CZA v Children's Guardian - [2017] NSWCATAD 178 - NSWCATAD 2017 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCATAD

CZA v Children's Guardian

[2017] NSWCATAD 178

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity|2017-03-30

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity

Decision date

2017-03-30

Catchwords

Secretary, Department of Justice v P M Y [2012] VSCA 143 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63
228 CLR 152 Ye v Commissioner for Fair Trading

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Catchwords

Secretary, Department of Justice v P M Y [2012] VSCA 143 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63228 CLR 152 Ye v Commissioner for Fair Trading

Judgment (25 paragraphs)

[1]

457 BPA v Children's Guardian [2015] NSWCATAD 36 Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336 Bronze Wing Ammunition Pty Limited v SafeWork NSW (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 988 Bronze Wing International Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW [2017] NSWCA 41 BVT v Office of the Children's Guardian [2016] NSWSC 1169 BXJ v Children's Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 11 BYR v Children's Guardian [2013] NSWADT 310 BZU v Children's Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 3 Carr v Simnovic (1980) 26 SASR 263 Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia [1986] HCA 58 CHB v Children's Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 214 Children's Guardian v BQJ [2016] NSWSC 869 CJT v Office of the Children's Guardian [2016] NSWSC 738 Collector of Customs (Tas) v Flinders Island Community Association (1985) 7 FCR 205 Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111 Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476 CSZ v Children's Guardian [2017] NSWCATAD 57 Elgammal V Director General, Department of Transport [1999] NSWADT 82 Greyhound Racing Authority v Bragg [2003] NSWCA 388 Hall v New South Wales Trotting Club Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 378 Karakatsanis v Racing Victoria Ltd [2013] VSCA 305; (2013) 42 VR 176 Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 32 LA v Commissioner for Children and Young People [2012] NSWSC 1454 M v M [1988] HCA 68; 166 CLR 69 Maloney v New South Wales National Coursing Association Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 161 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v QAAH of 2004 (2006) 231 CLR 1 New South Wales Bar Association v Muirhead (1988) 14 NSWLR 173 New South Wales Bar Association v Stevens [2003] NSWCA 95. Polini v Gray (1879) 12 Ch D 438. R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIR Comm 101 Re Control Investments Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (No 2) (1981) 3 ALD 88 Re Sophie (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 89 Re XTWK and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 46 AAR 350 Roberts v Balancio (1987) 8 NSWLR 436 Secretary, Department of Justice v L M B; Secretary, Department of Justice v P M Y [2012] VSCA 143 SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152 Ye v Commissioner for Fair Trading; Ucer Investments and Resources Management Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2016] NSWCATAD 147 YG & GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247 ZZ v Secretary, Department of Justice [2013] VSC 267 Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: CZA (Applicant) Children's Guardian (Respondent) Representation: Counsel/Solicitor: N Dawson (Applicant) J McDonald (Respondent)

[3]

Introduction

The applicant seeks to have granted to him a Working with Children Check Clearance in order to work with children as a teacher.
The applicant is known by the pseudonym "CZA" in these proceedings in order to protect the identity of the applicant in accordance with Procedural Direction 9 of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal.
The applicant applied for a Working with Children Check Clearance on 17 January 2017 and education is the relevant child related work in which the applicant wishes to continue to engage. The Act came into force on 15 June 2013. The amendments introduced into the Act in 2015 apply to this particular matter due to the date of the application to the Children's Guardian: see Schedule 3 Part 4 of the Act, clauses 16, 19, and 22.
On 8 February 2017 the Children's Guardian informed the applicant that he is a "disqualified person" due to 2 offences of indecent assault pursuant to section 76 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) which are included in schedule 2 of the Act. The offences occurred in 1977. Because of that classification the Children's Guardian must not grant a Working with Children Check Clearance. That is what happened: a clearance was not able to be granted.
On 2 March 2017 the applicant filed in the Tribunal an application for stay or interim order and an application for an enabling order under section 28 of the NSW Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 ("the Act").
The applicant is without a Working with Children Check Clearance now, preventing him from working in "child-related work" in his chosen field: subsection 6(2)(g) and section 8 of the Act; clause 10 of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Regulation 2013.
The application was heard orally and briefly by the Tribunal on 30 March 2017 in the directions list on that day due to the nature of the application. The matter was originally in the list on 9 March 2017 but because documents were filed the previous day by the respondent, the matter was adjourned for the applicant to consider the documents and issues raised by the respondent concerning the application for a stay. The matter was adjourned to 30 March 2017 to hear the stay application.
An enabling order pursuant to section 28 of the Act, in relation to a disqualified or ineligible person, may not be made subject to conditions: section 28(8) of the Act. The Tribunal may not lawfully attach conditions for the grant of a conditional clearance for this reason. A conditional grant of a clearance for the purpose of allowing the applicant to work with conditions and in his chosen area is not permitted by the legislation.
Provided that the matters which must be considered in section 30 of the Act are taken into account, the application for an enabling order will comply with the Act: see BCS v NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126.
The Tribunal has previously considered the grant of a stay in section 27 proceedings in BJB v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 111, but in different factual circumstances to the current application and these reasons partially draw upon the reasons in that matter. In BXJ v Children's Guardian [2016] NSWCATAD 11 the Tribunal considered whether to extend a stay which had been previously granted by the Principal Member, on conditions, to the date of final hearing. It was stated by the Tribunal in that matter BXJ that: "[22] It is thus considered doubtful that the Tribunal, in the circumstances of the application before it brought by BXJ, could lawfully attach conditions which would be permitted by the legislation effectively to the grant of an interim clearance as proposed, if the Tribunal decided that it would be appropriate or desirable to grant a stay on conditions."
An order prohibiting publication of identifying information has been made under section 64 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) on 9 March 2017. That order is varied to accord with the current practice of the Tribunal and is recorded at the conclusion of these reasons.

[6]

Legislative Provisions

The relevant legislative provisions have previously been referred to in earlier decisions of the Tribunal and are not controversial in this matter. The applicable provisions are referred to now and necessarily involve some repetition of previous statements in earlier decisions, so that the legislative basis of this particular decision is transparent and identified for the parties.
The paramount consideration set out in section 4 of the Act refers in particular to protecting children from "child abuse". The section is as follows: "Safety, welfare and well-being of children to be paramount consideration The safety, welfare and well-being of children and, in particular, protecting them from child abuse, is the paramount consideration in the operation of this Act."
There is no definition of "child abuse" contained in the Act. The Children's Guardian who is the respondent to these proceedings is appointed under section 178 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. An offence is created in section 227 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act which refers to child abuse and is as follows: "Child and young person abuse A person who intentionally takes action that has resulted in or appears likely to result in: (a) the physical injury or sexual abuse of a child or young person, or (b) a child or young person suffering emotional or psychological harm of such a kind that the emotional or intellectual development of the child or young person is, or is likely to be, significantly damaged, or (c) the physical development or health of a child or young person being significantly harmed, is guilty of an offence. Maximum penalty: 200 penalty units."
The objects of the Act are set out in section 3 which provides: "Object of Act The object of this Act is to protect children: (a) by not permitting certain persons to engage in child-related work, and (b) by requiring persons engaged in child-related work to have working with children check clearances."
"Children" is defined in section 5 (1) of the Act to mean "persons under the age of 18 years."
"Conviction" as defined in section 5 (1) of the Act "includes a finding that the charge for an offence is proven, or that a person is guilty of an offence, even though the court does not proceed to a conviction." The disposition of the criminal proceedings brought against the applicant by way of a recognizance or good behaviour bond pursuant to section 556A of the Crimes Act without recording a conviction is thus considered a conviction for the purposes of the Act.
The guiding principle to be applied to practice and procedure in the Tribunal "is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings" consistent with the objects and principles under the Act: section 36 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act.
The Tribunal may determine its own procedure in relation to any matter for which the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, or Civil and Administrative Rules 2014 do not otherwise make provision. Additionally, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence (except in relation to privileged disclosures, for example under section 128 of the Evidence Act 1995), and is to act with as little formality as the circumstances permit to appropriately determine matters without regard to technicalities or legal form: sections 38, and 67 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act.
Procedural fairness and other aspects of natural justice, of course, are to apply to these proceedings and the Tribunal has a discretion to act on material which is rationally probative, but must determine in all the circumstances whether it is proper to act on that material and must act fairly towards the parties: Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111; Roberts v Balancio (1987) 8 NSWLR 436.
The Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division ("AEOD") of the Tribunal has its practice and procedure prescribed by reason of Schedule 3 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act. Relevantly, a party to proceedings in this division is entitled to be represented by a lawyer without requiring leave of the Tribunal and there are no costs awarded in proceedings under the Act. A party aggrieved by a decision made under the Act in AEOD may appeal directly to the Supreme Court on a question of law: see sections 16, 17 and Schedule 3, clauses 9, 15, and 17 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 28 of the Act is protective and not punitive in nature: AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD to 9, at [34]; Commission for Children and Young People v FZ [2011] NSWCA 111, per Young JA at [61] and R v Commission for Children and Young People [2002] NSWIRComm 101 at [130].
The test to be applied when considering earlier predecessor legislation is whether the risk posed by the applicant is "a real and appreciable risk": see BYR v Children's Guardian [2013] NSWADT 310, at [38], [39]; AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian [2014] NSWCATAD 9, at [37], [38]; Commission for Children and Young People v V [2002] NSWSC 949; 56 NSWLR 476, at [42] per Young CJ in Eq (as he then was). That test has been held to be applicable in these matters in the Tribunal: see AHV v NSW Commission for Children and Young People [2012] NSWADT 263; AYU v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian (supra); BJB v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian (No 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 164. This is also the test to be applied in these proceedings: BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523.
The Tribunal is required to follow the decision in the Supreme Court BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian [2015] NSWSC 523, Beech-Jones J, at [31]-[33], in relation to the assessment of risk. In that decision His Honour relied upon the approach of the High Court in the often cited decision of M v M [1988] HCA 68; 166 CLR 69. A positive finding of abuse might be made according to the civil onus, with due regard to the matters in section 140 (2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), which incorporates those matters identified in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; 60 CLR 336. The Tribunal may also be affirmatively satisfied that an alleged incident did not occur. His Honour stated at [33], in relation to an application under section 28 of the Act for an enabling order: "However, in a context where the welfare of the child is paramount and the question being posed concerns the risk of harm to children, NCAT may not be satisfied that an allegation of abuse has been made out, but nevertheless conclude that the circumstances surrounding a particular incident or course of conduct means that there is a risk to a child or, more correctly, that the existence of a risk has not been disproven."
The Tribunal has previously determined that it is not appropriate for the Tribunal to make an order on conditions, whether that be under section 27 or section 28 of the Act: BJB v NSW Office of the Children's Guardian (No 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 164, at [36]-[45]; BKV v Children's Guardian [2015] NSWCATAD 65. This approach is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in BKE v Office of the Children's Guardian at [33].
An enabling order pursuant to section 28 of the Act, in relation to a disqualified or ineligible person, may not be made subject to conditions: section 28 (8) of the Act.

