DPP v Furman [2026] VCC 359

Trafficking in a drug of dependence - 15 years' imprisonment;[6]

Possession of a drug of dependence - 5 years' imprisonment;[7] and

Knowingly dealing with proceeds of crime - 15 years' imprisonment.[8]

1. The prosecution filed a summary of prosecution opening for plea dated 28 July 2024, which I am told by your counsel I can treat as a statement of agreed facts for the purpose of sentencing you.[9] The prosecution summary is lengthy, comprising 35 pages. I incorporate the relevant parts into these sentencing remarks. A brief summary of the sentencing facts follows.
2. You were born in May 1991 and over the period of the current offending you were aged 29 and 30 years. You were known by the nickname 'Russian Steve'. You were a close associate and business partner of your co-accused Alexander Orlov, who was sentenced by his Honour Judge Lauritsen on 22 March 2023.[10]
3. You lived at 7 Athena Close in Tullamarine. Orlov resided at three addresses during the offending period, 3 Saxby Court in Wantirna South, Apartment 1609, 442 Elizabeth Street in Melbourne CBD and 45 Clarke Street in Southbank.
4. The offences span the period from 7 July 2020 to 31 March 2021. So far a Charge 1 is concerned, between 7 July 2020 and 28 October 2020 you and Orlov conducted a business which involved the trafficking of methylamphetamine in a quantity that was not less than a large commercial quantity of that drug. You were a principal of that business.
5. You and Orlov sourced methylamphetamine in large quantities from regular suppliers, purchasing one kilogram or more at a time. Orlov would then repackage the drugs into smaller quantities and sell them to a number of regular customers. Those transactions usually involved the sale of one ounce, or multiple ounces of the drug.
6. You and Orlov took the following steps to avoid detection:

(a) You and Orlov communicated with each other using an encrypted service known as 'signal', which you installed on your mobile telephone. You also used SIM cards registered to persons with false identities.

(b) When speaking to each other you avoided talking overtly about the drug transactions. Instead you used a code. The prosecution contend that the code was relatively unsophisticated, and investigators were able to determine the quantities and value of the drugs involved in a large number of the drug transactions that form the basis of the present offending.

(c) You registered vehicles using company details that did not identify you, and arranged for fraudulent number plates to be placed onto the vehicles that were being used to meet clients and took a number of other steps to ensure that Victoria Police could not link the vehicles to you.

1. The current investigation commenced after Orlov was identified as someone involved in illegal activity while Victoria Police were conducting an investigation into one of his associates in December 2019.
2. On 5 June 2020, investigators obtained a warrant to intercept the mobile phone service that was being used by Orlov. After that date, all of the calls and SMS messages made and received on that service were monitored and recorded by investigators.
3. Investigators arranged for the Victorian Police Surveillance Unit to conduct physical surveillance on Orlov on a number of occasions throughout the investigation. They also obtained warrants and installed listening devices in Orlov's apartment and listening and tracking devices in his motor vehicle.
4. So far as your role in the offending is concerned, the prosecution allege, and I accept, that over the period alleged in the charge Orlov frequently attended your home. The investigation revealed that you assisted Orlov in coordinating the collection of drugs from his suppliers. You and he regularly discussed the purchase and sale of illicit drugs, and the costs and profits that would be associated with those transactions. You received a payment from Orlov which was your 'cut' of the profits made from the sale of the drugs. On occasion during the period of the offending, you and Orlov would also provide each other with quantities of methylamphetamine. You also discussed your clients and you had a network of associates within the illicit drug trafficking industry.
5. The prosecution contend that you undertook a role which generally involved you arranging for an unknown supplier to meet with Orlov and provide him with methylamphetamine in one kilogram transactions. It was alleged, and I accept, this occurred on five occasions. The investigation revealed that you received a payment for arranging each of those transactions. The investigation also revealed that on occasion you arranged for Orlov to provide a number of other persons with methylamphetamines. The prosecutor did not allege that you were involved in the sale or packaging of the drug, but instead that you assisted in supplying Orlov with large amounts of the drugs which he then on-sold down the chain.
6. Moreover, you allowed Orlov to register a number of motor vehicles which he used in his drug trafficking business under a business name associated with your mother so he could avoid detection.
7. I was told by the prosecutor that you accept you were involved in trafficking five kilograms of methylamphetamine by assisting Orlov to source a total of five kilograms of methylamphetamine over the charged period of nearly three and a half months. This occurred in five one kilogram transactions. I sentence you on that basis.
8. A large commercial quantity of methylamphetamine is defined as 750 grams in a mixed substance.[11] In other words, you trafficked 5.67 times the large commercial quantity applicable to this drug.
9. On 28 October 2020, at the conclusion of the investigation into the major drug trafficking, police officers executed a search warrant on you personally and at your home. In the pantry of your home, they located and seized 14.5 grams of cocaine. A traffickable quantity of cocaine in a mixed substance is 3 grams.[12] Accordingly, you possessed nearly five times the traffickable quantity of that drug.
10. There is no evidence of actual sales by you, however the cocaine was co-located with a number of items which contained white powder residue later found to be cocaine. These items comprised: digital scales, zip lock bags, two hand mixers with bowls and a hydraulic press. Sensibly, you did not contend the cocaine was possessed for your own use. (Charge 2)
11. Also, during the searches conduced on 28 October 2020 a total of $458,523.30 was located as follows:

$444,750.00 in cash in the pantry of your home; and

a further $5,475.00 in cash in the pantry of your home.[13] (Charge 3).

1. It is accepted by the prosecution and you that this cash represents proceeds of the crime charged in Charge 1 on the indictment. Therefore, I must have regard to this factor in sentencing you for this offence in order to avoid inflicting double punishment on you.
2. You were arrested that same day and interviewed by police. You answered 'no comment' to most questions as was your right. You declined to provide the passwords to various mobile telephones and other devices located at your premises. There is no charge relating to this conduct.
3. On 31 March 2021, police officers executed another search warrant at your home. They located and seized:

(a) in two locations in your home a total of 47.4 grams of cannabis, which it was agreed is a 'small quantity'[15] possessed by you for your own use (Charge 4);

(b) 4.1 grams of 1,4 benzodiazepine (Alprazolam)[16] (Charge 5); and

(c) in a number of locations in your home, amounts totalling $65,750 in cash, which you acknowledge by your plea was the proceeds of crime (Charge 6).

1. You were arrested and interviewed, during which you exercised your right to make 'no comment'.

1. Trafficking in a drug of dependence in a large commercial quantity and trafficking in a drug of dependence are very serious criminal offences, as indicated by the maximum penalties of life imprisonment and 15 years' imprisonment, respectively. This shows, unambiguously, how seriously the community, through the Parliament, views the conduct you have committed in respect of Charge 1 and Charge 2.
2. The Victorian Court of Appeal has reiterated that the sentencing regime for drug trafficking offences is quantity-based and, while the quantity trafficked is not determinative of my assessment of the objective gravity of the offences, it will always be of importance.[17] All things being equal, the greater the quantity trafficked, the more serious the trafficking offence.[18] Other important indicators of offence seriousness are your role, the duration of your offending and your motivation for involvement in it.[19]
3. It is also relevant for me to consider the harm that is inflicted on the community by offences involving trafficking in drugs of dependence such as methylamphetamine and cocaine.[20]
4. So far as Charge 1 is concerned, you are to be sentenced on the basis that you trafficked a very large quantity of methylamphetamine, five kgs, which is over six times the large commercial quantity (mixed) threshold for this drug. Analysis demonstrated that the purity of these drugs likely ranged from 81% to 86% of pure drug. Your offending involved five transactions conducted over a period of nearly three and a half months. You were a principal offender and your motive was financial gain.
5. Overall, I consider this is a high-range example of trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a drug of dependence. Moreover, I assess your moral culpability to be very high. Clearly denunciation, general deterrence and just punishment must be given considerable weight in sentencing you for this offence, subject to moderation on account of your personal circumstances discussed below.
6. I observe that trafficking in a drug of dependence is a serious enough criminal offence. So far as Charge 2 is concerned, you trafficked 14.5 grams of cocaine for the purpose of sale.
7. Knowingly dealing with proceeds of crime is also a serious criminal offence. By your plea of guilty to Charge 3 you admit that the cash found in your home was a result of the trafficking which is the subject of Charge 1. $458,532.30 is a large amount of money and $65,750 is a significant enough amount also.
8. Accordingly, I consider the conduct represented by Charges 3 and 6 are serious examples of this offence.

1. You were assessed on 21 August 2024 by Carla Lechner, a clinical psychologist engaged by your legal representatives. Ms Lechner prepared a psychological report dated 16 September 2024 which summarises your personal circumstances.[21]
2. On 2 June 2025 and 10 June 2025, at my request, you were assessed by Dr Emily Stevenson, a clinical and forensic psychologist from Forensicare, who also summarised your personal circumstances.[22]
3. You are 34 years old and were 31 at the time of the offending. You were born in Australia after your parents immigrated from Ukraine in 1990, when it was then part of the USSR.
4. You told Ms Lechner that you were primarily raised by your half-sister as your mother had to work. During your childhood you were exposed to alcohol and domestic violence at the hands of your step-father and mother. Your mother and step-father were both heavy drinkers.
5. Your sister, who was your parental figure, exposed you to drugs at a young age as she was involved in trafficking drugs from your childhood home. You told Dr Stevenson that between the ages of 8 and 12 your sister's criminal associates would drug and sexually abuse you. This eventually ended when your sister moved out when you were aged 12.

