19 On behalf of Goodwin, Mr Thomas submitted that when regard was had to the respective roles of Goodwin and McGregor the imposition of the same head sentence for both is inexplicable, and would give rise to a justifiable sense of grievance and an appearance of injustice to an objective observer. Mr Thomas accepted that the personal circumstances of McGregor were far more likely to excite sympathy and to favour an amelioration of sentence than was the case for Goodwin. He submitted, however, that it would have been inappropriate to reduce the sentence to be imposed on McGregor on account of such factors. Mr Thomas submitted that the courts had made it clear that in cases of drug trafficking considerable emphasis must be placed on the need for general deterrence as opposed to mitigatory factors personal to the accused: see R. v. Pantsis[1]. Furthermore, he submitted, the judge would not have been entitled to make any significant allowance on sentence for the mental illness suffered by McGregor. The condition of post-traumatic stress disorder which had been emphasised on the plea on McGregor's behalf, did not carry the same significance as the mental illness discussed in R. v. Tsiaras[2] and R. v. Anderson[3]. Those were cases where the accused was suffering schizophrenia or similar serious and delusional illness, which obscured the mental intent to commit the crime charged. By contrast, Mr Thomas submitted, the condition suffered by McGregor was, at its highest, akin to that discussed by Winneke, A.C.J. in R. v. Yaldiz[4]. Having regard to the symptoms and consequences of the particular psychiatric condition, and the nature and severity of the symptoms and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of McGregor, general deterrence would not have been removed or reduced to any significant extent as a relevant factor, Mr Thomas submitted.