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Agreed facts

4. The offender Ms Delphene Reid is the mother of the primary victim Miss U ('the victim') and of co-offenders “Deidre Wren” (‘co-offender Wren’) and A Brown.

5. The victim and Mr “Dylan Bird” ('co-offender Bird’) were previously in an intimate relationship for about four years and share a young child. The victim and co-offender Bird separated on about 29 April 2024.

6. On 2 May 2024, the victim was aged 16 years.

7. On 2 May 2024, the victim received abusive text messages from her ex-partner, co-offender Bird.

8. On the evening of 2 May 2024, the victim was present as a guest at [redacted], inside the residence of Ms I and her two sons, Master B and Mr M who are friends of the victim.

9. During the evening, the victim's father Mr U called her and informed her that the offender and the co-offenders had shown up at his house looking for the victim.

10. All four co-offenders travelled by car from the victim's father's house in [redacted] to [redacted].

11. About 5 minutes later, at about 8:25pm that day, Ms I was sitting in her living room and heard shouting from her front yard. Ms I heard people in the front yard yell words to the effect of "[Miss U] get the fuck out here, [Dylan] wants to talk to you", and "it's [Miss U’s] mum".

12. Upon hearing shouting, Ms I looked on her camera, which was directed at the front driveway, and observed four people in the front yard area. Ms I recognised co-offender Bird, and observed other offenders.

13. Ms I’s camera was operational, however, did not contain a hard drive and did not record or save video.

14. Ms I was aware that co-offender Bird was the ex-partner of the victim, and also understood from what was said that the victim's mother was present. Ms I went to collect the victim from a back room and said words to the effect of "if it's your mum you are at least going to have to go and speak to your mum and tell her you are okay". The victim then walked towards the front of the residence, followed by Ms I, Master B and Mr M watched from nearby, near the kitchen.

15. The victim walked to the front door, and opened the wooden door, expecting that the outer screen door was locked. The victim intended to speak to the co-offenders through the locked door.

16. Ms I was immediately behind the victim. Ms I also expected that the screen door to her residence was locked.

17. As the victim opened the wooden door, the offender and co-offenders immediately pushed into the house, having opened the screen door. The wooden door opened violently and swung back, hitting Ms I and causing her to stumble backwards towards the dining room area. The offender and all co-offenders barged into the house.

18. Co-offender Bird immediately grabbed the victim and pushed her to the ground, inside the door. At this time, co-offender Bird grabbed and was holding a short rounded wooden baseball bat. He swung the bat at the victim, hitting her in the side of her torso, under her ribcage.

19. The victim attempted to fight co-offender Bird off, and to break free. The two scuffled, and eventually the victim made it to the couch in the nearby living room. Co-offender Bird continued to pursue and assault the victim and swing the bat at her as she kicked out at him defensively. The victim continuously screamed for co-offender Bird to get off and to leave.

20. Around this time, co-offender Wren also assaulted the victim, and pulled on, tugged on and swung at the victim.

21. While co-offenders Wren and Bird were on the victim, co-offender A Brown and the offender yelled words to the effect of "why are you doing this to [Dylan]".

22. During this time, co-offender A Brown approached Master B and Mr M, attempting to fight them and to separate them from the victim. Master B and Mr M were taken to a bedroom.

23. The offender was behind co-offender A Brown, and at the same behaved threateningly to Ms I and indicated she wanted to fight Ms I. The offender kept Ms I separate from the victim, preventing her from assisting the victim. The offender then continued to speak to Ms I about the victim, however Ms I was not able to make much sense of the comments.

24. Ms I repeatedly stated, "someone is going to call police". Co-offender Wren repeated this to co-offender Bird. Around this time, co-offender Bird hit the screen door repeatedly with the bat. Ms I heard banging and formed the suspicion that this was co-offender Bird hitting the bat against the railing of the front stairs, power box, and gauze door.

25. The victim called 000 while crying, and stated "go away", "look what youse [sic] have done", "fuck off [Dylan]" and "I'm calling the cops on you" while connected to the operator.

26. The four offenders left the premises. The victim felt shocked and cried as a result of the incident. Gradually, she began to feel physical pain.

27. During the offending, the victim immediately recognised the offender and all co-offenders due to her respective family relationship with each person.

28. Throughout this offending, Ms I observed the offenders to be intoxicated, as she noticed co-offender Wren and co-offender A Brown were holding containers of alcohol, all co-offenders were slurring their words, and she could smell alcohol. Furthermore, the victim suspected the offender and all co-offenders to be under the influence of drugs. She observed co-offender Wren to be acting unusually, and co-offender Bird to be grinding his teeth.

29. Police attended [redacted] soon after at 8:42pm, and spoke to Ms I, the victim, Master B and Mr M, who described what had happened that evening. Police later completed an Evidence in Chief Interview with the victim, however the audio did not record during that interview, and a subsequent interview was declined.

30. On 1 June 2025, the offender participated in a digital record of interview with police and made partial admissions to police. The offender confirmed the family relationships between the offenders and victim, and stated that she was present with the co-offenders at the address on 2 May 2024, and that the offenders entered the home without consent. The offender stated that co-offender Bird had a bat, but that when the victim opened the door she grabbed the bat, pulled co-offenders Bird and Wren inside, and that the victim attacked co-offender Wren. The offender stated that she spoke with Ms I.

Nature and circumstances of the offending

31. The significant maximum penalty reveals the offence of aggravated burglary to be an objectively serious offence. I observe the following features of the offending which inform an assessment of the objective seriousness of this example of the offence: see R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [119].

32. The offending was a joint criminal enterprise and co-offender Bird was in possession of a weapon. The offending was committed at Ms I’s residential premises, a place where she, other residents and the victim were entitled to feel safe. There was a child at the residence at the time the offence occurred. The victim was a young person and she and Ms I were outnumbered by the group of offenders. The entry to the premises was obtained by force, once Ms I had opened the main wooden door. There was a degree of destruction and disarray occasioned by the forced entry; the main wooden door swung back violently and hit Ms I in the face which caused her to stumble backwards. The door was damaged in the process.

33. The offending involved both threats of violence and actual violence. A baseball bat, an item capable of causing significant harm was yielded and loud threats were directed to the victim. Two co-offenders perpetrated violence on the victim which included striking the victim repeatedly with the weapon. The victim was also punched and kicked by co-offender Wren. The offence was by no means sophisticated. I accept that there was some degree of planning or organisation involved given the offenders travelled to the premises together in search of the victim and had a weapon for use.

34. The remarks of Baker J in R v Hagen [2022] ACTSC 362 at [27] are apposite: Although the offender is liable for the actions of the other participants, when sentencing the offender it is necessary to draw distinctions between the roles and culpability of each of the individual offenders. (Citations omitted.)

35. The offender is the mother of the victim and two co-offenders as well as de facto mother-in-law of a third co-offender. The offender did not perpetrate any actual violence or make specific threats. Her role was limited to her presence at the scene. I accept that her presence as a matriarchal figure within the group in effect, endorsed and emboldened to a degree, the conduct of the co-offenders. Subjective circumstances

36. The psychological report of Ms Vanessa Edwige dated 13 November 2025 and an Intensive Corrections Order Assessment Report (ICOAR) dated 26 February 2026, combined with the submissions advanced by Ms Baker-Goldsmith on behalf of the offender and the circle sentencing conversation, comprehensively detailed the offender’s background, history and personal circumstances.

37. The offender undoubtedly experienced a disadvantaged childhood. She has gone on as an adult to experience multiple traumatic events, [redacted], which have compounded the effect of her adverse childhood experiences. She has been consistently challenged by mental ill health for much of her life. Ms Reid’s capacity for emotional and environmental stability in her adult life has been deeply affected by her childhood disadvantage characterised by exposure to traumatic and adverse events.

38. The offender’s childhood was marred by chronic parental substance misuse, persistent exposure to domestic and family violence, unstable living arrangements, [redacted].

39. The offender is a 43-year-old Wiradjuri woman born in Griffith, NSW. The offender’s parents separated when she was 2 years old, and her mother re-partnered to a man who she came to refer to as ‘Dad’. The offender’s mother and new partner were “chronic alcoholics”. The family lived on an Aboriginal mission in Griffith, NSW in a three bed-room house which was overcrowded. The offender was required to care for her younger siblings and described her mother and her new partner as “drunk all the time”. The offender reported responsibility for cooking, cleaning, bathing and ensuring school attendance which she reported to Ms Edwige was “distressing”.

40. Ms Edwige highlighted the following from the Bugmy Bar Book: Early Exposure to Alcohol and Other Drug Use: A parent’s overriding involvement with alcohol or drugs (AOD) may leave the parent emotionally and physically unavailable to the child; a parent’s mental functioning, judgement, inhibitions, and/or protective capacity may be seriously impaired, placing the child at increased risk of all forms of abuse and neglect; a parent may disappear for hours or days, leaving the child alone or with someone unable to meet the child’s basic needs; excessive responsibility may be placed on young children to care for themselves and/or young siblings; a parent may spend the household budget on alcohol and drugs, depriving the child of adequate food, clothing, housing and health care; and consistent exposure in the home may contribute to the child eventually developing AOD problems’. The direct effects of early exposure to substance abuse on children may include: emotional and physical abuse and other forms of maltreatment; modelling of poor drinking and substance abusing behaviours; inadequate supervision; and separation from parents due to incarceration and hospitalisation. In turn, these factors increase the likelihood that children will themselves develop substance abuse problems, making it more probable that they will come into contact with the criminal justice system.

41. The offender’s mother was the subject of physical violence from her partner in the presence of the offender and her siblings. The offender explained that violence always occurred when her mother and father were intoxicated and shared with Ms Edwige that she would “blame my mum. I do not know why. I was always on dad’s side. I think I was closer to dad. Mum would say nasty things to me.”.

42. Ms Edwige concluded that the following passage from the Bugmy Bar Book: Childhood, Infant and Perinatal Exposure to, and Experience of, Domestic and Family Violence had significance for the offender’s circumstances: [I]nfants have an extensive array of biopsychosocial competencies and are able to react to the meaning of others’ intentions and emotions. Early childhood is in fact the period of greatest vulnerability to stress-related changes to the brain. The majority of neurological development associated with language, values and complex cognitive and emotional functioning are determined in these early years of life. Infants who experience extremes of abuse or neglect are at risk of failure to thrive, reduced brain size, impaired development and ongoing mental health issues. Children’s development is embedded in family dynamics and the social environment, and is deeply affected by parental mental health and stress. An infant’s sense of self and wellbeing is enveloped within that of their mother’s. Young children are very much attuned to maternal depression, and can experience threat to the life of their mother as akin to a threat to their own life... Infants who are exposed to family violence will be exposed to dysfunctional relationships, inconsistent attachment dynamics and interactions characterised by negative affect and inconsistent meaning-making…[and] have been found to engage in more negative patterns of interaction.

