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Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Steven Denshire (Plaintiff)
Médecins Sans Frontières Australia Ltd (First Defendant)
The President of the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales (Second Defendant)
An Appeal Panel constituted under s 328 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (Third Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
EG Romaniuk SC and EE Grotte (Plaintiff)
LD Robison (First Defendant)
Submitting appearances (Second and Third Defendants)
Solicitors:
Walker Law Group (Plaintiff)
Lee Legal Group (First Defendant)

File Number(s): 2025/472567

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff, Steven Denshire, has sought judicial review of a decision of an Appeal Panel of the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales. He asserts that the Appeal Panel incorrectly rejected his submission that reasons given by a medical assessor of the Commission in relation to a medical dispute manifested apprehended bias.

2. The plaintiff had previously claimed that he had suffered a work-related psychiatric injury, in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), while employed with Médecins Sans Frontières Australia Ltd (MSF). The claim was accepted. The plaintiff later sought compensation for permanent impairment, his entitlement to which depended at the time upon there being at least 15% permanent impairment, often referred to as whole person impairment or “WPI”: note Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 65A(3). MSF’s insurer, EML Workers Insurance NSW Ltd, denied such an entitlement. The dispute was referred by the Commission to a medical assessor, Dr Stephen Glozier (the Assessor). He assessed WPI at 7%.

3. The plaintiff then appealed to the Appeal Panel against the medical assessment pursuant to ss 327(3)(c) and (d) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (NSW) (WIM Act). He asserted that the medical assessment certificate (MAC) contained a demonstrable error in that the examination, decision and reasoning of the Assessor manifested apprehended bias in the legal sense, in particular because the Assessor had described a particular conclusion as “medically risible”. The plaintiff also challenged the reasoning of the Assessor with respect to four categories of functional impairment, asserting that the assessment was made on the basis of incorrect criteria. The Appeal Panel rejected the appeal.

4. The plaintiff’s further amended summons in this Court seeks to overturn the decision of the Appeal Panel by reference to its failure to uphold the apprehended bias complaint. The case is not made out. For reasons explained below, it is sufficient and appropriate to determine whether or not the Assessor’s decision was affected by apprehended bias. It was not. The application for judicial review of the Appeal Panel’s decision should therefore be dismissed. In what follows I set out the background (at [5]-[13]), explain the issues raised in this Court (at [14]-[20]), then turn to determination of the dispute (at [21]-[38]).

Background

5. The plaintiff worked for MSF between 2014-2016 as a carpenter and logistics manager. He was deployed to humanitarian emergency zones in Sudan, Iraq, Sierra Leone and Ukraine. These deployments resulted in the plaintiff being exposed to traumatic events. He found himself struggling to cope with subsequent work once he had left employment with MSF. His claim for workers compensation based on a work injury of PTSD was accepted by the insurer, with a deemed date of injury of 23 November 2015.

6. In March 2024 the plaintiff made a claim for lump sum compensation for permanent impairment. The assessment of the degree of permanent impairment of an injured worker is to be made in accordance with the Workers Compensation Guidelines: WIM Act, s 322(1). The Guidelines require permanent impairment arising from psychiatric and psychological disorders to be evaluated across six scales, each corresponding to an area of functional impairment, with a formula for aggregating the scores into a WPI percentage.

7. The claim was supported by two reports by Dr David Kumagaya, a consultant psychiatrist. He diagnosed the plaintiff with PTSD, saying that the plaintiff’s workplace injury “is a primary psychological injury sustained during the course of his work as a logistics manager” at MSF, and that the injury was “a substantial contributing factor to his psychological condition”. Dr Kumagaya assessed the plaintiff’s WPI at 21%.

8. In October 2024 the insurer rejected the claim based on an assessment of the plaintiff conducted by a psychiatrist engaged by the insurer, Dr Peter Young, who concluded that the plaintiff’s WPI from the work injury was 12%. In reaching that figure Dr Young had made a deduction “for pre-existing condition / secondary condition”. His reason for doing so emerged from questions and answers in his report:

d) Whether you believe the Worker suffers from a psychiatric injury/condition as a result of his employment with Medecins Sans Frontieres Australia as well as other factors such as his right knee injuries and also his family situation considering the contents of the clinical notes of the Appletree Family Practice especially the entries on [nine identified dates].

