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R v Hancock [2025] ACTSC 31 | Case summary | Zoe

ACTACTSC

R v Hancock

[2025] ACTSC 31

Supreme Court of the ACT|2025-02-13|Before: Christensen AJ

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Supreme Court of the ACT

Decision date

2025-02-13

Before

Christensen AJ

Catchwords

CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST –
Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – breach of suspended sentence
imposed
after cancellation of drug and alcohol treatment order – drug

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST –Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – breach of suspended sentenceimposedafter cancellation of drug and alcohol treatment order – drugoffending – trafficking – possession – proceedsof crime– rehabilitation – intensive correction order not appropriate– no leniency – imposition and imprisonmentwith parole orderimposed

Judgment

Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title: R v Hancock (No 5); DPP v Hancock Citation: [2025] ACTSC 31 Hearing Date: 12 December 2024 Decision Date: 13 February 2025 Before: Christensen AJ Decision: See [49] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – breach of suspended sentence imposed after cancellation of drug and alcohol treatment order – drug offending – trafficking – possession – proceeds of crime – rehabilitation – intensive correction order not appropriate – no leniency – imposition and imprisonment with parole order imposed Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 114C Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 11, 12, 63, 64 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 602, 603 Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT) s 164 Cases Cited: R v Hancock [2021] ACTSC 52 R v Hancock (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 193 R v Hancock (No 3) [2022] ACTSC 232 R v Hancock (No 4) [2023] ACTSC 254 R v Hanson (No 3) [2025] ACTSC 6 R v Mathews [2019] ACTSC 262 R v Whitelock [2019] ACTSC 396 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions (Crown) Daniel Thomas Hancock (Offender) Representation: Counsel T Kelliher (DPP) C Duffy (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 5, 6 of 2021 SCC 271, 272 of 2024 CHRISTENSEN AJ: Introduction

Mr Hancock is to be sentenced in respect of three offences that are particularised as having been committed on 12 April 2024: (a) posses a drug of dependence, namely methylamphetamine, for sale or supply, contrary to s 164(2)(c) of the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/7735); (b) trafficking in a controlled drug, namely cannabis, contrary to s 603(8) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 3 years imprisonment, 300 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/6477); and (c) deal with money suspected to be proceeds of crime, contrary to s 114C of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment, 200 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/6478).
The offending was detected on 12 April 2024, after police were called to a disturbance in Gordon involving an incident between two vehicles. One of the vehicles in the incident belonged to Mr Hancock. During the police attendance, one of the people involved disclosed to police that Mr Hancock was a drug dealer who “travels all around dropping off drugs”.
Mr Hancock informed police that he was planning on leaving the ACT to drive down to the New South Wales coast. Mr Hancock had also ordered a tow truck to remove his vehicle from the property. Police then searched Mr Hancock’s vehicle, and located the following items: 1 (a) 197 grams of cannabis; 2 (b) 4.442 grams of methylamphetamine; (c) 2 x clip seal bags; (d) 1 x vacuum sealing kit; (e) 5 x glass smoking implements; and (f) a red and clear box containing small digital scales.
In addition, police located Australian currency consisting of 27 x $50.00 notes, 8 x $20.00 notes, 6 x $10.00 notes, and 6 x $5.00 notes, to the total value of $1,600.00. This currency relates to the charge of dealing with money suspected to be proceeds of crime.
The statement of facts includes that other items that were located were also analysed and contained traces of a number of illicit substances, including substances the subject

