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1. Alexander Cameron is before the court for sentence having pleaded guilty to the following offences:

Charge number Offence Maximum penalty

CAN 3403/2025 Sell or supply a drug of dependence, $80,000 fine, contrary to s 164(2) of the Drugs of imprisonment for five Dependence Act 1989 (ACT). years, or both.

CAN 9610/2024 Aggravated furious, reckless or $80,000 fine, dangerous driving (repeat offender, fail to imprisonment for five stop), contrary to s 7(1) of the Road years, or both. Transport (Safety and Traffic Automatic licence Management) Act 1999 (ACT). disqualification for 12 months.

CAN 9612/2024 Escape arrest, contrary to s 160 of the $16,000 fine, Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). imprisonment for five years, or both.

CAN 9613/2024 Drive stolen motor vehicle, contrary to s $80,000 fine, 318(2) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT). imprisonment for five years, or both.

CAN 9616/2024 Drive motor vehicle at police, contrary to s Imprisonment for 15 29A of the Crimes Act. years.

CAN 3404/2025 Drive while disqualified (repeat offender), $16,000 fine, contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Road imprisonment for one Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 year, or both. (ACT). Automatic licence disqualification for 24 months.

Facts

2. The facts below have been taken from an agreed statement of facts that was before the court.

3. Between the evening of 22 September and 23 September 2024, a vehicle belonging to “SK” was stolen.

4. At about 5:09am on 24 September 2024, SK’s vehicle was parked on the shoulder of the Barton Highway. The offender was asleep in the driver’s seat.

5. At about 5:17am, police approached and attempted to extract the offender from the vehicle. They directed him to get out of the car, which he did not do. Police told the offender that he was under arrest, to which he replied “okay”. The offender then drove the vehicle away from the scene (CAN 9612/2024), driving over a green belt to the wrong side of the road as he did so.

6. Police engaged the offender in a pursuit over the next half hour. During that time, the offender drove mainly around the Northbourne Avenue area on the wrong side of the road (CAN 9610/2024). He drove through several red lights. Traffic on the roads was light, though got heavier as the pursuit went on.

7. At 5:48am, police used one of their vehicles to make contact with the offender’s vehicle, bringing the latter to a stop. The offender’s vehicle was then surrounded by fully marked police vehicles. The offender slowly reversed his vehicle into one of those vehicles (CAN 9616/2024).

8. The offender was eventually removed from his vehicle. When police searched his person, they found 6.784 grams of methylamphetamine (CAN 3403/2025) as well as a pipe, zip lock bags and a portable scale.

9. At the time of the offending, the offender was driving a stolen motor vehicle (CAN 9613/2024) and his driver’s licence was disqualified (CAN 3404/2025).

The court’s task

10. For the benefit of the offender, when the court sentences a person for criminal conduct, it does so with a number of statutory purposes in mind. These include (in summary form) making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing his conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation: s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).

11. The mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act also require consideration insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances, with the resulting sentence imposed according with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56].

Consequences of offending

12. The offender was subject to a suspended sentence order at the time of his offending. This has the result that, upon conviction, he will be in breach of the good behaviour order imposed on 27 August 2024. The court must therefore cancel the good behaviour order and either impose the suspended sentence or re-sentence the offender: s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA Act).

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

13. The court must evaluate the conduct set out in the facts above, considering objectively how serious it is, with the maximum penalty for the offence providing the yardstick. I have endeavoured to articulate the factors that inform the character of each offence’s objective seriousness, applying R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 at [22] and Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 at [156].

Sale or supply of drug of dependence

14. DPP v Cichacz [2024] ACTSC 208 at [30] sets out the following factors as informing the assessment of the objective seriousness for this offence: (a) the quantity of the drug; (b) the purity of the drug; and (c) the motive for the offending.

15. The offender had 6.784 grams of methylamphetamine on his person. That is just over the trafficable quantity of 6.00 grams. There is no information before the court as to the purity of the drug. The motivation for the offending was the sale of drugs to fund the offender’s own addiction. For the trafficking offence, the conduct falls at the low range of objective seriousness.

Aggravated dangerous driving

16. Features relevant to this offence have been discussed in R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [122] and more recently by Taylor J in DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 at [38]. They are as follows: (a) the extent to which the public and other road users were put at risk, the number of people affected and their vulnerability (such as being children, elderly, frail or disabled); (b) the nature of the location where the driving occurred (for example: residential, busy commercial, shared user zone) and the time of day or night of the driving; (c) whether there were any passengers in the vehicle who were put at risk, especially if there were young children; (d) the variety and duration of aspects of the driving that were dangerous and the extent to which it was a multifaceted and/or a lengthy course of conduct, especially factors such as driving into oncoming traffic, onto footpaths or other places where pedestrians are, through stops signs, red lights or give way signs; (e) the distance driven and the period of the driving; (f) the speed of the vehicle and regard for the conditions; (g) whether the vehicle is engaged in a pursuit from police or fails to stop when directed to do so by police; (h) whether the offender was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs and the degree of intoxication; (i) whether there was competitive driving or street racing on a public road or showing off; (j) any damage occasioned to other vehicles, objects, houses or people; and (k) the extent to which police were put at risk when trying to terminate the driving.

17. The statutory circumstance of aggravation was the failure to stop for police. Other aggravating features of the conduct here include the duration of the driving being 30 minutes (a significant period of time), that the offender was engaged in a pursuit, that he drove on the wrong side of the road and that he drove through red lights. The offender put the police at risk when they were trying to stop him driving, but in taking that aspect of the conduct into account, I have been mindful of the separate charge with overlapping features and the court must be cautious to avoid double punishment.

18. Relatively few members of the public were directly at risk from the offender’s dangerous driving because there was little traffic on the road at the time of the offending. The driving occurred early in the morning and mainly took place on arterial roads, with some residential and commercial streets also used. The driving did not occur at high speeds, there was no suggestion of competitive driving or street racing, and the offender was alone in the vehicle.

19. Having regard to the wide spectrum of conduct captured by this aggravated form of the offence, this example was towards the mid-range of offending in terms of its objective seriousness. Escape arrest

20. This offence is itself relatively serious. In R v Dowling (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 200 at [43], Refshauge J set out the following features as informing the objective seriousness: (a) the reason for the escape; (b) whether there was any premeditation or planning; (c) whether any violence was committed or damage caused; and (d) the efforts taken to escape and their sophistication.

21. The offender here intended to evade arrest. Given that he was asleep until shortly before the escape, his offending does not seem to have been premeditated or planned and the escape was not violent. However, the offender did engage in further offending in an effort to avoid arrest. This aggravates the conduct, though again, the court must be careful not to doubly punish the offender given that the further offending has been separately charged. I overall consider this offending to fall in the low to mid-range of objective seriousness.

Drive stolen motor vehicle

22. The five-year maximum penalty indicates that the legislature also views this offence relatively seriously. Applying R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 at [29], the following considerations inform the objective seriousness of the offence: (a) the period of driving and the length of distance driven; (b) whether the vehicle was used in the commission of another offence; (c) whether the offender was the driver and not only the passenger; (d) the manner of driving, unless subject to a separate charge; (e) whether the vehicle was damaged; and (f) whether the vehicle was returned to the owner.

23. This offending is aggravated by the fact that the vehicle was used in the commission of four other offences, and that the offender was the driver of the vehicle. The offender drove the vehicle for at least half an hour, but I have considered that conduct as part of the aggravated dangerous driving. Similarly, I have not considered the manner of driving here because it too is subject to a separate charge.

24. The damage caused to the vehicle by the contact with police – which was so significant that the vehicle was not repairable – further aggravates the conduct because the vehicle was not returned to the owner (at least not in driveable condition). I have considered the fact that it was the police vehicle intercepting the offender, but it was the manner of driving in the first place that gave rise to the need to intercept the offender to try to terminate the offence.

25. Because there is some overlap between the features here and the dangerous driving offence, the offending falls around the mid-range of objective seriousness.

Drive motor vehicle at police

26. The maximum penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment is a clear indicator of the very serious nature of this offence. Following R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152 at [34] and [36]-[37], I have considered: (a) whether a police vehicle was damaged in the process; (b) whether the offender was engaged in a police pursuit; (c) whether the offending took place in a busy locality; (d) whether the offender was engaging in highly dangerous behaviour; (e) whether there was an intention to impede arrest without regard to the welfare or safety of the police officer or the community at large; (f) where the police officer was located (in a vehicle, on a motorcycle, or on foot); (g) whether the person drove directly at the police officer; (h) whether any physical injuries were caused; (i) whether there were other road users present; (j) whether there were any houses or footpaths bordering the road; and (k) whether there were any passengers in the offender’s vehicle.

27. In this case, the conduct occurred by reversing slowly, the police officer was inside a vehicle and only minor damage was caused to that vehicle. There were no passengers in the vehicle. Though the offence occurred on a main road with a footpath immediately adjacent, the locality was not busy at the time of the offending.

28. Features that would otherwise be aggravating, such as the fact that the offender had engaged in a police pursuit, drove at police to escape arrest and drove in a dangerous manner, have been separately charged and excluded from the assessment so as to avoid double punishment.

29. Overall, this offending is at the low end of objective seriousness, but the offence itself is extremely serious.

Drive while disqualified

30. Applying R v Law [2021] ACTSC 351 at [35], I have taken the following features into account: (a) the number of prior offences of the same type; (b) whether the driving was wilfully disobedient to the court’s order; (c) whether the driving was associated with the commission of other offences (noting that the court must not doubly sentence the offender); (d) the duration and distance of the driving; (e) how recently the disqualification was imposed; and (f) the manner of driving (again, noting that the court must not doubly sentence the offender if the manner of their driving was the subject of a separate charge).

31. The offender’s criminal history shows that this was his first offence of this kind. The disqualification was imposed on the offender less than one month before this offending occurred, and I am satisfied that the offender knew he was prohibited from driving at the time of the offending conduct. The driving was associated with the other offences for which the offender is now before the court and, while those are separate offences and care has been taken not to include overlapping features, the connection remains relevant. The driving took place over approximately 30 minutes, and the distance travelled is unknown. The offender drove in a dangerous manner, but this has been separately charged and once again, he is not to be doubly punished on that basis. The result is that the conduct specifically referable to this offence falls in the low range of objective seriousness.

Plea of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)

32. The court may impose a lesser period than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offences: s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act. The applicable discount for a guilty plea is a matter of discretion: Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 at [37]-[38]. Utilitarian value is a primary consideration: Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46; 19 ACTLR 99 at [47] and R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at [49].

33. Here the pleas of guilty were entered at an early opportunity. Although it was after briefs of evidence had been prepared, there remained considerable utilitarian value in the pleas. Having regard to the statutory matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act, I would have awarded a substantial discount. However, the prosecution argued that the case against the offender was overwhelmingly strong such that s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act is enlivened. I have recently set out the approach to be taken in DPP v Tate [2025] ACTSC 327 at [40] and apply it here.

34. I consider the case with regard to drug supply to be very strong but not overwhelming. As the offender submitted, the establishment of the purpose requires a mental element and this was required to be inferred from other indicia of supply.

35. With regard to the other offences, the video footage establishing the conduct constituting the elements of the offence does rise to the threshold of overwhelming. Multiple police maintained constant visual observations of the offender throughout the entire incident.

36. Accordingly, a 25% discount will be applied to the drug supply offence. A 7% discount will be applied for the remaining offences.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

37. The offender is 32 years old. His background was before the court through four reports. Those reports indicate a disadvantaged childhood, and I have given this full weight including a reduction in moral culpability: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [43]-[44]. The offender has a supportive relationship with his mother.

38. The offender completed Year 10. He has been a drug user since his early teens and has spent much of his adult life in custody. Notably, there was a six-year period during which the offender achieved sobriety and held secure employment for approximately four years. He has previously completed a 12-month residential rehabilitation program with Canberra Recovery Services between 2018 and 2019.

39. The offender has been diagnosed with several mental health concerns which are unnecessary to detail here. This has a bearing on the approach to be taken to the sentences here. Having regard to the psychological report prepared for the court by a qualified professional, and the nature of the mental illnesses, I consider that it is appropriate to apply Verdins principles (as to which see R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo [2007] VSCA 102 at [32]). The mental health concerns lessen the importance of general deterrence in the offender’s circumstances but heighten the need for structure and reintegration in a supported way.

40. The offender has an extensive criminal history that includes several driving offences similar to those currently before the court. This disentitles him to leniency.

41. This offending also occurred while the offender was on conditional liberty, as he was subject to a suspended sentence order at the time. This is an aggravating factor: see KQE v DPP [2024] ACTCA 7 at [40].

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

42. I accept that the offender has demonstrated genuine remorse. Although there was no sworn evidence, the offender did recognise in his letter of apology that he “put the lives of other road users and the police at risk as well as my own and am so lucky that no one was seriously hurt or killed”. This shows a degree of insight into his offending and recognises the harm that the offending caused.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

43. The prosecution helpfully provided a table of cases which have comparable offending, including R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC 143; DPP v Coulter [2024] ACTSC 262; Clarke (No 2); DPP v Holder (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 167; R v Crawford [2022] ACTSC 166; Seymour; R v Hancock (No 5); DPP v Hancock [2025] ACTSC 31; and R v Whitelock [2019] ACTSC 396.

44. The offender drew the court’s attention to the comparable cases of DPP v Loiterton [2025] ACTSC 59 and DPP v Swain (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 209. I have also had regard to DPP v Booth [2024] ACTSC 368 in respect of the escape offence.

45. I have taken these cases into account in the manner described in Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48]. Terms of imprisonment were the usual outcome for this combination of offending, with significant periods of full-time custody commonly imposed.

Pre-sentence custody

46. As at the date of sentence, the offender has spent 609 days in custody referable to this offending. This time will be taken into account by way of backdating his sentence and this too influences the ultimate disposition.

Totality

47. I have approached the structure of the sentence with totality principles in mind in terms of concurrency and accumulation, as to which see Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited). I accept the offender’s submission that the offences before the court constitute a course of conduct (s 33(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act), which warrants greater concurrency in the sentences to be imposed.

The suspended sentence will be imposed

48. On 27 August 2024, Special Magistrate Richter imposed a sentence of imprisonment for 1 year and 2 months with respect to a charge of aggravated furious reckless dangerous driving (repeat offender and fail to stop) (CC2024/2272). The sentence was suspended pursuant to a 2-year good behaviour order.

49. A discussion of the relevant principles is found in DPP v Rohrlach (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 192 at [9]-[14]. Applying those principles without repeating them here, the remainder of that original sentence will be imposed because: (a) The offender reoffended within weeks after he had been sentenced. (b) The offender had achieved no rehabilitation prior to the conduct constituting the breach, although as outlined above, he is not without prospects in that regard. (c) The offence was of the same kind as the offence that was the subject of the sentence that had been suspended. (d) The nature of the breach was serious in that it involved criminal behaviour, indicative of a deliberate intention to breach the order and an erosion of the trust reposed in the offender.

50. Those matters combined result in the conclusion that it is not appropriate to resentence the offender. The suspended portion of the sentence (1 year and 16 days) will be imposed.

Disposition - A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order is appropriate

51. Acknowledging that the imposition of a term of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort (s 10 of the Sentencing Act), it is the only appropriate sentence here due to the need to recognise, denounce and punish the gravity of the offending. The sentence which the court imposes must be proportional to the objective seriousness of the offence: Miller at [37], cited in R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 at [32].

52. However, I have determined that disposition by way of a Treatment Order is the appropriate outcome (s 12A(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act) because: (a) A treatment order would further the sentencing purposes directed to rehabilitation and longer-term protection of the community. The imposition of such a sentence would not run contrary to the need for denunciation, punishment or deterrence because of the length of time that the offender has already spent in custody. Further, effect will be given to general deterrence and denunciation through the length of the total effective sentence to be imposed and ensuring that it is proportionate to the gravity of the offending. That sentence will be hanging over the offender’s head for the entire time that he would undertake a treatment order. (b) The criminal history and the drug use as detailed in the most recent DATO assessment speaks to the offender being high-risk, complicated by mental health conditions that put him in a higher needs category. That combination makes the offender an ideal candidate for targeted intervention and the goals of a treatment order, as seen through the objects of s 80O of the Sentencing Act. (c) There is a rehabilitation program available to him to commence on 25 May 2026, through the Canberra Recovery Hub. He has secured appropriate accommodation through Justice Housing in order to facilitate this.

53. I am otherwise satisfied of the other formal requirements for a Treatment Order: (a) On the reports provided to the court, the offender is both eligible and suitable for a Treatment Order: ss 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. (b) There was a strong degree of correlation between the offender’s dependency on volatile substance use and alcohol addiction and his offending: s 12A(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Sentencing Act. (c) The offender has consented to the Treatment Order, having been given a clear explanation of what it involves: s 12A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act. (d) The offender will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: s 12A(2)(a)(iii) of the Sentencing Act. (e) There are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.

54. It is not necessary to set a non-parole period because the making of a Treatment Order means that the sentence becomes an “excluded sentence of imprisonment” under s 64 of the Sentencing Act.

Automatic disqualification periods

55. The aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving offence (CAN 9610/2024) carries an automatic disqualification period of 12 months: s 63(1)(f) and (2)(b) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (General Act). The drive while disqualified offence (CAN 3404/2025) carries an automatic disqualification period of 24 months: s 32(5)(b) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (Driver Licensing Act).

56. I will not order a reduction in the disqualification periods, but I will exercise the discretion under s 69 of the General Act to order that the disqualification periods run concurrently, having regard to the overlapping nature of the conduct and principles of totality. Accordingly, a two-year period of disqualification applies from the date of these orders.

Orders

57. The orders of the Court are: (1) Leave is granted to amend the particulars of charge CC2025/3403, replacing the word “METHAMPHETAMINE” with “METHYLAMPHETAMINE”. (2) Pursuant to s 110 of the CSA Act, the sentence of imprisonment that was imposed on 27 August 2024 (CAN 2272/2024) and then suspended is cancelled, and the remainder of the term of imprisonment of one year and 16 days is imposed, backdated to commence on 24 September 2024 and conclude on 9 October 2025. (3) For CAN 3404/2025, drive while disqualified, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for three months, reduced to two months and 23 days on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 1 October 2025 and conclude on 23 December 2025. (4) For CAN 9610/2024, aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 15 months, reduced to one year, one month and 29 days on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 20 November 2025 and conclude on 17 January 2027. (5) For CAN 9613/2024, drive stolen motor vehicle, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 14 months, reduced to one year and one month on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 1 March 2026 and conclude on 31 March 2027. (6) For CAN 9616/2024, drive motor vehicle at police, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 14 months, reduced to one year and one month on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 10 March 2027 and conclude on 9 April 2028. (7) For CAN 9612/2024, escape arrest, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for five months, reduced to four months and 19 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 January 2028 and conclude on 19 May 2028. (8) For CAN 3403/2025, sell or supply a drug of dependence, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 10 months, reduced to seven months and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 May 2028 and conclude on 15 December 2028. (9) Pursuant to ss 63(1)(f), (2)(b) and 69 of the General Act and s 32(5)(b) of the Driver Licensing Act, the offender’s driver’s licence is automatically disqualified for the following periods: (a) 12 months, from 25 May 2026 to 24 May 2027 in respect of CAN 9610/2024; and (b) 24 months, from 25 May 2026 to 24 May 2028 in respect of CAN 3404/2025. (10) The total effective sentence, including the imposed suspended sentence, is for four years, two months and 22 days, from 24 September 2024 to 15 December 2028.

Treatment order (11) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Alexander Cameron in respect of the eligible offences of: (a) CAN 9610/2024, aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving (b) CAN 9613/2024, drive stolen motor vehicle (c) CAN 9616/2024, drive motor vehicle at police (d) CAN 9612/2024, escape arrest (e) CAN 3403/2025, sell or supply a drug of dependence (12) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences, for which the offender has been sentenced to a total period of imprisonment for three years and 26 days, are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (13) A Treatment Order is made for two years, six months and 21 days from today, 25 May 2026 to 15 December 2028. (14) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for two years from today, 25 May 2026 until 24 May 2028. (15) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 25 May 2026, until 15 December 2028. (16) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Mr Cameron is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the CSA Act from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 25 May 2028, until the end of the total sentence that is the subject of the Treatment Order, 15 December 2028. (17) A probation condition is imposed that Mr Cameron accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or their delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (18) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: (a) The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the Sentencing Act are hereby imposed. (b) Mr Cameron is to travel to Canberra Recovery Hub (CRH) on 25 May 2026 and admit himself to the rehabilitation day program at that facility by 12:00pm. (c) Mr Cameron is directed to complete the drug rehabilitation day program at CRH or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. (d) Mr Cameron is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the day program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. (e) Mr Cameron is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. (f) Should Mr Cameron leave or be discharged from any residential or day program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. (g) Mr Cameron is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs, or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (h) Mr Cameron is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means. (19) Pursuant to s 12A(6) of the Sentencing Act, I direct that written notice of the order, together with a copy of these orders, be given to the offender.

I certify that the preceding fifty-seven [57] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam.

Associate: Date: