ENH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 61

In support of these claims, the applicant provided the following evidentiary material to the Department:[9]

ENH19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 61 | Case summary | Zoe

[12]

At [85]-[89], the Tribunal recorded that it discussed with the applicant country information indicating that the security situation in Pakistan had improved, including conditions affecting Pathans. It noted the country information the applicant had provided to both the Department and to the Tribunal. It considered the information provided to the Department to be out of date, but had regard to the more recent country information submitted directly to the Tribunal.
At [91]-[92], the Tribunal recorded that a non-disclosure certificate under s 438 of the Act had been issued in relation to one page of the Department's file, said to relate to internal Departmental deliberations. The document was described as an identification test. The Tribunal informed the applicant that the document was not relevant to its review and that the s 438 certificate was invalid because the stated reason for non‑disclosure could not support a public interest immunity claim.
At [93]-[109], the Tribunal concluded that, having regard to its factual findings, the applicant was not a witness of truth and had fabricated his material claims in order to obtain a protection visa. It accepted that he is a Sunni Muslim of Pathan/Pashtun ethnicity, born in Rawalpindi, that his father died in 1995, and that his immediate family principally remains in Pakistan. However, it rejected his claims that his father was murdered, that the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, Daesh or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a local political youth group, the police or any other actor had ever sought to recruit, harm or otherwise target him, or that he had any personal interactions with such groups. It similarly did not accept that his brother was of adverse interest to any of those groups. While accepting the applicant may have experienced some societal discrimination as a Pashtun, the Tribunal was not satisfied that this amounted to serious or significant harm, nor that he would be unable to obtain State protection. It rejected his assertions of ongoing threats, mental instability, or any need to live in hiding. The Tribunal found that there was no real chance of serious harm, nor any real risk of significant harm, arising now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if the applicant were to return to Pakistan; that any risk from generalised violence was remote; and that he neither left Pakistan nor feared returning for the reasons he claimed. Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria for a protection visa under ss 36(2)(a) or 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

[28]

(i) In relation to inconsistencies asserted at Decision [21]-[22], [33]-[35], [36]-[37], [38][40], [41]-[46], [47]-[51], [74]-[75] the Tribunal failed to articulate their significance, consider innocent explanations for them, articulate why the applicant's explanation was not accepted, and/or the asserted consistency are in any event not evident.

(ii) In finding that the applicant's conduct in Pakistan and Australia was inconsistent with his life being at risk in Pakistan at Decision [52]-[60], the Tribunal relied on unwarranted assumptions lacking an evidentiary foundation that were not matters of "ordinary human experience" as to the financial position and perception of risk of the applicant and his uncle and the speed and manner in which a person having reached safety would investigate the availability of legal advice including free legal advice and the matters they would raise with their agent and their agent's response. It also relied on unfounded "inconsistencies" as to the applicant's intentions to study in Australia and the possibility of later moving elsewhere from Australia.

(iii) In relying on communications purportedly between the applicant and Curtin University as affecting the applicant's credibility and veracity, the authenticity of documents relied upon by him, including death certificates of his father (at [23]-[32], [62]-[73) the Tribunal rejected his explanation that he was unaware of the communications and they may have been made by his agent without his knowledge while ignoring or summarily disregarding critical documentary evidence that supported the applicant's account (at CB33, CB53, CB 152, CB151, CB166, CB167-168). It otherwise rejected certain evidence of the applicant without explanation or justification (at [30]-[32], [45]).

(iv) Unless the final sentence of Decision [45] contains a typographical error, then the Tribunal's reliance on a reference from Land Lord as undermining the applicant's case is irrational and illogical as it accepts the possibility of the letter having been provided by the applicant's agent without his knowledge.

(v) The Tribunal's treatment of the FIRs (at Decision [76]-[84]) which supported the applicant's claims reflected an impermissible predisposition to discount and disbelieve corroborative material, in the course of which the Tribunal disregarded supportive aspect of the FIRs, asserted inconsistencies without considering their significance and possible innocent explanations, and relied upon unwarranted assumptions that lacked any evidentiary foundation as further particularised in the applicant's submissions.

(vi) The Tribunal's conclusion that any checks as to the authenticity of FIRs conducted by the Tribunal were unlikely to produce conclusive evidence (at Decision [83]) lacked an evident and intelligible foundation, and was legally unreasonable.

[29]

On 28 February 2025, my Chambers listed this matter for final hearing before me at 2.15 pm on 15 April 2025. Orders were made for the filing of written submissions, any affidavit evidence to be relied upon, and for the applicant to further amend the application if they so wish. The applicant's deadline for compliance was 18 March 2025, and the first respondent's deadline was 1 April 2025.
On 13 March 2025, the parties sought an extension of one week in order to file the required documents. Accordingly, on 13 March 2025, I made further orders, by consent, extending the time for compliance such that the applicant was to file their material by 25 March 2025, and the Minister was to file their material by 8 April 2025.
On 8 April 2025, the parties sought a further extension in order to file certain documents. Accordingly, on 11 April 2025, I made further orders nunc pro tunc, by consent, extending the time for compliance such that the applicant was to file any affidavit evidence to be relied upon by 4.00 pm on 8 April 2025, and the Minister was to file their written submissions by 4.00 pm on 9 April 2025.
The hearing on 15 April 2025 commenced at 2.39 pm and concluded at 4.17 pm. During the hearing, it became apparent, after approximately ninety minutes of the applicant's oral submissions, that the matter could not be fully heard that day. At that point, the applicant's Counsel, Mr Bhasin, had not progressed beyond addressing the first of the fifteen credibility matters the applicant had sought to impugn. Following discussion with Mr Bhasin and with the Minister's representative Mr Hillyard, it became clear that both parties would need to substantially revise their written submissions in order to more clearly address the relevant issues and applicable law. I identified that it would assist the Court if the applicant were first to prepare a tabular summary of the revised written submissions setting out: the credibility matter in issue and the corresponding paragraphs of the Tribunal's decision; the evidence said to underpin the impugned finding (if any); any further evidence said to have required consideration by the Tribunal; the alleged category of jurisdictional error together with a brief explanation; and pinpoint references to any authorities said to support the applicant's contention. Once prepared, the Minister could then insert a summary response in the final, otherwise blank, column of that table. Accordingly, on 15 April 2025, I made further orders adjourning the matter to 10.15 am on 13 June 2025, and directing the applicant to file supplementary written submissions (being the amended written submissions and the tabular summary) by 2 May 2025, with the Minister to file supplementary written submissions (being the amended written submissions and the response to the applicant's tabular summary) by 19 May 2025.
The hearing on 13 June 2025 commenced at 10.22 am and concluded at 1.19 pm. As the earlier hearing had been adjourned due to the length of the applicant's oral submissions, Mr Bhasin indicated that he would require approximately ninety minutes for his submissions, with a further ten minutes in reply to the Minister's oral submissions. Mr Hillyard informed the Court that the Minister would require no more than thirty minutes. The parties' oral submissions were confined to specific references to the material filed pursuant to the orders of 15 April 2025, and no reliance was placed on any previously filed written submissions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the proceeding was adjourned and judgment was reserved.
Therefore, the materials before the Court that are relevant to my determination of this application are:

[47]

52 As Robertson J put it in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at 137 [148], for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, "extreme" illogicality or irrationality must be shown, "measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions". And as McKerracher J (with whom Reeves J agreed) emphasised in SZOOR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCAFC 58; (2012) 202 FCR 1 (at 22-23 [84]), a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion.

...

54 ... The judgment of Crennan and Bell JJ in SZMDS reveals that jurisdictional error may be able to be established on the basis of illogical reasoning or illogical or irrational findings "on the way" to the final conclusion (see 648 [132]): see also SZRKT at 137-138 [151]-[153]; SZWCO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 51 at [61]- [62].

55 Nevertheless, allegations of illogical or irrational reasoning or findings of fact must be considered against the framework of the inquiry being whether or not there has been jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal: SZRKT at 137 [148]. The overarching question is whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by jurisdictional error: SZRKT at 137-138 [151]. Even if an aspect of reasoning, or a particular factual finding, is shown to be irrational or illogical, jurisdictional error will generally not be established if that reasoning or finding of fact was immaterial, or not critical to, the ultimate conclusion or end result: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZOCT [2010] FCAFC 159; (2010) 189 FCR 577 at 598-599 [83]- [84] (Nicholas J); SZNKO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 123 at [113]. Where the impugned finding is but one of a number of findings that independently may have led to the Tribunal's ultimate conclusion, jurisdictional error will generally not be made out: SZRLQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 566; (2013) 135 ALD 276 at 291 [66]; at [64]-[67].

56 An irrational or illogical finding, or irrational or illogical reasoning leading to a finding, by the Tribunal that the review applicant was not a credible or honest witness may in some circumstances lead to a finding of jurisdictional error. That would particularly be the case where the adverse credibility finding was critical to the Tribunal's decision that it was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the grant of a visa. Whilst it is frequently said that findings as to credit are entirely matters for the Tribunal, such findings do not shield the Tribunal's decision-making processes from scrutiny: SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31]. Considerable caution must, however, be exercised before too readily acceding to a proposition that adverse findings as to credit expose jurisdictional error: SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1089; (2015) 233 FCR 451 at 455-456 [14]- [15]. That is because assertions of illogicality and irrationality can all too readily be used to conceal what is in truth simply an attack on the merits of the Tribunal's findings and decision. In SZMDS, Crennan and Bell JJ (at 636 [96]) made it plain that the deployment of illogicality or irrationality to achieve merits review should not be sanctioned.