Yes, please see as above. The entries referred to in the clinical notes are consistent with the history reported and do not present an alternative cause. As noted clearly there has been some effect from his knee injury, however his family situation can be seen largely as a secondary effect of PTSD and associated behaviour.

e) If so, please provide your opinions in relation to the likely apportionment of the cause of this psychiatric injury/condition based upon his employment with Medicines Sans Frontieres Australia and the other factors.

As above apportionment of the psychiatric injury is predominately related to his employment with MSF. The effects of the physical injury are secondary symptoms, there is no reliable method of apportionment and I think it is reasonable to apportion 10% as secondary.

9. Following referral of the medical dispute, the Assessor examined the plaintiff by AVL on 23 April 2025 and produced the MAC on 29 April 2025. The Assessor made reasonably detailed reference to the plaintiff’s medical records in the MAC. He recorded the history relating to the injury at length, in similar but not identical terms to the previous medical reports. In doing so he noted a number of subsequent stressor events in the plaintiff’s life.

10. After detailing the history, and then providing a statement of his “findings on mental state examination”, the Assessor gave a “summary of injuries and diagnoses” as follows (emphasis added):

Mr Denshire quite clearly describes the onset of symptoms of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder following exposure to numerous criterion A events during his time at Medecins Sans Frontieres. Following this he received treatment including repetitive series of psychotherapy, antidepressant medication. After his injury he reestablished his carpentry business, obtained his residential builder's licence, married, had two children, went through a messy divorce, was engaged in long complex and highly costly court cases, had to sell one house to pay the nearly $500,000 of various legal fees, has no contact at all with any of his children and is still involved in complex legal matters trying to obtain access to them in another country. Further he has had repetitive knee injuries, operations and remains impaired such that he is unable to do some of his physical activities. Given all this, the idea that his current mental state is entirely caused by his Posttraumatic Stress Disorder is medically risible, but given the legal definition of causality and recent cases, I have accepted that his mental state is caused by his condition. This PTSD impairs him in social areas associated with irritability, conflict, intolerance. Notably today the symptoms he reported, and specifically addressed in the assessment, were quite different to that in his statement, e.g. sleeping, flashbacks, nightmares, easily startled, none of which were reported today and some of which clearly contradicted. His statement does acknowledge that his impairment is almost entirely within the social realm.

The diagnostic criteria in DSM-5 have been utilised as the basis for this diagnosis.

11. The Assessor assessed the plaintiff’s degree of WPI at 7%, giving relatively detailed reasons with respect to the various categories at issue.

12. The plaintiff then appealed. Relevantly, he asserted that the Assessor’s decision was infected by apprehended bias and therefore the decision contained a demonstrable error within the meaning of s 327(3)(d) of the WIM Act. He impugned the Assessor’s use of the word “risible”, arguing that it “reveals contempt on the part of [the Assessor] for legal causation principles and for judicial review decisions of the Supreme Court”. He argued that this satisfied the test for apprehended bias stated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; [2000] HCA 63.

13. The Appeal Panel held that no demonstrable error was established. It said that “use of ‘risible’ was a poor word choice”, but “when the whole paragraph is read, it contains later statements which have the effect of withdrawing the unfortunate description previously used”. It added:

When the Medical Assessor's summary of injuries and diagnoses is considered in context and as a whole, it becomes apparent that he did not consider, on a medical basis, that posttraumatic stress disorder was the only cause of Mr Denshire’s mental state. However, he went on to say that he accepted that it was for the purpose of his assessment and assessed Mr Denshire as he presented on the day of the examination. The Medical Assessor explained that the ongoing impact of post-traumatic stress disorder is on Mr Denshire’s social interactions and that there has been significant improvement in many of his symptoms since his statement and other medical reports were prepared.

