EPY18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 502

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

1. The application filed on 6 September 2018 is dismissed.
2. The first and second applicants must pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements, of and incidental to the proceedings, fixed in the amount of $5,400.
3. Pursuant to r 17.02 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), Orders 1 and 2 above not be entered until the date of the publication of written reasons for judgment (revised from transcript) which for the avoidance of doubt, and for the purposes of r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), will also be taken to be the date upon which the judgment was pronounced.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

1. Before the Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated 21 August 2018, by which it affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (delegate) dated 6 September 2017 to refuse to grant the applicants Protection (Subclass 866) visas (visas).

1. The relevant factual background to the matter and summary of the Tribunal's decision are derived primarily from the written submissions of the first respondent. Unless otherwise indicated that background does not appear to be in dispute.
2. The first applicant (applicant) is a female citizen of China who arrived in Australia on 9 April 2017 as the holder of a visitor visa (CB 22).
3. On 2 July 2017, the applicants applied for the visas (CB 1 to 40). The second applicant is the applicant's husband and was included in the visa application as a member of the same family unit as the applicant. He did not make separate claims for protection (CB 3 and 34).
4. The applicants' claims for protection can be summarised as follows (CB 44 to 48):

(a) the applicant is a follower and adherent of the Church of Almighty God (CAG), which was declared by the Chinese authorities to be an illegal cult. She claimed to have become a member of CAG in February 2015, when her distant relative (X), arrived in her hometown to spread the teachings of CAG. In February 2017, X was arrested by the Public Security Bureau (PSB) on suspicion of teaching CAG;

(b) the applicant tried to rescue X with the assistance of a friend who had contacts at PSB, but at the same time the applicant was planning her own escape from China with the assistance of her husband;

(c) during February and March of 2017, the applicant claimed to have been interrogated and treated "inhumanely" on three occasions;

(d) at the end of March 2017, two associates of the applicant who were also members of CAG were arrested. In the same month, the second applicant secured visas to come to Australia. The applicants claimed to have left China because they feared persecution;

(e) following their departure, other members of CAG were arrested, and the applicant was allegedly identified as a key member of CAG; and

(f) the applicant fears that if she were to return, she would be "subjected to persecution".

1. On 4 September 2017, the applicant attended an interview with the delegate at which she expanded on the claims made in her application (CB 95 to 98).
2. On 6 September 2017, the delegate refused to grant the applicants' protection visas (CB 93 to 109). The delegate found that the applicants' claims were not credible and did not accept that the applicant was an adherent of CAG. The delegate found that the applicants had not left China for the reasons claimed and were not persons to whom Australia owed protection obligations.

1. On 13 September 2017, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision and appointed their registered migration agent as their authorised recipient (CB 111 to 117).
2. On 16 February 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants (via their authorised recipient) to attend a hearing (CB 128 to 129). On 23 March 2018, the applicants' representative provided to the Tribunal by email a Statutory Declaration made by the applicant which was partially in English and also included portions in Chinese characters (CB 138).
3. The applicants accepted the Tribunal's invitation to hearing (CB 133 to 137) and, on 3 April 2018, they each appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing to give evidence and present arguments in relation to their case, with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language. The applicants' representative was also present (CB 140 to 142).
4. On 16 April 2018, the applicants' representative provided a translated copy of the applicants' marriage certificate to the Tribunal (CB 143 to 144).
5. On 21 August 2018, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision (CB 148 to 167).
6. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant was involved with, or attended gatherings of, CAG in China or Australia, nor that she undertook conversion activities (CB 157 at [18]). In support of that conclusion the Tribunal gave the following reasons:

(a) it was not convinced by the first applicant's explanation for joining CAG, and was not satisfied that she would have been involved in conversion activities so soon after being introduced to CAG, particularly with such little knowledge about its beliefs and principles and given she was raising children and running a business (CB 157 to 158 at [19]);

