DPP v Wade [2025] VCC 1548

Sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 - 15 years' imprisonment;[6]

Traffick drug of dependence to a child - 20 years' imprisonment;[7]

False imprisonment - 10 years' imprisonment.[8]

1. The victims of your offending are Bethany Davis[9] and Holly Kline.[10] They are both currently aged 19. At the time of the offending, Bethany was 14 years old and Holly was 13 years old. They are friends who lived in Kyabram and were not known to you.
2. The offending occurred at two properties, 4 Greenhill Drive[11] and 11 Greenhill Drive[12] in Kyabram. A number of people lived on-and-off at 4 Greenhill Drive, including you. Across the road, at 11 Greenhill Drive, a man named Ivan Atkins[13] resided.
3. I am satisfied the jury accepted Bethany's and Holly's versions of events. In my opinion, they were honest and reliable witnesses; indeed, they were impressive witnesses. I sentence you on the basis of the evidence they gave at the trial. I will summarise that evidence, having regard to the amended summary of prosecution opening for trial dated 26 June 2025 and Annexure A of the prosecution plea submissions dated 19 September 2025.[14]
4. On the day of the offending, Bethany and her friend Annabelle Dunn[15] decided they wanted to buy some cannabis. They contacted Holly to join them. The girls had $70 with them to purchase the cannabis.
5. Bethany, Holly and Annabelle walked to an address on the other side of Kyabram from Annabelle's house. The person who answered the door refused to sell them any drugs because they were underage. Annabelle then suggested they go to Greenhill Drive, because there was a man there from whom they could buy cannabis. Annabelle did not go with Bethany and Holly to 4 Greenhill Drive. Instead, she waited in a park located next to the house.
6. Bethany and Holly knocked on the door. You answered and asked them what they were there for. They told you they wanted to buy some 'weed'. You initially refused because they were underage, but eventually you agreed and told them you could not be caught.

1. You took Bethany and Holly into the backyard of 4 Greenhill Drive. You sat on a garden chair to count the money, and had Bethany and Holly help you do so. While counting the money, you grabbed Holly's breast. She pushed your hand away and zipped her jacket up.

1. After the money was counted, you told Bethany and Holly the amount was not enough and you wanted $30 more. When they said they did not have any more money, you told Bethany and Holly they would have to 'work the rest off'.
2. You had Holly play with a dog in the backyard. Then, you pushed Bethany into a shed and closed the door behind you.
3. Bethany asked you what you were doing. You told her to shut up and to not worry. You removed her jacket and put it to one side, placing the money on top. You then pulled Bethany's pants down and bent her over one of the suitcases in the shed. You pulled your pants down and inserted your penis into her vagina. Bethany asked you to stop and told you she did not like it. You continued to penetrate her vagina. You then penetrated her anus with your penis. In her VARE, Bethany recalled you saying things while you were penetrating her like, 'you're perfect', 'I want to marry you', 'I want to run away with you' and 'I want to have kids with you'. Bethany told you it did not feel right and continued to ask you to stop.
4. After what Bethany estimated was about 10 to 15 minutes, you stopped. You had not been wearing a condom and you did not ejaculate. You pulled up your pants and Bethany pulled up hers.
5. While this was occurring, Holly was outside. Her evidence is that Bethany was in the shed for a long time. Holly had been messaging Annabelle, who was still waiting at the park. When Bethany emerged from the shed, Holly observed Bethany's eyes were watery, she was adjusting her clothing and she had a red mark on her neck.
6. After you and Bethany left the shed, you told Bethany and Holly you were all going to go across the road to your friend's house. Bethany said to 'not worry about it' and that they did not want to go with you. You told Bethany and Holly you would not be there for long.

1. You took Bethany and Holly across the road to 11 Greenhill Drive, entering the house via the backyard. On the way there, Bethany told Holly you had raped her from behind, and that she was telling you to stop but you would not listen.
2. Once in the house, you had Bethany and Holly sit on a couch in the lounge room. The owner of the house, Ivan Atkins, offered them drinks and spoke to them about his family. You sat near Bethany. You put her hand on your leg and started rubbing it. You gave Bethany a can of coke and Holly an icy-pole.
3. Eventually, you left Bethany and Holly at the house for the first time so you could obtain the cannabis. You retuned empty-handed. In evidence at trial, Holly said you told them you had to leave to check on your dinner. You left the house again, this time returning a short time later with the cannabis. You told Bethany it was a quarter of what they asked for, but if they came back that night you could give them the rest.
4. You told Bethany and Holly if they wanted to leave, they would have to share some of the cannabis with you. If they did not want to share, they would not be able to leave. Bethany did not want the cannabis, but had some to 'get it over and done with'. Holly did not.
5. In the meantime, Annabelle was still at the park. Annabelle saw you walk Bethany and Holly across the road to 11 Greenhill Drive. Annabelle was panicking because Bethany and Holly had been at the house for a long time. Annabelle asked her friends for help and Alison Mann,[16] Samantha Reed[17] and Louisa Murray[18] attended the park. Alison and Louisa recalled men coming and going from the house while they watched. Samantha recalled a man walking through the back gate of the house.
6. After Bethany smoked the cannabis, you let them leave. You walked them across the road and let Bethany and Holly enter the park. Holly said Bethany was laughing because she was 'high'.
7. Bethany recalled telling the girls at the park that she and Holly had obtained the weed, but things had happened she did not want to talk about. Holly told the girls she had had her 'boob touched'.
8. Annabelle gave evidence that Bethany told her she had been raped. Samantha gave evidence that Bethany told the girls she had been forced into the shed, forced to have sex and forced to smoke weed in the house. Louisa gave evidence that Bethany told them she had been 'raped in the arse'.
9. After the conversation at the park, Alison, Samantha and Louisa left, while Bethany and Holly went back to Annabelle's house.

1. Bethany's mother, Kristie Davis,[19] became aware of your offending on 30 March 2019 and notified the police at Kyabram police station. The informant, DSC Jacqui Stubbins, spoke to Bethany that evening.
2. You were arrested on 9 April 2019. In the course of your record of interview, you denied the offending. You told police you had been cooking a chicken roast dinner on 16 February 2019 when two girls knocked on the door looking for someone. You said you told the girls 'they're not here'. You said they 'could've' asked to purchase cannabis from you, but they would not have gotten any from you. You said you had no further interaction with the two girls because you were cooking dinner.
3. Bethany and Holly both identified you from photoboards shown to each of them respectively on 18 April 2019 and 15 May 2019.

