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1. Patrick Michael Tate is before the court for sentence, having pleaded guilty to the following offences which occurred over 18 February to 25 October 2024: (a) Six charges of theft (CAN 9126/2024, CAN 10564/2024, CAN 11606/2024, CAN 12161/2024, CAN 412/2025 and CAN 4657/2025) contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Code); (b) One charge of burglary (CAN 11270/2024) contrary to s 311 of the Code; and (c) One charge of robbery (CAN 10881/2024) contrary to s 309 of the Code.

2. The maximum penalty for each charge of theft is a fine of $160,000, imprisonment for 10 years, or both. The maximum penalty for the charge of burglary is a fine of $224,000, imprisonment for 14 years, or both. The maximum penalty for the charge of robbery is a fine of $224,000, imprisonment for 14 years, or both.

3. Upon conviction for these offences, the offender will be in breach of a suspended sentence that had previously been imposed on 7 February 2024 in the Magistrates Court, for a separate offence of burglary. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of nine months, fully suspended upon the imposition of a good behaviour order for a period of 18 months. All of the offending occurred within the period of the good behaviour order.

4. Under s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), a sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort. Here, the offender accepts that terms of imprisonment inevitably follow from his conduct, including the breach of his previous sentence. He seeks that such sentences be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (Treatment Order): s 12A of the Sentencing Act. The prosecution does not oppose the imposition of a Treatment Order. The offender has been assessed as suitable for such an order by ACT Health Services and ACT Corrective Services. For reasons that follow, I consider such an order is an appropriate and suitable one.

Facts

5. The conduct constituting the offences has been agreed in a statement of facts. The brief summary that follows is not to be viewed as a substitute for the full circumstances which are contained in the agreed facts. There was CCTV footage of all the offences at the various stores, with police or other people known to the offender recognising him in the footage. First theft offence – CAN12161/2024

6. On 18 February 2024 at about 11:30am, the offender took a PlayStation 5 and controller without paying for them from Woolworths Proprietary Limited, trading as “Big W” in Woden Westfield in Phillip. He had asked a staff member to inspect it, and while that staff member moved from the counter to serve another customer, he departed the store with the items without payment or making any attempt to pay for the items, which were valued at approximately $1,000.

7. Further, on 5 June 2024 at 3:21pm the offender returned to “Big W” in Woden Westfield in Phillip. He pushed out glass from a cabinet in the technology section and took goods to the value of $1,756 as follows: (a) One Canon 3000D DSLR Camera valued at $729; (b) One Fitbit Charge 5 watch valued at $229; and (c) Two “Spacetalk Adventurer 2” 4G smartwatches valued at $399 each.

8. He then put the items into a gift bag he had brought with him and left the store without making any attempt to pay for the items.

Second theft offence – CAN10564/2024

9. The second theft offence occurred on 9 April 2024 at around 3:15pm at JB Hi-Fi in Fyshwick. The offender forced some glass cabinet doors open with a small screwdriver and took six white Bose branded “Ultra Open Earbuds” and three black Bose branded “QuietComfort Ultra Earbuds”, which were collectively valued at $4,041. He hid the items in his pants and jacket pockets and exited the store without payment or attempted payment.

Third theft offence – CAN9126/2024

10. The third theft occurred on 20 May 2024 at 12:25pm at the Boating Camping Fishing store in Fyshwick. The offender cut security tags from a number of items, and then hid under or in his clothing a black Macpac puffer jacket and four fishing reels. He departed the store with the items without paying or seeking to pay for them. The items were collectively valued at approximately $2,180.

Fourth theft offence – CAN4657/2025

11. The fourth theft offence occurred on 19 September 2024 at 3:55pm at the Anaconda store in Gungahlin. The offender removed a security tag from a North Face “Antora” rain jacket with a tool he had produced from his pocket. He then put the jacket under his shirt and walked away.

12. He later went to the shoe section and took a pair of black North Face waterproof hiking boots and put them inside his shirt before walking away. He then left the store making no attempt to pay for the items, which were collectively valued at approximately $480.

Burglary offence – CAN11270/2024 and fifth theft offence – CAN11606/2024

13. These offences occurred on 23 September 2024 at 8:20am at the Telstra store in the city. The offender entered the store. The store manager told him that the store was not open and requested him to leave, which he did. But he loitered around the front area of the store and, when the manager went to the back office, the offender slid open the door to the store and took from the store six Samsung Galaxy Watches, collectively valued at $4,344.

Robbery offence – CAN10881/2024

14. On 11 October 2024 at about 4:15pm, the offender entered McGlades Jewellers in the city. He spoke to the store assistant and asked to look at one of the watches for sale. He tried it on and asked to look at another two. The end result of the interaction was that the offender ended up holding two watches and went to leave the store. A second store assistant attempted to grab the offender, saying “no”. The offender then pulled away, resulting in that assistant falling onto her back before rolling onto her left side.

15. A man was sitting outside the store and saw the offender make his way out of the jewellery shop. He attempted to hold on to the offender’s jumper using both his hands. The offender punched the man to the left side of his head using a closed fist, before running away. However, the man did take hold of the offender’s black backpack and the offender’s bike was also left parked outside the store.

16. The stolen watch was a Baume & Mercier silver and blue colour worth approximately $4,700. The second watch was not taken but was damaged by the conduct of the offender. Sixth theft offence – CAN412/2025

17. On 25 October 2024 at about 6:20pm, the offender entered the Angus & Coote store in Woden Westfield in Phillip. He declined offers of assistance and remained in the store for almost 20 minutes. He had taken a screwdriver with him in his pocket and used it to open a glass sliding panel and push the glass panel open from a display of gold men’s jewellery. He removed two trays of gold chains and ran out of the store. As he left, the screwdriver fell out of his pocket. The cumulative value of the nineteen jewellery pieces that were stolen was $47,191.

18. The offender handed himself into police on 30 October 2024.

19. On 4 November 2024 while under police caution, the offender said to police “The jewellery store next to Big W just the other day I took all the gold from that I know I did that.”

The court’s task

20. The sentencing objectives and mandatory relevant considerations are set out in ss 7 and 33 of the Sentencing Act and have been considered below insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances, and in accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56]. The court balances making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing his conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation. Those considerations have been taken into account in the reasoning that follows, mindful that a sentence of imprisonment should never exceed the minimum that is necessary to accomplish relevant sentencing objectives: Thorn v Laidlaw [2005] ACTCA 49 at [30].

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

21. The requirement to consider the nature and circumstances of the offences proceeds upon a number of established principles: (a) There is a theoretical spectrum from the least serious instance of the offence to the most serious. That spectrum takes into account both the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at [19]. (b) Within that assessment, the sentence which the court imposes must be proportional to the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 at [37], cited in R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 at [32]. (c) The evaluation of the nature and circumstances of the offence is “objective” in the sense that the court does not consider matters personal to the offender and determines the seriousness “wholly by reference to the nature of the offending”: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27]. (d) The maximum penalty for an offence provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the Court: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31]. The 14-year maximum penalties for the burglary and robbery offences are thus to be regarded as more serious than the 10-year penalties for each of the theft offences.

22. Considering the objective seriousness of the specific offences, as outlined in R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [115] and R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 at [38] (both of which were cited by Taylor J in DPP v Monaghan [2024] ACTSC 183 at [18]), the following features are relevant to offences of theft: (a) The motive for the theft; (b) The extent and value of the property taken; and (c) Whether the stolen item was of sentimental value or utilitarian value, such that it would be difficult or inconvenient to replace.

23. For the burglary offence, in R v Hancock [2021] ACTSC 52, Refshauge AJ drew upon a number of authorities before helpfully summarising the approach to be taken to the offence of burglary at [33]: ... the following factors seem appropriate to consider: (a) whether the property on which the offender trespassed was residential, which would be more serious, although an underground car park in an apartment complex is perhaps not so serious, but not at the level of seriousness of, say, commercial premises; (b) whether there was damage committed on entry or while the offender was in the premises, unless causing that damage is separately charged, and whether there was vandalism, scattering property of the premises around about and the like; (c) whether the occupants of the premises were present or the burglary was committed at a time when they were likely to be present; (d) the motivation for the burglary; (e) whether there was premeditation or planning or organisation, especially professional organisation and execution; (f) whether there are on the premises, or were likely to be there, elderly, sick or disable persons, which is especially aggravating if the offender knows this; (g) whether the offence is committed in a series of repeat incursions into the same premises; and (h) the actual trauma suffered by the occupants.