Mr Hancock was arrested, and his phone was searched. Text messages on the phone are consistent with Mr Hancock engaging with others to organise meetings for the sale of drugs.
The prosecution submitted that the seriousness of the offence of trafficking is elevated by the extent to which Mr Hancock was engaging in arrangements for sale. It was submitted, with reference to the message exchanges, that Mr Hancock was engaging in trafficking for a relatively lengthy period, some five months.
The difficulty with this submission is that Mr Hancock is not charged for trafficking beyond the date of 12 April 2024. Trafficking is defined in s 602 of the Criminal Code as including selling the drug, but also as including transport with the intention of selling it, or possessing the drug with the intention of selling it. The statement of facts does not particularise the form of trafficking relied upon, and pleaded guilty to, by Mr Hancock.
No submissions were made on Mr Hancock’s behalf that the period of the trafficking is to be limited to the single day. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore the date of the charge, and that the offence can clearly be established, with reference to the meaning of trafficking as defined, to conduct occurring on a single day. Accordingly, I will consider the objective seriousness of the trafficking offence with reference to it being trafficking of cannabis, seemingly as possession with the intention of sale, on 12 April 2024.
On this basis, the trafficking was not a serious example of the offence. The quantity possessed, for the purpose of trafficking, was not high. It is apparent though that Mr Hancock had a ready intention to commit the offence, with reference to the indicia of trafficking such as the sealing kit and the scales, but there was nothing of particular sophistication in this regard. It is also apparent that Mr Hancock was on this day engaging in communications with a view to sell drugs. There is an incoming message on 12 April 2024 that says, “when you are free if U [sic] come to mine I’m only getting pot [cannabis] ok”. Mr Hancock’s level in the operation is seemingly as a street-level dealer, with a motivation for the offending being to feed his own drug dependency.
The offending is otherwise not a serious example of this type of offending. The quantity of substances involved is below trafficable quantities, and there is, overall, nothing of significant sophistication. This observation extends to the proceeds of crime offence which involves only a modest sum of money.
Despite the lack of serious aggravating features in the offending, I am satisfied that, having considered possible alternatives, no penalty other than imprisonment is warranted. This is particularly because of Mr Hancock having committed the offences while on conditional liberty, the form of which is of particular concern. Strongly deterrent sentences that denounce the conduct and promote accountability are appropriate.
In reaching this conclusion, I have also had regard to authorities provided by the prosecution as to current sentencing practice, to the extent these can be of assistance. As the prosecution accepted, these authorities (R v Whitelock [2019] ACTSC 396; R v Mathews [2019] ACTCSC 262) are of little comparative assistance. Nonetheless, it is clear from authorities for offending of this type that sentences of imprisonment are typically imposed.
Plainly, each of the offences are inextricably linked and therefore in an application of the totality principle, a large level of concurrency is warranted.
A plea of guilty to the charges the subject of sentence was entered in the Magistrates Court. While there had been a plea of not guilty to more serious charges and a hearing date allocated, these charges were, after negotiations, not proceeded with. The charges for which there had been a plea of guilty were committed for sentence to the Supreme Court. The prosecution, fairly, conceded that in the circumstances of this matter, a reduction in the order of 25 per cent is appropriate. I agree. There is a high level of utilitarian value to the pleas of guilty to the charges the subject of sentence in this matter.

On 6 February 2023, Mr Hancock was sentenced in respect of the nine offences the subject of the treatment order. The sentence was partially suspended, having regard to the time already served in custody. A period of 1 year, 9 months, and 5 days was suspended, with a good behaviour order imposed. This order was due to expire on 10 November 2024.
Section 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2002 (ACT) (Sentence Administration Act) provides that in the event of a breach of a good behaviour order made under a suspended sentence the Court must cancel the good behaviour order and either (a) impose the suspended sentence or (b) re-sentence the offender.
The prosecution submitted that the circumstances of the breach, and the limited progress towards rehabilitation, are such that imposition is appropriate. The prosecution did though also raise, in fairness to Mr Hancock, that the Court may consider re-sentence more appropriate if s 64 of the Sentencing Act is interpreted in such a way that the sentencing exercise here involves an excluded sentence of imprisonment: s 64(2) Sentencing Act. That is, it was submitted that because the original sentence involved a fully suspended term, the operation of s 64 of the Sentencing Act could preclude a nonparole period being set at this time.
I do not consider that s 64 of the Sentencing Act is a relevant consideration because of this. Firstly, the sentence the subject of the breach proceeding was not fully suspended. It was a partially suspended sentence in accordance with s 12(2) of the Sentencing Act. The suspension took effect from the date of sentence, after a period served in custody. Secondly, I would not interpret s 64 of the Sentencing Act as being enlivened with reference to the original sentence imposed. Thirdly, I am not readily persuaded that the decision to be made under s 110 of the Sentence Administration Act should be determined with reference to a consideration that is seeking to circumvent a provision of the Sentencing Act, even if such an approach may enable a “cleaner” sentencing exercise, as was submitted.
In short, while the issue was fairly and appropriately raised by the prosecution, I do not consider it a basis upon which re-sentence ought be considered. I will regard the prosecution position to be one of seeking imposition.
The 2024 offending occurred with 6 months and 30 days of the order remaining. There is little to suggest that up until that time, Mr Hancock was engaging well with the order and committed to his rehabilitation. While there is no suggestion of a breach of the order other than by way of re-offending, the Community Corrections report observes that, overall, Mr Hancock is someone who has “demonstrated generally unsatisfactory compliance with community supervision, due to failure to report, illicit substance use and further offending”.
The further offending that Mr Hancock committed on this occasion is of an entirely different nature than that of the original offending. This is, in a sense, a positive reflection of his progress. However, the further offending is of its own type of seriousness, and the nature of it suggests little to no progress has been made with rehabilitation from substance dependency.
On behalf of Mr Hancock, it was submitted that the Court consider re-sentencing him, with reference to his progress while in custody, and his commitment to rehabilitation. The information provided on Mr Hancock’s behalf demonstrates that he has engaged with a number of courses while in custody, and he has demonstrated positive behaviours. Mr Hancock has provided a letter to the Court in which he expresses an apology for his actions, and sets out his commitment to, and motivations for, rehabilitation. He has also been engaging in counselling, and has prepared a relapse prevention plan.
Further, the finding of Community Corrections is that, despite his history of non-compliance with community based orders, Mr Hancock is suitable for an ICO. The report finds that he demonstrates commitment to such an order, and that his completion of the Solaris Therapeutic Community Program while in custody is positive.
Irrespective of that positive progress while in custody on this occasion, the seriousness of the breach is such that imposition is warranted. To not do so would bring suspended sentences into disrepute. As the prosecution submitted, Mr Hancock’s further offending involved conduct that causes significant harm to the community and individuals. It was conduct that constituted a significant betrayal of the opportunities for rehabilitation afforded to Mr Hancock. Condemnation by the Court, with recognition of there being consequences for a breach of such significance, is necessary.

Mr Hancock’s subjective circumstances are set out in detail in the previous decisions of this Court. It is unnecessary to repeat those, other than to observe that he is now 50 years of age, and he has a significant criminal history, with limited gaps in offending behaviour, that disentitles him to leniency. This criminal history is one that has occurred in a context of challenges with substance dependency from when Mr Hancock was 14 years of age, and significantly problematic dependency occurring from when Mr Hancock was aged 32 years with the use of methylamphetamine.
An ICO assessment report was prepared on behalf of Mr Hancock. By way of an update to his subjective circumstances, Mr Hancock is reported to have experienced mental health challenges with depression during 2024. In this report, dated 2 December 2024, Mr Hancock is assessed as having a high risk of general reoffending. This is an increase from the treatment order assessment on 26 February 2021 which found him to be a medium-high risk of general reoffending.
As already observed, the current assessment finds Mr Hancock suitable for an ICO, concluding that he appears to have the capacity to adhere the strict conditions of an ICO. The assessment speaks of Mr Hancock as having displayed generally positive custodial behaviour. He is described as having actively engaged in the Solaris Therapeutic Community program to address his drug dependency, and as having completed the program in November 2024.
Mr Hancock intends, upon release from custody, to attend a day rehabilitation program, and then to obtain employment. He has available to him accommodation in a house with a friend who is in recovery. The assessment finds this address to be suitable for an ICO.
Of further significance from the assessment report is that Mr Hancock is described as denying responsibility for the offences. He claimed that someone else had used his phone and that he had been unaware of the presence of the drugs. He stated to the assessors that he had chosen to plead guilty anyway, and there was no change to his position at the sentence hearing. Mr Hancock is not to be regarded as demonstrating any remorse or insight into the offending. This is particularly concerning given the nature of the charges, and his previous history of attempts to rehabilitate.

For a person who has himself struggled with overcoming drug dependency, and being someone who has been afforded multiple opportunities to rehabilitate from such a dependency, it almost defies belief that Mr Hancock would choose to engage in conduct that only serves to contribute to the destruction of other people experiencing such dependency.
Mr Hancock is well aware, from his own experience, and from his exposure to others experiencing alcohol and drug dependency, of the depth of destruction that substance dependency causes. There is no basis to conclude anything other than that his moral culpability for the further offending is high. That Mr Hancock did such offending, while subject to an order that followed a sentencing option to address his own drug dependency, underscores the need for a response that has no leniency.
There is no basis to conclude that anything other than strongly deterrent sentences that bring accountability and denounce the offending are warranted. Mr Hancock, and other people who think to engage in the trafficking and/or supply of drugs, must understand that imprisonment is the likely result. I am satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is warranted.
I am not satisfied that there is any basis upon which Mr Hancock should be afforded an opportunity to serve that imprisonment by way of an ICO. While ACT Corrective Services do find him suitable for such an order, and for community service work, it is not clear to me that Corrective Services have appreciated the full extent of previous opportunities that Mr Hancock has had to engage with community based orders, and which he has not embraced. Further, on this occasion, Mr Hancock has not demonstrated any genuine remorse or insight that would be an encouraging indicator of prospects of rehabilitation.
It is not clear to me what has changed since Mr Hancock failed to adhere to the requirements of a treatment order such that he is now found to have the capacity to adhere to the strict conditions of an ICO. While he has recently completed a comprehensive rehabilitation program while in custody, he has previously completed rehabilitation programs both in custody and in the community (see, for example, R v Hancock at [88] and R v Hancock (No 4) at [48]) and sustained change is yet to be achieved. A treatment order involves more intensive supervision and expectations of progress in rehabilitation than what an ICO does. How, in those circumstances, Mr Hancock is regarded as suitable for an ICO is, with respect to Corrective Services, quite remarkable.
In any event, whether an ICO is imposed may be a moot point. The imposition of the original sentence, and the penalties for the further offending, are such that, in totality, a sentence that exceeds four years imprisonment is to be imposed. The prosecution submitted that such a sentence order would disentitle Mr Hancock from eligibility for an ICO: s 11 Sentencing Act. It is not clear to me whether the imprisonment term ‘ceiling’ provided by s 11 is concerned only with the individual sentences or with the total effective sentence (cf s 12A(1)(b) Sentencing Act and see, most recently, R v Hanson (No 3) [2025] ACTSC 6 at [20]), but it is unnecessary to resolve that for the purposes of this matter. Mr Hancock’s demonstrated non-compliance with previous community based orders, and his lack of solid rehabilitative progress, is such that an ICO is not an appropriate sentence order for him.
Nevertheless, the view of Corrective Services has given me pause as to Mr Hancock’s prospects of rehabilitation. I also accept that during his most recent period in custody Mr Hancock has made progress towards engagement with rehabilitation. It remains though that fulfilling the purposes of sentencing here, including protection of the community and promotion of rehabilitation, is best met by a sentence order that affords Mr Hancock no further opportunities of leniency. It is to be hoped that by the imposition of imprisonment, with a parole order, the deterrent effect of sentencing will finally compel Mr Hancock’s stated motivation to rehabilitate.
It was submitted on Mr Hancock’s behalf that having regard to the finding of his suitability for a community service work condition the Court could consider making a recommendation for community service work and therefore set an earlier nonparole period than might otherwise have been set. While this may be a course that could be adopted, I am not persuaded that it is an appropriate order for Mr Hancock. It would introduce a level of leniency that I do not consider is appropriate.
Nevertheless, I am conscious that the Court, with regard to the totality principle, must not impose a crushing sentence. This is particularly so given the sentencing exercise involves sentencing for a number of offences committed some five years ago, along with the further offences committed in 2024. Mr Hancock has now spent significant periods of time in custody. It would be contrary to fulfilling the purposes of sentencing if the sentence imposed ultimately dissuaded Mr Hancock from remaining committed to his rehabilitation intentions. In order to reflect this, I will slightly moderate the nonparole period that I would otherwise have set. In doing so, Mr Hancock will have the deterrent effect of a return to custody, along with supervision in the community, upon his release. Orders
For those reasons, the following orders are made: (1) The breach of good behaviour order is proved. (2) The suspended sentence and good behaviour order made 6 February 2023 is cancelled and Daniel Thomas Hancock is re-sentenced. (3) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of possession/use of a prohibited weapon (CAN 2019/12329) is confirmed and the sentence of 1 month imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 January 2023 and end on 15 February 2023. (4) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of possession/use of a prohibited weapon (CAN 2019/12330) is confirmed and the sentence of 2 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 January 2023 and end on 15 March 2023. (5) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of burglary (CAN 2020/1583) is confirmed and the sentence of 27 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 March 2023 and end on 15 June 2025. (6) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of theft (CAN 2020/1584) is confirmed and the sentence of 10 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 November 2024 and end on 15 September 2025. (7) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of theft (CAN 2020/1585) is confirmed and the sentence of 10 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 February 2025 and end on 15 December 2025. (8) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of theft (CAN 2020/1588) is confirmed and the sentence of 15 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 March 2025 and end on 15 June 2026. (9) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of theft (CAN 2020/1589) is confirmed and the sentence of 10 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 October 2025 and end on 15 August 2026. (10) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of theft (CAN 2020/1593) is confirmed and the sentence of 12 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 December 2025 and end on 15 December 2026. (11) The conviction of Daniel Thomas Hancock of drive while disqualified (CAN 2019/13133) is confirmed and the sentence of 2 months imprisonment is imposed to commence on 16 November 2026 and end on 15 January 2027. (12) On the charge of possess a drug of dependence for sale or supply (CAN 2024/7735), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, reduced from 8 months on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 16 January 2027 and end on 15 July 2027. (13) On the charge of traffic in a controlled drug (CAN 2024/6477), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 16 May 2027 and end on 15 August 2027. (14) On the charge of deal with money suspected to be the proceeds of crime (CAN 2024/6478), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 2 months imprisonment, reduced from 80 days on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 16 July 2027 and end on 15 September 2027. (15) The total period of imprisonment of 4 years and 8 months will commence on 16 January 2023 and end on 15 September 2027. (16) A nonparole period is imposed to commence on 16 January 2023 and end on 4 November 2025.