CK Nominees Australia Pty Ltd v Official Receiver

… SCHEDULE 1 TO NOTICE DATED 12 AUGUST 2005 RECORDS REQUIRED TO BE PRODUCED I. All original and/or copy documents signed by Kevin Trevor Pollock, whether in his own right, or on behalf, formally or informally, of any other natural person or legal entity. II. All original and/or copy documents received from Kevin Trevor Pollock, whether in his own right, or on behalf, formally or informally, of any other natural person or legal entity. III. All original and/or copy documents sent to Kevin Trevor Pollock, whether in his own right, or on behalf, formally or informally, of any other natural person or legal entity. IV. All records of meetings attended by Kevin Trevor Pollock. V. All records of conversations with Kevin Trevor Pollock. VI. All original and/or copy documents including, but not limited to, Agency Agreements and Powers of Attorney which purport to confer the ability or right for Kevin Trevor Pollock to act for or on behalf of another natural person or legal entity. VII. All original and/or copy documents including, but not limited to, Agency Agreements and Powers of Attorney, which purport to confer the ability or right for another natural person or legal entity to act for or on behalf of Kevin Trevor Pollock. VIII. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence that Kevin Trevor Pollock holds property (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) in trust for another person or legal entity. IX. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence that another person or legal entity holds property (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) in trust for Kevin Trevor Pollock. X. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence that any of the natural persons or legal entities listed in Schedule 2 to this Notice are controlled by Kevin Trevor Pollock or any person acting on his behalf or for his interest. XI. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence any involvement of Kevin Trevor Pollock in making decisions for and on behalf of any of the natural persons or legal entities listed in Schedule 2 to this Notice. XII. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence the provision of personal services by or on behalf of Kevin Trevor Pollock to or on behalf of any of the natural persons or legal entities listed in Schedule 2 to this Notice, and/or the provision of remuneration in respect of those services. XIII. All original and/or copy documents which evidence or purport to evidence any payment by or on behalf of any of the natural persons or legal entities listed in Schedule 2 to this Notice to Kevin Trevor Pollock or any person or entity acting on his behalf or for his benefit. XIV. All original and/or copy documents relating to the transfer(s) of property (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) to or from Kevin Trevor Pollock. XV. All original and/or copy documents relating to the transfer(s) of property (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) to or from any of the natural persons or legal entities listed in Schedule 2 to this Notice as a result of dealings with Kevin Trevor Pollock whether in his own right, or on behalf, formally or informally, of any other natural person or legal entity. XVI. All other books (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) which relate to the Examinable Affairs (as defined in Section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966) of Kevin Trevor Pollock. 6 In evidence before the primary judge was an affidavit of Ms Carina Healey sworn 2 September 2005. Ms Healey was the director of the appellant and the daughter of the bankrupt. She deposed that she did not have any legal training, did not keep a record of correspondence sent by her to other persons or, ordinarily, copies of correspondence sent by her to others, and had not received an advance from the first respondent for costs of coming to Perth to comply with the notice. Her address was in the State of Victoria. 7 The first ground upon which the notices were challenged was that the issue of the notices was not authorised by s 77C. The central proposition was that the notices did not demonstrate that the first respondent was entitled to require production of the documents which the notice required to be produced. The appellant submitted that the expression "which relate to the examinable affairs of Kevin Trevor Pollock" which appear in an introductory paragraph of the notice did not save the notice by limiting the scope of the documents required to be produced (to those concerning the examinable affairs of the bankrupt). That was because the notice properly construed, having regard to ordinary meaning of the expression, required the recipient to produce all the documents listed in schedule 1. However, his Honour found that on a fair reading of the notice and schedule 1, it was apparent that the drafter's intention was to limit the scope of the classes of documents set out in the schedule. His Honour found that the classes of documents had to be read as being qualified by reference to the examinable affairs of the bankrupt and to the prescribed time period, that is, documents "which are dated, or relate to matters arising, between 1 January 2000 and the date of this Notice". 8 The second ground was that compliance with the notices was oppressive. His Honour considered this ground in relation to five aspects of schedule 1. First, his Honour considered whether paragraphs I to V and XVI of schedule 1 were oppressive. The appellant's submission was that the paragraphs were in such wide terms that the only reasonable inference was that the documents sought did not have any relation to the bankrupt's examinable affairs and that in requiring such documents to be produced, the first respondent had acted beyond power. Alternatively, the appellant argued that if the paragraphs were to be construed as only requiring the production of documents relating to the examinable affairs of the bankrupt, a recipient would be required to determine what was meant by "examinable affairs", and that in imposing such a burdensome requirement, the first respondent had acted beyond power. His Honour held that the first respondent did not act beyond power in requiring the production of categories of documents in the paragraphs because the documents required to be produced were subject to the limitations noted earlier. In relation to the alternative argument, his Honour found that although recipients would be required to determine whether a particular document related to the examinable affairs of the bankrupt and also to determine the meaning of terms such as "associated entity", the notice was not rendered invalid because the terms were not so confusing or devoid of meaning that the recipients would not know which documents to produce. His Honour referred to Federal Commissioner of Taxation v ANZ Banking Group Limited (1979) 143 CLR 499 as authority for the proposition that difficulty in identifying the documents required to be provided by a notice was not sufficient basis for concluding that a notice was invalid, which was a principle emphasised by his Honour in respect to a number of the appellant's submissions. 