24. For the robbery offence, to provide context for where this offending might sit in the spectrum of conduct, I have considered whether there was actual or threatened violence, the nature of the victim, the degree of planning and the value of the items taken. As counsel for the offender submitted, the offence was not charged as including force against the male bystander who attempted to apprehended him and accordingly, I did not take that expressly into account in respect of aggravating the objective seriousness of the robbery. However, it was accepted that the use of force and violence against the bystander cannot be ignored, and it does form part of the context in which the offence occurred.

25. The theft, burglary and robbery offences are all fairly typical examples of each type of offence. The motivation for all offences was personal gain, with the underlying factors being drug use and financial stress, which are often inextricably linked, as the prosecution submitted.

26. I also accept the prosecutor’s submission that the offences were unsophisticated and involved limited pre-planning (but all involved the use of an implement the offender took with him, either to break into cabinets or cut tags). They did not involve goods of sentimental value. The offending occurred in respect of commercial premises, which was discussed in R v Hughes (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 344 at [28] as being less serious than that occurring in a residential property. Overall, they may be viewed as generally less serious examples of the offence.

27. That said, the first theft offence involves rolled-up conduct and is therefore treated as being of increased objective seriousness. The value of the property taken in respect of the sixth theft offence was significantly greater and is the most serious of the theft offences.

28. For the burglary and robbery offences, staff and bystanders were present and in respect of the robbery offence, a degree of force was used, although plainly the conduct was at the lower end of the level of violence involved.

Course of conduct of offending (s 33(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act)

29. The offences may be viewed as a series of criminal acts of the same or a similar character. Every time the offence was repeated, that carries with it increased gravity.

Injury, loss or damage from offending (s 33(1)(e) of the Sentencing Act)

30. The items that were stolen were not recovered. Their value has been set out above.

Victim impact statements (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

31. No victim impact statements were before the court. That does not mean there was no impact. On the agreed facts, there was clearly a physical impact to the shop attendant who was knocked over by the offender as he left the jewellery store in Civic. It is simply that the court does not speculate or take into account any aggravating feature arising out of the level of harm suffered by a victim. Equally, the court must not draw any inference about the harm suffered by a victim from the fact that a victim impact statement is not given to the court in relation to the offence: s 53 (1) (b) of the Sentencing Act.

The victims’ vulnerability (s 33(1)(gb) of the Sentencing Act)

32. The prosecution argued that shopkeepers were an inherently vulnerable class of victim and that this should be taken into account as a matter the offender ought reasonably to have appreciated. I have taken that into account, although as counsel for the offender fairly submitted, this was not a taxi driver or front-line worker, and the offences all occurred during daylight with numerous staff members on duty and bystanders in the area.

The offender’s degree of responsibility in the offending (s 33(1)(i) of the Sentencing Act)

33. The offender accepts that he was entirely responsible for his conduct.

Plea of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act) and assistance to authorities (ss 33(1)(l) and 36 of the Sentencing Act)

34. The court may impose a lesser period than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offences: s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act. If it does so, the penalty that would otherwise have been imposed but for the guilty plea must be explicitly stated: s 37(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act.

35. The applicable discount for a guilty plea is a matter of discretion: Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 at [37]-[38]. It is necessary to consider the particular circumstances in which the plea was entered, being the statutory matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act. Some of those matters are addressed separately elsewhere in these reasons, such as the seriousness of the offence and the impact of the offence on victims.

36. Utilitarian value is a primary consideration: Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46; 19 ACTLR 99 at [47] and R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 at [49].

37. While the discretion under s 35 of the Sentencing Act remains unfettered, a principled approach to its exercise enhances consistency and a degree of predictability, which in turn furthers the interests and administration of justice through the ability of legal practitioners to reliably advise their clients and the confidence of the community arising from that consistency.

38. Here, the pleas of guilty were indicated early and were entered prior to a brief of evidence. While the pleas followed negotiations between the parties, it does not appear that these offences were the product of the offender receiving any benefit from the negotiations such as to reduce the discretionary discount that might otherwise be awarded for an early guilty plea. I consider that the utilitarian value of each of the pleas is high.

