Dayan & Shaul [2026] FedCFamC1F 242 | Case summary

Dayan & Shaul [2026] FedCFamC1F 242 | Case summary | Zoe

[61]

Before the Court are the parties' competing applications for parenting orders with respect to the child X, who was born in in 2020 and is aged five.
The applicant father, MR DAYAN ("the father"), was born in 1977 and is aged 48. The respondent mother, MS SHAUL ("the mother"), was born in 1987 and is aged 38.
The parties shared a very brief relationship, the precise nature of which is not entirely clear from the evidence before the Court, but which appears to have commenced a short time prior to the mother falling pregnant with X and to have ended in or around mid-2020, prior to X's birth. They did not marry and did not cohabit but spent time together at each other's homes.
X has lived in the full-time care of the mother since her birth. The father was not notified by the mother of X's birth and did not meet her for a number of months after her birth. The parties dispute the circumstances in which the father came to meet X, but agree that he met her on only a small number of occasions when she was an infant. He has not seen her since approximately April 2021, when she was an infant. At the time of the trial, X was living with the mother and spending no time with the father pursuant to interim orders made on 19 August 2024.
The mother has a daughter from a previous relationship, B, who was born on in 2014 and is aged 11. The mother lives with B and X in an undisclosed location. She works in hospitality and undertakes part-time study.
The father lives with his partner of approximately four years, MS C, who is also his carer. He receives a disability support pension and works on a part-time basis in manual labour. The father has a son from a previous relationship, MR D, who was born in 2005 and is aged 20. Following the father's separation from Mr D's mother, MS E, the father resided with the paternal grandparents. Mr D lived with his mother and spent time with the father at the paternal grandparents' residence under their supervision.
Ms C has two daughters, MS F, aged 18 and G aged 17. Both daughters grew up in long-term foster placements, and the younger child remains in such a placement. Ms C and the father have a relationship with and spend time with both of Ms C's daughters.
There has been no direct communication between the parties since approximately April 2021.
The current proceedings were commenced by the father on 24 October 2023, approximately two and a half years after he last saw X. They were transferred to this Court on 31 July 2025.
X's interests were represented in these proceedings by an Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL").

[77]

The issues with the reliability of the father's evidence which I have outlined render the task of assessment of his credibility difficult. In my view, however, it is not necessary to undertake a global assessment of the father's credibility as a witness. The limitations to the reliability of his evidence are such that his evidence cannot be accepted in the absence of corroborative evidence, at least to the extent that it was disputed.
The mother gave her evidence in a direct and forthright manner. She became distressed at times when discussing difficult subjects. The mother's presentation when giving her evidence was consistent with an observation made by Ms J that she provided comprehensive responses and presented as a protective and child-focused parent who was focused on X's safety. Her evidence was not undermined in cross-examination. To the extent that the evidence of the parties conflicts, I prefer the evidence of the mother.
The father gave his evidence from the witness box physically located in the courtroom. The mother gave hers via videolink from a secure room within the precincts of the Court. Although an order permitting the mother to give evidence from a secure room was made by consent on 24 March 2026 (prior to the commencement of the trial), before she commenced her evidence, an application was made on behalf of the father for her to give her evidence in the courtroom, during which period it was proposed that the father observe from a secure room. Counsel for the father submitted that having the mother give her evidence in the courtroom would allow the parties' evidence to be assessed "in like terms" in the same context and environment. The application was refused.
In assessing the parties' evidence, I have had regard to the differences in the manner in which each party's evidence was given. I do not consider that my assessment of the evidence of either of the parties was compromised by the different modes utilised for the giving of that evidence or the different settings from which it was given.
As a number of judges of this Court have observed,[4] the Court is well able to assess the evidence of witnesses given electronically, and such a method of giving evidence does not impact the capacity of the Court to assess the demeanour and veracity of a witness or to allow cross-examination to proceed effectively.
The ICL submitted that there had been no qualitative difference in the ability of the Court to assess the parties as witnesses, as the Court had had a clear view of the mother and her facial expressions and there had been no delay in transmission, meaning that the immediacy of her reactions had been clear. I agree.
Ms C gave evidence and was cross-examined by counsel for each of the mother and the ICL. She gave her evidence in a forthright and fulsome manner and freely volunteered extensive information, including information which was clearly difficult for her to share, often in a manner which far exceeded the scope of the question she had been asked. Ms C impressed an earnest witness endeavouring to provide honest answers. However, the weight that can be given to her evidence is limited by her unwavering support of and strongly protective approach towards the father, and her lack of understanding of or indeed interest in the experiences reported by the mother and many of the risk issues raised in the proceedings.
In accordance with section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), all findings of fact in this judgment are made on the balance of probabilities. Some of the findings in these reasons relate to conduct of a very serious nature, including findings of serious acts of family violence. I have had regard to the matters outlined in subsection 140(2) of the Evidence Act, particularly the gravity of the matters alleged, when making such findings, and am satisfied to the extent of "actual persuasion"[5] with respect to each of my findings with respect to such matters.

[93]

With respect to the text messages referred to above, the father acknowledged that the phone number that appeared on the printed versions of the messages was his, but denied having sent them and demanded "proof," insinuating that the mother had fabricated them. Police records record that police officers viewed at least two of the threatening messages directly on the mother's phone.[15]
The father asserted that he could not have written the text messages in question because he could not write. Ms C gave evidence to similar effect, but also confirmed that she and the father had commenced their relationship by exchanging written messages. The assessment of Dr P, who assessed the father's cognitive functioning as part of his psychological assessment, was that the father would likely have the capacity to write to the standard required to create the messages in question. I am not satisfied that the father's literacy level is such that it would not be possible for him to have authored the messages.
In his trial affidavit, father admitted to having made the Facebook post referred to at subparagraph 44 (m) above. Under cross-examination, he repeated that admission but then sought to retreat from it by claiming that somebody else (being a person he was unable to name) had typed and posted it at his direction. The difference is immaterial.
It was put to the mother that if she had in fact received the handwritten letter referred to at subparagraph 44 (n) above, she would have kept it. She responded that she had given it to the police. It was then put to her that she had not in fact given it to the police, a proposition directly contradicted by the [16]levant police records,16 and then that she should have taken a photograph of it. She credibly explained that her concern at the time had been with the threat to her life and the safety of herself and her children, rather than evidence gathering.
The mother alleged that the father's abuse and threats towards her had at times occurred in the presence of B, who was six years old at the conclusion of the parties' relationship.
The mother's evidence of family violence included the use of coercive and controlling behaviours by the father. The concept of coercive and controlling violence has been described as "a course of conduct aimed at dominating and controlling another person,"[17] and as "the exercise of power, to restrain another or to cause another to act, by force, domination or command."[18] It is a particularly insidious form of family violence.
The concept of coercive control essentially captures one person's domination over another. A person may subject another to coercive control without subjectively intending to do so. Intention is not a necessary element of coercive or controlling behaviour. A person who engages in such behaviour may be completely oblivious to the impact of their behaviour, but the behaviour may nevertheless coerce or control the other family member and fall within the definition of family violence. The focus is on the behaviour and its impact. A finding that there is coercive or controlling behaviour is an evaluative one, having regard to all of the circumstances and all of the evidence before the court.[19]
As Aldridge and Carew JJ held in Pickford & Pickford:[20]

