Is there a case for investigation?
58 Enares contends that it has established it is acting in good faith and for a proper purpose on two bases. First, that there is an objective basis for a suspicion of sufficient substance to demonstrate past or future wrongful conduct of the directors. Second, that an inspection of Nimble's books is necessary to understand the effect of the debt refinance on the value of Enares' shareholding. I will deal with each in turn.
59 Enares contends that in relation to the debt refinance that:
(a) Nimble is in financial distress;
(b) it is taking on further debt at high interest rates;
(c) its rationale for pursuing debt over equity has not been disclosed;
(d) that Enares cannot rule out if the new investors are related to VDLF or the three new directors;
(e) that there is an information asymmetry between Enares and VDLF. This contention is based on the assertion that Mr Edney is freely sharing information he receives as a director with VDLF;
(f) the debt refinance was formulated at the direction of Mr Edney when he was the sole director of Nimble and the recent appointment of the three new directors makes it unlikely that they could make an informed assessment of the proposal; and
(g) Nimble has refused to meet with Enares to discuss its concerns and the debt refinance.
60 Nimble contends that each of these concerns are wrong, unfounded or insufficient to support any "case for investigation" as that term is used in the authorities.
61 Enares contends that the refinance of Nimble's debt by the issue of the New Investors' Subordinated Notes is detrimental in circumstances where the company is in financial distress and on Enares' submission, the refinancing amounts to further debt. Enares submits that the better option would be to raise funds through equity, which it says it is prepared to underwrite. These arguments have an air of commercial unreality in four respects which undermines there being an objective basis for the court to intervene.
62 First, the basis on which Enares has alleged that Nimble is in financial distress requires careful scrutiny. There is no suggestion of impropriety in the management of the company being the cause of Nimble's financial distress. Rather, the evidence establishes that there has been a downturn in revenue by reference to the COVID-19 pandemic. That is hardly surprising particularly given the nature of Nimble's business and the impact that prolonged lockdowns have had on the implementation of the planned change in Nimble's business strategy. The shareholders have been provided with regular updates in this respect. Some of the decrease in available cash is explained as having been used to reduce debt. There are signs the business is improving. The size of the loan book has substantially increased. Notwithstanding the qualification in the auditor's report the evidence suggests that the Board, the new investors and the subscribers to the Follow-On Offering are cautiously optimistic on the company's future prospects. Both the new investors and existing shareholders who have subscribed for the Follow-On Offering have weighted their investments towards the series 15 notes which are convertible. That reflects a level of optimism about the future trajectory of the company when one takes into account the option exercise price which ranges from $0.15 (Year 1), $0.20 (Year 2) to $0.25 (Year 3).
63 Second, a comparison of the rates under each of Nimble's existing financing facilities as against the terms of the proposed New Investors' Subordinated Notes issue demonstrates that in the context of this company the proposed rates are commercially comparable to those agreed to by the company in the past. Such a comparison also elucidates that the interest burden on Nimble under the new debt arrangement will likely be reduced relative to the status quo. While Mr Mackenzie was cross-examined on the rates in question and the losses incurred by Nimble leading to its current financial position, Enares did not put to Mr Mackenzie that the rates were not serviceable. Mr Mackenzie has given evidence of the material benefit to Nimble of refinancing via the New Investors' Subordinated Notes issue. He has indicated that his expectation was that there will be no increase in the size of Nimble's debt and that the rates under the proposed refinancing arrangements would be less than the effective rates under the existing Series 13 Subordinated Notes. Further, Mr Mackenzie gave evidence under cross-examination that Nimble had stress-tested the company's ability to service the interest rates under the New Investors' Subordinated Notes and that Nimble had formed the view that it had sufficient liquidity to pay those notes. I accept Mr Mackenzie's evidence.
64 Third, a comparison of the options prices under the Follow-On Offering and the Enares' October and November Proposals undercuts Enares' argument that the new refinancing arrangements are imprudent. Under the Follow-On Offering, options are priced at $0.15, $0.20 and $0.25 per option over year one, two and three of the fixed term series 15 notes under the New Subordinated Notes Offer. In comparison, Enares' October and November Proposals priced new shares at $0.058 and $0.075 respectively. The Follow-On Offering provides Nimble with equity at a higher valuation than either of Enares' proposals, which were, in any event, withdrawn. In entering the debt refinancing arrangements that it has, Nimble appears to have bought itself time to reap the benefit of the recovery of its business from the lockdowns occasioned by the pandemic and the delayed implementation of its change in business strategy.
