Summary of relevant principles
10 It is convenient to repeat the summary of the relevant legal principles concerning both the subsistence of a claim for privilege and implied waiver which were set out in College of Law Limited v Australian National University [2013] FCA 492 at [23] and [24]:
23 The parties were generally agreed on the relevant principles to apply in determining both the subsistence of a claim for privilege and implied waiver. Reference was made to various authorities, including Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 (Carnell); Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101; AWB Limited v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30 (Cole); Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275 (Osland); British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing (2011) 195 FCR 123 (BATA) and Cooper v Hobbs [2013] NSWCA 70. Drawing on those authorities, the relevant principles concerning the subsistence of privilege may be summarised as follows:
(a) privilege attaches to communications between legal adviser and client for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice, where the communications are confidential and the legal advisor is acting in his or her professional capacity;
(b) the party claiming privilege bears the onus of establishing the facts necessary to establish the claim. The onus might be discharged by evidence as to the circumstances and context in which the communications occurred or the documents were brought into existence, or by evidence as to the purposes of the person who made the communication, or authored the document, or procured its creation, but might also be discharged by reference to the nature of the documents supported by argument or submissions;
(c) the existence of privilege is not established merely by using verbal formula, or by asserting that privilege applies to particular communications, or that communications are undertaken for the purpose of obtaining or giving "legal advice";
(d) …;
(e) although the concept of legal advice is reasonably broad, it does not extend to advice that is purely commercial or of a public relations character;
(f) subject to meeting the dominant purpose test, privilege extends to notes, memoranda or other documents made by officers or employees of the client that relate to information sought by the client's legal adviser to enable him or her to advise; and
(g) the Court has power to examine a document over which privilege is claimed and, where there is a disputed claim, the High Court has said that the Court should not be hesitant to exercise such a power (see Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 689). The essential purpose of such an inspection is to determine whether, on its face, the nature and contents of the document support the claim for privilege.
24 These authorities also establish the following relevant principles concerning implied waiver of privilege (noting that it is common ground here that the common law principles apply at this stage of the proceedings and not Part 3.10 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)):
(a) privilege will be waived where the conduct of the person claiming it is inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality in the relevant communication which the privilege is intended to protect;
(b) the test for implied waiver is objective, thus where such inconsistency is found, privilege will be waived regardless of the subjective intention of the party claiming the privilege;
(c) whether there is inconsistency is to be determined in the context and circumstances of the case and in the light of any considerations of fairness arising from that context and those circumstances;
(d) the question of implied waivers raise matters of fact and degree;
(e) disclosure of the gist, conclusion, substance or effect of a privileged communication does not necessarily effect a waiver of legal professional privilege in respect of the advice as a whole. Whether it does or not in a particular case depends on whether, in the circumstances of that case, the requisite inconsistency exists between the disclosure on the one hand and the maintenance of confidentiality on the other;
(f) the context includes such matters as the nature of the matter in respect of which the advice was received, the evident purpose of the person making the disclosure, and the legal and practical consequences of limited, rather than complete, disclosure; and
(g) where the party claiming privilege has disclosed or deployed the relevant information in order to achieve some forensic or other advantage for itself, or to disadvantage another person in a similar way, this may amount to conduct which is inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality which the privilege is intended to protect. Accordingly, the purpose for which the partial disclosure was made is important.
11 The High Court has stated that the same approach applies to the question of waiver at common law as under s 122(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Limited [2013] HCA 46; 250 CLR 303 (Expense Reduction) at [32]). In that case, the High Court made the following relevant observations at [45] concerning disclosure in the context of discovery:
45. Although discovery is an inherently intrusive process, it is not intended that it be allowed to affect a person's entitlement to maintain the confidentiality of documents where the law allows. It follows that where a privileged document is inadvertently disclosed, the court should ordinarily permit the correction of that mistake and order the return of the document, if the party receiving the documents refuses to do so.
12 Expense Reduction is relevant in other respects. First, for reasons which will become evident it is appropriate to note Kiefel J's remarks during the course of Counsel's argument at 307:
It does not seem so long ago that when a solicitor explained that a mistake had occurred in discovery the other side simply gave the documents back. That did not occur here, and it has taken up the resources of the Supreme Court and this Court.
13 To similar effect, at [50] the plurality noted that the need for the Courts to be concerned with the correction of error only arises if there is a dispute and that, in the case of inadvertent disclosure, "this should not often arise".
14 The approach of the High Court in Expense Reduction to the inadvertent disclosure of privileged material in discovery is different from that in England. The plurality noted at [41] that the Courts in England continue to apply the principles stated in Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 (Guinness Peat) in relation to the inadvertent disclosure of privileged or confidential documents. In particular, the plurality emphasised in [42] that, whatever be the current position in England, New South Wales Courts "should actively engage in case management in order to achieve the purposes of the [Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)]". The plurality made the following observations at [56] and [57] which, while directed to the relevant New South Wales legislation, are equally applicable because of the similarly worded terms of ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth):
56. The evident intention and the expectation of the CPA is that the court use these broad powers to facilitate the overriding purpose. Parties continue to have the right to bring, pursue and defend proceedings in the court, but the conduct of those proceedings is firmly in the hands of the court. It is the duty of the parties and their lawyers to assist the court in furthering the overriding purpose.
57 That purpose may require a more robust and proactive approach on the part of the courts. Unduly technical and costly disputes about non-essential issues are clearly to be avoided. However, the powers of the court are not at large and are not to be exercised according to a judge's individualistic idea of what is fair in a given circumstance. Rather, the dictates of justice referred to in s 58 require that in determining what directions or orders to make in the conduct of the proceedings, regard is to be had in the first place to how the overriding purpose of the CPA can be furthered, together with other relevant matters, including those referred to in s 58(2). The focus is upon facilitating a just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings, although not at all costs. The terms of the CPA assume that its purpose, to a large extent, will coincide with the dictates of justice.
15 In circumstances where some of the material which has been disclosed relates to professional advice provided by Precision's patent attorney, it is also relevant to note s 200 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), which relevantly provides:
…
(2) A communication made for the dominant purpose of a registered patent attorney providing intellectual property advice to a client is privileged in the same way, and to the same extent, as a communication made for the dominant purpose of a legal practitioner providing legal advice to a client.
(2A) A record or document made for the dominant purpose of a registered patent attorney providing intellectual property advice to a client is privileged in the same way, and to the same extent, as a record or document made for the dominant purpose of a legal practitioner providing legal advice to a client.