(aa) the provision of suitable financial products to consumers of financial products; and

Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] ARTA 149 | Case summary | Zoe

[85]

A reasonable proportion of the documents tendered by ASIC were not relevant to a fact in issue in these proceedings. They may have been once relevant to a fact which ASIC expected would be in issue in other proceedings. As an example, ASIC filed extensive documentation evidencing SFM's corporate relationships, and the activities of individuals involved those allegedly related companies, including transcripts of s 19 Examinations conducted with those individuals. The Respondent's Supplementary SFIC, filed 9 October 2023, is identical to Supplementary SFICs filed in the Pecyna proceeding and Schneider proceeding. It refers to alleged conflicts of interest "for each Applicant" and alleges that the "Applicants" "failed to adequately deal with" those conflicts, and includes a flowchart demonstrating those allegations. This is somewhat explicable because the order requiring the Supplementary SFIC to be filed was made when these proceedings were joined with those of two directors of SFM (discussed below at 18]). What is inexplicable, however, is why ASIC would continue to rely on that Supplementary SFIC and the seemingly irrelevant evidence aforementioned, when these proceedings were separated from the other proceedings and there is not even a mention of the Applicant in that Supplementary SFIC (other than a footnoted reference to documents filed in his proceedings), no reference to any alleged involvement or knowledge by the Applicant of those corporate relationships, and no allegations of contraventions to which such facts are relevant.
A large proportion of the documents and records tendered by ASIC were relied upon in support of their contention that the Applicant was knowingly involved in the alleged contraventions of SFM. This included tables created by ASIC of call centre records, audio of telephone calls between persons said to be SFM representatives, and persons said to be customers of SFM; transcripts and transcript extracts from such telephone calls, and some emails between SFM representatives and their customers. The Respondent submitted that these call centre records provided the Tribunal with sufficient evidence to make findings that SFM had contravened ss 911A, 912A, 949A and 1041H of the Act, which was a necessary preliminary finding before considering whether the Applicant was knowingly involved in such contraventions pursuant to s 920A(1)(g) of the Act. It was not until the final days of the hearing and at the direction of the Tribunal, however, that ASIC provided particulars of each of the contraventions it relied upon, or identified exactly what evidence was submitted in support of the precise findings it sought. ASIC provided the Tribunal with a table for that purpose on 20 June 2025, which was then the subject of closing submissions. The submissions on this issue took up a significant amount of time at the hearing, in addition to comprising a significant proportion of the evidence before the Tribunal.

[122]

See, for example, the summary in Ashell v Homes Constructions Pty Ltd v Kobus [2024] ACTCA 32 at [48]:

(a) Procedural fairness will vary according to the facts in each case and must be moulded to the particular facts of the case: Applicant VEAL of 2022 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88 at [25] and Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 611-612.

(b) Procedural fairness is concerned with procedures, rather than outcomes, and processes rather than conclusions: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [55]; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [59]; SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [25];

(c) In determining what procedural fairness requires in a specific case, regard must be had to the legal framework of the decision under review, including any statutory or regulatory requirements or considerations: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZARH (2015) 256 CLR 326 at [30] and SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [29].

(d) Consequences of a breach must be considered, but procedural fairness is concerned with whether practical injustice has occurred. It is not a question of abstract injustice: Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 at [37].

(e) For a denial of procedural fairness to be established on appeal, there must be a material error in the sense that there is a reasonable possibility that the decision of the Tribunal could have been different if the error had not been made: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610 at [7]. This might be if a party was denied an opportunity to present evidence, or make submissions on an issue

that required consideration: Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 at [33].

(f) The Tribunal is not necessarily required to disclose issues in respect of which an applicant is already on notice or information the substance of which is already known to an applicant: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH [2012] FCAFC 45; (2012) 200 FCR 223 at [30].

