DOY22 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 389

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04(h) of the Rules.

1. In this matter the applicant is challenging a migration decision under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant seeks constitutional writ relief against the respondents in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 11 May 2018 which affirmed an earlier decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the first applicant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (protection visa) under s 65 of the Act.

1. On 26 March 2018, the applicant, a citizen of Sierra Leone, arrived in Australia to participate in the 2018 Commonwealth Games as a holder of a subclass GG408 (Temporary Activity) visa.
2. On 14 May 2018, the applicant lodged an application for a protection visa.
3. On 26 July 2018, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant him a protection visa on the basis that they were not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect to whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2) of the Act.
4. On 7 August 2018, the applicant lodged an application for review of the delegate's decision with the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as it then was.
5. On 4 October 2022, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. The applicant, a member of the Mande Tribe and a Muslim, claimed he feared he would be targeted by members of the Poro Society for forced initiation into the society and subjected to violence if he were to return to Sierra Leone. The applicant claims his father held a significant role within the Poro society, a men's secret society, and that his father made an agreement with the society that the applicant would join the society upon his father's death and take up his father's role.
2. The applicant claimed that the authorities of Sierre Leone could not or would not protect him if he was to return to Sierra Leone as the ruling party is entirely occupied by members of the Poro Society. The applicant also claimed he could not relocate within Sierra Leone as the Poro Society operated throughout Sierra Leone.
3. The Tribunal made the following findings in relation to his claim to being a purported male descendant of a Poro Society chief:

(a) At Tribunal Decision (TD) [47]: the Tribunal found applicant's evidence lacked detail and in particular he could not provide specifics as to dates and the timing of his discussions with his late father about when he would join the Poro Society. The Tribunal found the alleged discussions between the applicant and his father to be vague, and due to the significance of these discussions, it found it was implausible that the applicant did not have a clear and detailed recollection of these discussions.

(b) At TD [48]: the Tribunal found it was implausible that the applicant was not forcibly initiated into the Poro Society given his claim that his father was traditional and played a prominent role in the Poro Society, and was not convinced that the applicant's father was prepared to wait for him to voluntarily join the society given he claimed that his father held a prominent role in the society and the head of his family.

(c) At TD [49]: the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence regarding reasons he provided to the Poro Society members about his inability to join their society in December 2017 were vague and inconsistent, and that Country information suggested that candidates that were not able to attend initiations voluntarily were often kidnapped by the Poro Society and forcibly initiated.

(d) At TD [50]: The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence about when he moved to Freetown to live with his aunty was different to the evidence given by the applicant's aunt, and the Tribunal rejected the applicant's explanation he was not good on dates and times and not accept that the applicant is unable to recall the details and timing of significant events such has his move from living with his parents in Bo to living in Freetown to undertake his high school studies.

(e) At TD [51]: Given the Country information and the claims of the applicant that he had informed the Poro society members that he would join them in April 2018, at the time of the Commonwealth Games, the Tribunal did not accept that the society members who had visited him would not have become aware of his activities and his selection to travel to Australia, and thus intervened and confronted the applicant at one of his regular training or competition locations.

(f) At TD [52]: The Tribunal found for the reasons in [47]-[51] it did not accept that the applicant's father was a Poro society Chief or 'big man' and the Tribunal equally did not accept that the applicant was approached by five men of that society in Freetown seeking him to join the society and take up his father's former role within the society.

(g) At TD [53]: The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he faced a real risk of significant harm from being a purported male descendant of a Poro society chief. The Tribunal found that the applicant's fears as to this claim were not genuine.

1. In relation the applicant's claim relating to his fear of harm arising from him being a member of the All People's Congress (APC), the Tribunal at [54]-[58] found on the evidence that it did not accept that the applicant had an actual or imputed APC political profile or that APC members and supporters were being targeted now or will do so in the reasonably foreseeable future. It was not satisfied that the destruction of the applicant's father's house was connected to the applicant's political activities. In making its finding relating to the applicant's role in the ACP, the Tribunal referred to Country information and found that he would not be harmed by reason of his support for the APC.
2. The Tribunal at [59]-[60] dealt with the claim that he would face persecution by reason of being a failed asylum seeker from Australia. The Tribunal referred to Country information and found that the applicant would not face persecution by reason of his status as a high profile failed asylum seeker from Australia.
3. As to the claim by the applicant that he has concerns that he will be unable to find work and support his family if he were to return to Sierra Leone, at [61] the Tribunal did not accept that he would not be able to gain employment and be able to support himself and his family if he was to return to Sierra Leone.
4. The Tribunal found at [62]-[69] that the applicant did not satisfy the refugee or the complementary protection criteria under the Act and affirmed the delegate's decision to not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

1. On 7 November 2022, the applicant filed in this Court an application for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision. The application included five grounds of review, they are (as written):
   1. The Tribunal's finding that the Applicant's father was not a Poro Society chief was unreasonable and illogical.
   2. The Tribunal was mistaken the fact that the applicant spoke to his father about initiation at 12, not to be initiated at 12, the Tribunal's reasons to reject the applicant's explanation as to why he was not initiated in his adolescence was based on assumptions, not the evidence in the country information.
   3. The Tribunal's finding that the applicant was not approached by five men of the secret society in Freetown seeking him to join the society was not based on evidence.
   4. The Tribunal's findings on the applicant's poor credibility based on poor memories or objectively minor matter of fact was illogical and constitute a jurisdictional error.
   5. The Tribunal failed to conduct a review.
2. On 27 July 2023, a registrar of this Court made a procedural orders, including that, upon the matter being listed for hearing, the applicant file and serve at least 28 days before the hearing a written submission, any amended application with proper particulars of the grounds of the application and any additional evidence on which the applicant seeks to rely.
3. The applicant did not take up the opportunity to provide the Court with a written submission.
4. On 19 November 2025, the first respondent filed a written submission.
5. On 2 October 2025, the proceedings were docketed to me and set down before me for final hearing on 2 December 2025.
6. On 2 December 2025, I made orders adjourning the final hearing until 21 January 2026.

1. At the hearing of this matter on 21 January 2026, the applicant appeared unrepresented and was assisted by a Krio interpreter. Ms I Celata of HWL Ebsworth appeared for the first respondent.
2. At the hearing I invited the applicant to make any submissions in support of his application. In summary, he made the following oral submissions at the hearing:

(a) He disagreed with the factual finding in TD [52] that the Tribunal did not accept the applicant's father was a Poro society Chief;

(b) He disagreed with the Country Information regarding the Poro Society in Sierra Leone, in particular he disagreed with the factual conclusion reached by the Tribunal in TD [42] that it was implausible that the applicant was not initiated in his adolescence (at the age of 12 years) into the society forcibly or otherwise by his father given his father's alleged role within the society. He said the practice was not as strict as the Country Information had outlined, and that it was true that his father was prepared to wait "believing he would later convince the applicant to voluntarily join the society".

(c) He disagreed with the factual finding in TD [52] that the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was approached by five men of that society in Freetown seeking him to join the society and take up or take over his father's former role within that secret society. He submitted that the Tribunal should have accepted his evidence that they did approach him at his auntie's house in Freetown in December 2017.

1. Ms Celata made brief oral submissions summarising the first respondent's written submissions on the five grounds in the application. In relation to the matters which the applicant submitted orally at the hearing (outlined above) Ms Celata submitted that all those matters went to the merit of the claims made in the Tribunal by the applicant and they could not be reviewed in this Court under s 476 of the Act.

1. The issue before this Court is whether the Tribunal's decision contained a material jurisdictional error; that is, a serious legal error that results in an administrative decision lacking any legal force: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [2] and Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 264 CLR 421.
2. In deciding this issue, the Court does not consider the merits of the decision; nor can I re-consider factual findings, or it remake the decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 (Djokovic).
3. I agree with Ms Celata's submission at the hearing that all the matters raised by the applicant orally before me (outlined above) were matters that only went only to the merits of the Tribunal decision. In my view they did not raise any arguable jurisdictional errors made by the Tribunal. It is not open to this Court in judicial review applications to re-consider factual matters, such those made by the Tribunal in TD [47], [52] and [57].
4. Below I set out my consideration of the written grounds of the applicant's application.

