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Parties: The Queen (Crown) Trinity Hagen (Offender) Representation: Counsel B Morrisroe (Crown) T Jackson (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Z McBride (Offender) File Number: SCC 236 of 2021

BAKER J: Introduction

1. On 7 June 2022, the offender, Trinity Hagen, pleaded guilty to the following offences: (a) Count 1: aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT); (b) Count 2: assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT)

2. Counts 1 and 2 were offences of joint commission by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal Code.

3. The prosecution offered no evidence to the charge of minor theft by joint commission (CC 2021/8166). That charge will be dismissed.

4. The maximum penalty for aggravated burglary is a fine of $320,000, 20 years’ imprisonment or both. The maximum penalty for assault occasioning actual bodily harm is 5 years’ imprisonment. Facts

The offending

5. The facts are set out in an Agreed Statement of Facts.

6. At about 2:00am on 31 July 2021, the offender and her son, Bailey Hagen, another child of hers who is under 18, and two other people, Mikaela Engeler and Rebecca Eade, attended the residence of Ms Samantha Chatfield (“the victim”).

7. The victim was previously in a relationship with Jordan Hagen, who is another son of the offender. At the time of the offence, Ms Engeler was in a relationship with Jordan Hagen, who was then remanded in the Alexander Maconochie Centre.

8. The group attended the victim’s unit purportedly to retrieve Jordan Hagen’s belongings. When they entered the unit, the victim was at home with two other people, including her brother. Bailey Hagen said “where’s my brother’s shit?” The victim was then dragged outside to the front veranda, although it is not clear by whom. Ms Eade and Ms Engeler proceeded to assault the victim outside, punching and kicking her, including to her head. Ms Engeler also burnt some of the victim’s hair with a lighter. The younger relative took a gold necklace and iPhone from the victim during the assault. At one point, the victim’s brother ran outside with a saw.

9. While this assault was occurring, the offender entered the house and proceeded to the victim’s bedroom where she started packing items into bags. In doing so, the offender also took some property that belonged to the victim. The prosecution acknowledges that this conduct may have been opportunistic in nature. The items taken from the victim included one grey and black Nike bag containing the victim’s personal items (including life insurance documents, certificates and letters), a pink Nike backpack and another black bag, and items from her wardrobe. The offender later agreed to return the items that belonged to the victim. There is no evidence that the offender saw the assault occurring at any time.

10. A neighbour called 000 and reported a home invasion. Police who attended the residence shortly after observed a broken wooden picture frame, shards of glass, a steel kitchen knife, and a large bow saw. The officers also noticed the victim’s cupboard to be mostly empty and that there was another knife on the bedroom floor.

11. The injuries to the victim included a welt to her forehead, several welts on the right side of her neck, a small cut on her right ear, small cuts to her right torso and right hand, and singed hair strands.

12. At approximately 3:55am on the night of the offending, the offender sent an email to Jordan Hagen. The email said she had just returned from Jordan Hagen’s ex-partner’s house and that there was “a commotion… but once I got home I rang the police n let them know that I attended [the victim’s] place n that all I did was simply pick up my son’s clothes n jewellery”. The prosecution submits that this email is indicative of an attempt by the offender to conceal her role in the offending.

The offender’s subjective circumstances

13. The subjective circumstances of the offender are set out in a pre-sentence report dated 1 December 2022.

14. The offender is 40 years old. Both of her parents had illicit substance and alcohol issues, and were in and out of custody. As a result, the offender was raised primarily by her grandparents. Both of the offender’s parents are now deceased.

15. The offender reported that she maintains a good relationship with her grandparents and her sister. She said she has some family support in the ACT, including her grandparents. She currently resides with her uncle in an ACT housing property, although she said that her relationship with her uncle was unhealthy.

16. The offender reported several past partners, resulting in four children, who are now between 7 and 23 years of age. She described her past relationships as being characterised by drug use and domestic violence. The offender said she is close with her children, and that she would like to move to Queensland and to provide her children with a fresh start.

17. The offender left school before completing year 10. She has completed a certificate IV in Alcohol and Other Drugs through the Canberra Institute of Technology. She reported last being employed in 2003 as a sales assistant. She is currently in receipt of Centrelink benefits.