1. A victim impact statement (VIS) was prepared by Bethany[20] and her mother, Kristie.[21] Both VIS were tendered at the plea hearing and read into evidence by the informant.
2. Bethany writes what happened to her was a complete violation of her body, mind and sense of safety. You stripped her of her control and left her feeling powerless, degraded, isolated, disgusting and terrified. You left her with lasting trauma that will forever haunt her. She is scarred not only from the assault, but from the words you spoke to her that day. These phrases follow her into her relationships with others.
3. Since the day of your offending, Bethany has been left to try and survive. She has struggled with severe PTSD, depression and anxiety and suffers from panic attacks. She has an eating disorder and is in recovery for self-harm, drug addiction and multiple suicide attempts. Everyday small tasks now feel overwhelming. She avoids going places alone because she finds it difficult to trust others and now questions her safety wherever she goes.
4. Bethany does not sleep properly, as nightmares take her back to that shed. She is now hypervigilant and often feels like she is still trapped in that moment, reliving the trauma you caused her over and over again. Every part of her life, and her ability to feel like a whole person, has been adversely affected by your offending. Bethany writes you stole her teenage years. What should have been her best years, have turned into her worst.
5. Although Bethany knows she did nothing wrong, she has endured continuing feelings of guilt and shame. She feels isolated, ashamed and broken. Her confidence has been shattered. Your offending has also affected her friends, family, work, education and overall, the life she once had. She carries the pain of your offending with her everyday of her life. You changed her into a person she does not recognise, but she is determined to not let you define the rest of her life.
6. Kristie writes your offending changed her and her daughter's life forever. You shattered Kristie's heart and she has lost all trust in humanity and the safety of the world. As Bethany's mother, Kristie lives with the scars you left as a result of your conduct. She has watched her daughter's light dim, her joy fade and her safety stolen. It haunts Kristie every day that she could not protect her daughter.
7. Kristie writes she has seen Bethany fight to rebuild herself again and again, only to be pulled back into the darkness of that day.
8. Your offending has torn apart Kristie's entire family. Kristie cannot sleep. She lives in constant fear of losing Bethany to the pain you have caused. She worries every time Bethany leaves the house, every time she sees Bethany break down and every time Bethany tells her she feels worthless. Your offending has poisoned her family's peace, happiness and future. Kristie and Bethany are forced to live with the consequences of your conduct every single day.
9. Holly did not prepare a VIS. However, the Victorian Court of Appeal has made clear there is a presumption of harm to children who are exposed to premature sexual activity and that long lasting and serious physical and psychological harm is to be presumed.[22]
10. In Clarkson v The Queen ('Clarkson')[23] the Victorian Court of Appeal quoted with approval from the judgment of Baroness Hale in R v G[24] where Her Ladyship said:

More importantly, anyone who has practised in the family courts is only too well aware of the long term and serious harm, both physical and psychological, which premature sexual activity can do.[25]

1. Moreover, the Victorian Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the important role restorative justice plays in the criminal justice system. In Talbot (a pseudonym) v The Queen[26] the Court approved the statement of Vincent JA in DPP v Toomey[27] concerning the notions of social rehabilitation and restorative justice, where his Honour said:

It is well to bear in mind that the rehabilitation of the victim of sexual abuse may often be more difficult to achieve than that of the perpetrator. Frequently the damage will be profound and a long time will pass before it can be addressed at all. In the meantime, childhood will be destroyed, self esteem damaged, educational and career opportunities lost and the capacity to form and maintain relationships seriously impaired. The notion to which I have adverted underpins, I believe, such concepts as restorative justice, just punishment, the vindication of rights and the attribution of responsibility based on moral culpability. The vindication of the victim in cases of this kind, in particular, is profoundly important if the criminal justice system is to perform its role properly.[28]

1. In this case the serious and continuing adverse effects of your offending against Bethany and Holly, and by extension Bethany's mother, are writ large. It is to be hoped that with time they can all heal.

1. Sexual assault of a child under the age of 16, sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16, trafficking a drug of dependence to a child and false imprisonment are serious criminal offences, as indicated by their maximum penalties. In particular, Charges 2, 3 and 5 are very serious offences, carrying maximum penalties of 15 years and 20 years' imprisonment respectively. This unequivocally indicates the seriousness with which the legislature, on behalf of the Victorian community, views these offences, and 'reflects the community's abhorrence of sexual crimes against children.'[29]
2. Sexual offending by adults against vulnerable children is a 'most serious blight on society'.[30] The Victorian Court of Appeal, and its predecessor, have emphasised on numerous occasions the harm sexual offending against children causes to the innocent victims and the community at large.[31] As Hedigan AJA, adopting an earlier statement of Marks J in R v Sposito,[32] put it in R v MJ:[33] 'A society which fails to protect its children from sexual abuse by adults, particularly those entrusted with their care, is degenerate.'[34] I accept there is no suggestion that any of the victims were under your care at the time you committed the present offences, however, in my view, this statement is nonetheless apposite in this case.
3. In Clarkson, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that under the legislative scheme, a child under 16 cannot consent to sexual penetration. This prohibition has two purposes: protecting the child from harm that can come from premature sexual activity; and deterring adults who would contemplate having sex with someone under the age of 16. The prohibition is founded on a presumption that premature sexual activity will cause long term physical and psychological harm and is unaffected by the presence of apparent consent - not that there is any suggestion of consent in the case, apparent or otherwise; it is quite the opposite.
4. Offending of this nature is regarded by the courts as extremely serious and usually calls for the imposition of condign punishment.[35] The courts have denounced offences of this nature as 'inherently evil and depraved'.[36] They violate 'the most basic norms of civilised behaviour, and [strike] at the heart of the value which our society places on the lives and wellbeing of each of its young persons.'[37]
5. Moreover, sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 years and sexual assault of a child under 16 are standard sentence offences.[38] The standard sentence fixed for sexual penetration of a child under 16 years is imprisonment for six years. The standard sentence fixed for sexual assault of a child under 16 years is imprisonment for four years.[39]
6. Accordingly, in sentencing you for these offences, I must have regard to the relevant standard sentence[40] which 'is the sentence for an offence that, taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle of the range of seriousness.'[41] This is a matter I must have regard to as one of the factors relevant to the sentences I impose on you.[42] However, the standard sentence is just another factor to consider, it is not determinative and does not interrupt the operation of my instinctive synthesis.[43] In fact, the relevant legislation specifically approves the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing.[44] The standard sentence is to be treated as a 'legislative guidepost', as is the maximum penalty.[45]
7. Your counsel submitted, particularly in relation to Charges 2 and 3, your offending is below the mid-range for offences of this kind. I reject that submission.
8. As the prosecutor outlined in written and oral submissions, the aggravating aspects of your offending conduct that affect my assessment of its nature and objective seriousness can be summarised as follows:

(a) There is a significant age gap between you and both Bethany and Holly.