1. Ground 1 alleges that the Tribunal's finding in paragraph [52] that the applicant's father was not a Poro Society chief was "unreasonable and illogical".
2. At the hearing the applicant did not make any submissions directly about why the finding in paragraph [52] was legally unreasonable or illogical. In summary, he submitted that he disagreed with the finding in paragraph [52] and submitted that the Tribunal was mistaken about this finding.
3. The first respondent in written submissions contended that the Tribunal gave cogent reasons for rejecting the applicant's claim that his father was a Poro Society Chief ([46]-[52]). The first respondent submitted the Tribunal reasoned that if the applicant's father was a traditional man, who was a Poro Society Chief, the applicant would have been initiated into the society when he was around 12 years old. The Tribunal reached that conclusion having regard to country information and inconsistencies in the applicant's evidence. It was submitted that the matters relied on by the Tribunal provided a reasonable and logical basis for its conclusion.
4. In Djokovic, the Full Court summarised the principles relevant to legal unreasonableness based on illogicality (or irrationality) (citations omitted):

[33] The characterisation of a decision (or a state of satisfaction) as legally unreasonable because of illogicality or irrationality is not easily made: ... .

[34] The task in assessing illogicality is not an exercise in logical dialectic. "Not every lapse of logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A Court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case": ... . It is the ascertainment, through understanding the approach of the decision-maker and characterising the reasoning process, of whether the decision (or state of satisfaction) is so lacking a rational or logical foundation that the decision (or relevant state of satisfaction) was one that no rational or logical decision-maker could reach, such that it was not a decision (or state of satisfaction) contemplated by the provision in question. Some lack of logic present in reasoning may only explain why a mistake of fact had been made which can be seen to be an error made within jurisdiction. ... [T]he evaluation of whether a decision was made within lawful boundaries is not definitional, but one of characterisation and whether the decision was sufficiently lacking in rational foundation, having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of power, that it cannot be said to be within the range of possible lawful outcomes.

[35] Ultimately, the question is whether the satisfaction of the relevant state of affairs or matter was irrational, illogical or not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds: ... , such that it cannot be said to be possible for the conclusion to be made or the satisfaction reached logically or rationally on the available material. It will then satisfy the characterisation of unjust, arbitrary or capricious.

1. In EUD24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 128 the Full Court held that Djokovic extended the ground of illogicality or irrationality to critical or intermediate findings of fact, not just the ultimate conclusion.
2. As the first respondent submitted, and I accept, the threshold to be met for any allegation of illogicality or irrationality is high: see Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 610 per Crennan and Bell JJ at [130]-[131].
3. At TD [46]-[51], the Tribunal set out its reasons for rejecting the applicant's claim that his father was a Poro Society District Chief in TD [52]. In summary the Tribunal made this finding based on the following reasoning:

(a) there was a lack of evidence about the applicant's claim of being a male descendent of the Poro Society Chief, after his father died, and a lack of particulars as to the claim that he feared serious harm from the initiation process to replace his father in that society, including the claim that the initiation process is a barbaric ceremony where young candidates are taken into the bush and circumcised and then left by the society to fend for themselves for a period of several months, and that many candidates disappear and those who have already been circumcised are subjected to other torturous acts, and this serious harm can be fatal (see TD [46]);

(b) there was a lack of detail about his discussions with his father as to when he would join the Poro Society, and that, given the significance of these discussions to both the applicant and his purported Poro Chief father, it seems implausible that the applicant would not have a clear and detailed recollection of these matters and be able to provide a detailed recollection to the Tribunal (see TD [47]);

(c) the applicant's evidence as to his interactions with his father and the men from the Poro society was generally not consistent with the Country information as to the practices of the Poro Society, and that the explanation for why he was not initiated into the society in his adolescence as is the normal practice was not consistent with country information about the Poro Society (see TD [48]);

(d) the applicant's vague evidence about meetings with Poro Society members about his initiation into the society was inconsistent with country information, which suggests that candidates who do not attend initiations voluntarily are often kidnapped and forcibly initiated (see TD [49]);

(e) the applicant gave unreliable evidence about the details and timing of significant events such has moving from living with his parents in Bo to living in Freetown to undertake his high school studies (see TD [50]);

(f) it did not accept, based on country information, that the Poro Society members who had visited him would not have become aware of his activities and his selection to travel to Australia and thus intervened and confronted the applicant at one of his regular training or competition locations (see TD [51]).

1. In my view, the finding in TD [52], based on the reasoning in TD [46]-[51], that the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant's father was a Poro society Chief, or 'big man' was reasonably open on the evidence. It was not an unreasonable or illogical finding. It was a finding that fell "within the range of possible lawful outcomes", applying Djokovic. The reasons in TD [46]-[51] provided a logical basis for the Tribunal's finding that it did not accept that the applicant's father was a Poro society Chief in TD [52].
2. Ground 1 is rejected.

1. In this ground the applicant alleges that the Tribunal made a mistake of fact about the finding as to when the applicant was to be initiated into the Poro Society. The applicant made oral submissions on this factual finding at the hearing (outlined above).
2. The first respondent submitted that the factual findings on this factual matter were reasonably open to the Tribunal, based on the applicant's evidence, and on country information.
3. The Tribunal summarised the evidence regarding his initiation into Poro Society given by the applicant to the Tribunal at TD [33 e] and [33 g].
4. At TD [48], the Tribunal found that the applicant's evidence on the issue of age of initiation into Poro Society was consistent with country information, which indicated that candidates were usually initiated in their adolescence. However, the Tribunal rejected the applicant's explanation about why he was not initiated at that time. As to this aspect of the applicant's evidence, the Tribunal found as follows at TD [48]:
   1. ...As to this issue, the applicant provided an explanation to the Tribunal as outlined above at paragraph 33 at g. in which he states that was initiated at 12 years of age as he had told his father he did not want to join and that his father was prepared to wait, believing he would later convince the applicant to voluntarily join the society. This explanation is not accepted by the Tribunal given the applicant's earlier evidence that his father was a traditional Mande tribal man and Poro Chief who was the leader of the applicant's household. Given his father's role as the head of his family and a Poro chief when considering the relevant Country information and the applicant's own evidence the Tribunal rejects this explanation offered by the applicant as to why he was not initiated into the society in his adolescence as is the normal practice.
5. It was reasonably open to the Tribunal to make this factual finding rejecting the applicant's explanation about why he was not initiated when he was 12 years old. It is well accepted that a Tribunal's fact-finding (including factual findings regarding Country Information) are not reviewable in this Court if the findings of fact were reasonably open to the Tribunal: see Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
6. At the hearing the applicant criticised the Tribunal for making findings based on Country Information which the applicant considered was not accurate, regarding the practices within the Poro society about initiating young boys into the society. However, it is well established that the choice of country information, the weight afforded to country information and any consideration regarding the accuracy of country information is a matter for the decision-maker: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]- [13]; DAK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 68 at [27] and CRG16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 374 at [56]. The choice and interpretation of country information is also a factual matter for the Tribunal: NBKT v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 156 FCR 419.
7. For these reasons ground 2 is rejected.

1. Ground 3 is a complaint that the finding the applicant was not approached by five men of the secret society in Freetown seeking him to join the society was not based on evidence. The applicant made oral submissions on this factual finding at the hearing (outlined above).
2. The first respondent submitted that the Tribunal considered the applicant's claim of being approached by members of the Poro Society, but was not satisfied that it was plausible because:

(1) the applicant gave inconsistent evidence about his conversation with the five men; and

(2) it was public knowledge that the applicant would leave Sierra Leone for the Commonwealth Games, such that those members would have confronted the applicant before he left the country (TD [49] - [51]).

