EBELING -v- THE OWNERS OF CHATEAU RIVERSDALE STRATA PLAN 14729 [2025] WASC 110 (9 April 2025)

1. The Applicant is The Owners of Chateau Riversdale Strata Scheme 14729 (Strata Company).
2. The Strata Company is the strata company for the scheme (Scheme) the subject of strata plan 14729 (Strata Plan).
3. Thomas Charles Ebeling (Respondent) is the owner of lot 13 (Lot 13) on the Strata Plan.
4. The Respondent has contravened:

4.1 the by-laws (By-laws) that apply to the Scheme on at least 3 separate occasions; and

4.2 sections 45(2) and 83 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (Act),

in relation to the presence of the dog named 'Buddy' (Dog) at the Scheme.

1. The Strata Company has given the Respondent several notices under section 47(1)(a) of the Act specifying the action that must be taken by the Respondent in order to avoid a continuing or further contravention of the By-laws in relation to the Dog. The Respondent has contravened each of those notices.
2. All of these contraventions by the Respondent have had, and continue to have, serious adverse consequences for other owners and occupiers of lots within the Scheme (Other Members).
3. The Strata Company has a statutory duty to:

7.1 control and manage the common property of the Scheme for the benefit of all owners under section 91(1)(b) of the Act: and

7.2 enforce compliance with the By-laws by others to whom the By-laws apply under section 112 of the Act,

(Duties), particularly in circumstances where the ongoing contraventions have serious adverse consequences for Other Members.

1. The Strata Company has taken reasonable steps to carry out its Duties by requiring the Respondent to comply with the Act and By-laws.
2. In taking these steps, the Strata Company has incurred pecuniary loss by way of legal and management expenses associated with:

9.1 issuing notices to the Respondent; and

9.2 commencing these proceedings in the State Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal),

(Enforcement Expenses).[1] (original emphasis)

1. Before the SAT, it appears that there were, relevantly, hearings on 1 February 2024 (for directions); 4 April 2024 (for the hearing of the matter, including the taking of evidence); and then the Member delivered oral reasons on 4 October 2024.
2. There were other directions hearings before, and mediation in, the SAT, but they do not appear to be relevant to these reasons.

1. The SAT was exercising original jurisdiction in hearing the application made to it by virtue of ss 13, 14 and 15(1) of the SAT Act.
2. On 4 October 2024, following delivery of oral reasons, the SAT made the following orders:

1. Pursuant to s199(3)(a) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (the Act), the respondent has contravened:

(a) Schedule 2 By-Laws 2(a), 2(b) and 12(c); and

(b) Sections 45(2) and 83 of the Act.

1. Pursuant to s47(5) of the Act, the Tribunal orders the respondent must:

(a) Remove the dog Buddy permanently from the strata scheme on or before 11 October 2024;

(b) Pay a penalty of $100 for each contravention of the notices validly issued under s47(1)(a) of the Act, being combined payment of $400 on or before 5pm on 18 October 2024; and

(c) Not cause or permit the dog Buddy to be present on Lot 13 or any other part of the strata scheme at any time.

1. For the payment of the Applicant's enforcement expenses by the Respondent in the liquidated sum of $15,007.10 pursuant to s200(2)(o)(i) of the Act on or before 5pm on 1 November 2024.
2. Section 95(1) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act, 2004 (WA) applies to this decision (apart from the monetary order).
3. The application is otherwise dismissed.[2] (original emphasis)

1. The matter came before me urgently for directions on 27 November 2024 and on 20 December 2024. The matter was argued on 30 January 2025 and 14 February 2025.

Mr Ebeling's documents filed and, or, sent to my Chambers

1. I have attached, as Annexure A, a chronology of the correspondence which passed between Mr Ebeling and my Chambers, or which appears on the Court file.
2. I have also attached, as Annexure B, a chronology of what might be described as interlocutory applications sought to be made by Mr Ebeling in this Court.
3. I do not consider it would be a proportionate use of resources to attempt an exhaustive description of the matters raised, and applications made, by Mr Ebeling's documents in this Court. Rather, I have sought to summarise the substance, as I understand it, of Mr Ebeling's complaints and deal with the substance of those matters as I understand them.

Did the SAT lack jurisdiction because this was a matter of federal jurisdiction

1. In the course of the first hearing date on 30 January 2025, I raised with the parties whether the SAT Application may have been a matter of federal jurisdiction as a result of Mr Ebeling contending in the SAT that his dog was an 'assistance animal'.
2. While Mr Ebeling, in the SAT, did not expressly assert or rely on any provision of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)[3] and did not suggest that it prevailed over the State ST Act, the question of whether Buddy was an assistance animal was agitated in the SAT. I will return to this.
3. Analogously, perhaps, to the priority which the question of authority to decide should have for courts,[4] I consider this ought to be the first question to be resolved.
4. Ultimately as will be seen, I have concluded that no matter of federal jurisdiction arose in the SAT.
5. However, I have set out below the relevant passages from the hearings before the SAT and the Member's decision which I have considered in coming to that view. As will be seen, they are also important to other of Mr Ebeling's grounds in his Review Application and raised elsewhere by him.[5]

1. At the directions hearing on 1 February 2024, the Member (Ms East) and Mr Ebeling had the following exchange:

EAST MS: Okay. So from what I understand is that the dog is a service dog for you or an assistance dog for you?

EBELING, MR: Yes, he's registered as an assistance dog with the local council.

EAST MS: Okay. And have you provided a copy of that document there to the other side?

EBELING, MR: Many years ago, yes. I have another copy sent out of his registration.

EAST MS: Are you happy to provide a copy now?

EBELING, MR: But if they want any more, they can get that from the council. That's - - -

EAST MS: You don't want to give a copy now, which seems like the most easy way to do it? I'm not telling you to do it. It's just a suggestion. We can make a copy.

EBELING, MR: There's a copy of the registration for Buddy.

RICHARDSON, MS: Thank you.

EAST MS: Is the applicant proceeding with the application?

RICHARDSON, MS: We are.

EAST MS: Okay. I'm going to list it for hearing because I don't think that we're going to achieve anything here. So previously, orders were made on 3 November 2023, and that was at a directions hearing, Mr Ebeling, that you didn't attend. When I asked you last time, you said you felt that you didn't have anything to add to the proceedings, but as I pointed out to you at the time, you are named as a respondent. At the end of the day, it's your choice whether or not you put those documents in.

But the flip side to that is that you have the right to represent your side of the story, and if you don't do that, then the tribunal will only have the applicant's case in making a decision. So at the end of the day, it's entirely up to you as to what you put in, but I will warn you that failure to do so might make the case more difficult for you to make - well, it will make the case more difficult for you to make when you go to hearing.[6]

1. In addition to how the question of Buddy as an assistance animal was dealt with through the SAT, the above exchange has another significance It appears that what Mr Ebeling said was a copy of Buddy's registration as an assistance dog with the local council was supplied to Ms Richardson (then for the respondent) on 1 February 2024 and not, it appears, to the SAT.
2. Whether or not Mr Ebeling gave a 'copy of the registration for Buddy' to the SAT was debated with Mr Ebeling at the hearing in this Court on 30 January 2025.[7]
3. It appears to me from the SAT transcript quoted above, and the discussion in this Court with Mr Ebeling, that the registration for Buddy which Mr Ebeling put before this Court by attaching it to his Review Application was not supplied to the SAT. I have proceeded on that basis.
4. That, in my view, is consistent with the exchange between the Member and Mr Ebeling on 4 April 2024 as quoted in [22] above and the findings made by the Member as quoted below at [37].
5. At the SAT hearing on 4 April 2024, the respondent's counsel, in the course of submissions, recited orders made on 30 November 2023, by another Member of the SAT following a mediation which gave Mr Ebeling an opportunity to make application to the respondent to be able to keep Buddy at the Property.[8] Those Orders contained the following:

1. The respondent must by no later than 1 January 2024 give to the applicant an application for the dog the subject of the proceeding to be kept on the lot of the respondent. The application must include the following:

(a) A medical certificate to confirm that the respondent suffers from a medical condition for which the company of the dog is required;

(b) Approval from the relevant local government that the dog has been registered as an assistance dog for the respondent;

(c) A certificate that the dog has been trained for the said purpose;

(d) An undertaking by the respondent that the dog will be kept on a leash when on common property and that barking of the dog will be discouraged; and

(e) Any other relevant information.[9]

1. On 4 April 2024, in the course of one of the witness's oral evidence (Ms Lilly), Mr Ebeling sought to ask how long she had been a registered occupational therapist. The Tribunal told Mr Ebeling that the question was not relevant. In the debate with the Member the following exchange took place:

EAST MS: What she has said in her statement as an allied health professional - so she's an OT, isn't it?---[Witness] Yes. That's correct.

Yes:

I adamantly believe in the value of an assistance dog.

Okay. She said:

I would have advocated for Mr Ebeling's right to retain had I seen physical evidence of medical necessity and certification of training.

All she's saying is she hasn't seen that. And, to be honest, the issue of whether or not Buddy is an assistance dog isn't in dispute. It's whether or not you've breached the by-laws. So Ms Lilly's qualifications - you're badgering her. It's unnecessary.

EBELING, MR: It's evidence being used in a case against me. I'm entitled to, like, support my case.[10] (emphasis added)

1. The point of quoting this exchange is to record, in context, the statement of the Member then as to whether the issue of Buddy being an assistance animal was in dispute and to provide the context for the next exchange quoted immediately below.
2. The following exchange then occurred between the Member and counsel for the Strata Company:

EAST MS: This isn't an application under the Dangerous Dog Act to say whether or not you need the dog.

EBELING, MR: Yes.