[265]

(a) Policies of the type discussed by Brennan J in Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2)(1979) 2 ALD 634 ('Drake (No 2)') which seek to provide guidance to public officers about how they should exercise a broad discretion conferred by a statutory instrument. In respect of such policies, Brennan J went on to say that if the Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant policy is valid, it should adopt a practice of applying the policy unless there were cogent reasons to the contrary: Drake (No 2) at 645. I expressed the approach relating to this type of policy as follows:

If the Tribunal is satisfied that the policy is valid and consistent with the statute, ordinarily the Tribunal would be expected to apply the policy provided that the Tribunal had regard to the particular circumstances of each case and considered whether those circumstances gave rise to cogent reasons for not applying the policy: GJDB at [20].

(b) Policies that seek to provide guidance to public officers by stipulating that a particular interpretation of a statutory provision is the correct interpretation and requiring public officers to adopt that interpretation. I stated the following in relation to such policies:

Such a policy cannot bind the Tribunal, as a government policy cannot control the meaning of a statute. The Tribunal is obliged to form its own view about the correct interpretation of statutory provisions. The Tribunal may consider any explanation in the policy about why the asserted interpretation is correct and may adopt it if it is persuaded by that explanation and concludes that it is preferable to all alternative interpretations that are argued before it. In such a case, the Tribunal reaches its own view about the correct or preferable interpretation of the provision after taking into account not only the policy but all other submissions and matters before it that are relevant to the interpretation of the provision: GJDB at [22].

(c) Policies that seek to provide guidance to public officers by setting out a process of reasoning they must follow in deciding whether they are satisfied that a particular statutory requirement is met. I stated the following in relation to such policies:

Such a policy cannot bind the Tribunal, as the Tribunal is obliged to form its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning it should follow. In performing its task, the Tribunal must give an active intellectual consideration of the material before it in a fulsome way, and not only in accordance with a structure imposed on the decision-maker by an executive policy. The Tribunal may consider the logic underpinning the process of reasoning set out in the policy and may adopt it if it is persuaded by it and concludes that it is preferable to all alternative processes of reasoning that are argued before it. In such a case, the Tribunal reaches its own view about the correct or preferable process of reasoning to determine whether it reaches a state of satisfaction after taking into account not only the policy but all other submissions and matters before it that are relevant to whether it should reach the state of satisfaction: GJDB at [23].

[281]

(i) Banning orders are designed to protect the public from ... harm, which includes the protection of investors;

(ii) The banning order is protective against present and future breach;

(iii) A banning order has a motive of personal deterrence, though it is not punitive;

(iv) The objects of general deterrence are also sought to be achieved;

(v) In assessing the fitness of a person to be permitted to provide financial advice, they [must] have an understanding of their role and obligations;

(vi) In assessing an appropriate length of prohibition, consideration [must be] given to the degree of seriousness of the contraventions, the propensity that the defendant may engage in similar conduct in the future and the likely harm that may be caused to the public;

(vii) Longer periods of disqualification are reserved for cases where contraventions have been of a serious nature such as those involving dishonesty;

(viii) It is necessary to balance the personal hardship to the defendant against the public interest and the need for protection of the public from any repeat of the conduct;

(ix) A mitigating factor in considering a period of disqualification is the likelihood of the defendant reforming;

(x) It is necessary to assess matters such as the character of the person, the nature of the breaches, risks to others from the continuation of the person as an authorised representative of a licensed person and the honesty and competence of the person;

(xi) Factors which lead to the imposition of the longest periods of disqualification include large financial losses, high propensity for the person to engage in similar conduct and lack of contrition or remorse; and

(xii) Factors which lead to the conclusion that these cases were serious though not 'worst cases' resulting in disqualification from 7 to 12 years, include serious incompetence and irresponsibility, substantial loss or deliberate courses of conduct to enrich themselves at others' expense, but with lesser degrees of dishonesty.

[326]

...a local Australian director was added, and then ... a sale was executed... in 2018 to Cardiff, which become Cardiff Global Markets. And .. so, I was still... the responsible manager and the key person and Michael Sawyer, the CEO of ... Cardiff was added as a key person, the responsible management was the local ... CEO and

... director. So, then another person joined Michael Sawyer, Kara Ordway.

