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[2014] NSWLEC 115
Land and Environment Court (NSW)
2014-04-29
Sheahan J, Forrest J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Introduction 1This is an appeal, under s 56A of the Land and Environment Court Act 1979 ("The Court Act"), against the decision of a commissioner, handed down on 28 November 2013, in matter no 10242 of 2013: Universal Property Group Pty Ltd v Blacktown City Council [2013] NSWLEC 1231. 2In that decision, Hussey C dismissed the applicant's Class 1 appeal against the deemed refusal by Council of an application for approval of a medium density project at 236 Richmond Road, Woodcroft. 3The applicant/appellant seeks remittal of the matter to a commissioner other than Hussey C to be heard again and determined afresh: s 56A(2)(b), and Boral Cement Pty Ltd v SHCAG Pty Ltd [2013] NSWLEC 203, at [134] - [137]. 4The medium density development proposed comprised 102 dwellings (88 two-storey houses, and 14 villas, each with three to four bedrooms), and included associated uses, open space, parking and private internal roads. 5The design of the project's internal roads became a principal cause of concern to the Commissioner during the hearing, and then the primary basis for his refusal to grant consent. 6The original internal road design comprised an oval-shaped perimeter loop road, of about 580m in length, intersected by three shorter cross-roads. The perimeter road provided for two-way traffic, and the cross-roads for one-way traffic, with a single access point to the project off Eucumbene Drive. 7Significantly, these internal roads were to operate as a "shared zone", i.e. pedestrians and vehicles would use the same space. When the Commissioner raised his concerns about this element of the proposal, the respective traffic experts endorsed an amending plan, which included a raised pathway adjacent to the perimeter road. 8Even in the absence of any submission by the Council that the DA should be refused, the Commissioner remained not satisfied that it should be approved, and he dismissed the appeal. 9Before me, three grounds of appeal against that decision were pressed by the applicant/appellant: (1)Denial of Procedural Fairness. (2)Failure to give (adequate) reasons. (3)Failure to deal with a mandatory relevant consideration (Blacktown Development Control Plan 2006 - "the DCP"). 10The parties agreed upon a three-volume Appeal Book ("AB1", "AB2", and "AB3").
The Hearing of the Class 1 Proceedings 11The Class 1 appeal proceedings were heard over two days on 10 and 11 October 2013, and commenced with an onsite view, conducted on the morning of the 10th. (The transcripts of each day are in AB1, tabs 3 and 4, at folios 23 - 65, and 66 - 128, respectively, but, when transcript is quoted below, I will give its date and page reference, rather than its AB tab and folio reference). 12Once back in the courtroom, the applicant opened its case first, and its Counsel identified five of Council's filed contentions, which then remained unresolved, and so remained as issues between the parties. The respondent's counsel agreed. 13Those issues were (T10.10.13, pp7 - 11): (1)Proximity of car parking spaces; (2)Distribution of visitor parking; (3)Whether there should be a separate pedestrian path; (4)Whether some driveways are set back sufficiently from the intersection; and (5)The location of some common open space. 14The applicant relied on the evidence of five experts - Mr Varga and Mr Finlay (Traffic Engineers), Mr Grech (Town Planner), Mr Fanning (Ecologist), and Dr Martens (Hydrologist). The respondent relied on only two - Mr McLaren (Traffic Engineer) and Mr Apps (Town Planner). 15The traffic experts gave concurrent evidence (T10.10.13, pp14 - 43, and T11.10.13, commencing p16), and were then joined in concurrent evidence by Dr Martens (T11.10.13, pp17 - 22). 16Most of the five issues were found to be capable of resolution either by minor amendment of the proposal, or by agreed conditions of consent. 17However, the perimeter loop road remained an issue. Mr McLaren articulated a problem with its operating as a "shared zone", absent a pedestrian pathway (T10.10.13, p21), ultimately conceding that, if a number of speed humps were installed along the perimeter road, it would become "barely acceptable" (Tp37). 18At the resumption of the hearing on the second day, the Commissioner indicated (T11.10.13, pp2 - 3) that he had a number of particular concerns with the design of the internal access ways, flowing from the concerns Mr McLaren raised on the first day. 19In response to the Commissioner's concerns, the applicant's traffic engineers further consulted, and, after a short adjournment, Counsel for the applicant said (Tp5, L29) that the Commissioner's concerns again could be resolved by amendments to the plans, which would introduce a separate pathway around the perimeter road. 20Mr McLaren ultimately agreed (Tp16, LL40 - 45) that, if the proposal were amended to provide a separate pedestrian pathway on the perimeter loop road, the internal road design was acceptable on traffic safety grounds. 21The engineers then marked up the location of a footpath on a plan, which eventually became Exhibit N before the Commissioner (and can now be found in AB1, at tab 17). 22Hussey C also raised an issue in relation to the drainage within the road area. In particular, he took issue with the "sag dish" profile proposed, as opposed to a "crown" road, which was usual practice (T11.10.13, p18). He indicated (1) that, prior to making a decision, he wished to see amended architectural, landscaping and drainage plans (Tp56), and (2) that it may be of assistance if he were provided with examples of other sites with the "sag-dish" profile (Tp61). 23Counsel for the applicant submitted that in view of what had occurred during the hearing, in respect of the contentions which were outstanding at the beginning, there was no reason for the Court to refuse the application. The solicitor for the Council confirmed that any residual concerns which Council had were "not determinative". 24At the conclusion of the hearing (Tpp61 - 63), the Commissioner (1) directed the applicant to file amended plans incorporating the amendments to the shared accessway, and also (2) directed the Council to then file agreed draft "without prejudice" conditions. The final plans were submitted on 21 October 2013 (AB1, tab 19), and the draft conditions on 14 November 2013 (AB3, tab 33). 25The learned Commissioner delivered his lengthy written judgment some 6 to 7 weeks after the conclusion of the hearing (28 November 2013).
The Commissioner's Decision 26Hussey C dismissed the appeal and refused consent, primarily on the basis that the design and intended mode of operation of the private internal access ways were inadequate. 27The Commissioner assessed the design of the internal accessways, against the RMS "shared-zones" policy, which identified a number of qualitative outcomes which must be achieved by any shared-zones. However, he highlighted the lack of any development control standards for designing internal roads for developments of this scale, against which the "shared accessway" could be assessed. Accordingly, the Commissioner assembled his own set of evaluative criteria, against which to determine whether the road met the qualitative standards listed in the RMS policy, (see [77] - [78]). 28The Commissioner drew attention (at [15]) to the fact that, although the traffic experts said that the guidelines contained in the RMS "Shared Zone" Policy can be readily applied to the private accessway proposed, they provided no specific justification or reasons presented for that approach. He then outlined (at [16]) the desirable qualitative outcomes contained in the policy, viz the "shared-zone" accessways must:
Appeals 53Section 38 of the Court Act states (my emphasis): (1) Proceedings in Class 1, 2 or 3 of the Court's jurisdiction shall be conducted with as little formality and technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of this Act and of every other relevant enactment and as the proper consideration of the matters before the Court permit. (2) In proceedings in Class, 1, 2 or 3 of the Court's jurisdiction, the Court is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on any matter in such manner and as the proper consideration of the matters before the Court permit. 54However, in Carstens v Pittwater Council ("Carstens") [1999] NSWLEC 249; (1999) 111 LGERA 1, Lloyd J cited with approval this passage of Davidson J in Hodge v Williams (1947) SR(NSW) 489, at [46]: "Nevertheless, it is not permissible for the Judge or jury, in the absence of the parties, to gather by extraneous evidence or experiments of their own, anything in the nature of additional evidence, and apply it in the determination of the issues, unless the facts so obtained are ventilated and submitted to the comment of the parties or their counsel. ..." 55Thus the broad power given to commissioners in Class 1 proceedings to inform themselves of any matter in s 38(2) is qualified by a requirement that the parties are made aware of the matters upon which commissioners will inform themselves and how. 56Further, s 39(2) of the Court Act states that: In addition to any other functions and discretions that the Court has apart from this subsection, the Court shall, for the purposes of hearing and disposing of an appeal, have all the functions and discretions which the person or body whose decision is the subject of the appeal had in respect of the matter the subject of the appeal. 