2.99 In short, there is nothing in the North Sydney Centre (CBD) Character Statement which the proposal is inconsistent with. Most particularly, the height of the proposal is within the Notional Arc which depicts the desired heights for buildings in the Centre.
27 The council concedes that the only submission it made to the Commissioner concerning the notional arcs were that they should be disregarded because they were not sufficiently proximate to the site and were inconsistent with the LEP. That proposition was considered and rejected by the Commissioner at [23] of his reasons for judgment. The council made no submission to the Commissioner that the proposed building infringed the three-dimensional umbrella. Nor was any such contention made in the council's pre-hearing statement of contentions or at any other time. The exchanges quoted above at [22(b)] were during the course of evidence over many days, not during submissions.
28 The concept of a three dimensional umbrella generated by the notional arcs in DCP figures 1.1 and 1.2 was fundamental to the Commissioner's decision. I accept Castle Construction's submission that had there been any contention or submission by the council before the Commissioner that the proposed building did not satisfy the three dimensional arcs umbrella or any specific suggestion by the Commissioner to that effect at the hearing, Castle Constructions would have made a submission on the point including referring to Exhibit N and the evidence of Dr Lamb and Mr Byrnes. In the circumstances, I am persuaded that the Commissioner made his critical findings without giving Castle Constructions a proper opportunity to do so. I do not think that this is sufficiently answered by the council's submissions. Accordingly, I uphold the first ground of appeal.
Second ground of appeal
29 The second ground of appeal, which is closely related to the first, is as follows:
The Commissioner erred in law in failing to consider evidence which was material to the Commissioner's ultimate decision, namely Exhibit N, section 2.3 of the Statement of Evidence of Dr Richard Lamb dated October 2007 and paragraphs 2.13 and 2.99 of the Statement of Evidence of Terence Byrnes dated 17 November 2007.
30 In Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 (CA) at 443 Meagher JA identified three fundamental elements of the judicial obligation to give reasons for judgment. Castle Constructions submits that the first element, which was expressed as follows by Meagher JA, was not satisfied in the present case:
First, a judge should refer to relevant evidence. There is no need to refer to the relevant evidence in detail, especially in circumstances where it is clear that the evidence has been considered. However, where certain evidence is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter and it is not referred to by the trial judge, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge overlooked the evidence or failed to give consideration to it: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435. Where conflicting evidence of a significant nature is given, the
existence of both sets of evidence should be referred to.
31 Castle Constructions also invokes Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 30, 44, 45, 61 and 70 in relation to the obligation of administrative decision-makers to take into account current available information in relation to mandatory considerations. Reference was also made to the application of Peko Wallsend in Canham v Australian Guarantee Corporation Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 246 at 265 and Gales Holdings Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure and Planning (2006) 69 NSWLR 156 at [161] - [176]. Those cases were decided in a different context of judicial review of administrative decisions. It is true that a Commissioner of this Court is not a judicial officer and, when exercising a merits review function, stands in the shoes of the council. However, it is common ground that the obligation to give reasons, as expressed in Beale, applies equally to a Commissioner of the Court as to a Judge. In the circumstances, I consider that it is unnecessary to go beyond the statement of principle in Beale.
32 Castle Constructions submits that the first element of the obligation to give reasons for judgment as expressed in Beale was not satisfied because: