DIXON -v- THE KING [2026] WASCA 48 (14 April 2026)

1. The charges on the indictment, together with their maximum (and where applicable, minimum) penalties, were as follows:

Sexual intercourse with a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.8(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Sexual intercourse with a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.8(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Sexual activity with a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.9(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Cause a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.9(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.8(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Cause a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.9(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.8(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.8(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Persistent sexual abuse of a child outside Australia, contrary to s 272.11(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Engage in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia, contrary to s 272.14(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth)

Producing child exploitation material, contrary to s 218 of the Criminal Code (WA).

1. The circumstances of Mr Dixon's offending were recited before, and recorded by, the learned sentencing judge in great detail. As Mr Dixon recorded his offending, the abuse of the child victims was able to be described in minute and graphic detail, as were Mr Dixon's conversations with the adults in the Philippines and his other conduct while watching the children's abuse.
2. As Basten JA observed in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Beattie,[1] in describing the offending in a case like this, there is a fine line to be drawn between providing lengthy graphic depictions of the offending and a bland statement of the offences that is unlikely to convey the true level of moral culpability of the offender. While the summary which follows seeks to convey, in general terms, the gravity of Mr Dixon's offending, and so must include some descriptive material, it necessarily omits much of the sordid detail that would be inappropriate to publish widely. It suffices to observe that what follows cannot convey the full depravity of much of Mr Dixon's offending.

1. On 22 November 2022, Mr Dixon arrived at Perth International Airport on board a flight from the Philippines. An inspection of his mobile phone by Australian Border Force officers revealed a photograph of a naked prepubescent girl. The officers seized a number of electronic devices from Mr Dixon, and later recovered further devices following the execution of search warrants at Mr Dixon's home and at a storage unit owned by him.
2. In summary, inspection of the various devices revealed:

(a) photographs and videos of Mr Dixon engaging, in person, in sexual intercourse or sexual activity with prepubescent children;

(b) messages on Skype between Mr Dixon and four adults (accomplices), who, for payment, procured prepubescent boys and girls for sexual abuse by Mr Dixon over live video calls on the internet;

(c) videos of the sexual abuse of the children by the accomplices;

(d) images and videos of other child abuse material;

(e) admissions by Mr Dixon, in messages to the accomplices, to the possession of a hard drive, not found by the authorities, containing up to 10,000 articles of child abuse material; and

(f) correspondence between Mr Dixon and other adults in which he sent and received images and text‑based descriptions of child abuse material.

1. In the descriptions of the particular offences committed by Mr Dixon that follows, pseudonyms are used for the victims (and one of the accomplices). It is in the nature of much of Mr Dixon's offending that, tragically, the real identity of many of his victims may never be known.

1. Count 1 occurred on or about 19 April 2013, when Mr Dixon was in Manila in the Philippines.
2. On that occasion Mr Dixon sexually abused an 8‑year‑old boy, Lucio. The sexual abuse was depicted in photographs in Mr Dixon's possession.
3. The sexual abuse of Lucio included Mr Dixon penetrating Lucio's mouth and anus with his penis.

1. Count 2 occurred on 8 October 2015 in the Philippines.
2. The victim of this offending was a 12‑year‑old boy, Camilo. Mr Dixon penetrated the boy's anus with his penis. The offending was captured in a photograph which showed that there were other adults present, and watching Mr Dixon, while he abused Camilo.

1. Count 3 also occurred on 8 October 2015 in the Philippines. The victim was a 4‑year‑old girl, Rosa.
2. A photograph taken on that day depicts Mr Dixon anally penetrating another male person whose face cannot be seen. It was not possible to determine from the photograph whether that other person was a child. The photograph, however, does depict that, at the time of the sexual penetration, Rosa was present. Rosa was in physical contact with both Mr Dixon and the other person in a pose suggestive of her active involvement in the activity.

Count 4 - cause a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence overseas

1. Count 4 is the first of the offences involving an adult accomplice in the Philippines, Gerald Ganton De Leon (not a pseudonym). De Leon was an adult who communicated with Mr Dixon over a period of approximately four and a half months between May and October 2022. Over that time they exchanged 1,329 messages and Mr Dixon paid De Leon the equivalent of $AUD94.11.
2. The first child abused by De Leon at Mr Dixon's instigation was a 2‑year‑old boy, Felipe. The abuse was captured in a 9‑minute and 32‑second video, depicting De Leon and Felipe, in the Philippines, and Mr Dixon, in Australia. During the offending De Leon stripped Felipe naked and masturbated Felipe's penis. At the same time Mr Dixon both masturbated himself, and physically interacted with the camera and video in a lascivious manner.

Count 5 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

1. Conveying the gravity of Mr Dixon's offending in language that is appropriately moderated for publication is perhaps most difficult in relation to count 5.
2. Count 5 concerned the repeated and systematic sexual abuse of a little girl, Nica, between 5 June 2022 and 2 October 2022. Nica was 4 years old at the beginning of that period and turned five during the period of the abuse.
3. The accomplice to the abuse of Nica was her own mother, Sisa (a pseudonym). Sisa was 21 years old and, in her conversations with Mr Dixon, said that she had been performing 'shows' on the internet since she herself was a child. The abuse of Nica also involved Sisa's brother (that is, Nica's uncle). At various times, Sisa and Mr Dixon also discussed plans to sexually abuse Sisa's 13‑year‑old sister.
4. It is apparent from their conversations that Mr Dixon knew Sisa from a time prior to the offending the subject of count 5. In March 2022, for example, he wrote to her 'wish I can see you ... hi bb ... long time no see'.
5. The offending against Nica, the subject of count 5, occurred on at least eight separate occasions, many of which included multiple acts of sexual penetration and other sexual abuse of Nica. While much of the abuse was recorded by Mr Dixon, it is clear from the online conversations that the abuse extended beyond that which was recorded.
6. The abuse of Nica included penetration of her vagina and anus, principally by Sisa but also, on one of the occasions, by Sisa's brother. Sisa also slapped the child and displayed her in obscene poses for Mr Dixon. Throughout the abuse, Mr Dixon directed Sisa as to what she should do to Nica, including the extent to which Nica should be penetrated, using graphic and obscene language. Mr Dixon's graphic sexualised discussion of the abuse of Nica and other children was incessant and insistent. He also masturbated himself during the calls and interacted with the camera (including by licking it).
7. On the final occasion covered by count 5, prior to a call lasting approximately 35 minutes, during which Nica was sexually abused, Sisa described Nica as 'always sad ... and always cry'. Mr Dixon's responses, which concerned a fetish of his and his own gratification, displayed a complete indifference to Nica's suffering.
8. For the abuse carried out at his request, Mr Dixon paid Sisa the equivalent of $AUD792.44.

Count 6 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. Count 6 also involved Sisa, but in this case involved another potential child victim. From 13 June 2022 to 14 August 2022, Mr Dixon actively attempted to have Sisa procure a 7‑year‑old boy for the purpose of having the boy engage in sexual intercourse with Nica.
2. In addition to his obscene descriptions of what he required Sisa to do with the children, Mr Dixon discussed with Sisa what he was willing to pay the mother of the boy. When Sisa told Mr Dixon that the mother of the boy wanted 10,000 Philippine Pesos (about $AUD258), Mr Dixon responded 'what! No way ... its very too much bb'. Asked what he could afford, Mr Dixon said he thought '2k' (about $AUD54).
3. Mr Dixon ultimately transferred the equivalent of $AUD187.20 to Sisa, which Sisa said the mother of boy took and then ran away with. Mr Dixon expressed great displeasure at the outcome of this attempt, by chastising Sisa and concluding 'grrrrrr .... it was so exciting to think and wish it happen'.

Count 7 - cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence overseas

1. Count 7 is the first of a number of offences involving another adult accomplice Gary Historica Labini (not a pseudonym). Labini was an adult who communicated with Mr Dixon between 18 June 2022 and 29 September 2022, exchanging 5,185 messages. Mr Dixon paid Labini the equivalent of $AUD713.29.
2. Count 7 occurred on 25 June 2022. The victim was an 11‑year‑old boy, Rafael, and the abuse was recorded in three separate videos, each lasting 10 minutes.
3. The abuse of Rafael included Labini performing oral sex on the boy, Labini having the boy anally penetrate him, and each of them masturbating the other. Mr Dixon and Labini engaged in written conversation during the abuse, in which Mr Dixon directed the interactions between Labini and Rafael. It is apparent from the conversations that the boy expressed his unwillingness to perform certain acts, and that Mr Dixon persisted in making his requests. Mr Dixon masturbated during the call.

Count 8 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

Count 9 - cause a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence overseas

Count 10 - cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence overseas

1. Counts 8, 9 and 10 were all related, and concerned the sexual abuse of three boys carried out by Labini at Mr Dixon's direction.
2. The victim of count 8 was a 10‑year‑old boy, Elias, who Labini sexually abused on two occasions. On each occasion Labini simultaneously engaged in the abuse of another child. On the first occasion (count 9) the other victim was a 10‑year‑old boy, Crispin, and, on the second occasion (count 10) the other victim was an 8‑year‑old boy, Manuel.
3. The first occasion occurred on 8 July 2022. Mr Dixon requested Labini to obtain boys for a 'show', which he described in characteristically obscene terms. He discussed with Labini 'what is the youngest boy you know can play'. Labini later returned with Elias and Crispin, whose abuse was captured in two 10‑minute videos. In the first video, Labini performed oral sex on Elias while Crispin licked Labini's nipple and, in the second video, Labini again performed oral sex on Elias while posing Crispin for the camera. During the call, Mr Dixon typed numerous obscene commands to Labini as to what he should do to the boys.
4. Following the abuse of Elias and Crispin, Mr Dixon asked whether Elias (who he simply called 'the 10') had a sister. When Labini said that Elias had an 8‑year‑old sister, Mr Dixon suggested that she could do a 'show'. When he ultimately agreed to pay the equivalent of $AUD94.26 for a call that day, Labini asked Mr Dixon to hurry with the money because the children were hungry. Mr Dixon's response, which was again concerned with involving Elias' sister, did not acknowledge the children's hunger. He concluded 'maybe [we] should keep secret from his mom'.
5. Two days later, on 10 July 2022, Mr Dixon paid Labini the equivalent of $AUD79.67 to again abuse Elias, and Manuel. Following a lengthy and obscene exchange between Mr Dixon and Labini, Labini penetrated Elias' anus, while Manuel stood to the side and watched.

Count 11 - cause a child to engage in sexual intercourse in his presence overseas

Count 12 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. Counts 11 and 12 were both committed on the same day, 12 July 2022, and again with the accomplice Labini. The offending related to two boys, a 7‑year‑old boy, Antonio and another boy, who was 6 years old.
2. Illustrative of the high degree of vulnerability and corruption of the children against whom Mr Dixon offended, is the fact that Antonio and the other boy approached Labini, as they had been told about Labini by Crispin, the boy abused by Mr Dixon and Labini on 8 July 2022. The boys asked for 2,000 Philippine Pesos, but Mr Dixon insisted 'no ... 1,500 both'. He ultimately paid Labini the equivalent of $AUD59.21 to abuse the boys.
3. In the course of a 49‑minute video call, Labini abused Antonio. Early in the call the other boy left because his mother had called him. Mr Dixon said 'ah ... only the 7 now ... ok then ... I hope good show' and then proceeded to tell Labini what to do to Antonio. Labini penetrated the boy's mouth with his penis. In one of the obscene messages exchanged between Mr Dixon and Labini, Labini said 'he shy ... ok babe I am forcing him ... becos I will pay him'.

Count 13 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

1. Count 13 involved the persistent sexual abuse of a girl, Ana, between 7 August 2022 and 13 August 2022. The girl was described by De Leon as between 10 and 11 years of age. De Leon was the accomplice.
2. The abuse of Ana included De Leon having Ana pose naked and De Leon rubbing his penis on her vagina. Mr Dixon continually instructed De Leon to penetrate Ana's vagina with his penis and he became incensed when De Leon did not do so.
3. Following the call, Mr Dixon berated De Leon in a manner that can best be described as deranged. By way of a small example, when De Leon said that he would do what he wanted next time, Mr Dixon replied:

NOT NEXT TIME ... NOW!!! ... U WASTE MY MONEY ... FUCK PUSSY I TOLD U ... U WASTE MY TIME AND MONEY ... I DON'T WANT ANY NEXT TIME ... I WANT U FUCK HER PUSSY NOW .. U DIDN'T FUCK HER YET ... I DIDN'T GET ANY SHOW ... FUCKING BULLSHIT ... FUCKING CHEAT ... I SAID PUT ALL UR COICK (SIC) INSIDE HER PUSSY ... ALL UR COCK ... THAT IS VERY CLEAR .. NO NEXT TIME ... I PAID U TO PUT INSIDE NOW!!! ... I AM VERY ANGRY.

Count 14 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. Count 14 concerned attempts by Mr Dixon between 10 August 2022 and 18 August 2022 to have Labini procure a 10‑year‑old boy, a 9‑year‑old girl and a 6‑year‑old girl to engage in sexual activity for his gratification.
2. During part of that period, Labini was in prison and Mr Dixon dealt with a woman who was using Labini's account. The woman was the mother of the two girls and the aunt of the boy. Mr Dixon and the woman discussed the ways in which her 6‑year‑old girl had previously been abused by Labini. Mr Dixon identified the kind of sexual acts he wished to see performed by the children. After the woman told Mr Dixon that the children would do what he asked, Mr Dixon gave the woman money for the proposed abuse.
3. Later, after Labini's release from prison, Mr Dixon continued to ask about the two girls. Following the abuse, by Labini, of two other boys, Mr Dixon again became irate that he had paid money to the mother of the girls and was still 'waiting [for] the show'. When Labini said that the girls' mother didn't know that Labini was going to have intercourse with the girls, Mr Dixon's response included 'yes, just tell her u do [the] same as before ... all mom want money ... sometimes they don't care or don't want to know how they get ... it is too much and I see nothing! ... u must think of me'.
4. The conversation continued with Mr Dixon graphically describing how to gradually increase the degree of physical violation involved in the abuse.

Count 15 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. Count 15 concerned another attempt by Mr Dixon to have Labini procure two children to engage in sexual activity. The proposed victims in this instance were two boys aged 10 and 11 years, who Mr Dixon wanted to have sexual intercourse with each other and with Labini. The conduct occurred over four days between 14 August 2022 to 17 August 2022.
2. At one point, after Mr Dixon had paid money to Labini, Labini contacted Mr Dixon while speaking to the mother of the boys. Labini said that the family had many children, up to 12 years old, to which Mr Dixon replied that 'I see so many young ... 12 is not young anymore'. In their chat, Labini told Mr Dixon that he would abuse the boys in his room, and that their parents would allow it if Mr Dixon also paid for a video they already had of one of the boys engaging in oral sex with another 12‑year‑old boy. Mr Dixon again became irate at what he regarded as the injustice of having been deprived of a 'show'.

Count 16 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

Count 17 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

Count 18 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

Count 19 - persistent sexual abuse of a child overseas

Count 20 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. Counts 16 to 19 concern the persistent sexual abuse by Mr Dixon of four children: an 11‑year‑old boy, Simon; an 11‑year‑old boy, Pedro; a 12‑year‑old boy, Jose; and an 11‑year‑old girl, Maria. The four children were physically abused by Labini, at Mr Dixon's direction, on a number of occasions between 18 August 2022 and 23 August 2022. On the final day, Mr Dixon also attempted to arrange for Maria's 12‑year‑old sister, Isabella, to be abused as well (count 20).
2. On 18 August 2022, Mr Dixon arranged for Labini to engage in sexual intercourse with Simon, Pedro and Jose. Initially Labini was with Pedro and Jose, who had been supplied to him by their mother. Mr Dixon enquired of Labini whether the boys were virgins, to which Labini replied that they were. Simon later arrived and Mr Dixon paid Labini to abuse the three boys.
3. During a video call lasting for approximately 57 minutes, the boys all masturbated and then Labini performed oral sex on each of them. Labini then had Simon anally penetrate him while he continued to masturbate one of the boys. During the call, Mr Dixon directed Labini as to what to do with the boys with graphic instructions.
4. After the abuse, Mr Dixon said that he was happy with the call but said '... I really need girl ... only young ... ask the boys first'. Labini said that he would try.
5. Two days later, on 20 August 2022, Labini had also procured Maria. Mr Dixon paid Labini the equivalent of $AUD117.05 to sexually abuse Maria, along with Simon, Pedro and Jose. At one point, after Mr Dixon had described in graphic detail what he wanted the four children to do, Maria went outside. Mr Dixon was incensed, saying ' ... I want to see all together ... I WANT THE GIRL'.
6. Maria returned and the abuse began, which lasted for approximately 48 minutes. Labini rubbed Maria's vagina and she was vaginally penetrated, first by Pedro and then by Simon. At that point Maria screamed and left the room, so Labini performed oral sex on Jose and all the boys masturbated. While the call continued, Labini said that Maria had been hurt when penetrated by Simon. Mr Dixon at first professed some sympathy for her and then immediately asked Labini to ' ... plse try another boy ...' and requested that Maria engage in a variety of other sexual acts. Mr Dixon's most pressing concern was that ' ... I didn't cum yet ... how will I cum now'.
7. In the days that followed, Mr Dixon continued to complain about what he regarded as the failure of Labini to provide what he wanted. Much of that communication concerned his sordid expectations concerning Maria.
8. On 23 August 2022, Mr Dixon again arranged for Labini to abuse two of the children, Pedro and Maria. Prior to the abuse, Mr Dixon insisted, in graphic terms, that Labini was to have sexual intercourse with Maria on this occasion. Mr Dixon and Labini also discussed including Maria's 12‑year‑old sister, Isabella, in the abuse, who was also initially present. Mr Dixon gave Labini detailed instructions as to how the abuse was to occur.
9. There was some delay in the abuse commencing, as Labini was waiting for the children's mother to leave the house.
10. Mr Dixon also told Labini on this occasion that he had communicated directly with Maria on Facebook and that he had told her what he wanted Labini and Pedro to do to her. He recorded in that conversation that Maria had told him that 'she was virgin and hurts too much'.
11. The abuse of Pedro and Maria, which was recorded, included Labini penetrating Maria's vagina with this finger and mouth and Labini having Pedro penetrate Maria's vagina with his penis. Maria's sister, Isabella, was not ultimately involved in the abuse on this occasion, as their aunt had come to the house before the call and Labini had sent her to distract the aunt.

Count 21 - procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas

1. On 13 October 2022, Mr Dixon paid De Leon the equivalent of $AUD30.52 to engage in sexual intercourse with a 9‑year‑old girl and a 10‑year‑old girl. The abuse did not occur as De Leon said that he needed to go and buy food and did not return. Mr Dixon was again incensed.

1. Count 22 concerned the production of all of the videos depicting the abuse of all of the children recorded as part of the other counts. There were 33 videos in total.

1. In addition to the offences for which Mr Dixon was convicted, his electronic conversations included descriptions of him sexually abusing other children, going back years. Those conversations included conversations with Labini and an 18‑year‑old man, Sherwin, who Mr Dixon made reference to abusing when Sherwin was a child. The conversations with Sherwin occurred in late 2021 and early 2022.
2. Mr Dixon also used the Google search engine on his phone to look up 'child sex tourism main countries' and 'child sex' in various countries, including Cambodia, Nepal, Portugal, El Salvador and Indonesia (Bali and Lombok).
3. Mr Dixon's international travel records revealed that he had lived in the Philippines for over 20 years, from 1991 to 2011, and had regularly visited countries in Southeast Asia since that time.
4. The learned sentencing judge was in no doubt, from the material as a whole, that Mr Dixon had sexually abused other children. While his Honour made clear that he would not take that other abuse into account as an aggravating factor, it did mean that the offending could not be characterised as isolated.

1. Mr Dixon's personal circumstances, as found by the learned sentencing judge, included the following.
2. Mr Dixon was born in Sydney on 7 January 1951 and was 74 years old at the time of sentence. He has two sisters and continues to have a close relationship with his younger sister, who is of Christian faith and remains accepting of Mr Dixon despite the nature of his offending. Mr Dixon's parents separated when he was 5 years old, and he denied having been exposed to domestic violence in the home.
3. Mr Dixon's mother died of cancer at the age of 49 years. His father also had cancer, who Mr Dixon returned to Australia from overseas to care for in the 1980s.
4. As a young man, Mr Dixon moved to South Africa with his first girlfriend and subsequently lived in Swaziland, Taiwan and the Philippines (where he lived for many years). Mr Dixon married a woman in Swaziland, although the marriage lasted only three years before the couple separated due to frequent arguments. Mr Dixon was later engaged to another woman for a year, but said that she became violent and threatened him after he refused to engage in sexual intercourse with her (he described himself as a 'devout Christian' at the time and opposed to sex before marriage).
5. Mr Dixon had two further significant relationships, each lasting approximately three years. From the first of those relationships, Mr Dixon had a daughter, who was aged 31 years at the time of sentence, with whom he remains in contact. From the second relationship Mr Dixon has two sons, aged 25 and 28 years at the time of sentence. He maintains a few close friendships in the Philippines and remains in contact with a friend from primary school.
6. Mr Dixon completed Year 12, describing himself as somewhat of a 'nerd' at school. He said that he was bullied.
7. In terms of work history, Mr Dixon operated a successful pump business in Swaziland, taught English to both children and adults in Taiwan at various times, and worked as a diving instructor in the Philippines. He returned to Australia in 2010, initially living with his sister in Darwin and found casual employment, but struggled to find work as he was then around 60 years of age.
8. Later in 2010 Mr Dixon relocated to Perth, where he secured a fly‑in/fly‑out role as a mechanical fitter in maintenance and construction roles in the mining industry. He also worked as a trade assistant for a year and, for approximately 18 months prior to his arrest, worked training and assessing mechanical fitters in the Philippines. The learned sentencing judge found that Mr Dixon had a good work ethic.
9. Mr Dixon has a complex medical history. He sustained two left‑knee injuries as a child and had suffered from malaria and pneumonia in the past. In about 2015, he had a cardiac arrhythmia and an infection in his right knee, requiring him to use a walking stick. Mr Dixon also suffered a partial loss of his nose in an incident involving a friend in the Philippines and has an ongoing right visual field deficit affecting his peripheral vision.
10. In 2020, Mr Dixon was diagnosed with stage 4 melanoma and underwent surgery to remove a brain tumour. He has a mild cognitive impairment, that was not unexpected given the tumour and its treatment. There was, however, no evidence of significant cognitive impairment or an emerging neurodegenerative process. While Mr Dixon reported a perceived decline in his attention, concentration, and short‑term memory since his diagnosis and treatment, he was assessed as functioning at least at the high end of cognitive capacity.
11. A neuropsychological assessment undertaken for the purposes of sentencing also found no causal link between Mr Dixon's mild cognitive impairment and his offending behaviour. Rather, the motivation for Mr Dixon's offending was his sexual attraction to young children, together with personality related factors and some depressive symptoms.
12. Mr Dixon had a history of depression and had previously been prescribed antidepressants. He also received psychological support following treatment for depressive symptoms and a loss of independence, resulting from being unable to drive.
13. Mr Dixon had no prior criminal record. Given how long he had engaged in sexually offending against vulnerable children, however, the learned sentencing judge did not find that he was a person of prior good character.