[98]

And further that "[t]he alleged pattern of coercive and threatening conduct suggests a sustained effort to exert power and control, with the potential for psychological and physical harm."
Section 60CG of the Act provides that in considering what order to make, the Court must, to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration, ensure that the order is consistent with any family violence order and does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
In December 2020, the mother sought and obtained an interim family violence order against the father. A final order was made in June 2021 on an uncontested basis. The order names the father as the defendant and the mother as the protected person. X is not named on the order despite having been included in the mother's application for the order.[21] The father's evidence was that he had "successfully applied" to have X's name removed from the order. He produced no documents to support that assertion. The mother deposed to having agreed to having the order made with respect to her only in order to avoid the matter proceeding to a contested hearing, on the basis that X (and B) would be protected by virtue of being in her care. The mother credibly denied that she had agreed to the removal of X's name because she had known that the father was not a risk to X. I accept the mother's evidence in this regard.
In November 2021, the father was charged with breaching the family violence order. His evidence was that this was a result of a social media post which "the mother had wrongfully perceived as a threat." He deposed that he attended Court and "explained" this to the magistrate, and the charge was dismissed. The mother's evidence was that the post in question had called her a "cunt" and said he "wanted [her] head" but that the police had asserted that it would be difficult to secure a conviction.
In January 2021, the mother moved with B and X into emergency accommodation provided by a domestic violence service.
The mother's evidence was to the effect that she permitted the father to spend time with X in April 2021 under duress, out of fear of the consequences of refusing to do so arising from intimidation, threats and harassment from him. She deposed that safety concerns arising from his erratic behaviour led her to cease facilitating the time after approximately one month. She also deposed that the father had become aware of her new address through a friend of hers and at that time had recommenced an earlier practice of having associates drive past and watch her home.
The father's evidence was that the mother had telephoned him "out of the blue" at 2.00 am one morning and offered him time with X. He deposed that he then saw X each day for approximately one week, after which the mother suddenly stopped responding to his communications and facilitating time with X, and he had "no idea why."
Because of my comparative assessment of the evidence of the parties, and because of its consistency with documentary evidence of contemporaneous events including the mother's application for a family violence order and move into emergency housing, I accept the mother's evidence with respect to the circumstances surrounding the father spending time with X in April 2021.
The mother alleged that once she ceased facilitating the time, the father's threatening and abusive behaviour escalated, leading her to obtain further emergency housing in April 2021.
The father denied the mother's allegations of family violence, asserting that they were baseless and had been fabricated. This denial included a denial of having sent the text messages referred to above. In the witness box, he acknowledged that violence would include verbal violence and harassment, and asserted that he had "never had violence with anybody in [his] life."
The father denied in his affidavit that he had ever laughed in response to incidents of violence. Whilst under cross-examination, he laughed in response the incident of violence represented by the text message referred to at subparagraph 44 (k) hereof.
The father suggested to Ms J that the mother had fabricated the allegations she made against him as an act of retribution after he had rebuffed an attempt made by her to reconcile in April 2021. This theory is difficult to reconcile with the fact that the mother's first move into emergency housing and her application for the family violence order both took place prior to April 2021.
In support of his denial of having sent the message referred to at subparagraph 44 (k) above, the father claimed that he had not been aware that "[Mr K]" was the name of the mother's former partner until that information was put to him in cross-examination. The name of the mother's former partner had appeared in numerous documents produced in these proceedings prior to the commencement of the trial, including Dr P's report with respect to the mother, Ms J's family report, the mother's trial affidavit and the ICL's case outline. It had also appeared in the affidavit made by the mother in support of her application for [22]family violence order.22 Most significantly, it appeared in the father's own trial affidavit. The father's evidence in this regard was extremely unconvincing, even allowing for his cognitive limitations.
The mother's evidence with respect to the father's propensity for angry outbursts was supported by:

[102]

The father was cross-examined about police records demonstrating that police had responded to allegations made by two former partners against him with respect to repeated unwanted attendances at their homes and refusal to leave when asked, harassment, and aggressive and intimidating behaviour similar to that alleged by the mother.[23] He asserted that he was unable to remember most of the incidents in question. If that evidence was true, it suggests that the father's denials of having perpetrated family violence can, at best, be considered evidence only that he does not remember having done so. Concerningly, he asked what these incidents had to do with domestic violence. His denials of having engaged in family violence must be considered in the context of this lack of understanding that such behaviour constitutes family violence.
It was put to the mother that she had not taken any threats she had received from the father seriously. She gave compelling evidence that this was not the case and that she had taken them very seriously. As the mother herself pointed out, her actions in making reports to police, applying for a family violence order, engaging with social workers and moving with her young children to emergency housing on two occasions support her evidence in this regard.
It was then put to the mother that she had not taken the threats seriously throughout 2020 because she had not done anything about them at that time, and when she had eventually done something, all she had initially done was block the father's phone number. The mother gave tearful, highly emotional and compelling evidence of having been in a state of fear, having been frightened to do anything, and not having known what the "right" reaction was. This evidence encapsulated the reality is that there is no "right" reaction to family violence.
The premise of this line of questioning was out of step with contemporary understandings of family violence. Long gone are (or at least should be) the days when a person reporting an experience of family violence is asked a question to the effect of "if it was so bad, why didn't you just leave?".
As the Full Court made clear in Amador & Amador,[24] victims of family violence do not have to complain to authorities in order to have their accounts accepted. Nor do they have to take other identifiable steps in response to their experiences. I reject the suggestion that anything about the mother's actions during 2020 or at any other time constitutes evidence that she did not take the father's threatening behaviour seriously.
Furthermore, I accept and endorse the submission made on behalf of the ICL that to suggest that the mother did not take the threats seriously is to misunderstand and minimise the objectively serious nature of the threats themselves and the insidious and manipulative manner in which the mother's own trauma history was woven into those threats to cause her maximum harm.
Ms C gave evidence that she had never witnessed the father commit an act of family violence including physical aggression, verbal abuse or coercive control. I note that Ms C is in an intact and apparently stable relationship with the father. Her experience does not indicate that the mother's evidence is false, and nor does it provide a reliable indicator of the manner in which the father would be likely to behave towards the mother, a person towards he continues, even during his evidence, to exhibit considerable animus, in the event of contact with her in future.
I accept the mother's allegations of family violence in their entirety and find that the father subjected her to violent, abusive, intimidating and threatening behaviour and to coercive control.
The mother gave clear, unequivocal and compelling evidence, which I accept, that she experienced and continues to experience intense fear of the father. She became tearful as she described him as scary, unpredictable and dangerous and described feeling overwhelmed with fear and anxiety at the prospect of being required to hand X over to him and her belief that it would only be "a matter of time" before something bad happened to X.
She also gave evidence that following the service of the father's court documents, she had become afraid that the father would find her again and that B, who had overheard the process server mentioning the father's name, had been afraid to play outside the house, fearing that the father had located them.
The mother gave evidence of deliberate steps she has taken to ensure that the father cannot locate her and her children, including distancing herself from people who know him and requesting that his former solicitor not disclose her residential address (at which she was served after being located by a private investigator) to him. She described having worked hard to create a safe, nurturing and secure environment for X to grow and develop in, free from exposure to unsafe persons from her past, and to being concerned about the risk of undermining this through X's exposure to the father, whom she considers unsafe.
I accept the mother's evidence that the father's actions caused and continue to cause her fear.
Counsel for the father repeatedly put to the mother that her view of the father had been tainted by her past trauma, that it was her past experiences and not anything done by the father that caused her to be fearful, and that she was confusing or conflating the father with other abusive men she had encountered in her life. She firmly and credibly denied this and explained that the father had used her past trauma to instil fear and control her, but that it was his actions, and not her past experiences, which caused her to fear him.
Counsel for the father repeatedly, in his cross-examination and in his closing submissions, emphasised that the mother's evidence did not disclose "actual physical violence." To the extent that this can be taken to imply that violence must be physical in order to constitute "actual" violence, this suggestion must be rejected in the strongest of terms.
As submitted by counsel for the ICL, the definition of family violence in the Act encompasses far more than simply physical violence, and many of the acts in which I have found the father engaged constitute serious and concerning family violence. It must be recognised that threatening, intimidating and abusive behaviour and coercive control are insidious behaviours that can cause serious and lasting psychological and emotional consequences whether they are accompanied by acts of physical violence or not.
It is true that the mother's affidavit did not contain evidence of physical violence perpetrated against her by the father. The only evidence before the Court of an allegation of physical violence made by the mother against the father is a statement made by the mother to Ms J to the effect that the father had used excessive physical force towards her in the form of using his body weight to pin her down. This allegation did not appear in the mother's trial affidavit and was not put to the father in cross-examination. I accept the submission of counsel for the father that in those circumstances, the evidence before the Court does not support a finding that this incident occurred. However, this is not the same as being able to find that it did not occur, and I do not find that the mother was untruthful in the account she gave to Ms J.
It is a well-recognised feature of the experience of trauma and family violence that victims often do not provide a comprehensive, consistent and cohesive account of their experiences on each occasion upon which they tell their story. This issue was addressed by the Full Court in Hendy & Penningh,[25] where their Honours said the following:

[104]

The father's police records demonstrate that at least one former partner other than the mother has made an allegation of physical violence against him in the form of an allegation that he had smashed in her door by kicking it and physically assaulted her by punching her in the face.[26] The Court is similarly not in a position to make any finding with respect to that allegation, and I merely observe that it is simply not the case that the father has never been accused of having committed physical family violence.
Most significantly, it must be said that the absence of a finding of physical violence (or, for that matter, a finding that physical violence did not occur) categorically does not equate to a finding that a person has not engaged in any family violence, that they have not engaged in serious and dangerous family violence, or that they do not pose a risk to a child. It is also the case that the absence of a finding that physical violence has occurred in the past does not equate to a finding that there is no risk of physical violence occurring in future, particularly in circumstances such as those present here, where there have been overt and explicit threats of physical violence.
Counsel for the father submitted that even if the threats alleged by the mother had been made (a finding he conceded was open), they had never been acted upon, because the father had not committed physical violence. This submission misses the point that it is the threats themselves and the fear they instil that constitutes the family violence. Failure to act upon threats does not render those threats harmless, meaningless or inconsequential. Acting upon them would constitute further family violence in addition to the violence already committed by having made them. The mother gave evidence, and I accept, that the father's threats had left her certain that it was "only a matter of time." That in itself is a serious harm inflicted by the father upon her. The fact that the father did not commit even more family violence does not detract from the seriousness of the family violence he did commit. Evidence that a person has made but not acted upon threats of serious violence is hardly evidence that that person is safe.
Ms J confirmed in the witness box that the absence of evidence of physical violence did not reduce her concerns about family violence in any significant way.
Many of the instances of family violence to which the father subjected the mother demonstrate misogynistic views and concerning and demeaning attitudes towards women. This, particularly when considered in light of the limitations to the father's impulse control, raises concerns about the kind of role model the father would be for X and the views and attitudes to which she would be exposed if she were to spend time or communicate with him. There is a risk that time and communication with the father could result in X being exposed to his harmful attitudes towards women.
In her family report, Ms J expressed concern about "the potential dangerousness and lethality" of the father's abuse. She opined that the cumulative nature of the allegations give rise to significant concerns regarding his capacity for coercive control and the potential risk he may pose to the safety and well-being of X, the mother, and B. Similarly, Dr P assessed the father's potential violence as "an ongoing and significant concern."
The father's ongoing denial of having engaged in family violence, even in the face of clear evidence, and even in the face of his own admissions in respect of the Facebook post made in November 2021, which was an act of family violence, is itself a matter of concern. Denial and minimisation of events found to have occurred is relevant to assessment of risk.[27] Ms J opined, and I accept, that:

[106]