1. You told Ms Lechner you were bullied extensively in primary school owing to your socio-economic background, weight, and the fact that English was your second language. Whilst in primary school you were suspended twice for fighting.
2. You attended Yeshiva Jewish School from year seven to year nine on a scholarship. Whilst at that school you were suspended numerous times. You told Dr Stevenson you were eventually expelled in year nine for bringing a bullet, which you had stolen from your step-father, to school.
3. You then attended Brighton Secondary College, at which time you began to associate with a 'bad crowd'. You told Ms Lechner that you were expelled midway through year 10 for harassing teachers and students.
4. You then moved to Sandringham Secondary College where your mental health began to decline, which led to you engaging in self-harm. You were expelled later that year.
5. You told Ms Lechner that after leaving school you successfully completed a carpentry apprenticeship and worked in that industry for about six years.

1. You had a solid work history up until the age of 28. You worked from 15 to 18 in framing and fixing, and commercial construction.

1. In December 2022 people impersonating police broke into your home. They assaulted you, your partner at the time, and your children.
2. On 15 November 2023, you were a victim of a further home invasion. Two men broke into your home and assaulted you with various weapons, including a gun. As a result, you suffered serious injuries which required hospitalisation.
3. You were advised by police that your safety was under threat and that you should consider moving interstate. Since you were unable to obtain protection for your family in Victoria, you moved interstate. However, you failed to change your bail conditions prior to relocation and your bail was revoked. You were then remanded in custody.

1. You told Dr Stevenson that you began gambling when you were 16 years old, when you made fake accounts to play online games of poker.
2. Gambling has posed a significant issue for you. You have borrowed and lost hundreds of thousands of dollars. This led you to incur a debt with members of the Russian underworld. You told Ms Lechner that these members include the people who sexually abused you as a child, and the people who threatened and assaulted you and your family. Ms Lechner opines you suffer from a gambling disorder which is in early remission.

1. You have four daughters and were in a long-term relationship with your partner from whom you have now separated since being remanded. Initially, you had regular contact with your older daughters over the phone and were visited by them every couple of months. However, you now have no contact with older daughters.
2. Your ex-partner now lives interstate and since your separation you have had no contact with your two younger daughters.

1. In relation to your mental health, you reported self-harming when you were about 15 years old, at which time you met with either a psychologist or psychiatrist.
2. Ms Lechner opines you meet the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and major depressive disorder (MDD). In relation to your PTSD diagnosis, you experienced symptoms of flashbacks, nightmares, avoidance, hyper-vigilance, and heightened sense of threat. Ms Lechner opines that your PTSD stems from your childhood trauma and the home invasion of which you were a victim.
3. Dr Stevenson echoes Ms Lechner's observations in relation to your PTSD diagnosis and indicates you present with symptoms of nightmares, hypervigilance, and fear.

1. You began drinking at the age of fourteen to fifteen. You told Ms Lechner that you drank heavily until the age of 22 or 23, after which you took up Ice.
2. You were first introduced to cannabis at the age of 12 by your stepsister's friends. You told Ms Lechner that you were smoking about 14 grams of cannabis a day. At some point, you began using Xanax daily, and on the weekends you would take ecstasy.
3. You admitted to Ms Lechner that you used heroin as a teenager and ketamine recreationally. Ms Lechner opined that you suffered from stimulant, cannabis and cocaine use disorder, which are currently in early remission in a controlled environment.

1. Dr Stevenson applied the Level of Service/Risk, Need, Responsivity tool which is a measure of factors relating to the offender, their history, and current circumstances, which is used to assess levels of need and appropriate management. When assessed by Dr Stevenson your overall profile fell within the range of high risk/needs. In Ms Lechner's supplementary report, she agreed with Dr Stevensons assessment that you present as a 'high' risk of reoffending.[23]
2. Dr Stevenson opined that you have limited insight into your offence drivers, and consequently you do not have well-formed plans to address them. However, Dr Stevenson does report there are some protective factors, such as a willingness to engage in psychological intervention. Dr Stevenson writes that targeted intervention should focus on alcohol and drug specific treatment as well as trauma focused interventions.
3. Overall, in light of your high risk of reoffending and lack of insight I must give real weight to specific deterrence and protection of the community in sentencing you. On the balance, I assess your prospects of rehabilitation as being guarded.