43. The offender began smoking marijuana at age 13 which became the commencement of what is now a lifetime of struggle with reliance on illicit substances.

44. At age 15, the offender moved to Canberra to live with her maternal grandparents who were also dependant on alcohol. [Redacted].

45. [Redacted].

46. [Redacted]. The offender reported she commenced consuming alcohol at age 15 to excess and has continued to do so until her remand in custody for this offence. The offender began crystal methamphetamine use at age 16 and continued to misuse this substance until her remand in custody for this offence.

47. The offender had her first relationship at 17 years of age and became pregnant at 18 years of age. The offender was subject to family violence in this relationship. Throughout the period of the relationship, the offender was often homeless and would reside in hotels and refuges.

48. The offender had a child to another relationship at age 19. This relationship also featured family violence. The offender sustained multiple head injuries which required hospitalisation. The offender continues to experience chronic headaches from “being bashed in the head”.

49. The offender had her second son at age 20 and another daughter at age 21. [Redacted].

50. [Redacted].

51. [Redacted].

52. After a period of significant instability in her housing situation, the offender secured her own housing in [redacted] and resided there for 6 years.

53. The offender reported she has engaged in drug and alcohol counselling at Forensic Mental Health in Canberra which she considered “very helpful”. She attended and completed the program at Weejali Residential Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Centre in NSW some years ago. The offender reported she has never been diagnosed with a mental health disorder and has not participated in any therapeutic interventions for her wellbeing, however did note to the ICOAR author that she recalled a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder in 2016.

54. [Redacted].

55. Against the background of that history, it is unsurprising that Ms Edwige concluded that the offender’s “longstanding trauma exposure and cumulative disadvantage have had a substantial impact on her mental health and social and emotional wellbeing resulting in her current psychological difficulties, including her emotional dysregulation, maladaptive coping strategies, impaired decision-making, and vulnerability to forming relationships characterised by instability and violence”. Ms Edwige considered that with appropriate supports and treatment, the offender can make positive change in her life.

56. Ms Edwige concluded that the offender: (a) Meets the diagnostic criteria in the ICD 11 for complex post-traumatic stress disorder; and (b) Meets the diagnostic criteria in the DSM 5 for substance use disorder (stimulant, alcohol and cannabis use disorder in early remission in a controlled environment).

57. Ms Edwige considered the offender would benefit from the following: (a) Engagement with Yeddung Mura across their psychosocial programs to enhance wellbeing. Ms Reid reported that she would like to access drug and alcohol counselling through this service. (b) Referral to the Ngunnawal Bush Healing Farm to engage in culturally appropriate support to assist with healing from past traumas and engage in cultural programs to further develop life skills. (c) Be supported to access a psychologist at Winnunga Nimityjah Aboriginal Health Service to further develop skills to address her complex post-traumatic stress disorder. (d) Be referred to a Neuropsychologist for an assessment of her cognitive functioning. Ms Reid presents with memory impairment, difficulties with sequencing, and possible cognitive deficits. A comprehensive neuropsychological assessment would assist in clarifying these issues and identifying any targeted supports required to meet her psychosocial needs. (e) Continue to paint. Ms. Reid has started painting again. Rhythmic, repetitive and patterned movements restore a sense of safety to the body and assist with emotional regulation.

58. The offender was assessed as unsuitable for an intensive correction order (ICO).

Responsibility

59. The offender’s disadvantaged childhood must be given “full weight”. In Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [44], the High Court explained that childhood disadvantage does not “diminish with the passage of time and repeat offending” but does not have the same “(mitigatory) relevance for all purposes of punishment”.

60. The offender explained some of the background to the offence with respect to her daughter, the victim. The offender’s daughter (the victim) and sister had been subject to an attack by a group of offenders at a time prior to the offence at a residence which was not their own. This previous attack had caused the victim significant physical harm including being knocked unconscious. The previous attack provided context for this offence, in that the offender was concerned about the victim’s presence at the residence after being unable to locate or contact her. The offender accepted that what occurred after she and the group arrived at the residence was entirely unacceptable and that her inability to regulate her emotional response combined with alcohol consumption, set the scene for the situation to dramatically escalate. She also accepted that as the mother of the victim she should have been concerned to protect her from harm.

61. Ms Edwige concluded that at the time of the offending, the offender presented impaired in her ability to make considered and appropriate choices, make reasoned judgments, think clearly, regulate her behaviour and fully appreciate the wrongfulness of her actions.

62. Significantly, Ms Edwige considered that the offender’s developmental history (including exposure to chronic parental substance misuse, parentification, repeated exposure to domestic and family violence, unstable living arrangements, [redacted], at critical periods of her development) contributed to her offending conduct.

63. The prosecution initially accepted that the Bugmy principles should apply and operate to reduce the offender’s moral culpability. In supplementary written submissions, Mr Chatterton for the Director appeared to depart somewhat from that initial position and highlighted an element of planning and pre-meditation in the offending to submit that the “nature and seriousness of the offending in the matter currently before the Court will affect the degree to which the offender’s moral culpability is reduced”. In making that submission Mr Chatterton drew attention to the observations of Ierace J in Robertson v R [2024] NSWCCA 22 from [109] (with whom Harrison CJ at CL and Wilson J agreed): [109] His Honour’s reasoning assumes that a reduction of the moral culpability of an offender due to their profound childhood deprivation is precluded if their offence is committed with significant planning beforehand, rather than it being an impulsive act, and they knew it to be wrong and, prior to the offence, they had demonstrated a capacity to live a pro-social life. [110] An offender who planned the offence for which they are being sentenced, when that factor is considered with all the relevant evidence, may not receive a reduction of the offender’s moral culpability; see for example Hoskins at [57], where Brereton JA (Basten JA and Beech-Jones J agreeing) stated that: “… the Bugmy principles may not operate to reduce moral culpability in a case where careful planning and premeditation is involved, such as cultivation and drug supply matters.” (emphasis added) [111] However, it is incorrect to state that an offender’s moral culpability cannot be reduced pursuant to an application of the Bugmy principles if the offence is preplanned. In Taysavang, Fagan J at [42], Simpson JA and McCallum J (as their Honours then were) agreeing, considered factors that were relevant to the determination that the offender’s moral culpability could not be reduced: “It was sought to extend this principle so as to impute a reduction in moral culpability for the offence of drug supply which is under consideration here. As her Honour found, the offence involved planning and organisation rather than impulsivity. There was nothing in the evidence to suggest that frustration on the part of Mr Taysavang gave rise to unconsidered action on his part. It was not an offence of a kind that could sensibly be regarded as flowing from dysfunctional tendencies subconsciously absorbed from experience within the offender’s family in early childhood.” [112] In Harris v R [2021] NSWCCA 322, Dhanji J at [82], Simpson AJA and I agreeing, considered that a determination by the sentencing judge to reduce the applicant’s moral culpability for an offence involving planning (armed robbery) was not inconsistent with Taysavang: “In the present matter there was no issue that the applicant’s background was one of profound deprivation: cf Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207; Hoskins v R [2007] NSWCCA 169. Further, there was no suggestion in this case that the offence involved the type of careful planning which may impact the application of Bugmy principles for the reasons discussed in Taysavang v R; Lee v R [2017] NSWCCA 146 at [42]–[43]. While the applicant’s actions may not have been the result of an instinctive reaction in the sense discussed in Bugmy (at [44]), the offence was clearly poorly planned, and, particularly given the applicant’s role largely involved him joining in with the co-offender, his decision to participate appears to have involved little in the way of deliberation. Consistently with these observations the sentencing judge found that the principles referred to in Bugmy, Munda v Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38 and R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 applied and ‘serve to ameliorate the moral culpability’ of the applicant.” [113] Three recent examples from judgments of this Court that involved a reduction of the offender’s moral culpability in the context of an application of the Bugmy principles without criticism, where the offence was of a type that involved a degree of pre-planning, are: Chiarlini v R [2023] NSWCCA 227 at [21] and [37] (supplying a large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine); Baines v R [2023] NSWCCA 302 at [71]–[76] (a planned gangland execution); and Harris v R [2023] NSWCCA 174 at [79] and [84] (armed robbery). [114] As to whether an offender’s awareness that the offence is wrong and their earlier positive achievements are pivotal considerations, in my view, the observations by the plurality in Bugmy at [43] and [44] that profound childhood deprivation “may compromise the person’s capacity to mature and to learn from experience”, that the effects “do not diminish with the passage of time” and apply “notwithstanding that the person has a long history of offending”, acknowledge that its impact on an offender’s moral compass may be embedded and is not necessarily, or easily, responsive to a change in circumstances for the better. In the case of Chiarlini, the applicant was of prior good character, having finished high school, studied accounting and law at university and worked in accounts departments and as a law clerk, before committing the offence.

64. These observations reflect that the application of Bugmy will turn on a consideration of each individual offender and the circumstances of the offence for which they must be sentenced. The fact that the offender was involved in searching for the victim lends some support to her explanation (which was not challenged) that she was concerned to find the victim to satisfy herself that she was safe, in the context of a previous incident in which the victim was harmed. I observe here that the agreed facts are not inconsistent with the offender’s explanation of the context of the offending, Ms I was described as encouraging the victim to show herself to the offender so that she could see that the victim was “ok”.

65. I am not satisfied that the planning or organisation which attended to the arrival at the premises in search of the victim necessarily contemplated a plan for the victim to be subject to violence upon the group’s arrival. Clearly that is what occurred and the offender was part of that joint criminal enterprise as the situation evolved. The availability of a weapon is explained by the offender’s concern for the victim’s safety, in the context of the previous incident, at the residence where she was discovered. The anger directed toward the victim is explained by the offender’s inability to contact her to check on her welfare; hence the need to ‘search’ for the victim.

66. The offender’s capacity for sound decision making, emotional regulation and impulse control arise in her adult life because of her profound childhood disadvantage. To which I would add the effect of many years observing violence as a response to conflict in the home going some way to explaining the offender’s preparedness to be involved, in or resort, to violent conduct.

67. All these factors were operating at time she engaged in the offending conduct including any planning involved. Any planning involved was not ‘careful’ or calculated. Indeed, having successfully located the victim, the conduct was entirely unsophisticated and seemingly without any real end in mind. The offender’s participation did not include the making of any threats or the infliction of any violence. Her participation upon arrival at the scene does not appear to have arisen by way of careful deliberation but rather reflects an escalation of a situation she was unable or not minded to control.

68. The offender’s impaired executive functioning is inexplicably intertwined with her childhood disadvantage. Ms Edwige determined that: Ms. Reid’s actions at the time of the offence appear to have occurred in a heightened state of fear and perceived threat in relation to her daughter’s safety. Ms. Reid’s responses are consistent with a trauma-based response which in my opinion impaired her ability to make considered and appropriate choices, make reasoned judgments, think clearly, regulate her behaviour and fully appreciate the wrongfulness of the act. I consider this and Ms. Reid’s development to be a contributing factor to the offences committed. (Emphasis added.)

69. An offence meticulously or carefully planned in pursuit of an identifiable outcome as contemplated in Taysavang v R; Lee v R [2017] NSWCCA 146 may tell against a reduction in moral culpability because of childhood disadvantage. Though as revealed in the above analysis and reflected in the approach I took in DPP v Kelleher [2026] ACTSC 89, the careful, planned pursuit of an outcome may nonetheless be attributed to or explained by a disadvantaged childhood. This seems to me to be the point made by Simpson AJA (Dhanji J agreeing on this point though in dissent on the sentence appeal, and McNaughton J agreeing) in Baines v R [2023] NSWCCA 302 at [75]: In my opinion that reasoning is equally applicable to offenders whose childhood and adolescence was subject to the deprivation demonstrated in this case. That is the effect of the decision of the High Court in Bugmy. The High Court did not distinguish between offences of varying gravity, to some of which the principle applies, and others to which it does not. The principles stated in Bugmy are capable of applying to even the most serious offences. (Emphasis added.)

70. Many of the effects catalogued by Ms Edwige of the offender’s disadvantaged childhood experience can be found in the offending conduct: emotional dysregulation, impulsivity and poor decision making. Giving full weight to the offender’s childhood disadvantage operates to reduce her moral culpability to a substantial degree.

Remorse and rehabilitation

71. The offender has demonstrated a degree of remorse for her offending.

72. She disclosed to the ICOAR author that she was disappointed in her behaviour and accepted that the events which took place should not have occurred. The offender explained to Ms Edwige: I had been on edge since when [Miss U] was attacked. I spoke to [Miss U] a couple of times that day and it sounded like she was being held against her will. I was in freak mode. I wanted to see her and make sure she wasn’t being held against her will. When I got there, [Miss U] came out. [Dylan] was angry because she was in the house with all of these older men. They were part of the attack at the [redacted] address. I found that out later on.

73. The ICOAR author recorded that the offender did not offer any insight into her offending behaviour. However, the offender did report the following to Ms Edwige “I feel like I am at fault because I was the one that insisted that we all go and see if [Miss U] was okay. Just wanted to see if she was okay. I am sorry to the mother. I just care about my kids”. The offender agreed in her exchange with Aunty Paula during the sentencing conversation that the fear she felt knowing her sister and daughter were attacked in the incident prior to the offence was likely the same fear experienced by the victim and Ms I in the face of the group attack upon them.

74. At the circle sentencing conversation on 20 November 2025, the offender explained to the panel: I hadn't come down from finding my sister and [Miss U] in [redacted]. And I just thought she was being held against her will because we've had threats like that towards us. The police weren't very helpful.

75. I am satisfied that the offender is genuinely remorseful for the offence.

76. It is difficult to assess the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation with certainty. Ms Edwige concluded that the offender has “prospects of rehabilitation through accessing therapeutic work that focuses on skill development in the areas of emotional regulation, pro-social coping skills, resilience building and self-esteem”.

77. The offender passionately explained to the Elders panel her desire to lead a life away from the criminal justice system and frankly addressed the need to address her consumption of alcohol and offending behaviour: People saying that that’s not even me, you know what I mean? They know what I can do. The community knows what I can do, and they know I can talk, you know what I mean? I’ve been there and done that. If anyone’s going to lead the way, it’s me. So it’s time to do that, I know.

78. The Elder’s panel reinforced the need for the offender to engage with support services to effectively address her challenges to realise her desire of a life removed from the criminal justice system. Aunty Paula stated: When horrific things happen in your life that are, you know, beyond your control, you've kind of had to live and survive for a very long time, and I think you're doing it, but the biggest fear right now - and it's a good - I see it as a good fear, is with AA, with NA, with that trauma I know that's there, to take that first step towards 'I need to do something differently.' And do you know what, Delphene? You are somebody as well. You're somebody very, very important in this world. So don't let anyone or our community make you feel otherwise. … And this is where this fear possibly might be now, which will again be a good fear because you've got to start addressing some of these issues if you do take up that hard work that's going to be needed, you know, to tackle what's been holding you back, and like you said, you know, with this incident in particular, you were very intoxicated.

79. This matter demonstrates the real force in the High Court’s observation in Bugmy that the effects of a deprived childhood do not diminish over time. The offender is attempting to turn the tide on a lifetime of adverse events which can be tracked back to her childhood [redacted]. The court acknowledged in Robertson that which is common sense and which applies to this offender; the effects of a deprived childhood can be embedded and are not always amenable to immediate or long-term change.