9 Secondly, the primary judge considered paragraphs X, XI, XII and XIII of schedule 1. The appellant submitted that by purporting to require production of documents covering more than five and a half years concerning the bankrupt's dealings with fifty four entities listed in schedule 2, the first respondent had acted beyond power by imposing requirements without regard to the burden imposed on the recipient to comply, referring to Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1982) 39 ALR 565. His Honour held that imposition of the two requirements was explicable on the basis of the first respondent acting within power and for a proper purpose. The requirements regarding the number of entities reflected the extent and complexity of the bankrupt's examinable affairs, whereas the time requirement was explicable on the basis that the scope of the investigation was limited to a limitation period of six years. His Honour indicated that there was an absence of evidence of a significantly onerous burden upon which to found a conclusion that the first respondent could only have imposed the requirements in excess of the implied limitation as to oppression. 10 Thirdly, the primary judge considered paragraphs VI to XIII of schedule 1 in relation to the words "purport to evidence" and "purport to confer" which appear in a number of descriptions of the records required to be produced. His Honour did not accept the appellant's submission that expressed this way, this part of the notice imposed a burdensome task on the recipients by requiring them to determine not only whether a document related to a particular matter but also whether it is or might be a sham. His Honour found that the expressions made the recipient's task easier by relieving the recipient of the task of having to determine whether a document was a sham or was effective in its purpose. 11 Fourthly, the primary judge considered paragraph XV of schedule 1. The appellant sought to impugn this paragraph on the basis that it imposed an obligation which was almost impossible to comply with, by requiring the recipient to determine whether a transfer of property from a third party had occurred as a result of dealings with the bankrupt in his own right or on behalf of some other person. His Honour accepted it was possible that some documents in this category would not contain a direct reference to the bankrupt and would require the recipient to make inquiries as to the bankrupt's involvement with any transfer of property. However, no evidence had been given that there were in fact such documents nor in relation to other relevant matters, which would demonstrate that the requirement imposed a burdensome task on the recipients or that the first respondent could only have imposed the requirement if he had exceeded his powers. 12 Finally, the primary judge considered paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice. Paragraph 2 required the recipient to provide a list of documents provided in response to the notice, together with an affidavit verifying the truth and completeness of the list and deposing that it contained all the documents specified in schedule 1 which were within the recipient's possession, custody or control. The appellant took issue with the requirement to depose in absolute terms, rather than in terms limited to the recipient's knowledge, information and belief, which was said to be unreasonable and oppressive. The first respondent's position was that the requirement for affidavit evidence permitted the recipient to respond by deposing in terms of his or her information and belief. His Honour noted that although a similar obligation is imposed on the deponent to an affidavit of discovery, such a deponent was only required to depose to the best of his or her information and belief and was not subject to a statutory penal sanction, unlike the recipients in the present case. His Honour concluded that it was not possible to read the requirement as only requiring the recipient to depose to the best of his or her information and belief and that the imposition of the requirement to make the affidavit in the terms referred to was invalid. His Honour noted that s 267B(1) of the Act provided a statutory penalty for failure to comply with the terms of a notice and that s 267B(2) of the Act provided a defence for failure to comply based on reasonable excuse. The Act therefore provided the standard for compliance. The first respondent had imposed a requirement exceeding the standard recognised in the Act and had therefore acted beyond power. 13 As to the requirement in paragraph 3 of the notice, the appellant sought to impugn both the requirement to provide the list and the requirement that the list be verified by affidavit, as being oppressive and unreasonable. The list required was a list of documents identified in schedule 1 which the recipient once had, but no longer had, in his or her possession, custody or control, and the persons to whom those documents had been sent and when, which the appellant contended was oppressive in the circumstances. The requirement to provide affidavit evidence was in similar terms to that contained in paragraph 2 and the appellant sought to impugn it on the same basis. His Honour held that the requirement to provide the affidavit in paragraph 3 was beyond power for the reasons given in relation to the similar requirement in paragraph 2. However, his Honour did not accept that the requirement to compile the list itself had been invalidly imposed. It was not self evident that such a requirement was oppressive and whether it was so would depend on a number of factors, of which no evidence had been given. The affidavit evidence of Ms Healey, who deposed that she did not keep a record or copies of documents she had sent, was viewed as insufficient in this respect. His Honour made severance orders in accordance with his findings in relation to the requirements for affidavit evidence, relying on Re McKee; Ex parte Laroar Holdings v Ross (1996) 71 FCR 156 at 170, and found that subject to that severance, the notice was not invalid.

Grounds of appeal 14 The notice of appeal filed 15 August 2006 raised four grounds which can be stated as follows:

1. The trial judge erred in law in failing to find that the notices were invalid on the ground that the first respondent was not authorised by the Act to require the production of the documents and information sought in the notice ;
2. The trial judge erred in law and in fact in failing to find that the obligations imposed by the notices were oppressive, having regard to the nature and number of enquiries the noticed required the recipients to undertake, the period over which those enquiries had to be made and the consequences of non-compliance;
3. the trial judge erred in law in finding that the phrase "associated entity" in the context of the notices had a commonsense, self evident meaning such that the notices were not oppressive;
4. the trial judge erred in law in holding, in relation to paragraph XV of schedule 1 of the notices, that it was necessary for the applicant to adduce evidence that documents existed within the scope of that paragraph before a finding could be made that the paragraph was oppressive. 15 The third ground was later amended to read instead "were not reasonably clear and were oppressive" in place of "were not oppressive", which amendment was not opposed. At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant sought to amend the notice of appeal to add a fifth ground concerning the power to issue notices to companies. It was an issue which had been raised with the parties by the Court shortly before the hearing. It had not been raised before the primary judge. In summary, what had been raised with the parties was that the notice to the appellant was, in terms, addressed to the directors of the appellant, yet the proceedings had been brought, on a representative basis, by the company itself. Possibly the proceedings should have been brought by the directors. The notice was also, at least potentially, directed to more than one person, "the directors". On the other hand, if the notice should have been treated as being addressed to the company, it would not have been addressed to a natural person, which may also raise an issue about its validity: see: Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475 at 481, Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v The Duke Group Ltd (1993) 62 SASR 158 at 160-161 and Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92. 16 In my opinion, leave to amend the notice of appeal to raise this fresh point should not be granted notwithstanding that it had its origins in a communication from the Court. In particular, whether a notice under s 77C can be directed to a company is potentially an important issue. However, we do not have the benefit of a considered judgment by a single judge on this point and, in so far as the parties have addressed the matter, they only had a limited opportunity to do so. In addition, s 77C has been amended since the notices in question were issued, and the amendment may well be of significance in resolving the issue. Were this Full Court to resolve this issue by reference to the unamended s 77C, any conclusion of ours would be of limited utility in the future. In addition, any such conclusion by reference to the unamended section could well mislead those who either issue or receive notices under the section in its amended form.

