1. The Tribunal finds that the following documents are neither exempt from the Freedom of Information Act 1982 nor irrelevant to the request of the respondent.
2. Insofar as the applicant determined otherwise, the applicant's decision is set aside and varied to release the following to the respondent:

Document 4

(i) Email timestamped 5.24pm at point 1, word 17.

Document 7

(i) Email timestamped 3.11pm to the extent that it contains material already released to the respondent with respect to Document 6.

Document 9

(i) Email timestamped 12.23pm minus the mobile telephone number of the agency officer.

Document 10

(i) Email dated 8 August 2017 and timestamped 3.29pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 August 2017 and timestamped 8.00pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the email address of the agency officer.

(iv) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(v) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 11

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 12

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.36am minus the mobile telephone number of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 13

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.41am.

(iii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender.

(iv) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am.

Document 14

(i) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender.

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am including the name of the recipient.

Document 15

(i) Email dated 5 July 2017 and timestamped 5.30pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. The Principal Registrar shall, if practicable, give notice of the order and reasons dated 18 May 2021 to the person(s) to whom the information relates in accordance with section 53A(3) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982.

1. On 22 November 2018, Mr Rennie sought access under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 ("the FOI Act") to "all correspondence relating to my service with the CFA." In due course, on 22 January 2019, Mr Rennie, in response to a request to do so by the Country Fire Authority ("CFA"), clarified his request as follows:
   • all correspondence from the Smythesdale BMT to District 15 HQ whilst I was a member of the Smythesdale Brigade,
   • all correspondence from the Smythesdale BMT to CFA HQ People and Culture whilst I was a member of the Smythesdale Brigade and
   • all correspondence from District 15 HQ to CFA People and Culture whilst I was a member of the Smythesdale Brigade.
2. On 26 April 2019, the CFA notified Mr Rennie of its decision to:

1. In due course Mr Rennie applied to the Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner ("the Commissioner") under section 49A(1)(a) of the FOI Act for review of the CFA's decision.
2. On 12 December 2019 the Commissioner made a decision which differed from the CFA's decision in that the Commissioner determined that additional material should be released to Mr Rennie.
3. Under section 50(3D) of the FOI Act, an agency may apply to this Tribunal for a review of a decision of the Commissioner.
4. Accordingly, on 27 December 2019, the CFA applied to this Tribunal for a review of the Commissioner's decision. The CFA contended that:

(a) some of the additional material to be released to Mr Rennie by virtue of the Commissioner's decision fell outside the parameters of Mr Rennie's request and was therefore irrelevant to the request and should not be released, and/or

(b) the material was exempt under either section 30 (internal working documents), section 33 (document affecting personal privacy) or section 35(1)(b) (documents containing material obtained in confidence) of the FOI Act.

1. Mr Rennie maintains that the material identified by the Commissioner as being relevant and/or not exempt under the FOI Act should be released to him.

1. When interpreting provisions of the FOI Act, section 3(2) of the FOI Act makes it clear that it is the intention of Parliament that the provisions of the FOI Act be interpreted so as to further the object set out in subsection (1) - namely, to extend as far as possible the right of the community to access information in the possession of the Government of Victoria and other bodies constituted under the law of Victoria for certain public purposes - and that any discretions conferred under the FOI Act be exercised as far as possible so as to facilitate and promote, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information.
2. Section 25 of the FOI Act requires an agency to grant access to an edited copy of a document when it is practicable for the agency to delete irrelevant information.
3. In many of the contentious documents, the pivotal question was whether the material deleted as irrelevant by the CFA should or should not have been so deleted.
4. The Commissioner considered that certain material contained in documents 7, 9, 10, 12 and 13 was not "out of scope" and was relevant to Mr Rennie's request. Paragraph 14 of the Commissioners' decision read:

In my view, these emails are relevant to the Applicant's request as they relate to the Applicant. While I acknowledge the content of certain emails relates to the Applicant in a limited way, I consider the email subject lines place them within the scope of the request. Further, I have determined this information is not exempt under the Act.

1. Mr Rennie agrees with the decision of the Commissioner.
2. The CFA contends that the Commissioner incorrectly focused on Mr Rennie as the subject of the request rather than focusing on the request itself. The CFA contends that it was correct in its decision to delete the material as irrelevant.
3. The CFA contends that the Commissioner misconstrued the question to be determined and thereby gave access to material other than that sought by Mr Rennie as articulated in his FOI request. The CFA contends that the request was clear, seeking communications between specifically identified areas of the CFA to other specifically identified areas of the CFA.
4. Section 30(1) of the FOI Act (relevantly) exempts documents where the disclosure would disclose matter in the nature of opinion, advice or recommendation prepared by an officer, or consultation or deliberation that has taken place between officers, in the course of, or for the purpose of, the deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency and would be contrary to the public interest.
5. The CFA claims this exemption in respect of parts of Documents 10 and 15.
6. Whilst the exemption was not raised before the Commissioner, that is of no moment in these proceedings.
7. Section 33(1) of the FOI Act exempts a document if its disclosure under the FOI Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person.
8. The CFA relied upon this exemption in relation to Documents 4, 10 and 15.
9. Personal affairs is very widely defined in section 33(9) and includes information-

(a) that identifies any person or discloses their address or location; or

(b) from which any person's identity, address or location can reasonably be determined.

1. Section 35(1)(b) of the FOI Act exempts a document from disclosure if disclosure under the FOI Act would divulge any information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a person to an agency and the disclosure of the information under the FOI Act would be contrary to the public interest by reason that the disclosure would be reasonably likely to impair the ability of an agency to obtain similar information in the future.
2. The CFA relied upon this exemption in relation to documents 10, 11, 12 and 15.
3. The CFA contended that the following test articulated in the Commissioner's decision at [41] misconstrued the question to be determined:

However, with respect to Documents 10, 11, 12 and 15, having reviewed the documents, I am not satisfied information exempted by the Agency was communicated in confidence. I am of the view the internal emails between Agency officers concerned Agency procedures rather than the provision of confidential information to the Agency. Accordingly, I am not satisfied these documents [are] exempt under section 35(1)(b).

1. The CFA contended that communications can be innocuous, yet still attract the exemption if the communication occurred in confidence, from the perspective of the giver/receiver of the information.

1. I read detailed legal submissions from the CFA dated 25 August 2020. Those written submissions were complemented by oral submissions at the hearing.
2. I also read emails from Mr Rennie dated 29 January 2021 and 11 February 2021 ("the 2021 emails"). Mr Rennie relied upon those submissions at the hearing as his response to the submissions of the CFA.
3. I heard evidence from Mr Kade Dowie who is the Assistant Chief Fire Officer, Performance Improvement with the CFA. He made a statement dated 26 August 2020 which he adopted in his evidence before me.
4. Mr Rennie responded to Mr Dowie's statement in the 2021 emails. He also briefly cross-examined Mr Dowie at the hearing.
5. Mr Dowie's evidence described in broad terms the need for a healthy, respectful and collegiate atmosphere. He spoke to the flow on effects in small communities of issues arising within the CFA potentially flowing into the local community and vice versa. He spoke about the need for issues to be dealt with expeditiously and for CFA staff to be able to communicate frankly and openly about staff related issues. He spoke of the need for people to be able to come forward with issues or concerns. He emphasised the need for sensitive management of issues to avoid tension, animosity and recrimination.
6. Mr Dowie spoke of the potentially disastrous impacts on the brigade, its officers, staff and the local community if frank views about staff related issues were made available to the person the subject of those issues, including recrimination and reluctance for matters to be disclosed or raised. He spoke to the impact this could have on other small brigades and the local community. He said at [13] of his statement:

Each of these potential adverse effects can also then have direct and indirect effects not just in relation to the brigade, but in relation to harmonious co-existence within a small local community. Because of these adverse effects, if information of the kind in the documents is disclosed, people would refuse to participate in raising or dealing with issues, or not participate in the future as fully as they might otherwise due to a fear that information they contribute may be released to the person the subject of the information. The CFA cannot compel people to participate in processes to deal with staff related issues.

1. Mr Dowie emphasised the voluntary nature of CFA work and the need for trust and how this could break down if documents were to be released.
2. As a general reflection on reasons for why confidentiality is often important in organisations such as the CFA, Mr Dowie's evidence was reasonably uncontroversial.
3. It however lacked the specificity required to be of assistance in resolving the issues before me as they arose in the context of this case.
4. Where there was specificity, the evidence was more controversial and not particularly helpful to the issues to be resolved. It had the potential to have the proceedings descend into a circular discussion of Mr Rennie's history in the CFA which was not the issue to be determined.
5. Mr Dowie does not know Mr Rennie but gave evidence about the way in which Mr Rennie is apparently viewed by some within the CFA. Mr Rennie unsurprisingly holds a different view of his own conduct and/or reputation and takes issue with this.
6. Even taking into account the evidence of Mr Dowie and being mindful that there is evidently some history between the CFA and Mr Rennie, many of the documents were innocuous, without any inherent ability to inflame or ignite past anxieties or stressors.
7. Given the nature of the material before me, this was not then the forum for those differences to be ventilated at any great length. They accordingly were not. The history could not shed light on the documents themselves.
8. What I needed to determine in respect of each of the documents was the limited question of whether to withhold some or any of the material which the Commissioner had determined should be released to Mr Rennie.
9. I turn then to a consideration of the disputed documents.

1. The Commissioner's decision was to release an email timestamped 5.24pm at point 1, word 17 (name of agency officer). The Commissioner was not satisfied that disclosure of the officer's name would be unreasonable, noting the body of the email in question was released to Mr Rennie.
2. The CFA contended that:

when it comes to names and other personal affairs information of staff holding non-executive positions, an approach regarding disclosure as unreasonable is the correct and preferable approach.[1]

1. The CFA contended that a clear statement of general principle has been established in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal, articulated at [126]-[127] in Coulson v Department of Premier and Cabinet [2018] VCAT 229 (20 February 2018) as follows:
   1. DPC's position is consistent with the Tribunal's decision in Smeaton v Victorian WorkCover Authority (General) [2012] VCAT 1549, where the Tribunal said:

... the names of non-executive staff should not be released. I repeat the substance of what I said in Smeaton v Victorian WorkCover Authority (General) [2010] VCAT 1908 (30 November 2010). In my view, disclosure of the names would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of non-executive staff. It would be unreasonable because the intrusion on the personal affairs of non-executive staff. ...

1. With the passage of years since those decisions and the increasing prominence of rights of privacy, in my view an approach regarding disclosure of the names of staff holding non-executive positions as unreasonable disclosure is the correct and preferable approach.
2. The CFA referred me to several subsequent decisions of the Tribunal constituted by Deputy President Proctor, in which the same principle was applied.[2]
3. The CFA contended on this basis that the document was exempt under section 33(1) of the FOI Act.
4. In AOZ v JLV [2019] VCAT 31, I however broke the chain (if indeed there ever was one) when at [178]-[179] I said:
   1. Whilst the Department redacted the names and telephone numbers of staff below VPS 6 level, it is not appropriate for the Tribunal to simply determine, without any analysis, that the mention of any/all names below VPS 6 level ... engage the exemption.
   2. I repeat the comments I made at [101]-[107] in relation to the global redaction of names and contact details.
5. I now repeat and adopt those observations in the context of this application.
   1. In every case, it is necessary to examine the information sought to be disclosed. Under cross-examination, Witness F agreed that every employee in the Department has a departmental email address used to communicate both within and outside the Department. The employee signatures are mandated by the Department and include name, position, email address and direct phone numbers. People both within and outside the Department obtain this information regularly; every time an email is sent by the staff member. Whilst each email has a disclaimer making it clear that the email is for the intended recipient, the disclaimers really relate to the information contained within the email, not the personal details of the employee. Witness F, however, gave evidence that it was different to release under FOI because the information provided was protected by legislative provisions surrounding the Department and information conveyed by it.
   2. I do not consider that the disclosure of the redacted names and contact details in this case would involve the unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs information. In many cases before the Tribunal, applicants seek to discover through FOI the identity of individuals. Disclosure of an individual's identity may then be unreasonable, particularly if there are concerns in those circumstances about the way in which the information will be used.
   3. This case is very different. AOZ is not seeking to discover the hitherto unknown identities of individuals. AOZ, by reason of his/her employment already knows the identities and telephone numbers of all the individuals whose details have been redacted.
   4. I have no reason to believe that AOZ intends to widely distribute the information. I accept his/her evidence that (s)he does not. Even if (s)he did however, it is impossible to see how this would in the context of this document have an adverse impact on anyone.
   5. There is no reason to believe that releasing the details on the documents sought by AOZ is likely to lead to criticism or harassment of those individuals or greater dissemination of their details.
   6. Although responses provided under s.53A of the FOI Act may have indicated that the individuals concerned do not want their personal affairs released, this is not determinative of the matter given the considerations outlined above.
   7. The document is not exempt under s. 33 of the FOI Act.
6. Whilst the CFA concedes that in decisions published since AOZ the Tribunal has not adopted a universal approach that the personal details of junior staff are exempt,[3] it contends that this is not the correct position.
7. I disagree. I do not accept that there is a universal exemption which prevents the release of the name of an officer of the Department.
8. To be perfectly clear, I reject that proposition.
9. Nowhere in the FOI Act is there any such articulated exemption. Rather, what is required is a consideration in each case as to whether disclosure in the circumstances of that given case would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person.
10. It is clear that by virtue of section 33(9) of the FOI Act, a name is personal information. Whether the name properly falls within the section 33 exemption therefore must turn on whether its disclosure would be unreasonable.
11. In order to attract the exemption, there must be a reason articulated as to why disclosure in the circumstances of any given case would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person.
12. There must be some factual basis or reason to find that the disclosure would be unreasonable.