80. It is encouraging then that for the period the offender has been on bail she has not re-offended. The offender has participated with varying degrees of success in bail supervision including regular appearances before me. Her overall compliance on bail in combination with the absence of re-offending is a significant consideration. This is despite the offender’s frank concession that from time to time on bail she has struggled to remain abstinent from alcohol and drug use. The offender has also struggled with some ongoing physical health issues which have resulted in her admission to hospital. Her day-to-day life remains characterised by a level of disorganisation. I do not doubt that the offender sincerely desires a peaceful and safe existence. It is her capacity to bring about the change necessary to achieve that end, particularly with respect to her reliance on alcohol and drug use, where causes me to hesitate.

81. That said, the offender’s genuine desire for change does present an opportunity for rehabilitation. At 43 years old it makes sense that the offender has grown weary of engagement with the criminal justice system and has developed insight into some of the challenges she must confront.

82. I share the view of Ms Edwige that with tailored, meaningful therapeutic supports the offender is capable of reform.

Plea of guilty

83. The offender entered a plea of guilty on 15 October 2025 before a scheduled criminal case conference. There is no reason to depart from the usual reduction that the timing of that plea would attract: see Blundell v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 34 at [12]. I will apply a 20 per cent reduction in the sentence to be imposed.

Time in custody

84. The offender has spent a substantial period in custody over the course of these proceedings. A sentence of full-time imprisonment was imposed by her Honour Magistrate Campbell on 11 November 2025 for unrelated offences which took account of much of the time the offender had spent in pre-sentence custody. The offender has spent 6 days in custody solely referable to this offence. The sentence I impose will be backdated accordingly.

Criminal history

85. The offender has a significant criminal history in both the ACT and NSW [redacted], including convictions for aggravated burglary and other property, dishonesty and violent offences. The offender’s criminal history limits to a significant degree the leniency that can be afforded to her.

Parity

86. Parity is a consideration in this matter there being three co-offenders.

87. Co-offender Brown was sentenced for two other series of offences in addition to the offence which arose from his part in the incident involving the offender. In relation to this incident, he was sentenced by me on 7 April 2026 as follows (see DPP v Brown [2026] ACTSC 90): (a) Joint commission aggravated burglary: 18 months of imprisonment (reduced from 20 months for his plea of guilty).

88. Co-offender Brown was sentenced to a total period of full-time imprisonment of 4 years with respect to all three series of offences and subject to a non-parole period of 1 year, 7 months and 15 days.

89. Co-offender Wren was sentenced for their part in the offending on 24 April 2025 by Christensen ACJ as follows: (a) Joint commission aggravated burglary: 19 months of imprisonment (reduced from 24 months for her plea of guilty). (b) Aggravated common assault: 10 months of imprisonment (reduced from 12 months, to commence 19 November 2025).

90. Co-offender Wren was sentenced to a total period of imprisonment of 2 years and 2 months. She was initially sentenced to a drug and alcohol treatment order which was ultimately cancelled the effect of which was that she spent 8 months and 43 days in full time imprisonment.

91. Co-offender Bird was sentenced for their part in the offending on 5 March 2025 by Christensen AJ as follows: (a) Joint commission aggravated burglary: 18 months of imprisonment (reduced from 24 months, to commence 22 August 2024). (b) Aggravated common assault: 9 months of imprisonment (reduced from 12 months, to commence 22 November 2025). (c) Contravene family violence order: 13 of months imprisonment (reduced from 18 months, to commence 22 March 2026).

92. The total period of imprisonment imposed was 2 years and 8 months of imprisonment, suspended after 14 months of imprisonment.

93. As I observed in Brown at [131], co-offender Brown had a lesser role in the offending than co-offender’s Bird and Wren who were responsible for the actual infliction of violence on the victim. This offender had a similar level of involvement in the offending to co-offender Brown. The offender’s age and perhaps more significantly her status as the victim’s mother is a basis to distinguish her. Those factors I accept served to validate the co-offender’s use of actual violence and elevate the offender’s culpability to an extent. It must be recalled that both co-offenders Wren and Bird were sentenced for offences with which this offender was not charged. Co-offender’s Bird’s conduct occurred when he was subject to a family violence order intended to protect the victim. This is a factor which significantly elevated the gravity of his conduct. Current sentencing practise

94. The prosecution provided a table of comparative sentencing outcomes which is annexed to this judgment (‘Annexure A’). I have carefully considered the outcomes imposed in those matters though bear in mind the limitations of comparable sentences.

Determination

95. The purposes of sentencing to which I must have regard are set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). The reduction of the offender’s moral culpability moderates to a degree the weight of punishment and general deterrence in the sentencing task. The sentence I impose must recognise the harm done to the victim, deter the offender from engaging in this kind of conduct and promote her prospect of rehabilitation.

96. The prosecution submitted that the offender’s conduct in this matter amounted to the use of family violence as defined in s 8 of the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT). Accordingly, I have regard to those matters contained in s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. The victim, being the child of the offender, was entitled to feel safe and secure in her mother’s presence. The offender’s participation in the joint criminal enterprise was a spectacular departure from her obligations as a parent and sadly risks normalising for her own children a recourse to violence as a response to conflict.