18. The report stated that the offender has “limited access to pro-social influences”. The offender reported that many of her family members and friends are involved in the criminal justice system.

19. The offender denied any history or current problematic use of alcohol. She reported that she started using cannabis at age 15, which she continued to use until she was 28 years old. She used methamphetamine for a period of six months in 2008. During this year, Child and Youth Protective Services intervened and removed the offender’s children from her care. She subsequently attended a detox program and successfully completed a rehabilitation program at Arcadia House in 2008. The offender stated she has not used illicit substances since that time. The report stated there is no evidence to indicate that she has any current problematic drug use.

20. The offender reported having health issues with her back, but said that medical practitioners had not been able to diagnose the cause of this pain. The offender was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) when she was younger, but she is not currently prescribed any medication for ADHD. The offender reported experiencing depression and anxiety, and finds talking with friends and family to be a useful tool in managing these conditions. Custodial Mental Health Service records provide no evidence of any major mental illness and confirm that the offender is not prescribed any medications.

21. The offender did not dispute the agreed statement of facts. She acknowledged that she could have taken a different course of action and organised a time to retrieve her son’s items without the others present. She stated she had returned the personal items of the victim which she had “taken by mistake” and that she thought she was doing “the right thing” by her son. Whilst the offender accepted responsibility for her actions, the report states that the offender displayed limited insight into the impact her offending had upon the victim.

22. The pre-sentence report author assessed the offender as being at a medium-high risk of general reoffending, with her primary criminogenic risk factors being unemployment, accommodation, antisocial peer group, mental health and attitude towards offending. The author suggested that the offender may benefit from engagement with a mental health service, a referral to Onelink to address housing, and a referral to a job network to address her unemployment.

Criminal history

23. The offender has an ACT criminal history which commences in 2006. She has been convicted of common assault five times and has been convicted of unlawful possession of stolen property two times. The most recent offending before the present offending was in 2020.

Sentencing considerations

Objective seriousness Aggravated Burglary

24. In accordance with the decision in R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [113], I have taken into account the following matters in assessing the objective seriousness of the aggravated burglary offence: (a) The offence occurred in the early hours of the morning; (b) The offence occurred in the victim’s home, where the victim was entitled to feel safe: Elphick at [113(c)]. (c) The offence committed by the offender involved the “ransacking” of the victim’s bedroom. On the police’s arrival, the victim’s bedroom was dishevelled, her cupboard was empty and there was a broken wooden frame and shards of glass on the floor; (d) The offending was not spontaneous, but involved some degree of premeditation, as evidenced by the email exchanges prior to the offending between Ms Engeler and Jordan Hagen. However, it is unclear what the offender’s role was in this planning or what she knew would occur prior to arriving at the victim’s address; (e) The offence occurred in the company of three adult co-offenders and one young person. The five offenders outnumbered the victim, who was in the unit with her brother and a friend. The presence of such five co-offenders is relevant to the level of intimidation both intended and experienced; and (f) The offender invaded the victim’s privacy by rummaging through her bedroom and taking personal items, while a violent assault was taking place. Some of the items taken were of a personal nature, such as life insurance documents, certificates and letters. These items heighten the invasion of privacy that the victim experienced.

25. I consider this offending to be moderately serious.

Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm

26. The assault consisted of the victim being dragged from her residence onto the veranda, where she was punched and kicked in the head, and had her hair burned with a lighter. The victim suffered from a number of physical injuries as a result of the assault, including a welt to her forehead, several welts on the right side of her neck, a small cut on her right ear and some small cuts to the right torso and right hand, as well as singed hair.

27. The offender is liable for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm by joint commission. Although the offender is liable for the actions of the other participants, when sentencing the offender it is necessary to draw distinctions between the roles and culpability of each of the individual offenders: KR v R [2012] NSWCCA 32 per Latham J (Whealey JA and Harrison J agreeing) at [19] - [22]; Burrows v R [2017] NSWCCA 45 at [37]. In this respect, the offender did not herself participate in the assault. At the time of the assault, she was ransacking the victim’s bedroom. Accordingly, in respect of the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, she has less culpability than her co-offenders.