So, the two of them worked together, they were both responsible managers, I believe Kara was one as well. So, what happened there is that with Cardiff Global Markets those two worked together, I was a no-show responsible manager. Then around - I think it was about August, September of 2019, I noticed that there was a lot of changes on the - on the ASIC register of, you know, 484 form and the like, of, you know, changes in the - in the share- holding and - and - well, actually most of the forms were corrections to - to other forms that had been lodged. And, then found out in - I wasn't notified but I found out the new owner was Sirius Financial Markets in - around the 15th of November 2019. And, then around - actually it was on the 5th of December of 2019 I received a text from - from Michael Sawyer to - asking to come into - come to - to the office of - of which is now Sirius Financial Markets,

before Cardiff, at level 21 Australia Square there. So, I went to see the - to the office on - on that date, 5th of December, 2019, Michael Sawyer told me then that my services weren't required as a CEO and - and responsible manager and that him and Kara had become responsible managers and I was not needed.

So, we - we came to an agreement, I had a 60-day notice clause to the key person in ... my responsible manager agreement, and so that was from the 5th of December to the 31st of January is 57 days, so we agreed on it being the 31st of January, 2020.

...and I said, "Okay. Can you please ensure that it's done in five days' time as required, the notification, five business days to - to ASIC?" ... He said, yes, he will do that ... I started to hear some rumours in late January of 2020 that both Kara and Mike were no longer with the company. At the time it didn't really concern me so much because I knew I was off the licence effectively. Then I received a call in early February, I can't remember the exact date, it was first or second week of February in 2020... from Sophie Gerber of Sophie Grace, saying did I want to be on the licence of Sirius, and I said, "Well, I - I'm no - no longer on it," and she said... "No. You still are." So, I was asked to help with the business process if I could stay on the licence 'til after and I said, "Yes."

[370]

Of his role at SFM, the Applicant stated:
1. My role at SFM was more restricted and hands off than I would normally expect a responsible manager/key person role to be. In retrospect, I would not accept a position as responsible manager/key person with a company at which I was not employed.
2. To make sure I stayed informed about any critical developments on the AFSL, from 2013 I regularly checked ABN Lookup and ASIC Connect to see if there were any new documents or updates. I also regularly purchased the ASIC extract for the company to marry up the documents from the multiple portals.
3. Although the RM Agreement with SFM stated that I was to be available for 3 days a week, neither I nor SFM ever operated on that basis.
4. I am aware that as a key person I had direct responsibility for significant day to day decisions within the company. However, I was not employed by the company in a day to day role. I was therefore reliant on the employees of the company to provide me with information about its activities and to seek my input, if they wanted it. That was provided for in my RM Agreement at clause 9 at MJB-1 page 140.
5. SFM never gave me access to any of the documents or resources listed in clause 9 of the RM Agreement. I was given some information about a proposed breach report regarding SFM's financials in mid 2020; l was also given the three Xenia reports, and some information about general annual financials. That was the only information listed in clause 9 that I can recall receiving. I did not have access to SFM's internal systems. I was not included on internal emails.
6. During the Relevant Period 18 September 2019 to 9 March 2021, SFM had between 2 and 3 other responsible managers and, until February 2021, another KP (Michael Sawyer), who were all full-time employees of the company. I was aware that those people had far greater access to information about the company than I did, and that they worked together every day. None of those people ever asked me to do anything except attend the Compliance Committee meetings.
7. In retrospect, I believe I should have declined Ms Gerber's January 2020 request that l stay on the AFSL after I first resigned. In part, I stayed on because - thought my position was temporary and that I was just there to smooth the transition to the new management team.
8. I was not given the information I needed to properly carry out my responsibilities under the RM agreement. In those circumstances, I should not have stayed in the role.
9. Throughout the time that CGM/SFM operated, I was constantly frustrated by my inability to get information from the management and owners of SFM. I tried to obtain my own information by speaking to people in the industry, and by doing regular searches of ASIC's databases.
10. Part of the reason why I tolerated the lack of information was that I believed that SFM was a young company, having only started operating in 2019. When people who I believed to be reliable joined the company, as l described above at 82

[450]

ASIC: it says under, 'role': 'Mr Bringans responsibilities include implementing regulatory improvements.' Your responsibilities at Sirius didn't include implementing regulatory improvements, did they?