57As I noted in Concrite Pty Ltd v South Sydney City Council (1998) 101 LGERA 170 at 191, s 39(2) of the Court Act clearly vests in the Court all the functions and discretions of the consent authority, and the Court "is not bound by any limited articulation by the parties of the issues and options". 58I can find no authority for any proposition that a commissioner of the Court, allocated by the Chief Judge to hear a Class 1 appeal, is not entitled to determine the proceedings independently of any agreement reached between the parties, on any issues which they had not earlier resolved, and/or that the commissioner is bound by their definition of issues outstanding. 59Appeals from decisions of commissioners under s 56A of the Court Act are limited to errors of law: The Village McEvoy Pty Ltd v Council of the City of Sydney (No 2) [2010] NSWLEC 17; (2010) 176 LGERA 119, at [25]. However, the Court must not approach a s 56A appeal by examining the Commissioner's decision with a "fine tooth comb" to find errors of law: Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council ("Brimbella") (1985) 79 LGERA 367 at 368. 60In Carstens, Lloyd J said (at [69]): "... I approached the question in this case by seeing if the Commissioner gave adequate reasons for coming to [his] conclusion, ... in a way which exposes the basis upon which such decision was reached, but not in an overly critical or pernickety way and not examining the words too narrowly nor as if they were written by a lawyer."
The Grounds of this Appeal 61As I indicated at the outset ([9]) three grounds of appeal were pressed. 62The following particulars of them were pleaded: DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 1. The Commissioner denied procedural fairness to the applicant. Particulars (a) The Commissioner determined the matter on the basis of matters either not in contention or no longer in contention between the parties without putting the applicant on notice of his intention to do so and without giving the applicant an opportunity to address him on those matters with such matters including: (i) the safety and amenity impacts arising from the design of the internal road system. (ii) the adequacy of the width of the internal accessways at garbage pickup points, in areas nominated on sections and generally. (iii) the adequacy and likely success of the proposed landscaping. (iv) the appropriateness of the application of the RMS 'shared zone" principles to the accessways and the extent to which the proposed accessways complied with those principles. (v) the setback of the dwellings from the accessways. (vi) the Commissioner considered the RMS Guidelines for Traffic Generating Developments in relation to car parks and the Blacktown City Council Engineering Guide for Development in determining the appropriate width of the internal accessways. (vii) that the amount of signage required would constitute visual clutter in the streetscape. (viii) sight distances from garages and or parking spaces was inadequate. (ix) that preferred traffic desire lines will be complicated by the traffic flow restrictions arising from the one-way traffic roads, which are an essential traffic management control, mainly due to narrow carriageway widths. (x) that there would be a private pathway through the front setback are of unit 40 to access the dwelling's secondary car space. (b) ... (c) The Commissioner failed to consider and evaluate the evidence of the experts admitted at the hearing: (i) the oral evidence of the traffic experts in relation to the safety of the amended internal accessways and proposed footpaths. (ii) the oral evidence of the traffic experts in relation to the manoeuvrability of and around garbage trucks, furniture delivery trucks and parked vehicles. (iii) the operation of the internal accessways as shown on the amended plans. FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS 2. The Commissioner failed to give adequate reasons. Particulars (a) All three traffic experts agreed that the safety and amenity of the amended internal accessways was acceptable. The Commissioner found that the safety and amenity of the internal accessways was not acceptable. The Commissioner failed to give reasons for not accepting the evidence of the traffic experts. (b) All of the planning experts agreed that the amenity of the internal accessways was acceptable. The Commissioner found that the amenity of the internal accessways was not acceptable. The Commissioner failed to give reasons for not accepting the evidence of the planning experts. FAILURE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION A MANDATORY RELEVANT CONSIDERATION 3. The Commissioner failed to take into consideration the provisions of the DCP in relation to the width of the proposed accessways and instead set aside the standard specified in the DCP and applied his own standard of what he considered to be reasonable.
Ground 1 - Denial of Procedural Fairness 63A failure to afford procedural fairness is an error of law: Castle Constructions Pty Ltd v North Sydney Council [2008] NSWLEC 239, at [20]. 64The applicant submitted that it was denied procedural fairness in two respects: (i)The Commissioner determined the matter on the basis of a number of issues which were not contentious between the parties, none of which were adequately raised with them by the Commissioner, with the result that the applicant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard in relation to them (Ground 1(a), and subs par 43); (ii)The Commissioner failed to consider and evaluate the evidence of the respective town planning and traffic experts, without giving adequate reasons as to why certain evidence was disregarded, therefore denying the applicant procedural fairness by not taking into account its arguments (Ground 1(c), and subs par 51).
Ground 1(a) 65Under s 39(2) of the Court Act ([56] above), the Commissioner stands in the shoes of the determining authority (here the Council), and is not bound to determine proceedings solely by reference to the issues argued by the parties. Agreements by the parties, the experts, or the legal representatives do not discharge the Commissioner's duty or discretion. 66The Commissioner may take into account matters beyond the scope of those identified or argued between the parties, but procedural fairness requires that they be given notice of those additional matters, and afforded the opportunity to be heard upon them; Shao v Hornsby Shire Council [2001] NSWLEC 254; (2001) 116 LGERA 462. 67The Court of Appeal said in Warkworth Mining Limited v Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc [2014] NSWCA 105; (2014) 200 LGERA 375, at [38] and [112]: "38 Whilst the preceding comments were made in reference to administrative decision-making, procedural fairness is also 'an essential characteristic of judicial proceedings': RCB v The Honourable Justice Forrest [2012] HCA 47; 247 CLR 304 at [42]. However, as the High Court there observed, 'its content is dependent upon the nature of the proceedings and the persons claiming its benefit'. In this regard, the requirement under the Court Act, s 38(1), that proceedings in the Court's Class 1 jurisdiction are to be brought with as little formality as possible, does not abrogate the fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in those proceedings: see RTA v Peak [2007] NSWCA 66 at [15] and [150]. ... 112 The essential point, however, is that if evidence is required to meet an issue, the party asserting the factual basis for the issue raised bears the responsibility for adducing the necessary evidence. It is not sufficient to expect that the underlying basis of an opinion would be revealed in cross-examination. Nor was the Association's failure to cross-examine the experts productive of procedural unfairness. The parties were given an opportunity to adduce evidence on the issue. A party's failure to adduce relevant evidence does not give rise to a failure to afford procedural fairness. ..." 68In Design Power Associates Pty Ltd v Willoughby City Council [2005] NSWLEC 470; (2005) 148 LGERA 233, at [70], Lloyd J held: "A commissioner of the court is not bound to determine the proceedings solely by reference to the issues and there is no error of law if he or she does so. If, however the proceedings are to be determined by reference to matters outside the issues, then procedural fairness would require that the parties be put on notice that some additional issue is raised." 69In its written submissions, the applicant listed a number of matters to which the Commissioner referred in his dismissal of the appeal, which were not in contention between the parties, and were raised with the parties (par 43). They can be summarised as follows: (i)The safety and amenity impacts arising from the design of the internal accessways (judgment pars [3] and [14]); (ii)The adequacy of the width of the internal accessways ([27], [30], and [31]); (iii)The adequacy of proposed landscaping with the addition of the pedestrian pathway in the further amended plans ([51] - [55], and [94]); (iv)The extent to which the development was amenable to "shared access" ways in accordance with the RMS "Shared Zones" Policy ([15] - [26], [44] - [48], [74] - [79], and [90] - [101]); (v)The setback of the dwellings from the accessway ([40] - [41], [51], [53], [55], [86], and [95]); (vi)Based on an interpretation of cl 6.13 of the DCP, the pavement width should be 6 - 6.5m wide ([28], and [32] -[ 34]); (vii)The visual clutter generated by signage for the shared accessway is inadequate ([92]); (viii)Inadequate sight lines from garages and open carparking spaces to pedestrians ([40]); (ix)Complications arising from the one-way traffic roads ([38]); and (x)Concern over private pathways that would be required to be put over landscaped areas of some units to allow access to their secondary carparks ([53]). 70In its oral submissions, the applicant argued that the Court's relevant Practice Note ("PN") covering Class 1 development appeals imposes on those opposing a development, such as the relevant local council, but not, at the moment, judges or commissioners determining development appeals, quite onerous parameters for their contentions. 71Paragraph 6 of Schedule B to the PN relevantly requires a "respondent consent authority", in its "Part B Contentions", to, in particular: (a) focus on issues genuinely in dispute; (b) have a reasonable basis for its contentions; (c) present its contentions clearly, succinctly and without repetition; ... (f) where it contents that a proposal does not comply with provisions, including development standards, of an environmental planning instrument or provisions of a development control plan, identify the standard or provision that is breached and quantify the extent of the non-compliance (if necessary, in a diagrammatic form), grouping together provisions dealing with the same aspect (for example, height or density); ... 72Mr Hemmings suggested that the same tests ought be applied to any "Commissioner's issue" - he submitted (at Tp4, LL13 - 20): "... where a Commissioner raises a Commissioner's issue ... there needs to be at the very least a clear and succinct identification of the contention, and even then, one needs to look at the way in which the proceedings have unfolded to see if the applicant has appropriately been put on notice ..." 73He submits that the commissioner in the present case did not satisfy that test. He added (Tp30, LL15 - 18): "...it seems to be happening more often and it may be that it's the sort of thing ultimately the Court needs to deal with by means of some sort of practice note or something for the assistance of Commissioners ..." 74The respondent, in its written submissions (par 23), submitted that items (ii) - (x) simply reflect the detailed reasoning process by which the commissioner came to his conclusion on the issue which he identified (at [14]) as the principal access contention, namely, "the safety and amenity impacts arising from the design of the internal road system". 75In his oral submissions, Mr Pickles (Tp53, LL4 - 21) responded briefly to the applicant's PN suggestion in these terms: "... practice directions are of course only directed to the parties not directed to the Court itself. They're directed to the conduct of the parties in preparing matters for hearing. And so to the extent to which it is a requirement of the parties to formulate the issues in dispute in the manner specified in sch B of the practice note, that's an obligation on the parties but that obligation is not one which applies to the Commissioner. One can't then impute that upon the Commissioner and say he should have sort of been bound by that kind of standard. In any event, I would say he met that standard and it can be demonstrated he met that standard because in response to his raising of the issue, the applicant took steps to do something about it. Now, it might not have done enough and it reaps the consequences of that but it did respond. And the fact that the applicant responded to the raising of the matter by the Commissioner is of itself proof that the Commissioner didn't have a closed mind about this matter. He may well, if the applicant had addressed all of his concerns, and addressed by submissions, matters that went to those concerns, he'd be prepared to hear them and may indeed, form a different view." 76The Commissioner sought help from the parties' experts, but with "minimal response" (see judgment par [74]), and Mr Pickles commented (LL41 - 44): "Help me here. That's not the mark of a Commissioner who had a closed mind, that's a mark of a Commissioner who's wanting to evaluate it fairly and properly and gave the applicant every opportunity to meet it by raising the concern on the second day and allowed the applicant to amend its plans." 77The question in this appeal is, therefore, whether the applicant was given proper notice of, and an opportunity to meet, such concerns of the Commissioner as led to his refusal to grant consent. 78On the beginning of the second day, the Commissioner indicated that he had a number of concerns regarding the design of the internal road system, in particular its operation as a "shared-zone", with no separate pathway for pedestrians. 79In an attempt to deal with the Commissioner's concerns, following conferencing between the applicant's traffic experts, marked up plans, which included a separate pedestrian pathway around the perimeter road, were submitted (Exhibit N, at AB1, tab 17). 80Both sides found them satisfactory, but the Commissioner remained concerned, and did not accept that the parties had addressed his concerns adequately, if at all. 81Mere perusal of the transcript of the Commissioner's dialogue with counsel at the beginning of the second day of the hearing shows how his concerns were ventilated (see T11.10.13, pp2 - 7). The Commissioner employed terms such as (at Tpp2 - 5):
Ground 1(c) and Ground 2 93Both Grounds 1(c) and 2 (see particulars in [62] above) relate to the Commissioner's treatment of the oral evidence of the town planners and traffic engineers. Accordingly, it is convenient to deal with them together. 94Ground 1(c) alleges that the applicant was denied procedural fairness as the Commissioner failed to properly consider the evidence of the experts in concluding that the accessway should be 6m wide, exclusive of any footpath. They were of the opinion that the proposed internal accessway design, including its width, was acceptable (T11.10.13, pp16, and 30 - 37). 95It is clear from the lively engagement of the Commissioner during the oral evidence, and then from his assessment, in the judgment, of all the expert evidence, oral and written, that he weighed all of it and remained unsatisfied. 96Again on this aspect of the appeal, I can find no denial of procedural fairness, and I conclude that Ground 1(c) must fail. 97Ground 2 alleges that, even if the Commissioner did consider the evidence of the experts, he failed to give adequate reasons for his rejection of it, on the issue of the safety and amenity of the internal access ways. This would amount to an error of law. 98The relevant paragraphs of the Commissioner's judgment are [61] - [66] and [76] - [86], which are summarized above ([41] - [48]). He did not always distinguish between written and oral expert evidence, but that is not an error of law, and I have carefully considered his detailed reasoning, in the light of relevant authority, which makes clear that one must be careful not to conclude, from the failure to specifically mention some detail of the evidence, that it had not been considered. 99In Mifsud v Campbell ("Mifsud") (1991) 21 NSWLR 725, Samuels JA said, at 728: "Similarly, in my opinion, it is an incident of judicial duty for the judge to consider all the evidence in the case. It is plainly unnecessary for a judge to refer to all the evidence led in the proceedings or to indicate which of it is accepted or rejected. The extent of the duty to record the evidence given and the findings made depend, as the duty to give reasons does, upon the circumstances of the individual case. Accordingly, a failure to refer to some of the evidence does not necessarily, whenever it occurs, indicate that the judge has failed to discharge the duty which rests upon him or her. However, for a judge to ignore evidence critical to an issue in a case and contrary to an assertion of fact made by one party and accepted by the judge ... may promote a sense of grievance in the adversary and create a litigant who is not only disappointed but "disturbed" ... It tends to deny both the fact and the appearance of justice having been done. If it does, ... it will have ... resulted in what I would take to be an error of law which is reviewable on appeal. Whether it is an error of law or an error of fact, it seems to me a failure by the judge to do what the nature of the office requires." 100In Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW ("Beale") (1997) 48 NSWLR 430, at 442, Meagher JA cited with approval what Samuels JA had said in Misfud. 101His Honour continued (at 443): "... reasons need not necessarily be lengthy or elaborate: ... The scope of the reasons to be given is, as Mahoney JA said in Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 at 386, related ... to the function to be served by the giving of reasons. Accordingly, the content of the obligation is not the same for every judicial decision. No mechanical formula can be given in determining what reasons are required. However, there are three fundamental elements of a statement of reasons, which it is useful to consider. First, a judge should refer to relevant evidence. There is no need to refer to the relevant evidence in detail, especially in circumstances where it is clear that the evidence has been considered. However, where certain evidence is important or critical to the proper determination of the matter and it is not referred to by the trial judge, an appellate court may infer that the trial judge overlooked the evidence or failed to give consideration to it: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435. Where conflicting evidence of a significant nature is given, the existence of both sets of evidence should be referred to." 102In Segal v Waverley Council [2005] NSWCA 310; (2005) 65 NSWLR 177, Tobias JA said (at [43]): "... it does not necessarily follow that a Commissioner or judge of the Land and Environment Court is required to give reasons only with respect to his or her subjective thought processes in coming to their particular decision. Notwithstanding those thought processes, their duty to give reasons would be contravened if they failed to address an issue joined between the parties which, if decided in a particular way, would result in a different decision to that to which the Commissioner or judge has arrived. ..." 103The evidence of the town planners and traffic engineers on the safety and amenity of the design of the internal accessway was essential to the decision of the Commissioner. His rejection of the expert evidence of both parties was central to his decision, and, therefore, there needed to be a clear articulation as to why. 104On any fair reading of the judgment (eg [61] - [66]), the Commissioner not only considered the expert evidence, he provided adequate reasons for his rejection of it. 105It is plain from the judgment that the evidence of the planners as to the internal road design was rejected on the basis that they could not point to any consistent evaluative criteria that could provide a basis for the favourable assessment of the safety and amenity of the proposed accessway. 106The Commissioner was, therefore, entitled to evaluate the proposed accessway according to his own criteria, based on his expertise, experience, and the material before him, including the expert oral evidence. 107It can not be said that the Commissioner was required to specifically spell out his rejection of the expert planning evidence when such rejection and the reasoning behind it is implicit in the Commissioner's well reasoned judgment. Such an approach would fall into error by approaching the Commissioner's decision with a "fine-tooth comb": Brimbella ([59] above). 108In regard to the evidence of the traffic experts, the Commissioner said (at [76]): "Insofar as the traffic consultants agreed that the Policy guidelines could be applied to the subject development, there are significant variations to the policy provisions, which I do not consider have been adequately justified by the consultants. The critical issues arising concern:
Ground 3 - Failure to take into consideration a mandatory relevant consideration 113Pursuant to s 79C(1)(a)(iii) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, the Commissioner must consider the provisions of any DCP that applied to the proposed development. 114The applicant argued on appeal (par 58) that the Commissioner failed to give proper consideration to cl 6.13 of the DCP, because he: "... acted independently of the DCP and substituted his own test as to what should be the appropriate width of the accessway. The Commissioner therefore applied his own view rather than the policy embedded in the DCP and in so doing fell into error." 115The appellant relied on Botany Bay City Council v Premier Customs Services Pty Ltd ("Premier Customs") [2009] NSWCA 226, (2009) 172 LGERA 338, and Zhang v Canterbury City Council ("Zhang") [2001] NSWCA 167; (2001) 51 NSWLR 589; 115 LGERA 373. In Premier Customs, Macfarlan JA (Ipp and Hoeben JJA agreeing), cited with approval (at [24]) Spigelman CJ's judgment (with which Meagher and Beazley JJA agreed) in Zhang (at [76] - [77]): "76 In my opinion, the Commissioner did not 'take into consideration' the standard contained in cl 4.0 of DCP 23. Rather, he substituted for the statutory requirement a different approach. The Commissioner posed the 'issue' for his determination to be: 'The appropriateness of the location taking into account the proximity to the adjoining church, local schools and hotel'. He resolved this issue on the basis that adverse impact upon land affected by the presence of a brothel had to be demonstrated in the legal proceedings before him. This approach could only be supported if the discretion was entirely at large, i.e. that there were no 'standards' of any character which the decision maker had to take into account. By adopting this approach, the Commissioner, in my opinion, proceeded on an impermissible basis. 77 There was a relevant and applicable 'standard' which he was obliged to 'take into consideration'. It ought to have served as a focal point for, or constituted a fundamental element in, his deliberations. The evidence, or rather the absence thereof, about actual effects, was not entitled to determinative weight, without regard to the presumptive 'standard' in this way." 116In the present case, the Commissioner noted specifically the DCP's cl 6.13, which he set out in full (at [28]), and which is also quoted above (at [33]). 117That provision does not specify any required widths of accessways for developments of this size. It prescribes minimums of 5m for developments of up to 15 lots, 4.5m up to 5 lots, and 5.5m at bin standing areas. 118The Commissioner, said (at [29]) that for developments of this size the requirement would "presumably" be not "less than 5m and probably somewhat wider, otherwise the controls may not contemplate such large developments serviced by private accessways". 119I have already summarized the Commissioner's subsequent analysis and reasoning ([34] - [37] above). He drew upon not only the DCP, but documents which it called up for consideration, and/or which were filed with the amended plans, to arrive at a minimum carriageway width of 6 - 6.5m. That process did not amount to a failure on his part to consider the DCP. I consider that he actually applied the DCP. As the Commissioner was, at least, "expressly permitted", if not obliged, to do that, he cannot be guilty of any Zhang/Premier Customs error (subs par 44). 120On Council's behalf, Mr Apps conceded that cl 6.13 "doesn't set a control for anything greater than 15 lots even though ... there's so many medium density developments that are proposed that are in excess of 15 lots", and Apps "guessed" that one would need have regard to such other guideline documents (T11.10.13, p30, LL29 - 43). 121The Commissioner also questioned Mr Grech (at Tp31, LL26 - 34): "COMMISSIONER: Well I follow the design process but at a certain point would you ever say that the internal road systems are unsatisfactory? WITNESS GRECH: It's only unsatisfactory if it doesn't serve the function for which the design is required. So you get to one point and you need to provide two vehicles to pass, you must design the roadway to do that. You get to another point where you must provide manoeuvring into that particular garage or that visitor parking space so you must, so you basically shape the internal driveway until you achieve those outcomes." 122DCP cl 6.13 provides that "all accessways shall be constructed to Council's standards appropriate to the type and volume of traffic it is assessed they will carry." 123Minds may differ on "appropriate", but finding what was appropriate, was exactly the duty of the Commissioner, and also the process he followed. 124Therefore, Ground 3 must also fail.
CONclusion 125As the applicant has failed on all grounds pressed, the question of remitter need not be addressed, and the appeal must be dismissed.
Costs 126Both sets of competing written submissions indicate that costs should "follow the event" - here the dismissal of the appeal - and there was no departure from that approach during oral argument.
Orders 127Accordingly, the Orders of the Court will be: (1)The applicant's appeal is dismissed, and the decision under appeal is confirmed. (2)The applicant is ordered to pay the respondent's costs, as agreed, or assessed according to law. (3)The appeal books are returned.
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 04 August 2014
Universal Property Group Pty Ltd
Blacktown City Council
[2012] HCA 47
(1997) 48 NSWLR 430
(2009) 172 LGERA 338
(1985) 79 LGERA 367
(1999) 111 LGERA 1
(1998) 101 LGERA 170
(2005) 148 LGERA 233
(1991) 21 NSWLR 725
(1995) 87 LGERA 435
(2005) 64 NSWLR 177
(2001) 116 LGERA 462
(2010) 176 LGERA 119
(2014) 200 LGERA 375
(2001) 51 NSWLR 589
(2005) 65 NSWLR 177