39. However, the prosecution has submitted that the case against the offender in respect of each offence was “overwhelmingly strong” such that s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act applies. That section provides that the court: ... must not make any significant reduction for the fact that the offender pleaded guilty if, based on established facts, the court considers that the prosecution’s case for the offence was overwhelmingly strong.

40. In that regard, the following principles apply: (a) If the court considers the prosecution’s case was overwhelmingly strong, s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act is enlivened, although this does not preclude the giving of a limited discount for the guilty plea, nor does it preclude a discount for other factors: R v Newby [2022] ACTCA 20; 367 FLR 122 (Newby) at [49]. (b) If the court does not form the view that the case was “overwhelmingly” strong, the strength of the prosecution case becomes irrelevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion in applying any discount for a plea of guilty: Cooke (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 44; 18 ACTLR 204 at [47]. (c) Overwhelming means: “so great as to render opposition useless” (Newby at [31]). In context, it suggests that an acquittal is realistically unlikely and calls for “a practical assessment of the reality of the situation”. It does not mean “so high a hurdle that it can never be met”. (d) Where the prosecution argues for the application of s 35(4) of the Sentencing Act, or that subsection is the subject of a specific submission, the court is required to address the issue and give a clear and express explanation of the reasons for the conclusion expressed: Newby at [39]-[43]. (e) In assessing whether the strength of the case was overwhelming, the court may take into account admissions, as they form part of the evidence upon which an assessment of the prosecution case must be made: R v Snowden [2022] ACTSC 186 (Snowden) at [44], citing R v Garay (No 4) [2022] ACTSC 138 at [114]. (f) If the court finds that the prosecution’s case was overwhelmingly strong, the court will be required to grapple with what constitutes a “significant reduction”, which may vary from case to case. It may be relevant to consider the significance of a reduction by reference to the percentage by which the sentence is to be reduced, or, where the head sentence is a long one, the period of the reduction: Snowden at [47], cited in DPP v Jesse Draper (a pseudonym) [2023] ACTSC 109 at [35]. (g) Although the making of admissions may impact upon the conclusion reached as to whether a particular case is overwhelming, they may also separately be taken into account in assessing the offender’s willingness to facilitate the course of justice, which reflects upon his remorse, contrition and likelihood of reoffending: Snowden at [48].

41. That last point has significance here, where the offender made an admission in respect of the sixth theft charge and also turned himself in. In that way, he has provided assistance to law enforcement authorities. The court may decide whether to “impose a lesser penalty for the offence, and the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed” taking into account various matters set out in s 36(3) of the Sentencing Act. They include: (a) The effect of the offence on the victim and those associated with the victim who made a victim impact statement; (b) The value of the assistance; (c) The reliability of the information provided; (d) The nature of the assistance; (e) The timeliness of the assistance; (f) Any benefits that the offender gained because of the assistance; (g) Whether the assistance is in relation to the offence for which the offender is being sentenced or an unrelated offence; and (h) If the offender is to serve a sentence of imprisonment, the likelihood that the offender will commit further offences after release from imprisonment.

42. Other considerations not material to the present circumstances include whether the offender will suffer harsher custodial conditions, or risks of danger to the offender or his family because of the assistance.

43. The applicable principles for reductions in penalty for assistance to authorities were summarised in R v Ngata [2015] ACTSC 356 at [55]-[58] and I incorporate those principles without repeating them in full here.

44. I accept that in relation to the sixth charge, due to the offender’s admission, the prosecution had an overwhelming case. While the discount under s 35 would be in the vicinity of 8%, the offender is entitled to a significant discount under s 36 for handing himself in and admitting the conduct less than a week after the sixth theft occurred. The assistance provided overlaps with the utilitarian value in that regard. Taking all those matters into account, a 25% discount is appropriate, noting that the majority of that discount is attributable to s 36 considerations.

45. With regard to the other offences, my view is that they were very strong cases but not overwhelming. In respect of the robbery offence, I have accepted the submissions made by the offender, in that the quality of the CCTV footage and the photograph were unknown and the stolen objects were not recovered in the offender’s possession. Applying the principles set out above, the strength of the case does not impact upon what would otherwise be a 25% discount having regard to the utilitarian value discussed above.