(b) Your offending, especially in respect of Charges 1, 2 and 3 was brazen.

(c) Notwithstanding the presumption a child under 16 cannot consent, there was a proven absence of consent, as Bethany repeatedly told you to stop.

(d) You used sufficient force to remove Bethany's jeans and underwear, bend her over the suitcase and leave a red mark on her neck, which was observed by Holly.

(e) Your penetration of Bethany was forceful;

(f) You were not wearing a condom when you offended against Bethany, exposing her to a risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease.

1. Accepting the difficulties inherent in determining what constitutes a 'mid-range' example of this offence, I consider your offending conduct, objectively viewed, in relation to Charges 2 and 3, to be serious examples, certainly above the mid-range.
2. False imprisonment and trafficking a drug of dependence to a child are serious offences and I consider your conduct giving rise to Charges 4, 5 and 6 to be serious enough examples of these offences. In relation to the false imprisonment charges, as I foreshadowed at the plea hearing, your offending cannot be seen in isolation of what occurred before. Given the jury's verdicts, Bethany and Holly had been the victims of serious sexual assaults and they were being falsely imprisoned by the perpetrator of those crimes. You were aware of what you had done to Bethany and Holly before you brought them to 11 Greenhill Drive, and you had control over them.
3. I consider your moral culpability to be very high. Your counsel did not rely on Verdins principle 1 to moderate my assessment of this factor.[46] No doubt this was on account of the fact that there is no demonstrable link between your mental health conditions (discussed below) and your offending conduct.
4. Moreover, significant weight must be given to just punishment, general deterrence and denunciation, particularly in sentencing you on Charges 2 and 3. Some moderation in general deterrence is warranted on account of your mental health conditions discussed below.

1. Your counsel tendered the following reports which summarise your personal circumstances:

(a) A psychological assessment report prepared by Gina Cidoni on 21 August 2021;[47] and

(b) A confidential psychological report prepared by Kristie Fakhri dated 28 August 2025.[48]

While I have generally had regard to Ms Cidoni's report, I note Ms Cidoni's report was prepared when you were still prepared to plead guilty to a negotiated set of charges.

1. I also ordered a psychological court report. You were assessed by Dr Emily Stevenson, clinical and forensic psychologist, on 19 August 2025. Dr Stevenson prepared a psychological report dated 17 September 2025.[49]
2. You are 58 years old and were 51 at the time of the offending. You were born in Deniliquin, New South Wales. You were raised between Deniliquin and Adelaide by your parents. You have an older half-brother and half-sister and a younger biological brother.
3. To Ms Fakhri you described your upbringing as 'good and generally stable'. However to Dr Stevenson, you reported your father was abusive towards you, your mother and your younger brother, and he was often intoxicated by alcohol. You told Dr Stevenson you sometimes were unable to go to school because you had obvious and significant bruising as a result of your father's abuse. Across all three reports you described your mother as loving and caring.
4. In May 2021, you visited your father, who was very unwell at the time. You described this interaction to Ms Fakhri as negative, as your father was aggressive and rejected you. This was the last time you had contact with him. You reported to Ms Fakhri not having spoken to your family for the last four years, although they are aware of your imprisonment. Prior to choosing to cease contact with your family when you were remanded, you had a good relationship with them.

1. You attended both primary and secondary school in Deniliquin. You reported to Ms Fakhri and Dr Stevenson frequently getting into trouble at school, primarily for fighting with other students and distracting your classmates. You struggled with learning and concentration, although reported you generally achieved average grades. You told Dr Stevenson you only went to school because you had to and you looked forward to when you could leave and start work. Dr Stevenson writes it is unclear when you left school, but this would have been before your first term of imprisonment, which occurred when you were 17 years old. You completed Year 10 via correspondence from prison at some point during your adulthood.
2. Following secondary school, you commenced a boiler-making apprenticeship. Dr Stevenson's report indicates that until 2014, unless incarcerated, you always had been employed, although you changed jobs between '10 to 20 times' because you would 'go where the money [was]'.
3. While in prison you undertook further studies and completed up to your second year of a Structural Engineering course by correspondence through a Sydney-based program. Around the age of 40, once you were released from prison, you relocated to Victoria where you continued working in construction. Prior to being remanded for the present offending, you were couch surfing.
4. When you were approximately 47 years old, you sustained a workplace injury that significantly impacted your ability to work. You initially received WorkCover payments, although these ceased when you attempted to return to employment. You told Ms Fakhri you returned to work out of financial necessity and relied on pain medication in order to do so. During this period, you worked as a welder with a transport and logistics company. Ms Fakhri writes you were also in receipt of Centrelink benefits, which you reportedly received for approximately two years. At the time of Ms Fakhri's report you were unable to work while on remand as you were awaiting surgery for your injury.

1. Prior to your workplace injury, you reported to Ms Fakhri having no significant issues with alcohol or other drugs. You disclosed to Dr Stevenson using alcohol and drugs as an adolescent to the point of 'blacking out', but you were generally vague as to the frequency of your use.
2. Following the workplace accident, you turned to daily use of alcohol and drugs as a means of coping with both physical pain and emotional distress. You were prescribed opioid-based medications, including Endone, codeine, and OxyContin, and subsequently began sourcing substances illegally. Dr Stevenson considers your use of drugs and alcohol was significant and included cannabis, methamphetamine, 'mushrooms', and heroin.
3. At the time of the present offending, you reported to Ms Fakhri using a number of substances, including alcohol, but you were unable to recall the exact drugs. Your last reported use of any drugs or alcohol was on the day of your arrest in May 2021.
4. Ms Fakhri diagnoses you with the following conditions:

(a) Opioid use disorder, severe, in sustained remission, in a controlled environment.

(b) Stimulant use disorder, severe, in sustained remission, in a controlled environment.

(c) Alcohol use disorder, severe, in sustained remission, in a controlled environment.

1. Dr Stevenson referred to your prison health record, which indicated you had completed alcohol and other drug (AOD) programs while in prison. While I have not been provided with the details, you told Ms Fakhri while in custody you completed about 15 programs, which include general AOD counselling, violent offending programs, sex offender programs and substance-specific programs.

1. In relation to your medical history, your workplace injury resulted in numerous fractures to your right leg and ankle. Dr Stevenson's report indicates you had unsuccessful surgery in an attempt to repair your ankle. You then had to wait nine years for further surgery to address your chronic pain and limited movement. At the time of Dr Stevenson's assessment you were awaiting further surgery.
2. During previous terms of imprisonment you have sustained a number of head injuries, including blows that rendered you unconscious on several occasions. You reported to Ms Fakhri being assessed in New South Wales, which confirmed you had a brain injury, which you say contributes to ongoing difficulties with memory, concentration and balance. You told Ms Fakhri you struggle to recall what day of the week it is. However, there is no evidence before me of an acquired brain injury (ABI) and your counsel does not submit you suffer from an ABI.
3. You disclosed to Ms Fakhri struggling with your mental health and finding reintegration into the community challenging after the completion of your 15-year prison sentence. Following your second period of incarceration, you engaged with a support worker who provided emotional support and assisted you in returning to employment.
4. You told Ms Fakhri that your symptoms following your workplace accident included feelings of hopelessness, helplessness and daily low mood. You reported chronic pain as a result of your injury. These symptoms, when combined with your inability to work and lengthy delays in receiving surgery, contributed to your psychological distress. You told Dr Stevenson you have historically had periods of suicidal ideation, but could not provide further detail. Dr Stevenson again referred to your prison health record, which notes you reported fleeting suicidal ideation as recently as 2021, and a previous suicide attempt whilst in the community prior to being on remand for the present offences.
5. Ms Fakhri administered the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) and Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment (GAD-7) during her assessment. The PHQ-9 is a brief tool used to assist in diagnosing depression through an assessment of symptoms over the past two weeks, and is based on the diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). The GAD-7 is a brief measure of symptoms of anxiety, based on the Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) diagnostic criteria, and requires clients to evaluate their level of symptoms over the last two weeks.
6. You scored 19 on the PHQ-9, which is indicative of moderate to severe symptoms that would be significantly affecting your daily functioning and quality of life. Ms Fakhri opines your symptoms meet the criteria for MDD and indicate a diagnosis of MDD, recurrent, moderate. You scored 17 on the GAD-7, which is indicative of severe anxiety symptoms in the preceding fortnight. Ms Fakhri also considers you demonstrate traits consistent with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) including 'a pattern of disregard for the rights of others, recurrent engagement in unlawful behaviours, and limited remorse for his past actions'.
7. Ms Fakhri also administered the Adult ADHD Self-Rating Scale (ASRS) which is an 18-item self-report questionnaire designed to assess Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in adults. Ms Fakhri opines your scores on the ASRS are suggestive of ADHD and further assessment is required for a formal diagnosis
8. At the time of Ms Cidoni's assessment, you had been prescribed mirtazapine and diazepam. According to Ms Fakhri's report, you discontinued these medications shortly after beginning them because of increased aggression and discomfort. You are currently not taking regular psychiatric medications and manage pain primarily with paracetamol, occasionally using stronger analgesics when necessary.
9. You denied any history of psychiatric admissions or psychotic symptoms outside of periods of substance use. You reported self-harm around the time of your first term of imprisonment at 18 years old, but have not done so since.

1. You reported four significant past relationships, however the timeline of these relationships is difficult to follow. You were in a relationship with Rosemary, with whom you share a son, now aged 37. The relationship lasted eighteen months and ended when you were imprisoned for a previous offence. Your contact with your son is now limited.
2. You told Dr Stevenson you commenced a relationship with Fiona when you were imprisoned in South Australia. You lived with Fiona for seven years upon your release and you share a daughter, now aged 22. You have no ongoing relationship with your daughter and only had sporadic contact with her prior to being in custody. Your relationship with Fiona ceased following disagreements between her and your father, during which you supported your father's position.
3. You were in a relationship with Donna for approximately 18 months and share a son, aged 11. You recalled to Dr Stevenson and Ms Fakhri that Donna initially told you your son had passed away, a discovery which distressed you. Two years after being told your son had died, Donna reached out to let you know your son was in fact still alive. Since learning the truth, you have had no contact with your son.
4. During the offending, you were in a relationship with Mary Shaffer,[50] and you lived together at 4 Greenhill Drive. You described to Ms Fakhri enjoying her company, until an incident occurred in which Mary smacked you with a broom while you were asleep. In response, you reportedly struck her across the face and chased her down the street. You were fined $300 and issued a two-year Family Violence Intervention Order (FVIO), which has since expired. You indicated to Dr Stevenson that you maintained a relationship with Mary after your separation, stating that she would not let you leave her life. You found this difficult at times, but also thought you may have become lonely since your separation.
5. Ms Fakhri writes you had a mixed group of friends prior to being remanded, who generally encouraged prosocial behaviour, although they did use drugs socially.
6. While in prison, you have not engaged socially with others, reporting daily pain and choosing to isolate yourself from other inmates. You disclosed to Ms Fakhri feeling like you do not have any significant support from family, friends or other social networks.
7. In relation to your psychosexual history, you denied to Ms Fakhri ever pressuring partners into sex, or using violence during sex and explicitly denied any sexual interest in prepubescent children.
8. To Dr Stevenson, you disclosed previously experiencing unwanted sexual contact during a previous incarceration. You were unable to provide details during the assessment and you became quite distressed. You did say, however, you occasionally have nightmares about the assault, and implied that being in prison and in protection, where other sexual offenders are housed, has made you think about the assault more frequently.