[59]

26. Consistently with its task on review, and bearing the reality to which the Full Court in W375/01A referred steadily in mind, appropriate attention has to be given by a decision-maker (here, the Tribunal) to all relevant material in making a finding of inconsistency which then underpins an adverse credibility assessment. As will shortly emerge, this did not occur here because the Tribunal overlooked what the appellant had earlier told a Departmental officer at the appellant's interview and this material was highly relevant to the question whether the appellant had given inconsistent evidence in support of his case.

27. Secondly, the term "inconsistency" should be used with appropriate caution and an appreciation of the danger of using labels or formulae which mask the need for deeper analysis. As we have noted above, adverse credibility findings might be based on a variety of matters, including inconsistencies between, for example, evidence or claims made at different stages of the decision-making process or differences between oral evidence and contemporaneous documents. In some circumstances a visa applicant may raise a claim for the first time at an advanced stage of the decision-making process and the failure to raise the claim previously may well be relevant to credibility, but that is not to say that this is correctly described as an inconsistency.

28. Thirdly, even where it is reasonably open to find that a person has given inconsistent evidence, the decision-maker needs to assess the significance of that inconsistency and the weight to be given to it. This requires consideration of, for example, the significance of the inconsistency having regard to the person's case as a whole and whether the inconsistency is on a matter which is central to the person's case or is at its periphery and involves an objectively minor matter of fact. It also requires the decision maker to remain conscious of the particular challenges facing asylum seekers in giving accounts of why they fear persecution, including that they may have to give multiple accounts, using interpreters, and that they may reasonably expect an interview or a review process will provide an opportunity for them to elaborate on, or explain, the narratives they have previously given. Consideration should also be given to whether there is an acceptable explanation for the person having given inconsistent evidence such that the fact of the inconsistency should attract little, if any, weight. How all these matters are weighed and evaluated in a particular case is a matter for the decision-maker, but a failure by the decision-maker to appreciate the particular nature of the task, or to perform it reasonably and fairly, may be the subject of judicial review.

[76]

[46] It is plainly not necessary for the Tribunal to refer to every piece of evidence and every contention made by an applicant in its written reasons. It may be that some evidence is irrelevant to the criteria and some contentions misconceived. Moreover, there is a distinction between the Tribunal failing to advert to evidence which, if accepted, might have led it to make a different finding of fact (cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [87]-[97]) and a failure by the Tribunal to address a contention which, if accepted, might establish that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. The Tribunal is not a court. It is an administrative body operating in an environment which requires the expeditious determination of a high volume of applications. Each of the applications it decides is, of course, of great importance. Some of its decisions may literally be life and death decisions for the applicant. Nevertheless, it is an administrative body and not a court and its reasons are not to be scrutinised 'with an eye keenly attuned to error'. Nor is it necessarily required to provide reasons of the kind that might be expected of a court of law.

[47] The inference that the Tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where however there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the Tribunal's review of the delegate's decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.

(emphasis added)

[84]

24. Consistently with well-established authority in different statutory contexts, there can be no doubt that a decision-maker must read, identify, understand and evaluate the representations. Adopting and adapting what Kiefel J (as her Honour then was) said in Tickner v Chapman, the decision-maker must have regard to what is said in the representations, bring their mind to bear upon the facts stated in them and the arguments or opinions put forward, and appreciate who is making them. From that point, the decision-maker might sift them, attributing whatever weight or persuasive quality is thought appropriate. The weight to be afforded to the representations is a matter for the decision-maker. And the decision-maker is not obliged "to make actual findings of fact as an adjudication of all material claims" made by a former visa holder.

25. It is also well-established that the requisite level of engagement by the decision-maker with the representations must occur within the bounds of rationality and reasonableness. What is necessary to comply with the statutory requirement for a valid exercise of power will necessarily depend on the nature, form and content of the representations. The requisite level of engagement - the degree of effort needed by the decision-maker - will vary, among other things, according to the length, clarity and degree of relevance of the representations. The decision-maker is not required to consider claims that are not clearly articulated or which do not clearly arise on the materials before them.

26. Labels like "active intellectual process" and "proper, genuine and realistic consideration" must be understood in their proper context. These formulas have the danger of creating "a kind of general warrant, invoking language of indefinite and subjective application, in which the procedural and substantive merits of any [decision‑maker's] decision can be scrutinised". That is not the correct approach. As Mason J stated in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd, "[t]he limited role of a court reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion must constantly be borne in mind". The court does not substitute its decision for that of an administrative decision-maker.

27. None of the preceding analysis detracts from, or is inconsistent with, established principle that, for example, if review of a decision‑maker's reasons discloses that the decision‑maker ignored, overlooked or misunderstood relevant facts or materials or a substantial and clearly articulated argument; misunderstood the applicable law; or misunderstood the case being made by the former visa holder, that may give rise to jurisdictional error.

[90]

At hearing before me, Mr Bhasin substantially reiterated the applicant's written submissions at AS[9]-[14] and argued that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the first credibility matter.[22] He submitted that the errors fell within those identified in Ground 1(a), and in support of that contention he relied upon EVI19 at [42]-[45] and BEL16 at [16]-[21], [53]-[56].
Mr Bhasin submitted the Tribunal asserted an inconsistency between the applicant's claim in his first written statement that his father was killed by unknown men because he was a Pathan and his explanation at interview with the delegate that his father was killed by individuals linked to Mr B because of his charity work in Balochistan. It was argued that the Tribunal's approach reveals two distinct errors: first, there is no evident inconsistency; and second, to the extent that there is any inconsistency, the Tribunal failed to articulate the reasons why it was significant to the assessment of the applicant's credibility.
In relation to the first alleged error, the applicant submitted the Tribunal erred in characterising his evidence regarding the killing of his father as inconsistent. He pointed out that, in his first written statement, he stated that 'locals knew that my father was shot an killed by unknown men because he was as Pathan', and that an FIR was lodged but no action was taken.[23] At his Departmental interview, he explained that his father was killed due to his charity work in Balochistan and that those responsible were linked to a powerful local political figure, Mr B.[24] Before the Tribunal, he further clarified that although the assailants themselves remained unknown, it was understood that Mr B - then head of a local youth group and now participating in the election for Pakistan People's Party - was connected to those responsible.[25] The applicant argued that there is no inconsistency in identifying the assailants as 'unknown men' while also stating that police and locals knew they were connected to a political figure; the two propositions were not mutually exclusive. As to motive, the applicant submitted the Tribunal similarly misunderstood the coherence of his account. His central claim was that, as ethnic Pathans/Pashtuns, he and his family were perceived as aligned with Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. The applicant contended that there was no inconsistency between saying that his father was killed because he was a Pathan and explaining that this was in the context of his father's assistance to Afghan Pathans through his charity work. My attention was drawn to the Tribunal's decision at [88], where it noted the applicant's evidence that 'his father was helping Afghan refugees', along with the Tribunal's failure to record in its decision the following written statement of the applicant in his first written statement:[26]

[93]

53. Further, it seems to me that if there was some discrepancy, the Tribunal was required to have regard to its significance and centrality and to explain why the discrepancy justified any rejection of the appellant's account. But it did not. It stated that it "consider[ed] the significance of these discrepancies" (at [69]), but never meaningfully elaborated on why they were significant rather than insignificant or why they were central rather than peripheral, and I mean central and significant to the appellant's truthfulness and credibility.

54. I agree with the appellant that the discrepancies identified (at [68]) do not go substantively to the appellant's credibility. Their subject matter was the appellant's speculation, which was based on second-hand opinion hearsay, as to the content of the corporate mind of the CID. It is apparent that to ask why the CID was pursuing a person, indeed primarily the appellant's father and uncle, was to invite speculation. The appellant could not know the answer. He was not the CID. And the CID had not told the appellant its motivations. Relevantly, he could only speculate based on what his uncle said to him about what his uncle thought was in the CID's mind.

55. Moreover, if the appellant speculated wrongly, it does not follow that he was not to be believed on the objective factual elements of his version of events where he did have first-hand knowledge. Any number of other explanations could be plausible as to his wrong speculation. For example, wrong speculation might more readily be explained by the innocent possibility of the appellant simply guessing wrongly, misunderstanding what he had been told, being given only a partial explanation, or being misinformed. But none of such possibilities could justify a finding that the appellant was not truthful or credible on the essential factual elements of which he had first-hand knowledge.

56. Indeed, and as counsel submitted, the appellant's knowledge of the CID's motivations based on second-hand speculation was peripheral in one sense. The central aspects relevant to the appellant's truthfulness were what had happened to the appellant.