To Dr P, the father indicated that he did not know why the parties' relationship had ended, and that the mother had simply "ghosted" him. He gave evidence to similar effect in the witness box. The father also told Dr P that his violent history had been 20 years ago, that he characterised himself as "a loving person who was no longer violent" and that he did not know why the mother did not want him to see X.
If that is indeed an accurate description of the father's understanding of the circumstances of the parties' separation and the level of his violence towards the mother, it is indicative of a significant lack of insight and a concerning lack of accountability for his actions. It also leaves the Court with no basis whatsoever for any confidence that there will be any meaningful change to the father's behaviour should he be permitted to interact with the mother in future.
In his trial affidavit, the father claimed to "deeply regret" having called the mother a "cunt" and a "piece of shit," yet that expression of remorse was followed immediately by attempts to justify his behaviour and attribute blame for it to the mother by saying that it had occurred because was "very upset and angry that the mother was unnecessarily depriving [him] of a relationship with [X]." Despite his asserted deep regret, the father once again called the mother a "piece of shit" during his oral evidence and said he would "stand by that 100 per cent." Under cross-examination, he denied having called her a "cunt" (though he also admitted having done so). I do not accept that the father feels any remorse with respect to his violent behaviour or that he has any real understanding of its harmful impact.
Further evidence of the father's lack of understanding of, or willingness to take accountability for, his harmful actions was provided in the form of his response when the contents of the text message referred to at subparagraph 44 (k) above were put to him. When the deeply concerning words of that message were read to him, he facetiously responded "is that poetry?" and then laughed. The mother gave compelling evidence that this response from the father had caused her distress as it had triggered memories of lack of the empathy she had shown towards her.
Ms J opined that the father's response in this regard was minimising and showed a lack of regard for the seriousness of the conduct, which heightened the risk for X. Even if the father genuinely does not recall having sent that message and believes he did not do so, his glib response to its disturbing contents is a matter of serious concern.
The father's flippancy with respect to this issue was described as being "at the heart of" the ICL's concerns with respect to the father's attitude towards family violence: he simply does not take it seriously. I am satisfied that the father either does not understand or does not care about the harm he has inflicted on the mother.
Dr P gave evidence that he held concerns about the father's insight into his own behaviour, and about his insight into how he was viewed by others. No part of the father's evidence provided any basis for the alleviation of such concerns. The consequence of this is that there is no basis for expecting any meaningful change in future.

[108]

The father has an extensive criminal history involving offences including driving whilst disqualified, driving under the influence of methamphetamine, other drug-related offences, failure to comply with bonds and bail conditions, and carrying an offensive weapon. In 2010 and 2017 he served sentences of imprisonment.[28]
The father is also currently facing further charges relating to possession of a prohibited weapon, being a knife, arising from a traffic stop in late 2025.[29] He did not disclose this fact to the Court and it was only discovered upon the making of an order pursuant to section 67ZBD of the Act directed to South Australia Police at the commencement of the trial.
Under protection of a certificate granted pursuant to section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the father admitted that he had had a knife in his bag when stopped by police. In an attempt to explain an entry in the relevant police record indicating that he had been argumentative with police, he alleged that the police had stolen money from him and asserted that he had had $20,000 in cash on him at the time. He provided no convincing evidence as to how he, as a pensioner, had been in possession of such a sum of money, but said that "maybe" he had been going to buy a car. This evidence was entirely unconvincing.
The father asserted implausibly under cross-examination that his police records were not correct and did not accurately reflect his criminal history, suggesting that somebody with the same name and/or his cousin was responsible for some of the criminal offending attributed to him. He also professed to be unable to understand what his criminal history had to do with his application for time with X, which demonstrated a concerning lack of insight.
Ms J opined, and I accept, that the father's criminal history gives rise to concerns about his potential for unpredictable and harmful behaviour, poor judgment on his behalf and his willingness to act outside established legal and social norms in order to fulfil his demands and desires. I also accept Ms J's evidence that the pattern of behaviours represented by the father's criminal history raises questions about his ability to prioritise parenting responsibilities and maintain a lifestyle that promotes the safety and well-being of a child.
The identified risk is compounded by the father's lack of demonstrated understanding or acknowledgement of the seriousness of his criminal behaviour, which leaves little room for confidence of meaningful change in the future. The father's lack of acknowledgment may, to some extent, be affected by his difficulties with memory. He acknowledged to Dr P that he had spent time in custody but said he could not recall any details about his past offending. Nonetheless, in the absence of meaningful acceptance and commitment for change, this remains a serious risk factor.
It is an undisputed fact that the father was previously a member of a gang. He asserted that he had left that gang in 2006 or 2007 following the birth of his son, out of a desire to distance himself from the associated dangerous lifestyle. The evidence does not suggest otherwise and I accept the father's evidence in this regard.
However, the mother alleged that the father continued to associate with members or former members of the gang and that he had used these associations to threaten and intimidate her. As a result of my assessment of the mother's evidence more broadly, and because it is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence before the Court with respect to the father's conduct, I accept the mother's evidence in this regard.

[111]

To Dr O, the father reported experiencing flashbacks of being injured.
Dr O considered, based on a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the father was suffering PTSD and ADHD. He was unable to confirm the father's existing diagnosis of a mental health disorder because the father was unable to remember the symptoms he had experienced. Dr O also considered it likely that the father was suffering from a brain disorder.
Dr H reported that the father's symptoms include chronic auditory hallucinations and some paranoid ideas at times. He reported that he can also be prone to suicidal thoughts, mood difficulties, anger, anxiety and panic attacks. Dr H reported that the father's condition was relatively stable on regular medication and that in recent years (clarified by Dr H in the witness box to mean the past four to five years), the most prominent problems had been anxiety and panic attacks. Although the father's auditory hallucinations were chronic, he had not complained about them to Dr H for some time.
A complicating factor when considering the impact of the father's mental health on the issues requiring determination is the unreliability of the father's account of his experience of psychiatric symptoms. For example, he informed Dr O that he had not experienced psychiatric symptoms beyond flashbacks, anxiety and depression in recent times, but in the witness box, he gave evidence of experiencing auditory hallucinations "pretty much" every day, including during the course of giving his evidence.
The father also expressed a view to Dr O that there is "nothing" wrong with him. Dr P gave evidence that this view held by the father would exacerbate the risk he posed.
The impact of the father's brain injury and mental health on X's safety and that of the mother is an issue squarely raised on the evidence before the Court. The father expressed concern that his mental illness might constitute a barrier to the development of a relationship between himself and X, and was at pains to emphasise that this was an issue that was not his fault and was beyond his control. The father exhibited very significant obviously genuine distress in relation to this issue when he gave his evidence.
I accept that the father is not responsible for the fact that he suffers mental illness. I also accept that he has acted appropriately and responsibly in relation to his mental health, including by way of reliable attendance upon Dr H and undertaking the treatment recommended and the medication prescribed by Dr H and other medical professionals over a very long period of time. To Ms J, the father described deliberate engagement in self-regulation strategies to manage the symptoms of his PTSD.
The line between mental health conditions and brain injuries on the one hand, and the behaviour of the sufferer on the other, is not always clearly drawn. It is not necessary or appropriate to speculate about the extent to which the father might, in the past, or in the future, behave or have behaved differently, had he not experienced the brain injury or his mental health conditions, save to note that all or almost all of the father's association with the outlaw gang (at least as reported by him) and a substantial number of the offences which form part of his criminal history occurred prior to both his injury and the reported onset of at least the most serious of his mental health conditions.
As the Full Court held in Oberlin & Infeld,[30] any diagnosis with a particular psychological condition does not of itself necessarily mean the party lacks sufficient parenting capacity, rather, it is necessary to determine if and how the condition and behaviour influences the necessary findings under section 60CC of the Act with respect to the child's best interests.
In the present case, what is important from the perspective of the Court's determination of X's best interests is not the extent of the father's mental ill health and injury but his behaviour and the risk he poses as a consequence of that behaviour to X and the mother. Violent and threatening conduct constitutes a risk and gives rise to the need for caution whether the person engaging in that conduct suffers from mental illness or functioning deficits or not.
Were it the case that the father suffered from his various mental health conditions and brain injury but had not engaged in violent, threatening or otherwise dangerous behaviour, it is quite possible that the primary focus for the Court would be how, rather than whether, X and the father could safely spend time together and enjoy a relationship. However, that is not the factual matrix with which the Court is faced.
I repeat and refer to my earlier findings with respect to the father's violent and threatening behaviour. It is this behaviour, and the risk of such behaviour occurring again in future, and not the father's diagnoses per se, that pose the greatest risk to X's safety and that of the mother.
There are other aspects of the father's conduct which may or may not be related to his mental health, which, in conjunction with his violent and abusive conduct, increase the risk he poses to the safety of X and the mother.
One example of this is a tendency to become fixated and obsessive. Ms J observed that when observed by her, the father presented as fixated on his connection to X.
The mother alleged that the father had become fixated on B despite only having known her for a very brief period of time. She alleged that this had manifested in conduct such as displaying a photograph of her in his home (which the father accepted was accurate), repeatedly asking the mother to leave her in his care, and commenting "my two sexy girls" on a social media post depicting the mother and B. Consistently with the mother's allegation, the father claimed in his trial affidavit that he "loved" B despite the very limited duration of his association with her.
The father also presented with elements of fixation in the witness box. One example of this was his repeated reference to a suggestion in Ms J's report to Ms C's children having been removed from her care as a result of sexual abuse, when in fact the removal had occurred as a result of physical abuse. The father persistently and repeatedly complained about this issue, even when it had no or only peripheral relevance to the question he had been asked.
Similarly, the father returned repeatedly to a reference in police records about which he was cross-examined to reference an address in Suburb M. The address in question was of no relevance to the proceeding but the father was unable to disregard it and move on with his answers to questions.
Another aspect of the father's presentation suggested by the evidence before the Court is a tendency towards impulsive behaviour. The mother gave evidence that the father can "just snap like that." Dr P reported (based on PAI analysis) that impulsivity and recklessness were features of the father's personality profile.
Dr H reported that the father experienced poor impulse control, intense outbursts of rage and anger, low frustration tolerance and violent acting out, though Dr H reported improvement with self-control and emotional regulation following the commencement of stimulant medication in December 2022. Dr H clarified under cross-examination that the intense outbursts of rage and anger referred to in his report had been verbal in nature.
A related concern raised with respect to the father was a poor understanding of, and/or lack of respect for, appropriate boundaries. In this regard, Ms J noted that the alleged (and now established) sustained harassment of the mother through repeated, unsolicited, and abusive communications, stalking behaviours and having enlisted his associates to perpetrate similar abusive, threatening and intimidating behaviours towards the mother suggested an inability on the father's part to disengage appropriately and a persistent intrusion into the mother's boundaries.
This is consistent with the father's alleged behaviour towards other former partners as described in the police records.[31]
In his affidavit evidence and in the witness box, the father demonstrated no insight into this issue, which leaves the Court with no basis for any expectation of improvement in the future.
The likely impact of the father's personality profile and other vulnerabilities (particularly when considered in light of his violent history and difficulties with impulse control) in the context of the challenges associated with building a relationship with X from a starting point of no pre-existing relationship, in circumstances in which the father is for all intents and purposes a stranger to X, occupied significant time during the course of the trial.
As submitted on behalf of the ICL, it is not known how X would react to meeting and spending time with the father. To his credit, the father acknowledged that meeting him could be confusing, stressful and even scary for X. He expressed a hope that X would gain an understanding from spending time with him that he was "not a monster." He also acknowledged that knowing that her mother was afraid of the father and having to keep secrets, such as her address, from him while trying to build a relationship, would be a burden for X.
The particular risk emphasised by the mother and the ICL in this regard was the risk of how the father might react if X did not embrace a relationship with him in the manner he hoped, or if her reactions to meeting and spending time with him did not meet his likely idealised expectations.
Dr P, who administered the PAI to the father, reported that the father had significant problems in thinking and concentration, accompanied by prominent hostility, resentment and suspiciousness; that sensitivity in social interactions had likely served as a formidable obstacle to his development of close relationships, and he was likely to be cautious, withdrawn and isolated, feeling both estranged from and mistreated by people around him. In the witness box, he said that the father "ticks all the red flag boxes about risk" including potential for violence and potential for emotional instability. Dr H agreed with respect to resentment and suspiciousness, though he was clear that these features were not always present in the father.
Dr P further reported that the father's judgment was very poor (poor judgment being a feature also reported as likely by Dr O and referred to by Dr H) and that his interpersonal relationships were likely to be superficial, volatile and short-lived. This latter observation is certainly true of the father's relationship with the mother, though I note that he is currently in an enduring and apparently stable relationship with Ms C.
In the witness box, Dr P opined that if X were to "act up," it was likely that the father would react negatively, that he had limited flexibility, and that this could place X at risk, including psychological and emotional risk. Dr P agreed that the making of orders for time would constitute placing X in an experiment.
Dr H gave evidence that there could be a negative outcome if time between X and the father did not go well, such as if X was detached and did not wish to engage, and that the father may have an idealised sense of who X is. He said, however that he would not expect a devastating or extreme reaction. He said he would expect that the father might experience disappointment and anger, but he did not think it likely that that anger would be directed towards X herself. He also said it was possible (though he did not consider it likely) that the father's feelings would overwhelm him and he would be unable to engage and participate.
Dr P opined that the father was likely to find such a scenario very hard to deal with, and agreed that disengagement on his part was a possible outcome. He considered that the likely worst case scenario would be that the father would become agitated and irritated, and that it would make him more aggressive towards the mother.
Ms J gave evidence that if time were to commence but then the father disengaged, X would be likely to feel rejected and to feel that there was something about her that had caused the disengagement. X would then go from the current situation where her understanding of the lack of a relationship was external to her, to potentially internalising the causes of cessation of the relationship
Ms J also confirmed that there was a risk of inconsistency in presentation and in interaction by the father with X, which could compromise the development of their relationship and impact X's sense of security.
I note also the father's evidence that his reaction to not being permitted to spend time with X after she was born was to take illicit drugs to the point where he "lost [his] mind." This would appear to be the best available evidence of the manner in which the father reacts if things do not go his way with respect to formation of his relationship with her.
Dr P, and to a lesser extent, Dr H, also agreed that there could be negative consequences arising from mistrust and suspicion of the mother on the father's part were the parties to attempt to coparent.