[8]

Considerations and the Evidence

On an application under section 28 or 29 of the Act the Tribunal may stay the operation of a determination of the Children's Guardian under the Act pending determination of the matter: section 30 (2) of the Act. The provisions of section 30 (1) of the Act "must" be applied in "determining an application" under Part 4 of the Act. This stay application is not determining or bringing to an end or concluding the application for an enabling order. However, in order to consider whether it is desirable to stay that decision, it is relevant to consider, even if briefly, the matters in section 30(1) of the Act. This is not a preliminary hearing.
The Tribunal "must consider" those factors set out in section 30 (1) in determining an application under Part 4 of the Act, which is the application for an order under section 28.
Provided that the matters which must be considered in section 30(1) of the Act are taken into account, the review will comply with the Act: BCS v NSW Civil & Administrative Tribunal [2015] NSWSC 126. That review will also fulfil the requirements of both sections, taking into account the nature of the administrative review.
Section 30 of the amended version of the Act relevantly provides as follows: 30 Determination of applications and other matters (1) The Tribunal must consider the following in determining an application under this Part: (a) the seriousness of the offences with respect to which the person is a disqualified person or any matters that caused a refusal of a clearance or imposition of an interim bar, (b) the period of time since those offences or matters occurred and the conduct of the person since they occurred, (c) the age of the person at the time the offences or matters occurred, (d) the age of each victim of any relevant offence or conduct at the time they occurred and any matters relating to the vulnerability of the victim, (e) the difference in age between the victim and the person and the relationship (if any) between the victim and the person, (f) whether the person knew, or could reasonably have known, that the victim was a child, (g) the person's present age, (h) the seriousness of the person's total criminal record and the conduct of the person since the offences occurred, (i) the likelihood of any repetition by the person of the offences or conduct and the impact on children of any such repetition, (j) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application, (k) any other matters that the Children's Guardian considers necessary. (1A) The Tribunal may not make an order under this Part which has the effect of enabling a person (the "affected person") to work with children in accordance with this Act unless the Tribunal is satisfied that: (a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the affected person that was not directly supervised by another person while the affected person was engaged in any child-related work, and (b) it is in the public interest to make the order. (2) On an application under section 28 or 29, the Tribunal may, by order, stay the operation of a determination by the Children's Guardian under this Act relating to the applicant pending the determination of the matter. Note : Division 2 of Part 3 of Chapter 3 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 enables a decision the subject of an application under section 27 of this Act for an administrative review under that Act to be stayed by the Tribunal.
The respondent Children's Guardian submits that it is questionable whether there is any operative "determination" which can be stayed. There is no discretion to be exercised and therefore no determination on the part of the Children's Guardian. Because of the classification of the applicant as a disqualified person the Children's Guardian must not grant a Working with Children Check Clearance. The reference in subsection 30 (2) to a "determination" is therefore curious. The Children's Guardian has merely notified the applicant that he is a disqualified person by reason of the indecent assault charges which resulted in section 556A of the Crimes Act recognizances in 1978 and dating back to the events which occurred in 1977.
The evidence at this stage is considered under each of the following subheadings. Each of the subheadings will refer to the considerations under section 30(1) of the Act. The evidence described is also placed under subheadings reciting the required considerations under the Act.
Also, as previously stated, because the rules of evidence do not apply in these proceedings, the restrictions imposed by the Evidence Act do not apply and hearsay evidence is permissible because in particular sections 59, 60 and 91 of the Evidence Act are not applicable: section 38 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act; but see also LA v Commissioner for Children and Young People [2012] NSWSC 1454. The Tribunal may therefore look at the surrounding circumstances and any evidence or factual circumstances in relation to the conduct of the applicant: section 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act.
It is probable that there may be factual matters in contention between the applicant and the Children's Guardian. The Tribunal is therefore cautious in its consideration of the evidence and will not reach a concluded view until after hearing further evidence including cross-examination and submissions in the final hearing.