[95]

The Minister submitted that, contrary to AS[12], there is a clear and inherent inconsistency in the applicant's accounts concerning his father's murder.[27] In his first written statement, the applicant claimed his father was killed because of his ethnicity, whereas before the delegate at interview he asserted that his father was killed because of his charity work. The Minister argued that these are fundamentally different motives: harm inflicted on a person because of their ethnicity is distinct from harm arising from the work they perform, which can apply irrespective of ethnicity. The fact that the applicant's father was a Pathan who worked with other Pathans did not, in the Minister's view, bridge that distinction, particularly as that was not an explanation the applicant offered before the Tribunal. Accordingly, it was open to the Tribunal to regard the differing accounts as inconsistent.
The Minister further submitted that the applicant's evidence as to the identity of his father's killers also shifted. Whereas the applicant first asserted that the assailants were unknown, he later claimed that they were connected to Mr B. The Tribunal put this discrepancy to the applicant at hearing and explained its relevance to his credibility. While the applicant contended at AS[14] that the delegate interview account was merely more expansive, that was not the explanation he provided to the Tribunal. Instead, he stated that a First Information Report was lodged against unknown persons but that '[Mr B] was the head of the local youth group', which did not grapple with the inconsistency identified. He otherwise gave no explanation for the change between the information provided in his first written statement and at interview. In these circumstances, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the inconsistency was not resolved and that its concerns about the applicant's credibility were not alleviated.
The Minister accepted that merely expanding on an earlier account does not necessarily indicate unreliability, but submitted that this principle only applies where the later account is, in truth, an expansion rather than a contradiction. Here, the Minister argued, the applicant's later version was not an elaboration but a different explanation. Jurisdictional error cannot be established simply because an applicant might have provided a different explanation or because another decision‑maker might have taken a different view. The question is whether the Tribunal could, on the evidence, rationally conclude that the applicant's accounts were inconsistent. The Minister submitted that it plainly could.

[96]

Having carefully considered the parties' submissions, the material before the Tribunal and its reasons as a whole, I am generally persuaded by the Minister's submissions. There was a clear and inherent inconsistency before the Tribunal in the applicant's accounts of both who killed his father and why.
As to the identity of the assailants, the applicant was unequivocal in his first written statement when he stated that his father was killed by 'unknown men' and that the police took no action to apprehend them. Although the applicant's later assertion before the delegate - that the assailants were connected to Mr B - could arguably be characterised as an elaboration of the earlier account, it remained open to the Tribunal to regard the difference as an inconsistency given the omission of such a significant detail when the claim was first presented. This is particularly so because, when afforded an opportunity at the hearing, the applicant did not explain why he had omitted any reference to the alleged connection to Mr B from his first written statement, nor did he offer an explanation that meaningfully engaged with the inconsistency. On that basis, the Tribunal's finding of inconsistency was open to it for the reasons it gave.
Similarly, regarding motive, the applicant asserted in his first written statement that his father was killed because he was a Pathan, whereas before the delegate the applicant said his father had been killed because of his charity work in Balochistan. These are, on their face, materially different explanations. It was not apparent on the evidence exactly what the charity work performed by the applicant's father entailed, or whether any such work was inherently tied to his father's ethnicity in a way that would reconcile the two accounts. I do not accept the applicant's submission that his testimony at hearing - that his father helped Afghan refugees, as recorded at [88] - and the similar passage in his first written statement that his father 'was helping Pathans who are refugees from Afghanistan' compels an inference that this was the charity work referred to in the delegate interview. Again, when given the opportunity before the Tribunal to address the inconsistency, the applicant did not provide an explanation that engaged with, or resolved, the discrepancy. In these circumstances, the Tribunal's finding of inconsistency was open to it.
Finally, while the Tribunal did not specifically articulate why these discrepancies were significant rather than insignificant, or why they were central rather than peripheral to the applicant's truthfulness and credibility, it is apparent from the reasons read as a whole that the Tribunal regarded the father's death as a central feature of the applicant's narrative, having referred to it at [12] and [14]. The discrepancies the Tribunal identified went to the substance of the applicant's credibility because they concerned matters at the core of his claim - namely, who killed his father and why - and they bore directly upon the nature of the feared harm and the actors said to be responsible. They were matters on which the Tribunal reasonably expected a fulsome and consistent account, or at least a cogent explanation for any inconsistency. Although the applicant was seven years old at the time of his father's death, the Tribunal did not invite speculation about matters outside his knowledge; rather, it addressed the inconsistent versions contained in his own accounts and afforded him an opportunity to explain the differences. In circumstances where the applicant did not provide an explanation that reconciled the inconsistency regarding identity (from 'unknown men' to persons linked to Mr B) or motive (from ethnicity to charity work), it was open to the Tribunal to treat those discrepancies as significant to credibility and central to the claim, and to conclude that its concerns had not been alleviated. The Tribunal's approach did not involve the error identified in BEL16, but reflected a permissible evaluation of credibility grounded in the applicant's own statements and the issues central to his claim.
Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal's first credibility matter does not reveal error.

[98]

By the second credibility matter, the Tribunal observed that the applicant had provided evidence with three different dates of death and two different causes of death for his father. That evidence was set out across his student visa application, his dealings with his Australian university, and in his protection visa application. Further, the applicant had provided death certificates containing inconsistent details - including different names for his father. The Tribunal rejected his explanations of translation errors and his denial of having provided documents to his Australian university, finding these assertions inconsistent with his own evidence and the circumstances of his enrolment. The Tribunal considered that the inconsistencies, the likely submission of false or inauthentic documents, the absence of independent verification, and the applicant's incentive to present a murder narrative in support of his protection claims all undermined the reliability of the death certificates and cast serious doubt on the authenticity of his evidence about his father's death.
By the twelfth credibility matter, the Tribunal considered that the applicant's communications with his Australian university had significantly damaged his credibility because they showed that he had knowingly given false information shortly after his arrival in Australia. Although Departmental records confirm that he entered Australia in June 2014, the university's records revealed that on 9 July 2014 - less than a month later - he falsely claimed that he was 'unable to travel to Australia' and sought to withdraw from his course and obtain a refund, later asserting that he had already returned to Pakistan and asking that his studies be deferred. When confronted with these contradictions, the applicant attempted to shift responsibility to his agent, asserting that the agent must have communicated with the university, possibly using the applicant's identity, and that he personally had no knowledge of the correspondence. The Tribunal rejected these explanations for four reasons. First, all correspondence was sent from the applicant's own email address, undermining his claim that the agent acted independently or used a different identity. Second, the agent would have had no financial motive to pursue a refund because any refunded fees would be payable to the applicant, not to the agent. Third, the applicant's own evidence showed that the agent's role ended once the student visa was granted, making it implausible that the agent continued engaging with the university after the applicant had already arrived in Australia. Fourth, the applicant's conduct was consistent with his stated lack of intention to study in Australia and with an attempt to recover some of the costs associated with obtaining the student visa. Taken together, these factors led the Tribunal to conclude that the applicant knowingly provided false information to the university, and that his explanations were implausible and unsupported. This conduct further eroded his credibility and the reliability of his claims.
By the thirteenth credibility matter, the Tribunal found that the applicant's conduct with his Australian university raised serious concerns about the authenticity of documents he later relied upon and about his overall credibility. Despite never having departed Australia after arriving in June 2014, he informed the university in August and September 2014 that his father had died in July 2014 and submitted a death certificate and a bank letter purporting to confirm his father's recent death. This directly contradicted his later claim, in his protection visa application, that his father was killed in 1995. When confronted with this, the applicant asserted that his agent must have been corresponding with the university, claiming he could not have been doing so himself 'because he was in Australia'. The Tribunal considered this explanation to be nonsensical because the correspondence was sent from and received at the applicant's own email address, and being physically in Australia posed no barrier to emailing an Australian institution. His further assertion - that the agent was communicating on his behalf without his knowledge - was rejected as implausible, given that the agent had no financial incentive to obtain a refund payable solely to the applicant, and given the applicant's earlier claim that he had no ongoing contact with the agent. His alternative suggestion that the agent used his 'ID under another name' was speculative, unsupported and inconsistent with the fact that the communications bore his own details. The Tribunal concluded that even if the agent had assisted, the applicant must have been aware of the correspondence and the documents being sent. It further noted that if the death certificate he now relies on - showing death in 1995 - is authentic, then the 2014 death certificate he submitted to the university must necessarily have been fake. This led the Tribunal to conclude that false documents had been provided, and that the applicant's implausible and contradictory explanations further undermined his credibility and the reliability of his evidence.

[99]

The applicant submitted that the Tribunal's second, twelfth and thirteenth credibility findings were affected by jurisdictional error because they were based on an unwarranted rejection of his explanation concerning communications with his Australian university, and because the Tribunal failed to consider material corroborative evidence. He contended that the Tribunal placed significant weight on communications purportedly made on his behalf with the university, which it treated as undermining the authenticity of his father's death certificates (second credibility matter at [23]-[32]), as raising broader concerns about his credibility (twelfth credibility matter at [62]-[69]), and as calling into question the authenticity of documents he relied upon (thirteenth credibility matter at [70]-[73]).
The applicant argued that the Tribunal erred in rejecting his consistent evidence that he had been unaware of those communications and believed they may have been undertaken by his agent without his knowledge. He pointed to documentary material in the record said to support that explanation, which the Tribunal did not engage with. In particular, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal's conclusion at [69] - that his agent could not have benefitted from seeking a refund because any refund would be payable to him - was contradicted by a letter addressed to his university in which he requested a refund of his fees be sent to a person described as his 'cousin' and a Refund/Transfer Request Form listing that person's bank account details.[28] He also relied on an email exchange between the university and another individual,[29] said to be consistent with a broader practice by his agent of seeking refunds for its own benefit once clients were in Australia.
The applicant further submitted that the Tribunal's reliance at [68] on the use of 'his email address' failed to account for evidence that the communications with the university were sent to and from a yahoo.com email address, whereas he used a hotmail.com email address for his protection visa application and communications with the Department. He argued that the Tribunal recited, but did not meaningfully assess, his explanation that the agent may have used an email account purporting to be his, and gave no reasoned basis for rejecting that account. He contended that the Tribunal's failure to consider this corroborative material vitiated each of the impugned credibility findings, which were interrelated and infected by the same error identified in Ground 1(b). In support of these contentions, he relied upon BEL16 at [16(b)], SZRKT at [112] and Applicant WAEE at [47].