The Court's jurisdiction to review notices issued under s 77C 17 During the hearing of the appeal, a question arose about the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by this Court in an application such as the present. The parties addressed this question in detailed and helpful written submissions filed after the hearing. On the approach I have taken to the primary issues raised in the appeal, it is not necessary to consider what might be the outer reaches of and limits on the Court's jurisdiction. However as the question was addressed by the parties, it is convenient to say something about the Court's jurisdiction at the outset. 18 There are two sections of the Act of central relevance, s 15 and s 27. Section 15(5) provides that the Court may review an act done by an Official Receiver. In its present form, s 15(5) was enacted by the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Act 1996 (Cth) ("the amending Act"). Section 27 confers jurisdiction on this Court as a court of bankruptcy and, together with s 30 which confers broad powers in furtherance of the jurisdiction, creates a jurisdiction of great width. 19 The power of the courts exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction has long been regarded as substantial. In McIntosh v Shashoua (1931) 46 CLR 494 at 520, the High Court quoted from In re Thurlow; Ex parte Official Receiver (1895) 2 Mans 158 at 160: Of all the procedures in our Courts, that of the Court of Bankruptcy will be the first to brush aside all technicalities to get at what is fair and just. Dr Lushington used to say of Admiralty law that it was wider than equity or common law, and that the Admiralty Court administered the law according to natural justice. That is also the rule in bankruptcy. In construing an Act of Parliament the Court will, if it can, so construe the Act as to leave the greatest latitude in the Court of Bankruptcy. Administration in bankruptcy is under the control of the Court, except where it is limited by an Act of Parliament. It is not the creditors who administer bankruptcy law; it is no part of the rights of the debtor to interfere; no official receiver has a right to interfere, except subject to the control or orders of the Court; and no department of the Government has any right to interfere. It is the Court of Bankruptcy alone that controls the administration through its officers, and above them is this Court of Appeal. (emphasis added) 20 An Official Receiver's functions under the Act are administrative in nature: see, for example, the discussion in Hayter M, "Notices and Investigative Powers", 4 Insolvency Law Journal 116 at 116, and can be subject to review by the Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ("the ADJR Act"). 21 There are a large number of provisions in the Act conferring power on the Court in exercise of its bankruptcy jurisdiction: see the discussion in Forshaw v Thompson (1992) 35 FCR 329 at 334. For example, s 178 of the Act allows a bankrupt or any other person affected by an act or decision of a trustee to apply to the Court, and assigns to the Court the power to make "such order in the matter as it thinks just and equitable". As a further example, s 139ZM confers on the Court the power to set aside a notice issued by an Official Receiver requiring the recipient to make payments to the trustee to discharge the liability of the bankrupt to make a contribution. Section 139ZS confers on the Court the power to set aside a notice issued by an Official Receiver to collect money or property from a party to a transaction that is void against the trustee. 22 There is no provision expressly conferring on the Court the power to review and, if appropriate, set aside a notice issued by an Official Receiver under s 77C. However, the appellant submitted the Court had a "wide power" of review of the conduct of the Official Receiver deriving from s 30(1) and s 15(5) of the Act. The second respondent contended firstly that neither ss 15(5) nor 30(1) are the sources of power to review. It was said that the power to review s 77C notices is conferred by the ADJR Act and confined to the grounds of review in that Act. A submission made in the alternative was that even if the source of the power to review is the Act, the grounds are those which reflect more general principles of judicial review or at least limited to the grounds discussed in Pyneboard. 23 Section 30(1) of the Act provides: (1) The Court: (a) has full power to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, in any case of bankruptcy or any matter under Part IX, X or XI coming within the cognizance of the Court; and (b) may make such orders (including declaratory orders and orders granting injunctions or other equitable remedies) as the Court considers necessary for the purposes of carrying out or giving effect to this Act in any such case or matter. 24 As noted earlier s 27, confers jurisdiction on the Court: see Forshaw at 334; Re Dingle; Westpac Banking Corporation v Worrell (1993) 47 FCR 478 at 485; Morris v Maroudas (1986) 12 FCR 346 at 350. Section 30 has been liberally construed: Forshaw at 341 citing Beaumont J in Zantiotis v Andrew (1987) 80 ALR 23 at 26. The section is regarded as conferring a wide power. In Re Lamb; Ex parte Melsom (1980) 42 FLR 399, the Court was asked to order the consolidation of the estate of the bankrupt and the debtor when the Act did not explicitly provide for such power. The Court (at 402) noted English authority concerning a cognate provision, concluding that "the court has the widest powers under the section as regards matters arising out of the bankruptcy". Section 30 has been relied upon in the absence of or in addition to more specific provisions conferring power to review: see Re Hedge; Ex parte Goddard (1994) 50 FCR 421 at 424 in the context of setting aside a bankruptcy notice and in Re Lucera; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Lucera (1994) 53 FCR 329 at 338 in the context of an application under s 139ZS to set aside a notice issued under s 139ZQ. 25 The existence of more specific provisions conferring power upon the Court in particular instances is not to be regarded as diminishing the width of review available under s 30: see Re Bond; Ex parte Bond v Caddy (No 2) (1994) 11 WAR 345 at 346-347. Nonetheless in Tyler v Thomas (2006) 150 FCR 357 the members of the Full Court observed in separate judgements (at [13], [78] and [208]) that s 30(1) is not a source of power that can be exercised to override express provisions of the Act. Similarly, in Re Bayliss; Ex parte Official Trustee (1987) 15 FLR 167 at 169, the Court said that "[i]t must be a matter of construction in each case whether a particular provision of the Act negates the possibility of the court's making an order under the general power". The power conferred by s 30 is a discretionary power: Re Dingle at 484 - 485. 