[22]

Consideration

The Act is designed to be protective and there are a number of matters identified in the legislation which are relevant to an assessment of risk. They would not be included as factors which must be considered by the Tribunal unless they were matters which are relevant to the assessment of risk.
While there is a presumption that the applicant poses a risk to the safety of children, the applicant may be able to provide evidence which ultimately satisfies the Tribunal that he does not pose a risk to the safety of children.
The factors which have to be taken into account pursuant to section 30 (1) of the Act have been identified earlier in these reasons. It can be seen from those considerations that further evidence will be required to determine the application.
In 1st Fleet Pty Ltd v Australian Co-Operative Foods Ltd [2006] NSWSC 881 at [5] the Supreme Court (per White J as he then was) emphasised that in an injunction application it is not the Court's task "to conduct a preliminary hearing". In determining whether there is "a serious question to be tried" when considering an interlocutory injunction, his Honour stated that is to be assumed that any conflict in the evidence "would be resolved in the plaintiff's favour." The decision of Deputy President Hennessy in Ye v Commissioner for Fair Trading; Ucer Investments and Resources Management Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Fair Trading [2016] NSWCATAD 147 at [34] applies that traditional formulation about interlocutory applications to a consideration of a stay pursuant to section 60 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act. The Deputy President also referred at [31] to [33] to the consideration of the prospects of the success or the merits of the review application as follows: [31] The corresponding provision in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), section 41, is in similar term but does not list the public interest as a mandatory consideration. Nevertheless, the prospects of success or the merits of the applicant's case on review have been regarded as relevant: Re XTWK and Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 46 AAR 350 at 354. [32] In AHJ v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2011] NSWADT 311 at [14] the former Administrative Decisions Tribunal held that the phrase "secure the effectiveness of the determination" is another way of saying that there needs to be irreparable loss or harm to the applicant before consideration will be given to making an interim order. The Tribunal went on to say- [15] Section 60 is to be read keeping in mind the common law principles in relation to the exercise of interlocutory injunctions. In Castlemaine Tooheys Limited v South Australia [1986] HCA 58, Acting Chief Justice Mason said at paragraph 11: "The principles governing the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions in private law litigation have been applied in public law cases, including constitutional cases, notwithstanding that different factors arise for consideration. In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction". [33] In a practical sense the onus is on the applicant to make out a case that it is appropriate for the Tribunal to make such an order: Bentran Pty Ltd v Sabbarton [2014] NSWCATAP 37 at [9], Wright J, President citing Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corporation Ltd (1985) 2 NSWLR 685 at 694.
The provisions of section 30 (2) of the Act are: "On an application under section 28 or 29, the Tribunal may, by order, stay the operation of a determination by the Children's Guardian under this Act relating to the applicant pending the determination of the matter."
Section 29 of the Act relates to the review of persons who have previously obtained enabling orders, which review may result in the revocation or confirmation of an enabling order, due to fresh evidence or subsequent events occurring since the original grant of enabling order. The provisions of section 30 (2) of the Act appear to be neither the same as an interlocutory injunction application nor a stay application pursuant to section 60 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act. However, the same principles should logically apply in relation to a consideration of the prospects of success of the enabling order application as an interlocutory step. The application pursuant to section 30 (2) of the Act specifically refers to a "determination by the Children's Guardian under this Act". The only matter 'determined' or stated by the Children's Guardian is that the applicant is a disqualified person by reason of the indecent assault matters. The Children's Guardian in those circumstances, because of the provisions of the Act, has no discretion and must refuse the application for a Working With Children Check Clearance.
The Children's Guardian submits that section 30 of the Act does not permit in effect an "interim enabling order". The argument correctly identifies that exactly the same considerations apply to the making of an enabling order on an interim basis as would apply to the making of an enabling order on a final basis. A stay application however, like an injunction application, is not an interim hearing as Justice White (as he then was) observed in 1st Fleet Pty Ltd v Australian Co-Operative Foods Ltd.
Further, the Children's Guardian submits that because section 28 (8) prohibits the making of an enabling order subject to conditions, this means that the Tribunal cannot make an interim enabling order a condition of which would be that it would expire at some future time. The so-called interim enabling order, however, would expire on the making of a final order at the final hearing.
The repetition of any indecent assault with a child under the age of 18 years would be more likely than not to do significant harm to that child.
The assessment of the Tribunal, based upon the previously identified evidence, is that it is not desirable to grant a stay in order to secure the effectiveness of the determination of the application, taking into account the interests of the applicant and the public interest.
The Tribunal accepts that the history of the applicant and his long involvement in the teaching profession provides significant support for the view that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety of children. The applicant, however, bears an onus to prove that he is not a risk to the safety of children.
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the Act is protective, not punitive, and an assessment of risk should err on the side of caution whilst balancing all of the risks which may be posed to children. The paramount principle under the Act requires that the protection of children, particularly from child abuse, is the main focus but it is not the only factor which must be considered.

