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• Clarecastle 27According to Mr Kassem's affidavit of 31 March 2010 affirmed in the Clarecastle Leave proceedings, the principal purpose of Clarecastle (incorporated in 1999) was to engage in tax effective investments ([7])). Mr Kassem deposes that his enquiries have revealed that the principal reason it was placed into external administration in 2007 was that the company had invested in a number of investment schemes (for the purposes of creating tax losses in order to minimise tax obligations of related entities that were consolidated with the company for tax purposes) that "lost their tax status" following audits undertaken by the ATO (as communicated by the ATO in February and May 2007), whereupon the commercial purpose of the company ceased. 28Mr Kassem has expressed the view, based on the company's financial records, that Clarecastle was insolvent on and from 30 June 2005. (Pausing there, it is noted by Mr Pritchard that there is no suggestion that the company was insolvent at the time of entry into the Scotch Whisky transaction or became insolvent by reason of entry into that transaction - therefore making any claim based on this as an insolvent transaction difficult to maintain in circumstances where Mr Kassem acknowledged in cross-examination that there was no reason to suspect that the 2001 transaction was for the purpose of defeating creditors (T.33) but was assumed to be for tax minimisation purposes. 29The two Clarecastle transactions on which focus has been placed (and which, as at the time the extension application was made Mr Kassem wished further to investigate) are the entry by Clarecastle in 2001 into the Scotch Whisky scheme (recently the subject of investigation by regulatory and other authorities and now the subject of criminal proceedings) and the assignment in 2006 by Clarecastle to Jasmic of an equity interest in the "Windsor Village partnership".
• Ladycare 30As for Ladycare (incorporated in 1990), Mr Kassem has deposed, in his affidavit of 31 March 2010 affirmed in the Ladycare Leave proceedings, that it operated a business of washroom sanitation services and that, following the issue in September 2005 by the ATO of a notice of amended assessment relating to the company's tax return for the financial year ended 30 June 1999 (in the sum of $1,346,591.95, which remains unpaid), transactions were undertaken between July and December 2006 (characterised by Mr Harper as asset stripping) by which the assets of the business were transferred to related parties (see [10] -[14] of Mr Kassem's affidavit). 31The transfer of assets followed the provision of advice to Mr and Mrs Shea by a New Zealand investment bank, HQZ Argentum. (A business of the same kind as that operated by Ladycare is now being conducted by a company incorporated on 6 March 2007 (after Ladycare had changed its name to its current name), the new company being Lady Care Services Pty Ltd (run by Mr and Mrs Shea's son) leading to the conclusion by Mr Kassem that the restructuring of Ladycare's assets and business was part of a calculated "Phoenix transaction". 32Mr Kassem has set out, in his 31 March 2010 affidavit in the Ladycare Leave proceedings, the various transactions that he considers to be voidable transactions involving that company. Those are: first, the transfers to other related entities, recorded by way of journal entries, on 30 June 2006 of loan accounts otherwise repayable to the company - being transfers to Jasmic, the Shea Group Trading Trust and the LCS Admin Unit Trust; second, the write-off, again by journal entry, on 30 June 2006 of the balances of related party loan accounts - including the write-off of sums due from LCS Administration Unit Trust, LC Washroom Pty Ltd, Clarecastle and Jasmic - together with the payment of a cash sum of $1,086,516 to Jasmic on 31 December 2006; and third, the payment to Ladycare of the sum of $1.15m by Jasmic on 29 May 2006, which sum was "expensed" as a management and indemnity fee and credited to the loan account of the Shea Group Trading Trust on 30 June 2006. Some, at least, of those transactions are already encompassed in the claims brought in the Jasmic proceedings (namely, the write off of the loan of $352,788 owing by Jasmic and the payment to Jasmic of the sum of $1,086,516). 33Mr Kassem has deposed that, based upon his review of the company's records, Ladycare became insolvent on or around 30 June 2006 as a result of entering into the alleged voidable transactions.
• Appointment of liquidators 34Clarecastle and Ladycare were both placed in liquidation on 5 April 2007, less than a year after the various transactions of which complaint is presently made in the three specific proceedings occurred. (The Scotch Whisky transaction, which is not presently the subject of any proceedings but was the focus of the recent examinations by the liquidators, took place much earlier - in 2001.) 35Mr Kassem (or a member of his firm) was initially approached to act as the liquidator of the companies by the accountant then acting for the companies (Mr Michael Roy) (T 34.4). Mr Kassem said in the witness box that he did not recall meeting Mr and Mrs Shea until towards the end of 2009 (T34.33), therefore quite some time after his appointment as liquidator on 5 April 2007. He confirmed that there was a meeting of the companies' members at which the appointment of liquidators to the companies was approved and the appointment was then confirmed at a meeting of creditors on that day (T 35.17). Mr Ozem Kassem and Mr Deryk Andrew were appointed joint liquidators on that day. Mr Bruno Secatore was subsequently appointed as joint liquidator in place of Mr Kassem on 20 March 2008.
• Investigations by liquidators 36Mr Kassem says that he was provided with some limited documents in relation to the companies on 22 March 2007 (i.e. prior to his appointment). By letter dated 11 April 2007, he wrote to Mr Roy, referring to his appointment as joint liquidator of the companies, enclosing a schedule of the companies' records that had been delivered to the office on 22 March 2007 (being draft financial statements for the period ending 30 June 2006/31 December 2006, respectively, as well as correspondence from the ATO and, in the case of Ladycare, 4 creditors' statements) and asking Mr Roy to advise if he was in possession of any further books and records of the companies. A letter in identical terms was sent on the same day to Mr Shea. Mr Kassem seemed to accept that this was a standard form letter seeking to gather in all the records of the companies (T 35.11). There is nothing to suggest what response there was to that letter or, conversely, any attempt by the liquidators to follow up that request. 37The next written communication with either Mr or Mrs Shea (or, for that matter, Mr Roy) on the part of the liquidators appears to have been in October 2009 when Mr Kassem wrote separately to each of Mr and Mrs Shea (on 23 October 2009) in relation to the liquidation of Ladycare, making a formal demand pursuant to s 530A(1) of the Corporations Act that each furnish all records in their possession or under their control in accordance with an attached Notice to Deliver Books of the Company to the Liquidator (or advise of their present location). (A similar letter and Notice was sent to Mr Roy.) Similar demands were issued in relation to Clarecastle including notices issued at this time to some of those involved in the Scotch Whisky transaction - Chambers Finance Limited, the financier, and Mr Patrick McCarthy of Grant McKenzie Pty Limited, the entity involved in the management of the scheme on behalf of the investors. 38In the witness box, Mr Kassem said that he did not think there was any written correspondence prior to October 2009 with Mr or Mrs Shea or Mr Roy in relation to Clarecastle (T.36.8) or Ladycare (T 36.15), but would have expected some correspondence to have been sent at about the time that Mr Hutchins took carriage of the file from about September/October 2009 (T 36.42). Mr Kassem did not dispute that no such correspondence (other than the 23 October letter) was exhibited to his affidavits in the respective Leave proceedings (T 37.9). He said that he suspected that Mr Hutchins would have made "the demand" (by which I understood him to be referring to a demand for company records akin to the letter of 23 October 2009) verbally, by telephone or in person, because there had been a number of meetings with Mr Roy from late 2009 (T 37.19). Mr Kassem also said that "the usual response was that there are no further records" (T 37.23) but acknowledged that he had not set out any conversations to that effect in his affidavits (and, indeed, it does not appear that Mr Kassem had the primary carriage of investigations into these matters at the time and therefore any such 'response', unless in writing, would most likely have been made to members of Mr Kassem's staff not to Mr Kassem himself). 39In the meantime, between April 2007 and October 2009, it seems that there was some communication by the liquidators in relation to Clarecastle's entry into the Scotch Whisky transaction with Chambers Finance Limited (the entity noted in Clarecastle's books as a creditor of the company in relation to the Scotch Whisky scheme). 40By letter dated 1 May 2007 information was sought from Chambers Finance in relation to the transaction. 41Mr Kassem accepted in the witness box that nothing in his affidavit disclosed any communications with Chambers Finance in the period 1 May 2007 and 5 March 2009 (T 54.30/35). However, tendered by Mr Castle was a bundle of correspondence (Exhibit 1) that comprises some communications during that time. In particular it appears that Mr Speirs, a director of Chambers Finance, responded to the liquidators' initial query by letter dated 9 July 2007. In that letter (which raises no objection to answering the request for information), Mr Speirs explains the delay in responding as due to the fact that the address to which the letter was sent was no longer current. He then provides certain information as to the loan documentation entered into by Clarecastle in 2000 and 2001 (noting that various documents had been seized in the criminal investigation) and of the whisky secured by the loan documentation. The letter concludes co-operatively with the statement that "You, or Mr Francipane are welcome to email me directly if there is anything further I can clarify". (Mr Francipane was the accountant in Mr Kassem's office with carriage of the investigation at that point.) 42On 17 September 2007, in a letter also forming part of Exhibit 1, Mr Francipane seems to have taken up that invitation and emailed to Mr Speirs a further request for information (seeking clarification as to whether it was expected that any of the stocks in the whisky pools in which Clarecastle had invested would be sold that year and as to the volume of alcohol contained in a hogshead). Mr Speirs responded by letter on that same day, providing the information requested and asking Mr Francipane to let him know if there was anything further he required and if he wished to have anything clarified (again, hardly an unco-operative stance). (Reliance on the information so provided seems later to have been placed by the liquidators in the preparation of their 12 May 2010 report to creditors insofar as that report gives a detailed account of how much alcohol a hogshead of whisky normally contains that was seemingly derived from Mr Speir's response). 43Mr Castle relies on the above correspondence as gainsaying the suggestion that there was no cooperation given to the liquidators in relation to their investigation into the Scotch Whisky transaction (and Mr Pritchard supported the tender of the correspondence in Exhibit 1 also for that purpose). 44Nothing further seems to have been raised with Chambers Finance until 5 March 2009 when Mr Kassem wrote again to Chambers Finance requesting information as to the stock of whisky held by the company, its location, the estimated time that it is likely to be realised and the estimated sale proceeds. Mr Kassem says that he received no response to this query (but again there is no suggestion that the liquidators pressed at the time for a response). 45For the period from April 2007 until at least June 2008, Mr Sam Francipane had the day to day conduct of the respective liquidations within the liquidators' office. It does not appear that he performed any work on either of those matters from June 2008. From October 2009, work on the matters was carried out by Mr Hutchins. 46Tendered as Exhibit 2 were copies of the Cor Cordis time records in relation to both liquidations, itemising the time spent on the matter over that period. 47The Clarecastle time sheets show a number of time entries for Mr Francipane from 5 April 2007 (the date of the appointment of liquidators) through to February 2008 but followed by only one entry for Mr Francipane thereafter (review issues re whisky stock) on 2 June 2008. The Clarecastle entries focus in the main on the Whisky transaction. On the Ladycare timesheets, Mr Francipane's time entries again start from 5 April 2007 and go through to 11 January 2008 (with an entry on 2 June 2008 "review issues of whiskey stock 1.5 hours" - seemingly an incorrect file entry). For Ladycare, the time entries seem to relate largely to dealings with directors; dealing with accountant; meeting (3/5/2007) with accountant; review documents in relation to commercial bond; and then on an application to the AAT and litigation in the County Court of Victoria. 48Without adjustment to take into account what seems (from the narrative description on the Ladycare timesheets) to be some wrong attribution of time as between the respective files, it appears that the time spent by Mr Francipane on the two matters (Clarecastle and Ladycare) was in the order of 22.5 and 20.5 hours respectively up to June 2008 (and none thereafter) and that Mr Kassem spent very little, if any, time on the matter in that period (nor, for that matter, did either Mr Andrew or Mr Secatore). 49Mr Hutchins commenced work as a consultant with Cor Cordis from about June 2009. The arrangement on which he was retained at that time was that he was remunerated by way of a percentage of recoveries on matters on which he worked (though from about October 2009 this changed and he was put on a monthly retainer). He explained in his affidavit that he reviewed dormant files but says he also acted on some funded matters. Although he commenced work in June 2009, the first time recorded by Mr Hutchins in relation to the Clarecastle or Ladycare matters was from October 2009. 50From a review of the Clarecastle time records, Mr Hutchins' first entry was 8 October 2009 - 5 hours (review books and records/prepare email for accountant and search for valuation of whisky data points), followed by 4 hours (investigations) on 13 October 2009, and then 1.5 hours on 20 October 2009 (issue of notices/undertaking investigations/review financials and company searches). From 6 November 2009 there were numerous time entries for Mr Hutchins in relation to the matter, including for 6 November 2009 (meeting with accountant Michael Roy and preparation for meeting - 1.5 hours). Other members of the office also recorded time in January and February 2010 as referable to the whisky investigation. (On 7 February 2010, there is an entry for Mr Hutchins - 1.5 hours prepare instructions for lawyers, that being the first reference to the involvement of lawyers.) 51For Ladycare, Mr Hutchins' time entries commence two days earlier on 6 October 2009 with 3 hours (review books and records/discussion with Michael Roy); 5 hours on 7 October 2009 (review books and records/undertake searches/discuss further information requirements with Michael Roy/ prepare investigation notes for follow up), with some 14 hours in total in October 2009 relating to investigations and the issue of statutory notices; and then discussions on 16 November 2009 with Mr Roy and Mr Francipane and a total of 31 hours reviewing financial records and account reconstruction in November 2009. On 3 December 2009 there is an entry for 3 hours recorded as "preparation note and analysis for Mr Kassem and meeting with Sam [Francipane] and previous advisor [who I assume to be Mr Russell from HQZ, since had it been a reference to Mr Roy it would be consistent with other entries for his name to have been used]". 52The above analysis of the time sheets mirrors what the documents show was taking place at that time. On 8 October 2009, Mr Hutchins sent an email to Mr Roy in relation to both companies, setting out what he described as "obvious" information required to complete his investigation and indicating that additional queries would likely flow from this. That email followed an earlier email the day before, in turn referring to a discussion on 6 October 2009, in which Mr Hutchins suggested that Mr Roy hold off sending additional records as Mr Hutchins had "located some books and records". 53On 9 October 2009, Mr Hutchins sent an email to Chambers Finance and to Mr McCarthy seeking information in relation to the whisky ventures, from which again it seems that Mr Hutchins had either met or spoken with Mr McCarthy earlier that day (since he expressed appreciation for Mr McCarthy's time, stating that "it was a useful start in developing an appreciation of the past and current status quo of the whisky venture"). 54Accordingly, it seems reasonable to infer that Mr Hutchins (having started to take steps in the matter only in early October) was at that stage trying to ascertain what information the liquidators already had and what further information might be required. In the witness box Mr Hutchins said that he had spoken with Mr Francipane when he started reviewing the matter, but the latter did not recall much. 55From October 2009 through to around March 2010, Mr Hutchins met or spoke with Mr Roy on a number of occasions, with Mr McCarthy on one occasion and, in March 2010, with Mr Roy and a representative from HQZ (Mr Russell). 56As noted earlier, formal notices to produce documents were issued to Mr and Mrs Shea and Mr Roy on 23 October 2009 and on that date notices were also issued to Mr McCarthy and Mr Speirs (of Chambers Finance) pursuant to s 530B(4) of the Act for production of documents relating to the scotch whisky transaction. (In relation to the latter, Atanaskovic Hartnell responded by letter dated 30 October 2009 on behalf of Chambers Finance denying that the liquidator was entitled to the documents because they were records of Chambers Finance and not books of the company as defined by Austin J in Hall v Sherman [2001] NSWSC 810 at [47]). 57The steps taken in issuing the formal notices to produce documents seem to have been as part of a standard procedure to obtain all relevant documents and not as a response to a perceived lack of co-operation at that date. In the witness box, Mr Hutchins did not suggest a lack of co-operation at that stage. 58There is also in evidence a copy of a one page typed bullet point document (p 257 CB) that Mr Kassem says (at [17] of his September affidavit) was provided by Mr Roy during the course of the investigations and which appears to be a summary of the Ladycare Services business and the circumstances in which it was transferred or taken over by a company associated with Mr Shea's son. (I note that filed in court on 29 June 2011 were affidavits from the respective solicitors, Mr Rollins and Mr Spinks, in which issue was taken as to various matters in relation to the provision of discovery but in the course of which Mr Spinks deposes to his recollection being that this bullet point document had been provided in the course of a discussion he thought had been on a without prejudice basis.) 59This document suggests that there was some dissatisfaction on the part of Mr Shea with Mr Carmona's performance as CEO; refers to the decision by Mr Shea's son to take over the business that his father due to his health was unable to continue; to the estate planning and business transition advice sought by the Shea family in December 2005 from HQZ Argentum; to the recommendation by the latter that a trading and a holdings trust be established; to the establishment of such trusts; and to the commencement of trading in Shea Group Trading Trust and cessation of trading in Ladycare Services in accordance with HQZ's advice in March 2006. 60The document states that there was no goodwill in Ladycare as the contracts were on a month-to-month basis and the company was unable to comply with existing contracts. Non-current assets were said to have been transferred in accordance with a valuation provided. 61Mr Carmona's affidavit places in issue a number of the factual statements contained in this document. 62There was a suggestion that this had in some way (intentionally or otherwise) misled the liquidators as to the transactions in question (and a different version of events was proffered by Mr Carmona in his recent affidavit). However, there is nothing on the part of the liquidators to say that, but for the information so provided, they would have taken a different course in the investigation of the Ladycare business and affairs. It seems to me that what this reflects is simply that there is a very different view as between the Shea interests and the liquidators as to the construction to be placed on the events that occurred at the time of the company restructuring. 63By early 2010 it appears that Mr Kassem had formed the view, based on Mr Hutchins' investigations, that there were transactions that appeared to be voidable against the liquidators from which a recovery for creditors might be obtained (49 cents in the dollar estimated for the Clarecastle matter and 100 cents in the dollar for Ladycare). 64By letter dated 28 January 2010, Mr Kassem wrote to Mr Roy in relation to Ladycare, referring to a number of transactions between June 2006 and December 2006 which were deemed to be voidable against the liquidators; outlining the liquidators' observations and conclusions in that regard and providing an opportunity for information to be provided as to why proceedings should not immediately be commenced in relation to those claims. The identified voidable transactions included the write-off of related party loans; the management and indemnity fee; the payment of a dividend by Jasmic; the transfer of cash at bank to Shea Group Trading Trust and Jasmic in December and a bond premium paid to the former also in December. The second claim referred to in that letter was in relation to the transfer of the Ladycare business between June and December 2006. 65On 11 February 2010, Mr Kassem wrote to Mr Roy in relation to Clarecastle, in similar fashion to the letter that had been sent in relation to Ladycare, outlining the position following the liquidators' review and asserting that the assignment transaction entered into on 7 July 2006 between Clarecastle and Jasmic in relation to the Windsor Village Partnership investment was a deemed voidable transaction and affording an opportunity for information to be provided as to why there should not be proceedings in relation to the transaction. (There was no reference in this letter to the Scotch Whisky transaction.) 66The thrust of both those letters suggested that the liquidators were then in a position to commence proceedings in relation to the alleged voidable transactions so identified. 67On 18 March 2010, Mr Hutchins sent an email to Mr Roy referring to a meeting on 9 March 2010 in relation to both matters and seeking further information "to assist in the ongoing investigation enquiries". It was put to Mr Kassem in cross-examination that this was the first occasion when information in relation to the Scotch Whisky scheme was sought (at least in writing) from Mr Roy and Mr Kassem accepted that this was the case (T 39.39). 68The above chronology is relevant when it comes to assessing the complaints made by Mr Kassem and Mr Hutchins as to the lack of co-operation or assistance in the course of their investigation of the companies' affairs. 69Mr Pritchard notes that Mr Kassem claims that, as at September 2010, more than 843 hours had been committed to investigating the affairs of Ladycare (which, on Mr Pritchard's calculations and assuming a 40 hour week, would amount to 21 weeks' work on Ladycare). A similar calculation for investigations into Clarecastle as at the date of the filing of the application would convert the 490 hours said to have been spent by the liquidators to12 weeks. 70By contrast, Mr Pritchard points to the time records that show very little time spent for over 2 years from the commencement of the liquidation (somewhere in the order of 42 hours). (The submission by Mr Pritchard was that the liquidators have had the resources and capacity to act in a substantial manner when it suits but otherwise were prepared to do very little.) 71Mr Kassem, in his 24 September 2010 affidavits in the respective proceedings says that since his appointment he has been provided with very limited books and records and that he has not received a satisfactory response to the demands issued. As a result of the lack of information he says that he was unable to progress his investigations into the affairs of the companies. 72In paragraph [14] of his September affidavit in the Clarecastle Leave proceedings, Mr Kassem refers back to [55] to [70] of his March affidavit, in which he deposes to a belief that he was not provided with all the information in relation to the assignment of the interest in the Windsor Village partnership as he would expect there to be more source documents [35]; says that the only material received from Mr Shea and Mr Roy were the company's general journals for the period ending 30 June 2005 and 2006; financial statements for those years; financial statements for the Windsor Village partnership for 1999 to 2002 and a deed of assignment 7 July 2006; and asserts at [71] that he has reached the conclusion that Mr Shea or Mr Roy have in their possession further records of the company and are deliberately withholding documents from him "because of their failure to respond to my notices and the limited records provided to date". 73In other words, Mr Kassem's complaint of lack of co-operation in production of documents is predicated on his assumption that Mr Shea and Mr Roy must hold further documents. 74A similar assertion is made at [72] in relation to Mr McCarthy, namely that he failed to provide any documentation or assistance to substantiate his claims. At [73], Mr Kassem deposes that no information was provided to his office by Chambers Finance following the request made of Chambers Finance. (He does not, however, refer to the earlier correspondence in which information was provided on request.) In his 24 September affidavit at [7], Mr Kassem says: "I am further advised [by Mr Hutchins] that CFL [Chambers Finance] has provided no assistance except to confirm that there is an alleged debt owing by the Company in respect of the purported loan". He deposes that there was no written response to the letter dated 5 March 2009 to Chambers Finance and that he is advised that Mr Speirs has continued to direct him to make enquiries with Grant McKenzie. At [8] of that second affidavit, read only as to the witness' belief, Mr Kassem asserts that it appears that Mr McCarthy "has no intention of cooperating with my investigations into this transaction". 75Again, Mr Kassem's complaint as to lack of co-operation in this regard assumes the existence of documents and a refusal to produce them. (In Mr Kassem's second affidavits in the respective proceedings he sets out documents he would expect to be in existence given the nature of the investments.) 76At [76] of Mr Kassem's first affidavit in the Clarecastle leave proceedings he deposes that his investigation has been far from satisfactory to date "considering the complexities involved with each transaction and the lack of co-operation from Mr Shea, Mr Roy and parties in connection with the investment schemes outlined in this affidavit". Similar complaint is made in [31] of his affidavit in the Ladycare Leave proceedings. 77In his affidavits in support of the respective extension applications, Mr Kassem bases his application for an extension of time on two matters - the perceived lack of cooperation with his investigation to date and the nature and complexity of the issues involved ([82] in the Clarecastle affidavit, [76] in the Ladycare affidavit). Mr Kassem sought at least 18 months to complete the Clarecastle investigation (12 months in the Ladycare case), obtain legal advice on evidence and alleged voidable transactions, determine whether there are any possible causes of action and to commence appropriate proceedings against the parties concerned. 78At some stage in early 2010 (or perhaps late 2009) Mr Kassem approached solicitors to act on a speculative basis in relation to the commencement of proceedings. (In the witness box Mr Kassem said that he had approached solicitors in late 2009 or early 2010 but the time sheets suggest that instructions for the solicitors were not prepared until early 2010.) 79On 12 May 2010, the liquidators reported to the creditors of the respective companies referring to "detailed investigations in relation to the company from a combination of books and records of the company and third party information sources". (For Ladycare alone the costs for time spent were $233,974.50, including about $130,0000.00 on various investigations). 80Though the creditors of Clarecastle were noted in Mr Kassem's affidavit as being Ladycare ($538,205); Chambers Finance ($1,426,650); Jasmic ($22,788); and the ATO and Mr Shea (both for unknown amounts), Mr Pritchard contends that in fact the only 'real' creditor of Clarecastle is Jasmic (on the basis, as I understand it, that a proof of debt had not been noted as having been lodged for Ladycare and that the Chambers Finance debt was secured over the whisky). (Mr Castle referred me to the loan documentation that suggests, contrary to what had been put to and accepted by Mr Kassem in cross-examination on 6 May 2011, that the loan in relation to the Scotch Whisky investment is not a limited recourse loan. The report to creditors notes from the liquidators' review of the agreement indicates that security for the loan appears to be limited to a legal mortgage over the scotch whisky investment.) 81The report to creditors as at May 2010 identified the claims under investigation as the Windsor Village partnership claim and the Scotch Whisky claim (the latter not suggested to be a voidable transaction claim). 82As to the position with Ladycare, the largest creditor (as noted in the report to creditors) is the ATO. The ATO had, on 14 September 2005, issued a notice of amended assessment in relation to the company's tax return for the 1998/9 financial year resulting in a liability to the ATO of over $1.3 million. The ATO claims to be owed $1,440,975.77.
• Proposed Ladycare proceedings 83I note that when the matter was before me in June 2011, the liquidators had put on evidence as to the particular transactions in respect of which they wish to make voidable transaction claims - as set out in a draft statement of claim annexed to the 29 June 2011 affidavit of Mr Tannous. 84In that regard it is relevant to note that the only s 588FF claim identified against the Jasmic parties in that draft pleading (ignoring a typographical error in the paragraph numbering in the draft Statement of Claim) relates to a payment by Ladycare on 3 August 2006 of $623,252 to Jasmic (said to be a voidable transaction because it was entered into during the 2 years ending on the relation-back day) that was an uncommercial transaction and was an insolvent transaction [57] or [58] was voidable pursuant to s 588FF(4) or (5) or was with intent to defraud creditors. 85Otherwise the draft pleading makes a series of allegations in relation to transactions to which other entities (albeit connected or associated with Mr and/or Mrs Shea or the Shea group) are involved (none of those entities, as I understand it, having been given notice of the present application). 86Briefly, those voidable transaction claims are as follows:
• In Part D of the draft pleading, a transaction involving Waltlo Pty Ltd (a company of which Mr and Mrs Shea are said to be sole directors) - it is alleged that it owed Ladycare the sum of $2,646,839 and interest, which was purported to be written off 30 June 2006;
• In Part E of the draft pleading, a transaction involving LCS IT (of which Mr and Mrs Shea are directors and which is a party to the LCS IT proceedings) in its capacity as trustee of the Victoria Unit Trust - in relation to the sum of $136,636 allegedly owed to Ladycare as at 30 June 2005 and written off 30 June 2006;
• In Part G of the draft pleading, a transaction involving Tama Pty Limited (a company of which Mr and Mrs Shea's son is the sole director) as trustee of the Tamarama Unit Trust - in relation to the sum of $474,749 said to have been owed as at 30 June 2005 and written off on 30 June 2006;
• In Part H of the draft pleading, a claim in relation to various transactions recorded in the journals of the company - the commitment on the part of Ladycare to pay a management and service fee of $1.15m to Australian Custodians Ltd and Providential Trustees Limited as trustees of the Shea Group Trading Trust to pay a management and service fee (a letter of 17 May 2006 seeking payment from Ladycare in respect of that claim being said to be part of the 'scheme'); the credit of an amount to the loan account of Shea Group Management Trust on 30 June 2006 ; and then on 3 August 2006, the payments by Ladycare to Tama of $424,051 and to Jasmic of $623,252; the making of journal entries on 31 December 2006 whereby those transactions were allocated to the loan account of Jasmic and Ladycare transferred $1,086,516 in purported discharge of its liability to Jasmic, on which date Ladycare transferred $78,095 to the Shea Group Trading Trust);
• In Part I of the draft pleading, the Ladycare dividend in favour of LCSIT OF $270,000 (that being the subject of a claim in the LCSIT proceedings); and
• In Part P of the draft pleading a claim against Enviro LCS (a company incorporated on 29 May 2006 with Mr and Mrs Shea as its directors and members), which is said to have received the benefit of transferred assets from Ladycare with the knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty but is alternatively pleaded as a voidable transaction. 87Each of the above transactions is said to be an insolvent and uncommercial transaction and voidable pursuant to s 588FE(3) or alternatively (4) or (5). Orders are sought pursuant to s588FF and otherwise (including under s 37A Conveyancing Act, setting aside the transactions). Breaches of statutory, common law and fiduciary duties are alleged. Equitable compensation or a declaration that assets are held on trust is sought (as well as a further extension to commence proceedings to 5 February 2012). (I note that at least the dividend claim in Part I and the transaction the subject of Part H involving a payment to Jasmic in December 2006 of $1,086,516 already appear to be part of the claims made in the proceedings on foot and for which leave under s 588(3)(b) would not be necessary. Insofar as the August 2006 payment of $623,252 is a part of that overall transaction, it might be thought to be encompassed by the existing claim in the Jasmic proceedings or a potential amendment to that claim.) 88The draft Statement of Claim also contains other allegations for which an extension of time under s 588FF(3)(b) would not be necessary and has not been sought:
• In Part F of the draft pleading, a claim against LCS in its own right for the sum of $8,204 as a debt or under contract (based on the amount disclosed in the company accounts) or as money had and received and/or pursuant to a restitutionary claim;
• In Part J of the draft pleading, claims against Mr and Mrs Shea as directors of Ladycare for breach of their duties as directors (statutory, common law, fiduciary) not to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or to cause detriment to the company;
• In Part K of the draft pleading, a claim in relation to the transfer of fixed assets to Enviro LCS (it being said that the Ladycare directors took no steps to cause Enviro to pay the purchase price or to obtain security for the payment of the purchase price, in breach of their duties as directors);
• In Part L of the draft pleading, a claim in relation to the transfer of other assets (goodwill and benefit of contracts) to Enviro LCS for no consideration, again said to be in breach of directors' duties;
• In Part M of the draft pleading, a claim that the rejection of an offer to purchase the business of Ladycare, was in breach of their duties as directors (seemingly based on Mr Carmona's evidence although that referred only to indicative offers, as I read his affidavit);
• In Part N of the draft pleading, that the declaration of the dividend in the sum of $270,000 and dissipation of Ladycare's assets was in breach of their duties as directors;
• In Part O of the draft pleading, that in relation to loans to related parties and the compromise or discharge of debts owed by Waltlo, LCS as trustee for Victoria Unit Trust, LCS in its own right and Tama as trustee of Tamarama Unit Trust, the directors of Ladycare were in breach of directors' duties. 89As pointed out by Mr Pritchard, insofar as the draft pleading includes claims otherwise than voidable transactions with a standard 6 year limitation period (such as the claims under s 37A of the Conveyancing Act and directors' duty claims), no leave is required or, at the most, leave is required to amend in respect of pleadings already on foot in accordance with orthodox principles. In that regard, it has been said that s 588FF(1) operates to the exclusion of the general power in s 1322(4)(d) of the Corporations Act but does not exclude the operation of court rules which would allow the amendment of proceedings to include additional transactions ( Rodgers v Commissioner of Taxation (1998) 88 FCR 61; Davies v Chicago Boot Co Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 96 SASR 164). 90Mr Harper submits that there has been a clear identification of the alleged voidable transactions (referring to [16] of Mr Kassem's 31 March affidavit) and notes that there is a commonality (at least in most cases) of Mr and Mrs Shea as directors and/or shareholders of the relevant entities proposed to be the subject of the claims contained in the draft pleading. 91With the above factual background in mind, I turn to the issues for determination. (i) Correctness of Brown 92For the reasons adverted to earlier, this is not an issue for determination in this Court, given that the decision of the Court of Appeal is binding on me. However, I note the submissions that were made, particularly in the context that it is suggested there is some ambiguity in the reasoning in Brown . 93Mr Pritchard submits that the subject leave applications seek ' blanket' extensions (the orders not being confined to a specific transaction or defendant), and that such a blanket extension of time application cannot validly be made. In that respect, the Jasmic parties do not accept the correctness of the Court of Appeal's decision in Brown. 94In Brown , an application had been made pursuant to s 588FF(3) for an order in terms that "the period prescribed by s588(3)(b) of the Corporations Law within which any application in respect to voidable transactions of [the company in liquidation] under s 588FF be extended to [a specified date]" . At first instance ( Brown v DML Resources Pty Ltd (2001) 52 NSWLR 685 at [693] - [694]), Austin J considered a submission that s 588FF(3) did not permit the making of a general order for an extension of time to make an application under s 588FF(1) against any creditor. It was submitted that the application must be made with respect to a specific person and a specific transaction. Austin J at [33] said: In my opinion the applicants' submission places an unduly restrictive interpretation on s 588FF(3). The statutory language does not literally require the construction that they advance. It is true that subs (1) speaks of a particular application concerning a single transaction, and the opening words of subs (3) refer to the specific application identified by subs (1). But subs (3) refers to the application under subs (1) only in order to say that such an application must be made within the period of time that subs (3) sets. Subsection (3) does not say, as it might readily have said if the applicants' contention were correct, that the application under subs (1) may only be made within a longer period than three years if the Court allows that application to be brought later. Instead, it sets the time limit for making an application under subs (1) as three years after the relation-back day, or such longer period as the Court orders on an application under subs (3) - that is a different application whose purpose is only to extend the time period. Consistently with the wording of subs (3), the application to extend the time limit can be an application to extend the time limit within which a particular subs (1) application can be made, or a broader application that applies to the particular subs (1) application under consideration and to other applications as well. I see no reason why the other applications cannot be described by category rather than in specific terms, provided that the description is clear. 95Before the appeal from his Honour's decision was determined, a similar issue came to be considered in the Queensland Court of Appeal in Greig & Duff as Liquidators of Australian Building Industries P/L (in Liq) v Australian Building Industries P/L (in Liq) & Anor [2003] QCA 298. There, Jerrard JA said (at p 1585, [111]): I agree with the view expressed by Williams JA that s 588FF(3) does not, as a general rule , authorise blanket applications made ex parte without any identification in the application (or order made) of any person or persons against whom an application may ultimately be made for any one of the variety of orders provided for in s 588FF(1)(a) - (j). (my emphasis) ... It seems incongruous that s 588FF(3) should be construed as allowing a (necessarily very specific) "application under subs (1)" to be made within such extended period as the Court orders, on an application brought ex parte in the broadest possible terms. Instead, s 588FF(3) will be construed more consistently with the particularity required in s 588FF(1) if s 588FF(3) is construed to require that any foreshadowed "application under subs (1)", for the bringing of which an extension of time is sought, should itself be described in the application made "under this paragraph" for that extension. 96Williams JA had said at [45]: Those arguments highlight a number of criticisms made above of the reasoning of Austin J in Brown No 2 . The answer, in my respectful view, is not to say that no creditor need be served with the application for an extension of time, but rather that any creditor sued outside the three year limitation period must have been made a party to the application for an order extending time. Surely any liquidator doing his or her job competently would at least be able to say towards the end of the three year limitation period what transactions might be challenged. Austin J in Brown No 2 at 694 referred to the situation which existed in Green v Chiswell as indicating that in some situations the liquidator may not be in the position to do that. I doubt, however, that that would be so in the circumstances which arose in Green v Chiswell . There the relation back day was 1 May 1996 when administrators of the company were appointed. Then those administrators were appointed liquidators on 21 January 1999 only a couple of months before the three year limitation period expired. But surely in such a situation, particularly where there was an identity between the administrators and liquidators, it would be known within the three year period what transactions were suspect. That would clearly be a case where an extension would be granted, but the creditors affected thereby would have to be served with the application and given the opportunity of making submissions as to why such an extension should not be granted . (my emphasis) 97On appeal, in Brown , Spigelman CJ said at [170] - [173] that: [170] The power to extend the time limit for commencing proceedings is intended to provide for the circumstance in which a liquidator is not in a position to commence proceedings within three years of the relation-back day, for whatever reason, subject to the assessment of the Court of all relevant circumstances, including the liquidator's conduct. It is not difficult to envisage a circumstance in which a liquidator is still ascertaining the identity of the recipients of benefits under possible voidable transactions and cannot give the Court an indication of the creditors to be targeted. The power should be broad enough to allow, in those circumstances, for an order granting an extension of time in general terms. [171] The requirement of commercial certainty on the part of those who have had past dealings with the corporation is to be balanced against the conflicting interest of the creditors of the company. The Court, through the discretions it exercises under s588FF(3) and s588FF(1), is in a position to control unwarranted delay by liquidators. Subject to reasonable expedition on the part of a liquidator, and to adopt the reasoning of Doyle CJ in Pegulan Floor Coverings Pty Ltd v Carter (1997) 24 ACSR 651 at 659, the creditors are entitled to: "... the benefit of having the affairs of an insolvent company properly investigated and administered in an orderly fashion in terms of the provisions of the law." [172] Such an orderly administration is one of the underlying purposes of the legislation. Pursuant to s5C of the Act and s15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, the Court must prefer a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act. The purpose or object of orderly liquidation is best served by recognising that diligent liquidators may not be able to identify a full list of targets for applications under s588FF(1) within the three year period specified in s588FF(3). [173] There is nothing in the words of s588FF(3)(b) which ties the character of the extension application to the specificity of what is required in an originating process for an order under s588FF(1). For the reasons I have mentioned, it is not appropriate to construe the section as if it did do so. 98Later in his Honour's judgment, his Honour considered the import of Greig and said (in a paragraph as to which Mr Pritchard submits there is some ambiguity) (at [200]): I have concluded above that the court does have power to grant an extension of time in general terms by specification of categories. I have left open the issue of the right of persons, who are not targeted or even identified at the time of the application, to move the court to set aside the order extending time. Some of the reasoning in Greig approaches the issue in a different way. 99The starting point for Mr Pritchard's submission in this regard is that, in Brown , the primary point of the appeal was the interpretation of s 1332(4)(d) (not 588FF(3)), reference being made to the observation at [77] by Spigelman CJ that "in a sense, the section that falls to be construed on appeal is not 588FF(3) itself but s1322(4)(d)". 100Insofar as the Chief Justice accepted that Austin J was correct in the conclusion that an application under s 588FF(3)(b) seeking a general order for an extension of time to make an application under 588FF(1) against any creditor is a valid application and an order in those terms is a valid order, Mr Pritchard submits that the conclusion to which Austin J came was not in fact that a blanket application with no specificity could be made but rather that ([168]): Consistently with the wording of Subs (3), the application to extend the time limit can be an application to extend the time limit within which a particular subs(1) application can be made or a broader application that applies to a particular subs(1) application under consideration and to other applications as well. I see no reason why the other application cannot describe by category rather than in specific terms provided that the description is clear. 101In this regard, the distinction seemingly drawn by Mr Pritchard is that between an application in which claims are described by category (which Austin J considered was permissible) and an application in general terms against any party. (Nevertheless, as Mr Pritchard notes, the finding made (at [170]) in Brown was that the power under s 588FF(3)(b) was broad enough to allow for an extension of time in general terms (in circumstances where a liquidator is still ascertaining the identity of the recipients of benefits under possible voidable transactions and cannot give the Court an indication of the creditors to be targeted). (Mr Pritchard notes that the analysis at [160] in Brown was not raised before Austin J; rather it was raised for the first time before the Court of Appeal and the response to the submission at that stage was that if that issue had been raised below the application could have been amended to make provision for a claim in relation to specific transactions.) 102Mr Pritchard submits that the decision in Brown is wrong for a number of reasons. First, by reference to the wording of the section (on the basis that s 588FF(1) contemplates an application for one or more specific orders being made and s 588FF(3) is directed to "an" application under subsection (1) - a submission considered and rejected in New Cap ). Second, on the basis that the reasoning (at [45]) in Grieg (requiring the defendant to have been made a party to the application) is inconsistent with the prospect of a blanket application being permissible. Third, the suggested inconsistency in the fact that in Brown the Court (at [136]) had declined to decide whether or not all persons affected by an order under 588FF(3) need be notified yet on the other hand the Court held the power should be broad enough to call for an order in those circumstance (at [170]). Fourth, that the construction in Brown is inconsistent with the finding that the strength of the proposed application should be considered and this cannot be done in a blanket application (though I note that in New Cap it is recognised that this factor may not be relevant where what the liquidator is seeking by the extension is time to investigate possible claims). 103Mr Pritchard also raises public policy considerations, some of which seem to overlap, in submitting that the construction preferred in Brown would create a number of unjust or undesirable outcomes (including that potential defendants would be disadvantaged by not being identified in s 588FF(3) applications; that liquidators would be encouraged not to identify potential defendants thereby reducing the prospect of opposition (at least in the first instance); that, having regard to accepted notions of natural justice, there may be a multiplicity of litigation by successive defendants applying to re-agitate leave applications of which they had not been given notice in the first instance; the possibility of inconsistent outcomes on applications to set aside the grant of leave by respective defendants, since each application would need to have regard to the factors that need to be taken into account such as the strength of the case against that defendant and the prejudice to that defendant; that there would be no finality as defendants who could claim that they were fairly identifiable but not identified might cause ongoing challenges to any leave granted; that liquidators would not have certainty themselves and prospective defendants may seek to have leave revoked after it has been granted and after proceedings have been commenced; that the interests of creditors could not be served by such uncertainty and the potential for wasted costs to be incurred; and that applications would be decided by reference only to the evidence that the liquidator elected to put before the Court. 104The position in Brown has been followed on various occasions. In HIH Insurance Ltd, Re McGrath (in liq) [2004] 22 ACLC 449, Barrett J made an order on an application for leave "extending to a date 12 months from the date of filing this application, or such other period as the Court thinks fit, the period within which the plaintiffs may make an application under s 588FF(1) of the Act with respect to any voidable transaction involving the HIH Companies which have not been identified by the liquidators as at the date of the filing of this application". In that case, however, the liquidators had given evidence of the very considerable tasks which they faced in investigating the affairs of the companies in the group having regard to the complexity of the business and affairs of the group, the need for continued liaison with regulatory and investigatory bodies and the difficulty in obtaining access to relevant information and documents. The order was granted by Barrett J, though excluding from the general extension of time, those transactions which the liquidators had already identified as allegedly voidable transactions. 105In New Cap , White J considered a submission by the defendants that if an order under s 588FF(3)(b) were sought in general terms then the applications falling within such an order must be described by category and the description of each category must be clear. In New Cap the order sought in the Originating Process was for an extension of time in respect of any claim of any description which fell within Pt 5.7B. White J noted that both before Austin J and the Court of Appeal in Brown it had been submitted that s 588FF(3) did not permit the making of a general order for an extension of time to make an application under s 588FF(1) against any creditor and that such an application must be made with respect to a specific person and a specific transaction. His Honour noted that Spigelman CJ, with whom on this matter the other members of the Court agreed, had held that an application for a general order for an extension of time to make an application under s 588FF(1) against any creditor was a valid application and that an order in those terms was a valid order and then said at [19] - [20]: [19] It is not obvious to me why the clarity of the description of a claim in an application under s 588FF(3)(b) should be a criterion of validity. Prima facie, the validity of an application should depend on whether the claim made, whether clearly or ambiguously, when properly construed, is within the provision . I doubt that [the sentence in his Honour's judgment that "I see no reason why the other applications cannot be described by category rather than in specific terms, provided that the description is clear"] forms part of the ratio of the decision either of Austin J or the Court of Appeal. (my emphasis) [20] A comparison with the order made in Brown v DML Resources Pty Ltd and para 33 of his Honour's judgment shows that Austin J was of the view that the description of an application being "in respect of any voidable transaction of [the company] under s 588FF" was a sufficiently clear description by category. The category of "voidable transactions" covered all of the transactions in Div 2 of Pt 5.7B. It covered all of the transactions in respect of which an order could be made under s 588FF(1). Therefore the reference to "category" does not require an identified sub-set of voidable transactions in respect of which an extension is sought. 106White J went on (at [21]-[22]) to express the view that when Spigelman CJ in Brown summarised his conclusion in the earlier part of his judgment as being that "the Court does have power to grant an extension of time in general terms by specification of categories" (at [200]), his Honour must have been of the view that a specified category of transactions in respect of which an extension of time may be granted includes any voidable transaction of the company. 107White J noted that in Greig , Jerrard JA had described the proposition that the section "does not authorise blanket applications made ex parte without any identification ... of any person or persons against whom an application may ultimately be made for any one of the variety of orders provided for in the section as a 'general rule'", and said, at [24]: However, Jerrard JA went on to describe this as a general rule and said that a case might be taken out of the general rule where a liquidator could satisfy the Court that the date of the liquidator's appointment, or the state of the affairs of the company, have resulted in the liquidator being unable to describe the nature of a possible application or applications to be brought and the identity of the potential respondent or respondents (at para 112). This indicates that the construction of s 588FF(3) propounded in the passage quoted is a construction as to how the section ought to be applied, rather than one which goes to the validity of an application in general terms for an order under s 588FF(3)(b). In any event I should follow the decision in BP Australia Ltd v Brown 108There, his Honour was prepared to make the orders sought, noting that the ambit of the orders could be discerned by the reference to s 588FF itself. In other words, since the reference in the application for extension was for the making of an application under s 588FF(1), and that subsection empowered the Court to make specified orders where, on the application of a company's liquidator, it is satisfied that a transaction of the company is voidable because of s 588FE, his Honour considered that the reference to s 588FF(3) showed that the liquidator must be seeking an extension of time for the bringing of proceedings or claims against the defendant under Part 5.7B of the Act in respect of transactions which are alleged to be voidable transactions under s 588FE and said "The paragraph could not be seeking an extension of time in respect of any other claim under Part 5.7B because s 588FF would have no application to any such claim." His Honour dismissed the submission that an application for an extension of time for claims limited only by reference to Div 2 of Part 5.7B would be too wide, saying at [27]: .... However it is clear from the orders which were made in BP Australia Ltd v Brown and in McGrath & Ors v HIH Insurance Ltd (In Liq), where the question of the allowable width of claims was a live issue, that applications under s 588FF(3)(b) may be made in respect of a category of claims as wide as voidable transactions. Implicitly, but nonetheless sufficiently clearly, that is the category of transactions to which para 3 is directed. 109The position in Brown has also been followed in the Federal Court in Tolcher v Capital Finance Australia Ltd [2005] FCA 108, where the Full Court of the Federal Court held that a liquidator may seek an extension of time for bringing proceedings to recover a voidable transaction by an application in general (or "blanket") terms, rather than by reference to a particular transaction or class of transactions. There, objection was taken to the application for an extension on the basis that the Court did not have the power to, and should not as a matter of discretion, grant an extension of time because the application was made in a general form in relation to a class of transactions and therefore lacked sufficient specificity. 110In rejecting that argument, Tamberlin J noted that the language of s 588FF(3)(b) does not require an application to specify a particular transaction as opposed to a class or category. His Honour referred with approval to the decisions of Austin J in Brown (No 2), the Court of Appeal in Brown and the subsequent decisions of New Cap and McGrath v HIH . His Honour noted the decision in Greig but considered (as had White J in New Cap ) that in that case Jerrard JA had directed his attention to the application, rather than to a "proper interpretation", of s 588FF(3)(b) and noted that the decision in Greig had been considered in both Brown and New Cap . 111Tamberlin J ultimately concluded (at [28]) that: In my view, the weight of authority and legal reasoning leads me to conclude that an application in the present case is a valid application and that the Court has the necessary power to grant the extension sought. Apart from authority, the literal wording of the Act and the practical commercial considerations favouring such an application of the provision persuade me that the submissions of the respondent as to the extent of the power under s 588FF(3)(b) should be rejected. 112In South Australia, the Court of Appeal has also followed the views of Spigelman CJ in Brown (in Ansell Ltd v Davies [2008] SASC 203; (2008) 67 ACSR 356 at [45]). There, the Court held that an application could be made under s 588FF(3)(b) even if the creditor was not joined. Doyle CJ agreed that there would be situations where a liquidator cannot identify within the required period persons against whom claims can or should be made under s 588FF(1) and considered that it would surprising if there was no remedy for that situation (noting that r 2.7 of the Corporations Rules 2003 (SA) acknowledged that there may be no respondent or defendant to an application, in providing that service was to be effected on "each defendant (if any) to the proceeding"). Although special leave was granted in respect of that decision the matter did not proceed to a hearing in the High Court. 113I note that at first instance (Re Harris Scarfe Ltd (in liq) and Harris Scarfe Wholesale Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2008] SASC 74; (2008) 65 ACSR 616), Debelle J had expressed reservations as to the position and, it might fairly be said, had somewhat reluctantly followed the position in Brown . His Honour, considering an extension of time to bring claims in respect of creditors "who were not named or identified" in the application said (at [17]): In my view, serious questions exist whether the order made on 14 April 2004 is valid. As a general rule, orders are made against identified and named persons. This order was made in respect of creditors who were not named or identified. It was capable of applying to any creditor of HSL or HSW other than those against whom proceedings under s 588FF had already been issued and the creditors who were listed in Sch 1 of the application and were described in the order as "the ascertained creditors". It is doubtful whether parliament intended that s 588FF(3)(b) should authorise an order against unidentified creditors. Orders of that kind have a real capacity to defeat the intention expressed in the Harmer report that there should be commercial certainty in the sense that creditors know where they stand after the period of 3 years prescribed by s 588FF has elapsed : see Brown v DML Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (in liq) (2004) 164 FLR 337; 188 ALR 469; [2001] NSWSC 719 (Brown) quoted in BP Australia Ltd v Brown (2003) 58 NSWLR 322; 46 ACSR 677; [2003] NSWCA 216 at [54]-[58] (BP Australia Ltd). That question aside, there are real questions whether an order can be made against a class of unidentified persons in circumstances such as these. An order extending the time limit has the capacity to cause prejudice to certain creditors. Individual issues affecting each creditor may exist. As the events of these proceedings demonstrate, the order will not bind those creditors who obtain orders setting it aside on the ground of a want of procedural fairness. The decisions in BP Australia Ltd and in Greig v Australian Building Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] 2 Qd R 17; [2003] QCA 298 (Greig) are further examples of the difficulties. However, the validity of a general order granting an extension of time has been upheld by two Full Courts in BP Australia Ltd and in Greig, albeit in the latter decision the validity of shelf or blanket orders was questioned. (my emphasis) 114Debelle J confirmed the order extending time, emphasising the desirability for uniformity of decisions in the interpretation of the Corporations Law and the Corporations Act . Relevantly, his Honour said (at [19]) that: Uniformity of decisions in the interpretation of the Corporations Law and the Corporations Act is desirable and a single judge should not depart from the interpretation placed on that legislation by an intermediate appellate court unless convinced that that interpretation is plainly wrong: Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492 ; 112 ALR 627 at 628-9 ; 10 ACSR 230 at 231-2 ; [1993] HCA 15. While I have real concerns to the validity of the order in this case, I am not prepared to say that the decisions in BP Australia Ltd and in Greig are plainly wrong. Furthermore, the reasoning in those decisions has been applied on a number of occasions since: see, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprizes Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 52 ACSR 103 ; [2004] NSWSC 1244; Tolcher v Capital Finance Australia Ltd (2005) 143 FCR 300 ; 52 ACSR 328 ; [2005] FCA 108; McGrath v National Indemnity Co (2004) 182 FLR 309 ; 49 ACSR 403 ; [2004] NSWSC 391; Re McGrath v HIH Insurance Ltd (in liq) (2004) 205 ALR 643 ; 48 ACSR 723 ; [2004] NSWSC 165; Wallman v Milestone Enterprises Pty Ltd (2006) 24 ACLC 1541 ; [2006] WASC 260. It is not for me to play the role of judicial iconoclast. I apply the reasoning in BP Australia Ltd and Greig holding that a court has power under s 588FF(3)(b) generally to extend the time limit against all creditors. Furthermore, none of the creditors sought to be joined has sought to invalidate the order on this ground. Mr Hoffmann QC, who appeared for 16 creditors, referred to the remarks of Spigelman CJ in BP Australia Ltd at [135] and of Williams JA in Grieg at [50]. He submitted that blanket orders of this kind should only be made in exceptional circumstances. He submitted that the circumstances of this case were not sufficiently exceptional to justify the order. In my view, that is a matter to be considered later on the hearing of the application against each creditor. It is inappropriate to determine it at this stage. 115Academic commentary recognises that the weight of judicial authority favours the approach in Brown . 116In Austin & Black's Annotations to the Corporations Act , the learned authors state in unqualified terms at [5.588FF] (though noting the contrary authority) that: An order may also be made under s 588FF(3)(b) extending the time for the commencement of proceedings in general terms or in relation to a class of transactions, if it is not possible to identify the relevant persons or proceedings: BP Australia Ltd v Brown , above at [170]-[173]; Tolcher v Capital Finance Australia Ltd (2005) 143 FCR 300; 52 ACSR 328; [2005] FCA 108; New Cap Reinsurance v Reaseguros Alianza SA (2004) 186 FLR 175; [2004] NSWSC 787; at[14]-[28], to the contrary Greig & Duff v Australian Building Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] 2 Qd R 17; (2003) 21 ACLC 1565; [2003] QCA 298 at [111]-[112] 117Similarly, in Ford's Principles of Corporations Law , the learned authors summarise the position in relation to "shelf" applications at [27.260] as follows: An order under s 588FF(3) extending time does not have to be confined to proposed proceedings concerning a particular person or particular transaction. In a rare case an order can be made where the liquidator is still identifying persons against whom s 588FF(1) applications might be made: BP Australia Ltd v Brown (2003) 58 NSWLR 322; 46 ACSR 677; [2003] NSWCA 216 at [168]; Re McGrath (as joint liq of the HIH companies ) (2004) 205 ALR 643; 48 ACSR 723; [2004] NSWSC 165; New Cap Reinsurance Ltd (in liq) v Reaseguros Alianza SA [2004] NSWSC 787; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) (2004) 52 ACSR 103; [2004] NSWSC 1244; Re Harris Scarfe Ltd (in liq) and Harris Scarfe Wholesale Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 3) (2008) 65 ACSR 616; 254 LSJS 154; [2008] SASC 74; aff'd sub nom Ansell Ltd v Davies (2008) 67 ACSR 356; [2008] SASC 203; special leave to appeal to the High Court granted 13 November 2008. (my emphasis) The Federal Court has adopted a similar view: Tolcher (as liq of Lloyd Scott Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq)) v Capital Finance Australia Ltd (2005) 52 ACSR 328; [2005] FCA 108 not following Greig v Australian Building Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] 2 Qd R 17; [2003] QCA 298. 118In his journal article, 'Voidable transactions - extending the limitation period under s 588FF(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)' (2009) 17 Insolvency Law Journal 121, Matthew Broderick observes in relation to "blanket" applications for leave (at pp 129 - 131): The concern expressed about "blanket" applications/orders is that a liquidator could avoid the three-year limitation period by filing an application to avoid any transaction and later supplement the application by the inclusion of additional parties after the three-year limitation period expired. This was said to make a mockery of the three-year limitation period, and would allow liquidators to procrastinate in a liquidation rather than promptly identifying voidable transactions. It could be utilised in theory where the court permitted joinder of a defendant after the three-year limitation period. ... [In Brown ] Spigelman CJ considered that that there were other means by which the court could avoid any mischief created by liquidators using "blanket" applications in inappropriate circumstances. First, courts maintain case management procedures which could monitor shelf or blanket applications. Secondly, where a liquidator failed to give notice of his or her intention to the party concerned in a shelf or blanket application, the court could take that failure into account in the exercise of its discretion at the subsequent inter partes hearing. concluding that: Before the issue is tested by the High Court, the predominant view, in most jurisdictions, is that "blanket" applications may be made only in exceptional circumstances. 119The High Court in Australian Securities Commission v Malborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at [492] said that: Although the considerations applying are somewhat different from those applying in the case of Commonwealth legislation, uniformity of decision in the interpretation of uniform national legislation such as the Law is a sufficiently important consideration to require that an intermediate appellate court - and all the more so a single judge - should not depart from an interpretation placed on such legislation by another Australian intermediate appellate court unless convinced that that interpretation is plainly wrong. 