26 Section 15(5), as enacted by the 1996 amending Act, provides: (5) The Court may review an act done by an Official Receiver. 27 Before the introduction of s 15(5), s 15 contained the following subsection which has since been repealed: (2) The Official Receivers shall be under the control of the Court. 28 There are no authorities of which I am aware in which the scope of s 15(5) has been considered though in Bond v Tuohy at 102 (a case predating the 1996 amendment and concerning, amongst other things, legal professional privilege claimed in relation to documents sought by notices issued under s 77C), Ryan J noted in brief that "the applicants could obtain similar protection by an application to this Court in the exercise of its general control over Official Receivers pursuant to s 15(2) of the Bankruptcy Act". What is comprehended by a "review" is not made explicit in the legislation. As Black CJ noted in Brock v United States [2007] FCAFC 3 at [26], Mason CJ, Brennan and Toohey JJ said in Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245 at 261: [W]hat emerges from the judicial decisions and, for that matter, from statutes is that "review" has no settled pre-determined meaning; it takes its meaning from the context in which it appears. 29 The explanatory memoranda for the 1996 amending Act said, at 45 at [16.4]: A new subsection 15(5) is proposed to be inserted, which will make acts done by an Official Receiver subject to review by the Court. Although a number of the decisions of an Official Receiver can be reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and by the Court when the Official Receiver is acting on behalf of the Official Trustee, there is no general power of review of an Official Receiver's decisions, which for example would enable the Court to review a decision by the Official Receiver to reject a debtor's petition on the basis that the statement of affairs presented by the debtor was inadequate. Although it is unlikely that many challenges would be mounted to such decisions, it is important in point of principle that a specific power of general review be conferred on the Court. (emphasis added) 30 The appellant noted the use of the term "specific power of general review" to apply to functions carried out by an Official Receiver. The second respondent, however, noted the focus of the paragraph on filling an existing gap, and suggested that Parliament, in introducing s 15(5), merely sought to extend judicial review to decisions of the Official Receiver that were not administrative in nature and were not made as a trustee (the former being outside the scope of the ADJR Act and the latter outside the scope of ss 178 and 179 of the Act). 31 In relation to ss 178 and 179 of the Act, the explanatory memorandum, at 28 at [91], suggests the Court's review power under these provisions is "review on the merits, and the Court can order the trustee to reconsider an act, omission or decision in accordance with its reasons for judgment". The applicability of ss 178 and 179 to review of acts by an Official Receiver, or to proper construction of the scope of review under s 30 or s 15(5), may therefore be relevant. 32 Even if it is accepted that ss 30 and 15 provide a broader scope of review than that available under the ADJR Act, the second respondent submitted that the Court's power to review a s 77C(1) notice stems from neither provision, but solely from the ADJR Act. Decisions under the Bankruptcy Act do not fall within the "Classes of decisions that are not decisions to which [the ADJR Act] applies": see schedule 1 of the ADJR Act. 33 The basis for this submission was first, that there have been no challenges to s 77C notices brought pursuant to ss 30 and 15. This is true. Of the cases concerning notices under s 77C decided to date, the two that make explicit the source of power for the review point to the ADJR Act: Re McKee and Bond v Tuohy. However, those cases were decided before the introduction of s 15(5) in its present form. 34 The second basis for the submission was said to be a constitutional limitation. Noting that it was essentially the same question as that raised in Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346, the second respondent contended: The proposition that Section 15(5) of the Act extends the Court's power to review the Official Receiver's administrative acts, on a basis wider than that provided by the ADJR Act, may raise a question as to the constitutionalvalidity of that provision. 35 The respondents suggested that the limited nature of the review allowable to the Court when reviewing a s 77C notice (namely judicial review) limits the extent to which the Court can look to the substance of the notice, as opposed to any illegality (such as improper purpose or failing to have regard to the burden imposed) by the Official Receiver. 36 I am inclined to the view that because of the Court's role in bankruptcy historically, the width of the powers conferred by s 30 - "full power to decide questions of law and fact", (emphasis added) - together with the explicit, and in terms unconstrained, conferral of power by s 15(5) to review an act done by an Official Receiver, the powers exercised by this Court in such a review is not constrained by limits ordinarily attending judicial review. That is not to say that the Court can place itself in the same position as the Official Receiver and decide what terms an impugned notice should be in as a matter of mere preference. But that is not the case we are presently considering.

Disposition of the appeal 37 I now turn to consider the issues raised in the appeal. It appeared to be common ground that for a s 77C notice to be valid it must, at the very least, satisfy two conditions. The first is that the notice should convey to the recipient with reasonable clarity what information or documents are sought. The second is that it should be apparent from the face of the notice that it was issued for a purpose authorised by the Act: Pyneboard at 570-571 and Re McKee at 169. 38 In the present case, the appellant contended that the notice satisfied neither condition. The first condition, and indirectly the second, was not satisfied because the class of documents sought by the notice was unconstrained. This in turn raised the question whether the expression "which relate to the examination of the affairs of [the bankrupt]" qualifies the documents identified in schedule 1. For the reasons given by the primary judge, they do. The notice must be construed as a whole. One could reasonably expect a recipient to commence reading the notice from the beginning. The recipient would read, in the paragraph immediately above the heading "Documents Required", that certain documents were required to be produced with the qualification that they were documents which related to the examinable affairs of the bankrupt. With the knowledge gained from these prefatory remarks, the recipient would then read what documents were required which would in due course take the recipient to schedule 1 and schedule 2. In my view, the notice identifies with sufficient clarity what documents are sought and discloses that the Official Receiver was authorised to require their production. 39 The appellant made a subsidiary submission that the notice was not reasonably clear about what documents were required. The submission centred on the expression "associated entities" which is used in the definition of "examinable affairs" set out on the third page of the notice (containing extracts from the Act). The expression "associated entities" is defined in the Act (though that definition was not sent with the extracts) and the expression "private company" which is found in the definition of "associated entities" is a defined expression. In my opinion, the primary judge was correct in concluding that the Court should, when construing a notice of the type under consideration, take a "broad common sense approach", an expression which fairly synthesises the more detailed discussion of the Full Court in Pyneboard at 570-571. In construing the reference to "examinable affairs" and looking at the definition, including the expression "associated entities", a recipient could reasonably be expected to understand that the notice was seeking documents concerning the direct dealings of the bankrupt as well as documents concerning the financial affairs of associated entities. That term described with sufficient clarity and as an ordinary English expression what was comprehended by the more precise definition including the reference to private company. 40 The next question is whether the notices were oppressive. The appellant submitted in its written submissions that the notices were oppressive on their face having regard to the period of time covered and the many combinations and permutations of documents required, and thus the enquiries to be made and searches undertaken, arising from the list in schedule 1 and in particular, the vastly expanded number of documents arising from the interaction between schedule 1 and schedule 2. It was said that because the notice was oppressive on its face, it could be inferred that the notice had not been issued responsibly by the Official Receiver with proper consideration having been given to the burden it imposed. Put this way, a finding of oppression in the way the appellant contended is a step towards a conclusion that the notice was not authorised by the Act. In essence, it is an argument concerning the power of the Official Receiver. However during oral argument, the appellant appeared to submit that the Court had power to set aside a notice if it was oppressive on its face quite apart from whether, if oppressive, it was not authorised. The appellant also submitted that the application before the primary judge raised oppression alone (not linked to power) as a ground of setting aside the notice. For my part, I am somewhat sceptical that this argument was put below, even in the alternative. It is true the amended application could be read so as to raise this point but the written submissions of the appellant to the primary judge linked oppression with power. Having regard to his reasons, the primary judge appears to have understood the submission to be limited this way. With respect, he was entitled do so. 41 However given the broad nature of the jurisdiction of the Court (as discussed in [19] to [36] above), it would be open to the Court to set aside a notice if it was oppressive on its face without moving to consider the question of power. I should add that in one sense this is probably a false dichotomy because if a notice was oppressive on its face then one could readily infer that its issue involved an excess of power. It may also be possible to set aside a notice if it was oppressive having regard to evidence led by a recipient about the burden the notice imposed on that recipient. However, on any view, the appellant's case was not put on this basis before the primary judge or on appeal even though there was some limited evidence concerning the capacity of Ms Healy to gather the documents. Accordingly it is unnecessary to explore whether oppression on a particular recipient having regard to evidence of that recipient is a basis for setting aside a notice under s 77C. 42 The question then is whether the notice or any part of it is oppressive on its face. In my opinion it is in one respect. Fairly clearly the notice was drafted as a formulaic template of sorts. An extensive range of documents was identified and embodied in schedule 1. However the way several of the classes of documents have been described (X to XIII and XV) invokes schedule 2. Schedule 2 contains the names or identities of fifty four persons. The result is that each of the five classes in X to XIII and XV have fifty four subclasses. It can be inferred, in my opinion, that the template has been used without regard to whether a particular recipient has or is likely to have documents concerning all the individuals and entities in schedule 2. It is a manifestation of a drafting technique which will indiscriminately catch any conceivable document which any recipient might have in their possession without consideration of whether each recipient may have a particular document of the type referred to in schedule 1 concerning each and every individual or entity in schedule 2. It may be that some of the recipients could be expected to have documents in each of the subclasses in X to XIII and XV created by the invocation of schedule 2. However the notices, on their face, had not been drafted to accommodate the possibility that some of the recipients do not. The notice is, in this respect, oppressive. I am not satisfied that in other respects the notice is defective and should be set aside. 43 Accordingly I would allow the appeal in part and vary the orders of the primary judge to sever paragraphs X, XI, XII, XIII and XV as well as scheduled 2 from the notice. I would otherwise dismiss the appeal. As both the appellant and the respondents had some but not complete success in the appeal, I would make no order as to costs. I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY WAD 231 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN: CK NOMINEES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 092 302 399)

AND: THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER FOR THE BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

PLACE: SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO PERTH) (HEARD IN PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT TAMBERLIN J 44 I agree with the judgment and reasons of Gyles J. I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Tamberlin.

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY WAD 231 OF 2006

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN: CK NOMINEES AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 092 302 399)

AND: THE OFFICIAL RECEIVER FOR THE BANKRUPTCY DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

PLACE: SYDNEY (VIA VIDEO LINK TO PERTH) (HEARD IN PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT GYLES J 45 Moore J (whose judgment I have had the advantage of reading in draft) has explained how the issue arises. I will not repeat that background except and insofar as it is necessary to do so to explain my own reasons. I agree with Moore J that leave should not be given to further amend the grounds of appeal. In my opinion, the appeal must be allowed, as the primary judge approached the case as if it were a review of a decision of the Official Receiver on administrative law grounds rather than a de novo review. 46 There were no pleadings apart from the amended application. The grounds set out in the amended application were: (1) that the notices require the production of documents and information not authorised by the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) (s 77C); and, alternatively (2) that compliance with the notices is oppressive. 47 The basic submission in relation to the second ground made to the primary judge was that the Official Receiver was obliged to exercise the power conferred by s 77C "responsibly" citing Re Jonson; Ex parte Prentice, unreported, Lockhart J, 1 September 1997. In my respectful opinion, that submission was not dealt with in the judgment below which was framed in terms of validity. 48 The respondents contend that the primary judge was correct in confining his consideration in that way. It was submitted that the proceeding was, or should be regarded as, a challenge to the validity of the issue of the notices pursuant to the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act) as had been the case in Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92 and Re McKee; Ex parte Laroar Holdings Pty Ltd v Ross (1996) 71 FCR 156. However, the proceeding is not framed as such an action and there is no reference to the ADJR Act in the amended application or in the judgment. 49 As submitted for the appellant, s 15(5) of the Act provides a clear basis for the challenge to the giving of the notices in question by the Official Receiver. There is no warrant for reading s 15(5) down to exclude those acts that are subject to the ADJR Act. There is no need to decide whether the appellant is correct in submitting that s 30 would also provide an independent basis for the proceeding. The courts have long had a general supervisory role in bankruptcy. Section 178 of the Act in relation to trustees provides a procedure comparable with s 15(5), of which Brennan CJ, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said in Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1995) 185 CLR 124 (at 138): "That jurisdiction has long been exercised by the courts charged with the supervision of administrations in bankruptcy." That history was traced by French J in Macchia v Nilant (2001) 110 FCR 101 at [30]-[46]. 50 A well known passage from the judgment of Deane J in Re Tyndall; Ex parte Official Receiver (1977) 30 FLR 6 at 9-10; 17 ALR 182 at 186 as to s 178 is apposite to s 15(5): "In my view, the wording of s 178 of the Act is such as to confer upon the court the widest possible discretion as to the appropriate order which should be made in the particular case and is quite inconsistent with the approach that, upon an application made pursuant to the section by a bankrupt, creditor or other person affected by an act, omission or decision of the trustee, the court is only empowered to interfere with the trustee's act, omission or decision if it is of the view that the trustee has acted absurdly or unreasonably or in bad faith." (cited with approval by the Full Court in McGoldrick v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1993) 47 FCR 547). As Lockhart J said in Re Jonson; Ex parte Prentice (unreported, 1 September 1997): "The power given by s 77C of the Act is one with far reaching consequences and must be approached responsibly by applicants for summonses and controlled carefully by the Court." (Emphasis added.) 51 There are many examples of the existence of a power of review by the Court of the kind provided for by s 15(5). Some of the authorities were recently discussed by the Full Court in O'Meara v Hitwise Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 114 - see also New England Biolabs Inc v F Hoffmann-La Roche AG (2004) 141 FCR 1 at [44] and [49]. 52 The appeal should be allowed. The next question is whether the matter should be remitted to the primary judge or dealt with by this Court. It would be remitted in the usual course. The primary judge only considered the issue of oppression from the standpoint of validity. He did not consider, for example, whether the notices should have been framed with more particularity and attention to individual circumstances in order to lessen the burden on the recipients. This would normally involve a weighing exercise of judgment best done at primary level. However, as Moore J points out, the issue essentially arises on the face of the documents. I have formed a clear view that the Official Receiver should not have given notices in this form. 53 In my opinion, the giving of notices in this form was oppressive and cannot be justified. Giving the same notice to more than one person is indicative of a "template" or "catch all" approach. The form of the notice confirms that approach. It covered a period of five and a half years. It casts the widest conceivable net. It includes documents under the control of the party as well as in the possession and custody of the party and purports to cover all capacities in which a document is connected with the recipient. Thus, it purports to catch all documents under the control of a person in his or her capacity as an officer of a company. Sixteen categories of documents are listed, many of which require judgment calls as to the nature of the document and connection with the subject matter. These categories are akin to topics for discovery by a party to litigation. The entities referred to comprised 15 individuals and 39 companies. The permutations and combinations are staggering. As pointed out by Lockhart J in Re Jonson; Ex parte Prentice (unreported, 1 September 1997), the power to give a notice pursuant to s 77C(1)(a) has far reaching consequences. This includes potential imprisonment for 12 months if a person fails to comply with a notice given to that person. These notices are far too uncertain in effect. Compliance with notices in this form would inevitably impose an unnecessary burden of time and expense upon the recipients. 54 I would set aside all such notices and remit the matter to the primary judge to consider what other orders should follow, including the issue of redrafted notices. The nature of the review is such that, in my opinion, the Court is not restricted to setting aside the act done or limited to "blue pencil" severability. It may (if it chooses) do that which ought to have been done by the Official Receiver. In that connection, attention will need to be given to the consequences of the proceeding being conducted as what was described as a representative action. 55 In summary, I would allow the appeal; set aside the orders below; set aside the notices; remit the matter to the primary judge for further hearing; and order that the respondents pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and of the proceedings at first instance up to date. I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.

Associate: Dated: 6 August 2007 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr D R Williams QC

Solicitor for the Appellant: Christensen Vaughan

Solicitor for the First Respondent: Carles Solicitors Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr D M Stone Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Williams & Hughes

Date of Hearing: 12 February 2007 Last Date for Submissions: 14 February 2007 Date of Judgment: 6 August 2007