that his account of the uncle's kidnapping was vague and inconsistent: [24] - [31].
11. While accepting that the Applicant's uncle may have been killed during the civil war, the Authority did not accept that the uncle was involved with the LTTE, kidnapped, arrested in connection with the airport attack, or that the Applicant was ever arrested or questioned about the uncle or his death: [32].
12. The Authority considered the Applicant's and his brother's alleged LTTE links: [33] - [37]. The Authority accepted that the Applicant had to register in Negombo and may have been questioned, but did not accept that he was arrested there. The Authority also accepted that Sri Lankan authorities may have checked his movements in 2010 and those of his relatives in 2011, but did not accept he was under ongoing suspicion or suspected of LTTE involvement: [35].
13. At [36], the Authority observed that the Applicant provided no details to support his claim that the LTTE had taken his brother. It considered the Applicant's claim that his brother was in a refugee camp, rather than a rehabilitation camp, to strongly suggest he was not suspected of LTTE involvement. The Authority further found that the Applicant's ability to live in multiple cities during and after the war, study, work, obtain a passport, and avoid being detained or sent to a rehabilitation camp was strong evidence he was not suspected of LTTE links: [37].
14. The Authority considered the Applicant's claim that he and his friends discovered an LTTE weapons cache and reported it to the SLA, however, it did not accept his explanations for not mentioning this earlier. The Authority further found that he shifted his account in response to the Delegate's concerns, which included changing dates, a lack of any paperwork for the alleged bail, and providing vague and unreliable evidence: [38] - [43]. Accordingly, the Authority did not accept the claim: [44].
15. As to the claims raised at the Visa interview about supporting the TNA and being identified as a Tamil Hindu, the Authority found deficiencies in the Applicant's evidence and did not accept that he had suffered harm for these reasons or faced a real chance of such harm in the future: [45] - [46].
16. The Authority, referring to country information, found the Applicant did not face a real chance of discrimination or harm as a Tamil under the Sirisena Government: [54] - [56]. The Authority accepted returnees may face difficulties; however, it found the Applicant's education and family support meant he did not face harm that threatened his capacity to subsist: [57]. The Authority noted that although some returnees are monitored, the Applicant did not have a profile of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities: [58].
17. Referring to its findings on the Applicant's alleged support for the TNA and country information showing no discrimination based on political opinion, the Authority found that he would not face harm for that reason: [59]. The Authority noted country information on the treatment of Tamil Hindus in Kilinochchi and the Applicant's own evidence of attending Temples without incident and found no real chance of harm on religious grounds: [60].
18. At [62] - [63], the Authority accepted that the Applicant would return as a failed asylum seeker but found no real chance of harm on that basis. The Authority accepted that the Applicant departed Sri Lanka illegally and might be questioned, charged, and fined under the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act_;_ however, relying on country information, it did not accept that the Applicant would be mistreated: [64].
19. The Authority found that if the Applicant pleaded not guilty upon return to Sri Lanka, he would be released on bail with a personal surety or a family guarantee, and did not accept that the Applicant lacked family who could provide surety, given his ongoing contact with them: [67] - [69].
20. Whilst the Authority accepted that the Applicant may be briefly held in an airport holding cell if he arrived on a weekend, it found that such short-term detention did not amount to serious harm: [72] - [74]. The Authority found that the Sri Lankan Immigrants and Emigrants Act was a law of general application, was not discriminatory, and did not involve systematic discriminatory conduct for the purposes of s 5J of the Act: [75] - [76].
21. Having considered all the evidence before it, the Authority was not satisfied that the Applicant had a well-founded fear of harm for any s 5J(1)(a) reason or in the reasonably foreseeable future: [77]. Accordingly, the Authority found the Applicant did not meet the definition of "refugee" in s 5H or the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act: [78].
22. The Authority, relying on its earlier findings concerning the Applicant's return as a failed asylum seeker, found he would not face a real risk of significant harm: [82]. Accordingly, the Authority found that the Applicant did not meet the s 36(2)(aa) criterion: [87].
23. As such, the Authority affirmed the decision not to grant the Visa to the Applicant.

1. The Applicant advances one ground of judicial review contained in the Further Amended Application filed with the Court on 28 January 2026. The sole ground of review is as follows (without altercation):
   1. The decision of the Authority was legally unreasonable.

• Particulars:
  1. The Authority rejected the Applicant's claim at the protection interview that he had been asked by the LTTE to join them in their technical college on the basis that it was a recent invention to enhance his claims. In fact, the claim had been raised at the first opportunity at the entry interview.
  2. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicants evidence at the protection interview that he was questioned by the army in Killnochchi on the basis that the applicant did not mention it his statement in support of his SHEV whereas in fact the applicant had referred to this in this statement in support of his SHEV (see CB70 at [26]-27] and CB71 at [29].