Pre-sentence custody

46. The offender was arrested on 30 October 2024 after turning himself in. He has been in custody since that date. As at the date of sentence, he has spent 272 days in custody, which will be taken into account here by partially backdating the sentence (I have allocated the time in custody to the sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court for reasons that will become apparent).

Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

47. The offender was on conditional liberty at the time of the offending, as he was subject to a suspended sentence at the time that these latest offences were committed. That is an aggravating factor on sentence. He also has a lengthy criminal history which contains numerous relevant entries. While the offender accepts these matters will heighten specific deterrence as an objective on this sentence, the conclusion is not straightforward due to the presence of social disadvantage and psychological factors, discussed separately below.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

48. The picture of the offender’s subjective circumstances was garnered from the report prepared by Ms Vanessa Edwige, psychologist, dated 3 July 2025, the DASL Suitability Assessment dated 7 July 2025 (Suitability Assessment) and the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Assessment report dated 14 July 2025. Ms Edwige was not required for cross-examination and I accept her evidence.

49. The offender is 41. He has been with his current partner for approximately 15 years, and they have a seven-year-old girl together. His partner has regular employment at a university. The offender also had employment in the construction industry.

50. His parents separated when he was 3-4 years of age and, without detailing the offender’s family background which is explained in detail in the reports, there is no doubt that the offender experienced social disadvantage from birth, including physical, emotional and sexual abuse at different points in his childhood years and experiencing homelessness during his teenage years.

51. On the evidence of Ms Edwige, I accept that the principles deriving from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 concerning the social disadvantage experienced by the offender, which have in turn had consequences for the offender’s mental health, apply here. The offender has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and various psychological disorders. Again, it is unnecessary to set them out in a public judgment.

52. I have applied those principles in accordance with what was said in R v Ruwhiu [2023] ACTCA 18 at [126], approved in Henderson v The King [2024] ACTCA 3 at [56]. Although a causal nexus is not required, there was evidence of that here and I accept the offender’s moral culpability is reduced. As submitted by the offender, and as I have said in other judgments where offenders had similar circumstances, while the offender’s social deprivation does not excuse the offending itself, it does feature in crafting a sentence that is designed to support the offender in overcoming the disadvantage he has suffered. This is one instance where the law and social justice most closely cooperate.

53. The parties have also submitted on the operation of the Verdins principles, derived from the case of the same name R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269. This includes the impact of the offender’s underlying mental conditions on his experience in custody. The principles were discussed in Higgins v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 26 at [40]-[45], with the Court of Appeal noting that the principles recognise the potential effect of a mental disability in any given case (citing Aslan v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 114 at [34]) and call for a discretionary evaluation as to the significance of the operation of those principles in the broader sentencing process. I accept that the offender’s numerous psychological disorders means that a sentence of full-time custody would weigh more heavily upon him (s 33(1)(r) of the Sentencing Act).

Reason for the offending (s 33(1)(v) of the Sentencing Act)

54. The offender’s reasons for offending have been taken into account as part of the motivation discussed in relation to objective seriousness. The offender was affected by illicit substances at the time of the offences being committed (s 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act). Drug addiction is a key feature underlying the totality of the conduct for which the offender is being sentenced. It has fed maladaptive coping strategies (borrowing the language from Ms Edwige) that have now become a compulsion in repeated shoplifting, a matter that was accepted by the offender. Addressing the offender’s drug addiction will not turn back the clock on his disadvantage or treat the psychological consequences of that disadvantage, but it is likely to remove one of the barriers to such treatment, with the ultimate goal of reducing recidivism and thereby protecting the community in the longer term.

Probable effect of any sentence or order of the offender’s family/dependants (s 33(1)(o) of the Sentencing Act)

55. The fact that the offender has a seven-year-old child who lives with him is a matter that adds weight to the proposed course of a sentence of imprisonment that is served by a treatment order.

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

56. The offender gave evidence under oath as to his remorse, by way of a statement which he had prepared. I accept that evidence. It speaks not only to an appreciation of the reality for commercial victims in that offences such as his not only affect businesses but the people who work in them. He says he does not want to be a “career criminal” and he was able to succeed in not offending for six years without any help. However, he believes that he is at a point in his life where he needs support to succeed in an outside setting in the longer term.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

57. I am mindful of the need to ensure consistency in sentencing practice, accepting that the objective in doing so is not to bind the sentencing court to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48]. Although I was not referred to any specific cases in this regard, I have taken into account the authorities referred to in the parties’ submissions. The difficulty here is the commonality of the crimes and the subjective factors unique to this offender. Part of the offender’s own criminal history provides assistance in ensuring that current sentencing practice considerations are met. Breach of a good behaviour order

58. In relation to the breach of the good behaviour order, the task for the court is governed by s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA Act), the relevant parts of which are as follows: Cancellation of good behaviour order with suspended sentence order (1) This section applies if— (a) an offender’s good behaviour order was made under the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005, section 12 (3) (Suspended sentences) on the offender’s conviction for an offence; and (b) a court is satisfied the offender has breached any of the offender’s good behaviour obligations. (2) The court must cancel the good behaviour order and either— (a) impose the suspended sentence imposed for the offence; or (b) re-sentence the offender for the offence. ... (4) The Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 applies to the re-sentencing in the same way that it applies to the sentencing of an offender on conviction for the offence. ...

59. Applying s 110(2) of the CSA Act, the court must cancel the good behaviour order (GBO) and decide whether to impose the suspended sentence imposed for the offence, or re-sentence the offender for the offence.

Applicable legal principles

60. The applicable principles are uncontroversial but are repeated generally here for convenience. In determining the appropriate response to the breach of a GBO in any given case, various factors may arise for consideration. Non-exhaustively, they include the following: (a) The proportion of the term of the good behaviour order that had been served without breach: R v Curtis (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 34 (Curtis) at [18]; (b) Any rehabilitation attained by the offender prior to the breach: Curtis at [18]; (c) The nature of the offence which breached the order, including whether it is similar to the offence for which the sentence of imprisonment, then suspended, was imposed: Curtis at [18]; (d) The relative seriousness of the offence so that the imposition of the suspended sentence would be disproportionate to the gravity of the breach offending: Curtis at [18]; (e) The prospects of the offender's rehabilitation: Curtis at [18]; (f) The actual facts of the matter for which the offender was first sentenced: R v Beniamini (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 32 at [53]; (g) Whether the breach indicates an intention to disregard the obligation to be of good behaviour: Bukulaptji v The Queen [2009] NTCCA 7; 24 NTLR 210 at [35], cited in The Queen v PM (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 358 (PM) at [22]; (h) Whether the offender has received any warnings about the consequences of breaches: PM at [22]; (i) The level of understanding of the offender of their obligations under the terms of the order and the consequences of the breach: PM at [22]; and (j) The nature of judicial and community resources previously devoted to the offender: R v Bennett [2017] ACTSC 104 at [11].

61. There is no presumption in favour of imposing the original sentence that had been suspended: Guy v Anderson [2013] ACTSC 5 (Anderson) at [83].

62. However, there are many statements by courts across multiple jurisdictions of the principle that, generally, a breach of the conditions of a GBO or the like following the suspension of a sentence will result in the offender serving the sentence that was suspended: see, for example, R v Buckman (1987) 47 SASR 303 at 304; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Cooke [2007] NSWCA 2; 168 A Crim R 379 (Cooke) at 386; Taylor v Bowden [2009] ACTSC 13 at [36]; Saga v Reid [2010] (Saga) ACTSC 59 at [99]–[101], all of which were cited by Refshauge J in Anderson at [87]. The reason for this is to recognise that the offender avoided serving full-time imprisonment by entering into a GBO: Taylor v R [2020] NSWCCA 355 at [21], citing PM at [19] and Saga at [99]– [101].

63. In Cooke, Howie JA stated at [23]: ... There is nothing more likely to bring suspended sentences into disrepute than the failure of courts to act where there has been a clear breach of the conditions of the bond by which the offender avoided being sent to prison. ... [I]f offenders do not treat the obligations imposed upon them by the bond seriously and if courts are not rigorous in revoking the bond upon breach in the usual case, both offenders and the public in general will treat them as being nothing more than a legal fiction designed to allow an offender to escape the punishment that he or she rightly deserved.