120Insofar as the Jasmic parties (and the other interested parties, since Mr Castle expressly adopted the submissions made by Mr Pritchard in relation to Brown ) seek to call into question the correctness of Brown they must do so in another forum. The weight of authority supports Brown . To adopt the words of Debelle J, it is not for me to play the role of judicial iconoclast. Still less is it for me to disregard the binding force of Brown , which I understand to be authority for the proposition that there is power under s 588FF(3)(b), albeit that it might only be exercised in rare or exceptional cases, to grant orders extending time for applications to be made in relation to voidable transactions the identity of which (or the parties to which) have not been identified or identified only in general terms at the time of the extension application. 121Mr Pritchard, accepting that I would be bound to follow Brown as being correct, and hence to accept that blanket applications are permitted by s 588FF(3), nevertheless submitted that such an order should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, referring to Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Karl Suleman Enterprises Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 1244; (2004) 52 ACSR 103 (at [6]) where Barrett J said: Before proceeding to those merits, I should refer to the distinction recognised and accommodated by the liquidators of KSE between the cases in which a person has been already been identified as the potential target of a S588FF(1) application and the case where no particular action is contemplated against any particular person. An extension of time under 588FF(3)(b) in relation to case of the latter kind is possible and permissible but must be regarded as exceptional. 122It is submitted by Mr Pritchard that there are no exceptional circumstances in either of the present cases that would warrant a blanket application being allowed. In relation to Clarecastle, he points to the fact that proceedings have already been commenced in relation to the Windsor Village partnership claim (and, I might add, it is not suggested that any other voidable transaction claim in relation to that assignment is contemplated) and there is no indication as to what claim might be contemplated in relation to the Scotch Whisky transaction. In relation to Ladycare, Mr Pritchard submits that this is simply a case of claimed lack of funds and lack of diligence by the parties in the provision of documentation to the liquidator. 123It is not strictly necessary for me to consider whether exceptional circumstances exist in the present case (nor is it necessary to address Mr Harper's submission that in fact this is not a blanket application, because the transactions and the parties involved in the transactions have now been identified), as I am not satisfied that leave should be granted in any event (other than in one limited respect). Suffice it to note that the difficulty I would have in concluding that there were exceptional circumstances to warrant a blanket order in either case is that I am not persuaded that it would not have been possible for the liquidators, acting diligently within the 3 year period, to identify the particular transactions that have now been identified in relation to Ladycare. Nor am I satisfied that it is likely that there are any voidable transactions to be identified in relation to Clarecastle (other than the transaction already the subject of proceedings). 124As to Mr Harper's submission that there are identified persons who have filed appearances and made submissions about broadly identified transactions, this does not address the fact that the liquidators in the draft Ladycare statement of claim now identify transactions against parties who have not formally been notified of the application and for whom no appearance has been made (such as Waltlo, Tama as trustee of the Tamarama Unit Trust, and Enviro LCS). 125As to the submission that these are not blanket orders, Mr Harper places reliance is placed on what was said by Barrett J in Arnautovic at [5]: Three things may be said at the outset about this application under s 588FF(3)(b) for extension of the s 588FF(3) limitation period in respect of those two defendants. First, the application was itself made within what s 588FF(3)(b) now calls "the paragraph (a) period". Second, the application, relating as it does to identified and named persons, is not an application "in gross" or a "shelf application" of the type in respect of which appeal proceedings in the High Court of Australia are pending (see Ansell Ltd v Davies [2008] HCA Trans 373). Third, it has been sufficiently shown that each of the second defendant and the fourth defendant has been served and has chosen not to seek to be heard on the application. and submits that the present applications are not "in gross" or a "shelf application". Mr Harper submits that, consequently, there is no occasion to apply as a test the notion of "exceptional circumstances" as stated in Karl Suleman at [6] (where Barrett J was referring to cases "where no particular action is contemplated against any particular person"). 126While it is true that particular claims against particular defendants have now been identified in relation to Ladycare (albeit that those identified persons have not all been notified of the present application nor given an opportunity to make submissions in that regard), the same could not be said in relation to Clarecastle, where the position of the liquidators seems to be that the liquidators do not suggest that entry into the transaction in 2001 was a voidable transaction but there may have been (unidentified) transactions since then that were. 127I note that Mr Harper takes issue with the suggestion that the entities (other than the Jasmic parties) identified in the draft Statement of Claim as having been party to voidable transactions involving Ladycare have not been (or should have been separately) notified of the current application, on the basis that they are companies in the Shea group of companies and there are common directorships and/or shareholdings (a factual conclusion to which dissent was expressed by Mr Pritchard). I accept that, to an extent there are some common directorships, but it is by no means clear that those entities should be treated as on notice that voidable transaction claims (as opposed to other claims involving breach of directors' duties or the like) might be sought to be made against them and I consider that as a matter of procedural fairness they would be entitled to be heard on the application (which, as against them, must be regarded as ex parte). 128In conclusion, on this preliminary issue, I accept that Brown is authority (binding on me) for the proposition that there is power to make the orders as presently sought. I also accept that, insofar as the liquidators have identified the claims proposed to be made in relation to Ladycare, there is some comfort that this is not a 'shelf' application as such. That said, I am concerned at the fact that there has not been an opportunity for a number of the identified defendants to address the question as to whether leave should be granted (and, in particular, to address the question of delay or prejudice in relation to their particular circumstances having regard to the particular claim identified). Therefore, had I been satisfied that it was otherwise in order to extend the time for the making of the claims I would have imposed the limitations on the orders as indicated above. As it turns out, this is not necessary as I am not satisfied (other than in respect of one claim) that leave should be granted, having considered the factors in New Cap , to which I now turn. (ii) Delay 129In Itek Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207 Ipp AJA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Sheller JA agreed, said (at [224]) that: ... where a broad discretion is conferred to grant leave to sue after expiry of a limitation period, the general question that has to be asked is what is fair and just (per Gleeson CJ in Salido ). Or what does the justice of the case require (per McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority ). 130In New Cap , White J (at [54]) noted that in assessing what is fair and just in all the circumstances, in the context of an application under s 588FF(3)(b) to extend the time for the bringing of claims, regard must be had to the public policy underlying the imposition of limitation periods both generally and in relation to s 588FF(3)(b) in particular. His Honour noted that in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, McHugh J (at [552] - [553]) had identified four broad rationales for the enactment of limitation periods (in a passage which was expressly adopted also in Brown ): First, as time goes by, relevant evidence is likely to be lost. Second, it is oppressive, even 'cruel', to a defendant to allow an action to be brought long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed. Third, people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilise their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them Insurers, public institutions and businesses, particularly limited liability companies, have a significant interest in knowing that they have no liabilities beyond a definite period. The final rationale for limitation periods is that the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible. (Citations omitted). 131White J went on to say (at [55]): In Itek Graphix Pty Ltd v Elliott (2002) 54 NSWLR 207 at 224, Ipp AJA identified the issue of prejudice as being one which ordinarily should be of paramount importance. But the absence of prejudice is not itself decisive. It is rather a relevant factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the general discretion. ( BP Australia Ltd v Brown at 358). There is an onus on the applicant to show why it is fair and just that the general rule established by s 588FF(3)(a) should not apply . (my emphasis) 132In New Cap , White J considered that the complexity of the liquidation and the many tasks which the liquidator faced was a mitigating factor (at [70]) and said at [71], in a passage on which reliance is placed by Mr Harper: Whether there is an adequate explanation for the delay is only one factor to be taken into account in considering where the interests of justice lie. The absence of any specific prejudice to the defendant is of more weight, although I take into account that prejudice may exist without its being able to be identified because facts which were once known may now be forgotten, or their significance may not now be appreciated ( Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor at 551). No evidence was led by the defendant as to its course of business, or change of personnel, or record keeping, which might bear on the probability of there being prejudice of that kind. 133In Brown , as noted earlier, Spigelman CJ had referred to the entitlement of creditors to the benefit of having the affairs of an insolvent company "properly investigated and administered in an orderly fashion in terms of the provisions of the law" (there anticipating that the investigation would be by a "diligent" liquidator). Mr Harper relies on this in submitting that because of the lack of documents available to the liquidators, creditors could not be satisfied that a proper investigation had occurred of the companies affairs of the kind which they would be entitled to expect. (His Honour also, however, noted the public interest in the completion of investigations into insolvent companies within the statutory period.) 134Circumstances of the kind that may be relevant to a consideration of delay on the part of a liquidator can be gleaned from the judgment of Finn J in Taylor v Woden (to which reference was made by Barrett J in Arnautovic ) in which reference was made to indications in the material there before the court as to matters such as the complexity of the affairs of the companies and the gross deficiencies in records; the lack of assets in the companies and hence lack of financial resources to fund an investigation; "importantly, the need to obtain, and the time lag involved in obtaining, financial backing for the investigation"; the place of this event in the web of matters in respect of which legal proceedings could be considered and on which advice was necessary; the other proceedings that have already been brought on; and the course the liquidator was then taking in holding a s 596A examination for the purpose of obtaining further evidence. In Itek , Burley J noted the listing of those relevant factors by Finn J as of assistance in identifying what may need to be established by the applicant in any given case. 135The approach in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (per McHugh J at [554] and Kirby J at [564] - [565]) was also noted in Arthur Andersen Corporate Finance Pty Ltd v Buzzle Operations Pty Ltd (in liq) [2009] NSWCA 104, where Ipp JA explained that, when considering the exercise of a judicial discretion that is not fettered by inflexible prescriptions the court must exercise discretion in the context of and by reference to the statute by which it is conferred (and any other statute that is relevant to the legislative context) and in accordance with principles developed by judicial decisions (the statutory provisions applicable in this jurisdiction including those contained in ss 56 - 59 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW)). 136Similarly, in Hans Pet Constructions Pty Ltd v Cassar [2009] NSWCA 230 at [36] Allsop ACJ (with whom Campbell and Young JJA agreed) observed that these provisions (together with ss 60 and 61 of the Act) bring about: a new statutory balance among various factors in litigation including court and party efficiency and the delivery of individual justice. Delay and case backlog are not merely factors affecting the public cost of delivering justice, they corrode the ability of the courts to provide individual justice. 137Of relevance, therefore, in considering the discretion under s 588FF(3)(b), is whether the liquidators, who seek the exercise of the discretion in their favour, have "diligently pursued the object of disposing of the proceedings in a timely way"; "used, or could reasonably have used, available opportunities under the rules or otherwise, to avoid delay"; and "reasonably implemented the practice and procedure of the court with the object of eliminating any lapse of time between the commencement of the proceedings and their final determination", to adopt his Honour's formulation of the relevant policy objectives. 138I note that Hodgson JA in Tolcher v Gordon [2005] NSWCA 135; (2005) 53 ACSR 442 (at [3], 443) also observed that an important aspect of the public policy behind the limitation period is that potential defendants should be made aware of claims against them within a reasonable time. 139Relevantly, in Brown, Spigelman CJ (having noted what had been said by McHugh J as to the four broad rationales for the enactment of limitation periods) went on to say (at [112] - [114]) in the context of an extension of the time limit under s 588FF(3), the following: There is, in my opinion, a broader public interest to be served by allowing persons who have had dealings with companies which become insolvent to conduct their commercial affairs with a degree of certainty about their exposure to having past transactions unravelled. I note the traditional hostility of the common law to the exhumation of bodies which was once described as an "inhuman and barbarous felony". ( Haynes' case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113, 77 ER 1389. See also R v Lynn (1788) TR 733, 100 ER 394; R v Sharpe (1857) 7 Cox CC 214, 169 ER 959.) In this respect, equity followed the common law. (P W Young " The Exclusive Right to Burial " (1965) 39 ALJ 50; Beard v Baulkham Hills Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 esp at 280.) This policy is informed by considerations of decency and human respect. Nevertheless, in my opinion, there is also a public policy against the disinterring of corporate corpses. Commercial life must at some stage rule off the past and focus energy on the future . The commercial and economic life of the community is sometimes better served by allowing the loss to lie where it falls, so that all concerned may proceed with a high degree of certainty as to their financial position. The passage of time, even the passage of three years, can be seen to legitimately alter the balance of conflicting interests in this regard. (my emphasis) 140His Honour observed (at [119]) that, in a context where conflicting interests have to be balanced, the eventual loss of the ability to make a relevant claim for a voidable transaction may "reasonably be regarded as something to be surrendered, in favour of providing certainty to others who have had dealings with the company, including other creditors, so that they can proceed with their business affairs with an assurance that they are no longer at risk". 141In Buzzle (at ([91]), Ipp JA expressed the view that a deliberate decision to allow a statutory limitation period to expire would be a powerful factor against the grant of leave, noting that any prejudice suffered in such circumstances, were the writ not to be extended, would be self-inflicted. Here, it is not suggested that there was a deliberate decision to allow the three-year period to lapse without bringing particular voidable transaction claims (and, indeed, some voidable transaction claims have been brought within the relevant period). However, what has occurred is that there was a seemingly deliberate decision (or one made as part of the liquidators' ordinary policy or practice in prioritisation of work) on the part of the liquidators not to pursue, in as timely a fashion as (with hindsight) it is clear that they could have done, the investigations for which an extension is now sought. That seems to me to be a deliberate decision of a similar kind to that considered in Buzzle , such that any prejudice occasioned by the making of that decision might be said to be self-inflicted. 142On the issue of alleged delay the liquidators make specific reference to New Cap where White J said at [72]: It is probable that the litigation of the existing claim will require investigation of the circumstances surrounding the other payments which are the subject of the proposed amendment. They may well be relevant to whether the defendant knew or had reason to suspect that New Cap was insolvent. Where the defendant does not point to the delay causing any identified prejudice, it would be somewhat incongruous if the circumstances relating to the other payments, which might themselves be unfair preferences, were investigated, perhaps minutely, to assess a defence to the claim, yet the liquidator was precluded from claiming relief in respect of them. 143In the present case, issue is taken as to the length of any relevant delay on the part of the liquidators (Mr Harper contending that any delay is at most 8-9 months in the period between the time that Mr Francipane ceased work on the matters and Mr Hutchins resumed such work) but in any event it is submitted for the liquidators that such delay is explicable principally by reference to the lack of funding (which Mr Kassem says impeded the progress of the investigations); the perceived lack of co-operation in the liquidators' investigations and the complexity of the companies' affairs and lack of records. I consider each in turn. Lack of funding 144As to the lack of funding, the evidence is that up until approximately 4pm on 28 June 2011, the liquidators were unfunded. 145Mr Hutchins' evidence was that an application for funding was first made to the ATO in about February 2011 (he initially put this as occurring in April 2011 but corrected that at T 107.41). He accepted that no other funding applications had been made (T 99.41) and thought that this was because the view had been formed that the ATO was the only creditor and was therefore the most likely party "to have the most zest for it" (T 100.1). He says that the ATO initially rejected the funding application but that about a month ago the application was re-submitted and, after discussions with an officer at the ATO who was able to be convinced of the basis for such an application, approval was given for a funding package. 146Mr Kassem had given evidence in his affidavits, sworn before the ATO agreement for funding was obtained, that the liquidations were totally unfunded and that this was an impediment to the progress of his investigation into the companies' affairs. Tested on this in the witness box, it became apparent that the real import of the lack of funding was that it had led to the investigation being given a lesser priority within the liquidators' office than matters that were funded. Mr Kassem explained that priority was accorded to liquidations in which there was funding. At T 43.29, Mr Kassem said: A. Well, I don't know what, it's a question of- you have got to understand in the liquidation side of the business when we don't have a job that's funded; when it's not funded we have got to be mindful of the time we spend on the job 147At T 45.21 he said "We made the enquiries but nothing was brought to our attention to warrant further... [investigation at that stage]". In other words, it seems that if a fairly basic level of investigation failed to disclose prospects or avenues of recovery for creditors, then further investigations were put in abeyance. 148When asked to explain how the lack of funding had interfered with any aspect of the investigation to date, Mr Kassem said at T 46.12: A. In every job we get a lot of matters that don't have funds or have very limited assets so the policy with those jobs is to do a preliminary investigation and if nothing, if it doesn't result in discovery of assets or transactions that need to be investigated then we can't obviously spend a lot of time on it but where the initial investigations lead to issues that need to be investigated or assets that need to be recovered, then the degree of that evidence will obviously mean that more time can be spent on the file. So, you know, until matters were brought to my attention in late 2009, we weren't in a position to allocated that sort of resource where we didn't know whether we were recovering assets. 149Mr Kassem accepted that the lack of funding had not interfered with any aspect of the investigation once the transaction was identified (T 46.25) and his evidence made it clear that the reason that the lack of funding had been regarded as the source of interference with the investigations was that "prior to Mark [Hutchins] establishing what he did, it's still regarded as an unfunded job so it didn't take priority in the office" (T 46.47). He said "It changes once we identify the transactions that I had to recover, it becomes an unfunded repeat with real significant transactions to pursue but it changes" (T 47.5). Mr Kassem emphasised that Mr Hutchins was being paid on a recovery basis, looking at dormant files or where there was a reason to look at them, and was not getting paid "unless we made recoveries on it" (T 47.13- 27). 150The position therefore seemed to me to be that, because these were unfunded liquidations, there was an initial (fairly limited) investigation and unless there were avenues of recovery identified at that time, then further resources were not applied (unless and until at a later time there was something to suggest that it was worth according the investigation a higher priority). It was only the process of utilising a consultant's services (on a contingency basis) to investigate the position at a later stage that seems to have led to a revival of interest in the investigation of the potential voidable transaction claims. 151Under cross-examination by Mr Castle, Mr Kassem accepted that he was aware of the coercive powers open to a liquidator to conduct examinations and request production of documents and that there was an ASIC Assetless Administration Fund to assist in the costs of conducting investigations where there was an unfunded administration (T 49.43). He conceded that no such application was made in relation to Clarecastle (T 50.11). Nor, it seems, was any such application made in relation to Ladycare. Mr Kassem accepted that his general rule (or practice) was not to go through the costly business of conducting examinations where he had cooperation from interested parties (T 51.31) but did not accept that the reason he had not done so here was because he was receiving cooperation from the parties in the present case. Mr Kassem was adamant that he did not think there had ever being sufficient cooperation (T 50. 43) but seems to have based this conclusion largely (if not wholly) on what was conveyed to him in that regard by Mr Hutchins. 152Indeed the lack of funding does not seem to have prevented the commencement of proceedings in these matters, since the liquidators were able to secure speculative fee agreements in order to commence in April 2010 the 3 specific proceedings, together with the leave proceedings, before any funding had been procured. Mr Kassem agreed in cross-examination that solicitors could have been involved much earlier than that but that he had delayed (until Mr Hutchins' involvement in October 2009), before even starting to think about whether he would get legal advice (T 44.39). 153In cross-examination by Mr Pritchard, Mr Kassem accepted that he did not take any meaningful steps to investigate the affairs of Clarecastle in the two and a half years since he was appointed as liquidator (T 41.44) but would not accept that before Mr Hutchins commenced there had been no meaningful step taken at all (referring to the steps taken by Mr Francipane) (T 41.48). (He nevertheless accepted that October 2009 was the first time any serious work started in relation to the investigation of the Scotch Whisky matter (T 43.40) and it would seem from the time sheets that a similar concession would also have to be made in relation to the Ladycare investigations.) 154Mr Harper submits, and I accept, that it was not incumbent on the liquidators to put their own assets at stake in commencing precipitate litigation without funding. Further, he submits that the liquidators would need to have a proper foundation on the evidence to justify commencing proceedings for recovery of assets (and it might be expected that any litigation funder would wish to see evidence as to the prospects of an application). 155I note that in Tolcher ,Tobias JA (at [50]) said in effect that the deliberate decision by the liquidator in that case not to attempt service of the statement of claim until "the litigation funding was in place" was "appropriate, prudent and responsible and not a decision for which the liquidator can be justifiably criticised". 156However, a deliberate decision of this kind (whether to delay service of an originating process or to delay investigation into particular claims) while funding is not available is nevertheless one that must be taken into account (even if not determinative) on an application such as the present. Ipp JA in Buzzle recognised that a deliberate decision to delay is not a factor that has an absolute effect on the discretion to be exercised, each decision depending on its own circumstances, but considered that a failure to take such a decision into account would be (or at least it was in that case) an error.
• Lack of cooperation 157As noted above, Mr Kassem accepted in the witness box that not a lot had happened in the administration in relation to Clarecastle until October 2009 (T 44.50) and that what had happened then was that Mr Hutchins commenced work and, because of his involvement, Mr Kassem thought that there should be more investigation (T 45.3-15). (The position would seem to be the same for Ladycare, having regard to the timesheets and the materials put before the court by the liquidators.) The delay does not seem to me to have been caused by any lack of cooperation on the part of the Jasmic parties or anyone else. 158Mr Kassem also accepted that the documents produced to the Court on this application had been provided to him voluntarily or were part of the company's books at the time of appointment (T 52.25). 159Mr Kassem accepted that the correspondence with Mr Speirs indicated that there was cooperation by Chambers Finance in the provision of information to assist in the liquidation (T 64.36) and agreed that as at 2007 it would be wrong to suggest any lack of cooperation between Chambers Finance and the liquidators' office in relation to the Clarecastle liquidation and the Scotch Whisky scheme (T 65.1). The only requests to which there seems to have been no response (other than the October 2009 Notice to Produce documents, which, being a formal demand, was perhaps not surprisingly met with a formal response) was the March 2009 letter that does not appear to have been pressed by the liquidators. 160Asked whether he was aware that Mr Hutchins had spoken to or met with Mr McCarthy, at T 69.27, Mr Kassem said "Look, I can only say that's Mark Hutchins reporting to me that he's not getting the cooperation he requires to get the information that he needs". 161In the period from 5 April 2007 until around October 2009, it seems to me that there was not a large amount of time spent on enquiries or investigations into the transactions now the subject of the liquidators' focus. Mr Kassem and Mr Secatore appear to have had little direct involvement in the day-to-day conduct of the liquidation; Mr Francipane carried out some investigations but not a great deal of time was spent in pursuing enquiries (and when Mr Hutchins became involved it seems that Mr Francipane was not able to be of much assistance to him so it cannot be the case that any significant or detailed analysis had been carried out before then). If Mr Hutchins was capable of spending the time in late 2009 (with the information then to hand) and coming to the view that there were voidable transactions that were worth pursuing, there seems no reason why it would not have been possible for Mr Francipane or the liquidators themselves to have done so at an earlier time. 162As noted above, Mr Harper submitted that there was a reasonable basis for the decisions that had been taken in the absence of funding and that liquidators should not be expected to expose their personal assets in precipitate litigation (referring to what was said in Matthews v Ipex ITG Pty Limited [2007] SASC 387.) I do not criticise the decisions taken by the liquidators as to how to prioritise funds in an unfunded liquidation but I cannot accept on the material before me that the principal reason for the minimal effort that seems to have been expended before Mr Hutchins became involved was a lack of co-operation by the persons involved in the management of the company or the transactions in which the liquidators are now enquiring and, to the extent that there was a policy decision involved in the expenditure of funds at that stage, that is a decision the consequences of which must be borne by the liquidators. 163So, for example, in relation to Clarecastle, while I accept that Mr Kassem has had difficulty obtaining information as to the latter (principally, it would seem because his enquiries have largely post-dated the criminal investigations), I do not accept that the evidence establishes that the delay in those investigations for the first two and a half years of the three-year period available to Mr Kassem was primarily due to any lack of co-operation on the part of the Jasmic parties or of the other interested parties for whom Atanaskovic Hartnell act. (There seems to have been only one conversation or meeting with Mr McCarthy, for example, and that took place in early 2009.) 164It seems to me that there was no real attempt at investigation into the scheme (beyond some very broad general enquiries) until October 2009 and at that stage what occurred was the issue of a demand to produce documents issued to Chambers Finance (as well as the Sheas and Mr Roy) and a number of meetings in relation to the Ladycare transactions. 165It is not suggested that the objection taken on behalf of Chambers Finance to the demand for production of what were asserted to be Chambers Finance's documents and not the company's books and records was misconceived as a matter of law or that it was unreasonable. 166Mr Kassem in cross-examination was unable to point to any correspondence he had had with Mr Shea in relation the Scotch Whisky Scheme prior to October 2009 or the to making of any allegation of breach of directors' duties in relation to this matter (of the kind that had, for example, been made in relation to the Windsor Village Partnership transaction). 167Mr Kassem's assertion that there had been deliberate non-production of records (or, as Mr Harper described it, "calculated non-cooperation") that had frustrated his efforts to investigate the companies affairs, seems to be put solely on the basis of his expectation that there would be relevant documents (of the kind he has identified) available to persons associated with Ladycare and therefore that the non-production of those documents must have been intentional. That conclusion is only as strong as the premise on which it is based and, even then, it does not take into account the possibility that the restructuring was left in the hands of the advisers from New Zealand with little input from either Mr Roy or Mr and Mrs Shea, and they might not have the relevant information he seeks. Mr Harper submits that the latter exhibited an "intransigent inability to recall" matters during the course of their examinations but it may equally be possible that they do not in fact recall the particular matters in question. 168Significance is placed on the fact that a financial document on which the liquidators place some weight (being the financial statement for the year ending 31 December 2006) was only obtained on discovery in the related but separate proceedings (and there was a complaint made as to the manner in which discovery was provided - to which the affidavit of Mr Spinks responds). However, that does not gainsay the fact that the liquidators' initial enquiries did not seem to suggest that further material was necessary in order to enable the liquidator (through Mr Francipane) to come to a view as to whether investigation was warranted. 169Mr Kassem, in his affidavit, broadly describes the attempts he has made to obtain information from Mr Shea, Mr Roy and others involved in the transactions (see, for example, [17]-[32] of Mr Kassem's affidavit affirmed on 30 April 2010 in the Ladycare Leave proceedings, but there does not appear to have been more than what might be described as cursory enquiries at least up until late 2009. 170What Mr Kassem does accept is that is clear is that Mr Roy attended his office on a number of occasions (Mr Kassem says that this was in Mr Roy's capacity as advisor to the Sheas but it must be remembered that he was also the company's accountant). Mr Kassem says that on all occasions, Mr Roy has advised him (though it would seem the relevant meetings were with Mr Hutchins) that there were no further books and records of the company and that Mr Roy and the Sheas could not recall the specifics of the transactions that took place ([25]). That is consistent, as I understand it, with the evidence that emerged during the public examinations (and which is criticised as an 'intransigent inability to recall' events). Mr Kassem does not accept this evidence and believes not only that there must be further records but also that the non-production of those records is the result of deliberate non-cooperation. (Mr Pritchard points out, however, that it was not put to any of the Jasmic parties during the examinations that documents had been lost or destroyed.) 171As to the level of cooperation given to Mr Hutchins, Mr Hutchins confirmed in the witness box that he had started with the firm in June 2009 (before then having been operating under his own consultancy) but did not start making enquiries until October 2009. He confirmed that he had spoken to Mr Francipane (T109) but that the latter did not remember much about the matter. 172Mr Hutchins had an initial meeting on 6 October 2009 meeting with Mr Roy (he says that "Sam had mentioned that Michael Roy was across all the information"). Mr Hutchins says that he only asked to see Mr Roy (so their can be no issue as to a lack of cooperation by Mr and Mrs Shea at this stage). He was dismissive of the assistance provided by Mr Roy (he says that he was told just that the business had been transferred and was not making any money). Mr Roy apparently offered to get some documents for Mr Hutchins to go through, though it is not clear that any were provided. Nevertheless, Mr Hutchins accepted that at that stage he considered that Mr Roy was trying his best to help (T 108.50). 173After the October 2009 notices requesting the production of documents were issued, Mr Roy asked to have another meeting with Mr Hutchins, which led to a meeting on 16 October 2009 attended also by Mr Francipane, apparently at Mr Roy's request. Some documents were apparently then provided at that meeting. 174There was a further meeting with Mr Roy on 26 November 2009 and at least another discussion with Mr Roy, perhaps over the telephone, to which reference was made in Mr Hutchins' affidavit ([22]). 175Mr Hutchins accepted that Mr Roy had arranged the meeting with Mr Russell of HQZ (the reason for that being put by Mr Roy as being that he did not understand the transactions but that Mr Russell would explain them), which led to Mr Russell travelling (presumably at the Sheas' expense, since the liquidators did not pay for it) from Brisbane for the meeting. At T 110.37, Mr Hutchins said of that meeting: ... That was a little bit of a joke to be frank. It went for 20 minutes. He drew a couple of diagrams representing this type of transaction. When I asked him the commercial terms his answer was : I did not get involved in that. Neither Mr Roy nor him could explain the commercial transactions. 176At T 110.44 he said: It was a structure that was represented as being complex. All it was was a couple of trading trusts that was set up represented by Mr Russell as something that he could not explain the commercial terms of" 177Mr Hutchins' complaint was that he was only given the "elements of the structure" (T 110.50) not an understanding of the commercial terms and that Mr Russell did not have all the information or documents (just "piecemeal photocopies"). Mr Hutchins considered that the diagram provided by Mr Russell as explaining the restructuring did not look complicated (and said that he subsequently learned it was not the entirety of the transactions). Mr Hutchins was critical of the information provided by Mr Russell and did not think it was a very accurate representation of reality (T 111.24). 178Another meeting took place with Mr Roy meeting in early February 2010 but again Mr Hutchins was critical of the information he was given by Mr Roy at that meeting. Mr Hutchins again met Mr Roy on 8 March 2010. 179It seems apparent from the above that there was, contrary to the liquidators' assertions, a level of cooperation on the part of the Jasmic parties (albeit that the liquidators were not satisfied as to the information gained from those enquiries). The nub of Mr Hutchins' complaint is that he says (accepting that this is in hindsight), that he does not believe Mr Roy provided him with all the information. He clearly does not accept that Mr Roy was telling him the truth when he said that he did not understand the transaction (since it was Mr Roy who had entered the transactions by way of journal entries on both sides of the transactions (T 111.46). Nevertheless, Mr Hutchins accepts that both Mr Roy and the Sheas have been consistent in their evidence that they did not understand the transactions (it simply seems to be that he does not believe them and therefore considers that they have been obstructive of his efforts to investigate the transactions) (T 112).
• Complexity of companies' affairs 180Mr Harper submits that both liquidations are complex, involving a number of related companies and trusts between which assets were transferred on the expert advice of HQZ and pointing to the lack of records that have been available to the liquidators as justification for an extension of time. (Interestingly, the complexity of the transactions seemed to be disavowed by Mr Hutchins in the witness box, who was dismissive of the suggestion that had been apparently made to him by Mr Russell and Mr Roy as to the complexity of the restructuring in which they had engaged and seems to have regarded this as an attempt to mislead him as to the restructuring that had been undertaken.) 181Again, while I accept that there was a level of complexity as to the companies' affairs and that the liquidators were apparently faced with a position where there was a paucity of records, that does not address the fact that, had steps been taken at an earlier time, the liquidators might well now have been in the position where no leave was necessary because all the investigations could have been completed to the stage where the transactions were identified and proceedings commenced within the time period that the legislature has considered a sufficient time for that purpose in general. (iii) Merits 182The second factor to be considered in the context of the extension applications involves a preliminary review of the merits (at least so far as the purpose of the extension is not simply to investigate possible claims).
• Clarecastle 183In relation to Clarecastle, as at the time the extension applications were commenced, there were two matters then the subject of consideration by the liquidators: the assignment to Jasmic of Clarecastle's interest in the Windsor Village partnership (by then already the subject of a voidable transaction claim) and the Scotch Whisky scheme (about which little was then known). 184As to the first, the liquidators' suspicions appear to have been raised by the fact that the investment was recorded in Clarecastle's balance sheet for the years ended 30 June 2005 and 2006 as having a value of $601,876 but was transferred to Jasmic (a related party) for only $330,000 (and that this was at a time when the liquidators believe Clarecastle was clearly insolvent and shortly after the Australian Taxation Office had disallowed significant tax deductions claimed in relation to the investment in the retirement village). 185Mr Kassem has complained that he has received no assistance from Mr Roy in relation to his investigation of this transaction (although apart from a standard form request for documents it is not apparent to what this complaint refers). Mr Kassem in his affidavit at [31] says that his investigations have revealed nothing which indicates that the value for which the interest in the partnership was assigned ($330,000) reflected the realisable value of this interest and notes that the records provide no explanation why the consideration for the assignment is different to the amount indicated in the above general journal. 186However, the fact that proceedings under s 588FF have already been commenced within the three year period in relation to this transaction means it cannot be a transaction for which leave is sought in the present proceedings (within the terms of the orders now sought) and in any event that leave is not necessary. It seems to me that this disposes of the application in relation to this aspect of the matter. 187As to the Scotch Whisky transaction, as outlined in my reasons on the application to set aside the examination summonses, the position of the liquidators was not that they had identified particular transactions that they considered to be voidable but, rather, that they had insufficient information to determine what the company's position was in relation to that investment and whether there might be any voidable transaction or other claims. 188The Scotch Whisky transaction involved an investment of some $1.502 million (financed by Chambers Finance to a large degree) on 27 March 2001. The liquidators say that they experienced difficulties in obtaining information from Mr Shea and from Clarecastle's advisers, referring to requests for information that were sent to the relevant parties. However, as is apparent from the above, a number of those requests seem to have been standard form requests and there was little follow-up on those requests at least until 2009. Further, as Mr Castle noted in his submissions, Mr Kassem's affidavit did not disclose the extent of assistance given (or the offers to provide further clarification) by Chambers Finance in 2007. 189Mr Kassem said in cross-examination on 6 May 2011 that what was preventing him from commencing proceedings in relation to the whisky transaction was that he had not been able to identify the asset (the whisky itself). Mr Kassem said that the documents given to him by the company's accountant (Mr Roy) disclosed the Chambers Finance loan "so it appears in the company account as a liability but there's no corresponding asset in the balance sheet" and that he had not been able to obtain confirmation as to whether there was an asset (T40.26). Mr Kassem said that what had not been identified in relation to the Scheme is whether it was a sham or was a genuine investment by the company (T 40.6). He was therefore unable to indicate what claim he might seek to make in relation to the transaction (T 40.47). Relevantly, however, it was not then, nor is it now, suggested that there is any particular transaction which occurred after entry into the Scotch Whisky scheme which would fall within the definition of a voidable transaction (and Mr Kassem has now had the benefit of the examination of those involved in the scheme, though the said examinations are not, as I understand it, complete). 190In summary, it was submitted that the position in relation to the whisky venture no financial records of note had been produced, despite demands; that no persons associated with the venture had co-operated in providing information to the liquidators; and that documents relevant to the venture had been seized by investigative bodies, who would not release any information to the liquidators. Thus, Mr Harper submitted that even "the most well funded of inquiries would have come to nought in the face of the lack of co-operation of those behind the venture and the unavailability of records as a result of the seizures effected by investigative bodies." 191However, examinations have since taken place in relation to the Scotch Whisky scheme and (although I think they had not been completed at the time of the extension applications in June 2011,) it does not seem that any claim in relation to voidable transactions has yet been identified. I accept that the authorities suggest that it is not necessary to review the merits of a claim where the reason for the extension is that the liquidators' enquiries are not complete. Nevertheless, where there is no articulation of any real basis on which it is suggested there may be a voidable transaction (and it is not suggested here that anything of relevance occurred after the entry into the scheme and in the period up to the placement of the company in liquidation) then this is a factor to take into account in exercising a discretion to permit a blanket extension for any such claim. Ladycare 192As to Ladycare, the liquidators believe that a series of transactions occurring from March 2006 through to 30 June 2006 amount to asset stripping in the context of a classic "Phoenix transaction" whereby the benefit of the company's business was assumed by a company operated by a relative of Mr and Mrs Shea (their son). 193In March 2006, Ladycare's business operations were transferred to the Shea Group Trading Trust and the non-current assets were transferred to Shea Group Holdings Trust. Mr Kassem summarised the results of the transactions in his affidavit of 24 September 2010, noting that the net asset position of the company as at 30 June 2005 (as recorded in the company's financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2006) included a significant portion of related party loans that were due to the company and which haven been written off by way of journal entries during the 2006 financial year. Mr Kassem believes that these journal entries were processed to reflect significant losses which would reduce the net asset position of the company and allow the company's business to be transferred for no consideration. As at 31 December 2006, the company's balance sheet disclosed as assets only a commercial bond and a current tax asset, both said to have nil realisable value. 194The financial statements from which this conclusion was drawn were, according to Mr Kassem, not available to him prior to the commencement of the leave proceeding or the related party proceedings commenced at the same time. Mr Kassem asserts, and for the purposes of this application I accept that it is arguable, that a strong case exists that Ladycare "deliberately disposed of its assets to defeat a claim from the ATO", Mr Kassem basing that conclusion on the fact that, despite the "multitude" of payments said to have been made to related parties and for the benefit of Mr Shea's interests, no money was paid to the ATO in respect of the tax determination (which Mr Kassem notes was not the subject of any challenge from Ladycare). 195Mr Kassem estimates that success in relation to recovery of the related party transactions would return as much as 100 cents in the dollar to the creditors. It is submitted that as the ATO is Ladycare's largest creditor, the fruits of any successful litigation will pass to the community at large. 196Mr Pritchard notes that the liquidators have already commenced proceedings in relation to the payment made to Jasmic in June 2006 and the payment made to LCS IT Pty Ltd by way of dividend , so that leave is not needed for those claims.
• Further proposed proceedings 197In considering the merits of the proposed proceedings for which leave by way of a extension of time is sought, consideration also needs to be given to the claims identified in the draft statement of claim sought to be filed in the Ladycare proceedings. 198Mr Pritchard submits that there is insufficient information as to the transactions so identified to determine even on a preliminary basis their prospects of success . However, at least on the face of the proposed pleading it could not be said that such claims would be likely to be struck out as having no foundation if the underlying facts on which they are based could be proved. (iv) Prejudice 199Mr Harper notes that there has been no evidence (other than by Messrs Seller and McCarthy) by any interested party as to actual or specific prejudice, notwithstanding the opportunity to file and serve further evidence since 6 May 2011. 200On the question of the prejudice arising from delay, McHugh J in the Brisbane Health case, noted that: .... The enactment of time limitations has been driven by the general perception that "[w]here there is delay the whole quality of justice deteriorates". Sometimes the deterioration in quality is palpable, as in the case where a crucial witness is dead or an important document has been destroyed. But sometimes, perhaps more often than we realise, the deterioration in quality is not recognisable even by the parties. Prejudice may exist without the parties or anybody else realising that it exists. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Barker v Wingo , "what has been forgotten can rarely be shown". So, it must often happen that important, perhaps decisive, evidence has disappeared without anybody now "knowing" that it ever existed. Similarly, it must often happen that time will diminish the significance of a known fact or circumstance because its relationship to the cause of action is no longer as apparent as it was when the cause of action arose. ... The effect of delay on the quality of justice is no doubt one of the most important influences motivating a legislature to enact limitation periods for commencing actions. ... A limitation provision is the general rule; an extension provision is the exception to it. The extension provision is a legislative recognition that general conceptions of what justice requires in particular categories of cases may sometimes be overridden by the facts of an individual case. The purpose of a provision such as s 31 is "to eliminate the injustice a prospective plaintiff might suffer by reason of the imposition of a rigid time limit within which an action was to be commenced." But whether injustice has occurred must be evaluated by reference to the rationales of the limitation period that has barred the action. The discretion to extend should therefore be seen as requiring the applicant to show that his or her case is a justifiable exception to the rule that the welfare of the State is best served by the limitation period in question. Accordingly, when an applicant seeks an extension of time to commence an action after a limitation period has expired, he or she has the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires that extension . (my emphasis) 201Mr Harper submits that the absence of any specific prejudice should be given great weight and that it effectively neutralises any argument as to prejudice in the present case. 202In Brown (at [119]), Spigelman CJ noted that, when balancing the requirement for commercial certainty on the part of those who have past dealings with the company and the conflicting interest of the creditors of the company: The eventual loss of the ability to make a relevant claim can be reasonably regarded as something to be surrendered in favour of providing commercial certainty to other who have had dealings with the company. 203Mr Harper submits (as adverted to earlier) that from a public policy perspective, the absence of records to date means that the creditors of the companies can have no satisfaction that the companies' affairs have yet been adequately investigated (citing Brown in this regard). 204Mr Pritchard submits that if the liquidators are correct in their claim regarding the Windsor Village Partnership (which is not admitted), then the interests of the only real creditor (Jasmic) are adequately protected and in any event, it is questionable (having regard to costs of litigation and the uncertainty of any recovery) whether it is in the interests of creditors for further litigation to proceed when it appears that enormous costs are being incurred to recover $22,000.00 in circumstances where even that proof of debt is not supported by any evidence. 205In relation to Ladycare, it is said that the one creditor (ATO) appears to be owed $1,440,975.77 and that the claim in the Jasmic proceedings and LCS IT proceeding claim $ 1,709,304.00, such that if the liquidators succeed on these claims, then all creditors can be paid from the proceedings. 206Mr Pritchard submits that the prejudice to Mr and Ms Shea is that, by reason of the liquidators undertaking their duties in piecemeal fashion they are becoming involved in successive proceedings (3 to date), rather than the liquidator putting forward one claim containing all actions. It is said to be unfair to require a defendant to be "peppered" with claims many years after the event and that the multiplicity of actions should be discouraged. 207On the question of prejudice to the interested parties for whom Mr Castle appeared, that was largely put in relation to the then forthcoming examinations summonses (and the prejudice arising from the fact that evidence would be compelled to be given in advance of the pending criminal trials against Messrs McCarthy and Seller). That prejudice has been considered and, to the extent I considered appropriate, dealt with by the orders I made in the examination proceedings. There seems to be no further specific prejudice to which those parties point (other than the presumptive prejudice arising from delay). 208As to the issue of presumptive prejudice, in Agricultural & Rural Finance (at [192]) Tobias JA said: Although I accept the principle of presumptive prejudice is applicable to a case such as the present, I do not think that it should carry much weight when balancing the various factors which the court is required to take into account in the re-exercise of the relevant discretion. 209I have already noted above the dicta of White J in New Cap (at [55]) in this regard in which his Honour observed that the absence of prejudice is not itself decisive but is, rather, a relevant factor to be taken into account in the exercise of the general discretion. 210As I have had occasion elsewhere to note ( In the matter of Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) [2011] NSWSC 561 at [77]), the High Court in Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [29] emphasised the prejudice likely to be occasioned by delay: Delays in the courts are a major cause of disquiet not only among those who resort to the courts but also among judges and all others associated with the courts. Delay will almost always impede the proper disposition of any case that does not come to trial promptly. Memories fade; records may be lost. The impediments are many, varied and obvious. (my emphasis) 211In the present instance, the delay in commencing the proceedings beyond the time period in which they were required (absent leave) to be brought when measured by reference to the time at which the application for leave was brought was only small, but when measuring the impact of that delay it must be remembered that the time from the events in question is now some 5 years at least (it is not apparent how long the time from the relevant events in relation to any claim involving the Scotch Whisky transaction would be since it is not clear to what the claim would relate -any voidable transaction claim in relation to the 2001 transaction being disavowed). (And it is necessary to bear in mind the reason for the delay (which, it seems to me, is largely due to a policy decision by the liquidators not to expend funds on an inquiry into claims in an unfunded liquidation where no cause for investigation or potential claim had apparently been uncovered by the initial investigation into the company's affairs. Reasonable or not, that forensic decision is one that must have been made knowing the potential consequences.) 212That said, it seems to me that the prejudice likely to be suffered by the Jasmic parties (if there were to be an extension of time to bring proceedings in relation to alleged voidable transactions arising out of the restructuring of the Ladycare business and the related company loans of the kind foreshadowed in Part H of the draft pleading) must be considered in light of the fact that there are already proceedings on foot in which claims relating to those transactions are being raised. They will in any event be exposed to the cost of proceedings in relation to those matters and their recollection of events, diminished as it may be, will necessarily be tested in those proceedings whether or not leave is given in the present proceedings. 213Therefore, it seems to me that the prejudice likely to be suffered by the Jasmic parties as a result of an extension of time to bring voidable transaction claims in relation to matters that are already the subject of or related to matters the subject of proceedings against them is considerably diminished. 214I should note, however, as to prejudice, that the proposed claims sought to be made involve other parties (such as Waltlo, LCIS IT, Tama and Enviro LCS) to whom notice was not given of the proposed application (and even if they had indirect notice through Mr and Mrs Shea, there was no identification of the particular claim sought to be made against them). 215In the ordinary course a party whose interests may be adversely affected by an extension of time should be joined as a defendant to the application ( Greig ; McGrath v National Indemnity Co (2004) 182 FLR 309). Insofar as there is a series of individual transactions now sought to be impugned, it is submitted by Mr Pritchard that the parties to those transactions (with the one exception of the Jasmic payment that seems already to be the subject of the proceedings brought against Jasmic or sufficiently related thereto to make it perhaps likely that an amendment might be made to encompass that transaction in the existing proceedings) have not been given proper notice of the application. Mr Pritchard thus submits that the question of prejudice must be considered in the context of the foreshadowed application against entities to whom notice of the claim was not given and that although (as Mr Harper submits) those entities may have been on notice of investigation of matters such as directors' duty claims would not have been on notice of the particular claims now sought to be maintained. Conclusion 216When considering the delay in the present case, the liquidators' position was that it was explicable due to the:
• lack of funding (though the impact of this was really only that a conscious decision seems to have been made, in accordance with the liquidators' practice, only to investigate up to a certain point and there was no investigation of any means by which the liquidators' further investigations could have been funded in the interim - any prejudice in now not being able to maintain a voidable transaction claim would seem to me to be self-inflicted in the sense that this expression was used in Buzzle );
• complexity of the companies' affairs (though the Ladycare restructuring was not itself regarded by Mr Hutchins as a transaction of any complexity and, in any event, this did not preclude the commencement of proceedings in Ladycare or in relation to the Windsor Village transaction - the real difficulty seeming to me to arise from the lateness of the time at which the liquidators commenced to make serious efforts to investigate the position);
• lack of information available to the liquidator (again, this seems to some extent to be a product of the manner in which the investigations proceeded largely in a formulaic way issuing standard form requests for documents and not pursuing those requests; in relation to the complaints as to the manner of discovery, this seems to me to be as to production in a manner not identified by reference to particular transactions but in any event there is evidence from the solicitors acting for the Jasmic parties that production was in the form sought and that there was no complaint at the time); and
• lack of cooperation (but the evidence suggests that there was a measure of cooperation both on part of the Sheas and their accountant, Mr Roy, and on the part of McCarthy and Chambers Finance. In particular, Mr and Mrs Shea made available not only Mr Roy but an adviser from HQZ Argentum to provide information in relation to the Ladycare transactions. Mr Hutchins did not accept the information given by the respective accountants or advisers as helpful (and seemed to go so far as to suggest that there was an attempt to present the transaction in a misleading fashion as very complex when he considered the structure to be simple and his objection was to the lack of information as to its commercial purpose), but that seems to be a criticism as to the information he was given not a lack of cooperation in its provision. The liquidators were critical of the responses given in the course of the examinations of those involved with the Jasmic interests (reference being made in submissions to an "intransigent inability to recall" on the part of Mr Shea), but it seems that equally the explanation might be that the Sheas left matters in the hands of their advisers (hence their inability now to be of much assistance in identifying what took place) and that Mr Roy himself did not have a clear idea or does not now have a clear idea of the intricacies of a restructuring done on the advice of other advisers. Again, a criticism as to the lack of understanding of the parties involved in the transaction is not the same as lack of cooperation in the investigations.) 217As to the relevant period of delay, Mr Harper submits that it was at most 8-9 months during which time there was no activity on the part of Mr Francipane and the commencement of activity by Mr Hutchins; Mr Pritchard says that the delay is in effect the 2 and a half year period from the liquidators' appointment in April 2007 to the taking of steps from October 2009. I am of the view that the effective delay in relation to the investigations is the latter period (since the steps taken by Mr Francipane seem to have been somewhat formulaic in the sense of going through the motions (at least so far as the time sheets reveal) and Mr Hutchins was clear that he had obtained little assistance from the steps taken in that earlier period). 218The relevant delay, for the purposes of an extension application under s 588FF(3), is the delay in the bringing of proceedings. That time started to run from the expiry of the three-year period. That is not a lengthy period of delay. However, the presumptive prejudice resulting from that delay is the deterioration in memory in the time that has elapsed since the transactions that would be the subject of the voidable transaction proceedings if the period for bringing the proceedings were to be extended and the likelihood of that prejudice must be assessed by reference to a greater period of time. (As Brown makes clear, the statutory time limit involves a legislative balancing of the prejudice arising from delay in this regard.) 219In the present case, the reason for the delay in bringing the proceedings largely seems to be the relative inactivity of the liquidators for two and a half years of the three-year period available to them (due to the policy decision not to expend large funds on an unfunded liquidation). Mr Harper submitted that this was not an unreasonable approach. I accept the force of that. In the same fashion, Tobias JA in Tolcher accepted that it was responsible for a liquidator not to incur costs in proceedings until knew litigation funding in place. However, by analogy with the reasoning in Buzzle , where the decision is made not to pursue more than preliminary investigations unless something is discovered in those investigations that might make investigation worthwhile and not to seek funding (or to make an application to the ASIC fund for assistance) to do so, then that is a forensic decision made by the liquidators and in those circumstances the liquidators must bear the risk that there will be no extension granted. 220The facts seem to me to suggest that had an exercise of the kind carried out by Mr Hutchins in October 2009 been commenced at an earlier stage then there is every possibility that the liquidators could have obtained the same kind of speculative funding arrangements as they were able to do in early 2010. This reinforces the conclusion that the situation in which the liquidators now find themselves is as a result of decisions consciously taken by them and hence any prejudice is self inflicted. 221As to the merits, I accept that an arguable case seems to be shown in relation to the Ladycare transactions and the Windsor Village partnership transactions. 222The position is very different in relation to the Scotch Whisky transaction - initially the position was that an extension was necessary in order to enable a n investigation of the position (Mr Kassem having made it clear in the witness box in May this year that he did not know what particular claim there might be; did not know if there was in fact any whisky or the like); but since then examinations have taken place in relation to this issue and there is still no articulation of any voidable transaction claim. There cannot be a voidable transaction claim in relation into the entry into the 2001 transaction per se (unless the 10 year time period applied - and at T 33 Mr Kassem disclaimed any suggestion that it was considered that the transaction was entered into for purpose of defeating creditors; saying that he considered it bore the hallmarks of a transaction entered into for tax minimisation purposes). Mr Harper confirmed in closing submissions that there is not a claim to set aside the transactions but that what the liquidator is enquiring into is whether there is a voidable transaction in relation to the performance of the whisky transaction or during the period thereafter. However, nothing has been put to me to suggest that there is a basis for such a claim and given the delay to date I see no reason to grant a further extension to carry out what seems to be little more than a fishing expedition in that regard. 223As to the question of prejudice, Mr Harper emphasises that no evidence of actual prejudice (other than the effect on the forthcoming criminal trials of Messrs Sellers and McCarthy) had been adduced. However, presumptive prejudice of the kind identified in Brisbane Health is, of course, a presumption of actual prejudice. 224For his part, Mr Pritchard does not accept that there is no evidence of specific prejudice in any event, referring to the evidence of Mr Shea's advanced glaucoma as constituting actual prejudice. In that regard, while I accept that a medical condition of this kind is likely to make the giving of evidence by Mr Shea more difficult, this is not the same kind of prejudice as that which occurs where a witness has died or where there is a medical condition suffered which affects the witness' memory. That said, prejudice to some extent from the inevitable (or at least very likely) deterioration of memory (exacerbated by the fact that Mr Shea is an elderly witness) should I think be inferred. 225However, in circumstances where the Jasmic parties are already embroiled in claims relating to the transactions the subject of the leave application, and will no doubt be required to give evidence in relation to the restructuring of the Ladycare business for the purpose of other claims, any prejudice in respect of the deterioration of the quality of their memory is already present and it does not seem likely to me that this will be greatly exacerbated by the addition of a further voidable transaction claim in relation to those matters. 226Balancing the various considerations referred to above, my conclusion is that the applications for extension of time to commence voidable transaction proceedings in both the Clarecastle and Ladycare Leave proceedings should be dismissed other than in relation to the claim foreshadowed against Jasmic in paragraph [57] and [58] of the draft Statement of Claim (since I consider that the issues raised by it will be issues of the kind already raised in the proceedings on foot or which could be brought without leave). 227I note that this still leaves the liquidators in the position where there remain claims in relation to the conduct of the respective companies' affairs and it may well be that an extension of time in relation to particular transactions can be sought in the context of an application for amendment to the existing proceedings. Further, insofar as the applications for an extension of time in the 3 specific proceedings involve parties other than the Jasmic parties (who were not represented on this occasion) it seems to me that the findings above would not preclude an application for amendment of the existing proceedings to include claims against those parties and an extension of time in that regard (particularly since different issues relevant to the weighing of the delay and prejudice considerations might well arise in relation to those other parties). Orders 228For the reasons set out above, I propose to make the following orders:

1. Pursuant to s 588FF(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), I extend the time for the bringing of a voidable transaction claim of the kind identified in paragraphs [57] and [58] of the draft Statement of Claim annexed to the affidavit sworn 29 June 2011 of Mr Charly Tannous in these proceedings, against Jasmic Nominees Pty Limited.
2. Save as above, I dismiss the applications for an extension of time pursuant to s 588FF(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), brought in proceedings 81756 of 2010 and 81786 of 2010. 229I will hear submissions as to costs and as to the form of the proposed orders at an appropriate time.

[2003] QCA 298