1. You have a very limited an presently irrelevant criminal history. On 6 June 2013 you appeared at the Moorabbin Magistrates' Court in relation to one charge of obtaining property by deception. You were fined $500, without conviction. On 24 November 2020, you again appeared at Moorabbin Magistrates' Court in relation to a charge of driving whilst your licence was suspended. On that occasion, you were fined $250, without conviction.

1. You pleaded guilty to the present charges on 11 June 2024. I accept your pleas have been entered at an early stage in the proceedings and have significant utilitarian benefit. They also indicate acceptance by you of responsibility for your offending conduct and a willingness to facilitate the course of justice.
2. I accept you are undoubtedly regretful for the situation in which you find yourself and the effect this has had on you. However, I must decide whether you demonstrate true contrition and remorse for your offending conduct.
3. As Winneke P observed in R v Cooper:[24]

[a] distinction must always be carefully drawn between true regret for wrongdoing and regret engendered by concern for the position in which the offender finds [himself].[25]

4. True remorse is a question of fact and is determined on the balance of probabilities.[26] An offender must satisfy the court there is 'genuine penitence and contrition and a desire to atone'.[27] In many cases the most compelling evidence of remorse comes from the offender's testimony.[28]
5. In CD v The Queen,[29] Harper JA, with whom Buchanan JA agreed, quoted his earlier observations in Phillips v The Queen,[30] where his Honour said:

[Genuine remorse] indicates realistic prospects of rehabilitation and a reduced need for specific deterrence. An offender who pleads guilty because he or she has an accurate appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her offending, and of its impact upon its victim or victims, and who desires to do what reasonably can be done to repair the damage and to clear his or her conscience, is someone to whom mercy - in the form of a very substantial reduction in what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence - is very likely due.[31]

6. You expressed some level of remorse in a letter addressed to the Court where you said:

I know that my actions have destroyed lives, families and the greater community... I deeply apologise to all the people I have hurt and the families I destroyed. I am very ashamed of my actions.

1. Furthermore, you frankly admitted to Ms Lechner your role in these matters. You told Ms Lechner you became addicted to the 'kudos and good lifestyle' but that you regret it all.
2. In your letter, you expressed a realisation of the adverse effects your offending has had on the Victorian community at large, and those around you. All things considered, I find that you are gaining insight into the seriousness of your offending conduct and a level of victim empathy. I find you express a level of genuine remorse for your actions.

1. I accept the effect of delay is a mitigating circumstance in your case. You were first interviewed by police in relation to a number of the present offences on 28 October 2020, nearly five and a half years ago. You pleaded guilty to the offences for which you are now being sentenced on 11 June 2024, almost two years ago.
2. As the Victorian Court of Appeal observed in Rodriguez v DPP (Cth):[32]

Delay is normally relevant in two ways. First, it is relevant to rehabilitation that has occurred during the delay and the effect that has in turn on specific deterrence. Secondly, delay is relevant in the sense that the anxiety and uncertainty of having the prospect of a sentence hanging over one's head during the period of delay is akin to punishment in itself.[33]

3. So far as the rehabilitation aspect of delay is concerned, you have undertaken two drug rehabilitation programs while in custody[34] and you attended the 91-day residential rehabilitation program with DayHab in Glen Waverley as part of your bail conditions in the latter part of 2021.[35] I take this into account in your favour.
4. So far as delay akin to punishment is concerned, much of the delay in this Court has been occasioned by your decision to stand trial. However, this reasoning does not apply to the almost two years since you have pleaded guilty. Undoubtedly, awaiting sentencing would have caused you considerable anxiety and stress. I take the punitive aspects of delay into account in your favour.

1. Your counsel submitted your period on remand from 1 April 2021 to 28 June 2021 was more burdensome on you owing to COVID-19 lockdowns and restrictions. Seventy days of your remand period was endured under COVID-19 restrictions.
2. In Astbury v The Queen (No 2),[36] the Victorian Court of Appeal held that the COVID-19 pandemic, its associated restrictions, and any stress you may have suffered as a consequence of your being vulnerable to infection in the prison environment, can be broadly taken into account.[37] Accordingly, I accept you experienced a greater level of custodial hardship from 1 April 2021 to 29 June 2021 as a result of COVID-19, and I take this into account.

1. Your counsel submitted that you have experienced considerable hardship in custody amounting to extra-curial punishment. I have taken this into account in sentencing you for these offences.
2. Since you have been on remand, you have been held in protective custody. On 17 January 2026, you were assaulted in your cell within the protection unit, an incident that required you to be hospitalised for various injuries. You were subsequently moved to a higher‑protection unit, where you are permitted only a short period outside your cell each day and are not allowed to access programs. It is likely that you will remain in this high‑protection unit for the duration of your custodial term.
3. The prosecution accepts that you have experienced some measure of extra-curial punishment and that your time in custody is likely to be substantially more onerous than that of other prisoners.

1. Your counsel submitted that the general principles adumbrated by the High Court of Australia in Bugmy v The Queen[38] are engaged in your case. The prosecutor fairly agreed.
2. In Marrah v The Queen ('Marrah'),[39] Redlich and Tate JJA affirmed the relevance of a disadvantaged background when their Honours observed:

Circumstances of deprivation, abuse and other social disadvantage occurring during an offender's formative years are more than matters of historical significance to the administration of justice. The effects of such social disadvantage do not generally diminish with the passage of time and are likely to have profound and lasting consequences. ... Though they do not provide an excuse for offending behaviour, they must be given due weight in the sentencing calculus.[40]

3. Importantly, their Honours observed that when sentencing an offender the court should not consider an 'offender's social disadvantage has the same mitigatory relevance for all of the purposes of punishment'.[41] Social disadvantage does not 'diminish the need for the sentence to vindicate the dignity of a victim and reflect the community's disapproval of the offending'.[42]
4. In Sabbatucci v The Queen,[43] the Victorian Court of Appeal explained the principles in Bugmy as follows:

Whether, and to what extent, social disadvantage warrants a reduction in moral culpability in a particular case falls to be assessed by reference to the nature and circumstances of the offence, the nature and severity of the disadvantage suffered and whether the effects of the disadvantage can be seen to be in any way explanatory of the offending.[44]

5. In DPP v Herrmann,[45] that Court further observed:

The significance of the 'general' approach enunciated in Bugmy is that the relevance of deprivation to sentencing does not depend on proof of such a nexus. ... 'the impact of disadvantage is complex, multilayered, non-linear and not easily "diagnosed" or measured'. The High Court's recognition that serious childhood deprivation is likely to make an offender less morally culpable than 'an offender whose formative years were not marred in that way' reflects the principle of equal justice.[46]

6. In applying Bugmy principles in this case I do not need to find the disadvantage you suffered as a child was 'profound'. In Sabbatucci, the Court also said the sentencer must evaluate whether the disadvantage warrants the offender being viewed as 'less morally blameworthy' than someone who commits the same offence but does not have the same disadvantaged or deprived background.[47] Coming to this conclusion does not depend on the Court being satisfied the circumstances establish 'profound disadvantage' or 'profound deprivation' because in every case, 'it will be a question of fact and degree'.[48]
7. Your self-report to Ms Lechner and Dr Stevenson illustrate your childhood was marred by violence, alcohol, sexual abuse, hardship and trauma. Your counsel sought to argue that there was a causal link between your traumatic childhood and the offending. I accept that your childhood exposure to criminal activities, sexual abuse, and your socially disadvantaged background led you to develop PTSD and maladaptive coping mechanisms which may have affected your judgment and therefore contributed to some extent to the circumstances surrounding your offending.
8. However, you clearly knew the wrongfulness of your actions and your motive was purely financial gain. Judging by the amounts of cash you amassed in a relatively short timeframe you were very successful in this nefarious enterprise. You do not fall into the category of a drug addict who fell into drug trafficking to support your habit. Nor were you operating at a low level, such as a courier, in this criminal enterprise. Moreover, having been arrested and charged with Charges 1, 2 and 3 on 28 October 2020 you continued to offend and within five months you had amassed a further $67,750 from unknown criminal activities (Charge 6).
9. Nonetheless, I am prepared to accept your moral culpability is reduced to a very limited extent. I will moderate the weight I would otherwise have given to general deterrence, denunciation, and the punitive aspects of the sentences I impose on you to a small extent.

1. Your counsel submitted that Verdins principles 3, 4, and 5 are engaged in your case. Your counsel primarily relied on your diagnosis of PTSD as outlined by Ms Lechner and supported by Dr Stevenson.
2. In her supplementary report Ms Lechner writes:

Mr. Furman was clear and consistent in stating that he is constantly "on guard" and triggered by "door checks and the gate banging ... it's like the door being kicked in at the home invasion". He stated that flashbacks about the home invasion are more prominent "because noises trigger me ... I jump, get sweaty, feel panicky". He stated that he has intrusive thoughts about his experiences of sexual abuse "it might be twice a week or twice a fortnight ... it's triggered by I don't know ... I start dreaming of it and then in the day I might walk past someone who reminds me of them, for example, a beard ... the rabbi at the Jewish school". He stated, "if I think of the sexual abuse, I feel dirty, itch ... have a shower and wash it away". He added that these memories bring up feelings of powerlessness and loss of agency, accentuated by being imprisoned. Mr. Furman also spoke spontaneously of having "major trust issues" on account of his history of abuse, constant sleep disturbance (due to pain and nightmares).

Prison is aggravating his symptoms of PSTD, particularly hypervigilance, intrusive thoughts, paranoia, nightmares and startle response.

1. I am prepared to give weight to Verdins principles 3 and 4. I accept that, at the time of sentencing, you are experiencing symptoms of PTSD and I will moderate the weight I give to general and specific deterrence on this account.
2. So far as Verdins principle 5 is concerned, I accept given your complex mental health conditions it is likely the sentences I impose will weigh more heavily on you than they would on a prisoner in normal mental health.

1. I have had regard to the principles adumbrated in Akoka v The Queen[49] in regard to the 91 days you have spent in the inpatient drug rehabilitation program discussed above.

1. I have had regard to current sentencing practice in relation to these offences as informed by the decisions of the High Court of Australia in R v Kilic[50] and DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym)[51] and the Victorian Court of Appeal decisions in DPP v Zhuang,[52] DPP (Cth) v Thomas[53] and Gregory v The Queen.[54] Specifically, I have considered the 'comparable cases' I was referred to by the prosecutor.[55]
2. While current sentencing practice is relevant to the sentences I impose on you, it is only one of a number of sentencing considerations I must take into account in imposing just sentences in your case.[56]
3. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge more than a general yardstick from so-called 'comparable cases', given the wide range of offending conduct that can constitute these offences and the myriad of personal circumstances pertaining to individual offenders. Nonetheless, to the extent I have been able to gain assistance from comparable cases, I have sought to do so in your case.
4. The basic purposes for which a court may impose a sentence are just punishment, denunciation, deterrence, both specific and general, protection of the community and rehabilitation. In sentencing you, I must have regard to a range of factors, such as the seriousness of the offences, your culpability for them and your personal circumstances.
5. In sentencing you for these crimes I am required to balance the interests of the community in denouncing your criminal conduct with the interests of the community in seeking to ensure that, so far as possible, you are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society.
6. As I observed earlier, I must give substantial weight to denunciation, general deterrence and just punishment in sentencing you for these crimes, particularly Charge 1, sensibly moderated by reason of your personal circumstances. I also need to give real weight to specific deterrence, also moderated to some extent for the reasons previously discussed, and protection of the community. It is to be hoped that your arrest, incarceration and your breaking ties with your criminal associates will have the effect of deterring you from reoffending in the future, and that risk will be further reduced if your drug addiction and mental health conditions are properly treated whilst you are serving your sentence. However, you fall to be sentenced as a person with a high risk of general reoffending. As I earlier observed, I assess your prospects for rehabilitation as being guarded.
7. Trafficking in a large commercial quantity of a drug of dependence (Charge 1) is a Category 1 offence under the Sentencing Act 1991. Your counsel accepted that a significant sentence of imprisonment with a non-parole period was the only appropriate sentence in this case.
8. Moreover, Charge 1 is a standard sentence offence. The standard sentence fixed by law is 16 years' imprisonment.[57] Accordingly, in sentencing you for this offence I must have regard to the relevant standard sentence,[58] which 'is the sentence for an offence that, taking into account only the objective factors affecting the relative seriousness of that offence, is in the middle of the range of seriousness.'[59] This is a matter I must have regard to as one of the factors relevant to the sentence I impose on you on Charge 1.[60] However, the standard sentence is just another factor to consider, it is not determinative and does not interrupt the operation of my instinctive synthesis.[61] In fact, the relevant legislation specifically approves the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing.[62] The standard sentence is to be treated as a 'legislative guidepost', as is the maximum penalty.[63]
9. The standard sentencing scheme also prescribes the non-parole period to be imposed in relation to the standard sentence offence, or, as in this case, the total effective sentence which incorporates the standard sentence offence.[64] Unless I consider it is in the interests of justice to do so, I must fix a non-parole period, in this situation, of at least 60% of the total effective term of imprisonment imposed.[65]
10. Upon convicting you on Charge 1, I must make an order declaring you to be a serious drug offender.[66] However, this does not mean the provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991 relating the sentencing of serious offenders[67] apply to you. They do not.
11. I also must have particular regard to the totality principle in sentencing you for these offences because of the overlapping nature of the charges and in order to avoid imposing a crushing sentence on you.

1. Parity is a relevant sentencing consideration in relation to Charges 1 and 3 in this case.[68] I have had regard to the sentences imposed on the related co-offender, Alexander Orlov, to the extent they are relevant to your circumstances.
2. Orlov was charged on 28 October 2020. On 30 September 2021, he pleaded guilty to one charge of possessing a trafficable quantity of firearms, one charge of trafficking in a drug of dependence in a large commercial quantity, one charge of possession of a drug of dependence, and three charges of knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime.
3. On 22 March 2023, his Honour Judge Lauritsen sentenced Orlov to a total effective sentence of 16 years' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 10 years. I was provided with his Honour's reasons for sentence.[69] On Charge 2, trafficking in a large commercial quantity, on which charge you were his co‑accused, Orlov received a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment, which formed the base sentence. Moreover, on Charge 4, he was sentenced for dealing with the proceeds of crime in the amount of $141,045 cash and received 18 months' imprisonment, three months of which was ordered to be served cumulatively on the base sentence.
4. I accept, there are differences between the offending conduct for which Orlov was sentenced and the charges on which you fall to be sentenced. Orlov was sentenced on Charge 2 on the basis that he engaged in trafficking over a 10‑month period and trafficked 10 kilograms of methylamphetamine. By comparison, you are to be sentenced on the basis that your trafficking occurred over a period of three and a half months and involved 5 kilograms of methylamphetamine.
5. Moreover, Orlov had a relevant prior criminal history and fell to be sentenced as a serious drug offender owing to prior convictions for trafficking methylamphetamine. Unlike Orlov, you have mitigating Verdins, Bugmy and Akoka considerations, which I have taken into account in sentencing you, none of which were applicable in Orlov's case.

On Charge 1 - trafficking in a large commercial quantity in a drug of dependence (methylamphetamine) - you are convicted and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

On Charge 2 - trafficking in a drug of dependence (cocaine) - you are convicted and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment.

On Charge 3 - knowingly dealing with proceeds of crime ($458,532.30) - you are convicted and sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment.

On Charge 4 - possession of a drug of dependence (cannabis L) you are convicted and fined $300.00. That fine is referred to the Director of Fines Victoria for collection and management.

On Charge 5 - possession of a drug of dependence (1,4 benzodiazepine) - you are convicted and fined $300.00. That fine is referred to the Director of Fines Victoria for collection and management.

On Charge 6 - knowingly dealing with proceeds of crime ($65,750.00) - you are convicted and sentenced to 1 year's imprisonment.

I order 1 year of the sentence imposed on Charge 2, 1 year of the sentence imposed on Charge 3 and 6 months of sentence imposed on Charge 6 are to be served cumulatively on the sentence imposed on Charge 1 and on each other.

This makes a total effective sentence of imprisonment for 14 years and 6 months.

I order you serve a minimum period of 8 years before becoming eligible for parole. I consider in your case it is in the interests of justice to fix a non-parole period which is less than the 60% specified by the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) for a standard sentence offence. This is mainly because of the fact you will serve your sentence in protective custody and also because Verdins principle 5 is engaged in your case.

I am required to state my reasons for imposing the sentence I have imposed on Charge 1. They are contained in these reasons for sentence.

I am also required to explain how the sentence I have imposed on Charge 1 relates to the standard sentence of 16 years' imprisonment that applies to that charge. The sentence I have imposed on Charge 1 is 4 years less than the applicable standard sentence.

I declare 807 days (not including this day) as the period of pre-sentence detention to be reckoned as already served under this sentence and I direct the fact that declaration was made, and its details, be noted in the records of the court.

In accordance with s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), I declare that but for your pleas of guilty, I would have sentenced you to an overall total effective sentence of 20 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.

I declare pursuant to s 89DI of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) that you are a serious drug offender as a result of your conviction on Charge 1.

I will make the disposal order in the terms submitted by the Director pursuant to s 78(1) of the of the Confication Act 1997 and the forfeiture order in the terms submitted by the Director pursuant to s 33(1) of that Act.

[1] Contrary to Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 ('DPCSA') s 71(1).

[4] Contrary to Crimes Act 1958 ('CA') s 194(2).

[10] [2023] VCC 444.

[11] See DPCA s 70 & Schedule 11, Part 3, column 1B.

[12] See DPCA s 70 & Schedule 11, Part 3, column 3.

[13] I note these three sums add up to $458,533.30 but the charged amount is $458,532.30.

[14] See R v Jones [2004] VSCA 68 [13] (Charles JA, Phillips JA and Bongiorno AJA agreeing); McCray (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2017] VSCA 340 [17]-[18], [29]-[30] (Maxwell P and Croucher AJA); Crawford v The Queen [2018] VSCA 113 [43]-[44] (Maxwell P and Kyrou JA); R v Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 [102]-[109] (Garling J).

[15] See DPCSA s 70 and Schedule 11, Part 3, column 4.

[16] The traffickable quantity of this drug is 10 grams pure. (See DPCSA s 70 and Schedule 11, Part 1, column 3). I do not know the purity of the drug the subject of this charge.

[17] See eg DPP (Cth) v KMD [2015] VSCA 255; (2015) 254 A Crim R 244, 254 [36], 260 [64] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Beach JJA) ('KMD'); DPP v Fatho and Ors [2019] VSCA 311 [70] (Maxwell P, Priest and Beach JJA) ('Fatho'); Gregory (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2017] VSCA 151; (2017) 268 A Crim R 1, 7-8 [23]-[24] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Beach JJA) ('Gregory').

[18] Fatho [70]. See also Gregory, ibid; DPP v Fernando [2017] VSCA 208; (2017) 268 A Crim R 26, 38-40 [50]-[55] (Redlich JA); KMD 254 [36], 257 [50]-[52], 260 [64]; Adams v The Queen [2008] HCA 15; (2008) 234 CLR 143.

[19] Gregory 8 [24]. See also Elkadi v The King [2023] VSCA 328 [30] (Macaulay and Taylor JJA).

[20] R v Pidoto and O'Dea [2006] VSCA 185; (2006) 14 VR 269, 279 [45] (Maxwell P, Buchanan, Vincent and Eames JJA); Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584, 609 [70] (Gaudron, Gummow and Jayne JJ); R v D'Aloia [2006] VSCA 237 [56] (Nettle JA).

[24] [1998] VSCA 39; (1998) 103 A Crim R 51 ('Cooper').

[25] Cooper 55 (Tadgell JA agreeing). See also Raptis v The Queen (1988) 36 A Crim R 362, 366 (Young CJ , O'Bryan & Tadgell JJ).

[26] Cooper 55; R v Gillick [2000] VSCA 127 [20] (Callaway JA, Chernov JA agreeing) .

[27] Barbaro v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288; (2012) 226 A Crim R 354, 365 [38] (Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA) ('Barbaro').

[28] Barbaro 365-66 [38], [40]; Bonacci v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 194, 202 [44] (Neave, Mandie and Harper JJA).

[29] [2013] VSCA 95 [36].

[30] [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594.

[32] [2013] VSCA 216; (2013) 40 VR 436.

[33] Ibid 445-446, [36] (Warren CJ and Redlich JA) (citations omitted). See also Tones v The Queen [2017] VSCA 118, [36] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Kyrou JJA) and Thomas v The Queen [2019] VSCA 223, [66] (Ashley and Weinberg JJA).

[35] See Ex D5 the dates should be 28 June 2021 to 27 September 2021.

[36] [2020] VSCA 158 ('Astbury').

[37] Astbury [33] (Kaye, Niall and Weinberg JJA).

[39] [2014] VSCA 119 ('Marrah').

[40] Marrah [16] (Redlich and Tate JJA) citing Bugmy 586-89 [24] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).

[43] [2021] VSCA 340 ('Sabbatucci').

[44] Ibid [6] (Maxwell P and Emerton JA). See also Newton (a pseudonym) v The King [2023] VSCA 22 [36]-[38] (Beach and Macaulay JJA).

[45] [2021] VSCA 160.

[46] Ibid [45] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA). See also Jawahiri v The Queen [2021] VSCA 287 [73(s)] (Priest and T Forrest JJA).

[49] Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214 [111]-[112] (Warren CJ, Kyrou and Redlich JJA); Sahhitanandan v The Queen [2019] VSCA 115, [30]-[31]

[50] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-268 [21]-[25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).

[51] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 444-447 [47]-[58] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 452-455 [78]-[85] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).

[52] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]-[31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).

[53] [2016] VSCA 237; (2016) 53 VR 546, 606-609 [173]-[183] (Redlich, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]-[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA); Russo v The Queen [2021] VSCA 244 [53]-[56] (Emerton JA, Priest JA agreeing).

[54] [2017] VSCA 151.

[56] See DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428.

[61] Brown v The Queen [2019] VSCA 286; (2019) 59 VR 462, 464 [4] (Maxwell P, Priest, Kaye, T Forrest and Emerton JJA) ('Brown'); DPP V Drake [2019] VSCA 293.

[63] Brown 464 [4], 479 [55]-[57] (applying Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120, 132 [27] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

[68] See eg Collins v The Queen [2015] VSCA 106 [23] (Whelan, Santamaria and Beach JJA).

[69] [2023] VSCA 444 (EX P3).