64. It is for this reason that I have previously referred to the importance of the court enforcing the statutory regime. If that is not done by the imposition of the suspended sentence, the objective may equally be achieved by re-sentencing the offender in a manner that properly reflects the fact of the breach, so that the suspended sentence regime created by the Sentencing Act does not fall into disrepute: DPP v JJ (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 74 at [29]. In that regard, where the court exercises the discretion to re-sentence an offender under s 110(2)(b) of the CSA Act, the imposition of a more severe sentence is an alternative that may well be appropriate. It will promote respect for the law and, in turn, the maintenance of a just and safe society, being one of the objects of sentencing: s 6 of the Sentencing Act. That is a view that I have previously expressed in cases such as DPP v Beroukas (No 2) [2024] ACTSC 294 at [14] and I continue to adhere to it.

65. That is not to say that the sentence imposed should increase in every case where re-sentencing occurs as a result of a breach. A minor or technical breach of a GBO that occurs close to the end of the period of the suspended sentence and with a reasonable explanation for the breach is an example where it may not be appropriate to impose the original custodial sentence, nor to impose a more severe sentence. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the court to impose the same sentence that was imposed at first instance: Curtis at [16], cited in DPP v Hagen (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 386 at [20]. The legislation expressly does not fetter the court’s discretion in any particular way (including on a re-sentence).

Should the court impose the suspended sentence or resentence?

66. The following considerations have been taken into account in the present case: (a) The offending commenced less than two weeks after the sentence for the initial burglary offence was imposed, such that no steps towards rehabilitation had been taken. (b) The conduct that caused the offender to breach the GBO was of a similar nature to the original offence. (c) The breaches constituted habitual stealing from shops, evincing a series of poor decisions. Viewing the breaches in totality, the inference is that the offender acted in complete disregard of his obligations under the GBO. (d) The conduct that constituted the breach was a series of criminal offences. That fact itself constitutes a serious breach of the grant of conditional liberty. These were not trivial breaches. (e) Given the nature, number and timing of the breaches, the imposition of the original sentence would not be a disproportionate outcome.

67. Taking those above matters into account, it is appropriate that the original sentence be imposed, save that instead of describing the sentence as nine months, I will refer to it as eight months and 28 days (or four weeks) so as to align the completion of that sentence with the entirety of the period that the offender has spent in custody since his application for bail was refused, as well as the intake date specified by the relevant treatment provider for the rehabilitation program discussed below. To the extent that the different description might result in a calculation of a period of time that is a day or two shorter, it has no practical consequence here once adjustments for totality considerations are applied. However, it produces what I consider to be the appropriate outcome, which is to separate the earlier sentence imposed by the Magistrates Court from any drug and alcohol treatment order going forward.

Totality

68. The approach to principles of concurrency and accumulation has been set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited).

69. Having regard to those principles and the amount of time that the offender has already spent in custody, the sentence should be structured so that each individual sentence is cumulative to a degree. That is to recognise the different dates and different victims of the offences, save as to the burglary offence and the fifth theft offence which occurred as part of the one course of conduct. For these latter offences, I consider total concurrency to be appropriate as the sentence comprehends the criminality of both offences.

70. However, a substantial degree of concurrency is also appropriate to avoid a crushing effect of the total length of the sentence on this offender, and to give effect to the Bugmy and considerations.

Disposition

71. A reparation order (in addition to a term of imprisonment) was sought, but having heard from the offender at the hearing as to his financial circumstances (taken into account pursuant to s 33(1)(n) of the Sentencing Act), knowing that the offences were committed in part out of financial stress, and in light of the rehabilitative steps that I consider are necessary, I am not persuaded that is an appropriate course to take here.

72. I accept the offender’s submissions that this offender is not an appropriate legal vehicle to prioritise general deterrence and even, to some extent, denunciation. I am also doubtful about specific deterrence given what the offender has told me about what gaol is presently doing to deter him from further offending. This offender requires a more nuanced approach to deterrence, and in this case, that is through targeting the criminogenic risk factors with wrap-around support, decreasing over the next four years to a point where his rehabilitation will see him drug-free, crime-free and being the parent to his daughter that he never had.