97. The only appropriate outcome for the offending is a period of imprisonment. The prosecution submitted that the gravity of the offending warranted a period of full-time imprisonment.

98. Ms Baker-Goldsmith submitted that the role of the offender, the offender’s compelling subjective circumstances, as well as the absence of reoffending during the substantial period on bail supervision (despite some of her persistent challenges), justified the immediate suspension of a term of imprisonment which was conceded to be appropriate.

99. The outcome is finely balanced. The offending was serious and there is a need to denounce the conduct and recognise the harm occasioned to the victim. There is no doubt that a return to the full-time custodial environment would almost certainly extinguish the progress I am satisfied the offender has made whilst on bail. This would substantially set the offender back. The offender has struggled to engage consistently with ACT Corrective Services with respect to engaging in phone calls and attending appointments. She has for the most part consistently appeared in court when required. Her struggle at times with supervision in my view reflects some of the chaos which attends to her personal life and was not driven by a desire to avoid accountability entirely. I am of this view because for the most part the offender has appeared in court when required and was frank about the challenges which face her.

100. The community must have an interest in the rehabilitation of a 43-year-old woman with a history of engagement with the criminal justice system. The full-time custodial environment has no great record for rehabilitation. The psychological and emotional effects of the offender’s childhood, as well as [redacted] dictate that reform is unlikely to occur overnight. Against that background it is likely that a substantial period is required for the offender to bring about meaningful change in her life.

101. Whilst the offender has only spent a small number of days in custody solely in relation to this offence, it should be recalled that she did spend several months in custody reflected in a sentence imposed upon her in the Magistrates Court. I am satisfied this period in custody has had some deterrent effect upon the offender which is consistent with the absence of re-offending whilst on bail.

102. Having carefully considered all the relevant considerations, I am satisfied that the making of a suspended sentence order appropriately will mark the gravity of the offending whilst at the same time promoting this opportunity for rehabilitation.

103. In my view a suspended sentence with conditions requiring the offender to engage with support services intended to assist her rehabilitation is the just and appropriate outcome. Any breach of the order will see her return to court with the potential for the suspended period of imprisonment to be imposed upon her. I am satisfied the offender is motivated to avoid that outcome.

104. The starting point for joint commission aggravated burglary (CC2025/2468) is 22 months of imprisonment reduced to 1 year, 5 months and 18 days of imprisonment in recognition of her plea of guilty.

Orders

105. For those reasons, I make the following orders: (1) On the offence of aggravated burglary (CC2025/2468) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 1 year, 5 months and 18 days of imprisonment. (2) The sentence is suspended today after the offender has served 6 days of imprisonment on conduction that the offender sign an undertaking to comply with her good behaviour obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) and the following additional conditions until 2 November 2027: (a) Engage with Yeddung Mura for support and assistance with respect to drug and alcohol use and any other program offered by their service considered appropriate for the offender. (b) Engage with the Ngunnawal Bush Healing Farm (NBHF) to determine whether participation in their programs is suitable and if found suitable participate in programs and supports offered to her by NBHF. (c) Continue to access and engage with Winnunga Nimityjah Aboriginal Health Service for psychological and physical wellbeing support and assistance including for referral to a neuropsychologist.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and five [105] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Taylor. Associate: P Beohm Date: 26 May 2026 Annexure A: comparative sentencing outcomes table

Case Summary Relevant sentences

DPP v Eneliko (a pseudonym) Pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court Aggravated burglary- 2 years and [2025] ACTSC 306 to aggravated burglary, intentionally 4 months reduced from 3yrs. inflict GBH and AOABH. The offender and three co-offenders Intentionally inflict GBH - 2 years, entered house at night armed with a 10 months reduced from 3 years, knife and masked over a drug 8 months. dispute. Offender stabbed female victim four times in left arm and chest. Offender and co-offenders punched and kicked male victim's AOABH - 1 year, 11 months head. Offender stabbed arm and leg imprisonment reduced from 2 of male victim. years, 6 months. Offender was 18 years of age and had no criminal history. Bugmy Total head sentence: 5 years Principles applied. Number of (suspended after 30 months for 2 disciplinary actions whilst in years, 6 months, 1 day) custody. 'Guarded' prospects of rehabilitation. Spent 416 days in custody.

DPP v Chatfield [2024] ACTSC Pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Intentionally inflict GBH - 2 years, 329 Court to a number of offences, 7 months, 14 days, reduced from 3 including aggravated burglary, years, 6 months. intentionally inflict GBH and AOABH in an FV context. Aggravated burglary - 2 years, 3 Entered the house at night in a months, reduced from 3 years. balaclava armed with three knives and attacked his ex-partner's friend, causing multiple injuries to his hands, arms and cheek. Punched AOABH - 1 year, 6 months, his ex-partner. reduced from 2 years. The offender was 30 years old, came from a background of significant disadvantage and trauma, had diagnoses of schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder, entrenched issues with drug addiction, and an extensive criminal history that disentitled him to leniency.