1. Both the Static-99 assessment and the risk of sexual recidivism protocol (RSVP) were administered to you by Dr Stevenson. The sexual violence risk-20 version 2 (SVR-20 V2) guideline was administered by Ms Fakhri.
2. The Static-99 is a 10-item risk tool that identifies factors associated with a risk of sexual recidivism. You scored a total of 5 on the Static-99, which means you fall into the moderate to high risk category for future sexual offences.
3. The RSVP is a structured professional judgement tool used to assess an individual's propensity to engage in future sexual violence. Applying this tool, Dr Stevenson opines you need continued risk management and treatment at an intensity similar to that of the average sexual offender.
4. The SVR-20 V2 is a 20-item structured professional judgement guideline for sexual violence risk assessment. The 20 risk factors fall into three main categories: psychosocial adjustment, sexual offending and future plans. Ms Fakhri considers, based on the SVR-20 V2, you are at a moderate to high risk of future sexual reoffending without any intervention. In other words, Ms Fakhri is of the view you require a moderate to high level of intervention to mitigate your risk of recidivism, provided you engage with psychological treatment and continue to develop insight and emotional regulation skills. According to Ms Fakhri, your risk of reoffending is likely to increase in contexts of 'substance use, social isolation, financial instability, and limited external monitoring'.
5. To Ms Fakhri you maintained your innocence, stating you were at the house preparing food when two teenagers knocked on the door and denied any further interaction. Dr Stevenson writes your account of the present offending was lacking in detail. At times you claimed to have no memory of the offending, and at other times reported you were unlikely to have committed the offences as there was 'no way' you would have had 'sex with someone underage' or not remember if you had. You expressed to Ms Fakhri and Dr Stevenson feeling 'bad for those girls if something happened to them', but said they had misidentified you as the perpetrator. Dr Stevenson acknowledged, however, that you maintaining your innocence may have reduced your willingness to discuss the offending during the assessment.
6. Ms Fakhri writes:

While his sexual offending is limited to a single known episode, the seriousness of the conduct is concerning. The alleged behaviour involved penetration, coercion, and the infliction of both physical and psychological harm on vulnerable victims. His continued minimisation and denial of responsibility significantly restrict his capacity for insight, and this lack of acknowledgement is a well-established risk factor for reoffending. Furthermore, his historical difficulties in complying with supervision and his limited willingness to engage in rehabilitative treatment suggest a low level of readiness to change.

1. Your criminal history is extensive, spans several jurisdictions and includes a range of offences relating to driving, drugs, weapons, thefts, contravening a family violence intervention order ('FVIO'), and perhaps most notably, murder.
2. Your first experience with the criminal justice system was on 23 January 1987, when you appeared at Christies Beach Magistrates' Court in South Australia on a charge of illegal use of a motor vehicle. You were convicted and given a 3-month sentence of imprisonment suspended for two years. On separate occasions you were also convicted in South Australia of numerous driving related offences and one charge of criminal damage.
3. In particular, the prosecutor drew my attention to your appearance at the District Court of South Australia on 17 November 2009 in relation to a charge of commit theft using force (aggravated offence).[51] You were sentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years' and 1 month's imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months.
4. In New South Wales your criminal history commenced when you appeared at the Wagga Wagga Supreme Court on 19 September 1989 on a charge of murder.[52] You were sentenced to a total effective sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 15 years.
5. In New South Wales, you have also been convicted of several drug offences. On 25 June 2001, you were sentenced in the Wagga Wagga Local Court to a 2-year bond for self-administer/attempt to self-administer a prohibited drug, and fined $300 for a possess prohibited drug. On 27 June 2002, you appeared at the Wagga Wagga District Court on a charge of supplying a prohibited drug, where you were sentenced to an 18-month suspended sentence of imprisonment. Later that year, on 3 July 2002, you were fined $600 at the Wagga Wagga Local Court for possessing a prohibited drug. Your last drug-related court appearance was on 4 November 2002, when you appeared at the Wagga Wagga Local Court and were fined $300 for possessing a prohibited drug.
6. You also have several prior convictions in New South Wales related to driving and weapons offences. These convictions resulted in various fines and, on one occasion, a 12-month licence disqualification.
7. In Victoria, your criminal history consists of one appearance at the Bendigo Magistrates' Court on 2 October 2018 where you were convicted and fined an aggregate of $350 for one charge of contravening a FVIVO and failing to answer bail.

1. You stood your trial, which was your right, but it means you can receive no discount for pleading guilty.
2. As your counsel fairly conceded, you continue to deny all the offending conduct. Accordingly, you lack insight into the reasons for your offending and you have demonstrated no remorse or victim empathy. In these circumstances, and given your extensive and serious prior criminal history, albeit not for sexual offending against children, I must give significant weight to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you for these offences.
3. Moreover, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being very guarded. You have a moderate to high risk of future sexual reoffending without any intervention and you appear to have no protective factors available upon your eventual release from custody.

1. Your counsel submitted Verdins principles 3 and 5 are engaged in your case.[53]
2. With respect to principle 5, your counsel relied on your diagnosis of a major depressive disorder ('MDD') and Ms Fakhri's opinion to the effect that:

... it is noted that imprisonment would likely weigh more heavily on Mr Wade than someone without his conditions (MDD). His conditions make him particularly more prone to emotional dysregulation which can result in disproportionate, impulsive, reactive behaviours which are heightened under stress and within the volatile prison environment.

Prison is likely counterproductive for Mr Wade because it does not adequately address the mental health and substance use issues underlying his offending ...

1. Your counsel also relied on the following section of Ms Fakhri's report in relation to your cognitive function:

A psycholegal (sic) assessment conducted by Ms Gina Cidoni ... in August 2021 included a Brief Cognitive Status Exam, which indicated that his global cognitive functioning was in the very low range, affecting basic daily functioning. Furthermore, RBANS (neuropsychological battery) assessment scores suggested borderline capacity for verbal learning, significant difficulties with attention and information processing speed, and very low delayed memory performance.

His mental illness and cognitive difficulties, and lack of appropriate treatment can cause problems in a prison setting and this would be more onerous for him than for an individual without his conditions. He has a lowered ability to learn, reason and make sound judgements and decisions. He struggles to plan and to problem solve.

1. The prosecutor submitted that only Verdins principle 5 is enlivened and its weight is to be assessed in the context of the letter from Jenny Hosking, Assistant Commissioner of the Sentence Management Division at the Department of Justice and Community Safety, dated 5 September 2025.[54]
2. Ms Hosking writes you were transferred to the Ravenhall Correctional Centre on 17 August 2021, which has a higher overlay of forensic mental health care. The prosecutor submitted that while Verdins principle 5 does apply in your case, I am to have regard to the treatment options available in custody in accordance with Ms Hosking's letter, and the fact some degree of mental health care is able to you. However, the prosecutor also emphasised that in Dr Stevenson's report you denied seeking mental health support at all, meaning it is difficult to know whether you are willing to engage with available services if they were offered to you.
3. On balance, I accept Verdins principle 5 is engaged to some extent in your case. Given your mental health condition of MDD, in particular, it is likely the sentences I impose will weigh more heavily on you than they would on a prisoner in normal mental health. You borderline intellectual functioning is also relevant in this regard.[55]
4. Regarding Verdins principle 3, your counsel relied solely on a general proposition that an offender suffering from a mental health disorder, such as yourself, is not an appropriate vehicle for general deterrence, and that the application of general deterrence should be moderated.[56]
5. The prosecutor submitted that Verdins principle 3 is not engaged in this case and your diagnosis of MDD is only relevant as part of your personal circumstances. The prosecutor contended that a moderation of general deterrence may only be called for because the offender's mental health condition makes them unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or understand the consequences of their conduct.[57] It is not the case that a diagnosis of a mental impairment, such as MDD, automatically means general deterrence is reduced as a sentencing factor.[58]
6. In Verdins the Court quoted with approval a passage from the judgment of Winneke ACJ in R v Yaldiz ('Yaldiz') as follows:[59]

It is not appropriate to simply fasten on to the words "recognised psychiatric disorder" and then, without reference to the symptoms and consequences of that disorder, to contend that purposes of general deterrence have no part to play in the sentencing process. Whether in the particular case a psychiatric condition should reduce or eliminate general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of punishment will depend upon the nature and severity of its symptoms and its effect upon the mental capacity of the accused.[60]

The Court also quoted with approval a passage from the judgement of Batt JA in Yaldiz, in which his Honour described 'the correct approach' as follows:[61]

... general deterrence is not eliminated but still operates, sensibly moderated, in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or severe intellectual handicap.[62]

1. As Eames JA opined in R v Skura:[63]

A disorder falling short of serious psychiatric illness might well be capable of moderating the need for general or specific deterrence but the onus was on the applicant to demonstrate that it did so in this case, by establishing that its effect reduced the seriousness of the offences and the moral culpability of the applicant.[64]

1. Finally, in another passage quoted with approval by the Court in Verdins,[65] the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Wright,[66] opined:

It is an accepted principle of sentencing that general deterrence should often be given very little weight in the case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others. In most of the cases in which that principle is applied, the offender has suffered from a significant mental illness or retardation, but such a condition is not a necessary condition for the principle to be applied. Considerations of general (or even personal) deterrence are not rendered completely irrelevant, and the significance of the offender's mental incapacity is to be weighed and evaluated in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. The reason for the principle is that the interests of society do not require such persons to be punished as severely as persons without that disability because such severity is inappropriate to their circumstances. The full understanding of the authority and requirements of the law which is attributed to the ordinary individual of adult intellectual capacities cannot be expected of a person whose intellectual function is insufficient to have that understanding. The means by which the courts give effect to that principle (as an instrument of social administration) is to moderate the consideration of general deterrence to the circumstances of the particular case. But, if the offender acts with knowledge of what he is doing and with knowledge of the gravity of his actions, the moderation need not be great.[67]

1. There is no evidence before me that your MDD or level of intellectual functioning caused you not to fully understand the wrongfulness of your actions or their consequences for your innocent victims. Indeed, you counsel did not submit otherwise. However, although you were not suffering from a serious psychiatric illness which obscured your mental intent or reduced your moral culpability, that is not to say that your MDD and intellectual disability do not justify some relatively small degree of moderation of the principle of general deterrence. I will sentence you on that basis.

1. Your counsel submitted the effect of delay is a mitigating circumstance in this case. You were interviewed by police in relation to the present charges on 9 April 2019, over six years ago.
2. There will always be some delay in prosecuting cases of this kind, however in your case there has been very significant delay in finalising this matter. I allow that much of this delay has been occasioned by your own forensic decisions. You were initially committed for trial on 13 May 2020. Although you pleaded guilty to a negotiated set of charges on 30 June 2021, you were permitted to change your pleas to 'not guilty' on 15 March 2023.
3. As the prosecutor submitted, a number of special hearings and voir dires were conducted because of Defence applications, and you applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against an interlocutory decision which resulted in further delays. Moreover, the jury in your first trial, which commenced on 2 December 2024, was discharged because of a line of questioning put to the informant by your previous counsel which caused you incurable prejudice.
4. It is your right to proceed to trial and make legitimate forensic decisions, and you will not be punished for this. However, the delay in your case lacks the added factor of systemic delay primarily caused by the Prosecution or the court system.
5. I acknowledge that not all of the delay has been occasioned by you, and there was some delay attributable to the Prosecution and this Court. Your second trial commenced on 30 June 2025 and after 13 days the jury in that trial delivered its verdicts on 17 July 2025. There has been further unavoidable delay between the delivery of those verdicts, your plea hearing on 25 September 2025, and today's sentencing hearing.
6. As the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Rodriguez v DPP (Cth):[68]

Delay is normally relevant in two ways. First, it is relevant to rehabilitation that has occurred during the delay and the effect that has in turn on specific deterrence. Secondly, delay is relevant in the sense that the anxiety and uncertainty of having the prospect of a sentence hanging over one's head during the period of delay is akin to punishment in itself.[69]

1. Your counsel submitted rehabilitative and punitive aspects of delay are relevant in your case. It is the case that you have committed no further offences since the present offending, and you have completed some rehabilitative and educational programs whilst you have been in custody on remand, although I have no details regarding this. However, until you accept you committed the present offences, your rehabilitation regarding the risk of future sexual offending remains extremely problematic.
2. Given the nature and seriousness of your offending conduct, your high risk of reoffending, your continued denial of committing these offences and your consequent lack of insight, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being very guarded. Much will depend on how you respond to any rehabilitative programs offered to you in prison which address your risk of recidivism in the future and the community supports put in place upon your release from custody.
3. So far as delay akin to punishment is concerned, since you were charged in relation to these offences you have had the prospect of a lengthy sentence of imprisonment hanging over your head. Undoubtedly, this would have caused you considerable anxiety and distress. I take the punitive aspects of delay into account in your favour.

1. Your counsel submitted your period on remand from 2 July 2021 to March 2023 was made harder owing to COVID-19 lockdowns and restrictions. The prosecutor reckoned 638 days of your remand was endured under COVID-19 restrictions.
2. Assistant Commissioner Hosking stated in her letter:

Since Mr Wade's reception into custody on 2 July 2021 until 21 June 2025, he has been subject to lockdown requirements on 553 occasions. ... Lockdown periods varied from 8 minutes to 11 hours in duration. During lockdown periods, Mr Wade continued to have access to phone and zoom calls.

1. In Astbury v The Queen (No 2),[70] the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the COVID-19 pandemic, its associated restrictions, and any stress you may have suffered as a consequence of your being vulnerable to infection in the prison environment, can be broadly taken into account.[71] Accordingly, I accept you experienced a greater level of custodial hardship from 2 July 2021 to March 2023 as a result of COVID-19.

1. I have had regard to current sentencing practice in relation to these offences as informed by the decisions of the High Court of Australia in R v Kilic[72] and DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym)[73] and the Victorian Court of Appeal decisions in DPP v Zhuang[74] and DPP (Cth) v Thomas.[75] I have also had regard to the comparable cases I was referred to by your counsel.
2. While current sentencing practice is relevant to the sentences I impose on you, it is only one of a number of sentencing considerations I must take into account in imposing just sentences in your case.[76]
3. Moreover, it is always difficult to gauge more than a general yardstick from so-called 'comparable cases', given the wide range of offending conduct that can constitute these offences and the myriad of personal circumstances pertaining to individual offenders. Nonetheless, to the extent I have been able to gain any assistance from 'comparable cases', I have sought to do so in your case.
4. The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are just punishment, deterrence - both specific and general, rehabilitation, denunciation, and protection of the community. In sentencing you, I must have regard to a range of factors, such as the seriousness of the offences, your culpability for them, the impact of the offences on the victims, and your personal circumstances.
5. I am required to balance the interests of the community in denouncing criminal conduct with the interests of the community in seeking to ensure that, so far as is possible, you are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.
6. Just punishment and denunciation must be given significant weight in sentencing you for these offences. While general deterrence needs to be sensibly moderated by reason of your MDD and borderline level of intellectual functioning, I consider in the circumstances it needs to be given real weight. Specific deterrence and generally protection of the community must also be given real weight. For reasons discussed below, I must regard protection of the community as the principle purpose for which the sentence on Charge 3 is imposed. As I earlier observed, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being very guarded.
7. Charges 1, 2 and 3 are 'sexual offences' pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Sentencing Act 1991 ('SA').[77] Accordingly, upon receiving a sentence of imprisonment for Charges 1 and 2, you will fall to be sentenced as a 'serious sexual offender' on Charge 3.[78]
8. By reason of your status as a serious offender, in sentencing you on Charge 3 I must regard the protection of the community from you as the principal purpose for which that sentence is imposed.[79] The prosecution did not submit that an objectively disproportionate sentence was called for in this case.[80]
9. Moreover, unless I otherwise direct, the term of imprisonment imposed on Charge 3 must be served wholly cumulatively on the sentences of imprisonment imposed on Charges 1 and 2. In order to give effect to the totality principle and to avoid imposing a crushing sentence on you, I will otherwise direct in this case.
10. In the present circumstances, Charges 2 and 3 are Class 1 offences for the purposes of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 ('SORA'),[81] and Charge 1 is a Class 2 offence.[82] Charges 2 and 3 arise from the same incident[83] and are to be treated as a single Class 1 offence.[84] Given you will be effectively convicted of one Class 1 offence and one Class 2 offence, pursuant to s 34(1)(c)(ii) of SORA, you will be a registrable offender and required to comply with the reporting requirements under that Act for life.

On Charge 1, sexual assault of a child under the age of 16 (Holly Kline), you are convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

On Charge 2, sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 (Bethany Anne Davis), you are convicted and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On Charge 3, sexual penetration of a child under the age of 16 (Bethany Anne Davis), you are convicted and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.

On Charge 4, trafficking a drug of dependence to a child (Bethany Anne Davis), you are convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

On Charge 5, false imprisonment of Holly Kline, you are convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

On Charge 6, false imprisonment of Bethany Anne Davis, you are convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment.

I direct that three months of the sentence imposed on Charge 1, two years of the sentence imposed on Charge 3, two months of the sentence imposed on Charge 4, one month of the sentence imposed on Charge 5 and one month of the sentence imposed on Charge 6 be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed on Charge 2 and on each other.

That makes a total effective sentence of imprisonment for eight years and seven months.

I order you serve a minimum period of six years before being eligible for parole.

I am required to state my reasons for imposing the sentences I have imposed on Charges 1, 2 and 3.[85] They are contained in these reasons for sentence.

I am also required to explain how those sentences relate to the standard sentences of 4 years' imprisonment on Charge 1, and 6 years' imprisonment on Charges 2 and 3, respectively.[86] The sentence I have imposed on Charge 1 is 3 years and 6 months less than the standard sentence for that offence. The sentences I have imposed on Charges 2 and 3 are equal to the standard sentence for those offences.

I declare 1575 days (not including this day) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I direct the fact that declaration was made, and its details, be noted in the records of the court.

I declare you have been sentenced as a serious offender on Charge 3.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004, I declare you are a registrable offender and order you comply with the reporting provisions of that Act for life.

[1] Contrary to s 49D(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 ('CA'), as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Sexual Offences) Act 2016 ('CA(SO) Act').

[2] Contrary to s 49B(1) of the CA, as amended by the CA(SO) Act.

[3] Contrary to s 71AB(1) of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 ('DPCSA').

[7] Pursuant to s 711AB(2) of the DPCSA.

[9] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[10] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[11] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[12] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[13] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[15] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[16] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[17] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[18] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[19] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[22] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 371 [33] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA) ('Clarkson'); DPP v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 148 [47] (Maxwell ACJ, Redlich and Beach JJA) ('Dalgliesh No. 1').

[23] Clarkson 370‑-71 [32]. See also Adamson v The Queen [2015] VSCA 194; (2015) 47 VR 268, 280 [18] (Warren CJ, Redlich and Weinberg JJA).

[24] [2008] UKHL 37; [2009] 1 AC 92.

[26] [2016] VSCA 218 [39] (Weinberg and Osborn JJA).

[27] [2006] VSCA 90 ('Toomey').

[28] Toomey [22]. See also DPP v DDJ [2009] VSCA 115; (2009) 22 VR 444, 454 [40] (Maxwell P, Vincent and Neave JJA) and Pitt (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 73 [52] (Priest and Weinberg JJA).

[29] Dalgliesh No.1 [78], [123], [126]; DPP v Charlie Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] VSCA 360; (2017) 271 A Crim R 1, 16 [75] (Ferguson CJ, Weinberg and Whelan JJA) ('Dalgliesh No. 2').

[30] DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 447 [57] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) ('Dalgliesh HCA').

[31] See eg R v Wayland (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Criminal Appeal, Crockett, Southwell and Hampel JJ, 14 September 1992) 3-4 (Crockett J, Southwell and Hampel JJ agreeing); R v Sposito (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Court of Criminal Appeal, Marks, Hampel and McDonald JJ, 8 June 1993) ('Sposito') 4-5 (Marks J, Hampel and McDonald JJ agreeing); R v Ware [1997] 1 VR 647, 653 (Hedigan AJA, Winneke P and Hayne JA agreeing) ('Ware'); R v Wakime [1997] 1 VR 242, 244 (Winneke P, Hayne JA and Hedigan AJA agreeing) ('Wakime'); R v WEF [1998] 2 VR 385, 387 (Winneke P, Charles JA and Hedigan AJA); DPP v VH [2004] VSCA 180; (2004) 10 VR 234, 237-238 [11], (Callaway JA, Buchanan JA agreeing), 241 [23] (Eames JA); DPP (Vic) v OJA [2007] VSCA 129; (2007) 172 A Crim R 181, 196-7 [33] (Nettle JA, Ashley and Redlich JJA agreeing) ('OJA'); DPP v CPD [2009] VSCA 114; (2009) 22 VR 533, 546-547[54]-[56] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA and Robson AJA); DDJ 453-54 [36]-[40] (Maxwell P, Vincent and Neave JJA); DPP v TDJ [2009] VSCA 317, [14]-[19] (Maxwell P and Neave JA); Reid (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2014] VSCA 145; (2014) 42 VR 295, 310 [83] (Priest JA, Maxwell P and Whelan JA agreeing); Sutton (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2015] VSCA 251, [25]-[28] (Maxwell P and Redlich JA).

[33] [2000] VSCA 66.

[34] Ibid [17]. See also DPP v Toomey [2006] VSCA 90 [18]-[19] (Vincent JA).

[35] See eg Wakime 244; OJA 196-197 [33].

[36] Fichtner v The Queen [2019] VSCA 297 [67] (Maxwell P and Kaye JA).

[38] Sentencing Act 1991 ('SA') s 5A(1); CA s 49B(3), CA s 49D(1).

[43] Brown v The Queen [2019] VSCA 286; (2019) 59 VR 462, 464 [4], (Maxwell P, Priest, Kaye, T Forrest and Emerton JJA) ('Brown').

[45] Brown 464 [4], 479 [55]-[57] (applying Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120, 132 [27] ((French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

[46] See R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').

[50] A pseudonym has been used to protect the victim's identity.

[55] See Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120, 137-139, [50]-[55] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ) ('Muldrock').

[57] Sikaloski v The Queen [2012] VSCA 130 [44] ('Sikaloski') (Cavanough AJA, Weinberg JA agreeing). See also Muldrock 138-139, [53]-[55].

[58] Barton v The Queen [2013] VSCA 360 [40] (Tate JA, Whelan JA agreeing), citing Sikaloski [44].

[60] R v Yaldiz [1998] 2 VR 376, 383 (Winneke ACJ, Hampel AJA agreeing) ('Yaldiz').

[62] Yaldiz 381 (Batt JA, Winneke ACJ and Hampel AJA agreeing). See also R v Lewis (unreported, Court of Appeal, 20 April 1998) 9-10 (Charles JA, Winneke P and Brooking JA agreeing); R v Swingler [2001] VSCA 26 [13] (Buchanan JA, Callaway JA and Coldrey AJA agreeing); R v Chambers (2005) 152 A Cim R 164, 171-172, [26]-[28] (Charles JA, Winneke P and Buchanan JA agreeing; R v Ahmed [2006] VSCA 200 at [28].

[63] [2004] VSCA 53 ('Skura').

[64] Skura [8] (Eames JA) citing R v Vodopic [2003] VSCA 172 [28]-[29] (Eames JA, Winneke P and Phillips JA agreeing); R v Danaher [2003] VSCA 119 [16]-[18] (Ashley AJA, Vincent and Eames JJA agreeing); R v Goodwin [2003] VSCA 120 [35] (Eames JA, Charles and Chernov JJA agreeing).

[66] (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 ('Wright').

[67] Wright 273-74 [20] (Hunt CJ at CL, Gleeson CJ and Hidden J agreeing) (emphasis original, citations omitted).

[68] [2013] VSCA 216; (2013) 40 VR 436.

[69] Ibid 445-446 [36] (Warren CJ and Redlich JA) (citations omitted). See also Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118 [36] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Kyrou JJA) and Thomas v The Queen [2019] VSCA 223 [66] (Ashley and Weinberg JJA).

[70] [2020] VSCA 158 ('Astbury').

[71] Astbury [33] (Kaye, Niall and Weinberg JJA).

[72] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-268 [21]-[25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[73] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 444-447 [47]-[58] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 452-455 [78]-[85] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).

[74] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]-[31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).

[75] [2016] VSCA 237; (2016) 53 VR 546, 606-609 [173]-[183] (Redlich, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]-[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA); Russo v The Queen [2021] VSCA 244 [53]-[56] (Emerton JA, Priest JA agreeing).

[77] SA s 6B(1) and sch 1 cl 1(a)(va) and (1)(a)(vii).

[81] Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 ('SORA') s 3 and sch 1.