1. Having set out the facts of Mr Dixon's offending, the learned sentencing judge identified 13 matters that informed the seriousness of Mr Dixon's offending. Those matters were as follows:

(a) in relation to counts 1 to 3, that Mr Dixon actually committed the sexual acts against the children, including anally penetrating two young boys;

(b) in relation to a number of the offences, that Mr Dixon was directing what was to occur and did occur by virtue of the messages that he sent to the accomplices;

(c) that 15 children were involved in contact offending, that is, children who are actually engaged in sexual activity with Mr Dixon, with other adults and with each other;

(d) that Mr Dixon attempted to arrange for the sexual abuse of a further six children;

(e) the ages of the children, which ranged from 2 years of age to 12 years of age;

(f) that, had it not been for various circumstances, there would have been more children offended against, reflected in the charges involving the preparation for child abuse that did not occur;

(g) the fact that the children lived in a relatively poor country, namely, the Philippines and were vulnerable to people who were prepared to pay them to engage in sexual activity and prepared to pay adults to engage in that activity;

(h) the fact that Mr Dixon paid for the sexual activity to occur on a number of occasions;

(i) the high degree of deviancy in the offending, which was best reflected in the offending against Nica (count 5);

(j) the fact that Mr Dixon took pictures or recorded sexual activity with children, which the learned sentencing judge found was for Mr Dixon's own personal sexual gratification by repeated viewing;

(k) the fact that Mr Dixon was sexually attracted to young children and was prepared to act on that sexual interest over a nine‑year period. His Honour found that, notwithstanding his age, Mr Dixon remained a risk to the community;

(l) the fact that, in some cases, the children were clearly either hurt by the sexual conduct, or clearly reluctant to participate in it, and that Mr Dixon required it to continue; and

(m) the fact that Mr Dixon was responsible for the absolute corruption of a large number of children, and had no insight into the harm that he had caused to them.

1. In relation to Mr Dixon's lack of insight and lack of remorse, the learned sentencing judge referred to the following passage from the neuropsychological assessment:

[Mr Dixon] said that in some cultures, it was 'socially acceptable' to have sexual intercourse with people younger than 18 (i.e., with children and adolescents) and that in these environments, 12‑year‑olds were able to consent to sexual interactions. He added that it was in Western culture that this was unacceptable and that our values were 'the opposite' of many other cultures and thus when in these other cultural environments, 'one need(ed) to adapt'. He also said he 'never considered how old people were'. When asked around his sexual preferences, he openly stated that he preferred pre‑pubescent female children around the age of 11 or 12 (i.e., those with 'small breasts' and 'no pubic hair'). He demonstrated no empathy for the victims of his offending.

1. The learned sentencing judge identified and discussed the various sentencing considerations identified in s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), in relation to the Commonwealth offences, and s 6 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) in relation to the State offence. His Honour identified the dominant sentencing consideration for all of the offences as general deterrence, followed by specific deterrence, although his Honour accepted that as Mr Dixon got older and his ability to act on his sexual attraction to children was reduced, his risk to the community would diminish.
2. In relation to Mr Dixon's pleas of guilty, the learned sentencing judge said:

Your counsel has very clearly and articulately outlined the progression of this matter and why it's taken so long to get here and I accept everything that she says. You did take this matter to a disclosure committal hearing. There was a delay. You always knew what you had done, but I accept what your counsel says about why it took so long. The real benefit to the community though, is the avoidance of a trial and the members of the jury having to view the depraved material the subject of the charges.

1. His Honour stated that, pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), he would reduce the sentence to be imposed on count 22 by 10%, on account of Mr Dixon's guilty plea. While s 9AA did not apply to the Commonwealth offences, his Honour stated that he would also discount the sentences for those offences by 10% on account of Mr Dixon's guilty pleas.
2. The learned sentencing judge addressed, in general terms, the other cases that had been referred to him. His Honour observed that, perhaps with the exception of Beattie, the criminality involved in those other cases was 'nowhere near on a scale of that involved' in Mr Dixon's case. His Honour also made reference to the changes in the law made by the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sexual Crimes Against Children and Community Protection Measures) Act 2020 (Cth) (Amendment Act) that were intended to increase sentences for the type of offending committed by Mr Dixon. For that reason, his Honour said that the sentences imposed in the other cases referred to him did not assist 'in any meaningful way'.
3. In relation to Mr Dixon's age and health conditions, the learned sentencing judge said:

Emphasis has been placed on your age, that being you are 74 years of age, and that and your health conditions are such that it is submitted this should ameliorate the total effective sentence to be imposed. I do not accept that submission.

As was noted by the Court of Appeal in The State of Western Australia v FJG [2012] WASCA 206 at paragraph 55:

Advanced age is only one of the factors which a sentencer must take into account in order to arrive at a just sentence. Advanced age intersects with a number of issues in this case: appropriate punishment, general deterrence, health and the second limb of the totality principle.

Reducing a sentence for advanced age is predicated on the basis of mercy. However, there will be some cases where the exercise of mercy is not justified, because the offending for which an offender is to be sentenced is simply too serious.

In Moore v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 156, the court noted that:

The exercise of mercy will depend upon the individual facts of the case.

It was further noted in Wark that:

An offence may be so serious that humanitarian considerations relating to advanced age cannot be accommodated.

So the second limb of the totality principle is not absolute. There are cases, Mr Dixon, in which an offender by the very nature of their criminal conduct has forfeited the right to any expectation of being released from prison at a time that would permit them to enjoy their remaining life. Mr Dixon, you fall within that category.

This is a case in which the exercise of mercy is not warranted. By virtue of your appalling conduct, you have forfeited the right to that expectation that is outlined in the second limb of the totality principle. I readily acknowledge, Mr Dixon, that you may well die in custody.

1. In relation to the application of the totality principle, the learned sentencing judge observed that, other than counts 1, 2, 3 and 22, s 19(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) created a presumption in favour of all sentences being cumulative. His Honour, however, concluded that to accumulate all of the sentences would be a gross breach of the first limb of the totality principle, effectively a sentence of approximately 100 years imprisonment. For that reason, while there was to be some accumulation of the sentences, it was necessary to depart from the presumption in s 19(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
2. The individual sentences imposed by the learned sentencing judge (together with their concurrency or cumulacy) were as follows:

1. As will be apparent, the total effective sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge was 23 years imprisonment, which his Honour achieved by ordering that the sentences in respect of counts 1, 5 and 19 be served cumulatively upon each other, with all other sentences to be served concurrently. His Honour imposed a minimum non‑parole period of 17 years.

1. The discount of 10% for the appellant's pleas of guilty was manifestly inadequate. 2. The sentencing judge erred in the application of the first limb of the totality principle by:

(a) disregarding the sentences imposed in comparable cases, and
>
> (b) imposing a total effective sentence and non‑parole period which did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences having regard to all relevant circumstances.

1. The sentencing judge erred in finding that the appellant's age and health conditions did not ameliorate the total effective sentence to be imposed.
2. Before turning to the particular grounds of appeal, it is appropriate to commence with some general observations in relation to the sentencing regime prescribed for Commonwealth offences by the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

1. The general sentencing principles applicable to Commonwealth offences are prescribed by pt 1B, div 2 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Section 16A, in particular, identifies the matters to which a court sentencing offenders for federal offences is to have regard. Section 16A(1) provides that '[i]n determining the sentence to be passed, or the order to be made, in respect of any person for a federal offence, a court must impose a sentence or make an order that is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence'.
2. Section 16A(2) then sets out various matters that the court must take into account. Section 16A(2) relevantly includes:

16A Matters to which court to have regard when passing sentence etc. - federal offences

...

(2) In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court:

(g) if the person has pleaded guilty to the charge in respect of the offence:

(i) that fact; and

(ii) the timing of the plea; and

(iii) the degree to which that fact and the timing of the plea resulted in any benefit to the community, or any victim of, or witness to, the offence;

1. In addition to these general principles, there are a number of provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) that apply specifically to 'Commonwealth child sex offences', the definition of which relevantly includes all of the Commonwealth offences for which Mr Dixon was convicted.
2. Many of the provisions of the Criminal Code (Cth) and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), were amended by the Amendment Act. Those amendments came in effect on 23 June 2020. As a consequence, the amendments applied to all of the Commonwealth offences committed by Mr Dixon, other than counts 1, 2 and 3.
3. Three aspects of the changes made by the Amendment Act are relevant in the present case.

1. First, the amendments to the Criminal Code (Cth) made by the Amendment Act relevantly increased the maximum penalties for a number of Commonwealth child sex offences. Those offences for which the maximum penalties were increased included all of the Commonwealth offences committed by Mr Dixon after 23 June 2020, other than counts 6, 12, 14, 15, 20, and 21 (that is, the offence of engaging in conduct intending to procure a child to engage in sexual activity in his presence outside Australia). The relevant maximum penalties for all of the offences committed by Mr Dixon are set out in the table at [8] above.
2. The function of the maximum sentence prescribed by Parliament was considered, in the context of the changes made by the Amendment Act, in Hurt v The King.[2] As Gageler CJ and Jagot J said in that case:[3]

[W]hen a statute specifies a maximum sentence the specified maximum has two functions. It confines the power of the court to impose any sentence greater than the maximum. It also informs the sentencing process by conveying the Commonwealth Parliament's view of the relative seriousness of the offence. In Markarian v The Queen, for example, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ said that 'careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick'. In other words, the maximum sentence reflects the Commonwealth Parliament's view of the appropriate sentence for the worst possible case constituting the offence.

1. It follows, as a matter of legislative intention, that an increase in maximum penalties for a particular offence serves as an indication that sentences for that offence should be increased.[4] As will be seen from the Minister's Second Reading speech in relation to the Bill for the Amendment Act, that was certainly Parliament's intention in making the increases to maximum penalties for Commonwealth child sex offences.

1. In addition to increasing maximum penalties, the Amendment Act introduced minimum penalties for a number of Commonwealth child sex offences by inserting s 16AAA and s 16AAB into the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Relevantly, minimum penalties were prescribed for all of the Commonwealth offences committed by Mr Dixon after 23 June 2020, other than counts 6, 14, 15, 20, and 21. The relevant minimum penalties for the offences committed by Mr Dixon are also set out in the table at [8] above.
2. Section 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides for a number of exclusions and reductions to the minimum penalties prescribed by s 16AAA and s 16AAB. Relevantly, s 16AAC provides:[5]

16AAC Exclusions and reductions - minimum penalties

...

Reduction of minimum penalty

(2) A court may impose a sentence of imprisonment of less than the period specified in column 2 of an item of a table in section 16AAA or subsection 16AAB(2) only if the court considers it appropriate to reduce the sentence because of either or both of the following:

(a) the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(g), the person pleading guilty;

(b) the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(h), the person having cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of the offence or of a Commonwealth child sex offence.

(3) If a court may reduce a sentence, the court may reduce the sentence as follows:

(a) if the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(g), the person pleading guilty - by an amount that is up to 25% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table;

(b) if the court is taking into account, under paragraph 16A(2)(h), the person having cooperated with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of the offence or of a Commonwealth child sex offence - by an amount that is up to 25% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table;

(c) if the court is taking into account both of the matters in paragraphs (a) and (b) - by an amount that is up to 50% of the period specified in column 2 of the applicable item in the relevant table.

1. The High Court in Hurt v The King confirmed that the minimum penalties prescribed in relation to a number of Commonwealth child sex offences, operate not merely as a restriction on a sentencing court's power, but as a yardstick for the exercise of the sentencing discretion. The effect of that yardstick was to impose a 'starting point for the appropriate term of imprisonment for the offence in the least serious circumstances'.[6] As Gageler CJ and Jagot J explained: 'the minimum sentence is the yardstick representing the Commonwealth Parliament's view of the least worst possible case warranting imprisonment against which the case before the court at the time can be measured'.[7]
2. In reaching this conclusion the Court in Hurt v The King referred to statements in the Second Reading Speech for the Bill for the Amendment Act. Those statements and their effect were summarised by Gageler CJ and Jagot J as follows:[8]

[T]he Attorney‑General said that 'current sentencing practices for Commonwealth child sex offences are out of step with community expectations, they do not reflect the severity of the harm inflicted by these predators, and they fail to protect our children and communities from further offending. This government is completely committed to ensuring that the predators who commit these heinous crimes receive the sorts of sentences that the community would expect.' The Attorney‑General said that '[l]ike many Australians, this government is fed up with lenient sentencing practices that fail to protect the community from child sex offenders. This bill will vastly improve justice outcomes and community safety through a range of measures', one of which was 'mandatory minimum sentences for the most serious child sex offences and for recidivist offenders'. Section 16AAB, of course, concerns recidivist offenders. The Attorney‑General also said that '[t]oo often, child sex offenders spend insufficient time in custody to undergo even treatment programs or receive any significant rehabilitation before being eligible for release back into the community' and that the Bill 'addresses this unacceptable situation by introducing a sentencing presumption in favour of actual imprisonment, rebuttable only in exceptional circumstances'. He concluded by saying '[f]or too long, child sex offenders have been receiving inadequate sentences for their crimes that are completely out of step with community expectations. It is time for this to change.'

In the face of these statements, it cannot be doubted that the Commonwealth Parliament intended the statutory minimum sentence to increase the number and length of sentences of imprisonment for Commonwealth child sex offences overall. (footnotes omitted)

1. As noted above, s 16AAC provides that a court may impose a sentence that is less than the prescribed minimum for a Commonwealth child sex offence, if the court is taking into account a guilty plea. In such a case the court may reduce the sentence by an amount of up to 25% of the statutory minimum. Section 16AAC does not affect what discount may be allowed for a plea of guilty, subject to ensuring that the final sentence imposed is not thereby reduced to below 75% of the statutory minimum.[9]

1. Finally, the Amendment Act made amendments to s 19 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), in relation to the court's powers to order sentences be made cumulative, partly cumulative or concurrent. In that context, ss 19(5) to (7) provide:

Additional requirements for Commonwealth child sex offences

(5) An order must not have the effect that a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a Commonwealth child sex offence be served partly cumulatively, or concurrently, with an uncompleted term of imprisonment that is, or has been, imposed on the person for:

(a) another Commonwealth child sex offence; or

(b) a State or Territory registrable child sex offence.

(6) Subsection (5) does not apply if the court is satisfied that imposing the sentence in a different manner would still result in sentences that are of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances.

(7) If the court imposes a term of imprisonment other than in accordance with subsection (5), the court must:

(a) state its reasons for imposing the sentence in that manner; and

(b) cause the reasons to be entered in the records of the court.

1. It is clear that, notwithstanding the presumption in favour of cumulative sentences in s 19(5), the totality principle is not excluded by these provisions. This is confirmed by the text of s 19(6) and the Attorney General's Second Reading Speech in relation to the amendments, which stated:[10]

The introduction of mandatory sentencing complements a new presumption in favour of cumulative sentences for multiple child sex offences. This will ensure that sentences imposed adequately reflect the harm done to each individual victim, or the harm done by each distinct individual crime.

The presumption in favour of cumulative sentences can be set aside if the court is satisfied that imposing sentences concurrently or with only partial cumulation will produce a sentence of appropriate severity. The principle of totality will also continue to apply in the sentencing exercise to guard against unjust outcomes.

1. While ss 19(5) to (7) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) have been referred to and applied by courts in other jurisdictions on a number of occasions,[11] the authorities have not yet addressed whether, and if so how, those provisions might, in practical terms, produce a different outcome to the application of the totality principle itself as it operated prior to the Amendment Act.
2. As in the case of the increase in maximum penalties and the introduction of minimum penalties, however, it is notable that the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill for the Amendment Act described the presumption of cumulative sentences as a 'yardstick'. The Explanatory Memorandum stated:[12]

The objective of the presumption is to act as a yardstick against which to examine a proposed sentence of an offender for multiple child sex offences to ensure that the effective sentence represents a tougher response to the objective seriousness of the sexual abuse of children. It benefits circumstances such as where offences are committed against separate victims over an extended period of time. The proposed subsection 19(6) provides an exception to this rule where the court is satisfied that imposing a sentence in a different manner (such as partly cumulatively or concurrently) would be of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances.

The proposed subsection 19(6) recognises there will be circumstances where the application of this presumption would result in an unacceptable outcome. Accordingly, discretion is retained for the court to consider the outcome for all the offences in totality and, if appropriately satisfied, order the sentence in a different manner provided that the sentence overall is still of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances.

1. With this legislative background, we turn to the grounds of appeal.

1. Ground 1 alleges that the learned sentencing judge erred by applying a discount of 10% with respect to Mr Dixon's pleas of guilty on the basis that the discount was 'manifestly inadequate'. The ground, accordingly, alleges a House v The King error.[13]
2. It is clear that s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) applied to any discount for Mr Dixon's plea of guilty in relation to count 22, the only charge under the Criminal Code (WA). As this Court has long held, s 9AA by requiring the court to state the fact and extent of any reduction in open court, involves a forced departure from the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing.[14] For that reason s 9AA creates a separate discretion which is amenable to appeal on House v The King grounds.
3. As Mr Dixon recognised, however, s 9AA, did not have any application to the Commonwealth offences (counts 1 to 21), in relation to which the relevant provisions concerning pleas of guilty are to be found in the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
4. In that regard, as set out at [97] above, s 16A(2)(g) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides that in sentencing a federal offender, the court must take into account the fact, timing and benefit of any plea of guilty. There is, however, no requirement for the sentencing court to specify the discount to the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed. While the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Xiao v R said that it was 'desirable that, in the interests of transparency, such discounts be specified' there is no obligation on a sentencing judg[15]to do so.15 In addition, unlike s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) does not prescribe a maximum discount that may be given for a plea[16]f guilty.16
5. For these reasons an issue arose at the hearing of Mr Dixon's appeal as to whether it is open to appeal from a specified discount for a guilty plea for a federal offence on the ground that it is manifestly inadequate or, alternatively, whether the contention that inadequate account has been given to a plea of guilty can only ever be a particular of a ground of appeal contending that the sentence as a whole was manifestly excessive.
6. This point of principle was significant for two reasons. First, while Mr Dixon contended, by ground 2, that the total effective sentence imposed on him did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality in all of his offending, he did not contend that any individual sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.[17] Secondly, while it was open to challenge the discount under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) in relation to the State offence (count 22) on the ground of manifest inadequacy, as that 2‑year sentence was ordered to be served wholly concurrently with the other sentences, any alleged error in the discount for that sentence could not have materially affected the outcome in the appeal.
7. It was therefore essential, to succeed on ground 1, for Mr Dixon to make good the proposition that it is open to appeal from a specified discount for a guilty plea for a federal offence on manifest inadequacy grounds (absent a contention that the sentence as a whole is manifestly excessive). For that reason the parties were given leave to file supplementary submissions in relation to that issue. The supplementary submissions filed by the parties were of considerable assistance to the Court.
8. In that regard, in his supplementary submissions, counsel for Mr Dixon submitted that there were a number of express errors that the learned sentencing judge 'may have' made in applying a 10% discount. Counsel, nevertheless, quite properly submitted that it was not possible to conclude that his Honour had made any such error, and the ground remained one of alleged implied error on the basis of manifest inadequacy of the discount for the pleas of guilty.
9. We therefore turn to the question whether it is open to appeal from a specified discount for a guilty plea for a federal offence on manifest inadequacy grounds (absent a contention that the sentence as a whole is manifestly excessive).

Ground 1 - challenges to discounts for pleas of guilty to federal offences

1. Absent the 'forced departure' from the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing required by s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), the decisions of this Court (and its predecessor the Court of Criminal Appeal) are to the effect that an appeal alleging that insufficient weight had been given to an individual sentencing factor, including a discount for a plea of guilty, does not allege an appellable error.
2. That proposition was stated, and applied, in terms by this Court in MMA v The Queen in the context of federal offences. In that case Mazza JA (McLure P agreeing) said:[18]

The ground of appeal relied upon by the appellant alleges a weighting error to the effect that the discount of one‑third that the learned sentencing judge gave for the appellant's 'expedited early plea of guilty and his cooperation with the authorities' was insufficient. Framed in these terms, the ground does not allege an appellable error: see Vagh v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 17 [76] and R v Lee [2013] WASCA 216 [51]. However, having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it may be taken that the appellant alleges, in substance, that the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle.

1. This position accords with the approach taken in Victoria, where the relevant statutory provisions (in s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)) differ from those in s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA). In Scerri v The Queen, for example, the Court held:[19]

There is nothing in the language of s 6AAA to suggest that Parliament intended, by enacting that provision, to introduce into the law of sentence appeals a new category of specific error based on the (in)adequacy of the sentence discount given for a plea of guilty.