1. At [20], of the decision record, the Authority made the following statement:

At the protection interview he [the applicant] also added in 2005 the LTTE came to the school and conducted classes and he was first in the class so they asked him to join them in their technical college, but he did not want to so he went to Negombo.

1. The Authority went on to make the following finding at [24] of the decision record:

However, I do not accept that the LTTE asked the applicant to join the LTTE as he did not mention that until the protection interview. I consider his statement set out in some detail why he moved to Negombo. He was concerned about and fearful of the LTTE and authorities and felt he was under suspicion because he was a Tamil and young. However, the statement did not mention that he was asked to join the LTTE, rather it mentioned that he was told his brother was taken by the LTTE. I consider if the applicant had been asked to join the LTTE that he would have mentioned it in his statement. I consider the applicant added that claim late in the protection interview to enhance his claims.

1. The Authority had stated that the Applicant did not mention that he had been asked to join the LTTE until the Visa interview, and, in substance, it said it would not accept the claim, as it considered it a recent concoction to enhance the Applicant's case. However, the record of the Applicant's entry interview contains the following statement (CB 9):

I did not fight but I was being forced in 2006 by the LTTE to study in their college, it was only after this that I was forced to move to Colombo.

1. The conclusion that the Authority overlooked this statement in the entry interview is reinforced by its absence from the summary it provided at the second dot point in [20] of the decision record. Accordingly, the Authority had reasoned on a false factual premise that the claim was first raised at the Visa interview. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSNSW [2014] FCAFC 145 at [19], a finding that a claim had not previously been raised, when in fact it had, amounted to be a jurisdictional error.
2. In Lee v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1669, Abrahams J explained at [65]:

...where an error of fact leads to unreasonableness, illogicality, irrationality or reasoning for which there is no probative basis, and the erroneous finding is material to the ultimate decision, jurisdictional error may be established: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 361 ALR 227 ; at [41(d)]; CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496 ; at [38]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 ; at [130]-[132], [135] per Crennan and Bell JJ; see for example: Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 51; (2017) 250 FCR 309 ; . The "fundamental question must be the importance of the material to the exercise of the Tribunal's function and thus the seriousness of any error": Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 ; at [111] per Robertson J. Circumstances giving rise to jurisdictional error do not arise in this case.

1. The Authority's mistake in this case is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the Authority found that the claim was concocted, which inevitably impacted its assessment of the Application's overall credibility. Secondly, it meant the Authority irrationally excluded information concerning the LTTE's interest in the Applicant, which may have impacted its overall assessment of whether the Applicant may be imputed as a supporter of the LTTE. Accordingly, the mistake was significant and amounted to jurisdictional error.

1. In the history provided as part of the Applicant's Visa application, the Applicant stated that he lived in Killinochchi until 2006, during which time the area was under LTTE control. The Applicant then moved to Negombo to live with his uncle. After his uncle passed away, the Applicant relocated to Galle and lived with his grandfather. From 2009, the Government regained control of Killinochchi from the LTTE, and accordingly, in 2012, the Applicant returned to Killinochchi to live with his mother.
2. In his statement accompanying his Visa application (the Visa statement) (CB 67 - 71), the Applicant claimed that while living in Negombo, police discovered he had not registered his residence at his uncle's address, and he was taken to the police station and questioned: [14] - [16]. In that Visa Statement, the Applicant also claimed that when he returned to Killinochchi in 2010, he was questioned by the SLA: [26] - [27]. The Authority refers to this at the penultimate and last dot points in the summary it provided at [20] of the decision record. In the second dot point at [20] of the decision record, the Authority further noted that the Applicant had previously mentioned the 2012 SLA questioning during his entry interview.
3. The Authority went on to accept that the Applicant had been questioned by the police in Negombo at [50]; however, it did not accept that he had been questioned by the SLA in Killinochchi: [24]. At [24] of the decision record, the Authority stated:

However, I do not accept that the LTTE asked the applicant to join the LTTE as he did not mention that until the protection interview. I consider his statement set out in some detail why he moved to Negombo. He was concerned about and fearful of the LTTE and authorities and felt he was under suspicion because he was a Tamil and young. However, the statement did not mention that he was asked to join the LTTE, rather it mentioned that he was told his brother was taken by the LTTE. I consider if the applicant had been asked to join the LTTE that he would have mentioned it in his statement. I consider the applicant added that claim late in the protection interview to enhance his claims. For similar reasons, I do not accept he was questioned by the army in Kilinochchi. While he claimed this in his arrival interview, he did not mention it in his more detailed statement about the reasons why he left Kilinochchi. (emphasis added)

1. The Tribunal's reasoning is perverse. The Applicant did refer to the questioning by the SLA at Killinochchi in his detailed Visa statement. This was a central claim, made both during his entry interview and in his Visa statement. The Authority's rejection of this claim on such a flawed basis is plainly material.