The issues raised in this Court

14. The plaintiff’s further amended summons articulated five grounds of review but they boiled down to two issues:

15. The Appeal Panel erred in law by failing to apply the correct test for apprehended bias, in particular because it did not consider the issue from the perspective of the fair-minded lay observer.

16. The Appeal Panel erred in law in failing to find that the decision of the Assessor, manifest in the MAC, was infected by apprehended bias.

17. The plaintiff was correct to focus upon the decision of the Appeal Panel, as it is that decision which is the subject of the judicial review application. However, the second issue is the real issue in dispute. It is the only issue I need to resolve.

18. Apprehended bias is a form of jurisdictional error. It involves failure to comply with an implied condition of the statutory conferral of decision-making authority, such that the decision lacks legal force and is, in law, no decision at all: see eg LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12 at [2]. Whether the MAC disclosed apprehended bias, and thus lacked legal authority, is a question of law. It is a question to which there can only be one right answer, just as for other forms of jurisdictional error: see eg, as regards legal unreasonableness, Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30. There was no dispute that apprehended bias would constitute a “demonstrable error” within the meaning of s 327(3)(c) if this Court found such an error to have been made: note Vitaz v Westform (NSW) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 254 at [16]-[17] and [53]; Vannini v Worldwide Demolitions Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCA 324 at [76]-[92].

19. In this context, if the Appeal Panel had reached the wrong conclusion on the bias issue, and the Assessor’s decision was infected with jurisdictional error, then the Panel necessarily would have erred in law: note analogously Fisher v Nonconformist Pty Ltd (2024) 114 NSWLR 1; [2024] NSWCA 32 at [48]. In his application for judicial review the plaintiff seeks certiorari and asserts both jurisdictional error and error of law on the face of the record. An erroneous conclusion on the bias issue would be manifest in its conclusion, contained in the record, and would suffice to make out the claim for certiorari. In such circumstances it would be open to the Court not only to set aside the Panel’s decision but also to make an order with the effect of upholding the appeal to the Appeal Panel, that being the only possible order the Panel could have made: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69(3)(b); note also, at general law, eg Plaintiff S297/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 255 CLR 231; [2015] HCA 3. There would be no utility in remitting the matter to the Panel to make the only order it could properly make.

20. Conversely, if the Appeal Panel had reached the correct conclusion on the bias issue then whether or not it erred in some respect in its reasoning is of no practical consequence. In such circumstances any error of reasoning by the Appeal Panel would not be material, as there could be no realistic possibility that the decision that was made in fact could have been different if the error had not occurred (in a context where there is only one correct answer at law). Furthermore, administrative law relief is discretionary and there could be no utility in granting relief in such circumstances: note LPDT at [7] and [16].

21. It has been held that where there is an operative decision of the Appeal Panel then it is not open to challenge the decision which was the subject of the appeal: eg Vitaz at [20]-[24]; Ryder v Sundance Bakehouse [2015] NSWSC 526 at [7]-[10]. The approach I have just articulated does not conflict with such authorities. It is consistent with the decision under challenge being that of the Appeal Panel, but recognises that the real issue in dispute in such cases is whether the assessor’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error, as had been asserted to the Appeal Panel and to which there can only be one correct answer. It is an illustration of the point made in Vitaz at [24] that the fact that an original decision has been the subject of an appeal, prior to seeking judicial review, does not mean that the original decision is irrelevant for all purposes.

22. I thus propose to address whether or not the decision of the Assessor was affected by apprehended bias in the manner that that claim was put to the Appeal Panel. It is not necessary or useful for me to address whether or not the Appeal Panel’s reasoning to reach its conclusion was sound. As explained below, one aspect of the plaintiff’s argument moved beyond what had been put to the Panel. The Panel cannot be said to have erred in law in not addressing a submission about bias that had not been put.