[100]

The Minister submitted that the applicant's challenges to the Tribunal's second, twelfth and thirteenth credibility findings were not made out, because the Tribunal had regard to the totality of the evidence before it, afforded the applicant procedural fairness, and was entitled to reject his explanation concerning the university communications. As to the second credibility matter ([23]-[32]), the Minister emphasised that the Tribunal undertook a detailed comparison of the multiple death certificates provided at different stages of the applicant's migration history, noting significant inconsistencies in the name, date and cause of death recorded on each document. It was submitted that the Tribunal expressly put these inconsistencies to the applicant under s 424AA of the Act, and that it was open to the Tribunal to conclude that the discrepancies could not be explained by translation error or misunderstanding, particularly when the applicant's own identity documents consistently recorded his father's name as 'S__ A__ K__' while the death certificates variously recorded his father's name as 'M__ A__ K__' and 'S__ A__ K__'. For privacy and other reasons, I have deidentified the father's name as it appears on the death certificates.
The Minister argued that the Tribunal was entitled to rely on the correspondence between the applicant and the university as one part of the evidentiary matrix identifying inconsistencies in his account, while also noting that it was not the sole basis for the Tribunal's adverse findings. The Tribunal also considered photographic evidence and undertook online research in an attempt to verify the date and cause of the father's death. The Minister submitted that the applicant bore the burden of establishing that relevant evidence had been overlooked, and that no such failure was demonstrated.
In relation to the twelfth and thirteenth credibility matters ([62]-[69], [70]-[73]), the Minister submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to treat the university correspondence as relevant to both the applicant's general credibility and the authenticity of documents provided to the Department and the Tribunal. The materials before the Tribunal included emails from an address used by the applicant for his student visa application, in which he asserted that his father had recently died and was sponsoring his studies, as well as a signed letter requesting that a refund be paid to a person described as his cousin. The Minister submitted that, in light of the totality of the documentary evidence, it was open to the Tribunal to reject the applicant's claim that these materials had been fabricated or submitted by an agent without his knowledge, particularly given the absence of any evidence before the Tribunal - or before the Court - demonstrating the existence of such an agent or supporting the allegations made about the agent's conduct.
The Minister submitted that the applicant's arguments ultimately amounted to disagreement with factual findings that were reasonably open to the Tribunal. The Tribunal had considered, but was unpersuaded by, the applicant's explanation, and gave cogent reasons for rejecting it. On that basis, the Minister argued that no jurisdictional error was established in respect of any of the impugned credibility findings.

[101]

I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions. The applicant's submissions do little more than invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review. It is of concern to the Court that these arguments were advanced in circumstances where it is patently clear that the Tribunal adopted a legally permissible approach in assessing the applicant's credibility given the existence of evidentiary material which undermined his claims in relation to the father's death and other evidentiary material which indicated the applicant's willingness to provide false information to his Australian university about highly personal matters such as his father's death simply to gain access to a fee refund. It was entirely reasonable for the Tribunal to have identified these matters as having some bearing upon its credibility assessment and there is nothing before the Court which indicates that the Tribunal's concerns were not properly put to the applicant for explanation.
I reject the applicant's argument that the Tribunal failed to consider material corroborative evidence, namely the purportedly accurate death certificate and the various communications with the applicant's Australian university. In my view, that evidentiary material was closely considered and the Tribunal formed a view in relation to that material which was entirely open to it. In relation to the purportedly authentic death certificate, the Tribunal's concerns about that were not overcome by the applicant's various explanations and there is nothing to suggest that its rejection of those explanations was legally unreasonable. In relation to the applicant's communications with his Australian university and how they bore upon his credibility, the Tribunal's concerns about that were also not overcome by the applicant's various explanations and there is nothing to suggest that its rejection of those explanations was legally unreasonable.
Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal's second, twelfth and thirteenth credibility matters do not reveal error as contended by the applicant.

[110]

I am generally persuaded by the Minister's submissions. The applicant's submissions, for the most part, do little more than invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.
In relation to the applicant's submissions relating to an allegation that the Tribunal failed to take into account corroborative material supporting his account, including that his original student visa application recorded both versions of his father's name, I note that the Tribunal's reasons at [28] take issue with the discordance of the evidence in that regard. In my view, the Tribunal's reasons suggest either the Tribunal did not have regard to material in his student visa application which indicated that his father was known by the name of 'M__ A__ K__' and 'S__ A__ K__' or that this discordance was simply another inconsistency similar to that reflected in the inconsistent names provided in the death certificates. It is not for the Court to hypothesise what the Tribunal thought of the material in the applicant's student visa application which suggested that his father was known by both names. In the absence of reference to that material in its reasons, I am prepared to infer that the Tribunal had overlooked that material in its assessment rather than considered it and gave it no weight.
The question then arises as to whether this failure caused the Tribunal to be unduly sceptical of the authenticity of the applicant's evidence about the death of his father and thereby give rise to a finding that was legally unreasonable or otherwise rendered that finding to be lacking in an evident and intelligible justification. In answering this question, it is important to read the Tribunal's reasons as whole and recognise the Tribunal identified other bases upon which it was unprepared to accept the applicant's claims in relation to his father's death, namely the different dates of death and cause of death specified across the evidentiary material. In my view, the evidentiary material in relation to those two matters was closely considered and the Tribunal formed a view in relation to that material which was entirely open to it. Put simply, the Tribunal's concerns about the discordant information regarding the date and cause of death were not overcome by the applicant's various explanations and there is nothing to suggest that its rejection of those particular explanations was legally unreasonable.
While I acknowledge the Tribunal's error in relation to failing to identify and consider corroborative material concerning the possibility that the applicant's father was known by two different names, it is patently clear that the Tribunal otherwise adopted a legally permissible approach in assessing the applicant's credibility and the reliability of the evidentiary material said to support the claim that the applicant's father was murdered in 1995. On any view, that evidentiary material was inconsistent in significant ways extending well beyond the name of the applicant's father and it was entirely reasonable for the Tribunal to have identified those two separate inconsistencies relating to the timing and cause of death and put them to the applicant for explanation. There is also nothing to suggest the Tribunal failed to have regard to those explanations, or indeed the applicant having brought to the Tribunal's attention that his father had been known by both names. Given the two independent evidentiary bases upon which the Tribunal rested its adverse credibility finding in relation to the claims and evidence relating to the death of the applicant's father, the alleged error is not jurisdictional. As Beach J accepted in BEL16 at [25]:

[117]

Having considered the parties' submissions, I reject the applicant's contention. It proceeds from a fundamental misapprehension of the governing principles of legal unreasonableness and of the Court's strictly supervisory function on judicial review. As the Minister correctly submitted, the applicant's argument amounts to an invitation for the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.
The inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal concerned a central plank of the applicant's case: the alleged abduction, involving the deprivation of his liberty. In those circumstances, it was plainly open - indeed, orthodox - for the Tribunal to inquire about that event and expect a greater degree of internal coherence in the account, and to require more than the bare, repeated assertion that an abduction occurred. Nothing in the applicant's submissions demonstrates that expectation to be legally unreasonable; rather, the contention merely disputes evaluative findings that were reasonably available to the Tribunal on the material before it.
Notwithstanding the well‑recognised judicial authority acknowledging that applicants may experience difficulties recounting their claims consistently over time and across differing contexts, it was, in the circumstances of this case, not unreasonable for the Tribunal to expect a substantially higher degree of consistency. This was so given the seriousness of the claim of abduction, its obvious centrality to the applicant's protection claim, and the highly divergent accounts provided. No jurisdictional error is established.
While the Tribunal did not specifically articulate why these discrepancies were significant rather than insignificant, or why they were central rather than peripheral to the applicant's truthfulness and credibility, it is apparent from the reasons read as a whole that the Tribunal regarded the applicant's abduction as a central feature of his narrative, having referred to it at [12] of its decision. The discrepancies the Tribunal identified went to the substance of the applicant's credibility because they concerned matters at the core of his claim - namely, who had abducted him and why - and they bore directly upon the nature of the feared harm and the actors said to be responsible. They were matters on which one would reasonably expect a fulsome and consistent account, or at least a cogent explanation for any inconsistency. The Tribunal clearly identified the inconsistent versions contained in his own accounts of abduction and afforded him an opportunity to explain the differences. In circumstances where the applicant did not provide an explanation that reconciled the multiple inconsistencies, it was open to the Tribunal to treat those discrepancies as significant and central to its credibility assessment, and to conclude that its concerns had not been alleviated. The Tribunal's approach did not involve the error identified in BEL16, but reflected a permissible evaluation of credibility grounded in the applicant's own statements and the issues central to his claim.
Accordingly, I find that the Tribunal's third credibility matter does not reveal error.