EAST MS: This is about whether or not you've breached the by-laws. Her profession is not relevant to that. Is there anything further you wanted to say, Mr Monaco, in relation to that?

MONACO, MR: No. I don't.

EAST MS: You've raised the initial objection - - -

MONACO, MR: I just want to put our position in relation to an assistant animal. Buddy is not an assistant animal - - -

EAST MS: I know.

MONACO, MR: - - - according to the applicant. If the dog was an assistant animal the by-laws - - -

EAST MS: Well, I have no evidence of that.

MONACO, MR: But the by-laws would not then apply to it because ‑ ‑ ‑

EAST MS: That's right.

MONACO, MR: - - - it would have the lawful rights to be with - - -

EAST MS: Correct.

MONACO, MR: - - - its owner at all times under certain conditions.

EAST MS: Yes. Correct.

THE WITNESS: I was - may I say that I was under the impression based on what Mr Ebeling had said that it was an assistance animal, and I - but taking him at his word, I - I do reiterate the fact that I do believe assistance animals are important and integral part of a medical management plan. I've worked with assistance animals and - - -

EAST MS: I think we need to - - -?---Yes.

- - - draw a distinction here between assistance animals, such as the most obvious one being a guide dog, and - - -?---I've worked with guide dogs, yes.

- - - an emotional - yes?---Yes.

And an emotional support dog. I don't think there was any suggestion that Buddy was certified as an assistance dog?---Mr Ebeling did say in mediation that he is an assistance dog or certified, that's all.

We don't have any evidence of that, so the assumption will be that he's not. But - okay. I take your point. Yes?---Yes. That's - that's why I included it in the - - -

I know that there are assistance dogs - - -?---Yes.

- - - for particular medical conditions where dogs can anticipate them and warn their owner. But unless there is that certification, as Mr Monaco said, then the by-laws wouldn't apply. If you had an assistance dog then obviously that would be a discrimination point, but we haven't had any evidence about him being an assistance dog. It appears he's an emotional support dog, which has the same status as a pet.

EBELING, MR: At the annual general meeting a couple of years ago I gave them my paperwork from the doctor and - - -

EAST MS: Well, Mr Ebeling - - -

EBELING, MR: - - - for the dog.

EAST MS: - - - if you have paperwork that Buddy is an assistance dog, as in that he's registered as an assistance dog, and you had provided that me, then we could have shortened this hearing significantly. Because if you have got the right medically to have a medically trained assistance dog live with you, that's the end of the story. But despite comments being made about it repeatedly it hasn't been forthcoming, which makes me think it doesn't exist. Because if it does and I was you, I would be producing it.

THE WITNESS: May I also add to that that I would have 100 per cent backed you in the council if it was made clear that it was an assistance dog with paperwork. I would have absolutely had your back with the council there.

EBELING, MR: I've been badgered relentlessly for the past three to four years by this strata company over meaningless things. I've given them my paperwork. The law states I only have to give them my paperwork ‑ ‑ ‑

EAST MS: Well - - -

EBELING, MR: - - - one time and after that it's discrimination.[11]

1. Early in the hearing on 4 April 2024, Mr Ebeling was sworn in to give evidence by the SAT.[12] Soon after, the SAT moved from Mr Ebeling's opening address, or the beginning of his evidence, to the witnesses called by the Strata Company.[13]
2. After the Strata Company's witnesses had been called, Mr Ebeling stated:
   1. that Buddy had been to an animal behaviourist doctor for training;[14] and
   2. he asserted a right to privacy concerning his personal and medical information as being both protected by Western Australian and federal law.[15]
3. Although it is not completely clear, I have treated these statements as effectively being given in evidence on oath by Mr Ebeling in the SAT.
4. At the conclusion of the hearing on 4 April 2024, the SAT ordered further submissions to be made in writing.
5. In Mr Ebeling's closing submissions filed with the SAT on 12 June 2024, he asserted:

... Buddy's status as both an assistance animal and a working dog has significant implications for this case. I have taken all necessary steps to ensure that Buddy is compliant with the relevant laws and regulations, and the Applicant has failed to provide any evidence to the contrary.

Buddy's Registration and Compliance

Buddy is registered with the Belmont City Council as both an assistance animal and a working dog. This dual registration reflects Buddy's essential roles:

• Assistance Animal: Buddy provides emotional and practical support, helping me manage my mental health and daily tasks. His presence has been a source of comfort and stability in my life, particularly given my background of living on a cattle station where such animals are integral to daily life.

...

As an assistance and working dog, Buddy has rights that need to be recognized and respected:

• Protection Under Law: Buddy's status as an assistance animal affords him certain protections under the law. These include the right to reside with me and perform his duties without undue interference or discrimination.
• Contribution to Well-Being: Buddy's role is crucial to my mental and emotional well-being. His presence is not only beneficial but necessary for my daily functioning and quality of life.

Conclusion

In light of Buddy's registration as both an assistance animal and a working dog, and the Applicant's failure to provide any evidence to the contrary, I respectfully request the Tribunal to:

• Recognize Buddy's essential role and compliance with all relevant regulations.
• Dismiss any claims against Buddy based on unsubstantiated allegations.
• Consider the significant contributions Buddy makes to my well‑being and daily life, ensuring his rights are protected and respected.

It is imperative that the Tribunal acknowledges these factors and upholds the principles of justice and equity, ensuring that both Buddy's and my rights are fully protected.[16] (original emphasis)

1. In the Strata Company's closing submissions filed 30 April 2024, it submitted that 'the dog is not registered as an assistance animal with the City of Belmont'.[17]
2. In the Member's oral reasons, she stated that:

At no time has the respondent sought the permission of the applicant to keep Buddy nor has he provided any evidence that he is an assistance animal or that an application has been made to the local council to have him registered as such.

I note for the sake of completeness that if the respondent is claiming that Buddy is an emotional support dog that has the status of a pet and not an assistance animal.[18]

...

... The respondent has claimed that Buddy is registered with Belmont City Council as an assistance dog and a working dog. Despite this being raised on multiple occasions and also being the subject of orders arising out of mediation, no evidence of Buddy being an assistance animal was provided to the tribunal by the respondent.[19]

1. On my review of the material in the SAT, at no point was the Disability Discrimination Act expressly raised or identified and, in particular, the definition of an 'assistance animal' in s 9(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act was not referred to.
2. However, as may be seen from the above review of the material, the question of whether Buddy was an assistance animal was raised before the SAT at different points in time.
3. And, as may be seen from paragraph [37] above, any claim to Buddy being an assistance animal was rejected by the SAT.
4. Without expressly identifying the Disability Discrimination Act, in my view, Mr Ebeling did assert by way of 'defence' to the Strata Company's claims that he was entitled to keep Buddy because Buddy was an assistance animal. That assertion was rejected by the SAT on the basis of a lack of independent evidence.
5. The question is whether this raised a matter under a Commonwealth law within the meaning of s 76(ii) of the Constitution and, whether consequently, the application before the SAT was a matter of federal jurisdiction.
6. If it was a matter of federal jurisdiction, then there may have been a live question as to whether the SAT had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter.
7. That is because the SAT is not a 'court' of Western Australia.[20]
8. Power to exercise Commonwealth judicial power must be conferred through Ch III of the Constitution. Ch III of the Constitution allows the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate to invest a State court with federal jurisdiction under s 77(iii) of the Constitution.
9. However, the exclusive nature of Ch III of the Constitution has the negative implication that a State parliament cannot confer on a body such as the SAT, adjudicative authority in respect of a matter, for example, in s 76(ii).[21]
10. In my view, the SAT was exercising judicial power in the case brought by the Strata Company against Mr Ebeling.
11. While it may be accepted that at the State level, a distinction between judicial and non-judicial power is of less significance than at the Commonwealth level,[22] it must be considered here.
12. The SAT may exercise administrative or judicial power. An example of the former may be seen in Paspaley Pearling Company Pty Ltd & Anor and Delegate of the Chief of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Primary Industries & Regional Development & Anor.[23] Another example is its making of guardianship orders or administration orders as per GS v MS.[24]
13. I have reached the view that the SAT was exercising judicial power by reference to the principles in the following paragraphs:

[60] The unique and essential function of judicial power is the quelling of controversies about legal rights and legal obligations through ascertainment of the facts, the application of the law and the exercise, where appropriate, of judicial discretion.

...

[62] As is apparent from this statement of principle, judicial power is generally concerned with the ascertainment and enforcement of existing rights and obligations; it involves the determination of what the relevant person's rights or obligations are, not what they should be. The closer one moves to the core of this conception of judicial power, the more readily may it be concluded that a particular power is, essentially, judicial in nature.[25] (original emphasis)

1. Although there are limitations on the SAT enforcing its own orders which weighs against the characterisation of the SAT exercising judicial power, that consideration is not conclusive.[26]
2. If Mr Ebeling's invocation of Buddy being an assistance animal was the raising of a matter arising under the Disability Discrimination Act, a Commonwealth law, then, in my view, the SAT would not have been vested with the authority to hear and decide that matter.
3. The fact that Mr Ebeling had not expressly referred to that Commonwealth legislation would not be determinative of the matter.[27]
4. The plurality's judgment in Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn stated:[28]

The resolution in principle is that for a claim or defence in reliance on a Commonwealth law or in reliance on the Constitution to give rise to a matter of a description in s 76(i) or s 76(ii) of the Constitution, it is enough that the claim or defence be genuinely in controversy and that it give rise to an issue capable of judicial determination. That is to say, it is enough that the claim or defence be genuinely raised and not incapable on its face of legal argument.