1. In this case, it is clear that Mr Rennie has the rest of the relevant paragraph's contents.
2. During the course of the hearing, Mr Rennie expressed frustration that the CFA annually distributes unsolicited material such as calendars and flyers with private names, telephone numbers and email addresses, yet objected to the release of the officer's name in the rather innocuous circumstances of the email in question.
3. No cogent reason was disclosed in the evidence before me as to why the release of the officer's name would be unreasonable in the context of this document. There was no evidence of ill blood between Mr Rennie and the officer. There was no evidence before me that the officer would even object to the release of their name. There was no reason for me to conclude that the release of the name would trigger any negative or disproportionate response from Mr Rennie or that there would be any other reason not to release the name.
4. It is not at all obvious from the document itself or the evidence before me that release of the name contained within the document would be unreasonable.
5. I am not satisfied that the officer's name is exempt under the FOI Act. I will make the same determination as the Commissioner.

1. The Commissioner determined to release the duplicate of the email timestamped 3.11pm which appears in Document 6. The Commissioner was of the view that all duplicate information could be released.
2. The CFA contended the document fell outside the parameters of the request and should be excluded as irrelevant.
3. There is no reason why this document should not be released to the extent that it contains material already released to Mr Rennie with respect to Document 6.

1. The decision of the Commissioner was to release an email timestamped 12.23pm (except for the mobile telephone number of the agency officer which the Commissioner found to be exempt).
2. Although the Commissioner considered the relationship to be marginal, the Commissioner considered that the email subject matter lines placed it within scope of the request. The Commissioner therefore determined the information was relevant to Mr Rennie's request and should be released.
3. The CFA contends that the information should reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the request and deleted under section 25 of the FOI Act.
4. The CFA contends that the Commissioner misconstrued the nature of the request made by Mr Rennie. The CFA emphasised that the mere naming of Mr Rennie in a document was not sufficient in and of itself to mean that the material in question was relevant to the request made by him.
5. The CFA submitted that, when determining whether information is irrelevant, it is necessary to:

(b) consider whether the disclosure of information could or would reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the request - meaning whether disclosure of certain information might reasonably, as opposed to irrationally or absurdly, be considered or looked on as irrelevant to the request for access made under the FOI Act.

1. The CFA contended that the email did not fall within the (reframed) scope of the request because the identified email was not from the specifically identified area of the CFA articulated in the request to the other specifically identified area of the CFA articulated in the request. It contended that it therefore fell outside the scope of the request.
2. Whilst I agree with the legal analysis, I disagree that it leads to the result contended for by the CFA in the context of Document 9.
3. The CFA contended that I should accept the uncontradicted evidence of Mr Dowie on this point. Although Mr Dowie proffered an opinion that several of the documents fell outside the request, this is properly a matter for my determination rather than the subject of a witness statement.
4. I am not satisfied that the email can reasonably be regarded as irrationally or absurdly irrelevant to the request.
5. I note that other related communications between the same two individuals with the same subject line was released to Mr Rennie as being relevant to his request.
6. I further note from looking at the documents that one of the individuals (during the relevant period) wore different professional hats, placing the individual in different roles. If the communication was in the context, as it appears to be, of the individual wearing one of those hats, the document would fall squarely within the terms of the request as articulated by Mr Rennie.
7. There was no contention that there was any other basis under the FOI Act for why the document should not be released to Mr Rennie.