Determination

21. The test for apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question they are required to decide: Ebner at [6]. The test involves three steps (see Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Smith [2024] HCA 32; (2024) 419 ALR 212 at [92]):

22. identification of the factor which it is said might lead the decision-maker to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits;

23. articulation of the logical connection between that factor and the apprehended deviation from deciding that question on its merits; and

24. assessment of the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer.

25. In Maules Creek Coal Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (2023) 112 NSWLR 507; [2023] NSWCCA 275, the perspective of the fair-minded lay observer was explained by reference to earlier case law (citations omitted):

[102] Although the test involves two “mights”, it also involves the notion of there being a reasonable apprehension of bias, which requires more than fanciful or speculative possibilities. The hypothetical fair-minded lay observer is not a lawyer. Even so, the nature of the decision-maker is relevant. As regards judges, the observer is taken to understand that the person being observed is “a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [the judge] to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial”. Even so, they may be taken “to recognise that even a professional decision-maker is not ‘a passionless thinking machine’ and that information consciously and conscientiously discarded might still sometimes have a subconscious effect on even the most professional of decision-making”. …

[104] The observer can also be taken to understand that judges are human beings. The observer is “neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious”. Thus, for example, the observer “would be taken to know commonplace things, such as the fact that adjudicators sometimes say, or do, things that they might later wish they had not, without necessarily disqualifying themselves from continuing to exercise their powers”. …

23. The plaintiff’s attack on the reasoning of the Assessor was explained in its written submission in this Court in this way:

In the present circumstances, the [Assessor] described as “medically risible” the causal nexus between the injury of PTSD and the subsequent events in the Plaintiff’s life upon his return to Australia.

The ordinary meaning of “risible” is “laughable”, “so ridiculous that it deserves to be laughed at”, “far-fetched” or “absurd”.

It is respectfully submitted that the use of that word reveals a view that is held by the [Assessor] regarding causation that is contrary to the legal concepts of causation and material contribution and that there was a myriad of other reasons for his mental state. The psychological injury diagnosed as PTSD only has to “materially” contribute to the events that took place following Mr Denshire’s return to Australia which caused ongoing stress, anxiety and other psychiatric symptoms described in the evidentiary materials. As found by Dr P Young, “his family situation can be seen largely as a secondary effect of PTSD and associated behaviour”.

In describing the causal pathway as he did, the [Assessor] disclosed a personal view that might lead a fair-minded lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the [Assessor] might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question of what is the Plaintiff’s degree of permanent impairment resulting from the psychological injury.

The [Assessor]’s view, expressed explicitly, betrayed a misunderstanding of the law of causation and, it is respectfully submitted, revealed contempt for the legal concept of the causal pathway. The fact that the [Assessor] then stated that he accepted “that his mental state is caused by his condition” is not sufficient to overcome the disclosure of personal bias. The risk of bias, conscious or unconscious was revealed. …

It is respectfully submitted that the statement by the [Assessor] in the present matter is not the same as a judge expressing a tentative or preliminary view as to matters that may require addressing by the parties. By expressing himself in the way that he did, the [Assessor] dismissed an entire body of jurisprudence on causation but then proceeded under apparent protest to perform his task.

24. Thus, as regards the first step in applying the bias test, the factor which it is said might have led the decision-maker to resolve the question other than on its legal and factual merits was that the Assessor misunderstood, or disclosed a personal disagreement with, the state of the law concerning causation in a workers compensation context. Importantly, the plaintiff did not submit that any aspect of the MAC disclosed apprehended bias connected to the plaintiff himself. The claimed logical connection, then, was that the Assessor’s “misunderstanding of the law of causation”, or his antipathy to it, might lead him to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with that law and the merits of the case.

25. The plaintiff’s argument is unconvincing. As to the claimed misunderstanding, it seems the Assessor well understood that a material contribution would suffice at law; it is just that he thought that did not correlate with what he regarded as medical realities. In any case, the plaintiff has not made any claim that the Assessor misdirected himself.

26. As to the Assessor’s view on the merits of the law of causation, whatever his views, he accepted and applied that law in the very paragraph in question (quoted above at [10]). Immediately after the criticised words of “medically risible”, he said that “I have accepted that his mental state is caused by his condition”, and “[t]his PTSD impairs him in social areas associated with irritability, conflict, intolerance”. He thus accepted that all of the plaintiff’s current difficulties in his mental state were to be attributed to the PTSD work injury. The passage in question was under the heading “summary of injuries and diagnoses”, and concluded with a statement that “[t]he diagnostic criteria in DSM-5 have been utilised as the basis for this diagnosis”. The diagnosis referred to could only be a diagnosis of PTSD. There was no dispute that the plaintiff had suffered such a work injury. Thus the Assessor had earlier said at the commencement of the history section that, in their discussion, the plaintiff “understood the reasons why we did not need to go into each incident [during his time at MSF] in greater detail given the injury had been accepted”.

27. The reason the Assessor mentioned causation issues is not clear. It may have been because Dr Young had said that the plaintiff’s “family situation can be seen largely as a secondary effect of PTSD”, or because Dr Young had made a deduction with respect to “secondary symptoms” he had thought were not attributable to the PTSD (see above at [8]). Unlike Dr Young, the Assessor made no such deduction in his conclusion on WPI. Even if the comment was not sparked by what Dr Young had said, it does not alter its irrelevance to the analysis then undertaken.

28. The Assessor went on to address the distinct issue of the evaluation of permanent impairment. In so doing he made no reference to causal issues, nor did he express or even hint that there should be some reduction because of other stressors. The Assessor’s discussion in the “PIRS Rating Form” addressing the six categories was all directed to assessing the plaintiff’s functioning in the relevant categories. The plaintiff argued in oral submissions that the possibility of bias raised by the “medically risible” comment was “not quelled later”. The issue of causation and attribution was not addressed later; it had fallen away.

29. The plaintiff sought to place some reliance on the fact that at the commencement of the PIRS Rating Form there is an entry for “Psychiatric diagnoses” which says “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder – currently of somewhat borderline significance”. The meaning of the comment is not entirely clear. It appears to reflect the Assessor’s assessment, then explained in the form, that the plaintiff’s PTSD had limited practical significance as regards his functioning. In any event, it does not undermine the earlier clear acceptance of a diagnosis of PTSD and that this caused the plaintiff’s mental state. It does not suggest that the Assessor was attributing the mental state of the plaintiff in part to other stressors. The plaintiff correctly submitted that the issue was to be understood from the perspective of the fair-minded lay observer. However, as noted in Maules Creek, establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias requires more than fanciful or speculative possibilities.

30. As regards assessing the current mental state of the plaintiff, the Assessor gave relatively detailed reasons for his findings. Notably, he assessed the plaintiff’s employability impairment at level 4, higher than either of the other doctors. While the Assessor arrived at a lower overall assessment of WPI than Drs Kumagaya and Young, he explained that this was because he had assessed the plaintiff at a different time to those other practitioners. Dr Kumagaya’s assessment was conducted “in the immediate aftermath of a quite devastating court case and understandably [the plaintiff’s] condition, symptoms and impairment were worse at the time, as also corroborated by his treating clinician”. The plaintiff also appeared “to have been more symptomatically affected and impaired, and with a somewhat unstable home basis” when he was assessed by Dr Young.

31. The plaintiff made an argument about “unconscious” bias. That argument was not made to the Appeal Panel and thus, as explained above, is not relevant. In any event, no real attempt was made to clarify how such a bias might have reached beyond the Assessor’s apparent disagreement with an aspect of the legal principles relating to causation. Causation was not the subject of the Assessor’s subsequent analysis in relation to the plaintiff’s then-current mental state and how that correlated to some percentage of WPI on the approach mandated by the Guidelines.

32. Thus there was no logical connection between the relevant bias factor and the claimed potential deviation from proper decision-making because, despite the Assessor’s implied criticism of the legal test of causation, he applied that law, doing so in the plaintiff’s favour. The argument fails at the second of the steps.