1. The finding that is challenged in this ground is found at TD [52]. The relevant part of that paragraph is as follows (emphasis added):
   1. For the reasons above the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant's father was a Poro society Chief or 'Big Man' and the Tribunal equally does not accept that the applicant was approached by five men of that society in Freetown seeking him to join the society and take up or take over his father's former role within that secret society.
2. This finding was based on earlier findings made about the applicant's evidence, and on country information as to the Poro society, including their customs, practices, traditions, ethnic and political alliances. For example, at TD [48], the Tribunal found that the applicant's evidence as to his interactions with his father and the men from the Poro society are generally not consistent with the Country information as to the practices of the society. And the finding in TD [49] that:
   1. The Tribunal when considering the relevant Country information does not accept that when members of the society visited the applicant in Freetown at his Aunties home in December 2017 that they would have accepted his promise to attend for his initiation later in April 2018 and did not forcibly take the applicant then and there to live with them until his initiation into the society. As to this visit, it is also noted that the applicant gave contrary evidence as to the reasons he provided to the society members as to his inability to leave with them for induction into the society....Given the significance of this visit upon the applicant by five men from the society it is not accepted by the Tribunal that the applicant would not have a clear and detailed recollection of the conversations he had with these men. It is noted in that regard that the applicant's recollection is of a short conversation without any threats or detailed discussions as to his obligations to the society. The applicant's version seems unlikely given the serious and significant nature of this meeting both for the society members and the applicant. Notwithstanding the limited recollection offered to the Tribunal by the applicant's Aunty, Hawa Kamara of this meeting, which is in support of her nephew's evidence, the Tribunal does not accept these vague versions of the meeting as they are not consistent with the relevant Country information. This information as outlined above, suggests that candidates who do not attend initiations voluntarily are often kidnapped by the society and forcibly initiated.
3. The Tribunal when making its finding in TD [52] preferred country information as to the Poro society and its customs and culture, over the evidence of the applicant in relation to his claims. This was confirmed in paragraph [53]:
   1. Given the generally unparticularised nature of the evidence as to this claim, which the Tribunal finds not to be consistent with the relevant Country information, the Tribunal is not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant faces a real chance of persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future or that he faces a real risk of significant harm from being a purported male descendant of a Poro society chief.
4. To make out a "no evidence" ground in judicial review, the applicant must establish there was no evidence whatsoever available (not even a skerrick) to support the finding: see MZZUG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1151 at [59].
5. In BSE17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1926 (BES17) at [33] Moshinsky J said:

[33] ...The "no evidence" ground cannot be made out unless it is established that there was no evidence capable of supporting the impugned finding or inference. Even a skerrick of evidence will mean that an allegation of jurisdictional error premised on this basis will fail: MZZUG v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1151, [59]. Further, evidence to support a finding or inference need not be direct, but may be found in material that permitted the decision-maker reasonably to infer a particular matter: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32; (2004) 207 ALR 12, [39]-[41] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; see also Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321, 367 per Deane J.

1. The finding made in TD [51] was based on evidence that was before the Tribunal. It was based on the concerns the Tribunal had about the applicant's evidence about that event, and the Tribunal not being satisfied ultimately about the claims being made by the applicant about the event because it was not consistent with country information that was before it. As the Federal Court held in BES17, evidence to support a finding or inference need not be direct but may be found in material that permitted the decision-maker reasonably to infer a particular matter. This is what occurred in the present case. The "no-evidence" argument in ground 3 is rejected.
2. Further, to the extent this ground is also a challenge to the Tribunal's relying upon Country Information, then I repeat what I said above on this issue in ground 2: the choice of country information, the weight afforded to country information and any consideration regarding the accuracy of country information is a matter for the Tribunal.
3. Ground 3 does not establish jurisdictional error.