1. I take this opportunity to observe that it is unfortunate when a somewhat artificial and narrow approach to a request is taken by agencies - particularly when an agency has asked for a request to be clarified.[4] Such an approach has the potential to lead applicants to be hesitant about acceding to requests to clarify or amend their requests. It also has the potential to exhaust the resources of departments by forcing FOI applicants into making a multiplicity of applications for information when an overly literal or narrow interpretation is given to the request.

1. This document consists of the following emails:

(i) Email dated 8 August 2017 and timestamped 3.29pm.

(ii) Email dated 6 August 2017 and timestamped 8.00pm.

(iii) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am.

(iv) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm.

(v) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm.

1. The CFA contended that although the material contained within the emails is brief, the communication(s) arose in the course of determining how to deal with issues relating to Mr Rennie. It was submitted that the communications therefore arose in the course, and for the deliberative process, of running the CFA and dealing with members or staffing issues. The CFA contends that the emails therefore comprise opinions, deliberations or consultations between officers of the CFA for the purpose of the deliberative functions of the agency and are therefore exempt under section 30 of the FOI Act.
2. The CFA contends that public interest considerations weigh against disclosure in this case. It alluded to the sensitivity of the staff issues involved and contended that disclosure would inhibit frankness and candour, undermine harmony and trust within the brigade(s) and would have an adverse effect on the integrity of the decision-making processes.
3. I consider that it would be a distortion of the purpose of the section to find that any of the brief communications contained within Document 10 fell within the parameters of section 30(1)(a) of the FOI Act.
4. I am not satisfied that any part of the document is exempt under section 30 of the FOI Act. It is barely opinion, advice or recommendation. No evidence was put before me upon which I could conclude that it was prepared for the purposes of the deliberative function of the agency. No reason was disclosed to enable me to find that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest under section 30 of the FOI Act.
5. The CFA further contended that the personal affairs exemption in section 33 of the FOI Act was engaged and relied upon a response received under section 53A of the FOI Act.
6. I disagree. There is nothing in the contents of any email contained within Document 10 for which the disclosure could be considered unreasonable. None of the broad evidence relied upon before me would lead to this conclusion in relation to the document in question.
7. There is nothing to suggest it will be widely disseminated, but even if it were, it is innocuous content. Whilst I accept that there are numerous factors which can give rise to a finding that the release of personal information would be unreasonable, none were specifically identified in the context of this document. I was simply taken to the reasons for such findings to have been made in other cases. I was left blind as to why the disclosure would be unreasonable in the context of Document 10.
8. A statement provided under section 53A of the FOI Act took the matter no further. Whilst the CFA in oral submissions identified that statistically the Tribunal has more frequently than not over the years made non-disclosure orders where section 53A responses have indicated a concern about the release of personal affairs information, that of course is not the test. The Tribunal must determine whether the material is properly to be considered exempt under the FOI Act.
9. The CFA further contended that the information was communicated in confidence and was exempt from release under section 35(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
10. I can see no basis for finding, on any reading of the document, that the information was communicated in confidence. No evidence directly related to the communication was lead upon which I could conclude that it was. There was no evidence for example that either the sender or receiver of the email(s) believed the communications were communications in confidence. Broad brush statements that issues are sensitive is not enough. Broad brush statements that, in some cases decided by the Tribunal, the exemption has applied is not enough. I was referred to a number of cases where the exempt material formed part of an investigation. This did not help me in the context of this case, where there was no investigation on foot.
11. It appears to me, as it did to the Commissioner, to be routine process-based innocuous factual information. There is no realistic basis to believe that the ability of officers to communicate regarding agency policies in future would be inhibited by the release of this paragraph.
12. The legislative provision is not catering for overly sensitive or highly strung agency officers.
13. A reasonable officer in the reasonable execution of their duties should understand that some, if not most, of their communications about individuals may be subject to the FOI Act, unless a properly articulated exemption applies.
14. I reject the analysis of the CFA in this respect.
15. There was further no basis upon which I could find that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest.
16. I consider that each email falls within the scope of Mr Rennie's request. Once again, I consider that it would be taking an unnaturally narrow interpretation of the material given the identity of the persons involved in the exchange and the subject matter of the exchange to find that it did not. I repeat and rely upon the comments I made in relation to Document 9.
17. Although I was asked to rely on the broad evidence of Mr Dowie about the nature and sensitivity of the issues in the context of the CFA as well as responses received under section 53A of the FOI Act, neither changed my view in relation to Document 10.
18. I make the further following observations in relation to two of the emails contained within Document 10:

(iii) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. I gave careful consideration to whether I should view the first seven words of the first line after the salutation differently in considering whether the information was communicated in confidence under section 35(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
2. Ultimately, I concluded that there is no realistic basis to believe that the ability of officers to communicate regarding agency policies in future would be inhibited by its release.
3. Whilst there may be a basis to believe that officers will be more circumspect in the tone they choose to adopt when discussing individuals if communications such as this were to be released, that is an entirely different matter.
4. The provisions of the FOI Act are not designed to exclude from release all communications between officers. The provisions exempt confidential communications where disclosure would be contrary to the public interest because the agency's ability to obtain similar information would be impaired.
5. A reasonable officer in the reasonable execution of their duties would not be precluded from doing so if this email's contents were to be released in its entirety.

1. Finally, discussion took place in relation to another email:

(v) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. The Commissioner found this email was not exempt under section 35(1)(b) of the FOI Act (although once again found that the personal email address of the agency officer was exempt under section 33(1) of the FOI Act).
2. The Commissioner described the contents of this document at [42] as follows:

I note the email sent at 12.16pm on 6 July 2017 is not legible and was exempted in full by the Agency. OVIC staff have made multiple attempts to source a copy of the email in its original format, however, the Agency advised by email on 15 October 2019 the email is corrupt, and no original can be sourced. ... In these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the document, in its available form, contains exempt information.

1. The CFA agrees that the email was corrupted. It contends however that because there is no way to determine what the text of the email contains, it falls outside the scope of the request.
2. I disagree. It is no secret that the content of the material is completely indecipherable.
3. Clearly it would be impossible to make a finding in these circumstances that the document was exempt under a provision of the FOI Act.
4. It is also difficult to determine whether the document does or does not fall within the scope of the request. The only glimmer is, as identified by the Commissioner, the subject line of the email.
5. I consider that the subject line of the email makes it more likely than not that the email would have fallen within the scope of the request. I do not consider that it is irrationally or absurdly so considered.
6. I shall accordingly order the release of the following emails:

(i) Email dated 8 August 2017 and timestamped 3.29pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 August 2017 and timestamped 8.00pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iv) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(v) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. Document 11 contains duplicate emails of the emails contained in Document 10. I shall accordingly release the following documents for the same reasons as articulated with respect to Document 10:

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the personal email address of the agency officer (duplicate of document 10(iii) with the same email date and time and I make the same findings in relation to it).

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. Document 12 once again contains duplicate emails of the emails contained in Document 10. I shall accordingly release the following documents for the same reasons as articulated with respect to Document 10:

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.36am minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. Prior to the hearing, the parties reached agreement with respect to Document 13.
2. Mr Rennie confirmed at the hearing that he no longer seeks access to:

(i) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.46am as relevant to Mr Rennie's request and not exempt.

1. I will not in those circumstances order its release.
2. In a Notice of Response under section 53A of the FOI Act, the individual named in documents 13(ii), (iii) and (iv) indicated their consent to the release of personal information and indicated that the Tribunal could release the information relating to "identity and/or personal affairs to the applicant and the public." Thereafter, the CFA no longer sought to claim any exemption in relation to Document 13(ii), (iii) and (iv). Accordingly, the following emails will be released:

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.41am.

(iii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender.

(iv) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am with the name of the recipient.

1. Document 14 contains duplicate emails of the emails contained in Document 13. I shall accordingly release the following documents for the same reasons as articulated with respect to Document 13.

(i) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender (duplicate of the document with the same date and time referred to in Document 13(iii)).

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am with the name of the recipient (duplicate the document with the same date and time referred to in Document 13(iv)).

1. The OVIC decision was to release the following:

(i) Email dated 5 July 2017 and timestamped 05.30pm (although the personal email address of the agency officer is exempt under section 33(1).

1. The Commissioner did not consider that the document was exempt under section 35(1)(b) of the FOI Act.
2. The CFA maintains that it is and now also relies on sections 30(1) and 33 of the FOI Act.
3. The CFA relied on the statement of Mr Dowie and drew my attention to the material provided under section 53A of the FOI Act.
4. The CFA produced submissions on the various exemptions under the FOI Act.
5. Neither the submissions nor the evidence however, tied directly back to the documents in dispute.
6. In relation to this document, I adopt and repeat the comments I made in relation to Document 10.
7. It is not enough to say that there are sensitivities at play within an organisation and invite a ruling that an exemption is made out for what on its surface appears to be an innocuous document.
8. I agree with the analysis of the Commissioner that the document reveals no more than an individual's recollection of events. I add that it expresses no opinion and does not appear to contain anything that would not be well known to Mr Rennie (or others, in terms of process). It has no ring of confidentiality. It does not have the tone of being prepared for the deliberative processes. In the circumstances, there is no basis upon which I could find that its disclosure would be contrary to the public interest or impair the ability of the agency to obtain similar information in the future or accept that its release would be contrary to the public interest.
9. I will order its release in full.

1. I will make the following findings and orders.
2. The Tribunal finds that the following documents are neither exempt from the FOI Act nor irrelevant to the request of the respondent.
3. Insofar as the applicant determined otherwise, the applicant's decision is set aside and varied to release the following to the respondent:

Document 4

(i) Email timestamped 5.24pm at point 1, word 17.

Document 7

(i) Email timestamped 3.11pm to the extent that it contains material already released to the respondent with respect to Document 6.

Document 9

(i) Email timestamped 12.23pm minus the mobile telephone number of the agency officer.

Document 10

(i) Email dated 8 August 2017 and timestamped 3.29pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 August 2017 and timestamped 8.00pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the email address of the agency officer.

(iv) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(v) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 11

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.35am minus the email address of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

(iii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 12.16pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 12

(i) Email dated 10 July 2017 and timestamped 10.36am minus the mobile telephone number of the agency officer.

(ii) Email dated 6 July 2017 and timestamped 5.32pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

Document 13

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.41am.

(iii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender.

(iv) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am.

Document 14

(i) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 11.34am including the name, position title, telephone, fax and email of the sender.

(ii) Email dated 15 May 2013 and timestamped 6.49am including the name of the recipient.

Document 15

(i) Email dated 5 July 2017 and timestamped 5.30pm minus the personal email address of the agency officer.

1. The Principal Registrar shall, if practicable, give notice of the order and reasons dated 18 May 2021 to the person(s) to whom the information relates in accordance with section 53A(3) of the FOI Act.

[1] See [4.10] of the CFA's Statement of Legal Contentions dated 25 August 2020 and repeated during oral submissions.

[2] Cowen v Monash University [2018] VCAT 694; United Firefighters Union of Australia - Victoria Branch v Country Fire Authority [2018] VCAT 630, [70]; United Firefighters Union of Australia - Victoria Branch v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board [2018] VCAT 631, [62]; Smeaton v Department of Premier and Cabinet [2018] VCAT 1672, [56] and Smeaton v Victorian WorkCover Authority [2018] VCAT 914, [41].

[3] See for example Tucker v Commissioner of State Revenue [2019] VCAT 2018; Shore v Western Health [2019] VCAT 1038; Wellington v Surf Coast Shire [2019] VCAT 1811; Chopra v Department of Education [2019] VCAT 1941; Marke v Victoria Police [2020] VCAT 557.

[4] By correspondence dated 6 December 2018, Mr Rennie was asked to provide a clearer understanding of what he meant by "all correspondence relating to my service with CFA". The letter then said:

To assist, information you could provide includes details such as:

- Or do you just want the details about your service history?