That is what should be taken to have been meant by repeated acknowledgements that the assertion of a claim or defence will not give rise to a matter within the description in s 76(i) or s 76(ii) of the Constitution if the claim or defence is "unarguable" or if the claim or defence is "colourable" in that it is made for the purpose of "fabricating" jurisdiction.[29] (citations omitted)

1. Following that was the Court of Appeal's decision in Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161[30] where the Court stated (of Citta Hobart):

The plurality also emphasised that examination of what the prospects of success of a legally coherent claim or defence might be, were that claim or defence to be judicially determined on its merits, forms no part of the requisite assessment. That reflects the principle that:

1. a justiciable controversy answers the description in s 76(i) of a matter 'arising under' the Constitution where the invalidity or inoperability of a Commonwealth or State law is asserted in the controversy in reliance on the Constitution; and
2. the assertion operates to characterise the totality of the justiciable controversy and continues to characterise the totality of the justiciable controversy even where the assertion is later resolved in the exercise of judicial power or withdrawn.[31] (citations omitted)
3. I sought further submissions from the parties on the question at the hearing on 30 January 2025. I received further written submissions from the respondent which drew my attention to ss 46(h) and (i) of the ST Act.
4. Those sections provide:
   1. Invalidity of scheme by-laws

Scheme by-laws are invalid as follows -

...

(h) to the extent that they prohibit or restrict the keeping on a lot of an animal that is used as an assistance animal by a person with a disability who is an owner or occupier of a lot;

(i) to the extent that they prohibit or restrict the use on the parcel of an assistance animal by a person with a disability;

1. 'Assistance animal' in those provisions of the ST Act is defined by s 3(1) to have the meaning given in the Commonwealth Disability Discrimination Act, s 9(2).
2. As is apparent from the transcript quoted in paragraph [30] above, the Strata Company was aware in the SAT that its by-laws would not be enforceable, at the least, if it were the case that Buddy was an assistance animal.
3. The principles as to when a matter arises under a law made by the Commonwealth parliament were summarised by the Court of Appeal in Hanssen. From the well-settled authorities, it was said that a matter will arise under a Commonwealth law if:
   1. the right or duty in question in the matter owes its existence to Commonwealth law; and
   2. the right or duty depends on Commonwealth law for its enforcement.[32]
4. As was said by the plurality in LNC Industries v BMW (Australia) Ltd:[33]

It is true to say that a matter does not arise under a law made by the [Commonwealth] Parliament merely because the interpretation of the law is involved. ...

... Equally, there is a matter arising under a federal law if the source of a defence which asserts that the defendant is immune from the liability or obligation alleged against him is a law of the Commonwealth...[34]

1. In my view, the use by the ST Act of a definition taken from the Commonwealth Disability Discrimination Act does not have the result that a matter arose under a law of the Commonwealth or under the Commonwealth Constitution.
2. Rather, the Commonwealth legislation here provided only a definition for the State provision, which I consider is not of itself sufficient to mean that the matter arose under a Commonwealth law.
3. Further, because the ST Act would render the by-laws invalid, there could be no relevant inconsistency between the State provisions allowing for the enforcement of the by-laws with the Commonwealth legislation and so there was no question under s 109 of the Constitution.

1. Mr Ebeling, who was self‑represented, raised many grounds in his Review Application and sought to support or supplement his position by the voluminous documents filed with, or sent to, the Court; and which I have sought to capture in Annexures A and B to these reasons.
2. In his Review Application, Mr Ebeling raised the following grounds (into which I have inserted numbers):

Failure to Address Material Legal Arguments: The SAT did not consider key arguments from the applicant, including:

[Ground 1] ‑ Privacy Violations and Unauthorized Surveillance: The SAT ignored arguments on privacy breaches under the Surveillance Devices Act 1998, failing to substantively address the classification of common property as private rather than public.

[Ground 2] - Exclusion of Unlawfully Obtained Evidence: The applicant, citing Bunning v Cross [1978] HCA 22; (1978) 141 CLR 54, argued that unauthorized surveillance evidence should be excluded. SAT's dismissal of this claim breached procedural fairness by ignoring admissibility principles.

[Ground 3] - Incorrect Classification of Common Property as Public: The SAT misapplied the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) by classifying common property as public, impacting privacy rights and violating the applicant's entitlements under the Act.

[Ground 4] - Unaddressed Defamation and Hostile Environment Claims: The applicant alleged defamatory statements and harassment, citing Dow Jones v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575, but SAT failed to respond to these points, breaching principles of procedural fairness.

[Ground 5] - Procedural Unfairness and Abuse of Process: The applicant argued that the opposing party engaged in abuse of process and harassment, as supported by Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509. SAT dismissed these allegations without evaluation, impacting procedural rights.

[Ground 6] - Failure to Recognize Assistance Animal Rights: Evidence of the applicant's registered assistance dog, Buddy, was dismissed without review, impacting the applicant's quality of life and breaching rights to assistance animal accommodation.

[Ground 7] - Denial of Procedural Fairness through Delayed and Incomplete Reasoning: SAT's failure to provide timely written reasons denied the applicant's right to assess and appeal the decision, violating Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550.

[Ground 8] - Improper Inclusion of Legal Fees as Strata Levies: SAT did not properly assess the applicant's claim that legal fees were mischaracterized as levies, impacting the validity of penalties imposed.[35]

1. As will be seen, Mr Ebeling also raised other grounds which I will deal with below.
2. The submissions which appear in Mr Ebeling's Finalised Application for Review dated 15 December 2024 (Finalised Application for Review) as submitted to this Court are not expressly linked to the grounds in the Review Application. Where possible, and without unnecessary repetition, I have sought to marry the submissions from the Finalised Application for Review to the eight grounds in the Review Application.

1. I have grouped and considered these three grounds together.
2. Without reciting the submissions which go to each of these grounds made by Mr Ebeling, the core assertion, as I understand it, results from the Strata Company seeking to rely on photographs and video footage of Buddy in and around the complex, and in the common areas of the complex, in the SAT. These were led to assist in establishing the breaches of the relevant by‑laws for which the Strata Company contended in the SAT.
3. In his closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024, Mr Ebeling submitted:

My privacy rights under the Privacy Act 1998 and the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) have been flagrantly violated. The Applicant has engaged in unauthorized surveillance activities and the dissemination of my personal information without my consent. This not only infringes upon my privacy but also contravenes the Health Records and Information Privacy Act and the AMA's Code of Ethics. Such actions are illegal and unethical, demanding immediate rectification and penalties against the Applicant.

• Unauthorized Surveillance: The Applicant has conducted unauthorized surveillance, capturing and disseminating images and recordings of me without my consent. This violates sections of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), which protects individuals from unauthorized surveillance and ensures the sanctity of their private activities.
• Disclosure of Personal Information: The Applicant has further breached my rights by unlawfully sharing my personal and health information. This is a direct violation of the Health Records and Information Privacy Act, which mandates the confidentiality of such sensitive information.[36] (original emphasis)

... The respondent has claimed a breach of his rights under the Privacy Act 1998 and the Surveillance Devices Act 1998.

He further states that evidence obtained through unauthorised surveillance must be excluded and cites several case authorities in support. The evidence provided by the applicant included photographs and video footage of Buddy in and around the complex, most notably in the common areas. As was discussed at the hearing of this matter, taking photos and/or videos in a public area is not a breach of privacy laws and cannot be regarded as improper surveillance. As such, I see no basis for excluding the information - the evidence provided. In any case, if I did, we had oral evidence of witnesses in support of the evidence provided.[37] (emphasis added)

1. I do not think I need to resolve the 'merits' of these grounds which are directed to the SAT's receipt of the photographs and video footage as described.
2. As is plain from the reasoning quoted above, the SAT also reached its conclusions on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses called by the respondent.
3. I consider, from reviewing the transcript of the hearing on 4 April 2024 and the oral reasons, that it was open, as a matter of law, for the SAT to reach the conclusions that it did from the evidence of the witnesses called by the Strata Company, without having regard to photographs and video footage of Buddy.
4. So, even if it be accepted that there was a reviewable error of law on the basis of the photographs or video footage being taken in, it did not have a material effect on the decision because there was relevant evidence from witnesses which the SAT made plain it accepted and relied upon.
5. No separate error of law is asserted in the SAT having taken into account that evidence. As said, from my review, I consider it was open as a matter of law for the SAT to reach the factual conclusions which it did from that evidence of the witnesses.
6. In setting out the above, I am not accepting that there was the error of law as asserted. Rather, I have concluded, here, that even if there was such an error, it was not material and would not lead to the SAT decision or orders being set aside.
7. As may be seen from the quotation of Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT in paragraph [71] above, he did assert there that his 'rights' under the Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) had been infringed.
8. The question is whether that had the effect of rendering that a matter under a law of the Parliament for the purposes s 76(ii) of the Constitution.
9. In my view, the claim made is not one which brings the proceeding below within s 76(ii) of the Constitution.
10. I do not repeat here the principles of law I set out in [60] - [62] above; but I consider they are equally applicable here.

1. In his closing submissions to the SAT, Mr Ebeling asserted that he had been '... subjected to ... defamatory conduct ... which [had] been perpetrated by the [Strata Company] in an attempt to unjustly target [him]'.[38]
2. Those closing submissions under the heading 'Defamatory Statements and Hostile Environment' further stated:

Derogatory comments made by Miss Lilly during tribunal proceedings are both inappropriate and defamatory. She claimed that my presence devalues property values and creates a negative living environment. These statements are baseless, harmful, and contribute to a hostile environment, violating my rights to dignity and respect under antidiscrimination and human rights laws.[39]

1. In his Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling said that the SAT had:

... permitted witnesses, including Ms. Lilly and Mr. Murphy, to provide testimony that was irrelevant, speculative, Discriminatory, Defamatory and prejudicial. This testimony included unfounded opinions on my character, such as statements about feeling intimidated by me and speculative claims regarding my dog's behavior. None of this testimony was supported by direct evidence or firsthand knowledge.

