The respondent submitted that the Documents were exempt from disclosure as they contained personal opinions and subjective accounts of situational events which amount to personal affairs pursuant to clause 6 of the FOI Act. In addition, the respondent submitted that both Documents were exempt under clause 13 of the FOI Act, as they contain confidential information the disclosure of which may prejudice the future supply of such information to the Government or an agency.

• The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's submissions that clause 6(3) of the FOI Act means that a document must be disclosed to him if it relates to him even if it also concerns a third party. Clause 6(3) applies where a document wholly contains information about the particular applicant. There is no textual basis to read clause 6(3) as if the word "merely" means "if". That interpretation of clause 6(3) would be inconsistent with the purpose of the FOI Act to balance the public interest in the disclosure of documents with the public interest in protecting the personal privacy of a third party.
• The Tribunal is satisfied that Document 1 contains personal affairs of a third person which are highly sensitive, and that it is information which is likely to have been imparted in a confidential context. Therefore, disclosure would be unreasonable, and Document 1 is exempted from disclosure under clause 6 of the FOI Act;
• The Tribunal is satisfied that Document 1 contains information which was disclosed to the respondent in confidence, and that disclosure of such information might be reasonably expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the respondent. Therefore Document 1 is exempted from disclosure under clause 13 of the FOI Act;
• The Tribunal observed that an applicant for external review by the Ombudsman cannot, by the manner in which they express their application, exclude consideration by the Ombudsman (or the Tribunal) of any clause in Schedule 1 to the FOI Act that would prima facie appear to apply to exempt the documents in question. In this present case, the applicant could not bind the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman could not bind itself, to not consider clause 12 if that clause properly applied to the documents. To do so would be entirely inconsistent with the objects of the FOI Act, including that the right of access to documents is subject to such restrictions as are consistent with the public interest and the preservation of personal privacy;
• The Tribunal could not form a view, in the absence of relevant submissions, that Document 1 contains information the disclosure of which may constitute an offence and therefore did not make a finding as to whether Document 1 is also exempted from disclosure under clause 12 of the FOI Act;
• The Tribunal finds that Document 3 does not contain personal affairs information. Therefore Document 3 is not exempt under clause 6 of the FOI Act;
• The Tribunal finds that the information in Document 3 was not given to the respondent in confidence, nor such that its disclosure might be reasonably expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the respondent, or be contrary to the public interest. Therefore Document 3 is not exempt under clause 13 of the FOI Act;
• Observations were made by the Tribunal as to what was decided in City of Unley v Warnecke and that it could not be that any expression of an observation, view or opinion (which might even be banal or blithely made) could amount to that person's personal affairs under the FOI Act. The question of whether a particular expression of opinion would amount to personal affairs under the FOI Act would depend on the circumstances and could sometimes be a matter of controversy that may require specific evidential material and detailed submissions on the matter;
• The Tribunal finds that the correct or preferable decision is to affirm the decision to not to disclose Document 1;
• The Tribunal finds that the correct or preferable decision is to set aside the Ombudsman's decision in relation to Document 3 which must now be disclosed to the applicant.

Administrative Review - Freedom of Information Act 1991 - Person aggrieved by a determination of the Ombudsman - Whether a document is an exempt document - Public interest considerations

Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 ss 163, 164

Freedom of Information Act 1991 ss 3, 3A, 4, 12, 20, 26, 27, 28, 31, 48, Schedule 1

Mental Health Act 2009 s 57

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 34

Bradshaw v SA Police [2012] SADC 184

City of Unley v Warnecke [2004] SADC 48

Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152

Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606

Drew v Victoria Police [2012] VCAT 572

GM v Department of Human Services [2025] SASCA 68

Hall v SA Police [2019] SADC 5

Kararmaz v Rural City of Murray Bridge [2022] SACAT 87

Lau v Minister for Sustainability, Environment and Conservation [2018] SACAT 57

Martin v Electoral Commissioner [2021] SACAT 86

Priebe v SA Police [2007] SADC 119

Proudfoot v Attorney-General's Department [2024] SACAT 63

Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437

Re RBY [2021] SACAT 39

Sellars v South Australian Police [2012] SADC 9

Simring v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 270

South Australia Police v Patrick [2023] SACAT 82

State of South Australia (Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure) v Brokenshire [2015] SADC 68