1. The First Particular of the Applicant's sole ground of judicial review fails on the face of the decision record. The Authority rejected the Applicant's claims regarding the LTTE's attempted recruitment because he failed to mention it in his Visa statement. At [24], the Authority stated the following:

However, I do not accept that the LTTE asked the applicant to join the LTTE as he did not mention that until the protection interview. I consider his statement set out in some detail why he moved to Negombo. He was concerned about and fearful of the LTTE and authorities and felt he was under suspicion because he was a Tamil and young. However, the statement did not mention that he was asked to join the LTTE, rather it mentioned that he was told his brother was taken by the LTTE. I consider if the applicant had been asked to join the LTTE that he would have mentioned it in his statement. I consider the applicant added that claim late in the protection interview to enhance his claims. For similar reasons, I do not accept he was questioned by the army in Kilinochchi. While he claimed this in his arrival interview, he did not mention it in his more detailed statement about the reasons why he left Kilinochchi. (emphasis added)

1. The paragraph cited above, and in particular the bolded section, which was omitted from the Applicant's extract of the same paragraph, makes it clear that the Authority was aware of and did consider the content of the Applicant's entry interview. Accordingly, the Applicant's claim that the Authority acted illogically, irrationally or unreasonably by not considering this must fail.
2. The Authority was correct in finding that the Applicant did not state in his Visa application that the LTTE had asked him to join. The Authority acknowledged the claim made at the entry interview but considered it relevant that the Applicant omitted it from his later, more detailed Visa statement. The weight to be attributed to the evidence was a matter for the Authority: Vidiyala v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1973 at [29]. The Tribunal was not obliged to accept uncritically any of the Applicant's claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 (Randhawa) at [451]; and was entitled to doubt the claim where the Applicant did not provide details of this matter in his statement: Gunatillake v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 387 at [74].
3. The Applicant in his entry interview claimed, "I was being forced in 2006 by the LTTE to study in their college" (CB 9, in answer to question 8). Whatever that statement is intended to convey, it is not equivalent to the Applicant having been "asked" in 2005 "to join them in their technical college", as recorded in the third dot point at [20] of the decision record. The Authority was correct at [24] to find that the Applicant had not previously claimed this.
4. Taken at its highest, this particular invites the Court to review the merits of the Authority's decision, which is not open to it: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6 at [31].
5. The Authority comprehensively considered the Applicant's claims and available independent country information against the refugee and complementary protection criteria. Still, it made adverse findings against the Applicant based on the sporadic and conflicting nature of the documents and information provided by the Applicant. The Authority gave proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the case before making independent findings of its own: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS [2010] HCA 48 at [29].
6. The Authority's decision was based upon an orthodox assessment of relevant country information and a careful consideration of the Applicant's claims. The reasons given by the Authority to support its conclusion that it was not satisfied with the Applicant's claims to fear harm were open to it and probative of the material before it: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407 at [67].

1. In relation to the second particular, it appears from the second dot point at [20] of the decision record that the claim the Authority rejected at [24] is that the Applicant was questioned by the SLA in Kilinochchi in 2012. Whilst the Authority may have misread question one of the entry interview (CB 9), which indicated that the Applicant was questioned in 2006 by the police in Negombo, this does not suggest that the Authority was denying the Applicant's claim to have been questioned after his return to Kilinochchi in 2012. The Applicant's claim regarding the SLA's questioning of him in Kilinochchi is contained in paragraph [27] of the Visa statement and was expressly recorded by the Authority in the penultimate dot point at [20] of the decision record. Accordingly, it would not make sense to read the Authority's comments at [24] as referring to the 2010 questioning.
2. Ultimately, the Authority accepted that the authorities may have made inquiries of and questioned the Applicant in 2010, but did not accept that he was under ongoing suspicion or suspected of LTTE involvement: [35] and [37]. That conclusion addressed the claim that the Applicant was subject to such suspicion, and it was open to the Authority to reach it for the reasons it provided.
3. Accordingly, no legal unreasonableness within the principles in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [78] (Heydon J), [130] - [131] (Crennan and Bell JJ) has been established.

1. In Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3 at [17], the task of a Court conducting judicial review was described in this manner:

...an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government, here in the form of a decision of the Minister. The Court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the Court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.

1. It is well established that the Authority is not required to accept, uncritically, any and all claims made by an applicant_: Randhawa_ at [451].
2. Nor does the Authority have to possess rebutting evidence before holding that a particular assertion was not made out: Selvadurai v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1105; (1994) 34 ALD 347 at [348].
3. It is for an applicant to satisfy the Authority, being the relevant decision maker, that they meet the criteria for being a refugee: Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [187].
4. In Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 539 at [46], the following was said:

The Tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications... its reasons are not to be scrutinised 'with an eye keenly attuned to error'. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.

1. In BCK21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 475 at [19], Abraham J said the following:

It is first appropriate to recall that a Tribunal's reasons should be read fairly, and as a whole. The Tribunal's reasons should not be construed minutely, with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 271-272; Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 17; (2022) 400 ALR 417 at [38].

1. While the above quotes refer to the tribunal, the reasoning equally applies to the Authority.
2. The sole ground for judicial review is that the Authority's decision is legally unreasonable. Unreasonableness is where a decision-maker has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker could have come to it: Minister for Immigration v Li (2013) 297 ALR 225 (Li) at [28]; or where a decision has been made that lacks an "evident and intelligible justification": Li at [76]. The test for unreasonableness is "stringent" and will only arise in rare cases. Unreasonableness is not a means for challenging a decision on the basis that the Court disagrees with the consideration of matters or the evaluative judgements made by the decision-maker: Li at [30], [113].
3. In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11 at [11], Allsop CJ said the following concerning a review of a decision for legal unreasonableness:

The task is not definitional, but one of characterisation: the decision is to be evaluated, and a conclusion reached as to whether it has the character of being unreasonable, in sufficiently lacking rational foundation, or an evident or intelligible justification, or in being plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of the power, such that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes as an exercise of that power. The descriptions of the lack of quality used above are not exhaustive or definitional, they are explanations or explications of legal unreasonableness, of going beyond the source of power.

1. The claim of legal unreasonableness centres on two alleged errors made by the Authority in relation to the facts found by the Authority in [24] of the Authority's decision record. That paragraph is set out in full below:

However, I do not accept that the LTTE asked the applicant to join the LTTE as he did not mention that until the protection interview. I consider his statement set out in some detail why he moved to Negombo. He was concerned about and fearful of the LTTE and authorities and felt he was under suspicion because he was a Tamil and young. However, the statement did not mention that he was asked to join the LTTE, rather it mentioned that he was told his brother was taken by the LTTE. I consider if the applicant had been asked to join the LTTE that he would have mentioned it in his statement. I consider the applicant added that claim late in the protection interview to enhance his claims. For similar reasons, I do not accept he was questioned by the army in Kilinochchi. While he claimed this in his arrival interview, he did not mention it in his more detailed statement about the reasons why he left Kilinochchi.

1. The first particular of the Applicant's ground of judicial review relates to the rejection of the Applicant's claim regarding the Applicant being asked to join the LTTE in their technical College. The Authority found that it was added late in his Visa interview to enhance his claims.
2. At the Hearing, the Applicant in oral submissions drew the Court's attention to ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38 at [42] per Griffiths, Mortimer and Steward JJ, where the following was said:

Differing accounts of the same event may not be 'inconsistent' at all. One may be more detailed than the other. One may have a different emphasis. One may include a particular incident that another does not. Differences in accounts may arise from the kinds of factors to which the Full Court referred to in AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133 at [24] and [25].

1. In AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133, the following was also said at [48]:

Further, in any situation where an applicant is given an opportunity to attend an interview or engage in a review process, it is reasonable for that applicant to expect that she or he will be able to expand on, or explain, aspects of the narrative she or he has given prior to that point. This expectation and the other matters to which we previously referred (see [24]-[26] above) must be properly considered by a decision-maker in making any assessment of the applicant's claims and evidence.

1. In the Applicant's Visa application (CB 9), the following appears:

Q: Have you ever participated in any armed conflict or fighting?

A: Yes - I did not fight but I was being forced in 2006 by the LTTE to study in their College, it was only after this that I was forced to move to Colombo.