DPP v Manns (No 2) [2023] The offender pleaded guilty to Aggravated burglary- 2 years, 7 ACTSC 405 aggravated burglary and reckless months and 20 days, reduced from AOABH. 3 years. Two co-offenders forced their way into a residential premises. The co-offender discharged a firearm through the door, grazing the Reckless AOABH - 1 year, 9 victims leg. The offender was months and 3 days, reduced from enlisted into the enterprise to collect 2 years. money. The offender was also sentenced Attempt inflict GBH - 2 years, 5 for a separate incident of attempt to months and 7 days, reduced from inflict GBH, where he fired a 3 years, 3 months. handgun at a victim while driving by. He was 25 years old by time of sentence. He had a stable upbringing but fell in with the wrong crowd. He had a history of drug use and diagnoses of autism spectrum disorder, PTSD, Anxiety, OCD and Tourette's Syndrome.

Smith v The Queen [2023] Manifest excess sentence appeal Aggravated burglary - 3 years, 9 ACTCA 26, unsuccessfully following mid-trial plea to offences months, reduced from 4 years appealing [2022] ACTSC 162 including aggravated burglary and attempt to inflict GBH. He received a 5% discount. Attempt to intentionally inflict grievous bodily harm - 4 years, 3 Smith entered the residence with a months co-offender, both wearing balaclavas. The co-offender was armed with a jerry can. Smith picked up a knife from the kitchen bench. They cornered the occupants, stole a phone, cut the CCTV cable, and demanded money for a perceived debt. Smith held the knife to the throat of an occupant. Smith poured petrol on one victim and his dog, then lit a lighter, but the victim kicked him in the stomach and ran away. Smith was 31 years old at the time of the offending. His record was less than his co-offender but still denied him leniency. He had a background of disadvantage, mental health vulnerabilities, and issues with substance abuse. The appeal was dismissed.

DPP v Mena [2023] ACTSC 80 The three co-offenders were found Mena guilty at trial of aggravated burglary For the aggravated burglary, 3 with intent to cause harm. Mena years and 3 months was also found guilty of attempted DPP v Parlov [2023] ACTSC murder and unlawfully discharging a 147 firearm. Parlov DPP v Roberts (No 2) [2023] The co-offenders entered a Aggravated burglary - 2 years, 6 ACTSC 146 residential premises by Parlov months and 3 days - (taking into banging on the door in the early account but not including 272 days hours of the morning until it was of pre-sentence custody) -opened, following an earlier suspended for 2 years 6 months disagreement. They barged in and and 3 days Mena, who was masked, shot one of the occupants in the stomach. His criminal history was poor, and he Roberts was on a suspended sentence. He had a deprived background, Aggravated burglary - 3 years, 3 complex mental health conditions months and a high risk of reoffending. Parlov was remorseless and had a significant criminal history but demonstrated significant commitment to drug rehabilitation and successfully completed a Griffiths command. Roberts was 25 years old at time of sentence and had a longstanding methamphetamine problem, ADHD and very guarded prospects of rehabilitation.

R v Hanrahan [2020] ACTSC The 21-year-old offender entered a Aggravated burglary - 18 months, 10 residence at Sam with for other co- reduced from 2 years, immediately offenders, all with faces disguised. suspended on entry into a 2 year They demanded money due to a GBO with 200 hours community drug dispute. There was a minor service scuffle before they decamped. He was remorseful and had decoupled from his unsavoury colleagues. His history was minor, included a good behaviour order for a driving matter.

R v Saipani (No 2) [2020] Saipani was found guilty at trial of Aggravated burglary - 2 years, 4 ACTSC 228 aggravated burglary by joint months commission. He went with two co-offenders to a unit to extract money for a debt. His co-offenders were armed with two knives, a taser/baton and a strobe torch. Saipani was not aware of this. They knocked on the door, activated the strobe torch and barged in. The co-offenders struck an occupant in the head with the taser/baton. They were demanding money. Saipani was apologetic and not directly involved in the assaults. He was 25 years old at the time of the offence and had a limited criminal history. He had an unstable upbringing.

R v Salcedo; R v Stretton (No The two co-offenders were found For both offenders: 3) [2018] ACTSC 305 guilty at trial for a number of offences, including aggravated burglary, reckless AOABH, Aggravated burglary - 7 years intentionally inflict GBH and threaten GBH. In the context of a falling out, the Intentionally inflict GBH - 4 years offenders forced their way into the residence and threatened a child with a sawn- off shotgun. They then Reckless AOABH - 4 years shot at an occupant, hitting the child and causing AOABH. They then struggled with the occupant and shot him in the bicep, causing GBH. The burglary was found to be toward the upper end of the range, the intentionally inflict GBH below the mid-range, and the reckless AOABH between the mid and upper range. Salcedo was 19 at the time of the offending and had some issues with methylamphetamine. His criminal history did him little credit. Stretton was 21 at the time of the offending and a significant substance abuse issue and significant criminal record.

DPP v Makoi (No 3) [2023] In company burglary of residential Aggravated burglary - 3 years 8 ACTSC 337 premises of former friend. Victim months, 7 days, to be served by and five offenders from same way of ICO community. Offender was a least present and encouraging offending

R v Elson [2020] ACTSC 264 Aggravated burglary Contravene Aggravated burglary -21 months, FVO - residential home of ex- reduced from 2 years 3 months partner, offence involved family Contravene FVO -10 months, violence. Child present. Offender reduced from 12 months picked up a knife during offending. Eligible for ICO. Partially concurrent, total sentence of 2 years and 2 months, to be served by way of ICO