(b) noting the first applicant's religious conviction and zeal, the Tribunal was unconvinced by the first applicant's explanation for not trying to involve her family in CAG, particularly as she claimed to have been involved in converting others for a year (CB 158 at [20]);

(c) having cited country information about religious freedom and passport policies in China, the Tribunal was unconvinced that the authorities would have issued a passport to the applicant and allowed her to freely leave the country if they were aware that she was teaching the word of CAG (CB 159 at [22]);

(d) the Tribunal was not satisfied with the applicant's general level of knowledge about CAG and its teachings (CB 159 to 160 at [23] to [26]); and

(e) the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant had been attending church since arriving in Australia noting, inter alia, her inability to provide details of the church she attended in Australia or the names of the leaders (CB 160 at [27]).

1. Although the Tribunal acknowledged that some individual explanations for the above deficiencies might exist, it considered the reasons cumulatively and was not satisfied that the applicant converted to CAG in 2015, was a genuine adherent of CAG in China or Australia or was involved in CAG conversion activities. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant had suffered harm or harassment from the authorities in China, including arrest, detention, interrogation and torture, and found the applicant was not a devotee of CAG (CB 161 at [28]). Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for any of the reasons set out in s 5J of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (CB 162 at [29] to [33]).
2. For the same reasons given for its refugee assessment, the Tribunal was also not satisfied the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm from the authorities on the basis of commitment to CAG or CAG participation in Australia or China. The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant met the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (CB 163 at [37] to [39]). Accordingly, the second applicant was also found to not meet the criteria as a member of the applicant's family unit (CB 163 at [40]).

1. The applicants commenced the present proceedings by an application to show cause filed with the Court on 6 September 2018. The matter was initially docketed to another Judge of the Court (first primary Judge).
2. On 27 September 2018, a Registrar of the Court made orders by consent, which included that the proceedings would be listed for a hearing before the first primary Judge at a time to be notified to the parties administratively. Orders for the preparation of the matter for hearing, including a grant of leave to the applicants to amend their application on or by 7 January 2019, were also made.
3. The applicants did not file an amended application in accordance with the time provided by that grant of leave, or at all. The proceedings were later placed in the central migration docket and were next called-over before a Registrar of the Court on 22 August 2023, on which occasion the applicant appeared by telephone. A fresh timetable was made, again including a grant of leave to the applicants to amend.
4. On 5 March 2024, the proceedings were docketed to me and I made orders of the same date listing them for hearing today and granting the applicants further leave to file any amended application on or by 22 March 2024.
5. The applicants and first respondent were directed to file and serve written submissions 14 and 7 days before the hearing respectively. The first respondent complied with that order. Since the commencement of these proceedings, other than a Notice of Address for service filed on 23 August 2023, the applicants have not filed any additional documents in accordance with the Court's orders, or at all.
6. The applicants appeared before me this morning with the assistance of an interpreter in the Mandarin language. Only the applicant made oral submissions confirming that she would speak on behalf her herself and her husband. The Minister is represented by a solicitor.
7. The Court Book was tendered for the first respondent and marked Exhibit "1R". While the applicants filed an Affidavit of the applicant made in support of her originating application, regard was not had to it because the Affidavit did nothing more than to annex the Tribunal's decision, which is now included in the Court Book.