1. Clearly, the first sentence in [24] of the decision record is factually incorrect, in that the Applicant had raised being asked to join the LTTE or study at the College it ran prior to the Visa interview. It was not a recent invention to 'enhance his claims'. In reaching this conclusion, I have been mindful of errors that can arise with applicants whose first language is not English and of the filtering of terms that may occur during the interpretation process. The Applicant clearly understood that by studying at their College, the Applicant could be said to be 'joining' the LTTE.
2. The second particular to the Applicant's ground of judicial review relates to a claim that the Authority did not accept evidence raised at the Visa interview that the SLA questioned the Applicant in Kilinochchi on the basis that the Applicant did not mention it in his Visa statement, whereas he did in fact mention it.
3. At [26] - [27] of the Visa statement, the following appears:

2010 - return to the Kilinochchi District

1. In 2010 after completing my studies, I returned [from Galle] to live with my mother in V[redacted], Kilinochchi District. By this time, the civil war had ended and the Kilinochchi District was under the control of the authorities. I had to register my identity and provide my personal information to the Village Headman, which would then be passed onto the Sri Lankan army. As soon as the army received my information, army representatives came to my home and interrogated me.
2. The army representatives saw from my information that I had moved from an LTTE-controlled area to a government controlled area in 2006. Given I did not have permission to do this, they asked whether I had any influence with the LTTE. They questioned me a lot about the LTTE.
3. ...
4. In or around August 2012, army representatives came to my home and told me that I was under invitation [interpreted to mean investigation] and that I had to go and report the army camp. I did not report to the camp as I was scared that if I went, I may not be able to leave.

1. At [24] of the decision record, the Authority noted that although the Applicant claimed in his entry interview that SLA had questioned him at Kilinochchi, the Applicant did not mention this in his Visa statement explaining why he left Kilinochchi. Again, I accept that this statement by the Authority is factually incorrect.
2. The First Respondent submitted that the Authority was aware of and did consider the Applicant's entry interview; thus, any claim of legal unreasonableness based on illogicality or irrationality cannot succeed. Further, the First Respondent submitted that the Applicant's ground of judicial review invites impermissible merits review. I do not accept this submission. It is well accepted that credit findings, such as those in [24] of the decision record, can be subject to judicial review: EVI19 v Minister for Immigration [2022] FCA 518 (EVI19).
3. While the Authority did consider a range of matters in reaching its overall conclusion, the issue confronting the Court is untangling incorrect adverse credit findings from other adverse credit findings. In EVI19, the following was said as to this problem at [149] - [151]:
   1. Because of the approach taken by the Authority, the Minister's contention that certain findings (such as those conceded to be in error and those which I have found are not) did not contribute in any significant way to the ultimate finding made by the Authority in relation to the central narrative cannot be accepted. As Mortimer J pointed out in AWU16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 513 AT [20]:

emphatic adverse findings on credibility may well, expressly or implicitly, be linked with one another so that it will not be possible, or realistic, for a reviewing Court to be confident that an error in one strand of credibility reasoning does not infect other strands.

1. In support of that proposition, her Honour cited the judgment of Lee J in SZFTQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 562 at [44]- [45], the latter paragraph of which bears repeating:

To be too confident that emphatic disbelief on one issue would not inform, even subconsciously, the approach taken to weighing other evidence of the person disbelieved is, to my mind, to underplay the complexity of the anatomy of decision-making. As Kirby J observed in Applicant NAFF of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] HCA 62; (2004) 221 CLR 1 at 23 [81]:

...decision-making is a complex mental process. Disbelief of a litigant or witness on one point might carry over to affect the decision-maker's disbelief of the same person on other points. Contrary-wise, establishing that an initial disbelief of a person's credibility on one matter was erroneous might convince a decision-maker of the need to revisit other conclusions and to look at the person's entire evidence in a new light.

1. In the present case, I am confident that the unreasonable approach of the Authority infected all of its reasoning. Further, there is no doubt that the error is material in the relevant sense so as to give rise to jurisdictional error: see Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; 264 CLR 123 at [29]- [31] and [72]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; 264 CLR 421 at [45]; MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; 390 ALR 590 at [2]. If the error had not been made - i.e., if the Authority had undertaken its task reasonably in accordance with its statutory mandate - it is obvious that the Authority might not have made the same (or similar) credibility findings and, in turn, it may have accepted the appellant's central narrative.

1. In my view, given the Authority's factually incorrect findings set out above, I cannot be satisfied that they did not infect subsequent adverse findings, including credit findings made by the Authority.

1. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the decision of the Authority meets the standard for being legally unreasonable and, therefore, the proposed ground of judicial review has merit.
2. Taking all of the circumstances into account, as a matter of discretion, the Application for an EOT is granted.
3. The Application is upheld, and the matter is remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration.
4. The Court will now hear from the parties as to the issue of costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred (100) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge D Humphreys.