The establishment of such a category of error would be a radical departure from established law. Sentencing judges are required to synthesise a large number of factors in order to arrive at an appropriate sentence. A plea of guilty is one of those factors. Judges are not permitted to take a starting‑point and then add or subtract periods of time representing aggravating or mitigating circumstances (as the case may be). Accordingly, it is not to be supposed that in arriving at the sentence the subject of this appeal his Honour deducted a specific period for the plea of guilty. There is, as a result, an inherent artificiality in the requirement which s 6AAA imposes on sentencing judges, to revisit sentences which are the product of an instinctive synthesis and state the sentences that would have been imposed absent one factor, the plea of guilty.

What matters for present purposes is that the 'discount' - that is, the difference between the notional sentence and the actual sentence - is not examinable for specific error. As this Court said in Burke:

A complaint about the sentence discount ... identified in the s 6AAA statement is a complaint about the weight attributed to one particular sentencing consideration. As with any argument about weight, the question for the appeal court is whether, taking into account all the relevant sentencing considerations, the sentence imposed was within range.

In other words, a complaint about the discount for the plea of guilty can only ever be a particular of a ground contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive, that is, outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge in the circumstances of the case. (footnotes omitted)

1. Significantly, the sentences the subject of appeal in Scerri v The Queen included a Commonwealth offence and, in reaching the above conclusions, the court did not draw any distinction between the sentences for the Commonwealth and State offences. Similarly, the principle expressed in Scerri v The Queen was expressly applied in the context of exclusively Commonwealth offences in Nguyen v The Queen (albeit in the context of a challenge to the 'discount for future cooperation').[20]
2. Absent any binding or persuasive authority to the contrary, the position described in MMA v The Queen and Scerri v The Queen applies to the present case, such that it is not open to allege, as an appellable error, that the 10% discount applied to the Commonwealth offences by the learned sentencing judge was manifestly inadequate.
3. In that regard, the parties submissions identified a number of New South Wales decisions in which the Court of Criminal Appeal has considered grounds of appeal alleging 'manifest inadequacy' or 'manifest excess' in relation to a discount for a plea of guilty. Those decisions were Trujillo‑Mesa v R,[21] R v Karan,[22] Cappis v R,[23] and Linggo v R.[24]
4. For the reasons that follow, in our view, none of those decisions support the conclusion that the position described in MMA v The Queen and Scerri v The Queen is wrong.
5. First, and perhaps most importantly, while the appeal in each of the New South Wales cases included a ground of appeal to the effect that the discount given for a plea of guilty was 'inadequate' (or in the case of R v Karan 'excessive'), none of those cases expressly considered the point of principle as to whether such a ground of appeal, on its own, alleges appellable error. None of them, for example, address the issues discussed at some length by the Court in Scerri v The Queen. There is therefore relevantly no statement of principle in those cases that might be considered authority (or ratio decidendi) in relation to the issue.
6. This is particularly so in relation to Trujillo-Mesa v R and Cappis v R in which the court concluded that there was no error in the relevant sentences and the appeals were dismissed. Indeed, in each of those cases, the relevant ground of appeal was to the effect that the appellant had an entitlement to a 25% discount for their pleas of guilty. That proposition was emphatically rejected in each case.[25]
7. The appeals were allowed, however, in both R v Karan and Linggo v R. Those decisions, therefore, invite closer attention as to whether they establish any point of principle that ought to be followed by this Court.
8. R v Karan was a Crown appeal against sentence. The first point to note is that, in that case (unlike in the present case) the Crown also relied upon a ground of appeal that the sentence as a whole was manifestly inadequate. That ground was upheld.[26] Moreover, while a ground of appeal alleging error on the part of the sentencing judge in relation to a 25% discount for both the plea of guilty and co‑operation was upheld, the ground alleged an express error by the sentencing judge in finding that the plea was entered 'at the first opportunity'. The Court concluded that the sentencing judge ought to have found 'that the offender's late plea involved recognition of the inevitable'.[27] For this reason, while the Court did express the view that the discount was 'manifestly excessive', the ground, as alleged and upheld, alleged an express error as to the factual basis for the sentence.
9. In Linggo v R, the offender's appeal against sentence was allowed. The Court allowed the appeal on two grounds, one of which related to the discount given to the appellant for his pleas of guilty. The discount stated by the sentencing judge in Linggo v R was unusual, in that his Honour did not specify an amount but a 'range' of 'between 4 and 10 per cent', a practice which the Court of Criminal Appeal 'strongly caution[ed]' against.[28] In addition, it is apparent from the Court's reasons for decision in relation to the ground relating to the 'discount' that it found that the sentencing judge erred in having regard to an irrelevant consideration,[29] and in failing to have regard to a relevant consideration.[30]
10. As in the case of R v Karan, therefore, Linggo v R is properly to be regarded as involving express errors in the determination of the sentence as a whole, rather than establishing that an allegation that the 'discount' for a plea of guilty is 'manifestly inadequate' is a species of appellable error.
11. In any event, to the extent that those cases might be thought to implicitly recognise such an appellable error, they would be inconsistent with the express statements of principle in MMA v The Queen and Scerri v The Queen. Those statements of principle in our view accord with the instinctive synthesis approach to sentencing established by the High Court[31] and ought to be followed in this Court.
12. For these reasons, in relation to Commonwealth offences, and absent any express error in the sentencing process, in our view a complaint as to the size of the discount for a plea of guilty can only ever be a particular of a ground contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive, that is, outside the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge in the circumstances of the case.

1. The above conclusion is sufficient to dispose of ground 1. As we have said, Mr Dixon did not contend that any individual sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge for the Commonwealth offences (counts 1 to 21) was manifestly excessive. Nor could any error on the part of the learned sentencing judge in relation to count 22 materially affect the outcome of the appeal.
2. It is not, therefore, strictly necessary to reach a concluded view as to whether the discount of 10% in relation to the individual sentences in this case was 'manifestly inadequate'. Certainly, in our view, the learned sentencing judge made no express error of principle in the manner in which his Honour addressed the benefits of Mr Dixon's pleas of guilty.
3. In particular, his Honour did not err in concluding, in effect, that the benefit to the community by Mr Dixon's pleas of guilty was the avoidance of a trial and the need for a jury to view the material the subject of the charges. Certainly, none of the other utilitarian benefits that often follow from a guilty plea were present in this case. The Crown case in relation to each of the charges was very strong; convictions were all but inevitable. Given the nature of the Crown case, and the nature of Mr Dixon's victims, it was never going to be the case that his victims were going to be required to give evidence and be cross‑examined. Indeed, there was nothing in the material before the learned sentencing judge to suggest that the child victims had even been identified, let alone that they were aware that one of their abusers had been brought to justice.
4. That said, the avoidance of a trial in this matter had significant importance. Given the requirements of s 80 of the Commonwealth Constitution, any trial of the indictment in this case was required to be by jury. The proof of Mr Dixon's guilt of the offences would have consisted, principally, of the tender of the recordings that he had made of his victims' abuse. The prospect of ordinary citizens being required, by law, to view all of that material would have carried a real risk of vicarious trauma and harm to those jurors. The benefit in avoiding that risk should not be underestimated.
5. In those circumstances, the general discount of 10% applied by the learned primary judge could properly be described as low. Nevertheless, consistent with Mr Dixon having not contended that any of the sentences for the Commonwealth offences were manifestly excessive, the identification of that discount does not reveal any error. This is particularly so given the sentences actually imposed by the learned sentencing judge. In many cases his Honour imposed the statutory minimum for the individual counts (e.g. counts 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, and 18). While his Honour could potentially have imposed less than the statutory minimum, in light of and subject to s 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), given the serious nature of the offending for his Honour to have imposed even the statutory minimum for those offences may properly be regarded as lenient. In no way could any of the offences committed by Mr Dixon have been described as the 'least worst possible case warranting imprisonment' for such offences (see [106] above). In the absence of a guilty plea, the learned sentencing judge would have been obliged to impose sentences in excess of, and perhaps well in excess of, the statutory minimums.
6. In relation to count 22, to which s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) did apply, however, we are bound to conclude that the discount of 10% for Mr Dixon's plea of guilty, considered in isolation, was manifestly inadequate. In PMY v The State of Western Australia[32] this Court recently concluded that a discount of 10% in relation to a large number of State child sex offences was manifestly inadequate. The Court observed that a s 9AA discount as low as 10% had only ever been given in cases where the offender had entered a late (or very late) guilty plea.[33] In the present case, while not entered at the first reasonable opportunity, Mr Dixon's pleas of guilty were not 'late'. In those circumstances, in our view, the discount of 10% in relation to count 22 may properly be said to be so low as to manifest error.
7. The Court in PMY resentenced the appellant on the basis of discounts of between 20% and 22% for the individual sentences. We would not have gone that far in relation to count 22. Mr Dixon's plea of guilty, while relatively early, was not entered at the first reasonable opportunity and, if anything, the Crown case in relation to count 22 was the strongest of all of the counts, as in practical terms it simply required proof that Mr Dixon had in fact produced all of the records found in his possession. In our view, an appropriate discount for Mr Dixon's plea to count 22 would have been 15%.
8. Despite that error, however, we would not allow the appeal in relation to the sentence for count 22. The production of all of the child exploitation material by Mr Dixon was a serious offence of its type. Even applying a discount of 15% for the plea of guilty we are not of the opinion that a different sentence should have been imposed with respect to count 22.[34]
9. In any event, as we have already said, the sentence with respect to count 22 was made wholly concurrent with the other sentences imposed on Mr Dixon such that any error on the part of the learned sentencing judge in relation to count 22 could not have materially affected the total effective sentence.
10. For these reasons, while we would grant leave in relation to ground 1, the ground has not been made out.

Ground 2 - first limb of the totality principle

1. Ground 2 alleges that the learned sentencing judge erred in the application of the totality principle, by reference to two particulars. First, the ground alleges, in effect, an error of process, by contending that the learned sentencing judge disregarded the sentences imposed in comparable cases. Secondly, the ground alleges an implied error, in that the total effective sentence and minimum non‑parole period did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of Mr Dixon's offending. That formulation, of course, reflects the first limb of the totality principle.
2. It is appropriate to briefly summarise the principles relating to the first limb of the totality principle, particularly in the context of sexual offences involving children.

1. The first limb of the totality principle relevantly requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences, viewed in their entirety, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances including those referable to the offender personally, all relevant sentencing factors and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases.[35]
2. The range of sentences imposed in other cases does not establish the bounds of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important are the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect.
3. A number of decisions of this Court have emphasised the limited utility of broadly comparable cases in the context of sexual offending, including sexual offending against children. While those statements of principle have been made in the context of State offences, they are, in our view, equally applicable to Commonwealth child sex offences, such as those committed by Mr Dixon.
4. In CAND v The State of Western Australia, for example, the Court observed that:[36]

because the range of circumstances of sexual offending and sexual offenders are infinitely variable, there is no established tariff for sexual offences involving children and the total effective sentence imposed in one case can only provide very limited guidance in assessing whether the total effective sentence imposed in the case under appeal is manifestly excessive, in the sense that error can be implied from the exercise of the sentencing discretion. For those reasons there will necessarily be limits upon the utility of the process of argument presented on behalf of the appellant. (footnotes omitted)

1. To similar effect, in Pennetta v The State of Western Australia, Hall J (as his Honour then was) observed:[37]

Where, however, it is only claimed that there has been a breach of the totality principle and no challenge is made to the individual sentences the utility in comparing the total effective sentence with total sentences in other cases is more limited. This is because the total effective sentence is not one imposed for a single offence. It is often difficult enough to compare sentences imposed in different cases with different factual circumstances and different personal circumstances where the [sentence] relates only to a single offence. The fact that different offenders may have received different total effective sentences in respect of different groupings of sentences adds a level of complexity that makes comparisons difficult. Nonetheless it is important to ensure that there is broad consistency in sentences.

1. Finally, on this point, in JJR v The State of Western Australia, Mitchell JA said:[38]

Often, given the wide variety of combinations of offending conduct, offenders and victims involved in sexual offences against children, different views may reasonably be taken as to whether the overall criminality involved in a group of offences in one case is greater or lesser than that involved in a group of offences in a different case. That variety makes it difficult to identify direct comparators and complicates any attempt to analyse whether the total effective sentence imposed in a particular case reveals a comparatively more severe or lenient approach than that adopted in a different case.

1. In relation to Commonwealth child sex offences, to these general principles must be added the presumption of cumulative sentences in s 19 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
2. As we have observed at [110] above, it is clear that the presumption of cumulative sentences in s 19 was not intended to exclude the application of the totality principle. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the amendments to s 19 made by the Amendment Act are merely declaratory of the totality principle. Legislation is, after all, intended to produce real effects, and should not be construed in a way that is 'superfluous, void or insi[39]ificant'.39
3. In this context, it is, in our view, instructive, as we noted at [112] above, that the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill for the Amendment Act described the presumption of cumulative sentences as a 'yardstick', against which to examine the proposed sentence. In this respect, just as the 'yardsticks' created by increased maximum penalties and the minimum penalties introduced by the Amendment Act, reflect the legislative intention that the length of sentences of imprisonment for individual Commonwealth child sex offences should increase, so too, in our view, the presumption of cumulative sentences reflects a legislative intention that, in cases involving multiples such offences, total effective sentences should also be the subject of an overall general increase.
4. That is, while the presumption of cumulative sentences in s 19 does not exclude the application of the totality principle, the presumption does reflect an intention that, when applying the totality principle, the courts will give effect to the Parliament's intention that total effective sentences for Commonwealth child sex offences will generally increase, compared to those that were imposed prior to the Amendment Act. Clearly, giving effect to that intention does not involve some particular proportionate increase in total effective sentences imposed after the Amendment Act. The application of the totality principle, including in the context of s 19 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), remains a discretionary one that cannot be reduced to a mathematical exercise. Nevertheless, the presumption of cumulative sentences, in the context of all of the changes introduced by the Amendment Act, provide a further reason for recognising the limited utility of sentences imposed prior to the Amendment Act, in determining whether the first limb of the totality principle has been infringed.
5. It is to that issue that we now turn.

1. We commence with what we described above as the alleged error of process in ground 2(a), that the learned sentencing judge erred by 'disregarding the sentences imposed in comparable cases'.
2. The contention that the learned sentencing judge 'disregard[ed] the sentences imposed in comparable cases' must be rejected. By submissions filed prior to, and made in the course of, the sentencing hearing his Honour was referred to a number of previous sentencing decisions of this, and other, courts in relation to Commonwealth child sex offences, including Beattie, Baden v R,[40] R v Harrison; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth),[41] R v Schulz; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth),[42] and McGregor. Mr Dixon relied upon all of these decisions in the appeal, in addition to a further single judge of appeal decision in Senarath v R.[43]
3. The learned sentencing judge did not 'disregard' the decisions that were referred to him. To the contrary, it is apparent from his Honour's exchanges with counsel and his Honour's sentencing remarks, that his Honour read and considered those cases. Rather, what the learned sentencing judge did was, in effect, conclude that none of the cases referred to him were truly comparable. As recorded at [89] above, for example, his Honour said that, perhaps with the exception of Beattie, the criminality involved in those other cases was 'nowhere near on a scale of that involved' in Mr Dixon's case. In addition, with the exception of McGregor, all of the prior decisions were decided before the Amendment Act. For that reason, his Honour remarked that the sentences imposed in the previous cases did not assist him 'in any meaningful way'.
4. In that regard, we understand his Honour to have been making clear by this remark that none of the previous sentences could meaningfully mark out the upper ranges of the appropriate total effective sentence, either because the criminality of the offending was not comparable or because they were decided prior to the Amendment Act (or both). In that respect his Honour was, in our view, entirely correct.
5. It is not necessary to set out the circumstances of those earlier decisions in detail. The following summaries suffice for the purposes of the comparative exercise.
6. Beattie was, as the learned sentencing judge recognised, the most comparable with the present case. Also involving the online sexual abuse of children in the Philippines with an accomplice, Beattie involved a similar number of charges (24, compared with 22 in the present case) and a similar number of victims (17, compared with 15 in the present case). The nature of the sexual offending against the children was also broadly similar, although the ages of Mr Dixon's victims extended to much younger children. Mr Dixon submitted that there was 'an element of sadism' in Beattie that was absent in his case. This putative distinction should not be overstated. While it is correct to say that the physical coercion of the children was, at times, more pronounced in Beattie than in the present case, it is clear that Mr Dixon's offending involved the children being subject to physical harm, to which he was, at best, indifferent (see, for example, the treatment of Maria at [59] and [63] above).
7. In addition, there are a number of features of Mr Dixon's offending which can properly be said to be more serious than in Beattie. First, the period over which Mr Dixon's offending occurred (over nine years) was considerably longer than that in Beattie (approximately nine months). Secondly, unlike the offender in Beattie, Mr Dixon's offending included him sexually abusing children in person, as in the cases of Lucio, Camilo and Rosa. In addition, unlike Mr Dixon, the offender in Beattie gave active assistance to authorities (signing over his online account and online identities to the Australian Federal Police). Finally, while of lesser weight in cases such as the present, the offender in Beattie expressed significant shame and remorse and, indeed, voluntarily ceased his offending prior to coming to the attention of the authorities. Mr Dixon, by contrast was unrepentant, and continued to justify his offending (see [85] above).
8. The offender in Beattie was sentenced, on a Crown appeal, to a total effective sentence of 14 years imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 10 years.[44] Basten JA, while also allowing the appeal in Beattie, would have imposed a total effective sentence of 20 years with a non‑parole period of 13 years.[45]
9. Baden also concerned an offender who engaged in sexual abuse of children via internet chats and webcams over a four‑year period. There were two victims, in relation to whom the appellant was convicted of two counts of procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas, one count of persistent sexual abuse of a child and one count of engaging in sexual activity (other than intercourse) with a child. The offender in Baden was also convicted of two counts of possessing child abuse material. He was sentenced, on his pleas of guilty, to a total effective sentence of 11 years and 4 months imprisonment, with a non‑parole period of 7 years and 4 months.
10. As serious as the offending in Baden was, it was in no way comparable with the criminality involved in all of Mr Dixon's offending. The offending in Baden involved chats with the victims and the victims 'performing' sexual activity on themselves for the offender at the behest of their mother, while the offender masturbated. The offending did not appear to involve the victims having any physical contact with other persons. Mr Dixon by contrast abused 15 children (and sought to abuse more), he personally had sexual intercourse with children and he arranged for other adults to do so. In every respect, even without the effects of the Amendment Act, Mr Dixon's offending was substantially more serious than that in Baden.
11. Schulz also involved principally two victims, again involving offending via the internet, in which a woman in the Philippines assisted the offender to abuse her 8‑year‑old daughter and 3 to 4‑year‑old niece. In addition there was a charge of an offence involving the woman's 14‑year‑old son. There were 29 charges in Schulz, most of them (22 in total) involving either soliciting or transmitting child pornography or child abuse material. There were two charges of persistent sexual abuse relating to the girls, which included the girls being engaged in sexual activity with those persons. One of the charges in relation to the 8‑year‑old girl, in particular, was a very serious example of its type (for which the individual sentence was 9 years imprisonment) and was comparable to some of the 'contact' offending arranged by Mr Dixon. The offender in Schulz was resentenced, following his pleas of guilty, to a total effective sentence of 13 years imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 7 years and 6 months.
12. As we have indicated, some of the individual offences committed by the offender in Schulz were comparable to some of Mr Dixon's offending. The scale and variety of Mr Dixon's offending, particularly as to the sheer number of his victims, was, however, substantially worse.
13. One of the observations made by the sentencing judge in Schulz was that the offender's participation in the abuse exclusively online 'would have deadened [him] to the reality that [he] was directly participating as a party to the sexual abuse'.[46] This potential 'desensitising' effect of online activity on offenders has been referred to in other authorities in this context.[47] Whatever explanatory power that effect might have had in other cases, however, it could have none in the case of Mr Dixon. By his personal, physical abuse of children and his insistent demands of his accomplices, it is clear that Mr Dixon readily understood, and embraced, the reality of every act of abuse committed against his victims.
14. The offender in Harrison did engage in personal, physical abuse, by engaging in sexual intercourse on three occasions with a 14 to 15‑year‑old girl in the Philippines. The offender pleaded guilty to one count of persistent sexual abuse of the girl and four related offences concerning his use of the internet to transmit child pornography, possessing child exploitation material and seeking to procure a child to engage in sexual activity. The offender in Harrison, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced on a Crown appeal to a total effective sentence of 8 years imprisonment with a non‑parole period of 5 years. Mr Dixon's offending was, on any view, significantly more serious than that in Harrison having regard to the duration of the offending, the age and number of victims and the high degree of perversion involved in his offending. Harrison is not a helpful comparator.
15. McGregor was the only decision referred to the learned sentencing judge to have been decided after the Amendment Act. The offending, which occurred over a period of three months, involved a single offence of persistent sexual abuse (which was assessed to be within the lower range of objective seriousness), one count of procuring a child to engage in sexual activity overseas and three counts relating to possessing or transmitting prohibited material on the internet.[48] The offender in McGregor was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 10 years and 9 months imprisonment, with a non‑parole period of 7 years and 6 months.
16. The decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in McGregor was concerned with the proper application of s 16AAC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and with whether the aggregate sentencing regime in New South Wales applied to Commonwealth child sex offences. As a consequence, the Court did not address, save in very general terms, the nature and seriousness of the offending or its place in the range of sentences customarily imposed. Nevertheless, it is apparent from the duration of offending and the nature of the charges (and the sentencing judge's description of the persistent sexual abuse as being within the lower range), that it could not provide a useful comparator in the present case.
17. The final decision referred to by Mr Dixon on appeal, Senarath, was also decided after the Amendment Act, although it was not referred to the learned sentencing judge. The offender in Senarath was convicted of 14 charges, including one count of persistent sexual abuse, nine counts of grooming, three counts of possessing or transmitting child abuse material and one count of what is colloquially known as 'upskirting'. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 13 years and 8 months imprisonment, with a non‑parole period of 9 years and 6 months.
18. The most serious offending of the offender in Senarath was the offence of persistent sexual abuse, which involved two instances of sexual penetration and one instance of sexual activity with a child in the Philippines, albeit on a single day. For that offence alone the offender was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment. Beach JA refused leave to appeal, observing that there was 'no substance' to the proposed appeal.
19. The overall criminality involved in Mr Dixon's offending was, objectively, significantly more serious than that in Senarath. In any event, the refusal of leave in that case is such that it can provide no indication of the upper limit of the exercise of a sound exercise of sentencing discretion.
20. This review of the authorities relied upon by Mr Dixon, in our view, demonstrates the correctness of the learned sentencing judge's observation to the effect that the previous sentences provided little assistance in determining the appropriate total effective sentence for Mr Dixon's offending, either because the criminality of the offending was not comparable or because they were decided prior to the Amendment Act (or both).
21. As we have observed, Beattie was the closest case to being a useful comparator, although there are a number of features of Mr Dixon's offending that can properly be said to be more serious than that in Beattie. Beattie is, in any event, only one prior decision and was decided prior to the Amendment Act. It would therefore be expected that the total effective sentence imposed on Mr Dixon would be markedly higher than that imposed in Beattie.
22. This highlights an important point. While the learned sentencing judge said that the previous decisions did not assist him 'in any meaningful way', there is one sense in which those decisions do assist; namely that the decisions decided prior to the Amendment Act may provide an indication as to what would now be an inadequate total effective sentence. In other words, given Parliament's intention that there be an increase, not only in individual sentences, but in total effective sentences, it can at least be said that for a court to impose the same sentence for particular offending after the Amendment Act as would have been imposed prior to the Amendment Act, would be contrary to Parliament's intention.
23. Of course, as the principles discussed reveal, the range of sentences imposed in other cases is only one of the relevant considerations in the application of the first limb of the totality principle. It is necessary for this Court to have regard to all of the relevant facts and circumstances and sentencing principles.
24. The objective seriousness of Mr Dixon's offending was extremely high, as demonstrated by all of the matters referred to by the learned sentencing judge (see [84] above). Mr Dixon was engaged, for a long time, in the abuse of children on an industrial scale, in which he purchased the sexual degradation of children for his own gratification. His perverse use of, at times, affectionate language (i.e. 'she is a very good girl', 'tell her I love her'), could not mask his dehumanisation of the children, who he constantly referred to by their age alone (i.e. 'the 10', 'the 7', 'the 8') as if they were commodities.
25. Mr Dixon's offending as a whole revealed a high degree of depravity, both as to the acts he performed, or paid to be performed, on his victims, and his obsessive and obscene commentary during their abuse (which decency prevents being recorded in these reasons).
26. The vulnerability of Mr Dixon's victims, the extent of their corruption and the impact on their lives is also clear from the facts as a whole.
27. As to vulnerability, Mr Dixon exploited the disadvantage of children from evidently impoverished environments. The desperate circumstances of the children is vividly illustrated by the involvement of many of their parents and relatives in their abuse, who either acquiesced in, or actively engaged in their abuse for what were, in Australian terms, pitiful sums of money. Mr Dixon's willingness to exploit that disadvantage was, in turn, reflected in his grotesque 'haggling' over the price he was prepared to pay for their abuse.
28. The involvement of parents and relatives of the children also illustrates the degree of corruption and normalisation of abuse for some of Mr Dixon's victims, some of whom, like Antonio, sought out his accomplices in search of money.
29. The devastating, and intergenerational, impact on the lives of Mr Dixon's victims is starkly illustrated by 21‑year‑old Sisa's abuse of her 4‑year‑old daughter, Nica, at Mr Dixon's insistence. Sisa, who said she had been doing 'shows' since she was a child, would herself have been a child when Nica was born. That Sisa was an accomplice to Mr Dixon's offending against her own daughter does not negate the reality that she too was exploited and victimised by Mr Dixon.
30. Having regard to all of the circumstances, Mr Dixon's offending may properly be characterised as towards the highest end of seriousness of such offending. While eschewing the assistance of such labels, the learned sentencing judge said that he did not place Mr Dixon's offending in the category of the worst of its type. That was a prudent judgement and we agree with it. Nevertheless, the fact that Mr Dixon's offending may not have been the worst of its type probably says more about the ingenuity of the human capacity for moral evil, than it does about the seriousness of his particular offending.
31. The dominant sentencing consideration, in light of the objective seriousness of Mr Dixon's offending, was general deterrence, along with retribution and punishment. Personal deterrence, protection of the community and rehabilitation were also of some relevance, although given the impact of Mr Dixon's age, they were of less weight in the present case. Given the inevitability of a long term of imprisonment the prospect that Mr Dixon would be in a position to offend in future was reduced. In a case such as the present, the personal circumstances of the offender, although not irrelevant will also carry less weight. We will return to Mr Dixon's age and health conditions in the context of ground of appeal 3.
32. The only real mitigation available to Mr Dixon were his pleas of guilty, and as we have concluded, the mitigatory impact of those pleas was confined to the avoidance of a trial and the need for a jury to view the material the subject of the charges. Mr Dixon did not have the benefit of any remorse; indeed, judging by his responses in the neuropsychological assessment (see [85] above), he had learnt nothing from his arrest and conviction, either about himself or his victims.
33. In all of the circumstances, the total effective sentence to be imposed on Mr Dixon, and the non‑parole period, needed to be very lengthy. Even apart from the effect of the Amendment Act, it would have been well open to the learned sentencing judge to impose a sentence substantially higher than that imposed by the majority in Beattie. Following the Amendment Act, to not have done so would have been manifestly inadequate.
34. In assessing the total effective sentence in the present case, in our view the structure of the sentence imposed by the learned sentencing judge is instructive. First, none of the individual sentences imposed by the learned sentencing judge were particularly high. Indeed, having regard to the minimum penalties marking the yardstick for the 'least worst' case in those categories to which the minimum penalties applied, a number of the individual sentences imposed by his Honour could properly be described as modest, or even lenient. The presumption of cumulacy in s 19(5) applied to all of those individual sentences other than counts 1, 2 and 3. Applying s 19(5) to the other sentences would have produced a total effective sentence of 95 years (before taking into account the sentences for counts 1, 2 and 3). Clearly, as the learned sentencing judge concluded, such a sentence would be a 'gross breach' of the totality principle. It does, nevertheless, reflect the starting point, or yardstick, which s 19(5) required to be assessed in order to determine whether to apply s 19(6) and to depart from the presumption.
35. Having departed from the presumption, the number and variety of Mr Dixon's offending required that there be some reasonable accumulation of the sentences in order to achieve a sentence reflecting his overall criminality. In that context it is notable that the learned sentencing judge accumulated only three of the 22 sentences. While those sentences reflected three of the most serious individual offences, it can nevertheless be seen that the total effective sentence included a very substantial degree of concurrency.
36. It is also significant that, on any view, in order to reflect the overall criminality of his offending, the total effective sentence to be imposed by the learned sentencing judge would need to be very substantial. It is to be expected, in cases of that order of magnitude, that the range of sentences that will fall within the sound exercise of the sentencing discretion will be broader than in the case of offences attracting lesser sentences. As this Court recently confirmed in McCulloch v The State of Western Australia,[49] in the context of minimum terms for murder, where very substantial terms are being imposed differences in the order of magnitude of two to three years are 'of a kind that are inherent in the discretionary nature of the sentencing process' and are not such as to reveal implied error.
37. In all of the circumstances, the total effective sentence of 23 years imprisonment, while no doubt firm, cannot be said to be plainly unjust or unreasonable. In particular, we are unable to infer, from the length of the total effective sentence, any error of principle.
38. Similarly, the minimum non‑parole period of 17 years was, in our view, within the bounds of a sound exercise of sentencing discretion. A non‑parole period is the minimum period of imprisonment that justice requires the offender to serve, having regard to all relevant sentencing objectives, including punishment, retribution, personal deterrence and general deterrence.[50] Given the dominant sentencing considerations of general deterrence and punishment in the present case, justice required that the minimum non‑parole period itself be very substantial. We are unable to conclude that 17 years was erroneous or contrary to principle.
39. For these reasons, while we would grant leave to appeal on ground 2 (the sentence being a firm one), we would not uphold the ground.

Ground 3 - Mr Dixon's age and health conditions

1. Ground 3 contends that the learned sentencing judge erred in concluding that Mr Dixon's age and health conditions did not ameliorate the total effective sentence to be imposed. The particular passage of the learned sentencing judge's sentencing remarks that is the subject of ground 3 is set out at [90] above.
2. As noted above, Mr Dixon was 74 years old at the time of sentence and suffers from cancer (melanoma) and a mild neurocognitive impairment. While counsel for Mr Dixon at the sentencing hearing submitted that his time in custody was more onerous because of his conditions, it was not suggested that any of his conditions could not be properly managed in the prison environment.[51]
3. As will be seen, issues such as age and ill health are often addressed in the context of the second limb of the totality principle, the need (in appropriate cases) to avoid a total effective sentence that is 'crushing', by destroying any reasonable expectation of a life after release from prison.[52] At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for Mr Dixon submitted that ground 3, is not confined in that way and extended to the general consideration of age and ill health as a sentencing consideration.
4. It is appropriate then to refer to the relevant principles in this regard.

1. Age and ill health, being matters personal to an offender, are, of course, relevant sentencing considerations. The impact of those considerations on a sentence, or total effective sentence, if any, will vary from case to case.
2. In relation to advanced age, for example, as Steytler P said in Gulyas:[53]

Australian courts have often extended a degree of mercy in cases of advanced age (although the age has ordinarily been a good deal more advanced than that of the offenders in Poh). The justification for this is a recognition that, for an offender of advanced age, each year of a sentence represents a substantial proportion of the period of life which is left to him or her. ...

However, the cases stress that whether leniency will be afforded to a particular offender of advanced age depends very much on the circumstances of the case.

1. This analysis was adopted in the context of the totality principle by this Court in The State of Western Australia v FJG, where Mazza JA confirmed that '[a]dvanced age is only one of the factors which a sentencer must take into account in order to arrive at a just sentence'.[54]
2. The relevance of illness or infirmity was also addressed by Steytler P in Gulyas, where his Honour said:[55]

Illness may be a mitigating factor where it cannot be treated effectively in prison or where it is of a nature that will result in imprisonment being more onerous for the offender than in the ordinary case. However, it is important to bear in mind what King CJ said in R v Smith [1987] SASC 9802; (1987) 44 SASR 587, 589 (Cox and O'Loughlin JJ agreeing):

The state of health of an offender is always relevant to the consideration of the appropriate sentence for the offender. The courts, however, must be cautious as to the influence which they allow this factor to have upon the sentencing process. Ill health cannot be allowed to become a licence to commit crime, nor can offenders generally expect to escape punishment because of the condition of their health. It is the responsibility of the Correctional Services authorities to provide appropriate care and treatment for sick prisoners. Generally speaking ill health will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment only when it appears that imprisonment will be a greater burden on the offender by reason of his state of health or when there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a gravely adverse effect on the offender's health.

1. Again, these principles have been reaffirmed in this Court on numerous occasions.[56]
2. The impact of age and infirmity was discussed more generally in the context of the second limb of the totality principle in Moore v The State of Western Australia.[57] In that case, the Court, having cited the decisions in Gulyas and Wark v The State of Western Australia,[58] said:[59]

The second limb [of the totality principle] is founded on mercy. Where the only complaint is that the second limb has been infringed the relevant questions are whether the total sentence is crushing in the relevant sense and whether, if so, it has been established that the learned sentencing judge erred by not reducing the sentence for that reason. It is not enough to establish that it was open to the sentencing judge to exercise mercy. It must be established that he was manifestly in error not to do so and that the resulting sentence was plainly unreasonable or unjust.

Because every exercise of mercy will depend on the individual facts of the case, little is to be gained by an examination of other cases. Indeed, the parties to this appeal do not seek to support their submissions by reference to other cases, presumably for that reason. There have been cases where an appeal based on the second limb of the totality principle has been successful. In general, this has been where the offender is already elderly or infirm with a limited life expectancy. In such cases the offender will almost certainly die in prison unless the sentence is reduced. That is not this case. There is no reason to believe that the appellant will die before his sentence is complete. For that reason, it could be argued that the sentence in this case is not crushing in the relevant sense.

However, even if the sentence is crushing in the relevant sense there remains the question of whether error has been established. In considering whether there was some proper foundation for an exercise of mercy in this case it is relevant to take into account the nature and circumstances of the offences, as well as the personal circumstances of the appellant.

The appellant did not plead guilty, showed no remorse, had made no steps towards rehabilitation at the time of sentencing and had no physical or mental health issues. Any prediction as to what the appellant's quality of life may or not be upon his release is speculative. There is nothing in the appellant's present circumstances, such as ill health, that would indicate that he has a limited lifespan or would have a poor quality of life when he is 80 or 82. There is no reason to suppose that he will not live to such an age. There was nothing in this case that would excite considerations of mercy.

1. It will be apparent from the authorities to which we have referred that, whether they are addressed from the perspective of mitigating personal circumstances or in the context of the second limb of the totality principle, the thread of principle that underlies the relevance of age and infirmity in sentencing is that of mercy.
2. That is, it is considerations of mercy that will determine whether leniency will be afforded to a particular offender of advanced age or whether a total effective sentence is 'crushing', in the sense that it would destroy any reasonable expectation of a life after release from prison. Similarly, illness will generally only have an ameliorating effect on a sentence when it appears that imprisonment will be a greater burden on the offender by reason of their state of health or when there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a gravely adverse effect on the offender's health.
3. For the reasons that follow, we are not satisfied that the learned sentencing judge erred in concluding that Mr Dixon's age and health conditions should not ameliorate the total effective sentence that should be imposed. The learned sentencing judge clearly took those matters into consideration, as his Honour was required to do. Nevertheless, as with matters personal to the offender generally, those matters were of relatively little weight in the sentencing exercise, and the learned sentencing judge was entitled to conclude that they should not ameliorate the total effective sentence.
4. In relation to Mr Dixon's health conditions, in particular, there was no causal connection between any of his medical conditions and his serious offending. Nor was there any medical evidence before the learned sentencing judge to suggest that Mr Dixon's health conditions could not be properly managed in prison or to suggest that there was serious risk of imprisonment having an adverse effect on his health. Defence counsel's submission to the learned sentencing judge that Mr Dixon's time in custody had been, or would be, more onerous compared to other prisoners was therefore not supported by evidence. In particular, there was nothing to support the conclusion that his health was markedly different, in terms of its impact upon him, than other persons of his age.
5. In relation to Mr Dixon's age, whether his advanced years could ameliorate the total effective sentence to be imposed, including the minimum non‑parole period, ultimately depended upon whether there was some factor which called for the exercise of mercy in that way. The learned sentencing judge concluded that there were not and that Mr Dixon's case was one in which the exercise of mercy was not warranted.
6. In that regard, the learned sentencing judge was, in our respectful view, correct. There was, in our view, no basis for the exercise of mercy to reduce the sentence in this case. Mr Dixon's offending was, itself, merciless and committed in complete disregard of the humanity of his many victims. And, while he pleaded guilty to the offences, he was not remorseful and had no empathy for his victims. The exercise of mercy in a particular case must be justified by some particular circumstances that take the case out of the ordinary.[60] None was present in this case.
7. Indeed, as this Court confirmed in Wark,[61] there are cases in which an offender, by the very nature of their criminal acts, has forfeited the right to any expectation of being released from prison at a time that would permit them to enjoy their remaining life. This is such a case.
8. Mercy did not require that Mr Dixon's total effective sentence be reduced on account of his age and health issues. What mercy required in the present case was that Mr Dixon not be given false hope that he was likely to have any meaningful expectation of a life after prison, so that he might make peace with that reality.
9. We would refuse leave to appeal on ground 3.

1. Mr Dixon's appeal must be dismissed.
2. We would make the following orders:
   1. Leave to appeal on ground 1 and ground 2 is granted.
   2. Leave to appeal on ground 3 is refused.
   3. The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Beattie [2017] NSWCCA 301; (2017) 327 FLR 71 (Beattie) [5] (Basten JA).

[2] Hurt v The King [2024] HCA 8; (2024) 281 CLR 286 (Hurt v The King).

[3] Hurt v The King [27] (Gageler CJ & Jagot J).

[4] Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; (2011) 244 CLR 120 [31] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel & Bell JJ); HSV v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 5; (2020) 281 A Crim R 145 [44] - [45] (Buss P, Mazza & Mitchell JJA).

[5] Section 16AAC has, since Mr Dixon was sentenced, been amended, twice.

[6] Hurt v The King [54] (Edelman, Steward & Gleeson JJ).

[7] Hurt v The King [39] (Gageler CJ & Jagot J).

[8] Hurt v The King [42] (Gageler CJ & Jagot J); see also [92] (Edelman, Steward & Gleeson JJ).

[9] McGregor v R [2024] NSWCCA 200; (2024) 116 NSWLR 200 (McGregor) [33] - [34] (Bell CJ, Kirk JA, Harrison CJ at CL, Davies & Sweeney JJ). Since the hearing of the present appeal, an appeal to the High Court from McGregor, which concerned the application of the aggregate sentencing regime in New South Wales to Commonwealth child sex offences, was dismissed (The King v McGregor [2026] HCA 3).

[10] House of Representatives, Hansard, 11 September 2019, p 2446.

[11] See e.g. Phibbs v R [2023] VSCA 123 [22], [42], [59] (Beach & Kyrou JJA); McGregor v R [99] (Bell CJ, Kirk JA, Harrison CJ at CL, Davies & Sweeney JJ).

[12] Explanatory Memorandum, Crimes Legislation Amendment (Sexual Crimes Against Children and Community Protection Measures) Bill 2019 (Cth), [286] - [287].

[13] House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499.

[14] Rossi v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 189; (2014) 47 WAR 508 [80] (McLure P; Mazza JA & Hall J agreeing).

[15] Xiao v R [2018] NSWCCA 4; (2018) 96 NSWLR 1 [280] (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P & Hoeben CJ at CL, McCallum & Bellew JJ).

[16] Subject to the effect of s 16AAC on the minimum sentence that may be imposed in such a case.

[18] MMA v The Queen [2015] WASCA 177 [4] (MMA v The Queen) (Mazza JA; McLure P agreeing).

[19] Scerri v The Queen [2010] VSCA 287; (2010) 206 A Crim R 1 (Scerri v The Queen) [22] - [24] (Maxwell P, Buchanan JA).

[20] Nguyen v The Queen [2011] VSCA 32; (2011) 31 VR 673 [51] - [52] ((Maxwell P, Redlich JA).

[21] Trujillo-Mesa v R [2010] NSWCCA 201 (Trujillo-Mesa v R).

[22] R v Karan [2013] NSWCCA 53 (R v Karan).

[23] Cappis v R [2015] NSWCCA 138 (Cappis v R).

[24] Linggo v R [2017] NSWCCA 67 (Linggo v R).

[25] Trujillo-Mesa v R [17] Fullerton J; Hodgson JA & Price J agreeing); Cappis v R [60] ‑ [62] (Garling J; Gleeson JA & Johnson J agreeing).

[26] R v Karan [61] - [62] (Adamson J; Johnson & Harrison JJ agreeing).

[27] R v Karan [73] (Adamson J; Johnson & Harrison JJ agreeing).

[28] Linggo v R [51] (Beazley P, Walton & RA Hulme JJ).

[29] Linggo v R [46] (Beazley P, Walton & RA Hulme JJ).

[30] Linggo v R [49] (Beazley P, Walton & RA Hulme JJ).

[31] See generally BSN v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 142 [1] ‑ [2] (Quinlan CJ).

[32] PMY v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 113 (PMY).

[33] PMY [53] (Mazza, Vaughan & Hall JJA).

[34] Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 31(4).

[35] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21] (Buss P, Mitchell & Pritchard JJA).

[36] CAND v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 101 [48] (Martin CJ, Beech JA & Hall J).

[37] Pennetta v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 234 [39] (Hall J) (references omitted).

[38] JJR v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 51; (2018) 272 A Crim R 209 [168] (Mitchell JA; Mazza JA agreeing). This passage was cited with approval in MHE v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 133 [81] (Mitchell & Beech JJA; Quinlan CJ agreeing).

[39] Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 [71] (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby & Hayne JJ).

[40] Baden v R [2020] NSWCCA 23 (Baden).

[41] R v Harrison; Ex parte DPP (Cth) [2021] QCA 279 (Harrison).

[42] R v Schulz; Ex parte DPP (Cth) [2023] QCA 150 (Schulz).

[43] Senarath v R [2024] VSCA 306 (Senarath).

[44] Beattie [214] (Price J; Walton J agreeing).

[47] Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Knipe [2025] VSCA 228 [74] (Priest, Beach & Taylor JJA).

[48] McGregor [2] (Bell CJ, Kirk JA, Harrison CJ at CL, Davies & Sweeney JJ).

[49] McCulloch v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 24 (McCulloch) [105] (Quinlan CJ, Thomson P & Archer JA).

[50] McCulloch [73] ‑ [74] (Quinlan CJ, Thomson P & Archer JA).

[52] Gulyas v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 263; (2007) 178 A Crim R 539 (Gulyas) [48] (Steytler P; McLure & Miller JJA agreeing).

[53] Gulyas [34] - [35] (Steytler P; McLure & Miller JJA agreeing).

[54] The State of Western Australia v FJG [2012] WASCA 206 [55] (Mazza JA, McLure P & Buss JA).

[55] Gulyas [36] (Steytler P; McLure & Miller JJA agreeing).

[56] Colwell v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [67] - [68] (Newnes JA; Pullin & Mazza JJA agreeing); NE v The State of Western Australia 72 [44] - [45] (Quinlan CJ, Mazza & Mitchell JJA).

[57] Moore v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 156 (Moore).

[58] Wark v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 66 (Wark).

[59] Moore [90] - [93] (Quinlan CJ, Hall JA, Mullins AJA).

[60] The State of Western Australia v Rayapen [2023] WASCA 55 [204] (Quinlan CJ, Mazza & Hall JJA).

[61] Wark [639] (Buss P, Mazza & Vaughan JJA).