1. In the absence of having filed any amended application, the grounds which arise for consideration are those in the originating application which are as follows (errors in original):
   1. I believe the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), in its decision to affirm the refusal of my visa application, has made an error of law. Consequently, I believe I have not been given a fair and honest chance at having my visa application reviewed by the Tribunal. The reasons for my belief are as follows.
   2. The Tribunal, it its decision record, made it clear that their assessment of whether I am at risk of significant harm hinges on the legitimacy behind my claims of being a member o the Church of Almighty God (CAG). In doing so, I strongly believe they have taken an erroneous path to arrive at their final conclusion because of two main reasons. Firstly, the Tribunal relied on an invalid method of assessment when considering whether I am a true devotee to CAG. Secondly, the Tribunal came to their decision without granting me an opportunity to comment on or respond to their assessment of the legitimacy behind my devotion to CAG. This information is extremely relevant to my case because it provides the foundations to my claims of being subject to significant harm if I return to China.
   3. The Tribunal's first argument was the fact that I had not explained "convincingly" the motiving behind my joining of CAG. Specifically the Tribunal, in its decision record, indicated a failure on my part to "provide specific examples of what it was about (the) aspects of CAG belief that convinced me emotionally, intellectually or socially". I do not believe it is valid for the Tribunal to rely on someone's ability to describe the specific way they were motivated to convert to a religion as proof of it actually happening. Furthermore, there is no evidence that suggest New member of CAG are unable to participate in conversion activities nor is there evidence that suggests only very knowledgeable CAG members can participate in conversion activities. Conversion is motivated by affiliation to one's faith and someone who may not be knowledgeable can also identify with the role God bestowed upon all of us, that is, to convert.
   4. The second argument made by the Tribunal was that it "appear unconvincing that (I) would not at least try to involve or convert at least some member of my own family". This argument is invalid because it is based on misstated information, and it should not have any weight in the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal insists I did not attempt to convert my family members because I wanted them to "do it on their own free will". The information is misstated here, because I had said I did attempt to convert my family members but I wanted my family members to be converted on the merits of CAG as opposed to being converted out of respect and loyalty towards me. I showed them the benefits of being a member of CAG and hoped they would convert "on their own free will".
   5. The third argument made by the Tribunal was that "it is unlikely (I) could obtain a passport and freely leave the country as claimed, as only one month after (I) had been investigated". I believe this is not a valid consideration because it fails to consider all or some of the information. It is not uncommon for public officials and workers to receive bribes for favours that involve a misuse of power. Whilst the Tribunal recognises country information reporting briber as being "difficult... because of sensitivities to corruption, and the professional and comparatively well paid status of public security officials", the information, when considered in whole, does not suggest bribery and corruption is uncommon or impossible.
   6. The fourth argument made by the Tribunal was in relation on my, apparent, lacking "detailed knowledge which one would expect of a person who claimed she was actively trying to convert others". The Tribunal did not present any valid form of examination that may appropriately demonstrate the level of knowledge and understanding I possess about CAG and its literature. Instead, the Tribunal chose to rely on assumptions from arbitrary questioning that could have easily been influenced by other factors such as misinterpretation due to cultural differences. I do not believe it is valid or fair for the Tribunal to give weight to its perception of the level of my understanding and knowledge about CAG without, at least, ascertaining the assumptions about my knowledge with any valid form of examination.
   7. Furthermore, the Tribunal did not provide me with an opportunity to comment o nor respond to the information about my knowledge of CAG. The Tribunal did no indicate, during the hearing, that the amount of details I was giving would not satisfy their criteria of being knowledgeable. I was unaware my responses were being considered as a representation of my knowledge on CAG in its entirety. I was also not given an opportunity to comment on or respond to the information prior to the Tribunal making their decision.
   8. The fifth argument made by the Tribunal was that if I was attending a CAG church in Australia, then "(I) would have been able to verify (my) attendance by providing details of the church". The Tribunal's argument there is invalid, because it has relied on misstated information. I explained I cannot provide the details of the CAG church members because it was sensitive information and the Tribunal contradicts this by saying "she found the Australian branch of the church online including names of brothers and sisters and their contact details". This statement is misstated because online research will only obtain details through telephone numbers, but it definitely does not have the personal of church brothers and sisters such as their name.
   9. I believe the Tribunal has made invalid arguments that partly or wholly affect their finally decision to affirm the refusal of my visa application. I request for my case to be reviewed.
2. A number of the grounds raise similar issues and it is convenient to group those grounds together. This was explained to the applicants, the grounds were interpreted to them, and they were given the chance to address them in turn.

1. It is convenient to group grounds 1 and 9 together. On one view, each of grounds 1 and 9 is the chapeau and conclusion to the grounds, essentially alleging that the applicants are unsatisfied with the conclusions of the Tribunal and suggesting that grounds 2 to 8 inclusive particularised that dissatisfaction.
2. However, and as the Minister beneficially construed the grounds in the written submissions, ground 1 in particular might be taken as raising an allegation of error in and of itself, namely, the applicants were not given a fair and honest chance to have the delegate's decision reviewed by the Tribunal.
3. When asked to speak to these grounds, the applicant said that when the Tribunal was making its decision, it did not reach a fair conclusion. The applicant said that she believes that in reviewing her case, the Tribunal made a legal error, did not give her a fair outcome and for these reasons, she believes that the decision is wrong. The applicant said that she is a devotee of CAG, but that in making its decision the Tribunal did not accept this, so she disagrees with the decision.
4. As was explained to the applicants by the Court at a number of junctures during the hearing, including prior the parties' submissions, it is no part of this Court's jurisdiction to decide for itself whether or not the applicants' protection visa claims are true. The Court also explained to the applicant in relation to the submissions made in respect of these grounds that while the applicants may disagree with the Tribunal's conclusion, that is not sufficient in and of itself to establish legal error, even if, as the applicant says, the outcome of the Tribunal's decision is unfair. What is required by the Tribunal for procedural fairness is a fair hearing and not a fair outcome: see SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25] per Gleeson CJ, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ.
5. As the first respondent submitted, there is nothing in the materials to indicate that the Tribunal's procedures gave rise to any jurisdictional error. With respect to the complaint that the applicant was not given a fair and honest chance at having their application reviewed, construed generously, this could be construed as a breach of procedural fairness. The first respondent says that the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations which, by reference to s 422B of the Act constitutes an exhaustive statement of the its natural justice obligations.
6. By letter dated 16 February 2018, the applicant was invited to a hearing which she attended on 3 April 2018 (CB 126 to 133 and 140 to 142). It is apparent from the Tribunal's reasons that the issue under review, being whether the applicant satisfied the criteria for the grant of a protection visa, was discussed at the hearing. Otherwise, the Tribunal considered the applicant's claims and evidence and made findings which were open to it. The first respondent contends that there was nothing unfair about the Tribunal's decision or processes that could be found to have resulted in jurisdictional error. I agree.
7. Ground 9 broadly contends that the Tribunal has made "invalid arguments." The applicants have failed to identify any such arguments, and the first respondent contends that the Tribunal provided reasons for its findings, which were open to it.
8. I am not satisfied that either grounds 1 or 9 establish jurisdictional error, alleging, as they do, a basic disagreement with the outcome of the proceedings.

1. It is next convenient to group these grounds together.
2. Ground 2 raises two specific issues. In relation to the first aspect, this will be grouped with grounds 3, 4 and 6 and addressed here. The second aspect of ground 2 will be grouped with ground 7, and I will return to that shortly.
3. By ground 2, the applicants alleged that the Tribunal "took an erroneous path to arrive at their conclusion", "relied on an invalid assessment" and arrived at a decision without giving the applicants an opportunity to comment on, or respond to, the assessment of the first applicant's devotion to CAG. Taken together with grounds 3, 4 and 6, the applicants alleged that manner in which the Tribunal assessed the first applicant's religious conversion and devotion to CAG, and (specifically by ground 3) the Tribunal not being satisfied that the applicant's explanations for her motivations to convert were sufficiently convincing, was in error.
4. By ground 4, the applicants make a similar challenge, said to be evidenced by the Tribunal finding that the applicant's claims were not credible on the basis that she had not attempted to convert her family members to CAG.
5. When asked to speak to these grounds, the applicant sought to read from a written statement, in respect of which she gave some confusing information to the Court as to its authorship. The applicant ultimately claimed that she was its author, but that a friend of hers had assisted her in writing it in English. That was notwithstanding the fact that the document she had with her in Court was in Mandarin.
6. In essence, the parts of the statement from which the applicant read went towards seeking to satisfy the Court of the genuineness of her conversion and adherence to CAG. The Court again explained to the applicant that the Court was not assessing the truth of those claims.
7. Once off-script, the applicant made submissions to the effect that the Tribunal had made its decision based on the member's personal opinion. When the Court sought to explore this submission with the first applicant, she rhetorically asked a number of questions which (in essence) went to the basis upon which the Tribunal had decided she was not a devotee of CAG, and a suggestion that there was no other basis upon which the Tribunal found.
8. The central theme of these grounds is the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with the applicant's religious claims. The solicitor for the first respondent made submissions at hearing to the effect that, where a person makes claims to adhere to a movement or beliefs, the decision-maker is entitled to legitimately explore what the person knows. The solicitor for the first respondent submitted that there is a difference between adhering to a premise that all believers of a certain religion or faith need to have a certain level of knowledge, as opposed to that someone's lack of knowledge indicates that they are not a genuine adherent.
9. In the present matter, the solicitor for the first respondent accepts that the Tribunal asked questions of the applicant at hearing about the practice and doctrine of CAG, and this can be seen at [23] to [25] of its decision. It was also submitted that the Tribunal accepted that the applicant had some knowledge about doctrine and literature of the church in question, but that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant's evidence was consistent with her claims of evangelism, proselytisation and the conversion of others.
10. The solicitor for the first respondent submitted that the Tribunal legitimately explored those matters with the applicant because she had specifically claimed to have been involved in conversion activities. The solicitor for the first respondent also says that the Tribunal reached its conclusions based on other factors, such as her ability to freely depart China, the applicant's inability to explain why she had changed from one Christian faith to another, and also why it was that she was unable to provide any detailed information about her claim to practice with CAG in Australia.
11. To the extent that the applicants allege the Tribunal incorrectly gave weight to the applicant's unconvincing evidence at the hearing about the motivation for her claimed conversion, I find that the Tribunal was entitled to accept or reject, or give such weight to the evidence proffered as it thinks appropriate in all the circumstances: see Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 464 at [27] per French J.
12. The Tribunal gave cogent reasons for its findings. At its highest, ground 3 seeks impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shang Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ.
13. Ground 4 takes issue with the Tribunal's findings and reasons where it found it was "unconvincing" that despite the applicant feeling as strongly about CAG as she claimed and having become evangelical, she had not tried to convert her immediate family members (CB 158 at [20]). The applicants say this reasoning was invalid, but have not explained why. The first respondent submits that the Tribunal's findings were open to it for the reasons it gave and that this complaint, in essence, also seeks impermissible merits review of the Tribunal's decision. I agree.
14. Having read the decision as a whole, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal placed undue weight on the applicant's lack of knowledge, nor that it erred in the sense found in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZLSP [2010] FCAFC 108; [2010] 187 FCR 362 per Kenny, Rares and Buchannan JJ.
15. The Tribunal's conclusions about the applicant's conversion to CAG and her claimed adherence thereto, were grounded in inconsistent and implausible evidence, and the applicant's demonstrated lack of knowledge generally, and her lack of evidence about conversations despite earlier claims to have done so.
16. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal imposed any preconceived views as to the applicant's beliefs, nor that she would have to hold certain beliefs in order to be converted to CAG or an adherent thereto. As Flick J found in ABX15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 855 at [24]:

The manner in which the Refugee Review Tribunal set out to test the Applicant's claim to be a Christian was a function entrusted to it. There was no impediment to the Tribunal testing the claim being advanced. An assertion on the part of the Applicant that he was a Christian did not manacle the Tribunal to the confined task of simply testing whether he had been baptised or attended church. The Applicant by making the claim could not preclude the Tribunal from testing the more fundamental assertion of fact as to his Christian belief. In testing the claim being made, the Tribunal moreover did not seek to impose upon the Applicant any preconceived views as to the beliefs a person would have to hold in order to be a Christian; it was simply testing the claim made.

1. I find that the Tribunal's concerns about the applicant's lack of knowledge of CAG were within the parameters of a legitimate exploration of her alleged conversion and adherence to CAG, and her own knowledge (or lack thereof), as demonstrated.
2. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal engaged in an a priori assessment of the applicant's faith.
3. Ground 6 complains that it was not valid for the Tribunal to give weight to its view that the applicant lacked "detailed knowledge which one would expect of a person who claimed she was actively trying to convert others".
4. The applicants contend the Tribunal failed to "present any valid form of examination" to assess her level of knowledge and instead employed assumptions and arbitrary questioning. The applicants has not filed any evidence in respect of the conduct of the Tribunal hearing. In the absence of such evidence, the complaints about the Tribunal hearing cannot be sustained.
5. Given that the applicant made claims to be an adherent to a particular religious movement or set of beliefs, the Tribunal was entitled to legitimately explore what she knew about that religion in order to assess the genuineness of the claim (see SBCC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 129 at [47] per French, Lander, & Besanko JJ; WALT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2007] FCAFC 2 at [30] per Mansfield, Jacobson & Siopis JJ), and the weight to be given to its evaluation was a matter for the Tribunal (see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at [8] per Jacobson, Buchanan & Nicholas JJ).
6. To the extent that there is a suggestion today from the Bar table (also included within the text of ground 6) that the Tribunal might have been influenced by other matters (or that the Tribunal member's personal opinion is what grounded the findings), if that is intended to be an allegation of bias, whether it be apprehended or actual, it is a serious allegation which ought to have been properly particularised, and certainly the subject of evidence. In the present case it is neither.
7. If, by the suggestion the Tribunal could have been easily influenced by other factors such as "misinterpretation due to cultural differences", the applicants intend to say that there were cultural differences between the Tribunal member and the applicants, the allegation is unclear. If it is a suggestion that there are somehow errors in the standard of interpretation between the interpreter who was present at the Tribunal hearing and the applicant, which gave rise to an error, the test for such an allegation of error was expounded on in SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212 by Allsop CJ at [9], wherein his Honour stated:

The question whether standards of interpretation have affected a hearing as an opportunity to be heard is a question of evaluation as to whether the hearing was fair. That in turn involves the recognition of the purpose of the hearing: to give the person concerned or affected by the exercise of power a real opportunity to place before the repository of the power such information as is relevant. This will require a substantially effective mechanism of communicating oral and written information, both from, and to, the person. To the extent that interpretation or translation is necessary, it must be adequate to convey the substance of what is said, to a degree that the hearing can be described both as real and fair. It will be a matter of evaluation in all the circumstances, by reference to the issues, the nature of the evidence, the character and frequency of any proven errors in interpretation, and any other factor apparently relevant to the quality of the communication, as to whether the hearing was fair. Relevant to the task will be how the decision-maker approached the resolution of the task before her or him.

1. There is no evidence (specifically no comparative transcript)[1] to demonstrate that there was any material difficulty in the interpretation at that hearing which affected the evidence that the applicant gave.
2. Overall, I am not satisfied that any of grounds 2 (first issue), 3, 4 and/or 6 establish error of the kind alleged, or at all.

1. The second part of ground 2 makes an allegation similar to that in ground 7, namely, that the Tribunal came to its decision without giving the applicants the opportunity to comment upon the Tribunal's assessment about whether the applicant was genuinely a devotee of CAG. When asked about these grounds, the applicant said that the Tribunal did not give her an opportunity to comment, nor to rebut.
2. Ground 2 alleges that, having undertaken its assessment of the applicant's claims and reached conclusions in respect of them, the Tribunal ought to have put those conclusions to the applicant. With respect, that mistakes the requirements of the Act.
3. Ground 7 casts the ground slightly differently and alleges that the Tribunal did not provide the applicant with an opportunity to comment on the fact that her knowledge of CAG was insufficient such as to satisfy it.
4. Section 424A of the Act provides as follows:

424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal

(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:

(a) give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.

(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:

(a) except where paragraph (b) applies - by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or

(b) if the applicant is in immigration detention - by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.

(2A) The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.

(3) This section does not apply to information:

(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or

(b) that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or

(ba) that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or

(c) that is non‑disclosable information.

(4) A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 426A(1F).

1. It is well-established that information for the purposes of s 424A does not include the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or an absence of evidence, nor does it include the Tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations (see VAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 123; [2004] 206 ALR 471 per Finn, Merkel and Stone JJ at [24]). The High Court held in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 26 per Gleeson CJ and Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [18]:

Thirdly and conversely, if the reason why the tribunal affirmed the decision under review was the tribunal's disbelief of the appellants' evidence arising from inconsistencies therein, it is difficult to see how such disbelief could be characterised as constituting "information" within the meaning of para (a) of s 424A(1). Again, if the tribunal affirmed the decision because even the best view of the appellants' evidence failed to disclose a Convention nexus, it is hard to see how such a failure can constitute "information". Finn and Stone JJ correctly observed in VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs that the word "information":

does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations ... nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc ...

If the contrary were true, s 424A would in effect oblige the tribunal to give advance written notice not merely of its reasons but of each step in its prospective reasoning process. However broadly "information" be defined, its meaning in this context is related to the existence of evidentiary material or documentation, not the existence of doubts, inconsistencies or the absence of evidence. The appellants were thus correct to concede that the relevant "information" was not to be found in inconsistencies or disbelief, as opposed to the text of the statutory declaration itself.

1. As the solicitor for the first respondent observed in submissions today, the applicant agrees she knew that the issues dispositive of the review included her credibility and whether or not she was a devotee of CAG. The applicant confirmed as much from the Bar table. The applicant's concern appears to be that, having reached a conclusion that she was not going to be successful in her review, the Tribunal ought to have put to her its conclusions so that she could have rebutted them.
2. In my view, there is nothing emanating from grounds 2 or 7, even when understood in the manner explained by the applicant at hearing today, which gives rise to a jurisdictional error.

1. By ground 5, the applicants take issue with the Tribunal's finding that if the applicant had been the subject of an investigation in China, she would have been unlikely to have obtained a passport and to have freely departed China.
2. When asked to speak to this ground, the applicant said that she was questioned by the PSB three times, and so she asked her husband to organise her a visa. The applicant says that she was only put on a wanted list in China after she had departed for Australia. The applicant says that it is for this reason that she alleges that the Tribunal drew conclusions based on unfair personal opinions.
3. It appears that the explanation the applicant proffered indicates a misunderstanding on her part that the purpose, in one sense, of a judicial review application is to explain to the Court further evidence which might have countered the Tribunal's factual conclusions. If this be so, it is misconceived and, as noted above, the Court explained to the applicants on a number of occasions today that that is no part of its jurisdiction.
4. Moreover, and as the solicitor for the first respondent pointed out at hearing, the explanation in relation to the applicant having only been placed on the wanted list after her arrival in Australia was in fact given by the applicant to the Tribunal (CB 155 at bullet point 4). The Tribunal took that explanation into account, yet still found it was unlikely that the applicant would have been able to leave freely if, as she claimed, she had been subjected in the recent past immediately prior to her departure to three interrogations, during which she claims to have been tortured and inhumanely treated. The first respondent says that the Tribunal's findings in this regard were open to it. As with ground 4, the first respondent submits that this ground rises no higher than a complaint against the merits of the Tribunal's decision. I agree with the foregoing submissions.
5. To the extent that the ground also repeats the same aspects of the grounds raised in grounds 2, 3 and 4 above, I would make the same findings here as I did in respect of SZLSP (supra).

1. The final ground, which has not been individually addressed, is ground 8, by which the applicants allege that the findings about the first applicant's attendance at CAG in Australia are "invalid" because they rely on "misstated information".
2. The applicant says she was unable to provide information about CAG members because this was sensitive information. Though not raised clearly, this ground appears to take issue with the Tribunal's findings at [27] (CB 161) about its concerns with the applicant's inability to provide details of the CAG church she allegedly attended in Australia and the names of the leaders.
3. The first respondent says this complaint seeks impermissible merits review.
4. The applicant spoke to this ground at hearing, saying that the Tribunal had asked her about providing a written statement, but that CAG does not give out statements. The applicant says the Tribunal could have easily called the church to verify that it would not provide such information. The suggestion appears to be an allegation that the Tribunal had a duty to inquire, such as that duty is understood by reference to cases such as Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 111 ALD 15 per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel (as her Honour the Chief Justice then was) and Bell JJ. If that be so, I reject it as giving rise to any such error.
5. The test requires the applicants to establish that there was an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which was easily ascertainable. The somewhat circuitous nature of the allegation in this case is that the applicant, when being questioned about her activities in Australia, refused to provide information to the Tribunal, apparently on the basis of secrecy. As the Tribunal found (CB 161 at [27]:

Fifthly, the applicant was not able to provide details of the CAG church she claimed that she attends in Australia because she said that it was secret. For this reason she also could not provide names of the leader. The Tribunal questioned her about why the church needs to remain secret in Australia, as people can practice religion freely in Australia. She said that this was how the church operated, but as discussed with the applicant at hearing, she g the names of brothers and sisters and their contact details. CAG can in fact be located easily online by typing the words 'Church of Almighty God' into a search engine. Sources indicate that CAG has a sophisticated online presence (Dunn, E, 'Lightning from the East: Heterodoxy and Christianity in Contemporary China', e-book, p. 202). The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was attending a CAG church in Australia as if she had been doing so, she would have been able to verify this attendance by providing details of the church including the location of the church and its leaders, as well as by providing references from church members or corroborative documents.

1. Accordingly, to the extent that the applicant now suggests that the Tribunal ought to have made inquiries of CAG, I reject any suggestion that even if there was a critical fact, by her own description, the existence of it was not easily ascertainable because the applicant herself was refusing to disclose information to the Tribunal. It is no answer, as the applicant suggested to the Court today, to say that the Tribunal could easily have found that information online, because that somewhat undermines her own evidence given to the Tribunal that the information was secret.
2. In any event I am not satisfied that ground 8 as it is presently expressed, nor how it was particularised at the hearing today, gives rise to a jurisdictional error. As the first respondent submits, and I agree, this complaint seeks merits review. The Tribunal was under no obligation to uncritically accept any and all allegations made by the applicant: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 1253; (1994) 52 FCR 437 per Beaumont J. It was for the applicant to provide her evidence and arguments in sufficient detail to enable the Tribunal to reach the requisite state of satisfaction: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 per Heerey, Conti & Jacobson JJ at [76]. Ground 8 is not made out.

1. Overall, I am satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is not affected by jurisdictional error as alleged, or at all.
2. In the absence of any jurisdiction error, the decision is a privative clause decision and must be dismissed. I will so order.

1. Consequent on my dismissal of the application, the solicitor for the first respondent seeks an order that the applicants pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements of the proceedings fixed in the sum of $5,400.00. When asked to address the question of whether costs ought follow the event and, if so, in what amount, the applicants said "it's a lot", and that my decision was "unfair, as [she] is a genuine believer in [CAG]".
2. I am satisfied that there is no reason in these proceedings to depart from the ordinary rule that costs should follow the event. I am further satisfied that that the amount sought is reasonable. Accordingly, I will make an order in the terms sought by the first respondent.

I certify that the preceding eighty (80) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

[1] See BTQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 2101