By admitting such testimony, the SAT allowed the focus to shift from substantive legal issues ... to subjective narratives, which introduced bias into the proceedings.[40] (original emphasis)

1. I have set out Mr Murphy's relevant evidence below under Ground 5. I have not repeated that here. I have also addressed further below Mr Ebeling's contention, as made, that the SAT had, effectively, defamed him.
2. Ms Lilly's witness statement, which she adopted in her oral evidence,[41] gave evidence of:
   1. hearing a dog on occasion;
   2. seeing a dog on the balcony of Mr Ebeling's unit;
   3. seeing Buddy, not on a lead, walking from the carpark to Mr Ebeling's residence;
   4. reports made to her by other residents about Buddy;
   5. what was discussed when she was at an annual general meeting of the Strata Company; and
   6. not seeing any physical evidence of medical necessity on the part of Mr Ebeling for an assistance dog or any certification of Buddy's training.
3. In her oral evidence she gave evidence of:
   1. having owned a dog at the complex previously and deciding that there was not enough space for the dog to reside there;[42]
   2. what her feelings and apprehension would be if a dog of Buddy's size was to approach her;[43]
   3. steps that she takes to ensure she is not going to be confronted by Buddy;[44]
   4. her feeling intimidated by the dog and Mr Ebeling;[45]
   5. her upset at being told Buddy had bit another resident and that, in response, Mr Ebeling had hit Buddy;[46]
   6. warning a friend who had come to stay about the dog;[47] and
   7. as a result of arguments or altercations she had heard about the dog she did not want people to think she was in 'dodgy accommodation'.[48]
4. In cross-examination by Mr Ebeling, Ms Lilly gave evidence which included:
   1. her having made application to the Strata Company to have her dog at the complex;[49]
   2. she was nervous when her dog met Buddy but it was a friendly interaction;[50] and
   3. what Ms Lilly's attitude would have been towards Buddy if he was an assistance animal.[51]
5. I do not consider that I need to reach a view as to whether Ms Lilly's or Mr Murphy's statements made in either their witness statement or in oral evidence could, in a different context, be defamatory of Mr Ebeling. That is because, as witnesses, they were entitled to the protections provided by s 163(5) of the SAT Act.
6. Further, it is unclear from the introduction to Mr Ebeling's closing submissions in the SAT as quoted in [84] above whether his complaint to the SAT was:
   1. that it should not have regard to the statements about which Mr Ebeling complained; or
   2. that the SAT should have made some order (such as compensatory damages) as a result of the 'defamation' against him by Ms Lilly.
7. If it is the latter, then the provisions of s 163(5) of the SAT Act would apply.
8. If it is the former, then on my review of the reasons given, it does not appear that the SAT took any of the 'defamatory' statements complained of in Ms Lilly's evidence into account in reaching its decision.
9. That is, it does not appear that the matters about which Mr Ebeling complains in Ms Lilly's evidence were material to the decision reached.
10. The SAT considered Ms Lilly's evidence,[52] and found her to be a forthright and credible witness who gave her evidence clearly.[53] The SAT accepted her evidence of her hearing Buddy barking, him being on the balcony of Mr Ebeling's unit and walking through the common property without being on a lead.[54]
11. In the SAT's oral reasons Mr Murphy's evidence was recounted.[55] The SAT found Mr Murphy to be a forthright and credible witness and accepted his evidence that he was bitten by Buddy as he had described. And, apparently, also accepted his evidence of his later interaction with Buddy.[56]
12. The SAT also accepted as authentic Mr Murphy's photos of the bite mark he had after being bitten.[57]
13. The SAT accepted that having been bitten, Mr Murphy continues to suffer emotional distress and has a significant wariness now, not only of Buddy, but of other dogs in general.[58] That finding, it appears, was, relevant to its finding that Mr Ebeling's contravention of the notice of 21 July 2020 had had serious adverse consequences for Mr Murphy which, the Tribunal found, negated the need for a valid notice under s 47(1)(a) of the ST Act.[59]
14. In all of those circumstances, I do not detect any error of law as asserted under this ground.

Ground 5 : procedural unfairness and abuse of process

1. Mr Ebeling throughout both his Review Application and his Finalised Application for Review submitted that he has suffered procedural unfairness.
2. In different places, Mr Ebeling has also asserted that the SAT Application against him was an abuse of process.
3. Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT stated under the heading 'Abuse of Process Claim' that:

The Applicant's persistent misuse of legal forums to harass me suggests a clear abuse of process. Mr. Murphy's actions, characterized by unfounded legal claims, are intended to burden me rather than resolve any legitimate dispute. This misuse of the legal system must be addressed by the Tribunal, potentially leading to a declaration of Mr. Murphy as a vexatious litigant to prevent further abuse.[60]

1. The SAT recorded that Mr Ebeling suggested that Mr Murphy be declared a vexatious litigant. In dealing with that, the SAT noted that Mr Murphy was not a party to these proceedings but was merely a witness who gave evidence which was accepted.[61] There was no error made in doing so.
2. Mr Murphy made a witness statement, later adopted in his oral evidence,[62] in which he described:
   1. an incident where he was bitten on the outside of his right knee in the grassed area next to the pool at the complex, and Mr Ebeling's response to that incident;[63]
   2. his not trusting the dog since and his having seen it unleashed and unmuzzled around the common property;[64]
   3. a further incident where he felt threatened by the dog approaching him at speed and then Mr Ebeling's response to Mr Murphy screaming for the dog to get away from him;[65] and
   4. complaints that Mr Murphy had then made about that incident.[66]
3. In his oral evidence, Mr Murphy gave evidence of:
   1. his current fear and the steps he took to avoid a confrontation with Buddy;[67]
   2. his fear of not being able to get away from the dog if it charged him;[68] and
   3. where in the complex Mr Murphy was bitten.[69]
4. In cross-examination, Mr Murphy:
   1. said he had spoken about the case with his lawyer;[70]
   2. the circumstances in which Mr Murphy had withdrawn his first statement to the SAT and replaced it, excluding some statements from the original statement that Mr Ebeling had complained about;[71]
   3. Mr Murphy's perception of Buddy, in response to a question in cross‑examination;[72] and
   4. discussions or lack of discussions between Mr Murphy and Mr Ebeling about Buddy's 'job'.[73]
5. Doing the best I can, I consider that all of Mr Ebeling's assertions in the Review Application and the Finalised Application for Review regarding claims of an abuse of process have been dealt with under other headings in these reasons, and there is nothing which needs to be considered separately under this ground.

1. The review carried out above (in the consideration of federal jurisdiction) sets out the way in which the claim that Buddy was a registered assistance dog before the SAT was raised, agitated and decided.
2. As noted, Mr Ebeling asserted, both on the hearing of 4 April 2024 and in his closing submissions (as quoted in [35] above), that Buddy was an assistance animal. It is unclear whether Mr Ebeling gave evidence to that effect. However, I will proceed on the basis that Mr Ebeling gave sworn evidence to that effect.
3. That position was not accepted by the respondent in the SAT.
4. The SAT had indicated that Mr Ebeling had not submitted evidence (I consider that must be read as meaning evidence which was independent of his assertion) that Buddy was an assistance animal and had made it plain to Mr Ebeling that what material he put before the SAT was a matter for him.
5. The SAT was not obliged as a matter of law to accept Mr Ebeling's evidence. That was particularly so in circumstances where he asserted that Buddy was so registered, and had been so trained but where, in the face of that not being accepted by the respondent, nonetheless did not seek to support those matters with any 'independent' evidence.
6. In all of the circumstances, the finding that the SAT made that Buddy was not a registered assistance animal was open, as a matter of law, for it to make.
7. I do not detect any error of law in this regard.
8. I do not consider that any legal error has been disclosed and I would reject this ground.

1. I do not consider that it is a reviewable error of law for the SAT to have delivered its reasons orally.
2. It was not asserted that Mr Ebeling did not receive a copy of the transcript of the reasons delivered. And, even if it were to be, the answer is that Mr Ebeling had the transcript of the reasons by the time of his submissions in this Court and was able to fully ventilate his review rights which he has done so in this Court.
3. There was no denial of Mr Ebeling's 'right to assess and appeal the decision' as he contended.
4. Although Mr Ebeling did not seek to appeal to this Court pursuant to Part 5 of the SAT Act, that an appeal did lie informed the quality of and content of the reasons given.
5. The Full Court of this Court, drawing on many authorities stated in Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission[74] that:
   1. the giving of reasons is a normal (albeit not universal) incident of the judicial process;
   2. fairness requires that the parties should know why they have won or lost;
   3. where there is a right of appeal, the reasons must be sufficient to give effect to that right;
   4. the basis for the decision must be apparent, as otherwise the losing party cannot know whether there has been a mistake of law or of fact;
   5. reasons need not be lengthy and elaborate; and
   6. what will be required depends upon the nature of the case and contest before the decision maker.[75]
6. Those general principles are subject to an adjustment where a court is undertaking appellate review (or a judicial review) of an administrative tribunal: Centex Australasia Pty Ltd [104] - [105].
7. However, applying the full force of the principles adopted and set out in [120] above (on the basis that the SAT here was acting judicially and that is the most favourable basis for Mr Ebeling) in my assessment the reasons given by the Tribunal are well within what is expected.[76]
8. As far as I am aware, and certainly I was not taken to anything to the contrary in the SAT Act, there was no statutory obligation on the SAT to reduce its oral reasons to a more formal judgment. Indeed, the provisions of ss 156(1) and (2) suggests that there was no statutory obligation on the Tribunal to reduce any oral reasons to a more formal form than was done here.
9. I do not detect any error of law in the SAT delivering its reasons in the way it did.