Treglown v SA Police [2011] SADC 139

Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218

Williams v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [1985] AATA 226

Young v Wicks [1986] FCA 169

Ms E Bria, Crown Solicitor's Office, appeared in person for the respondent

This is an edited version of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. The applicant in these proceedings has been de-identified in accordance with the Tribunal's anonymisation policy. Other facts and details that may lead to the identification of the applicant may have also been anonymised or omitted. These changes do not affect the Tribunal's decision or its reasons for decision.

1. The issue in dispute in this application for review is whether redactions in certain documents to which the applicant, DTC, seeks access from the respondent are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (FOI Act) and should not be disclosed to him.
2. The relevant documents are referred to in the parties' materials and in these reasons as Documents 1 and 3.
3. The decision under review was made by the Ombudsman. These reasons explain why I have decided that the Ombudsman's decision should be affirmed in respect of Document 1 but set aside in respect of Document 3.
4. In making this decision, I have carefully taken into account the unredacted and redacted versions of Documents 1 and 3 and the written and oral submissions of the parties. This includes additional written submissions filed by the applicant that was permitted in lieu of an adjournment of the full hearing that he had requested.[1]
5. The applicant was unrepresented in these proceedings. I have taken this into account. I have also taken into account that the nature of this jurisdiction is that applicants may make submissions to the Tribunal without having seen the documents in question and may base their submissions on assumptions as to what the documents do or do not contain. This is what has occurred in this case. Nothing adverse should be taken from this fact.
6. I have not set out a summary of the parties' lengthy submissions in these reasons. The applicant filed extensive written submissions in the Tribunal but they were not of significant assistance to the Tribunal as they generally misconceived the legal principles that must be applied by the Tribunal in these matters. In some respects, I have also not accepted the submissions made for the respondent. Certain comments about the submissions of the parties are contained in the body of these reasons.

Review under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013

1. The Tribunal conducts its review of the respondent's decision as an independent body. The Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing. On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.
2. The procedure on a rehearing will include an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker and consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.
3. Any factual findings made by the Tribunal must be established on the balance of probabilities.
4. The review conducted by the Tribunal is on a basis resembling a de novo hearing, where the Tribunal Member conducting the review effectively stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker in determining the correct or preferable decision.[2]
5. After making its decision, the Tribunal can affirm or vary the decision under review or can set the decision aside and either substitute its own decision or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration.
6. In explaining the reasons for the Tribunal's decisions in matters under the FOI Act, the Tribunal must necessarily be circumspect so that it does not inadvertently suggest or disclose the exempt information. This will understandably be a point of frustration for applicants who may feel that they have an incomplete understanding of why their application has been unsuccessful. This is an unsatisfactory but inevitable nature of the proceedings.[3]

1. Under s 12 of the FOI Act, a person has a legally enforceable right of access to an agency's documents.
2. The objects of the FOI Act are found in s 3 and are, briefly, to promote openness and accountability in government and to facilitate more effective participation by members of the public in the processes involved in the making and administration of laws and policies. Section 3A(1)(a) of the FOI Act states that it is the intention of the Parliament that the Act should be interpreted and applied so as to further the objects of the Act.
3. Section 3 of the FOI Act indicates clearly that the right of access to documents is subject only to such restrictions as are consistent with the public interest and the preservation of personal privacy. Similarly, s 3A of the FOI Act states that it is the Parliamentary intention that administrative discretions under the FOI Act be exercised, as far as possible, in a way that favours disclosure of information without infringing the right to privacy of individuals.
4. Under s 20 of the FOI Act, an agency may refuse access to a document if it is an exempt document (by reference to the categories of exempt documents in the 19 clauses of Schedule 1 of that Act).
5. Despite a document being an exempt document, a decision-maker has a discretion to nevertheless release the exempt document to the applicant. Also, under s 20(4) of the FOI Act, where only part of a document contains exempt material, access under the FOI Act can be given to a copy of the document with the exempt material redacted if it is practicable to do so and it appears to the agency that the applicant would wish to be given access to such a copy.
6. In some situations, an agency is unable to give access to a document unless the agency has taken reasonably practicable steps to obtain the views of certain persons as to whether the document is an exempt document.[4]
7. Under s 48 of the FOI Act, the burden of establishing that a determination is justified lies on the relevant agency.

1. The following information is taken from the materials supplied to the Tribunal.
2. On 6 June 2024, the applicant applied to the respondent for access to:

Reports disclosed to SAPOL on the 1st October 2023, which resulted in SAPOL conducting welfare checks on me as a private individual. > > Reports made to SAPOL during October and November 2023 about activities of myself as an individual together with any associated investigative or intelligence documents.[5]

3. There were originally ten documents found by the respondent to be within the scope of the original FOI Act application.
4. On 2 July 2024, in the original decision by the respondent:
   1. the respondent determined to release redacted versions of Documents 1 to 4 inclusive, relying on clauses 6(1) and 12(1) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act in respect of the redacted portions. Briefly, in respect of these documents, the respondent asserted that the redacted text concerned the personal affairs of a third party and that disclosure of such information would be unreasonable given the need to protect the person's privacy and personal information. Additionally, in respect of Document 1 (only), the respondent asserted that disclosure of redacted text would constitute an offence against ss 163 and 164 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017;
   2. the respondent determined to release Document 5 to the applicant in full;
   3. the respondent determined not to disclose Documents 6 to 10 inclusive, relying on clause 4(3) of Schedule 1 to make that determination.
5. On 2 August 2024, after conducting an internal review of the original decision, the respondent confirmed the original decision.
6. On 28 August 2024, the applicant sought external review by the Ombudsman of the respondent's internal review decision. The Tribunal does not have a copy of the external review application. However, it would appear that the applicant sought only an external review of the respondent's use of clause 6(1) to deny him full access to the documents.[6]
7. The Ombudsman interpreted this as meaning that the applicant did not seek a review by the Ombudsman of the respondent's internal review decision in respect of Documents 6 to 10 inclusive (which relied on clause 4). The Ombudsman therefore did not undertake an external review in respect of Documents 6 to 10 inclusive. I agree that this was reasonable in the circumstances. This means, as a consequence, that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to deal with the respondent's refusal to disclose Documents 6 to 10 inclusive. Therefore, I say nothing further about those documents nor about clause 4. The Tribunal only has jurisdiction to deal with the Ombudsman's decision in respect of Documents 1 to 4 inclusive.[7]
8. On 5 May 2025, after the external review by the Ombudsman, the respondent's decision in respect of Documents 1 to 4 inclusive was upheld pursuant to clauses 6(1) and 13(1) of Schedule 1.
9. It is evident from the visible portions of Documents 1 to 4 inclusive that were provided to the applicant that, in the latter part of 2023, concerns by various persons had been expressed to the respondent about the applicant's declining mental health. This information indicates that the applicant was detained by police under s 57 of the Mental Health Act 2009 on about 26 November 2023 and was conveyed by the SA Ambulance Service to the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, where it would appear that he was placed under an inpatient treatment order.
10. The scope of the decision under review has narrowed during the course of the Tribunal proceedings.
11. As noted earlier, Documents 1 to 4 inclusive were provided to the applicant with numerous redactions. At the Tribunal directions hearing on 19 August 2025, the applicant said that he does not want access to any names, addresses and phone numbers but only what he referred to as "situational descriptions". Broadly speaking, I understood this to mean that the applicant wants access to what is said in the redacted portions of the documents rather than who said it.
12. Counsel for the respondent at that directions hearing observed that the redacted parts of Documents 2 and 4 are only of names, addresses and phone numbers. The applicant indicated that, in those circumstances, he was not seeking access to Documents 2 and 4 and was now only seeking access in full to Documents 1 and 3.
13. This has left very little in each of Documents 1 and 3 that remains in dispute.

1. Document 1 is four pages in length.
2. The portions of Document 1 disclosed to the applicant indicate that it is an account of contact made to police at Netley Police Station on 25 November 2023 by a woman concerned for herself and children from a male person's declining mental health.
3. It includes an account of actions taken by police as a consequence of the woman's approach to the police station, including attempts by police to speak to the male person about his mental health and that police officers subsequently took the woman and the children to their home address so they could pack some belongings and overnight bags before being conveyed elsewhere.
4. The name of the woman is not disclosed in the document but the applicant's name is disclosed as the male person referred to by the woman and the children's names are also disclosed.
5. The children have the same surname as the applicant and the inference to be drawn from the context of the document is that they are likely to be the children of the woman and the applicant.

1. Document 3 is 11 pages in length.
2. It is evident from the portions of Document 3 disclosed to the applicant that it is in the nature of a telephone call log made following contact with police by a mental health nurse on 1 October 2023 about the applicant's mental health.
3. The document includes an account of actions taken by police between 1 October and 3 October 2023, including the dispatching of police officers and the SA Ambulance Service, telephone contact with the applicant himself and others, and attendance at his home.

1. In arriving at the correct or preferable decision, the Tribunal must first determine if the redacted material is exempt under the FOI Act. If it is not exempt, it must be disclosed to the applicant, and any other person who may subsequently seek access to it. Further dissemination of the material cannot be prevented.
2. If the redacted material is exempt, the Tribunal must consider if there is any reason to exercise the discretion to disclose it. If there is no such reason, it cannot be disclosed to any person, including the applicant. If there is a reason to disclose the exempt redacted material, then it is disclosable to any other person who may seek access to it and its further dissemination by those persons cannot be prevented.
3. If the full documents are disclosed to the applicant, he will have an unfettered right under the FOI Act to do what he wishes with the documents, including to publish or disseminate them to others.[8] It is well established that a person who receives access to documents under the FOI Act receives such access unconditionally - an agency cannot impose a condition of non-publication.[9] There is no power to require and/or to enforce any assurance or undertaking against further dissemination provided to an agency.[10]
4. I take into account also that the FOI Act does not demand a "leaning" towards disclosure and that it provides a scheme for the balancing of competing interests including competing public interests and public interests that compete with private interests.[11]
5. As this matter concerns clauses 6, 12 and 13 of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act, I set the relevant parts of them out below.

Clause 6 - Documents affecting personal affairs

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person (living or dead)....

(3) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of subclause (1) ... merely because it contains information concerning the person by or on whose behalf an application for access to the document is made.

(3a) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter -

(a) consisting of information concerning a person who is presently under the age of 18 years or suffering from mental illness, impairment or infirmity or concerning such a person's family or circumstances, or information of any kind furnished by a person who was under that age or suffering from mental illness, impairment or infirmity when the information was furnished; and

(b) the disclosure of which would be unreasonable having regard to the need to protect that person's welfare.

1. In considering whether a document is exempt under clause 6, the public interest in the disclosure of documents in the possession of an agency needs to be weighed in the balance against the public interest in protecting the personal privacy of a third party whose personal affairs may be unreasonably disclosed by granting access to the document.[12] As Mahoney JA said in the NSW Court of Appeal in respect of the NSW equivalent statute:

this Act involves essentially a compromise between competing considerations or interests. The legislature has adopted the principle that a citizen should have access to documents held by government agencies ... But, in the nature of life in a society, that principle must be subject to exceptions and qualifications: unacceptable damage would be done to the State and the individual if it were not. It was necessary to determine what were to be the qualifications and exceptions to that general principle. These were embodied in the terms of the legislation.[13]

2. The Tribunal's decision under clause 6(1) is in two steps: first, whether the documents contain matter the disclosure of which would involve the disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person living or dead; and, secondly, whether the disclosure of that information would be unreasonable.
3. If the documents are exempt under clause 6(1), the Tribunal must consider if there is any reason to exercise the discretion in s 20 of the FOI Act to disclose them. If there is no such reason, they cannot be disclosed to the applicant.

1. In s 4(1) of the FOI Act, "personal affairs" of a person is defined non-exhaustively to include that person's financial affairs, criminal records, marital or other personal relationships, employment records and personal qualities or attributes. The term has been interpreted to include matters of private concern to an individual; information which concerns or affects the person as an individual whether it is known to other persons or not; and the composite collection of activities personal to the individual concerned.[14]
2. In Simring, Smart AJ said:

It is not possible to give a comprehensive definition of "personal affairs". Very often when particular facts and situations are disclosed it will be self evident that they come within the description of "personal affairs". There is a real danger in endeavouring to be comprehensive or prescriptive. "Personal affairs" is a broad description and a broad concept.[15]

1. In respect of whether disclosure under clause 6(1) would be unreasonable, in Treglown v SA Police, his Honour Judge Herriman said (citations omitted):

130. [Maxwell P said in Victoria Police v Marke]: > > If the giving of access to a document would "involve", to an unreasonable extent, disclosure of such information, the document is exempt. > > It follows that ... the question - the only question - for the decision-maker is whether the disclosure of the personal information to the applicant, which would occur by virtue of the disclosure of the document "under this Act", would be an unreasonable disclosure of that information. In the ordinary case, the decision-maker would need to consider for this purpose at least the following matters:

• the nature of the personal information;
• the sensitivity (past and present) of the personal information;
• any view about disclosure expressed by any person to whom the personal information relates;
• the relationship between the personal information and any other information in the document;
• how the personal information was obtained by the agency (whether voluntarily or involuntarily, and whether or not in confidence);
• whether and to what extent the personal information was already known to the applicant;
• the nature of any interest which the applicant can demonstrate in -

(i) the information in the document other than the personal information; or

(ii) the personal information.

It was not thus a balancing exercise but:

... the decision as to whether that disclosure would be unreasonable is to be arrived at by examining matters peculiar to the applicant, the document and the personal information in question.

1. Observations to similar effect were made by Pagone AJA in that case albeit that he commented that the particular use sought to be made of the material by the applicant may also be a relevant factor. He went on to say that there is:

... no warrant to limit the matters relevant for consideration of the statutory condition... for a document to be an exempt document beyond that which is relevant, logical and probative. > > 132. In Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs the court observed...: > > Whether a disclosure is 'unreasonable' requires, in my view, a consideration of all the circumstances, including the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance. Plainly enough what [the clause] seeks to do is to provide a ground for preventing unreasonable invasion of the privacy of third parties.

1. Those observations highlight the need to consider not merely the content of the information which is sought to be disclosed, although in some circumstances that may be sufficient, but, as well, its relationship with other material known to the applicant, its level of sensitivity, the attitude of the person affected by the disclosure, the circumstances in which the information was originally obtained, whether it was already known to the applicant, the nature of the applicant's interest in it and any disclosed intentions with respect to its use.[16]
2. The Marke and Chandra formulations referred to by his Honour have been cited and/or adopted in a number of other decisions over an extended period.[17] I consider that I should adopt these observations in the present matter.

1. After having read Document 1 in its full and unredacted form, I am well satisfied that it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of a third party. The redacted material in Document 1 contains highly sensitive information about a third party whose identity is reasonably ascertainable from the disclosed material that is now in the public domain.
2. I do not accept the applicant's extensive submissions that clause 6(3) means Document 1 must be disclosed to him because it relates to him. The applicant submitted that, as long as a passage concerns him, clause 6(3) applies even if the passage also concerns a third party. However, the applicant has misinterpreted clause 6(3). It applies where a document wholly contains information about the particular applicant. That is what "merely" means in this context. It means "only". The applicant has interpreted the clause as if "merely" meant "if" (in other words, he submits the document is not exempt if it concerns him to any degree). There is no textual basis to read clause 6(3) as if the word "merely" means "if". That interpretation of clause 6(3) would be inconsistent with the purpose of the FOI Act to balance the public interest in the disclosure of documents with the public interest in protecting the personal privacy of a third party.
3. In view of the high sensitivity of the information in the undisclosed contents of Document 1 concerning a third party, that the information was self-evidently imparted in a confidential context and the significant likelihood that the subject of the information would not wish that information to be disclosed without consent, I consider that disclosure of that material would be unreasonable.
4. I conclude that the redacted portions of Document 1 are exempt from disclosure under clause 6(1).

1. Document 3 contains numerous identifying details (names, addresses, etc) from which the identity of certain notifiers to police could be ascertained. These must be put to one side given that the applicant only wants to know what was said, not who said it.
2. After excluding this content, the only part of Document 3 that remains in issue is the brief redacted text recorded at timestamp 14:49:54 on 3 October 2023. Four individuals are referred to in the redacted text, being the notifier, the applicant and two minors.
3. It is not every reference that concerns a person that will amount to the personal affairs of that person for the purposes of clause 6(1). In Sellars, Judge McIntyre said that the definition of "personal affairs" in s 4(1) "must be read in light of the objects and principles of the Act relating to the preservation of personal privacy".[18] I do not consider that the redacted text in Document 1 reaches that threshold. The redacted information is innocuous, quotidian and uncontroversial. I do not accept that it concerns a person's personal affairs in the sense required by clause 6(1).
4. The Tribunal was also referred by counsel for the respondent to the decision of the District Court in City of Unley v Warnecke[19] as authority for the proposition that a person's personal opinion and subjective account of situational events and interactions with an agency constitute that individual's personal affairs under the FOI Act. The respondent's reliance on the City of Unley v Warnecke decision was somewhat misplaced. What the District Court actually turned its mind to in that decision was strictly not whether the opinions in the relevant document constituted personal affairs per se but whether its disclosure would be unreasonable. The Court said:

1. Document 8 is ... a document concerned with the personal qualities and attributes of the author and consequently, in my opinion, concerns the personal affairs of that person in a broad sense.

5. It is accepted by counsel that the appropriate test is as set out in Re: Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1984) 6 ALN 257 at 259 where the Tribunal said:

"Whether a disclosure is 'unreasonable' requires, in my view, a consideration of all the circumstances, including the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance. Plainly enough what section 41 seeks to do is to provide a ground for preventing unreasonable invasion of the privacy of third parties."

6. When I consider the matters there enumerated, I conclude that the information in the document is old information concerning the author's subjective views of certain matters in which that person was involved. The author has obtained this information from personal experience and has processed it subjectively. As such, I am of the opinion that it is not information which the author would wish to have disclosed. As the information relates to events which, at this time, are several years old, it has no current relevance. In my opinion, for those reasons, it would be unreasonable to require disclosure.[20]
7. It was submitted by counsel that the Tribunal should find that the notifier expressed a view which amounted to the notifier's personal affairs. However, this submission was not fully developed by counsel and was somewhat superficial.
8. It could not be that any expression of an observation, view or opinion (which might even be banal or blithely made) could amount to that person's personal affairs under the FOI Act. As I observed recently, the argument that opinions per se are personal affairs has not, to my knowledge, previously been considered by the Tribunal and the question of whether a particular expression of opinion would amount to personal affairs under the FOI Act would depend on the circumstances and could sometimes be a matter of controversy that may require specific evidential material and detailed submissions on the matter.[21]
9. As noted earlier, the burden of establishing that a determination is justified lies on the relevant agency. What is required from the respondent is more than a bland statement reciting the words of the District Court as to information being "obtained from personal experience and processed subjectively".
10. To the extent that the notifier disclosed to police an observation, view or opinion in this redacted text, I do not accept that this amounts to the notifier's personal affairs. The respondent has not discharged its burden in that respect.
11. In summary, I do not consider that the redacted passage in Document 3 constitutes personal affairs and, therefore, it is not exempt under clause 6(1). The question of reasonableness of disclosure does not arise for consideration.
12. For completeness, I would note that the redacted passage of Document 3 may arguably consist partly of "information concerning a person who is presently under the age of 18 years ... or concerning such a person's family or circumstances" for the purposes of clause 6(3a). This was not the subject of submissions however. In any event, I would not agree that disclosure of that passage "would be unreasonable having regard to the need to protect that person's welfare". As noted, this information is quite benign.

Clause 13 - Documents containing confidential material

(1) A document is an exempt document - > > ... > > (b) if it contains matter obtained in confidence the disclosure of which -

(i) might reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of such information to the Government or to an agency; and

(ii) would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

1. The applicant extensively criticised the Ombudsman's application of clause 13 to the document. He submitted that the Ombudsman acted improperly, unlawfully and in a partisan way by applying clause 13 when it had not even been raised by the respondent. I do not agree with the applicant's submissions in this regard. It was open to the Ombudsman to rely on any other clauses in the Schedule that appeared to the Ombudsman to apply to the documents in question even if those other clauses had not been raised by the parties. In fact, it would be remiss of the Ombudsman to do otherwise.
2. However, I note that the Ombudsman did not give either party notice that the Ombudsman intended to rely in part on clause 13 in the external review. The "provisional determination" about which the parties were invited to comment by the Ombudsman referred only to clause 6(1). As a result, the parties were not afforded the opportunity to make submissions on the prospect that the Ombudsman might consider that the redacted portions of Documents 1 to 4 inclusive were exempt under clause 13. In this regard, the Ombudsman did not afford the parties procedural fairness.
3. This alone does not mean that the applicant will succeed in this review before the Tribunal. It is well established that a full review on the merits before the Tribunal will cure any procedural irregularities in the decision under review.[22] I am satisfied that this has occurred in this case as the applicant had ample opportunity in these proceedings to provide submissions on the matter of clause 13.
4. As I have already found the redacted parts of Document 1 to be exempt under clause 6, it is not necessary to dwell long on the application of clause 13 to Document 1. However, I would note that it is self-evident from the disclosed portion of Document 1 that the notifier made contact with police to seek their protection. I am well satisfied that the highly sensitive personal information disclosed by the notifier to police was done so in confidence. I consider that the disclosure of the redacted information might reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the respondent and would be contrary to the public interest. Members of the public seeking the assistance of the police must not be discouraged from approaching police for protection out of fear that sensitive personal information given to the police by them in confidence will be disclosed to the general public. For these reasons, I consider that Document 1 is exempt under clause 13.
5. Turning now to Document 3, having considered the unredacted passage at the 14:49:54 timestamp, I am well satisfied that the information given to police as reported in that passage was not given to police in confidence. It has the appearance of information given freely and without hesitation. If I am wrong on this point, I would in any event be satisfied that the benign and innocuous nature of this information is not of the sort where disclosure might reasonably be expected to prejudice the future supply of information to the respondent nor that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. Clause 13 does not apply to exempt from disclosure the redacted passage in Document 3.

Clause 12 - Documents the subject of secrecy provisions

(1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would constitute an offence against an Act.

1. When considering the terms of the applicant's external review application, the Ombudsman concluded that the scope of the external review "excluded" consideration of the respondent's use of clause 12 to partially exempt Document 1.[23]
2. I disagree as a matter of principle with the position taken by the Ombudsman in this respect. An applicant for external review cannot, by the manner in which they express their application, exclude consideration by the Ombudsman (or the Tribunal) with any clause in the Schedule that would prima facie appear to apply to exempt the documents in question.
3. In other words, in this case, the applicant could not bind the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman could not bind itself, to not consider clause 12 if that clause properly applied to the documents. To do so would be entirely inconsistent with the objects of the FOI Act, including that the right of access to documents is subject to such restrictions as are consistent with the public interest and the preservation of personal privacy.
4. In an affidavit filed by the respondent in the Tribunal, it was intimated that the respondent maintains a claim for exemption under clause 12 for Document 1.[24] However, there were no submissions, written or oral, made for the respondent in respect of the application of clause 12.
5. I would observe that it is not apparent on the face of the unredacted version of Document 1 how s 164 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017 would be invoked. There might possibly be a prima facie case for the application of s 163 of the Children and Young People (Safety) Act 2017. However, I prefer not to make a conclusive finding either way given that there were no submissions made to the Tribunal about the application of clause 12. I remind the respondent that it is not the Tribunal's role to make any party's case for it.
6. In any event, as I have found that the redacted material in Document 1 is exempt under clauses 6(1) and 13, it is not strictly necessary to consider any other grounds of exemption.

1. Having found that the redacted passages in Document 1 are exempt under clauses 6(1) and 13, I find that the correct or preferable decision is to affirm the decision of the respondent not to disclose the redacted material in Document 1 to the applicant. It would be perverse and inappropriate to make a finding that disclosure is unreasonable and not in the public interest and nevertheless to release the document to the applicant.
2. Having found that Document 3 is not an exempt document, the correct or preferable decision is to set aside that part of the Ombudsman's decision relating to Document 3. Document 3 must be disclosed to the applicant.

[1] Counsel for the respondent indicated by email dated 28 October 2025 that the respondent did not propose to file any answering submissions.

[2] GM v Department of Human Services [2025] SASCA 68 at [140].

[3] Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152 at [37].

[4] Freedom of Information Act 1991 ss 26, 27 28.

[5] Affidavit of Christian Ainley, 26 June 2025.

[6] Ombudsman's external review decision, 5 May 2025, [13].

[7] I explained to the applicant at the directions hearing of 19 August 2025 that, if he wished to have access to Documents 6 to 10 inclusive or to any one of them, he would need to make a separate application either to the Ombudsman or to the Tribunal for external review of the respondent's internal review decision refusing to disclose those documents to him in full. I noted that such applications must be made within 30 days of the internal review decision unless either the Ombudsman or the Tribunal, as the case may be, extends that time. I also explained to the applicant that his concerns about the potentially defamatory content of Document 3 could not be dealt with in these proceedings, which concerned only the question of whether that document should be released to him in its present form. I explained that any concerns about its contents being incorrect might be the subject of a separate application by him to the respondent under s 31 of the FOI Act for amendment of records and that he should consider getting advice on that matter.

1. [8] Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152 at [2] per Jenkinson J; State of South Australia (Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure) v Brokenshire [2015] SADC 68 at [19].
2. [9] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at [30] - [31] per Maxwell P; Bradshaw v SA Police [2012] SADC 184 at [60].

[10] Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at [69] per Weinberg JA; at [105] per Pagone AJA.

[11] See South Australia Police v Patrick [2023] SACAT 82 at [25] and the cases cited therein.

1. [12] Re Chandra v Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437 at [52]; Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152 at [34]. Also, Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 at 621 per Kirby P and at 643 per Clarke JA; Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at [96] per Pagone AJA.

[13] Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 at 639 - 640.

1. [14] See generally Williams v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [1985] AATA 226; Young v Wicks [1986] FCA 169 at [17]; Colakovski v Australian Telecommunications Corporation [1991] FCA 152 at [25]; Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 at 624 and 625 per Kirby P.

[15] Simring v Commissioner of Police [2009] NSWSC 270 at [52].

1. [16] Treglown v SA Police [2011] SADC 139 citing Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437 at [51].
2. [17] See Williams v Registrar of the Federal Court of Australia [1985] AATA 226; Priebe v SA Police [2007] SADC 119; Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218 at [77] per Weinberg JA; Drew v Victoria Police [2012] VCAT 572; Bradshaw v SA Police [2012] SADC 184; Lau v Minister for Sustainability, Environment and Conservation [2018] SACAT 57 at [49]; Hall v SA Police [2019] SADC 5 at [167]; Martin v Electoral Commissioner [2021] SACAT 86; and Kararmaz v Rural City of Murray Bridge [2022] SACAT 87.
3. [18] Sellars v South Australian Police [2012] SADC 9 at [15]; Lau v Minister for Sustainability, Environment and Conservation [2018] SACAT 57 at [43].

[19] City of Unley v Warnecke [2004] SADC 48.

[20] I would respectfully observe that the later decision of the District Court in Treglown v SA Police [2011] SADC 139 may have also misunderstood the City of Unley case as the respondent has done in its submissions (see Treglown v SA Police [2011] SADC 139 [135], [141] and [147(1)(1.1)].

[21] Proudfoot v Attorney-General's Department [2024] SACAT 63 at [56].

[22] Re RBY [2021] SACAT 39.

[23] Ombudsman's external review decision, 5 May 2025, [14].

[24] Affidavit of Christian Ainley, 26 June 2025, [17].