[112]

An important consideration in these proceedings is the mother's mental health and functioning. The mother is X's uncontested primary carer and it is not suggested that her mental health in and of itself poses a risk to X. Rather, the important issue for consideration by the Court is the extent to which an order for time or communication between X and the father could impact upon the mother's mental health and impair her functioning as a parent and her ability to provide safe and secure parenting to X. It is well established that such impacts on the primary caregiver of a child can be a relevant consideration.[32]
The mother has a complex trauma history, which includes multiple experiences of violence and abuse. This has included sexual abuse perpetrated by a neighbour when she was a young child and by her father when she was a teenager, physical abuse suffered during childhood and serious family violence inflicted upon her by Mr K, who was reported to have been aggressive and violent towards her and to have shot her in the kneecap in 2014 while she was pregnant with B, and whose violence caused her to flee from Victoria where she was then living to her home state of South Australia. This is in addition to the serious violence I have found she has been subjected to by the father. I have accepted the mother's evidence that she continues to experience fear of the father.
The mother's evidence was that the father had, by his use of her past trauma against her, retriggered her PTSD and triggered the resurfacing issues she had been working hard to resolve. She became highly distressed while giving this evidence.
The mother's evidence was that if X were to spend time with the father, this would cause her such emotional distress that it would impact on her ability to parent X. Having observed the mother and particularly the level of distress she exhibited as she gave her evidence, I accept that this is a genuine and not embellished articulation of her expectation as to what would occur in the event that there was an order for time between the father and X.
As Ms J opined, given that the mother is X's primary caregiver and is her central source of stability, safety and emotional security, maintaining the mother's psychological well-being is a matter of primary importance for X.
Dr P's report with respect to the mother indicated that:

[116]

In the witness box, Ms J opined, and I accept, that X coming into contact with the father, even if there was no direct contact between the parties, could be destabilising and triggering for the mother, irrespective of how the father behaved in future.
Similarly, Dr P gave evidence that he expected that if there were an order for time between X and the father, the mother would become anxious and stressed. He also agreed that it was likely that the risk of information such as her location being leaked to the father would impact on her sense of safety.
At the time she met with Ms J, the mother was not engaged with therapeutic interventions, having successfully undertaken extensive therapy and brought her symptoms under control, and she was managing her mental health through self-care strategies. By the time of the trial, her evidence was that as a result of her mental health having deteriorated, she had attended her general practitioner and been prescribed antidepressants to help her cope with the court proceedings. At trial, Ms J gave evidence that this suggested that the mother's functioning was already being compromised.
The submissions of and cross-examination undertaken by counsel for the father focused heavily on the extent of the mother's hypervigilance and hyperreactivity. As an example, counsel for the father focused on an allegation the mother had made to Ms J that the father had discharged gunshots outside her home. Ms J agreed under cross-examination that, assuming the father had not in fact done so, this would indicate hyperreactivity on the mother's part.
It was put to the mother that this was demonstrative of hypervigilance or hyperreactivity on her behalf. The mother gave evidence, and I accept, that she had known that the father was in her street at the relevant time and had genuinely believed that he had fired gunshots. Irrespective of whether the father did in fact fire gunshots or take actions designed to cause the mother to believe that he had done so, the mother's evidence in this regard demonstrated her intense fear of the father.
Dr P's report indicated that his assessment of the mother did not indicate that she had a predisposition to being overly hyperreactive. However, he gave evidence that he expected that if there were an order for time between X and the father, the mother would be hypervigilant in that context.
I accept that the mother is hypervigilant with respect to the father, but this cannot be considered in isolation from, and indeed must be assessed in the context of, her experiences with him. The mother's hypervigilance is not evidence that the father does not constitute a risk or that the mother has exaggerated the extent to which he poses a risk. Rather, whilst the mother's complex history makes it difficult to pinpoint the precise cause of her hypervigilance, it is consistent with the mother's evidence of the intense fear she feels as a consequence of the father's behaviour.
Counsel for the father cross-examined Dr P at length about the fact that Dr P had been under the impression from the information he had gleaned from the mother about her history that the father had been amongst the people who had physically abused her, whereas no allegation of physical violence against the father appeared in the mother's trial affidavit. The tenor of this cross-examination was that the mother's belief that the father was dangerous was erroneous, and that what was required to resolve the issue was therapy for the mother.
Dr P clearly and repeatedly explained that his opinion with respect to the mother was not necessarily changed by the absence of evidence of physical abuse having been committed by the father, because it was the mother's perception and experience of risk of violence that caused her vulnerability, and she perceived the father as a violent and dangerous person. He confirmed that his view was that the mother's fear was genuine. In any event, I have found that the mother has been subjected to serious violence by the father (albeit I have not found that there was physical violence), and the mother's perception of him is entirely consistent with those findings.
Counsel for the father submitted that the basis for many of Dr P's conclusions had been "blown away" in circumstances in which there was no evidence of physical violence. I do not accept that submission. Dr P was very clear that his opinions remained because threats from the father were sufficient to cause the mother fear whether they were accompanied by physical violence or not. He gave clear evidence that if time or communication were ordered, this may cause the mother significant harm.
Ms J gave evidence that there would be considerable demands placed on the mother to support the development of a relationship between X and the father in circumstances in which no relationship presently exists. This would include scaffolding and supporting the relationship, preparing X, and reassuring X that it was safe to spend time with the father despite the mother's own strongly held view that it is not.
Counsel for the father submitted that the mother had presented as combative and "not in any sense oppressed by the process." I agree that there were times during the mother's evidence when she assertively stood up to counsel for the father. However, I reject entirely any suggestion that the mother's demeanour when giving evidence undermines her evidence as to the impact upon her of the father's behaviour. As Gill J held in Paintal & Paintal,[33] "there is no paradigm of family violence that requires a victim of it to respond in a demure or cowering fashion, or to refrain from responding in an aggressive manner."
In Friseal & Friseal,[34] the Full Court held that the primary judge had fallen into error by drawing precisely the type of conclusion invited by counsel for the father in the present matter. The primary judge in that matter had observed that the mother's demeanour did not appear consistent with what would be expected of a victim of coercion or control arising from physical and verbal abuse. In rejecting this analysis, the Full Court referred to "the problematic nature of fact finding in reliance upon an expectation that those who have experienced family violence will behave or present in a certain way."[35]
It was submitted on behalf of the father that the mother is a "tough cookie" and a "survivor" and that if there were orders for time between X and the father, this would not crush the mother any more than the events of her life had already done, and she would be able to cope.
True it is that Dr P reported that the mother's personality profile indicated that she had good control over her emotions, was emotionally stable and was able to deal with most of life's stresses. His report also indicated that her level of vulnerability was low and that she had exhibited a level of resilience despite the extreme nature of the traumas she had experienced. However, this does not overcome the substantial evidence to which I have referred of the likely destabilising impact on the mother of there being time or communication between X and the father.
Furthermore, Dr P indicated, and Ms J agreed, that any future treatment or therapy undertaken by the mother may be counterproductive until she was in a safe environment and her life was stable. In the witness box, Dr P agreed that if any time or communication between X and the father were to be ordered, the mother would be unlikely to consider herself to be in a safe or stable environment, and would therefore be unlikely to benefit from any therapy. Consistently with this, the mother gave evidence that she would not feel calm and stable until she knew "everyone is okay."
Dr P also agreed that if time between X and the father were to be ordered, there was a strong possibility that the mother's mental functioning would be severely compromised and that any time could "tip her over the edge." Furthermore, he opined that were the father to engage in threatening behaviour towards the mother, which he anticipated could occur if X did not respond to engagement with him in the manner the father hoped, the mother would be vulnerable and it would likely trigger more activated trauma for her, which could potentially cause her to withdraw.
I accept that there is a real risk that an order for time and/or communication between X and the father could compromise the mother's mental health and functioning in a manner which would lead to adverse consequences not only for the mother but also for X.