A: ---Well - - -

ASIC: Is that a 'yes' or a 'no'?

A: ---As far as like, well, it means - it kind of doesn't really - just improving around the licence.

ASIC: Your responsibilities at Sirius include, 'implementing regulatory improvements'?

A: ---No.

ASIC: So this is inaccurate where it says here your responsibilities include implementing regulatory improvements, isn't it?

A: ---It's phrased - should be phrased differently.

ASIC: It's not just the phrasing. It's just wrong, isn't it? Your responsibilities at Sirius did not include implementing regulatory improvements, did they?

A: ---It depends how you define regulatory improvement.

ASIC: Well, how did you define regulatory improvements in this document, Mr Bringans?

A: ---I think in the context of this I think it means overview of the AFSL.

ASIC: But you say in the context of this, you provided this information to Moga, didn't you?

A: ---Yes. Some of it was in a template by their - by their lawyers.

ASIC: But this is information specific to you, so this information would have come from you?

A: ---Most of the information did, yes.

ASIC: The information on your experience at Sirius, that would have come from you, wouldn't it?

A: ---I'd need to look back to what was sent over to Moga's lawyers.

ASIC: Well, they wouldn't have had any knowledge about your experience at Sirius, would they?

A: ---They knew about my experience at AMFEX.

ASIC: This part here, 'Responsibilities include implementing regulatory improvements', that information came from you, didn't it?

A: ---That is - I'm not - I'm not sure because it's in - it's in the - further over in the (indistinct) regulatory improvements, so that would, yes, be there - come from me, and that - - -

ASIC: You did not have a responsibility at Sirius for implementing regulatory improvements, did you?

A: ---Not in the context of Sirius.

ASIC: If you didn't have that responsibility, this statement that your responsibilities include implementing regulatory improvements is inaccurate, isn't it?

A: ---That bullet point.

ASIC: That's a yes, Mr Bringans? A: ---Well, yes to that bullet point.

[523]

Being "adequately trained" and being "competent" are two separate requirements and a failure to satisfy either of them is enough to enliven the power to make a banning order.

The adequate training and competence required relates separately to the three matters set out in the preceding paragraph. This limb of the banning power must be construed harmoniously with the fact that the Act contains other provisions which seek to protect the community from inadequately trained or incompetent advisers. Here, vulnerable customers of SFM have not been protected, partly due to Mr Bringans' failure to fulfil properly his role as responsible manager and key person. That failure stems, in part, from a lack of adequate training as to what his role was and his duties were, and a lack of competence that role.

It is not in dispute that Mr Bringans did have some training. Having training is not, however, sufficient. The training needs to be "adequate". It is open for the Tribunal to infer that Mr Bringans' training was not "adequate" based on his conduct. There was a failure to understand the roles of responsible manager and key person, which Mr Bringans now characterises as being "only ever an external adviser to SFM".

The evidence establishes that Mr Bringans is not adequately trained and is not competent to provide one or more financial services, perform one or more functions as an officer of an entity that carries on a financial services business, or control an entity that carries on a financial service business. The evidence discloses that:

(a) Mr Bringans was a disengaged and disinterested responsible manager and key person, notwithstanding that SFM paid him $4000 per month pursuant to his RM Agreement with SFM;

(b) Mr Bringans ignored his main duties as a responsible manager and key person for SFM's AFSL, including his responsibility to ensure that SFM was complying with financial services laws;

(c) Mr Bringans failed to properly acquit himself of his responsibility to know what SFM was doing in the context of its obligations under financial services laws;

(d) if SFM was not providing him with information to enable him to perform the role of a responsible manager properly, he did not resign but instead enabled SFM to continue to represent to third parties that Mr Bringans was its responsible manager and key person, and, by necessary implication, to also represent that Mr Bringans was adequately performing those roles.