65 Enares' criticisms are lacking in substance because they ignore the commercial circumstances in which Nimble finds itself. Nimble is presently faced with the looming maturation of two significant debt facilities. The evidence makes plain that Nimble has investigated a range of options to refinance in the period leading up to December 2021. It is also plain that timing is critical. Mr Mackenzie has been frank in his evidence that the new arrangements are intended to, and will, provide Nimble with breathing space.
66 The evidence demonstrates that Nimble has tried in a number of ways to raise capital in the past 17 months and has had external advice on how to do so. Previous attempts at equity capital raising have failed or have received little support from existing shareholders. The debt refinance is considered by the company to be the only viable alternative and has the support of other shareholders and the senior debt financiers. The most recent audit report makes plain that the auditors are aware that the debt refinance is in train and while the auditors have maintained the going concern qualification they have not made any adverse comment on the debt refinance itself. The Follow-On Offering was formulated and included in the proposal to provide for the participation of the existing members. There is no equity rights alternative on offer. The Enares November Proposal has been rejected. It is unlikely that such an alternative could be formulated, negotiated or implemented in time. That is implicitly recognised in Enares correspondence of 21 October 2021. The proposals put forward by Enares were indicative and conditional. The Board considered the Enares November Proposal for an equity rights issue to be an unsuitable refinancing proposal for Nimble because, inter alia, it:
(a) heavily discounted the value of the company;
(b) was subject to completion of due diligence by Enares;
(c) gave rise to regulatory risks relating to the takeover provisions of the Act; and
(d) included early termination provisions that prevented Nimble from progressing other refinancing proposals in parallel and restricted the company's flexibility going forward.
67 An aspect of Enares' complaint which it asserts substantiates its purpose as a proper purpose is that it claims to be subject to a disadvantage in terms of the information it has compared to that available to others.
68 To the extent that its complaint is directed to an information asymmetry as between it and Mr Edney, that is a function of Mr Edney being a director of the company. It does not give rise to an objective basis for the court to intervene in the domain of decision making reserved to management.
69 Insofar as the complaint is directed to an information asymmetry between Enares and VDLF, I am not satisfied that Enares has established the necessary premise. Enares submits that I should infer that VDLF has information in respect of the debt refinancing, including the New Subordinated Notes Offer, that Enares does not. The basis upon which I was asked to infer this was first, that I would infer that Mr Edney is freely passing information he received as a director to VDLF and second, because VDLF has likely taken steps to access the data room for the Follow-On Offering.
70 Mr Mackenzie was cross-examined at a high level of generality about Mr Edney's communications of company information to VDLF. The relevant section of the cross-examination is as follows:
And Mr Edney is the director that you understand to be associated with the shareholder VDL; correct?---Yes.
And, in effect, he's a nominee of VDL, isn't he?---I'm not sure the exact - the exact relationship in terms of whether he's a nominee or whether - whether he's - yes, on how his directorship has been formed.
Yes. But you would fully expect him to be reporting matters back to VDL as to what's going on with the company, wouldn't you?---Yes.
Yes. And so VDL, being a 14 per cent shareholder, has got access to a whole lot of information that the 15 per cent shareholder, being my client, doesn't have access to; you would agree with that?---I know there are some document - some - what's the word I'm looking for? Is a documented procedure for what - what that sharing is entitled to and when it's not entitled.
Yes. Well, to your knowledge, Mr Edney knows who the new investors are, doesn't he?---Yes.
And to your knowledge, one of the pieces of information the company is seeking to keep away from my client is who those new investors are?---Yes.
So you're accepting, as the CEO, that there's going to be information asymmetry between the two major shareholder groups?---Yes.
And that's a position that the company is happy with, that is, that one shareholder group has a lot more information about the new investors than another.
MS ROUGHLEY: I object.
71 Senior Counsel for Enares called for the documented procedure referred to by Mr Mackenzie, which was produced under objection and ultimately admitted into evidence (Information Protocol).
72 The Information Protocol appears to date from about May 2018. It relates to the sharing of information between persons appointed to the Board of Nimble as Nominee Directors of a Nominating Shareholder. It has relevantly been executed by Mr Edney and by VDLF and adopted by resolution of the Board. Enares submits that I would infer that Mr Edney has passed the information about which it complains to VDLF because it contends that clause 3 of the Information Protocol permits that to occur.
73 It is necessary to first consider clause 1 of the Information Protocol which stipulates an overarching general principle that in the absence of an express right to disclose information to a Nominating Shareholder, the Nominee Director must maintain Nimble's information in strict confidence. Clause 3 stipulates "standing principles" relating to disclosure of Nimble information. Clause 3 relevantly provides:
Standing principles relating to disclosure of Nimble information
The Board has determined that it is in the interests of Nimble for information relating to Nimble, that is provided to a Nominee Director (in his or her capacity as a director), to be provided to a Nominating Shareholder (and in doing so, the Nominee Director will not be in breach of his or her duty of confidence to Nimble), on an ongoing basis unless:
(a) the information falls within one of the following categories or types, in which case it must be redacted and removed, prior to any provision of the information to a Nominating Shareholder:
(1) information regarding any aspect of the relationship between Nimble and a Nominating Shareholder, whether on a business, corporate or strategic level
(2) information regarding Control (as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act)) of Nimble, including without limitation, any proposals that could result in a change in that Control; or
(3) information regarding any product, service, transaction or other matter relating to Nimble's business where the Nominating Shareholder has (in any capacity) a relevant or competing interest in that product, service, transaction or other matter;
74 It will be recalled that the New Investors' Subordinated Notes were issued for the purpose of retiring the Series 13 Subordinated Notes that were issued to Enares and Lempriere. Further, that the extension of the Senior Debt Facility was conditional on the retirement of the Series 13 Subordinated Notes. Information in respect of these arrangements arguably falls within clause 3(a)(1) or 3(a)(3). In these circumstances and in light of the answers given by Mr Mackenzie during cross-exaimination, I do not think there is a reasonable basis for inferring that VDLF (as opposed to Mr Edney) is receiving information concerning the refinancing arrangements including the New Investors' Subordinated Notes. I am not satisfied that there is an information asymmetry as between Enares and VDLF of the type asserted which would provide the necessary an objective basis for the court to grant access to the documents specified in Enares' application.
75 Enares' concern that the debt refinance arrangement between Nimble and the new investors was proposed and accepted at a time when Nimble had only Mr Edney as a director is not maintainable on the evidence. The indicative extension of the Senior Debt Facility was negotiated by the Board and shareholders were informed in about June 2021. At that time Mr Edney was not the sole director. The Board of Nimble resolved to refinance its Series 13 Subordinated Notes through a note issuance to new investors on 9 November 2021. That intention was notified to shareholders on 10 November 2021. At this time the Board comprised of:
(1) Mr Ben Edney a non-executive director appointed on 22 May 2018 who served as Chairman from 16 July 2018 until 24 May 2021. Mr Edney has over 30 years of experience in the financial services industry having worked at the National Australia Bank, Bank of Sydney and KPMG in finance, risk and restructuring. He is the current Managing Director of Lempriere;
(2) Mr Graeme Wilson, appointed as non-executive director and Chairman on 26 October 2021. Mr Wilson has extensive experience in financial services, having held senior executive roles at various private and listed companies in the health and telecommunications sectors; and
(3) Ms Helen Lorigan, non-executive director appointed on 27 October 2021. At the time of her appointment, Ms Lorigan was the Managing Partner of a venture capital firm and has experience across banking, wealth management, insurance, financial planning and consumer finance. Ms Lorigan had held senior executive roles in the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) and MLC.
(4) Mr Andrew Kearnan, non-executive director appointed on 27 October 2021. He had held executive and board positions at various institutions include Bank of America Merrill Lynch, CBA and Holland Insurance and currently runs an independent corporate advisory business.
76 Having regard to their previous experience and in particular, their combined expertise in stress debt financing, the members of Nimble's Board were clearly both qualified and experienced in dealing with the type of issues that were confronting Nimble at the time of their appointment. Mr Mackenzie deposed to being in discussions with the members of the Board regarding Nimble's financial position, its audit and refinance options. Mr Mackenzie gave the following evidence under cross-examination:
… Did the directors make any inquiry to you as to how the audit was going?---From time to time, yes.
And what were those inquiries; what were they interested in?---Was - was obviously the impact if we didn't have the facility in place the risk of us giving a qualified audit report.
I see. And the directors that we're talking about here are really Mr Edney; correct?---Well, there - there was - Mr Edney was - was the sole director until 27 October and then we had the other new directors thereafter.
77 Mr Mackenzie's evidence, which I accept, puts beyond doubt any question that the Board members were collectively involved in the decision making process regarding the refinance. On 20 October 2021, Enares was informed by Nimble that a decision on any recapitalisation proposal would be made only after new directors had been appointed "and a quorate board is constituted". The evidence demonstrates that that is what occurred. I reject Enares' attempt to cast aspersions against Nimble's conduct to support a case for investigation based on the short period of time when Mr Edney was the sole director of Nimble. The submission is lacking in substance.
78 Nimble has advised Enares that to the best of its knowledge the new investors are not associated with or related parties (as those terms are used in the Act) of any current director, lender or shareholder of Nimble. Further, that the Board has satisfied itself that the directors have no material personal interest in the debt refinance. In the circumstances, Nimble has done no more than keep the identity of the new investors confidential, which it is entitled to do. To the extent that Enares complains that Mr Edney is aware of the identity of the new investors whereas Enares is not, that is a function of the fact that Mr Edney is a director. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that I should infer that Mr Edney is passing relevant information in respect of the refinance to VDLF.
79 There has been extensive correspondence between the parties and their lawyers as to the reasons for pursuing the debt refinance in the relevant timeframe. Nimble has refused a meeting with Enares in early December 2021. I do not see that Nimble's refusal to meet with Enares at this late stage provides an objective basis on which to justify the court's intervention. Nimble has communicated its reasons for pursuing the debt refinance (subject to preserving some confidentiality). Nimble has been active in keeping its shareholders informed. It has made clear that it is open to other equity financing proposals in the future. It is clear that there is insufficient time to formulate or implement such a proposal in the time left before the existing debt matures.
80 Enares' concerns rise no higher than allegations of bare suspicion. It has led no evidence of a reason to believe that the directors of Nimble have acted other than diligently or efficiently in putting in place refinancing arrangements prior to the imminent expiry of existing facilities. It has not established that no board acting reasonably could have made those decisions: Praetorin at [89]. Even if the relevant threshold on managerial decisions is not so high, having regard to the whole of the relevant context and conscious that with respect to management decisions a conservative approach to the exercise of Court's discretion is appropriate, I am not satisfied that the potential for the debt refinance to be disadvantageous to Enares compared to implementation of one of Enares' proposals coupled with Enares' subjective suspicions about the conduct of management and the Board are sufficient to establish a proper purpose pursuant to s 247A of the Act: see Intercapital Holdings and Knightswood Nominees. There must be something in the evidence which provides an objective basis for the court to intervene. In this case that has not been established. Enares has done no more than demonstrate that it is dissatisfied with and disagrees with the decisions taken by Nimble's management.
81 Enares contends that its shareholding is at risk of dilution and that it is unable to protect itself from that risk. Enares has not argued that it is seeking documents to value its shareholding to consider an exit strategy. Bearing in mind that Nimble is an unlisted company and given its present financial difficulties liquidity, opportunities are likely limited in the near future. Similarly, Nimble has not contended that it requires the information to decide if it should participate in an opportunity or how it should vote at an impending general meeting: see Re Tolco and ENT Pty Ltd v Sunrasia Television Ltd [2007] NSWSC 270; (2007) 61 ACSR 626 (Austin J). In this respect I note that the evidence reveals that Enares had previously requested that a general meeting be held, but despite Nimble refusing to do so, Enares has not taken steps to require a general meeting to be convened. It would appear that Enares has not garnered sufficient support from other shareholders to force the issue.
82 The constitution of Nimble expressly provides that the decisions relating to the issue of shares or options are reserved to the directors. The directors may also exercise the powers of the company to borrow money, charge the property of the company or given any other security. Enares does not require the information sought to exercise its rights as a member because it does not have any relevant rights in those decisions.
83 Enares has elected not to avail itself of the information provided by Nimble in the data room to consider if it wants to participate in the Follow-On Offering. Enares says it has not done so on the basis of its concern of breaching s 606 of the Act by acquiring more than 20% of the issued capital in Nimble and because of the terms of the confidentiality regime which would limit the way in which Enares could use such information. Enares is under no obligation to avail itself of alternate methods of accessing information as a precondition to seeking access under s 247A.
84 Having regard to the observations of Brereton J (as his Honour then was) in Re Tolco (at [16] - [17]) I accept that in some contexts the purpose of understanding the value of a member's investment may supply a proper purpose on an objective analysis. However, I am not satisfied that Enares has established that the particular information it is seeking is necessary for it to have in order to exercise its rights as a member. There is no general meeting scheduled. Indeed Nimble has declined to call such a meeting and none has been requisitioned. There is no evidence to support any liquidity event in the near future which may necessitate access to facilitate valuation.
85 I am not satisfied that Enares has established a proper purpose by reference to the potential impact the debt refinance may have on the value of its shareholding. By way on contrast, Enares' interest in obtaining the information sought for the purpose of furthering its interest as the promoter and architect of an alternative capital raising (whether underwritten by it or by another) is palpable.