The Council's submission that this reflects the Commissioner's reasoning process in light of various factors is correct. The Commissioner had before him the agreed relative levels of buildings and data and buildings at the edges of the arcs as discussed in [21] - [23] and [32]. At [32] he accepted Mr Mossemenear's approach, summarised at [27] - [29]. The notional arcs were being used with the relative levels associated with the built forms as identified in [21]. The experts all contributed to the evidence discussed by the Commissioner. Particularly relevant is the third sentence of [34] which refers to the issues of visual dominance, transition towards the boundaries of the centre, streetscape and topography, and the area character statement in the DCP as discrete matters. These are separate from the notional arcs and arise from the LEP and DCP character statement. These factors inform the concluding sentence of [34] and for that reason the Commissioner was not therefore drawing the bald conclusion stated in the question of law in this appeal.
39 Secondly, it is important in s 56A appeals that any findings sought to be challenged must be considered in the context of a judgment as a whole. Stein J in Coles v Woollahra Municipal Council (1986) 59 LGRA 133 stated at [138] that "the "fine-tooth comb" approach should not be employed when examining the decisions of technical assessors for errors of law". This finding has been repeated subsequently in many decisions of this Court.
40 It is also important to remember that a Commissioner is not expected to be a lawyer. His reasons should not be reviewed pedantically for error as if he were. It is always instructive to consider Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (1985) 79 LGERA 367 where at [368] Kirby P (McHugh JA agreeing) stated in relation to the review of Commissioner's decisions:
It would be quite wrong, in my opinion, for this court to examine their decisions as if they were written by a lawyer. I am not, by these comments, suggesting double standards; simply that the court should take into proper account the composition of the tribunal, as it has been created by the parliament.
41 As submitted by the Council, [34] must be read with the preceding paragraphs ([30] - [33]) of the Commissioner's conclusion set out at par 13 and the summary of evidence in Castle Constructions No 2 identified at par 35 - 36. His finding in these paragraphs must also be considered with those in Castle Constructions No 1 at [33] that the site should not be considered an area of transition but rather an abrupt edge, and that he was concerned about visual dominance, which findings were not the subject of the s 56A appeal before Biscoe J. The Commissioner has addressed the evidence before him in light of the statutory controls, including the notional arcs, to reach a conclusion as to the acceptability of the proposed building taking into account relevant findings in both Castle Constructions No 1 and Castle Constructions No 2.
42 The reasoning process disclosed in the judgment as reflected in [34] and set out in par 36 and 37, does not give rise to the question of law which the Applicant seeks to raise in this appeal.
43 Thirdly, the Applicant's counsel submitted there were two errors in [34] (set out in par 16). For the reasons given immediately above, the first error identified by the Applicant that the Commissioner mandated a uniform building height does not accurately reflect what the Commissioner did, expressly or by implication, in [34]. Contrary to the submissions of the Applicant's counsel more than one interpretation of [34] is available.
44 The second error identified by the Applicant (par 16) that to require a uniform building height is contrary to the notional arcs because these contemplate a wide variety of heights at the boundary is not based on a correct analysis of the Commissioner's reasoning process for reasons already given in par 38 and 40.
45 Further, the alleged error as stated suggests that a mandatory approach to the application of the DCP as if it is a binding instrument in all respects is required. DCP controls must be taken into account under s 79C(1)(a)(iii) of the EP&A Act. As identified by Spigelman CJ in Zhang v Canterbury City Council (2001) 51 NSWLR 589, DCP controls are "to be considered as a "fundamental element" in or a "focal point" of the decision making process" [602]. The way in which they are taken into account must depend on the nature of the control in the instrument and the circumstances in which the controls are to be applied.