[124]

By the fifth credibility matter, the Tribunal found that the applicant's claim to have been hiding with relatives and friends after August 2012 was incompatible with the information he gave in his protection visa application form that he worked continuously as a businessman in a private real estate business in Rawalpindi from May 2010 to June 2014. At the hearing, he gave yet another inconsistent account, stating that his only job was as a real estate agent, commencing in 2011 and ending in 2012 or 2013, after which he stopped work due to threats and simply obtained a visa and left Pakistan. These shifting accounts about whether, where and when he worked - combined with the implausibility of maintaining a stable job for four years while allegedly in hiding - led the Tribunal to conclude that his evidence was internally inconsistent and further undermined the credibility of his claims.
By the sixth credibility matter, the Tribunal also noted that the applicant's protection visa claim of working solely as a 'private Businessman' in a real estate business in Rawalpindi from 2010 to 2014 was inconsistent with his earlier student visa application, in which he stated that he had been employed as a Sales Executive at Land Lord Builders in Islamabad from May 2010 to March 2014[40] and had provided an accompanying employer reference.[41] His attempts to explain this discrepancy - asserting that Land Lord Builders was his friend's business, then that it was his brother's business, and that his agent submitted documents without his knowledge - introduced further contradictions, especially since he maintained elsewhere that he only ever held one job in Pakistan. The Tribunal considered it implausible that he was unaware of the letter from Land Lord Builders, given that his agent acted on his behalf and would have needed documents supplied or authorised by him. Taken together, these contradictions in his work history, the inconsistency about who owned Land Lord Builders, and the doubtful claim that he stopped working due to threats all contributed to the Tribunal's conclusion that his evidence was unreliable and cast significant doubt on the truthfulness of his claims.

[125]

The applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred in its treatment of the fifth and sixth credibility matters at [38]-[46], which addressed the consistency of his employment history with his claim to have been in hiding. In relation to [38] of the Tribunal's decision, the applicant argued that the Tribunal's finding - that his claimed period of hiding was inconsistent with specifying his occupation as a real estate businessman from May 2010 to June 2014 - was an impermissible finding of implausibility lacking any evidentiary foundation. He submitted that the Tribunal assumed, without inquiry or evidentiary basis, that a person in hiding could not continue to work in a limited or discreet manner. This, he contended, gave rise to the error identified in Ground 1(c), and in support of that contention he relied upon EVI119 at [73]-[81] and BOH17 at [6]-[7].
The applicant further submitted that the Tribunal did not explore with him the period for which he had been in hiding, nor did it consider the explanation he gave to the Department, as set out in the delegate's decision,[42] that he had no office, worked by telephone referrals, operated only on a small scale in a less populated area, encountered few people, and continued to do some work after 2012 to support his family. He contended that these matters were consistent with the explanation he gave to the Tribunal, recorded at [42] of the Tribunal's decision, and that the Tribunal failed to take them into account. He argued that the security risks of such limited work were not matters of 'ordinary human experience' that the Tribunal could assume without evidentiary support.
As to the remainder of the fifth credibility matter (at [39]-[40]) and the sixth (at [42]-[46]), the applicant submitted that the Tribunal wrongly characterised as inconsistencies the fact that he nominated a single occupation across the period while the nature and volume of his work varied over time. He argued that the Tribunal failed to undertake the careful analysis required before making an adverse credibility finding based on alleged inconsistency, thereby falling into the error identified in Ground 1(a). In support of that contention, he relied upon EVI19 at [42]-[45] and BEL16 at [16]-[21], [53].
Finally, the applicant submitted that the Tribunal relied on a reference letter from Land Lord Builders[43] without noting that the letter did not specify the period of his employment, and that it erroneously rejected, or implicitly rejected, his explanation that dealings in relation to his student visa application - including any reference letters - had been handled by his agent. He contended that the Tribunal's finding at [45], that it was 'highly unlikely' he would have been unaware of any such conduct by the agent, lacked foundation, repeated the error already raised in connection with earlier credibility matters, and gave rise to the error in Ground 1(b). In support of that contention, he relied upon BEL16 at [16(b)], SZRKT at [112] and Applicant WAEE at [47].

[126]

The Minister contended that the applicant misunderstands the Tribunal's findings at [38]-[39] and [41]-[46]. Those paragraphs of the Tribunal's decision grapple with the applicant's evidence both as to whether he was in hiding in Pakistan and as to his employment in Pakistan over the same period. The Tribunal's concerns were open to it for the detailed reasons it gave in those paragraphs; those concerns were put to the applicant at the hearing, and although the applicant responded, he did not explain the differing accounts he had given of his employment history.
By way of example, in testing whether the claim of hiding at the homes of friends and relatives was consistent with the information provided in the protection visa application form (in which he stated that he had worked as a private businessman in a private real estate business in Rawalpindi from May 2010 to June 2014),[44] the Tribunal queried the applicant's ability to maintain consistent employment for a four‑year period while in hiding as alleged. Although the applicant's details (work obtained by telephone and in the area of Bahria Town which is a privately owned gated community) were not expressly referred to at [38]-[40], it does not follow - contrary to AS[27] - that the Tribunal failed to consider that evidence. The Minister pointed out that, against the sixth credibility matter, the Tribunal expressly identified that the employment included phone‑based work and work in the privately owned gated community of Bahria Town and in Rawalpindi. On the Minister's case, the Tribunal considered the employment evidence insofar as it was relevant to the inconsistencies it had identified and put to the applicant for comment. The focus of the fifth credibility matter was not the micro‑details of the job, but the core concern that a claim of consistent employment over years was plainly at odds with a concurrent claim of hiding and fearing for safety during that period.
The Minister submitted it was open to the Tribunal to be sceptical, as it was, about the applicant being able to keep the same job, in the same location, for years while fearing for his safety and remaining in hiding. That conclusion did not depend - contrary to AS[28] - on the Tribunal invoking 'ordinary human experience'. Rather, the Tribunal could rely on the inherent implausibility of the asserted combination of facts, an implausibility that arose from the applicant's own evidence that he faced security risks sufficiently serious to require hiding for four years. The finding therefore rested on the applicant's evidence, not speculation or personal knowledge.
In addition, the Minister relied on the Tribunal's concerns about differing accounts of who the applicant worked for, who owned the company, what work he performed, and how long he worked there. Taken together, those matters provided a sound basis for the Tribunal's lack of satisfaction as to the veracity of the claims. The Minister submitted these findings were logically open for the reasons given by the Tribunal.
The Minister further submitted that, although another decision‑maker might have reached a different view, it cannot be said that no reasonable decision‑maker could have reached the Tribunal's conclusion on the information before it. The applicant's complaint, on the Minister's case, reduces to the proposition that once an explanation is offered for inconsistencies, the Tribunal is required to accept it - which is not the law. The Tribunal was not required to accept the explanation and gave reasons for rejecting it.
For completeness, the Minister contended that [45] of the Tribunal's decision contains a typographical error, and that on a fair reading the Tribunal meant it was 'highly unlikely that [the applicant] would not have been aware' that his agent was providing evidence to the Department on his behalf. On that basis, particular (iv) to Ground 1 is not made out.

[127]

I reject the applicant's contention. It is premised on a fundamental misapprehension of the doctrine of legal unreasonableness and of the Court's strictly supervisory role on judicial review. The submissions impermissibly invite the Court to re‑weigh the evidence and prefer a different evaluative outcome to that reached by the Tribunal. The Tribunal identified concrete discrepancies - drawn from the applicant's own evidence - between his asserted periods of hiding and his work history, put those matters to him, considered his explanations, and gave cogent reasons for rejecting them. Nothing in that process discloses legal unreasonableness, irrationality, or illogicality; it reflects an orthodox fact‑finding and credibility assessment that was open on the material.
The inconsistencies between the asserted continuous employment and the claimed periods of hiding (and the shifting accounts of whether, where and when the applicant worked) were squarely put and addressed. The Tribunal's reasoning demonstrates engagement with the substance of the explanations advanced, including the asserted telephone‑based work and the claimed reduction in activity, and explains why those explanations did not alleviate the credibility concerns. That evaluative conclusion was plainly open.
The applicant's submission that the Tribunal was required to conduct further inquiry into the duration of hiding, the applicant's whereabouts, and the precise nature of his work misconceives where the onus lay. It was for the applicant to advance sufficient evidence to assuage the Tribunal's concerns; the Tribunal was not obliged to embark on its own investigatory exercise in order to make out the applicant's claim or otherwise uncover an explanation that was sufficient in order to overcome its concerns. Read fairly and as a whole, the reasons disclose that the Tribunal considered the totality of the material before it and resolved the competing accounts by reference to identified inconsistencies and their significance. The applicant's invitation to posit alternative pathways the Tribunal might have taken is, again, an invitation to merits review.
I also accept the Minister's submission that [45] of the Tribunal's reasons contains an obvious typographical error. Properly read, it conveys the view that it was 'highly unlikely that [the applicant] would not have been aware' of the agent's actions. That slip in expression does not found jurisdictional error; the meaning is clear in context and the finding was available.
Accordingly, the Tribunal's conclusions were open, rational, and reached in accordance with law. No jurisdictional error is established in respect of the fifth and sixth credibility matters.

[129]

By the seventh credibility matter, the Tribunal noted that the applicant had made numerous and varied claims across the process regarding the sources of harm he feared - citing criminals, the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, Daesh or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, a local political youth group, a Mullah and the police. However, at the hearing he stated that his only fears were the political youth group or the TTP in Quetta, and confirmed that these were the only groups from whom he feared harm. This narrowing of his claimed fears was inconsistent with his earlier assertions and, in the Tribunal's view, demonstrated a further shift in his narrative that undermined the credibility and reliability of his protection claims.
By the eighth credibility matter, the Tribunal observed that the applicant made no claim in his protection visa application that his brother had been threatened by the political youth group, notwithstanding that he had provided the first written statement which set out a broad range of claims with a high degree of particularity across eleven typed pages. Yet, following the provision of his first written statement, including at his interview with the delegate, he gave multiple conflicting accounts of harm to more than one brother - saying at different times that an assault of one brother had occurred after he came to Australia in 2014, then on 31 August 2012, then in February 2016, and finally in November 2018 - and further claiming that his brother was beaten 'every time' he was seen. The Tribunal rejected his explanation, finding it implausible that repeated assaults on both brothers would not have been mentioned in his comprehensive written claims. It concluded that the late, inconsistent and escalating nature of these allegations suggested fabrication, further diminishing the credibility of his evidence.
By the fourteenth credibility matter, the Tribunal noted that in the second written statement, the applicant made several new claims, including that the TTP entered his family home a week after beating his brother, that his brother was arrested and abused by police when this was reported, that a Mullah instructed his family to move to Quetta, and that the TTP had forced his brother to join them and repeatedly tried to send him to Afghanistan for military training. When these claims were discussed at the hearing, the applicant gave a different account, stating only that the TTP took his brother in December 2018 and that his uncle negotiated his release, without mentioning the other claims in his second written statement. The Tribunal considered these inconsistencies significant and found that they raised further concerns about the applicant's credibility and the veracity of his claims.

[131]

The Minister submitted that the applicant's complaint - that the Tribunal failed to apply the careful analysis said to be required by authorities in its assessment of the seventh, eighth and fourteenth credibility matters - mischaracterised the Tribunal's reasons. The Minister argued that the impugned paragraphs disclose an orthodox and transparent approach to credibility assessment, in which the Tribunal set out clear and specific inconsistencies arising from the manner in which the applicant had advanced his claims at different stages of the protection status determination process.
In relation to the seventh credibility matter, the Minister noted that the Tribunal recorded at [47] that the applicant had, in his first written statement and in the making subsequent new claims, asserted a fear of harm from 'criminals, the TTP, the Afghan Taliban, ISIS, Daesh, a local Pakistani political youth group, the Mullah and the Police', whereas at the hearing he confirmed that he feared harm from 'the political youth group or the TTP in Quetta'. The Minister submitted that inconsistency in the very identity and number of groups said to pose a threat was, self‑evidently, significant to an assessment of credibility and required no more elaborate reasoning that that provided by the Tribunal.
In relation to the eighth credibility matter, Mr Hillyard accepted at hearing before me that the Tribunal erred at [48] of its decision where it incorrectly stated that the applicant's claim in relation to his brother having been harmed in Pakistan was first raised at interview with the delegate as recorded in the delegate's decision.[45] Nevertheless, the Minister maintained that the Tribunal's reasoning at [48]-[51] similarly reflected reasonable and evidence‑based concerns arising from differences between the applicant's claims at different points in time. The Minister submitted that the inconsistencies identified by the Tribunal were not trivial matters of detail but went directly to the substance of the claims being advanced. On the Minister's case, the significance of the inconsistencies was obvious and did not require the Tribunal to undertake the more elaborate reasoning process contended for by the applicant. The Minister emphasised that the Tribunal's approach was far removed from the kind of trivial discrepancy, such as the inconsistency concerning the volume of music at a party that was held to be minor in EVI19,[46] and submitted that the inconsistencies identified here went to central elements of the protection claim.
As to the fourteenth credibility matter, the Minister directed attention to the Tribunal's reasons at [74]-[75], where it recorded that the applicant, in his second written statement, had asserted a detailed account of threats to his brother - namely, that the TTP had entered his home only a week after beating his brother, that his brother had been arrested and abused by police when the incident was reported, that the TTP had forced his brother to join them, and that his brother had been repeatedly sent to Afghanistan. By contrast, when questioned at the hearing, the applicant made no mention of his brother having joined or been forced to join the TTP, of being repeatedly sent to Afghanistan, or of refusing military training. The Minister submitted that these omissions were plainly material and that the Tribunal's reasoning logically supported the credibility concerns arising from such inconsistent evidence.
The Minister therefore submitted that the Tribunal's findings in the seventh, eighth and fourteenth credibility matters were open, logically reasoned, and disclosed no jurisdictional error.

[133]

Eighth, in his application for a Protection visa, the applicant did not make any claims in relation to his brother being threatened by the political youth group. He has filed with the Tribunal a copy of the Department's Decision Record dated 5 August 2016. It indicated that during his interview with the Department he made a new claim that his brother was beaten by the political youth group. He initially claimed that this happened after he came to Australia in June 2014. He later stated that this incident occurred on 31 August 2012. He subsequently stated that this incident occurred 2 months ago (February 2016). During the hearing, he gave evidence that this incident occurred in November 2018. The Tribunal raised as an issue with him these inconsistencies in his evidence and its concerns in relation to his credibility and the veracity of his claims.

49. The applicant responded that in 2018 he stated that it was recent. He stated that prior to that his brother was beaten whenever he went out or he was harassed when he was in Rawalpindi. He stated that when they saw him they beat him and he was beaten many times. He stated that that was why one of his brothers went to the USA. He stated that they talked to his uncle about the other brother so he could get him out of there.

50. The Tribunal is not persuaded by the applicant's response. Firstly, if he was beaten every time the political youth group saw him and if he was beaten many times as claimed, the Tribunal would expect him to have mentioned it in his application for a Protection visa and to have put his best case forward in his visa application. The only claim he made in his visa application that is related to this issue was that in August 2012 his three friends were attacked and threatened with death because they had protected him from being beaten by the political youth group. He did not claim that he was actually beaten on that occasion. His failure to make this claim in his application for a Protection visa raises concerns in relation to the credibility of this claim.

51. Secondly, if the applicant's brother was beaten every time the political youth group saw him, was beaten many times and attempts are being made to send him overseas for this reason as claimed, the Tribunal would expect him to have mentioned it in his application for a Protection visa as well. He provided a detailed 11 page typed Statement of Claims with his visa application providing lots of other details but failed to mention that either he or his brother were beaten many times by the political youth group. The Tribunal formed the view that he was fabricating this evidence as he was giving it.

[139]

The applicant submitted that the Tribunal erred in its ninth and tenth credibility findings at [52]-[60] by relying on unwarranted assumptions that lacked any evidentiary foundation. He argued that the Tribunal's conclusion - that his conduct both in Pakistan and after arriving in Australia was inconsistent with having genuinely feared for his life - rested on speculative reasoning rather than evidence. In particular, he contended that the Tribunal had no evidentiary basis for finding that an 'almost five‑week period' between the grant of his student visa and his arrival in Australia was inconsistent with his claim of fearing imminent harm. He submitted that this conclusion implicitly assumed facts about his uncle's financial circumstances, the speed with which funds could be raised, how his uncle might act in assisting him, and the nature or immediacy of the threat he faced, none of which were established by evidence and none of which fell within the Tribunal's 'ordinary human experience': c.f. DQM18 at [58].
The applicant further submitted that the Tribunal's reasoning at [56]-[60] rested on unwarranted assumptions about how a person genuinely in need of protection would behave after arriving in Australia on a student visa. In particular, he contended that there was no evidentiary basis for assuming that such a person would promptly investigate the availability and cost of immigration advice, raise confidentiality concerns with an agent (or receive accurate assurances in response), or independently research and discover the existence of free legal assistance services for migrants. The applicant argued that these were matters of personal circumstance and human behaviour not capable of being assessed by reference to 'ordinary human experience', and that the Tribunal's reliance on such assumptions rendered its reasoning legally unreasonable.
The applicant, in relying upon DQM18 at [58], contended that these findings collectively disclosed the error identified in Ground 1(c).

[144]

(a) invoked s 424AA and put to the applicant, for comment, the concern that he did not apply for protection until approximately 14 months after arriving in Australia, noting that if he genuinely feared for his life it expected he would have obtained immigration assistance and apply as soon as possible after he arrived in Australia;

(b) considered his response that the delay was because he thought he could stay temporarily in Australia and then travel to another country, that it was expensive to pay for a lawyer, and that he feared the Australian government might inform the Pakistan government about his claims, causing problems for his family in Pakistan; while also noting his evidence that his agent in Pakistan told him he could only be sent to Australia where he could apply for a protection visa, and that his friend advised him he could apply for such a visa online;

(c) inquired further into the steps he took to obtain free immigration advice in Australia, to which the applicant initially stated that he had been referred to two lawyers in Harris Park who quoted high fees, but subsequently stated that he had not made any such inquiries; and

(d) rejected the applicant's explanation for delaying his protection visa application for several reasons:

(i) first, the explanation that he delayed because he thought he could remain in Australia temporarily and then move to another country was inconsistent with his evidence that his agent told him Australia was the only country to which he could be sent;

(ii) second, given the applicant's evidence that the agent advised him he could apply for a protection visa after arrival, the Tribunal considered that any genuine concern about confidentiality and potential repercussions for his family would have been raised with, and addressed by, the agent - which did not occur; and

(iii) third, the Tribunal considered that if cost had prevented the applicant from engaging a private lawyer, it would have been reasonable to expect him to research other sources of immigration advice, including free legal assistance. In this regard, the Tribunal noted the lack of impediment to access such advice given the applicant's tertiary education and his English language proficiency, as indicated in his protection visa application, in which he stated he could read, write and speak English.

[151]

The Minister submitted that the applicant's contention under particular (ii) to Ground 1 - that the Tribunal relied on unwarranted assumptions lacking an evidentiary foundation in assessing the tenth credibility matter - misconceived the Tribunal's reasoning. It was open to the Tribunal to take into account the applicant's delay in lodging a protection visa application once onshore in Australia when assessing his credibility, consistent with authority such as ATC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1420 at [61]. In that context, the Tribunal was entitled to consider whether it was consistent with a genuine and pressing fear of harm for the applicant to wait a period of time before seeking protection after arriving in Australia, particularly when he was present as the holder of a temporary visa. The Minister noted that the Tribunal canvassed these matters directly with the applicant at the hearing and was not required to accept his explanations for the delay if they did not alleviate its broader concerns about the purpose of his travel to Australia and the genuineness of his fear of return to Pakistan. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal's approach was appropriate and neither unreasonable nor irrational in determining whether the applicant met the criteria in s 36(2)(a) or s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
The Minister further submitted that the Tribunal was entitled to scrutinise the applicant's shifting evidence concerning his reasons for coming to Australia, which was plainly relevant in the context of a protection visa application. The Minister emphasised that the evidence before the Tribunal showed that the applicant entered Australia on a student visa. His initial evidence was that the visa was merely a means to escape Pakistan, that he had no intention of studying, and that his sole motivation was to flee harm. Yet at the Tribunal hearing he stated that he thought he could 'do something to stay here like studying'. According to the Minister, while both versions referred to the applicant's desire to escape harm, they differed critically on whether he ever intended to study, and were also inconsistent with his evidence that his agent had told him he could only come to Australia and would need to apply for protection. The Minister argued that the significance of the applicant's changing explanations for his travel to Australia was self‑evident, requiring no further elaboration from the Tribunal. More generally, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal's decision must be read fairly and in context. The applicant's reasons for travelling to Australia formed part of a set of fifteen credibility concerns which the Tribunal considered cumulatively in finding that the applicant was not a witness of truth. The Minister argued that the Tribunal's credibility assessment followed an orthodox method and that it was for the applicant to dispel the Tribunal's concerns - something he failed to do. The Minister concluded that no error was disclosed by the applicant's submissions.

[154]

By the fifteenth credibility matter, the Tribunal examined the three First Information Reports provided by the applicant and identified multiple features that caused it to question their reliability and authenticity.
In relation to the first FIR, the Tribunal noted that it was dated 31 August 2012 at '3/5 am', related to an incident said to have occurred on 28 August 2012 at '10/15 am'. According to the first FIR, the complainant stated that, after responding to a doorbell, he encountered named individuals and others in vehicles, that shots were fired at him, and that the attackers fled. The complainant attributed the incident to an earlier dispute involving a neighbour and one of the alleged attackers, while also recording that a gunman allegedly shouted that the complainant should be killed because he was a friend of the applicant.
The Tribunal expressed numerous concerns about this FIR. It considered it unlikely that a person who had been shot at would delay reporting the incident for three days, and implausible that the complaint would be lodged in the early morning hours. The Tribunal also found it doubtful that street and gate lights would have been illuminated if the incident occurred at 10.15 am, that the attackers would have shouted that the complainant should be killed because he was a friend of the applicant when the complainant himself said the motive related to an unrelated quarrel, and that the attackers would have 'run away' despite being in vehicles.
The second FIR is dated 5 September 2012 at '12/20 am' and relates to an incident said to have occurred at '11/30 pm'. According to the FIR, a police officer recorded that, while investigating the first FIR and attempting to arrest the alleged culprits, he ordered persons travelling in motor vehicles to stop, whereupon shots were fired at the police. The FIR records that police officers returned fire and were able to arrest two men.
In relation to the third FIR, the Tribunal observed that it is dated 5 September 2012 at '2 am' and relates to an incident said to have occurred at '12/30 am'. It records the 'place of occurrence' as [named road], approximately '3 farlong eastern side of Police Station'. The complaint is stated to be based on the applicant's statement. According to this FIR, the applicant went to his friend [Mr I]'s house and, at about '12/30 am', [Mr I] and two other friends accompanied him outside to see him off. He stated that 10 to 12 'boys' arrived in motor vehicles and fired at them, that his three friends were badly injured, and that, in response to his 'hue and cry', two nearby residents came to the scene. The FIR records the asserted cause as the events of 28 August 2012, namely that 'the culprits fired at the house of [Mr E] and then registered a criminal case'.
The Tribunal identified numerous concerns about the third FIR. First, the applicant's testimony at hearing that the incident occurred between 10.00 pm and 11.00 pm conflicted with the FIR's timing of about 12.30 am. Second, his evidence was contradictory as to the location - initially outside his house, then outside [Mr I]'s house, and then again outside his house - whereas the FIR's 'place of occurrence' is recorded at a location different from his residential address. Third, if the incident took place at his own house, it was considered unlikely that his three friends would have been 'seeing him off'. Fourth, given his account that he and his friends were unarmed and confronted by 'many people' who were firing, it was regarded as implausible that all three friends were badly injured while he suffered no injury, particularly if he was the intended target.
Taken together, these matters led the Tribunal to question the authenticity and reliability of the FIRs. Further, the Tribunal also referred to country information indicating that document fraud is widespread in Pakistan, including fraudulent FIRs, and that even police‑verified FIRs may be unreliable.
Having regard to these concerns, the inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence, and the country information, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the FIRs or the death certificates were authentic and placed no weight on them.

[160]

The Minister submitted that the applicant's complaint - advanced by particular (v) to Ground 1 and AS[38]-[39] - that the Tribunal displayed an 'impermissible predisposition to discount and disbelieve corroborative material' in its treatment of the three FIRs should properly be read as an allegation of bias. To that end, the Minister argued that an allegation of bias is serious and must be distinctly made and clearly proven: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 75 ALJR 679 (Jia Legeng) at [69]. It was further argued that it is necessary to show either a pre‑existing state of mind disabling the Tribunal from undertaking a proper evaluation, or that a fair‑minded, informed observer might reasonably apprehend that the Tribunal did not bring an impartial mind to the task: Jia Legeng at [35] and [72]. The Minister noted that the applicant had made no attempt to establish such a case, and that none is disclosed by the evidence, and on that basis alone the applicant's complaint be rejected.
The Minister further submitted that the Tribunal's reasons set out the deficiencies and inconsistencies it identified in the first FIR and third FIR - including issues as to timing, date, location, and the incident details - and that these matters were put to the applicant at the hearing, with the Tribunal expressly having regard to his responses. It was argued that such an exchange was not indicative of a closed mind but of an open evaluative process.
The Minister rejected the suggestion that the absence of identified concerns in the second FIR required the Tribunal to treat it as corroborating the authenticity of all three FIRs. Rather, it was open to the Tribunal, having regard to the inconsistencies in the first and third FIRs, the applicant's inability to explain them, and country information indicating the ease of obtaining fraudulent FIRs, to withhold satisfaction as to authenticity. This was not a conclusion bound to a single discrepancy (c.f. EVI19), but a conclusion reached by reference to 'many concerns' taken together with the applicant's credibility and the country information.
The Minister further submitted that adverse findings, including adverse credibility findings, do not of themselves support any inference of bias. The weight to be given to each item of evidence was a matter for the Tribunal, and the applicant's disagreement amounts to no more than contesting the Tribunal's evaluative conclusions.
As to the challenge to [83] of the Tribunal's decision, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal did not rely solely on DFAT country information to reject the FIRs. Rather, its lack of satisfaction as to their authenticity was informed by three maters: the discrepancies identified on the face of the documents; its broader assessment of the applicant's credibility; and its view - formed with reference to country information - that any checks were unlikely to resolve the authenticity concerns, such that it declined to undertake the requested verification. The Minister noted that the weight to be given to country information is a matter for the Tribunal: NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [13]. The Minister further argued that the Tribunal's decision not to inquire further about the authenticity of the FIRs was a choice made entirely within its decisional freedom and did not evince a closed mind.
Accordingly, the Minister submitted that the Tribunal's conclusion that it could not be satisfied of the FIRs' authenticity, and that no weight should be placed on them, was reached by reference to the totality of the material and disclosed no error. On that basis, the Minister concluded that no error is established by particulars (v) or (vi) to Ground 1.

[161]

I am persuaded by the Minister's submissions and consider that the applicant's submissions, taken as a whole, do little more than invite the Court to engage in impermissible merits review.
While the applicant did not plead bias, the Minister submitted that the breadth of the applicant's criticisms - directed at all fifteen credibility matters - might be read as implying that the Tribunal approached his case with a closed mind. When I pressed Mr Bhasin at the hearing to clarify whether his client alleged bias, he confirmed that no such ground was advanced and that no submissions had been made in support of any contention of that kind.
Turning to the applicant's criticisms of the Tribunal's evaluation and conclusions about the authenticity of the FIRs - both its assessment of the deficiencies across those documents and its reliance upon country information - I am not persuaded that jurisdictional error is disclosed.
The Tribunal identified concrete, document‑specific anomalies (timing, sequence, location, internal logic and asserted motive) in the first and third FIRs; it put those matters to the applicant; it recorded his responses; and it explained why those responses did not alleviate its concerns. That evaluative process was orthodox and falls squarely within the Tribunal's fact‑finding remit. The Court's task is confined to determining whether the reasoning was open on the material; it is not to prefer a different evidentiary synthesis or to re‑weigh credibility: SZMDS at [135].
I also reject the submission that the Tribunal failed to consider the 'totality' of the corroborative material by not treating the second FIR as validating the first and third. The weight to be afforded to each item of evidence (including whether one document corroborates another) is quintessentially a matter for the Tribunal. It was open to the Tribunal to regard the second FIR as inauthentic in circumstances where it had already identified multiple, specific concerns about the first and third FIRs, where the second FIR related to consequences of the events described in the impugned first FIR, and where the applicant's explanations did not dispel those concerns.
As to the reliance on country information, I accept the Minister's submission that the Tribunal did not determine authenticity 'by DFAT alone'. Rather, it used the country information to inform a judgment about the likely utility of further verification checks and to contextualise the document‑specific concerns it had already articulated. The weight to be given to country information is a matter for the Tribunal; its evaluative use of that material does not bespeak legal error. On that footing, the Tribunal's decision to decline the applicant's request for further checks - having formed the view that such inquiries would be unlikely to resolve its authenticity concerns - was within its decisional freedom and does not evince a closed mind.
Furthermore, the Tribunal was not obliged to take up the applicant's invitation at hearing to 'check the FIRs or the Death Certificates he provided'.[53] While it was open to the Tribunal to require the Secretary of the Department to conduct such an investigation by invoking its power under s 427(1)(d) of the Act, it was under no obligation to exercise, or even consider exercising, that inquisitorial power: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594; HCA 1 at [22] per French CJ and Kiefel J; WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277 at [25] per Heerey, Nicholson and Mansfield JJ. Moreover, s 5AAA of the Act makes clear that it is for the applicant to provide sufficient evidence to establish their claim, and the Minister bears no responsibility or obligation to establish, or assist in establishing, that claim.
The applicant's further contention that the Tribunal's analysis depended on 'ordinary human experience' beyond its knowledge mischaracterises the reasons. The Tribunal's concerns were anchored in objective features of the documents and in contradictions between the FIRs and the applicant's own evidence. Again, a decision‑maker is not precluded from drawing commonsense inferences from the material; the question remains whether there was a rational and logical connection between the evidence and the conclusions reached. Here, there was.
Standing back, and reading the reasons fairly and as a whole - not with an eye keenly attuned to error - the Tribunal's conclusion that it was not satisfied as to the authenticity of the FIRs, and that no weight should be placed on them, was plainly open. The path of reasoning is coherent; it rests on identified discrepancies, the applicant's responses, and context supplied by country information. No failure to consider a material matter, no illogicality or irrationality, and no legal unreasonableness is established.
Accordingly, the fifteenth credibility matter discloses no jurisdictional error.

[162]

As jurisdictional error has not been established, the application must be dismissed.
Following changes to Ministerial portfolio arrangements, the name of the first respondent is to be amended to Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. Further, consequent upon the passage of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No 1) Act 2024 (Cth), the name of the second respondent is to be amended to Administrative Review Tribunal.
Having completed my reasons, I consider it appropriate to make some observations about the proper boundaries of judicial review advocacy, and to offer a few remarks concerning the manner in which the applicant sought to advance his case in these proceedings. These comments are offered to remind parties that judicial review is a supervisory jurisdiction directed to identifying material legal error, not a vehicle for recasting an applicant's claims or inviting the Court to undertake the fact‑finding task entrusted by Parliament to the Tribunal.
It is not uncommon, when arguing legal unreasonableness, for parties to seek to draw the Court into a reconsideration of the merits of the underlying claim. This tendency reflects a misunderstanding of the breadth of the Tribunal's decisional freedom and the necessarily stringent limits on the application of the legal unreasonableness doctrine.
As I have stated previously (see, for example, Da Silva v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1826 at [40]) and reiterated throughout these reasons, it is not the function of the Court to insert itself into a fact-finding role and re-assess the merits in the manner contended by an applicant in order to establish whether an approach taken by a Tribunal in its fact-finding endeavour was reasonable, still less whether it was preferable. Rather, when examining a statement of reasons for the presence of legal unreasonableness, whether said to arise from the Tribunal having relied upon asserted inconsistencies in the applicant's narrative, having found aspects of the narrative to be implausible, having reasoned by way of unwarranted assumptions, or having inappropriately discounted corroborative material, the Tribunal's process of reasoning is to be assessed with appropriate regard to the scope of decisional freedom afforded to it. The question is whether the particular reliance on inconsistencies, the findings of implausibility, any assumptions made, or the treatment of corroborative evidence reveal reasoning that is irrational, illogical or otherwise legally unreasonable.
To assist the Court in performing that limited but important task, it is incumbent on parties to recognise that judicial review neither occurs in the abstract nor is an opportunity to reconceptualise the merits of an applicant's case. The focal point is the Tribunal's reasons. Professional advocacy demands genuine engagement with those reasons and an honest confrontation with their logic, structure and evidentiary foundation. Any other approach risks the provision of submissions that are misconceived - or, at worst, disingenuous or obfuscatory - and frustrates the effective and efficient delivery of just outcomes. It compromises a party's obligation, in proceedings in Division 2 of this Court, to conduct the case consistently with the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions: namely, to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law, and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: ss 190-191 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth).
In the present case, many of the applicant's submissions failed to properly acknowledge or respect the Court's task and the limits upon its role. They disregarded the practical restraints that attend judicial review and invited the Court to construe the Tribunal's reasons 'minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to error': Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; HCA 6 at [30], citing Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCAFC 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 286-287. Such an approach is inconsistent with the repeated cautions of the Full Court: see, for example, Applicant WAEE at [46]. Almost three decades of authority make clear that judicial review of administrative action is not an exercise in minute textual scrutiny in search of missteps but one directed to identifying material legal error. The approach urged upon the Court in this matter misconceived that jurisprudence, placed an unwarranted burden upon the Minister to respond to a diffuse array of complaints, and imposed upon the Court the task of analysing those complaints and the Tribunal's reasons at a near microscopic level of granularity. It is a matter of concern that the breadth and variety of the applicant's asserted errors rendered two hearings necessary to dispose of the matter.
More broadly, it remains a matter of ongoing concern that some practitioners persist in approaching judicial review on the premise that the Tribunal's reasons may be dissected and re‑characterised so that their inherent logic is obfuscated and their justification misrepresented. That approach tends to generate specious submissions, is inconsistent with settled authority, and risks diverting attention from the true inquiry: whether the decision‑maker has acted beyond the limits of the authority conferred by the legislation.
I will hear the parties as to costs.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

ENH19

Respondent/Defendant:

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 61

Legislation Cited (3)

Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021

Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025

Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No](/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/num_act/artatpn1a2024807/index.html) [1) Act 2024

Cases Cited (58)

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271; FCAFC 38

ATC15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1420

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83; FCAFC 133

BEL16 v Minister of Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1678; (2019) 167 ALD 295; FCA 1678

BOH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 573

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

BUX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1510

BZD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 94; (2018) 263 FCR 292; FCAFC 94

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 252 FCR 352; FCAFC 107

Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCAFC 456; (1993) 43 FCR 280

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175; FCAFC 2

DQM18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 110; [2020] 278 FCR 529; FCAFC 110

ETA067 v The Republic of Nauru [2018] HCA 46; (2018) 360 ALR 228

EVI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 518

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118; HCA 22

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1; FCAFC 11

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541; HCA 30

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332; HCA 18

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594; HCA 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99; FCA 317

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

Sujeendran Sivalingam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1998] FCA 1167

Sundararaj v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 76

SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1001

SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198

SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253

Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCAFC 1726; (1995) 57 FCR 451

WAGJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 277

(2003) 256 FCR 593

(2019) 268 FCR 271

(2018) 266 FCR 83

(2018) 263 FCR 292

(2017) 252 FCR 352

(1993) 43 FCR 280

(2018) 258 FCR 175

(2018) 360 ALR 228

(2003) 214 CLR 118

(2016) 237 FCR 1

(2018) 264 CLR 541

(2013) 249 CLR 332

(2011) 241 CLR 594

(2010) 240 CLR 611

(2013) 212 FCR 99

(1996) 185 CLR 259

(2001) 75 ALJR 679

(2001) 2006 CLR 323

(2022) 275 CLR 582

(2019) 267 FCR 200

(1995) 57 FCR 451

(2012) 202 FCR 1

(2010) 189 FCR 577

(2015) 233 FCR 451

(2002) 194 ALR 676

(2009) 181 FCR 113

(2001) 206 CLR 323

(2003) 197 ALR 389

(2004) 144 FCR 1

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (166 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (3)

Cases Cited (58)