Having regard to the scope of Mr Bringans responsibilities and his position as a key person, had Mr Bringans properly performed his duties, SFM's contraventions of financial services laws most likely would have been for a lesser period, less numerous, or both. The evidence underscores an abrogation by Mr Bringans of his duties as a responsible manager and key person. It is accordingly open to the Tribunal to draw an inference that he either did not properly understand what he was required to do in those roles (and so was inadequately trained) or was not competent at the time of the contraventions.

In Schroeder, the Tribunal found that s 920(1)(da) was satisfied on the basis of Mr Schroeder's unsatisfactory approach to carrying out his roles as an officer and responsible manager. The same could be said of Mr Bringans' approach to his roles as responsible manager and key person. The approach taken in Schroeder was cited with approval by President Kyrou in Karamian at [209]. In respect of this contention, ASIC relies not just on the factual matters set out in this section of the submissions, but also on those factual matters set out in section IV of these submissions (knowing involvement in contraventions of the Act by SFM) and in section V of these submissions (likely to contravene a financial services law).

[540]

Mr Bringans ignored his duty to ensure compliance with financial services laws. This shows both a disregard of duties and a poor attitude regarding compliance with financial services laws. It can be inferred from these matters that Mr Bringans is likely, in future, to disregard financial services laws. 2. Mr Bringans was in both the positions of responsible manager and key person but abrogated his duties, effectively, in full (save for attending a handful of compliance committee meetings). The matters concerning his abrogation of duties have been set out earlier in this Statement. 3. Even after ceasing as responsible manager and key person, it is plain Mr Bringans had not learnt from taking on a critical position which he did not have the time to properly fulfil. Mr Bringans subsequently became a responsible manager for Moga International Group Pty Ltd for 13 months from February 2021, during which time Mr Bringans was still working full-time as CEO, responsible manager, and key person for AMFEX. ASIC has expressed concerns in cease-and-desist letters to Moga in respect of how financial services were being offered, primarily in respect of operating without the requisite licence. Moga and AMFEX share the same address at level 17, 9-13 Castlereagh Street, Sydney. 4. Further, Mr Bringans' spouse, Rachel Bringans, has been a secretary of AMFEX while he was CEO and director of that company. She has no discernible experience in a complex financial services company to qualify her to act in that role. It shows a lack of judgment by Mr Bringans in allowing that to occur. Rachel Bringans was then appointed as a director of AMFEX on 1 November 2022, a day before Mr Bringans ceased as a director on 2 November 2022. 5. In Schroeder v ASIC [2021] AATA 3519 at [100], the Tribunal found that a key person/director/responsible manager was likely to contravene or become involved in a contravention of a financial services law in the future due to a lack of insight and a tendency to defend failings by insisting that he should not be held responsible because he was merely ineffectual in his roles. The Tribunal commented that an "ineffectual officer is likely to get into trouble in a financial services business given the complexity of the obligations". The Tribunal described the senior executive's lack of insight as follows:

[548]

First, ASIC contends that Mr Bringans failed to perform his responsibilities as an RM and KP under Sirius' AFSL, that he lacks the necessary "professionalism, integrity, and diligence" to play a role in the provision of financial services, and that he cannot be relied upon to discharge his responsibilities. For the reasons already given at

paragraphs [129] to [149] of these submissions, the Tribunal would not accept that contention.

Moreover, a number of the propositions which ASIC says follow from this failure (which is not conceded) are not established on the evidence. While ASIC asserts that Mr Bringans lacks the necessary "integrity" to play a role in the provision of financial services, the evidence reveals no dishonesty on the part of Mr Bringans in the course of his long employment in the financial services industry. ASIC also claims that had Mr Bringans performed his duties, "Sirius' contraventions most likely would have been for a lesser period, less numerous or both". That contention rises no higher than speculation and should not be accepted by the Tribunal.