[119]

The father undertook a hair follicle test in June 2024.[37] This test was produced late, having been undertaken pursuant to an order made on 25 March 2024 which required the testing to be undertaken within 21 days. The result was positive for codeine, amphetamine and methamphetamine. The father asserted that the test had been positive as a result of his prescribed medications. His affidavit evidence in this regard referred only to codeine and amphetamine and made no reference to methamphetamine. Dr H's evidence confirmed that the father's prescribed medications would give rise to positive results for codeine and amphetamine. The father asserted in the witness box that the positive result for methamphetamine was "wrong."
In mid 2024, the father was convicted of driving with methamphetamine in his system. The conviction related to an incident in August 2021. The father did not disclose this conviction to the Court. When cross-examined about this conviction, the father gave evidence that Dr H had written a letter explaining that the test result relied upon by the police could be a false positive arising from his prescribed medication. In answer to a call, he produced the letter, which was dated 22 February 2024.[38] He had not previously disclosed it in these proceedings.
The letter from Dr H explained that the father was prescribed methylphenidate, which could cause a false positive test with occupational drug tests and roadside police drug testing. The letter went on to explain that in order to distinguish between the positive result from the prescribed medication and illicit methamphetamine drugs, an extra test on a urine sample called GCMS (Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry) confirmation was required. The father denied that the reason he had not produced the letter in the context of the current proceedings was because he had been concerned about being requested to undertake the GCMS confirmation test.
Under cross-examination, Dr H clarified that the letter had been referring to saliva tests commonly used for roadside and workplace testing, and that he would expect a hair follicle test to be more accurate than such tests. Dr H was careful to clarify that he is not a pathologist.
I do not accept the father's explanation that the positive result for methamphetamine recorded in the hair follicle test was a false positive. If that were the case, the onus was on the father to adduce evidence to demonstrate this, such as by undertaking the the GCMS confirmation test or calling evidence from a pathologist. He did not do so. Furthermore, the result of the hair follicle test aligns with the father's admissions to Ms J with respect to his drug use.
In November 2024, the father consented to an order requiring him to undertake a further hair follicle test within 14 days. He did not do so. I infer, as was sought by the ICL and the mother, that the reason the father failed to undertake the second test was that he knew or suspected that it too, would return a positive result because he had been using methamphetamine.
The mother alleged that when the father used illicit substances, his behaviour became increasingly impulsive and unpredictable. Consistently with this, Ms J recorded that the possible influence of illegal substances may further exacerbate the erratic and volatile behaviours attributed to the father by lowering his inhibitions, impairing his judgment, and potentially compromising his capacity for parental attunement and the provision of safe, consistent care to a young child. Dr P, similarly, opined that the father's use of drugs was likely to impair his already compromised judgment and was likely to have impacted on his relationships.
Under cross-examination, although he was able to identify that use of illicit substances could reduce his availability to properly supervise a young child and protect her from harm, the father refused to accept that illicit drug use would affect his ability to be a good parent, before begrudgingly acknowledging that this would be the case and that it would impact on his ability to meet X's needs. This evidence gave no basis for confidence that the father fully understands the risks that would arise for X if he were to be under the influence of illicit substances whilst spending time with her, nor for confidence that he would take appropriate steps to ensure that did not occur.
I am satisfied that the father's illicit substance use poses a risk to X.

[128]

Although the father does not presently have (pursuant to an order made on 25 March 2024), and is not proposed to have, parental responsibility for X, his capacity in this regard is an important consideration. To Ms J, the father expressed an understanding of the needs of children, including prioritisation of their needs, having someone who listens to them, seeks to understand their point of view, advocates on their behalf, spends quality time with them and provides consistent emotional availability.
The father displayed a basic understanding of the critical issues of parenting according to a Parent Awareness Skills Survey administered by Dr P.
The father gave unchallenged evidence, and I accept, that he had gained some parenting experience during the time his son had spent with him during his childhood, with the assistance of the paternal grandparents.
As a result of his limited past engagement with X, the father is not aware of her particular needs as an individual. That is not a criticism of the father but rather a reflection of the reality of the factual circumstances.
The father failed to comply with two separate orders requiring him to undertake parenting courses. He did not give an adequate explanation for this.
In light of my findings as to the serious family violence committed by the father and his lack of insight into the consequences of this behaviour, I am not satisfied that he has the capacity to provide for X's needs. To the contrary, exposure to a person who has engaged in such harmful conduct is likely to undermine X's needs, including her needs for physical and psychological safety and for stable and attentive care from her primary caregiver.
As a consequence of this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider in any great detail the extent to which the father's mental health and brain injury otherwise affect his capacity to provide for X's needs, though I note that Dr H's evidence was that the tasks of parenting are likely to be more challenging for the father than for a member of the general public, and Dr P agreed with the proposition that the father's capacity to parent a child is "exceptionally limited." Ms J also gave evidence to similar effect.

[147]

One potential means of ameliorating the risk I have identified would be supervision. Indeed, Ms J opined that the only viable option to adequately safeguard X's well-being and support her sense of security would be for any time spent with the father to be supervised by qualified professionals, such as staff from the Department for Child Protection or a recognised Children's Contact Service, on an indefinite basis.
Whilst it remains a matter of discretion, many authorities have expressed caution in relation to the desirability of orders providing for supervision for indefinite periods.[57] Consistently with this, Ms J opined that there is limited benefit to ongoing supervised time on a long-term basis, as the scope for developing a meaningful relationship between a parent and child is limited.
An added complication with the introduction of supervised time in the present case is the lack of existing relationship between X and the father. As explained by Ms J, when introducing a young child to a parent with whom they do not have an established relationship, best practice indicates that the schedule of contact should involve frequent, relatively brief interactions. However, if there were to be an initial period of brief and frequent visits to develop a relationship followed by a reduction, this could disrupt any emerging bond, which would likely be confusing and unsettling for X. A requirement of professional supervision significantly limits the scope and nature of the relationship that may develop, thus further reducing the potential benefit that may be derived by X.
Ms J gave evidence that even if time between X and the father were to be supervised the mother would be required to support and reassure X, but that X would likely pick up on the mother's anxiety and hypervigilance, which might make her more reserved and hesitant, in turn requiring more work on the part of the mother to support her. Any emotional impacts of this on the mother would impact X, not just at the time of handovers, but more generally. This could impact on X's relationship with her mother, which is a critical relationship for her. This would be a particular risk if the mother reassured X that the father was safe and then it emerged that the situation was not in fact safe, which could cause X to lose trust in the mother.
Dr P gave evidence under cross-examination that the mother would likely experience fear if X spent time with the father, whether such time was supervised or not. As I have discussed, negative impacts on the mother and her wellbeing have foreseeable consequences for X.
Ms J also opined that the emotional burden that would be placed on X as a result of the absence of any coparenting relationship between the parties and the high levels of distrust between them would be developmentally inappropriate and would require her to use her own emotional energy to create her own sense of comfort, leading to emotional strain and potentially other ill effects. Again, supervision would not mitigate this risk.
The mother expressed to Ms J a fear that if the father spent even supervised time with X, this would allow him to become familiar with X's appearance and thus increase the risk of him absconding with her. That risk cannot be disregarded. As noted by Ms J, this is a particular concern when considered in light of the father's criminal history which reflects a pattern of disregard for legal and societal boundaries, and the evidence (which I have accepted) of erratic and unpredictable behaviour on his part.
On balance, I am not persuaded that supervision would sufficiently ameliorate the risks posed by the father to X both directly and indirectly.
Substantial time during the trial was dedicated to the question of whether the substantial presence of Ms C, as proposed as an alternative position by the father, would represent a protective factor. Concerns included the child protection history concerning Ms C's own children and the lack of independent evidence before the Court with respect to it, together with the fact that she is a stranger to X, which would likely increase, rather than reduce, the emotional burden for X involved in relationship formation.
I accept that there are legitimate concerns raised by both the mother and the ICL with respect to the father's alternative proposal. It is not, however, necessary for me to make any findings with respect to Ms C and her suitability in this regard, because I am not satisfied that supervision would sufficiently ameliorate the unacceptable risk I have found would be posed to X by spending time with the father irrespective of the identity of the supervisor. It follows that the substantial presence of Ms C or indeed any other person would similarly be insufficient to ameliorate that risk.
Similarly, I record that the father sought on two occasions during the trial to amend his application to put an alternative position of time supervised by proposed supervisors being his mother, Ms C, and Ms C's daughter on an ongoing basis. Both applications were refused on the basis of procedural fairness concerns raised by the mother and the ICL, a lack of any adequate explanation for the father not having put his proposals before the Court properly in accordance with the directions made for preparation for the trial, and on the basis that it appeared likely that permitting such amendments would necessitate an adjournment to enable the mother and the ICL to obtain further evidence with respect to the suitability of the proposed supervisors, together with the potential need to recall the professional witnesses who had already given evidence.
Ultimately, permitting the amendments could not have altered the outcome of the proceedings, because I have found that supervision would not ameliorate the identified risks irrespective of the identity of the supervisor.

[149]

Dr O opined that a cautious approach was warranted, and recommended that the father have supervised time with X, progressing to unsupervised time upon completion of a neuropsychological assessment and information being obtained from Dr H as to his recent progress and compliance with treatment, and that there be a reassessment with a view to progressing to unsupervised time if supervised time progressed well.
Dr P opined that it was inappropriate for the father to be caring for a young child by himself, but that, subject to there being an appropriate supervisor, it may be possible for him to have some level of supervised time, though the guidelines for this would need to be clear and well-defined. He recommended professional supervision and opined that if that were not possible, the father's involvement with X should be delayed until she was older and more independent. In the witness box, he confirmed that by this he meant it should be delayed until she was 18 and able to make her own choices.
Dr H supported the reintroduction of X to the father by way of regular supervised contact visits.
Ultimately, when balancing all the competing considerations, Ms J recommended that X spend no time with the father. At the conclusion of her evidence, she confirmed that nothing she had heard or read since writing her report had caused her to change that recommendation.
It was submitted on behalf of the father that Ms J's recommendations were "out of step" with those of the other experts. That may be so, but it is Ms J's recommendations to which I give the greatest weight. Not only is Ms J the only expert witness who has met or observed X and the only expert witness who has undertaken a holistic assessment of all the relevant considerations including X's relationships and developmental needs, she is the expert whose particular area of expertise is recommendations as to parenting arrangements.
Furthermore, Dr P's recommendations must be considered in the context of his evidence that assuming the accuracy of the mother's assertion that the father was and is an extremely violent person (being an assertion consistent with my findings), exposing a child to such an individual would potentially be an act of cruelty towards the mother and the child.

Dayan & Shaul [2026] FedCFamC1F 242 (17 April 2026)

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