Ground 8 : Proper inclusion of legal fees as strata levies

1. With respect, I consider this ground to be misguided as it appears to misunderstand the basis on which the SAT made its Order 3.
2. As I have set out under the heading 'Costs of the application' below, the SAT did not decide that the Strata Company's legal costs were levies. Rather, as I have noted below, the SAT observed that if the respondent's legal costs were not otherwise recovered then the owners, in time, would no doubt have to pay them to the Strata Company via levies.[77]
3. It is unclear whether Mr Ebeling is asserting a different error and whether he is complaining about the future operation, potentially, of s 47(8) of the ST Act. However, such a future recovery was not ordered, and so I have not considered that further here.

1. I have sought, below, to capture additional grounds which Mr Ebeling raised through the documents he sent to the Court. Most of these have been taken from Mr Ebeling's Finalised Application for Review.[78] The Finalised Application for Review was one of the comprehensive documents sent to the Court by Mr Ebeling, ahead of what became a further directions hearing on 20 December 2024.
2. The Finalised Application for Review was a lengthy document (of some 51 pages). Unfortunately, it was not numbered. It contains a number of grounds which might be thought to be additional to the document which Mr Ebeling filed on 6 November 2024.
3. Where a complaint from the Finalised Application for Review has already been dealt with under the eight grounds set out in Mr Ebeling's Review Application, I have not discussed it further here.

1. Mr Ebeling repeatedly raised in this Court what he said were problems with the faithfulness and accuracy of the transcript of the proceedings in the SAT.[79]
2. Representative of the complaints Mr Ebeling made about the transcript in the SAT is the following:

The State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) transcript of proceedings in Matter CC 1289/2023 contains significant inaccuracies, including misattributions of statements and unexplained redactions. These redactions disproportionately impact evidence favorable to me, distorting the evidentiary record and hindering my ability to rely on the transcript in judicial review proceedings. Furthermore, selective omissions obscure key procedural errors and diminish the transparency of the SAT's decision-making process.[80]

1. In the course of the hearing on 30 January 2025, I sought to explain to Mr Ebeling some of the features of transcripts from court proceedings which are commonplace and familiar to legal practitioners, but which may not be obvious to a lay person.[81]
2. At the conclusion of the hearing on 30 January 2025, I made the following orders:
   1. The applicant has leave to listen to the audio recordings of the proceedings before the State Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal) on 1 February 2024 and 4 April 2024. This is to be done at the Registry of the Supreme Court, in business hours, at the time and with the conditions arranged by the Registry.
   2. The applicant file and serve a document which identifies, by reference to the time and date of the recording and by reference to the transcript, any material discrepancies, with a short description of what is said to be the discrepancy, by 4:00 pm on 7 February 2025.
   3. The applicant file and serve any documents which were put before the Tribunal by 4:00 pm on 7 February 2025.

1. Following the making of those Orders, there was a further welter of correspondence from Mr Ebeling addressed to my Chambers.
2. In short, Mr Ebeling asserted, repeatedly, that the Court had not complied with its own orders and that he had been denied procedural fairness. Mr Ebeling asserted that this Court's Registry had failed to facilitate his timely access to the audio recordings of the SAT proceedings and had caused him to be prejudiced in his ability to present his case. Representative of Mr Ebeling's assertions in this respect is the following from the hearing on 14 February 2025:

HOWARD J: ... do you still wish to have an opportunity to listen to the recordings in the State Administrative Tribunal?

EBELING, MR: I believe this is creating an impossible and unfair legal position where I'm being held to a deadline that I cannot comply with through no fault of my own.

HOWARD J: Well, Mr Ebeling, the reason I'm asking you as to whether you wish to have an opportunity is that if you do wish to have an opportunity, then I will make orders allowing you to have that opportunity.

EBELING, MR: I respectfully request for the court to formally acknowledge the failure to provide timely access to the audio recordings has rendered compliance with 7 February 2025 deadline impossible.[82]

1. I do not consider I need to consider, or make any determination in relation to, Mr Ebeling's assertions as to whether and, or, why he was not able to listen to the SAT recordings in time to comply with Order 2 that I made on 30 January 2025, or at all. In saying that, I should not be taken to accept the matters asserted by Mr Ebeling.
2. That is because at the hearing on 14 February 2025, I said that I was prepared to vary Order 2 to extend the time to enable Mr Ebeling to listen to the audio recordings and prepare the document identifying any material discrepancies.
3. Mr Ebeling in that hearing on 14 February 2025 made plain, after being asked repeatedly, that he did not wish for me to make further orders to allow him to listen to the audio recordings.
4. It appeared, rather, that Mr Ebeling wished to 'bank' what he saw as being an appeal ground.[83]
5. I do not think it can be sensibly contended that Mr Ebeling was denied procedural fairness or, practically, a chance to advance a case based on inaccuracies in the SAT transcript in the above circumstances.

1. Mr Ebeling dealt with this on pages 3 and 4 of his Finalised Application for Review, asserting that:

... the SAT consistently curtailed my ability to challenge the credibility, accuracy, and relevance of witness testimony.

1. In this respect, Mr Ebeling referred to his cross‑examination of:
   1. Ms Lilly at pages 49 - 51 of the transcript of 4 April 2024; and
   2. Mr Murphy at pages 35 - 36 of the transcript of 4 April 2024.

1. Ms Lilly in cross-examination said that she was an occupational therapist.[84]
2. Mr Ebeling then wished to cross-examine Ms Lilly as to how long she had been registered with AHPRA and the Member stated that she did not consider that was relevant to the matters before the SAT.[85]
3. I have dealt with the substance of Ms Lilly's evidence above in these reasons.
4. I do not consider that her registration, and indeed her occupation at all, can be seen as being of real, if any, significance to the matters before the SAT.
5. Particularly, it is not possible to see how the question of Ms Lilly's registration with AHPRA went to any of her credibility, accuracy or the relevance of her evidence.
6. I do not find any reviewable error disclosed.

1. As I note under Grounds 4 and 5 above, it appears that, at one stage, Mr Murphy's witness statement which had been submitted to the SAT contained statements to which Mr Ebeling took strong objection. By the time of the hearing before the Member of 4 April 2024, it appears that the offending statement of Mr Murphy had been replaced with a different statement, and it was this later statement that Mr Murphy adopted in his evidence.
2. In the course of Mr Ebeling's cross-examination of Mr Murphy, Mr Ebeling asked whether Mr Murphy had discussed the case 'outside the courtroom'.[86] Mr Murphy said that he had spoken with his lawyer about the case.[87] The Member wanted to know from Mr Ebeling why the discussion was relevant.[88]
3. Mr Murphy then gave evidence of a letter going from his solicitors to Mr Ebeling in which an apology was given for some of the statements included in the earlier witness statement and an indication that 'the bits to be retracted were retracted'.[89]
4. The Member asked again about the relevance of that where the offending document had been uplifted from the SAT's records prior to the hearing.[90] The Member said that: she did not know what the defamatory statements were; the witness statement that Mr Murphy had adopted did not have those statements in them; and so she did not understand what the relevance was of the line of questioning.[91]
5. As may be observed from the transcript of the hearing and the scope of the evidence which Mr Murphy gave (and which I have summarised above), Mr Ebeling was not restricted in his ability to question Mr Murphy about Mr Murphy's interactions with Buddy and his subsequent wariness and fears.
6. I do not find any reviewable error is disclosed.

1. In his Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling dealt with this on page 5.
2. Mr Ebeling asserted that:

... SAT's conduct demonstrated a consistent bias against me, favoring the respondents' [sic] witnesses and dismissing my objections and concerns without proper consideration.

(1) on page 44 of the transcript, his objecting to hearsay testimony from Ms Lilly regarding statements 'allegedly made by a friend about my dog';[92] and

(2) on page 46 of the transcript, Ms Lilly providing 'speculative testimony about feeling intimidated by me and Buddy despite admitting on page 53 of the transcript that neither she nor her foster dog had experienced any adverse interactions with Buddy.'[93]

1. Mr Ebeling further stated that his objections to hearsay testimony were summarily dismissed without proper legal analysis.[94]
2. Mr Ebeling further contended that:

The dismissal of my objections to hearsay evidence left inadmissible testimony unchallenged, impacting the tribunal's findings.[95]

1. Mr Ebeling contended that this was a failure to address key motions of his and instanced the denial of procedural fairness.
2. A core element of the complaint is, with respect, misguided. By its statute the SAT is not bound by the rules of evidence and is to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms.[96]
3. In those circumstances, it could not be, with respect, an error of law in and of itself for the SAT to dismiss or not uphold an objection on the basis of hearsay evidence.
4. And I also note that, as set out above, the SAT in its reasons made rather limited use of Ms Lilly's evidence. That is, it took into account principally her evidence about her having seen and heard Buddy at the complex.
5. These are matters which the SAT was fully entitled to take into account in reaching its decision and, in this respect, I do not detect any reviewable error.

1. Mr Ebeling dealt with this in his Finalised Application for Review at pages 6 and 7. He said that:

The SAT obstructed my ability to present critical evidence, particularly regarding my assistance animal certification and the respondents' [sic][97] bias against me.

1. Taking the complaint about Buddy's certification first, at page 6 of his Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling referred to page 53 of the transcript of 4 April 2024 and stated that the Member:

... dismissed my attempts to introduce evidence of Buddy's certification as an assistance animal, stating, "If you have paperwork that Buddy is an assistance dog ... then we could have shortened this hearing significantly". Despite this, my evidence was not admitted, leaving the tribunal to rely on unverified claims by the respondents [sic].[98]

1. With respect, this is a misrepresentation of the interaction between the Member and Mr Ebeling on page 53 of the transcript of 4 April 2024. I have quoted, relevantly, from that page of the transcript in [30] above.
2. I have reviewed the transcript of the proceedings before the SAT on each of 1 February, 4 April and 4 October 2024. Much of that review has been set out above.
3. At no point in time did Mr Ebeling seek to put before the SAT any certification or evidence (outside of his own oral evidence) which went to Buddy's certification as an assistance animal.
4. From my review, it is simply not the case that the SAT in any way obstructed Mr Ebeling's ability to put such evidence before it if he had wanted to do so.
5. With respect, this complaint has no substance.

1. With respect, this is a misrepresentation of the interaction between the Member and Mr Ebeling on page 53 of the transcript of 4 April 2024. I have quoted, relevantly, from that page of the transcript in [30] above.
2. Mr Ebeling's Finalised Application for Review referred in this respect to page 47 of the transcript of 4 April 2024, where Mr Ebeling stated he attempted to question Ms Lilly about her involvement in the strata council decisions, and asserted that the line of questioning was crucial to establishing her 'bias as a council member'.[99]
3. The transcript of 4 April 2024 at page 47 does not disclose such questioning of Ms Lilly. Indeed, it does not appear that Mr Ebeling questioned Ms Lilly about any strata council decision relating to him.
4. There is no substance to the complaints raised by Mr Ebeling under this heading.

1. Mr Ebeling in his Finalised Application for Review dealt with this at pages 7 to 9. Mr Ebeling stated that:

The SAT failed to consider several material motions and objections raised by me during the course of the proceedings. Among these were:

• A motion requesting the tribunal to review the audio recordings of hearings to verify procedural accuracy and inconsistencies in the transcript.
• A motion seeking a judicial inquiry into a potential procedural irregularities, including the improper admission of evidence and biased handling of witness testimony.

These motions were either ignored or summarily dismissed without detailed reasoning or consideration, depriving me of the opportunity to rectify significant procedural errors.[100]

1. I have dealt with the asserted failures about the accuracy and inconsistencies in the SAT transcripts above. I have noted that Mr Ebeling chose not to, in the end, listen to the audio recordings of the SAT proceedings and chose not to put before this Court any material discrepancies.
2. In those circumstances, I have found, as a matter of substance, that Mr Ebeling has not established that he was denied procedural fairness in the SAT, nor was he denied an opportunity that might be material to his application in this Court. In those circumstances, I consider that Mr Ebeling cannot be successful in establishing a material error of law on the part of the SAT whereby it did not review its own transcripts as 'requested' by Mr Ebeling.
3. The question of whether there was any procedural irregularity, or improper admission of evidence, or biased handling of witnesses' testimony by the SAT are, I consider, dealt with under other grounds I have considered in these reasons.
4. To the extent that Mr Ebeling asserts a separate error of law that the SAT should have ordered a 'judicial inquiry' into his procedural complaints and that its failure to do so was an error of law, this misapprehends the powers of the SAT and further fails to identify how the decision made by the SAT was affected.
5. This ground is without merit and does not need to be considered further.

Referral for investigation into professional misconduct

1. In the Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling sought a formal referral of the Strata Company's legal representatives to the appropriate regulatory body for investigation into breaches of their professional obligations.
2. He stated that:

The referral is requested on the grounds of facilitating procedural unfairness, non-compliance with court orders, and improper admission and reliance upon prejudicial and unlawful evidence.[101] (original emphasis)

1. As I understand it, this is not put by Mr Ebeling as an error of law on the part of the SAT which would lead to its orders being set aside. If that is correct, then this 'ground' does not assist Mr Ebeling in his application to have the SAT decision set aside.
2. Rather, as I understand it, it is an application to this Court for it to refer the Strata Company's legal representatives to the appropriate regulator.
3. Courts, from time to time, do refer their reasons in a matter to another authority for consideration and courts have, from time to time, referred their reasons or transcript to a regulator of the legal profession.
4. However, I do not consider, in the ordinary course, that that is a referral to be sought by a party.
5. And, in any event, from my review of the SAT proceedings, (and, for that matter, of the proceedings before me) I do not consider that there would be any basis for this Court to refer the conduct of the Strata Company's legal representatives to any regulator.

1. Mr Ebeling dealt with this in his Finalised Application for Review at pages 29 ‑ 32. Mr Ebeling there stated that:

The SAT's assertion that common property constitutes "public land" is not only a legal mischaracterisation but a direct misapplication of Australian property law. This flawed interpretation undermined my privacy rights and legitimized the use of unlawfully obtained surveillance evidence.[102]

1. I have dealt with the substance of this under Grounds 1, 2 and 3 above and I do not need to return to it here.

Disparity in treatment of sworn oral evidence and perjury 'threats'

1. In his Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling commenced these submissions under 'Item 10' at page 32.
2. Mr Ebeling's contentions under the heading are:

1. the evidence of all witnesses had to be treated with equal weight and with equal weight as documentary evidence; 2. all of the witnesses, including Mr Ebeling, gave evidence and were subject to penalties for perjury;[103] 3. the SAT had to impartially assess all evidence, including weighing conflicting oral testimony; 4. all parties' evidence had to be considered fairly without bias; 5. the Tribunal must not arbitrarily prefer one party's evidence over another without a clear and substantiated rationale; 6. Mr Ebeling's evidence which disputed the allegations against Buddy was summarily dismissed without adequate reasoning (in this respect Mr Ebeling particularly identified Mr Murphy's evidence that he was bitten); 7. the Tribunal failed to explain why his oral evidence was less credible than that of the Strata Company's witnesses; 8. the evidence of Mr Murphy and the other Strata Company witnesses were accepted without corroborative evidence such as medical reports or contemporaneous accounts of Buddy's behaviour; and 9. the SAT's preference for the Strata Company's unsubstantiated evidence over Mr Ebeling's sworn oral evidence had resulted in:

(a) a breach of procedural fairness;
>
> (b) prejudicial findings;
>
> (c) severe psychological and emotional distress; and
>
> (d) legal precedents being ignored.

3. The factual issues before the SAT were essentially simple. The primary question to be determined was whether Buddy was at the premises without the Strata Company's permission.
4. As set out in different places above, Mr Ebeling made no real challenge to the evidence led by the Strata Company as to Buddy's whereabouts. Further, Mr Ebeling, himself, gave no evidence which put into real dispute any of the evidence given by the Strata Company's witnesses as to Buddy's whereabouts.
5. In those circumstances, I cannot discern an error of law in the way that the SAT dealt with the evidence of the witnesses called by the Strata Company in its reasons.
6. The only factual matter raised by Mr Ebeling which was in dispute was whether Buddy was an assistance animal. I have set out above how that issue was agitated before the SAT. I have set out Mr Ebeling's assertions and evidence as to those matters and have noted that he called no corroborating evidence and put no documentary evidence before the SAT going to that issue.
7. The question in this Court is not whether the factual determination was 'correct' or whether the Court would have reached the same conclusions. Rather, the question is, did the SAT reach its factual findings in a lawful way; i.e. without making a reviewable error.
8. In those circumstances, I do not detect any error of law in the way that the SAT dealt with the evidence of the Strata Company's witnesses or with Mr Ebeling's assertions that Buddy was an assistance animal.

1. In many different places, Mr Ebeling asserted that he was entitled to be awarded damages.
2. I have taken those submissions or assertions to be claims that this Court, presumably after upholding some or all of his review grounds, should then move to make an award of damages in his favour.
3. That is, I have not understood his claims to be awarded damages are matters which (Mr Ebeling says) go to the correctness as a matter of law of the SAT decision.
4. For example, at page 35 of his Finalised Application for Review, Mr Ebeling sought:
   1. damages for 'emotional and procedural harm' as compensation for 'psychological harm and reputational damage caused by the SAT's unjust findings'; and
   2. damages for breaches of procedural fairness, unlawful surveillance, defamation, discrimination and abuse of process.
5. Perhaps the high water mark of his claims to damages came with Mr Ebeling's submissions of 11 February 2025 (sent by email to my Chambers at 2.00 pm) in which he sought damages for procedural fairness breaches, privacy breaches and defamation in the following sums:

(a) $600,000 for procedural fairness violations;

(b) $1,500,000 for unlawful surveillance and privacy breaches;

(c) $30,000,000 for defamation, reputational harm and emotional distress caused by false statements made in legal proceedings;

(d) $9,100,000 for direct defamatory statements and improper evidence handling;

(e) $10,000,000 for the total psychological and emotional distress suffered over two years as a result of the respondents' conduct...[104] (original emphasis)

1. Mr Ebeling in his materials regularly cited cases to support his claim for damages. I have attached as Annexure C a list of the cases cited to support his claim for damages as a result of alleged breaches of procedural fairness. These have been extracted from his material.
2. To my reading, only in Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW)[105] and Elisha v Vision Australia Limited[106] was there an award of a monetary sum where there had been allegations of, or akin to, a denial of procedural fairness.
3. In Jarratt, a police officer was removed from his position without being accorded procedural fairness.
4. At first instance (and reinstated by the High Court), the officer obtained declarations that his removal was invalid, and the termination of his contract was wrongful. He further sought and was awarded compensation pursuant to a statutory right under the relevant legislation;[107] or by way of damages for the repudiation of his contract of employment.[108]
5. It may be seen that, with the possible exception of Gleeson CJ, the balance of the Court saw the award to the officer as being, in effect, damages for the breach of his contract of employment. For example, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ stated, after reviewing the reasoning of the trial judge:

This reasoning indicates why, in the present case, the awarded damages by Simpson J did not cut across the principle that, where there has been a denial of procedural fairness in the exercise of statutory or prerogative powers, the law does not recognise a cause of action for damages and confines the complainant to public law remedies.[109]

1. With respect, Elisha v Vision Australia Ltd[110] also does not assist Mr Ebeling. That was a claim by an employee against his former employer where it was asserted that the way his disciplinary hearing and dismissal from employment had been conducted breached a term of his contract (because matters were not put to him) and gave rise to an action in negligence. Again, with respect, it has nothing to say about these applications for damages brought by Mr Ebeling.
2. As Deane J stated in Attorney‑General (NSW) v Quin:[111]

The law has not recognized a cause of action for damages for denial of procedural fairness in the exercise of statutory or prerogative powers. Curial relief, in the case of a denial of procedural fairness, is ordinarily confined to a declaratory order that the relevant exercise of power or authority is invalid and to ancillary relief to prevent effect being given to it.