[23]

Conclusion

The Tribunal has allocated a final hearing date for this matter on 31 July 2017.
There is a presumption in proceedings under section 28 of the Act that the applicant poses a risk to children because the applicant is a disqualified person seeking an enabling order: section 28(7) of the Act.
If the applicant is granted a clearance or a stay of the decision of the Children's Guardian he may work with any children of any age. No conditions may be imposed upon the grant of a clearance. There is, in any event, no mechanism to monitor any conditions which might be imposed. The Tribunal does not consider it desirable, after having regard to the matters set out previously, to grant a stay of the determination even if conditions could be moulded to provide an appropriate level of protection.
While the applicant will no doubt suffer financial hardship as a result of the decision of his employer to suspend his pay, and the prospects of the grant of an enabling order are strongly indicated by the pro-social evidence already placed before the Tribunal, there is force in the submission by the Children's Guardian that what is sought is in effect an interim enabling order. The Tribunal exercises the jurisdiction to grant an enabling order, not the Children's Guardian. That is clear from the structure of section 28 of the Act where the Children's Guardian is required to be a party to the application and may make submissions either in opposition to or in support of the making of an enabling order. In that sense the Children's Guardian is in the role of a contradictor, not the primary decision maker from whom the applicant seeks a review. The matter will be able to be determined on a final basis on 31 July 2017. The hardship to the applicant therefore will be limited in duration.
The purpose of the Act is protective and not punitive. It is in the public interest for the legislative intent to remain in force until the determination of the application for the enabling order is able to be made, and consideration can be properly directed to whether the applicant has discharged the onus placed by the legislation upon him to prove that he is not a risk to children. That is not able to be definitively determined at this time due to the state of the evidence.
The public interest is entitled to significant weight and is advanced by the maintenance of the status of the applicant as a disqualified person until a full consideration can be given at a final hearing as to whether he poses a risk to the safety of children.
The application for a stay order under section 30(2) of the Act is therefore refused and dismissed.

CZA v Children's Guardian

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Catchwords

Judgment (25 paragraphs)

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Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (53)