Second, ASIC contends that Mr Bringans "had not learnt from taking on a critical position which he did not have the time to properly fulfil", in becoming RM for Moga for a period of 13 months from February 2021, while he was the CEO, RM and KP for AMFEX.... To the contrary, the circumstances of Mr Bringans' resignation from Moga is evidence of the fact that Mr Bringans exercised proper judgment in circumstances where he did not consider himself to have the time required to carry out his functions as RM at multiple companies.

Third, ASIC contends that Mr Bringans allowed his wife, Ms Rachel Bringans, to be a secretary of AMFEX in circumstances where she had and has "no discernible experience", and that after the banning order came into effect, he caused her to be appointed as a Director of AMFEX. Ms Bringans' appointment as secretary was made following a review of the requirements necessary for company secretary, and following discussion with the shareholders of AMFEX... The evidence does not establish that Ms Bringans' appointments were in any way improper or inappropriate.

[631]

After his cross-examination, the Applicant's conduct now well and truly falls within the "Banning for 10 or more years and permanent banning" section of table 3 of RG 98, rather than the 3-10 years section. Referring to the factors in that section of the table:

(a) There are now issues of Mr Bringans' honesty arising from his cross-examination.

(b) The Applicant knew that false information was provided to ASIC in the Moga AFSL application. That occurred after the events with Sirius. Providing ASIC with information that is false in a material particular or materially misleading is one example of conduct that falls into the 10 year or more banning category.

(c) The Applicant now admits (contrary to his previous position) that he knew there were issues with Toyga as far back as April 2020. He knew there were contraventions of the law for months and months, but did nothing to prevent those contraventions, or to inform ASIC of them.

(d) There was a disregard by Mr Bringans of his obligations as responsible manager and key person. He knew what those obligations were, but chose to ignore them. Even now, he effectively claims that he had no obligations at all in those roles.

(e) Mr Bringans' conduct shows serious incompetence and irresponsibility. There was a total abrogation of responsibility and serious lack of competence displayed. This went on for a long period of time after Mr Bringans' initial engagement by Fibo. His failure to perform his duties was not just limited to the 18-month period during which Sirius contravened its obligations. Having a general lack of understanding of and regard for compliance is an example of conduct falling within the 10 year or more banning category, as is conduct indicating a systemic failure. (f) If the Applicant had properly performed his roles, or informed ASIC of the issues, then it is highly likely that the period during which Sirius' contravening conduct occurred would have been shorter and many customers would not have been subjected to the behaviour of Toyga. His conduct had a serious impact on customers, and not just the four customers who were selected as case studies by ASIC.

(g) The conduct has a significant adverse impact on confidence in, or the integrity of, the financial services industry. Investors and ASIC are entitled to expect that those who take on the roles of responsible manager and key person actually do their duties. The phenomenon of "no show" responsible managers can have a significant risk adverse risk on confidence and integrity.

(h) The conduct is also significantly inconsistent with the orderly operation of the financial markets. If a derivatives business, for example, engages responsible managers and key persons who do nothing then there can be some serious market impacts as demonstrated by the current case.

171. Although there are now a number of factors falling within the "Banning for 10 or more years and permanent banning" category, ASIC still only seeks to have the 8 year banning period affirmed. That is lenient given the now increased seriousness of the case.

Legislation Cited (8)

Review Tribunal Act 2024

Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024

Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001

Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012

Sector Reform (Hayne Royal Commission Response--Stronger Regulators (2019 Measures)) Act 2020

Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009

Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No.](/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/num_act/artatpn1a2024807/index.html) [1) Act 2024

Cases Cited (62)

Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] ARTA 149 (30 January 2026)

Anderson and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3771 Ashbury v Reid [1961] WAR 49;

Ashell v Homes Constructions Pty Ltd v Kobus [2024] ACTCA 32 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] FCA 342; (2015) 235 FCR 181

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2010) 187 FCR 334; 271 ALR 593; [2010] FCA 807

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) and Others (No 3) [2020] FCA 208

Australian Securities & Investments Commission v AGM Markets Pty Ltd (in liq) & ors (No 4) [2020] FCA 1499

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Investors Forum Pty Ltd (No 2) [2005] NSWSC 267; (2005) 53 ACSR 305

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672 Babbage and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3487 Banque Commerciale SA (in liq) v Akhil Holdings Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 279; 92 ALR 53 Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 3403 Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3096 Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3103 Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 1074; (1994) 49 FCR 576

Downey and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] AATA 958 Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2)(1979) 2 ALD 634 Edwards v R (1992) 173 CLR 653

Fletcher v Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 362; (1988) 19 FCR 442

Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 995 Frugtniet v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2019] HCA 16; (2019) 266 CLR 250 Frugtniet and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 295 GJDB v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] AATA 3245 Hawcroft and Australian Securities & Investments Commission [2024] AATA 3596 Hewish and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2025] ARTA 1822

Howarth and ASIC [2008] AATA 278

Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 127; [1955] HCA 28 HIH Insurance Ltd and HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd; Re: ASIC v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483; (2002) 42 ACSR 80; NSWSC 483

Kamha v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] FCAFC 248; (2005) 147 FCR

Karamian v ASIC [2024] AATA 2006

Ladic v Capital Territory Health Commission [1982] FCA 173

Lee and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] AATA 4048 Matai and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2024] AATA 520 Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 32

Norman and Tax Practitioners Board [2021] AATA 848Panganiban v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCA 510; 338 ALR 119

Pereira v Director of Public Prosecutions [1988] HCA 57; (1988) 82 ALR 217

Pilnara Pty Ltd v Cmr of Taxation [1999] FCA 945 Power v Hamond [2006] VSCA 25 R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd [1944] HCA 42; (1944) 69 CLR 407

Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42; (2004) 220 CLR

RTL Australia Pty Ltd v Younane Baker Pty Ltd in its capacity as trustee for the Younane Baker Trust [2025] FCA 1287

Saffron v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1991] FCA 234; (1991) 22 ATR 131

Schroeder v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] AATA 3519 Sherwal and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 4192 Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31

Tarrant v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AATA 926; (2013) 62

Tarrant v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 8 The Optimise Group Pty Ltd and Commissioner of Taxation [2010] AATA 782 WA Pines v Bannerman [1980] FCA 79; 41 FLR 175 at 186

XTWK and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2008] HCA 2; (2008) 26 ACLC 1,059 Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661

Young Investments Group Pty Ltd v Mann [2012] FCAFC 107; (2012) 293 ALR 537

[2022] AATA 3403.

(1990) 170 CLR 321

(2015) 235 FCR 181

(2010) 187 FCR 334

(1990) 169 CLR 279

(1994) 49 FCR 576

(1992) 173 CLR 653

(1988) 19 FCR 442

(2019) 266 CLR 250

(1955) 93 CLR 127

(2005) 147 FCR

516

(1999) 198 CLR 1

(2009) 259 ALR 429

(1988) 82 ALR 217

(1944) 69 CLR 407

(2004) 220 CLR

129

(1979) 22 SASR 70

(2006) 228 CLR 152

(1985) 158 CLR 661

(2012) 293 ALR 537

(2005) 225 CLR 88

(1985) 159 CLR 550

(2015) 256 CLR 326

(2000) 204 CLR 82

(2003) 214 CLR 1

(2024) 98 ALJR 610

(2022) 276 CLR 80

(2012) 200 FCR 223

(2004) 220 CLR 129

(2005) 147 FCR 516

(2016) 338 ALR 119

(2003) 214 CLR 118

(1985) 156 CLR 473

Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] ARTA 149 (30 January 2026)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (646 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (62)

Bringans and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2026] ARTA 149 (30 January 2026)