1. With appropriate adjustments, the passages quoted from Quin and Jarratt, with respect, set out my reasoning as to why Mr Ebeling is not entitled to any award of damages from this Court on a judicial review application, even if he were to be otherwise successful in some or more of his grounds for review.

Application for damages for dissemination of defamation

1. Mr Ebeling consistently submitted that he had been somehow defamed by either or both of the witnesses in the SAT or the conduct of the Strata Company in bringing the application. It may be that he also contended that somehow the SAT had contributed to his being defamed.
2. For example, in his Finalised Application for Review he stated:

The Tribunal's reliance on perpetuation of defamatory material significantly compounded the reputational harm and emotional distress I have endured. By embedding unverified and false statements in its orders and written decisions, the SAT became an active agent in disseminating defamatory allegations, extending the reach of these baseless claims.[112]

1. It is not clear from Mr Ebeling's material if he is contending that the SAT's dissemination (as he would have it) of defamatory statements demonstrates error of law in the making of the SAT decision.
2. If that is the contention, then at its base, as I understand it, Mr Ebeling is complaining about the way that the SAT dealt with the witnesses of the Strata Company and the findings that the SAT made from that evidence.
3. I consider that those complaints have been addressed elsewhere in these reasons and do not need to be addressed here further.
4. If the point of these contentions, however, is to seek an order from this Court to compensate Mr Ebeling for what he perceives to be 'defamatory conduct' by the SAT below, then there are two complete answers.
5. The first are the provisions of the SAT Act, especially s 163 of the SAT Act and, in particular, ss 163(2) - (5), which provide the same protections and immunities to SAT Members, legal practitioners, parties to proceedings and witnesses as those afforded in this Court. The provisions in ss 164 - 166 of the SAT Act are also, relevantly, a complete bar to these contentions.
6. The second is that, for the reasons I have already set out, I do not consider that this Court has power to award compensatory damages (of any description) on a 'pure' judicial review application.

1. Mr Ebeling, in his Finalised Application for Review, sought the following relief:
   • An order awarding the costs of this application against the respondents [sic] due to their deliberate non-compliance with procedural and substantive legal obligations.
   • The costs sought include full indemnity costs to compensate for the unnecessary litigation caused by the respondents' misconduct and breaches of their legal obligations.[113] (original emphasis)
2. It is plain from those submissions that the 'grounds' for awarding such costs as asserted by Mr Ebeling refer to the conduct of the 'respondents' (although there is only one respondent in this Court) in doing various things in the SAT proceedings.
3. I have taken this 'ground' to be directed at Order 3 that the SAT made about the Strata Company's 'enforcement expenses' ordered under s 200(2)(o)(i) of the ST Act in the sum of $15,007.10.
4. The SAT dealt with the reasons for making its Order 3 and stated:

... The applicant's enforcement expenses are itemised in invoices and time sheets provided to a total of $15,077.10.

I am satisfied that strata company has incurred a pecuniary loss by virtue of legal fees paid for enforcement of the scheme by-laws and provisions of the Act. That loss has been clearly articulated and documented. These legal costs will ultimately be borne by other owners within the scheme, no doubt as part of their levies. The schedule 1 governance by-laws of the scheme provide for the recovery of legal costs. Specifically, by‑law 11 states that legal proceedings include, without limitation, the issuing of a notice that may result in SAT proceedings as well as an application to the SAT for relief.

Costs are defined to include legal costs and disbursements on a solicitor and own client indemnity basis. By-law 12 provides for indemnity of the strata company and its employees, agents, contractors, subcontractors against any loss or damage incurred as a result of any breach of the by‑laws by the owner and without limiting that by-law, by-law 13 provides an owner will pay on demand the whole of the strata company's costs incurred in relation to all legal proceedings taken by the company against the owner or an occupier of the lot. Finally, by‑law 15 provides for recovery of costs associated with issuing a breach notice.

The costs are recoverable as a liquidated debt and action may be taken for their recovery. As outlined in the matter of Doronowski at paragraph 58 by Member Petrucci, when considering the recovery of the costs incurred by the strata company, they must be associated with a power, duty or function of the strata company. This arises because a strata company cannot be obliged to pay for invoices unless they relate to the powers, functions and duties of the strata company. This in turn is limited by the provision of the Act and the applicable - sorry - the applicable bylaws.

There is no doubt and I so find that the strata company has a duty to uphold the by-laws and enforce them when necessary and also control and manage the common property for the benefit of all owners as provided for in sections 91, subsection (1), paragraph (b) and 112 of the Act. The applicant has itemised its legal costs and I'm satisfied it is appropriate for me to exercise my discretion to order the payment of the legal costs as requested. ...[114]

1. The essential reasoning contained in the above passage was to the effect:
   1. the Strata Company had paid legal fees for the enforcement of the scheme by-laws and provisions of the ST Act;
   2. those fees were a 'pecuniary loss' within the meaning of s 200(2)(o)(i) of the ST Act; and
   3. the SAT was satisfied that the legal costs had been incurred properly.
2. The observations that the SAT made about those legal costs ultimately being borne by owners through levies to the Strata Company (if the Strata Company did not otherwise recover them) are to the side of the central reasoning which led to the SAT making Order 3.
3. In a review application, the question is not what this Court considers the 'costs' of the proceedings below should have been in quantum, or who should have had their costs paid.
4. Mr Ebeling has not identified a reviewable error made by the SAT in awarding those 'enforcement expenses'. The matters that he seeks to agitate in this Court may have gone to whether or not the SAT should have made Order 3. They do not disclose, however, a reviewable error.

Interlocutory application made 15 December 2024

1. By an email sent to my Chambers on 15 December 2024 at 6.36 pm, Mr Ebeling sought to 'file' an interlocutory application by which he sought the joinder of at least the following four parties:
   1. the strata management company;
   2. the respondent's lawyers;
   3. the SAT; and
   4. 'individual strata representatives'.
2. The 'relief sought' was:
   1. declarations of procedural unfairness and exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence;
   2. damages for defamation, unlawful surveillance, emotional distress and discriminatory conduct;
   3. permanent stay of orders to remove 'my assistance animal'; and
   4. costs for 'duplicative' litigation and vexatious proceedings.
3. I was told from the Bar table by the Strata Company's counsel that the application which Mr Ebeling had purported to bring on 15 December 2024 had caused some of the individuals who Mr Ebeling wished to join to experience stress and anxiety. While I do not need to make any finding about that, I can readily imagine that was the case. It was, with respect to Mr Ebeling, totally misconceived.
4. On 20 December 2024, I dismissed that application.[115]
5. I dismissed that application on the basis that I did not consider Mr Ebeling was able to obtain damages in his Review Application and, if that was correct, then there was no need to join the additional parties because they were not required parties to the judicial review application.[116]
6. Notwithstanding that, as may be seen in some of the submissions I have quoted elsewhere in these reasons, Mr Ebeling has persisted in referring to respondents in the plural and has continued to agitate damages claims against various persons who are not parties to these proceedings.

1. For the reasons set out above, I dismiss Mr Ebeling's Review Application.
2. I will hear the parties, as necessary, as to the form of final orders.

Email from the applicant to Supreme Court Central Office

Application for Interim Stay or Dismissal of Orders

Email from the Supreme Court Central Office to the applicant

Application for Interim Stay or Dismissal of Orders

Email from the applicant to Chambers and the respondent

Interlocutory application to join SAT, GV Legal and individual strata committee members as respondents

"Interlocutory Application for Joinder and Remedies"

Letter from Dr Louis Courtney suggesting that Buddy stays under the applicant's care

Zip folder containing financial information relating to the applicant's business

Letter from the SAT attaching transcript of proceedings on 4 October 2024

Letter from the SAT attaching transcript of proceedings on 19 August 2024

Letter from the SAT attaching invoice for payment of administrative fee for provision of a transcript within one day

Email from SAT customer service coordinator confirming transcript had been ordered

Letter from the SAT attaching transcript of proceedings on 19 August 2024

91-page document titled "Response to the Respondents' Written Submission"

Interlocutory application for joinder of additional respondents, damages, and 'declaration of procedural unfairness'.

Application for Interim Stay or Dismissal of Orders

Application for Interim Stay or Dismissal of Orders

Email from the applicant to Magistrates Court Transcripts

Email from Magistrates Court Transcripts to the applicant

Email from the applicant to Supreme Court Transcripts

Email from Supreme Court Transcripts to the applicant

Email from the applicant to Supreme Court Transcripts

Email from the applicant to Supreme Court Transcripts

Urgent Submission - Procedural Fairness Breaches and Court Non-Compliance

Summary of email correspondence between the Applicant and the Supreme Court

Orders of the Honourable Justice Howard dated 30 January 2025

Annexure B - 'Interlocutory Applications' filed by Mr Ebeling

Interlocutory application to join SAT, GV Legal and individual strata committee members as respondents

"Interlocutory Application for Joinder and Remedies"

Letter from Dr Louis Courtney suggesting that Buddy stays under the applicant's care

Zip folder containing financial information relating to the applicant's business

Letter from the SAT attaching transcript of proceedings on 4 October 2024

Letter from the SAT attaching transcript of proceedings on 19 August 2024

Letter from the SAT attaching invoice for payment of administrative fee for provision of a transcript within one day

"Application for Damages" - applying for $11.3 million in damages.