1. In this ground the applicant challenges the credibility finding of the Tribunal at TD [44]. This ground claims the Tribunal's findings on the applicant's credibility were based on poor memories or objectively minor matters of fact and was an illogical finding.
2. The applicant did not make any oral submission on this ground at the hearing before me.
3. The first respondent submitted that the credibility findings were based on lack of details about central aspects of the applicant's claims, such as the alleged conversations he had had with his father about his initiation into the Poro Society (at TD [47]), and the reasons he provided to the Poro Society members in relation to his inability to join the society in December 2017 relates to a central aspect of the applicant's claims (at TD [49]). It was submitted that it was not accurate to say that the Tribunal relied on minor inconsistencies to reject the applicant's claims, especially as they were not the only reason that the Tribunal gave for rejecting the claims.
4. The principles applicable to judicial review of credibility findings are well-established, and have been examined in a number of decisions of the Full Court of the Federal Court: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496, [36]-[38]; DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; (2018) 258 FCR 175, [30]; AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83, [41]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218, [50]-[58]; ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38, [39]-[45].
5. Recently, in CQO23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 97 (CQO23), Needham J said the following about judicial review of credibility findings:

[32] Adverse credibility findings are amenable to judicial review where the findings can be shown to be legally unreasonable, such as by being based on illogical or irrational findings or inferences of fact (BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [50] per Yates, Wheelahan and O'Bryan JJ).

[33] In addition, credibility findings must be rationally made and based upon facts having logical and probative weight, and be articulated properly; minor inconsistencies and trivial errors do not constitute a valid ground upon which an adverse credibility finding may be made (EVI19 at [36] per Stewart J, citing SZSHV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 253 at [31] per Flick J; SZLGP v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 at [25] per Gordon J. See also DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 175; [2018] FCAFC 2 at [30] per Kenny, Kerr and Perry JJ and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; [2016] FCAFC 11 at [11] per Allsop CJ).

1. In CQO23, her Honour found the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by basing its credibility on minor and trivial matters regarding the applicant's evidence given to the Tribunal.
2. CQO23 is unlike the present matter. In the present matter, I accept the first respondent's submission that the credibility finding was based on significant matters regarding the applicant's evidence and claims.
3. At TD [44] and [47] the Tribunal found that it had concerns about the plausibility of the applicant's evidence about conversations he alleged he had with his father about his initiation into Poro Society - which was a central part of the applicant's claim. It found, based on country information, as to the Poro Society including their customs, practices, traditions, ethnic and political alliances, the applicant's evidence was lacking in detail as he was unable to be specific the dates and/or timing of discussions with his father as to when he would be entering the society, that the applicant's description of discussions with his father as to when he would join the society and discussions that purportedly resulted in his father letting him make his own decision as to whether and/or when to join the society, lacked any detail. This was central to the applicant's claim, and the Tribunal found it would be implausible if the applicant did not have a detailed recollection of them and provide that recollection to the Tribunal.
4. At TD [49], the Tribunal had concerns about the applicant's credibility because of the lack of detail regarding a key part of his claim, namely a detailed recollection of conversations he had with the five men of the Poro Society who approached him at his Aunties house in Freetown in December 2017. It did not accept his version given the serious and significant nature of this meeting.
5. In my view, the credibility findings at TD [44]-[49] were based on logical and rational findings and inferences of fact. They concerned major aspects of the applicant's evidence, that were central to his claims. In my view, they did not concern minor or trivial matters: cf. CQO23.
6. Ground 4 does not disclose jurisdictional error.

1. Ground 5 merely contains a conclusory statement. It does not disclose an arguable jurisdictional error. I reject ground 5.

1. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal's decision is affected by jurisdictional error.
2. As the applicant is unrepresented, I am required to consider whether any arguable substantive jurisdictional error in the decision sought to be reviewed arises from the material before me: see MZAIB v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392 at [112] and [113]; and BSQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 943 at [27]. I am satisfied that no arguable substantive jurisdictional error arises from my review of the Tribunal decision in this matter.
3. The application is dismissed.

1. The first respondent seeks costs fixed in the sum of $5,600. The applicant did not make any submission against the making of a costs order. He submitted on this issue if an order were made that he would have to work to pay it off.
2. I consider the amount sought by the is reasonable for this type of matter. I note it is for an amount below the Court's scale. I will make an order for costs against the applicant for the amount sought by the first respondent.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Cleary.