Breach of conditional liberty

28. The offender was on conditional liberty at the time of offending, being subject to a 12-month good behaviour order imposed by a Magistrate in 2020 for common assault.

29. Section 108 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) provides that if a court is satisfied an offender has breached any of the offender’s good behaviour obligations; and s 110 of that Act (relating to the cancellation of a good behaviour order with suspended sentence order) does not apply to the order, the Court may take one or more of specified courses, including taking no further action; giving the offender a warning; giving directions about the offender’s supervision; amending the good behaviour order; ordering the payment of any security; or cancelling the good behaviour order.

30. The good behaviour order in question expired on 5 October 2021. In these circumstances, both parties agree that I should take no action in respect of the good behaviour order, but take the breach of the bond into account in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed for the present offences. I have done so.

Bugmy considerations: reduction of moral culpability Introduction

31. As outlined above, the offender had a disadvantaged childhood. She was exposed to illicit substance and alcohol abuse by her parents, who were in and out of custody during her early life. As a result, she was separated from her parents and was raised primarily by her grandparents. Both of the offender’s parents are now deceased.

32. The offender has not had the benefit of a stable adult relationship, reporting several past relationships which were marred by domestic violence and drug use. As the offender’s counsel submitted, the offender’s adult relationships echo those that she observed in her early life.

33. The offender has had previous problematic drug use, reporting methamphetamine use which lasted for 6 months and contributed to the removal of at least some of her children for a period of time.

No causal link required

34. In his written submissions, the offender’s then counsel, Mr Berents, submitted that there was a causal link between the offender’s disadvantaged upbringing and the offending. However, in his oral submissions, Mr Jackson, who appeared for the appellant at the oral hearing of the appeal, withdrew this submission on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a strict causal connection between the offending and the offender’s disadvantaged background. Nonetheless, he submitted that the offender’s disadvantaged background was such as to justify a finding of reduced moral culpability.

35. Counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions similarly contended that there was insufficient evidence to establish a strict causal connection between the offender’s disadvantaged background and the offending. However, she also accepted that it was not necessary for the offender to establish a strict causal connection before a finding of reduced moral culpability could be made.

36. For the reasons outlined below, I agree with the joint position of the parties on this issue.

37. In Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571, the plurality of the High Court (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) held (at [44]) that: Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving "full weight" to an offender's deprived background in every sentencing decision. However, this is not to suggest, as the appellant's submissions were apt to do, that an offender's deprived background has the same (mitigatory) relevance for all of the purposes of punishment. Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the discretion so difficult. An offender's childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender's recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender's moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender. (emphasis added)

38. There is no question that an offender’s disadvantaged background must be taken into account in determining the sentence to be imposed, regardless of whether or not there is a causal connection between the offender’s background and their offending. So much is clear from the High Court’s statement in Bugmy that “‘full weight’ must be given to an offender’s deprived background in every sentencing decision”.

39. However, over the past decade, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has expressed divergent views as to whether an offender must demonstrate a strict causal connection between their disadvantaged background and the offending before a court can make a finding of reduced moral culpability, such as to ameliorate the weight to be given to the need for general deterrence and denunciation: Perkins v R [2018] NSWCCA 62 at [42] (per Hoeben CJ at CL), at [73] and [76] (per White JA) and at [102] (per Fullerton J); Noonan v R [2020] NSWCCA 346 at [49] (per Bellew J); Dungay v R [2020] NSWCCA 209 at [153] (per N Adams J, Bell P and Davies J agreeing); Nasrallah v R [2021] NSWCCA 207 at [8] (per Bell P) and at [88] (per Hamill J). See also The Bugmy Bar Book Project: Presenting Evidence of Disadvantage and Evidence Concerning the Significance of Culture on Sentence - Judge Sophia Beckett (October 2021). The more recent decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal appear to hold that a strict causal link is not required: Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18 at [27], per McCallum JA (as her Honour then was).

40. In its decision in Bugmy, the High Court did not hold that a strict causal connection is required before an offender’s moral culpability may be reduced. Nor is there any principled basis for imposing such a requirement. Rather, to echo the language of the plurality in Bugmy, what is required is that there be a sufficient link or connection between the disadvantaged background and the offence, “such that” the disadvantaged background can, to some degree, “explain” the offending. Where such a link exists, it can be concluded that an offender’s moral culpability is reduced. Where moral culpability is reduced, the weight which “would ordinarily be given” to punishment, denunciation and general deterrence may be moderated in favour of other sentencing purposes, such as rehabilitation: Bugmy at [44].

41. This is the approach that was taken by a five member bench of the Victorian Court of Appeal in DPP v Herrmann [2021] VSCA 160; 290 A Crim R 110 at [4], which, whilst holding that there was no need to prove a strict causal nexus, nonetheless drew a link between the lifelong damage that can result from childhood exposure to violence and the distortion of the person’s “view of the world around them and their understanding of social norms” (at [46]). See similarly Black v R [2022] VSCA 125 at [28] – [30].

42. The concept of moral culpability refers to an offender’s “moral blameworthiness” for an offence: Paterson v R [2021] NSWCCA 273 at [29], per Beech-Jones CJ at CL (R A Hulme and N Adams JJ agreeing). An offender will be less morally blameworthy for an offence where their disadvantaged background in some way “explains”, is connected with, or otherwise sheds light on the offending. Of course, the extent of the reduction of moral culpability will depend on all of the circumstances. Where there is a clear causal relationship between the offending and the offender’s background (as was the case in Bugmy itself), the offender’s moral culpability may be significantly reduced. In other cases, where the connection between disadvantage and the offending conduct is not as strong, there may be a lesser reduction of moral culpability. Of course, in each case, it will be necessary to consider the impact of the offender’s disadvantaged background in the assessment of each of the purposes of sentencing as set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (“Sentencing Act”). Application

43. In the present case, there is a connection between the offender’s early childhood experiences and the offending conduct.

44. The offender’s early relationships with both of her parents were marred by substance abuse and the disconnection wrought by periods of incarceration. Those early experiences explain or shed light on the offending. In particular, it may be noted that the offences involved the offender acting to assist her son, who was then incarcerated, in recovering his personal items from a former partner. In this way, the offending might be viewed as the dysfunctional expression of the parental protection that the offender missed on out on as a child. Whilst the offender had the benefit of supportive relationships with her grandparents, she did not have the benefit of modelling of a functional parent-child relationship.

45. More generally, as Simpson J (as her Honour then was) held in R v Millward [2012] NSWCCA 2 at [69], “common sense and common decency dictate [that a person who had a disadvantaged upbringing] will have fewer emotional resources to guide his or her behavioural decisions”. This is certainly true of the present case. That is not to say that the offender bears no moral responsibility for her conduct; rather as Simpson J observed, it is to recognise that the offender does not have equal responsibility with a person who has had “what might be termed a ‘normal’ or ‘advantaged’ upbringing.”

46. For these reasons, I have concluded that the offender’s moral culpability for her offending is reduced and I have moderated the weight to be given to general deterrence, punishment and denunciation.

Parity

47. Three of the offender’s co-offenders have now been sentenced. Ms Engler and Ms Eade each pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm by joint commission. They were each sentenced in the Magistrates Court for their roles in the assault. Bailey Hagen pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He was sentenced by Kennett J on 11 October 2022. The following sentences have been imposed on each of the co-offenders: (i) For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, Ms Engeler was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment, fully suspended upon her entering into an 18 month good behaviour order. (ii) For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, Ms Eade was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, fully suspended upon her entering into a 12 month good behaviour order. (iii) For the offence of aggravated burglary, Bailey Hagen was convicted and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment (discounted from 13 months and 15 days), suspended after 4 months. For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, Bailey Hagen was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two months (discounted from two months and 7 days’), to be served concurrently with the sentence for aggravated burglary.

48. Parity principles are enlivened: Green v The Queen [2011] HCA 49; 244 CLR 462. However, application of those principles does not require that the offenders each receive the same sentence. Rather, as Gibbs CJ noted in Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; 154 CLR 606 at 609: It is obviously desirable that persons who have been parties to the commission of the same offence should, if other things are equal, receive the same sentence, but other things are not always equal, and such matters as the age, background, previous criminal history and general character of the offender, and the part which he or she played in the commission of the offence, have to be taken into account.

49. For this reason, “the parity principle allows for different sentences to be imposed upon like offenders to reflect different degrees of culpability and/or different circumstances”: Green v The Queen; Quinn v The Queen [2011] HCA 27; 244 CLR 462 at 473 [28]; see similarly R v Carberry [2022] ACTSC 208 at [4] – [5].

50. I have had regard to the sentences imposed on Ms Engeler and Ms Eade in the Magistrates Court for the offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

51. Of more significance for parity purposes are the sentences that were imposed on Bailey Hagen. Like the offender, he was charged with both aggravated burglary and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, and, like the offender, he was dealt with in this Court.

52. The offender’s Agreed Statement of Facts described Mr Hagen as participating in a serious way in the assault. In particular, it stated that Mr Hagen hit the victim in the head with a machete, pointed the machete to the victim’s head and neck and that he kicked the victim. However, as counsel for the Director noted, the Statement of Agreed Facts upon which Mr Hagen was sentenced did not state that he was personally involved in the assault. Rather, Mr Hagen was sentenced by Kennett J on the basis that he was armed with a large knife or machete, “which necessarily created some level of threat”, but that he did not use that machete in the burglary or the assault: R v Hagen [2022] ACTSC 274 at [17]. In assessing the relative criminality of the offender in comparison to Mr Hagen for parity purposes, I have considered the facts upon which Mr Hagen was sentenced and not the description of his role contained in the offender’s facts.

53. Assessing the objective circumstances of the offence on this basis, I note that Mr Hagen was armed with a large knife or machete, whereas the offender was not armed. Further, Mr Hagen was the first to enter the premises, was in physical proximity to the assault, and assisted in the assault of the victim, both by his presence and by preventing the victim’s brother from intervening to try to assist her. In contrast, the offender was not present at the time that the assault occurred. However, in respect of the aggravated burglary, it was the offender who went into the victim’s bedroom and took the victim’s personal items.

54. As to differences in the subjective circumstances of Mr Hagen and the offender, I have taken into account that: (a) Mr Hagen was 20 years old at the time of offending, and that youth was a strong consideration in the sentence imposed by Kennett J; (b) Mr Hagen had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and there was also evidence that he had a mild intellectual disability (albeit not rising to the level of a formal diagnosis). Justice Kennett took these matters into account in assessing Mr Hagen’s subjective case; (c) Mr Hagen’s disadvantaged upbringing had a stronger connection to the offending in comparison to the offender’s offending. In particular, the criminal undertaking involved his mother; and (d) The offender was in breach of a good behaviour order at the time of the offending.

55. I have taken these differences into account in assessing the appropriate sentence to be imposed.

Guilty plea

56. The offender is entitled to a discount in recognition of the utilitarian value of her guilty plea, pursuant to s 35 of the Sentencing Act. The quantum of the discount is discretionary. A plea entered after committal and before trial usually attracts a 10 to 15 percent discount: Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3. Section 37 of that Act requires that I specify the extent to which the sentence is reduced on the basis of the guilty plea.

57. The offender initially entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. She entered a plea of guilty to both offences 20 days before the date set for trial.

58. As counsel for the Director properly accepted, whilst these pleas were relatively late, they avoided court time and should attract a discount. I have afforded a 10 per cent discount for the offender’s guilty pleas to each offence.

Time in custody

59. The offender has spent 229 days in custody in relation to these charges. Counsel for the Director submitted that any sentence of imprisonment should be backdated to reflect that time spent in custody. Counsel for the Director submitted that the relevant backdate day as at 16 December 2022 would be 1 May 2022. The relevant backdate day as at today is 7 May 2022.

Determination

60. For the reasons outlined above, the offender’s moral culpability is reduced to some extent by reason of her background. Accordingly, in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed, I have moderated the sentencing purposes of punishment, denunciation and general deterrence (s. 7 of the Sentencing Act).

61. The purposes of recognising the harm done to the victim and the community, of ensuring that the offender is held accountable for her actions, and deterring the offender from committing the same or similar offences remain of importance.

62. The need for specific deterrence is of particular importance in the present case. As the Counsel for the Director observed, the offence that gave rise to the good behaviour order which the offender breached when she committed the present offending related to a common assault on a woman who was the ex-partner of her son Bailey Hagen. It is a matter of significant concern that the offender has again offended with a son against a son’s ex-partner. In this respect, it is also of concern that the offender has shown little remorse and limited insight into the impact of the offences on the victim, and that she described herself as “doing the right thing by her son” to the author of the Pre-Sentence Report.

63. It is also necessary for the sentence imposed to promote the rehabilitation of the offender: s 7(1) of the Sentencing Act. The offender has been assessed as being of a medium to high risk of re-offending, in view of her unemployment, peer group and the lack of empathy that she displays towards the victim. Nonetheless, I find that the offender does have some positive prospects of rehabilitation: she has accepted responsibility for her actions and has acknowledged that, rather than engaging in the offending conduct, she should have organised a time to collect her son’s personal items. Importantly, the offender has been on stringent bail conditions since 23 March 2022. During this time, the offender has complied with those bail conditions, including by making applications to the Court to vary her bail conditions where necessary. In this way, the offender has demonstrated that she can appropriately engage with Community Corrections. The offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are also heightened by her desire to provide a fresh start for her children.

64. In determining the appropriate sentences to be imposed, I have also taken into account principles of totality: R v XX [2009] NSWCCA 115; 195 A Crim R 38 at [52]; R v Bs-X [2021] ACTSC 160; 16 ACTLR 238. I have taken into account that the two offences occurred as a result of the same course of conduct. In general, it would be appropriate for there to be a measure of accumulation for an offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and an offence of aggravated burglary, as the latter would not usually comprehend and reflect the physical injury to the victim resulting from the former. However, in circumstances where the offender is liable on a joint commission basis for the assault occasioning actual bodily harm offence, and was not physically present when that offence was committed, I consider that it is appropriate for the two sentences to be served concurrently.

65. The sentence to be imposed for the aggravated burglary is a starting point of 18 months, reduced by ten percent and rounded down to 16 months. The sentence to be imposed for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm will be a starting point of three months, reduced by ten percent and rounded down to two and a half months.

66. The sentences for both offences will date from 7 May 2022 to take into account the 229 days that the offender has spent in custody referrable to this offending. This will result in a sentence that commences during a period when the offender was not in custody. As Kennett J observed when sentencing Mr Hagen, this is a permissible course: R v Hagen [2022] ACTSC 274 at [35], citing R v Newman [2004] NSWCCA 102; 145 A Crim R 361 at 368 and Hawkins v Hawkins [2009] ACTSC 148; 3 ACTLR 210.

67. The sentences to be imposed are somewhat higher than those imposed by Kennett J on Mr Hagen. I consider that the disparity in sentence is justified by the differences in the subjective circumstances of both offenders to which I have referred above.

Orders

68. The orders of the Court are: (1) On the charge of aggravated burglary (CC2021/8164), the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 16 months, to date from 7 May 2022 to 6 September 2023. (2) On the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (CC2021/8165), the offender is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 months and 2 weeks from 7 May 2022 to 20 July 2022. (3) The sentence on the charge of aggravated burglary (CC2021/8164) is to be suspended from 22 December 2022, upon the offender undertaking to comply with her good behaviour obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period from the giving of the undertaking until 6 September 2023. (4) In addition to the core conditions under s 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), order (3) is subject to the following additional conditions: (i) that the offender report to ACT Corrections within 48 hours; (ii) for the period of the good behaviour order, or such shorter period as determined by the Director-General, the offender be on probation subject to the supervision of the Director-General and obey all reasonable directions of that person, including as to undertaking any psychiatric or psychological assessment and participating in any program of treatment or rehabilitation. (5) The charge of minor theft by joint commission (CC2021/8166) is dismissed. (6) In relation to the charge of common assault (CC2020/986), I take no action on the breach of the good behaviour order.

I certify that the preceding [68] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Baker Associate: A Gallagher Date: 22 December 2022

Amendments 31 January 2023 “On” is to be replaced with “for the appellant Paragraphs: [34] at the oral hearing of”.