33. Even if one reached the third step of the analysis, it is not the case that the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Assessor might not have brought an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions of either causation or the assessment of the plaintiff’s degree of impairment by reference to the six categories in the Guidelines. He implicitly expressed a critical view about the law of causation in this context. Administrative decision-makers are required to apply the law. They are not required to agree with it. A similar point about judges was made by Gageler J, when himself applying a view of the law with which he had previously disagreed, in Hofer v The Queen (2021) 274 CLR 351; [2021] HCA 36. His Honour quoted a statement made in the Court of Appeal of this State that the “duty of judges in the hierarchy of courts is to obey authority; not to be convinced by it” (at [96]). He then said (footnote omitted):

[97] The bottom line is that I am impelled to follow [an earlier decision of the High Court], not “because it is the right decision, because it is logical, because it is just, because it accords with the weight of authority, because it has been generally accepted and acted on, because it secures a beneficial result to the community”, but “because it is a previous decision and for no other reason”.

34. The fair-minded lay observer would understand that assessors, as rational beings presumptively experienced in the area in question, might have views about the law or administrative criteria they are required to apply. Having opinions is a characteristic of being human. Their duty, however, is to give effect to the applicable legal regime. Of course, there may be good reason for an appellate judge to express views about legal issues with respect to which they are, or have been, in a position to influence the law. For an administrative decision-maker to do so may involve making comments which are simply gratuitous. Nevertheless, making a needless comment about some legal or administrative standard does not of itself mean the decision-maker fails the Ebner test.

35. The Assessor’s remark on the law of causation can be characterised as gratuitous. However, the comment was followed immediately by an indication that he would give effect to it. The law was faithfully applied. That would be enough to satisfy the fair-minded lay observer of the absence of bias, even on the “double might” test.

36. The plaintiff’s case seemed to rely to a significant extent on the proposition that use of the word “risible” manifested some tendency to be over-zealous or close-minded in a manner which would concern the fair-minded lay observer. It was said that the word was “highly pejorative” and betrayed “a possibly (viz, might) prejudicial mind”. I accept that the word was used here in the sense of laughable or ludicrous. Yet the observer is made of sterner stuff than to be concerned about the use of a strong word such as that to criticise something. A “display of impatience, irritation, and rudeness” by a judge to counsel, which “fell well short of desirable standards of judicial conduct”, did not support a finding of actual or apprehended bias in Reid v Commercial Club (Albury) Ltd [2014] NSWCA 98 at [117]. Whilst much depends upon the circumstances and context, use of “risible” to express disagreement with or rejection of a particular point does not by itself establish or suggest some prejudice or general close-mindedness or excessive zeal. Judges themselves have employed the word in relation to:

37. submissions: Commonwealth v Sanofi (2024) 282 CLR 30; [2024] HCA 47 at [388]; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [98(b)]; Toben v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2016) 93 NSWLR 639; [2016] NSWCA 296 at [108]; Ford v R [2016] NSWCCA 69 at [36]; Karaali v R [2024] NSWCCA 162 at [85]; Neilson v Secretary, Department of Planning and Environment [2024] NSWCA 28; (2024) 260 LGERA 108 at [163];

38. grounds of appeal or review: Fleet v District Court (NSW) [2002] NSWCA 25 at [6(iii)]; Ekes v Hyde Page (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 169 at [35(2)];

39. implausible evidence: Krahe v Manfate Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 363 at [29];

40. lines of cross-examination: R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494; (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [198]; and

41. a view expressed by Lord Diplock in the House of Lords: GR Mailman & Associates Pty Ltd v Wormald (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 80 at 99.

42. True, the word was employed in those cases to reject something put to the Court, where here the Assessor employed it implicitly to criticise a legal notion. That does not alter the fact that his use of a strong word is by no means unprecedented as a manner of expressing disagreement.

43. There is no reason to find that the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably have apprehended that the Assessor might not have brought an impartial mind to the assessment of the plaintiff’s WPI. The Appeal Panel was correct to reject the bias claim. There is thus no basis to overturn its decision. The plaintiff’s further amended summons must be dismissed. MSF did not seek its costs.

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