Urgent Submission - Procedural Fairness Breaches and Court Non-Compliance

Summary of email correspondence between the applicant and the Supreme Court Registry

Orders of the Honourable Justice Howard dated 30 January 2025

Applicant's response to respondent's further written submissions

Cited by the Applicant for damages on which grounds?

Annetts v McCann (1990) 170 CLR 596

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163

Elisha v Vision Australia Ltd [2024] HCA 50

Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; (2005) 224 CLR 44

Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421

Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 41; (2010) 243 CLR 319

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[3] Mr Ebeling did, in this Court, expressly rely on the Disability Discrimination Act.

[4] CSL Australia v Formosa [2009] NSWCA 363; (2009) 261 ALR 441 [22] (Allsop P, Basten JA and Handley AJA); Eberstaller v Poulos [2014] NSWCA 211; (2014) 85 NSWLR 688 [1] (Leeming JA for the Court).

[6] 1 February 2024, ts 4; SAT Matter Book page 389.

[8] 4 April 2024, ts 14; SAT Matter Book page 320.

[10] 4 April 2024, ts 50; SAT Matter Book page 356.

[11] 4 April 2024, ts 51 - 53; SAT Matter Book pages 357 - 359.

[12] 4 April 2024, ts 19; SAT Matter Book page 325.

[13] 4 April 2024, ts 29; SAT Matter Book page 335.

[14] 4 April 2024, ts 68 - 69; SAT Matter Book pages 374 - 375.

[15] 4 April 2024, ts 71; SAT Matter Book page 377.

[16] Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024, pages 5-6; SAT Matter Book pages 98 ‑ 99.

[17] Strata Company's closing submissions filed 30 April 2024, page 3 [11]; SAT Matter Book page 105.

[18] 4 October 2024, ts 9; SAT Matter Book page 298.

[19] 4 October 2024, ts 12 - 13; SAT Matter Book pages 301 - 302.

[20] Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 128 [48] (Martin CJ for the Court); GS v MS [2019] WASC 255, (2019) 344 FLR 386 (GS v MS) [23] (Quinlan CJ).

[21] Burns v Corbett [2018] HCA 15, (2018) 265 CLR 304 [43], [55], [64] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), [119] (Gageler J).

[22] Huynh v Attorney-General (NSW) [2021] NSWCA 297, (2021) 107 NSWLR 75 [136(2)] (Leeming JA).

[23] Paspaley Pearling Company Pty Ltd & Anor and Delegate of the Chief of the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Primary Industries & Regional Development & Anor [2023] WASAT 116.

[24] GS v MS [93], [104] (Quinlan CJ).

[25] GS v MS (Quinlan CJ).(citations omitted).

[26] GS v MS [73], [74] (and the citations therein) (Quinlan CJ).

[27] Agtrack (NT) Pty Limited v Hatfield [2005] HCA 38; (2005) 223 CLR 251 [32] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

[28] Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216 (Citta Hobart).

[29] Citta Hobart [35], [36] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon, Steward and Gleeson JJ).

[30] Hanssen Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan 58161 [2024] WASCA 87 (Hanssen).

[31] Hanssen [119] (Buss P, Mitchell and Hall JJA).

[33] LNC Industries v BMW (Australia) Ltd [1983] HCA 31; (1983) 151 CLR 575 (LNC Industries).

[34] LNC Industries 581 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); see also DPP (WA) v Mansfield [2008] WASCA 5; (2008) 35 WAR 431 at [110] and following (McLure JA, with Buss JA agreeing).

[35] Application for Judicial Review dated 6 November 2024, pages 4 - 5.

[36] Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024; SAT Matter Book page 95.

[37] 4 October 2024, ts 12; SAT Matter Book page 301.

[38] Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024, page 1; SAT Matter Book page 94.

[39] Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024, page 3; SAT Matter Book page 96.

[40] Finalised Application for Review, page 10.

[41] 4 April 2024, ts 42; SAT Matter Book page 348.

[42] 4 April 2024, ts 42 - 43; SAT Matter Book pages 348 - 349.

[43] 4 April 2024, ts 43; SAT Matter Book page 349.

[44] 4 April 2024, ts 43; SAT Matter Book page 349.

[45] 4 April 2024, ts 43; SAT Matter Book page 349.

[46] 4 April 2024, ts 43; SAT Matter Book page 349.

[47] 4 April 2024, ts 44; SAT Matter Book page 350.

[48] 4 April 2024, ts 45; SAT Matter Book page 351.

[49] 4 April 2024, ts 47 - 48 SAT Matter Book pages 353 - 354.

[50] 4 April 2024, ts 48; SAT Matter Book page 354.

[51] 4 April 2024, ts 52 - 53; SAT Matter Book pages 358 - 359.

[52] 4 October 2024, ts 6 - 7; SAT Matter Book pages 295 - 296.

[53] 4 October 2024, ts 7; SAT Matter Book page 296.

[54] 4 October 2024, ts 7; SAT Matter Book page 296.

[55] 4 October 2024, ts 6; SAT Matter Book page 295.

[56] 4 October 2024, ts 6; SAT Matter Book page 295.

[57] 4 October 2024, ts 6; SAT Matter Book page 295.

[58] 4 October 2024, ts 9; SAT Matter Book page 298.

[59] 4 October 2024, ts 10; SAT Matter Book page 299.

[60] Mr Ebeling's closing submissions to the SAT dated 12 June 2024, page 4; SAT Matter Book page 97.

[61] 4 October 2024, ts 12; SAT Matter Book page 301.

[62] 4 April 2024, ts 30; SAT Matter Book page 336.

[63] Witness statement of Mr Murphy page 1; SAT Matter Book page 135.

[64] Witness statement of Mr Murphy page 1; SAT Matter Book page 135.

[65] Witness statement of Mr Murphy page 1 - 2; SAT Matter Book pages 135 - 136.

[66] Witness statement of Mr Murphy page 2; SAT Matter Book page 136.

[67] 4 April 2024, ts 30; SAT Matter Book page 336.

[68] 4 April 2024, ts 31; SAT Matter Book page 337.

[69] 4 April 2024, ts 32; SAT Matter Book page 338.

[70] 4 April 2024, ts 34; SAT Matter Book page 340.

[71] 4 April 2024, ts 35; SAT Matter Book page 341.

[72] 4 April 2024, ts 40; SAT Matter Book page 346.

[73] 4 April 2024, ts 40; SAT Matter Book page 346.

[74] Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2004] WASCA 149; (2004) 29 WAR 273 .

[75] Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [26] - [28]. See also, for example, Centex Australasia Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Consumer Protection [2017] WASCA 79 [101] - [103] (per the Court).

[76] I do not need to consider whether a failure to give adequate reasons by an inferior court or a tribunal would, of itself, constitute a reviewable error: Rock v Henderson (No 2) [2025] NSWCA 47 [58] (Kirk JA for the Court).

[77] 4 October 2024, ts 15; SAT Matter Book page 304.

[78] Which was annexed to his email to my Chambers on that date at 9.53 pm.

[79] 30 January 2025 ts 39 - 40, 42, 54 - 55.

[80] This appears in Mr Ebeling's Finalised Application for Review. The document is not dated nor paginated, and the numbering is not of great assistance in identifying the passage in the document. The quotation comes from page 14 of the document.

[81] See, for example, 30 January 2025 ts 42.

[84] 4 April 2024, ts 48; SAT Matter Book page 354.

[85] 4 April 2024, ts 49 - 50; SAT Matter Book pages 355 - 356.

[86] 4 April 2024, ts 34; SAT Matter Book page 340.

[87] 4 April 2024, ts 34; SAT Matter Book page 340.

[88] 4 April 2024, ts 34; SAT Matter Book page 340.

[89] 4 April 2024, ts 35; SAT Matter Book page 341.

[90] 4 April 2024, ts 36; SAT Matter Book page 342.

[91] 4 April 2024, ts 36; SAT Matter Book page 342.

[92] Finalised Application for Review page 5.

[93] Finalised Application for Review page 5.

[94] Finalised Application for Review page 9.

[95] Finalised Application for Review page 10.

[97] As I have noted elsewhere, there was only the Strata Company as the other party to the SAT Application (and the Review Application in this Court).

[98] Finalised Application for Review page 6.

[99] Finalised Application for Review page 6.

[100] Finalised Application for Review page 7.

[101] Finalised Application for Review page 25.

[102] Finalised Application for Review page 29.

[103] Mr Ebeling nominated a penalty being mistakenly under s 123 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth).

[104] Applicant's minute of proposed orders submitted 11 February 2025 page 2.

[105] Jarratt v Commissioner of Police (NSW) [2005] HCA 50; (2005) 224 CLR 44 (Jarratt).

[106] Elisha v Vision Australia Limited [2024] HCA 50; (2024) 421 ALR 184; (2024) 99 ALJR 171.

[107] Jarratt [31], [33] (Gleeson CJ).

[108] Jarratt [57] (per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), [146] (Callinan J).

[110] Elisha v Vision Australia Ltd [2024] HCA 50.

[111] Attorney‑General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at [45].

[112] Finalised Application for Review page 37.

[113] Finalised Application for Review page 22.

[114] 4 October 2024, ts 15 - 16; SAT Matter Book pages 304 - 305.