TIME OF CREATION OR COMMUNICATION
4 It is uncontentious that the claims for privilege are to be determined by common law principles and not pursuant to the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) because this case is concerned with an application in the nature of discovery before hearing: see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at 59-63 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) ("Esso Australia").
5 As to the first ground of appeal, it is settled legal principle that the relevant time at which a claim for privilege is to be determined is the time when the document came into existence. The relevant question is whether the document came into existence for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice or assistance. If the document satisfies that description, then it is privileged from production. The same question also applies in relation to copies of documents where the test is whether the copy itself came into existence for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice or assistance. These principles are spelt out in a number of decisions, including National Employers' Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 at 654 (per Mason J); Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 508-509 (per Brennan CJ), 543-544 (per Gaudron J); 552-553 (per McHugh J) and 569 (per Gummow J) ("Propend"); and Esso Australia at 65-66 (per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). A recent and helpful resume of the principles of legal professional privilege relevant to the obtaining and recording of legal advice was conducted by Young J in AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382 at 405-420.
6 There may be exceptional circumstances where there has been a change of purpose after the creation of the document but prior to its communication which could affect the question of privilege, given that it is the communication between lawyer and client which is protected and not the particular document itself. However, in the present case there is no evidence of such circumstances.
7 The decision in Esso Australia is important because in that case the High Court expressed the test at common law for legal professional privilege as being whether a communication is made or a document is prepared for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice or legal services. This altered the earlier prevailing test in Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, which required a claimant for privilege to show that the sole purpose of the relevant document was to seek legal advice or services.
8 The courts have recognised that legal advisers, in addition to providing legal advice, may also advise on more general and broader issues concerning the financial and commercial dealings of their clients. Although the courts have taken a pragmatic or realistic approach in circumstances where there is mixed advice given by or sought from a legal adviser, the test for privilege remains whether the dominant purpose of the creation of a document was for the provision of legal advice: see DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v InterTAN Inc (2003) 135 FCR 151; Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610. If the advice given by a legal adviser is predominately for a financial, personal or commercial purpose, as opposed to a purpose of seeking legal services or assistance, it will not be protected: Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610.
9 In relation to copy documents, Gaudron J in Propend at 543-544 concluded that legal professional privilege attaches to a copy document provided to a lawyer if the copy was made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or for use in legal proceedings. A similar view was expressed by Gummow J at 571-572, where his Honour directed attention to the circumstances in which the document was brought into existence.
10 Gaudron J, when referring to copy documents and after pointing out that legal professional privilege is not designed to protect documents themselves but rather to protect the communication which takes place between the lawyer and the client, said at 543-544:
'… a document which is brought into existence solely for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or solely for use in litigation and which is then provided to a lawyer for that purpose is, itself, a communication with the lawyer and … a privileged communication. Equally, a copy of a document made solely for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or solely for use in legal proceedings is, when provided to a lawyer for that purpose, a communication to the lawyer. … The consideration that the provision to a lawyer of a copy document is, itself, a communication different only in form from the oral communication of the contents of the original documents leads me to conclude that privilege attaches to a copy document which is provided to a lawyer if the copy was made solely for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or solely for use in legal proceedings.' (Emphasis added.)
11 Although the current test is 'dominant purpose' rather than 'sole purpose', the principles articulated by Gaudron J are applicable to the present case insofar as they concern copy documents. To attract privilege, therefore, it is necessary to show that the copy was created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice or assistance. The consequence of this may be that an original document which is not created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice and assistance, and thus was not privileged, may become privileged if a copy of it is created for that purpose. On the other hand, for example, where a document is privileged, but a copy of it is created for the purpose of commercial negotiation, this may result in the copy not being privileged.
12 The above principles are relevant in the present case because some of the advice given on the face of the documents, which we have examined, is directed to not only financial and commercial purposes but also legal purposes. Accordingly, it is not possible in the absence of any specific extrinsic evidence to determine whether the documents are privileged. In such circumstances, where on the face of the document there is substantial doubt whether the appellants can discharge the onus of proof, privilege cannot made out.
13 Having regard to the above considerations and authorities, the appellants' first submission that the relevant time for consideration of privilege is the time of communication and not the time of creation of the document is rejected.