73. Dealing first with the formal requirements for a Treatment Order to be made: (a) The offender has consented to the Treatment Order and will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: ss 12A(2)(c) and 12A(2)(a)(iii) of the Sentencing Act. (b) On the reports provided to the court, the offender is both eligible and suitable for a Treatment Order: ss 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. (c) There are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.

74. Having taken into account the relevant sentencing considerations as set out above and the objects of a Treatment Order, I have formed the view that a Treatment Order is appropriate for this offender: ss 12A(2)(b) and 80O of the Sentencing Act. That is primarily because it is the method of intervention that is most likely to succeed in removing the criminogenic factor that was a significant contributing factor to the conduct that forms the sentences under consideration.

75. Having heard from the treatment team through their reports, and from the offender himself, I further accept that commencing by way of a day program will be beneficial for this offender, providing a degree of flexibility initially to allow him to settle into the course of rehabilitation, while giving those administering the Treatment Order options to move him into residential rehabilitation if that becomes appropriate in due course. Canberra Recovery Hub is available to induct him today. In short, there is force in the view of the report writer that commencing on a day program may assist the offender to successfully complete the program in the long term.

76. Accordingly, I will make a Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act. The length of the sentence and the proportion of the Treatment Order have been crafted to give the treatment team and the subsequent supervisory team administering the good behaviour component of the order maximum flexibility to increase or reduce their supports and conditions as they deem appropriate. Orders

77. The orders of the Court are as follows: (1) For the first offence of theft (CAN 12161/2024), contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven months and 14 days (reduced from nine months and 29 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 15 August 2027 and conclude on 28 March 2028. (2) For the second offence of theft (CAN 10564/2024), contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of seven months and 14 days (reduced from nine months and 29 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 December 2027 and conclude on 14 July 2028. (3) For the third offence of theft (CAN 9126/2024), contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months (reduced from eight months on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 20 April 2028 and conclude on 19 October 2028. (4) For the fourth offence of theft (CAN 4657/2025), contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of four months (reduced from five months and 11 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 15 April 2025 and conclude on 14 August 2025. (5) For the fifth offence of theft (CAN 11606/2024) contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of eight months (reduced from 10 months and 21 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 10 December 2026 and conclude on 9 August 2027. (6) For the sixth offence of theft (CAN 412/2025) contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 16 months (reduced from 21 months and 10 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 August 2025 and conclude on 30 November 2026. (7) For the offence of burglary (CAN 11270/2024) contrary to s 311 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 months (reduced from 13 months and 11 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 10 December 2026 and conclude on 9 October 2027. (8) For the offence of robbery (CAN 10881/2024) contrary to s 309 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months (reduced from 16 months on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 March 2026 and conclude on 28 February 2027. (9) In respect of the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court on 7 February 2024 (CC2023/10790), the good behaviour order is cancelled and a sentence of eight months and 28 days’ imprisonment is imposed to commence on 30 October 2024 and conclude on 27 July 2025. (10) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Patrick Michael Tate in respect of the eligible offence of theft (CAN 412/2025) for which he has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to imprisonment for 16 months. (11) That Treatment Order is extended to the eligible offences of theft, burglary and robbery, for which Mr Tate has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years, six months and five days in total. (12) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (13) The Treatment Order is for three years and two months and 22 days from today, 28 July 2025 to conclude on 19 October 2028. (14) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for 18 months from today, 28 July 2025 to 27 January 2027. (15) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 28 July 2025, until 19 October 2028. (16) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Patrick Michael Tate is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the CSA Act from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 28 January 2027, until the end of the total sentence, 19 October 2028, with a probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (17) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: a. The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the CSA Act are hereby imposed. b. Mr Tate is to travel to Canberra Recovery Hub on 28 July 2025 and admit himself to the drug rehabilitation (day) program at that facility by 1:00pm. c. Mr Tate is directed to complete the drug rehabilitation (day) program at Canberra Recovery Hub or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. d. Mr Tate is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. e. Mr Tate is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. f. Should Mr Tate leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. g. Mr Tate is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. h. Mr Tate is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven [77] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: