Bobeldyk & Anor v Moreton Bay City Council; Eichin & Ors v Moreton Bay City Council [2026] QSC 27

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION - WHERE THE APPLICANTS WERE HOMELESS AND SLEEPING ROUGH - where the respondent decided they should be prohibited from camping on public land - whether compliance and decision notices were valid - whether the applicants had a right to be heard before the decision - whether the officers took into account all relevant considerations - whether the applicants had an urgent reason for camping on public land - whether the time for compliance was reasonable

HUMAN RIGHTS - whether section 48 of Human Rights 2019 (Qld) applied to interpret the Local Laws - whether s 58(1) of the HRA is engaged - whether council officers were obliged to exercise the power of eviction - whether council officers were obliged to give consideration to the Human Rights of the applicants in making the decisions - whether there was a breach of any of the relevant human rights of the applicants in the making of the decisions

Alteration of Public Land Local Law 2023 ss 2, 3, 8, 9, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 44, 45

Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) s 7

Camping on Public Land Local Law 2023 ss 2, 3, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 44, 45

Community Standards for Public Land and Roads Local Law 2023

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) s 61

Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld)

Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 138

Explanatory Note to the Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld)

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ss 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26, 32, 48, 58, 59

Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld)

Imperial Acts Application Act 1984 (Qld) s 5 sch 1

Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) ss 4, 7

Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) ss 8, 9, 13, 28, 202

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 365

Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 59

Fleming The Law of Torts 10th ed Thomson Reuters 2011

R v A2 [2019] HCA 35; (2019) 269 CLR 507, cited

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Barton v R [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75, considered

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Canberra Fathers and Children Services Inc v Watson [2010] ACAT 74, cited

Castles v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2010] VSC 310; (2010) 28 VR 141, cited

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Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba [2014] VSC 52; (2014) 44 VR 526, distinguished

Disorganised Developments Pty Ltd v South Australia [2023] HCA 22; (2023) 280 CLR 515, applied

Dorante-Day v State of Queensland [2025] QSC 248, cited

Drake v Minister for Immigration (1979) 24 ALR 577, considered

Faulkner v Ireland (2022) ECHR 31 March 2022, cited

Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 524, cited

Griffith University v Tang [2005] HCA 7; (2005) 221 CLR 99, applied

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Heegsma v City of Hamilton [2024] ONSC 7154, cited

Hirtu v France (2020) ECHR 334 14 May 2020, considered

Homeground Services v Mohamed (Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 1131, cited

Innes v Electoral Commission of Queensland (No 2) [2020] QSC 293; (2020) 5 QR 623, considered

Johnston v Carroll [2024] QSC 2; (2024) 329 IR 365, applied

Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council [2006] UKHL 10; [2006] 2 AC 465, distinguished

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LPDT v Minister of Immigration Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321, cited

Maxwell v R [1996] HCA 46; (1996) 184 CLR 501, considered

Mizner v State of Queensland [2025] QCA 169, applied

Mizner v State of Queensland [2024] QCAT 468, cited

Momcilovic v R [2011] HCA 34; (2011) 245 CLR 1, applied

MSS v Belgium and Greece [2011] ECHR application no 30696/09 21 January 2011, considered

NEAT Domestic Training Pty Ltd v AWB Ltd [2003] HCA 35; (2003) 216 CLR 277, applied

NH and others v France [2020] ECHR applications Nos 28820/13, 75547/13, 13114/15 2 July 2020, considered

Owen-D'Arcy v Chief Executive, Queensland Corrective Services [2021] QSC 273; (2021) 9 QR 250, applied

Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35; (2025) 99 ALJR 1362, cited

PJB v Melbourne Health (Patrick's case) [2011] VSC 327; (2011) 39 VR 373, considered

Poff v City of Hamilton [2021] ONSC 7224; (2021) 498 CRR (2d) 83, cited

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R v Bossley [2012] QSC 292; [2015] 2 Qd R 102, cited

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Ukraine v Russia [2024] ECHR 25 June 2024, considered

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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [1980] ATS 23 art 6, 8

UN Special Rapporteur's open letter to Hungary 20 June 2018

Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 article 17

UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 30 October 2018

UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No 16 on

Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political

UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 20 on Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 10 March 1992

Araya v Denmark UN Human Rights Committee Communication No 2575/2015 3 May 2019, cited

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G Del Villar KC Solicitor General and K Blore for the Attorney-General

L Grant Counsel for the Queensland Human Rights Commission

Basic Rights Queensland for the applicants in proceeding 2741/2025

Hall & Wilcox for the applicants in proceeding 2054/25

Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (intervening)

[1] The applicants are homeless people. Because they could not afford to pay rent for suitable accommodation, they were sleeping rough in public parks in the Moreton Bay City Council area.

[2] The evidence reveals that homelessness has increased significantly recently, housing affordability stress has surged, the demand for services for homeless people far exceeds supply and when people are evicted from a public space this perpetuates a lack of connection and exclusion from broader society and it can add to isolation and stigma and creates fractures in society. If people are moved on without alternative accommodation the outcome is likely further hardship and the psychological toll can be severe.

[3] In November 2023, the council had a 'People Experiencing Homelessness' (PEH) Framework which permitted homeless people to camp on public land. All of the applicants were lawfully camping on public land under the framework.

[4] However, due to a large number of complaints received as to the amenity of the parks, in February 2025 the council revoked the PEH Framework. The effect of this was to render it unlawful to camp on public land under s 13 of the Camping on Public Land Local Law 2023 (Camping Law) and to store goods on public land under s 9 of the Alteration of Public Land Local Law 2023 (Alteration Law).

[5] On various dates in March, April, May, and June 2025, each of the applicants received compliance and decision notices under the Alteration Law and Camping Law requiring the applicants to remove their goods and to stop camping on the land.

[6] On 9 April, 10 April, 24 April, and 8 May 2025, council officers attended Eddie Hyland Park and impounded some of the items of property and disposed of other items by the use of an excavator.

[7] The applicants submit that the notice decisions made under the Camping Law and the Alteration Law, and the disposal decisions were unlawful and in breach of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (HRA).

[8] The Queensland Human Rights Commission supports the applicants' position concerning the alleged breaches of the HRA.

[9] The council and the Attorney-General (intervening) on the other hand reject that the decisions were unlawful or that the HRA was engaged or was breached.

[10] The applicants seek declarations under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (JRA) that the decisions made under the Alteration Law and Camping Law were unlawful. It is also submitted the bulldozing (or disposal) decision was unlawful. They seek a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from taking further action under the laws. In essence, it is alleged the decisions were unlawful as:

(a) They were made in breach of the rules of natural justice.

(b) The decisions involved errors of law.

(c) The decisions and conduct were not compatible with human rights.

[11] The respondent submits that the applicants were camping on public land in breach of the local laws. As a result of this, the council issued compliance notices to the applicants and generally, they had three weeks to comply with the notices. It is also denied that there was any bulldozing, although excavators were used to dispose of rubbish. It is submitted that the steps the respondent took to enforce its laws were authorised by its laws. In summary, it is submitted:

(a) The affidavit evidence of the applicants is inconsistent with the evidence of the council.

(b) The applicants cannot succeed under ordinary administrative law.

(c) The applicants have failed to establish that their human rights were limited by the council decisions.

(d) The applicants' submissions overlook the exclusionary operation of s 58(2) of the HRA.

[12] The Queensland Human Rights Commission (QHRC) has intervened in this matter. In summary, the Commission supports:

(a) The applicants' position that the obligations under s 58(1) of the HRA attach to the relevant exercise of powers by authorised persons under the local laws.

(b) The argument that the relevant exercise of powers under the local laws by authorised persons readily lend themselves to obligations under s 58(1) of the HRA.

(c) The applicants' position that on the council's material there appears to be a contravention of s 58(1)(b) of the HRA for each of the challenged decisions and conduct, as there is no evidence that the authorised persons gave proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.

(d) The applicants' position as to the human rights that are engaged by the relevant decisions and actions of the respondent and submits the right to equality under s 15 of the HRA may also be engaged.

[13] The Attorney-General acknowledges that homelessness poses significant challenges for local Governments. The question in this proceeding is whether the specific acts or decisions by the council to issue the compliance notices or to dispose of property impacted human rights in such a way that those acts or decisions were unlawful under the HRA.

(a) Section 48 of the HRA does not lead to a different reading of the Alteration Law or the Camping Law.

(b) The notice decisions were reasonably necessary to enforce the law such that s 58(2) of the HRA applied and the council was relieved of its human rights obligations under s 58(1).

(c) Each notice decision did not engage any human rights.

(d) The disposal decisions cannot be challenged on human rights grounds because the requirements of the piggyback clause have not been met.

(e) In the alternative, the presence or absence of consent is determinative as to whether the disposal decisions engaged any human rights.

1. The factual findings to be made.
2. Whether s 48 of the HRA requires human rights to be considered when interpreting the relevant local laws.
3. Whether natural justice should have been accorded to the applicants before the decision notices were issued.
4. Whether the time for compliance in the notices was reasonable.
5. Whether the officers issuing the notices erred in failing to independently exercise the discretion to issue compliance notices.
6. Whether the disposal decisions were lawful. This involves a determination on whether the applicants consented to their property being destroyed.
7. What is the effect of s 59 of the HRA.
8. Whether s 58(2) of the HRA is engaged such that council officers were not required to consider the HRA. Ancillary to this is whether the actions of the council created an incremental burden.
9. If s 58(2) of the HRA did not apply, did the council give consideration to relevant human rights under s 58(1)(b) of the HRA.
10. Whether relevant human rights were breached by council officers.
11. What orders are to be made in this matter.

[16] For the reasons which follow, the Court concludes that:

1. The fact findings are referred to in the judgment.
2. There is no need to resort to s 48 of the HRA in construing the local laws.
3. The Camping Law and the Alteration Law did not require natural justice to be accorded to the applicants before the issuing of the decision notices.
4. The time for compliance in the notices issued was not reasonable. For some this is under the general law and for some it was in breach of human rights.
5. There was an error of law made in issuing the notices.
6. With respect to the disposal decisions, some of the applicants' property was disposed of without the consent of some of the applicants.
7. Section 59 of the HRA permits the granting of relief even if the primary action fails.
8. Section 58(2) of the HRA is not engaged and therefore s 58(1) of the HRA did apply.
9. The council did not act in accordance with s 58(1) of the HRA in making its decision to issue the decision notices and in making the decision to dispose of the property.
10. The applicants' human rights were breached by the decisions.
11. The Court will hear further from the parties on the relief to be ordered.

[17] The council is an elected body responsible for the good rule and local government for the area of Moreton Bay under the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) s 8(1). This includes local government responsibility for not only people who live in housing (such as ratepayers) but also homeless people that live in the area.

[18] On 8 November 2023, the council resolved to make the Camping Law and the PEH Camping Framework. This permitted homeless people to camp on public land.

(a) Create a cumulative definition of a list of elements to satisfy the definition.

(b) Prohibit the keeping of animals.

(c) Prohibit the use of caravans, camper trailers and other vehicles for camping.

[20] Since 8 December 2023, the council received about 4,455 complaints in relation to the PEH camping.

(a) A decreasing ability to access public spaces.

(b) Increased illegal behaviours.

(c) Increasing aggression towards public space users and council staff.

(d) Increasing public safety concerns including from animals.

(e) Impacts to businesses and community events.

(f) Deterioration of amenity and public spaces from littering goods and vermin.

(g) Increased public health concerns concerning public toileting, vermin, syringes and drugs.

[22] As a result, Mr McCormack prepared a report for the council general meeting on 26 February 2025. This report was as to the community concerns and recommended the repeal of the PEH Camping Framework. On 19 February 2025, he delivered a confidential brief to the council. On 25 February 2025, Ms Nipperess, a senior council lawyer, provided advice regarding the effect of the repeal on human rights.

[23] On 26 February 2025, the council resolved to repeal the camping framework. A media statement was issued on the same day. The repeal took effect on 12 March 2025.

[24] Thereafter, it became unlawful under s 9 of the Alteration Law to store goods on public land unless the alteration was necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety. It also became unlawful under s 13 of the Camping Law to camp on public land unless they had approval to do so, or the camping was necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety.

[25] There is no challenge by the applicants as to the validity of the laws. Even though there is evidence from Ms Draper that some human rights training occurs, there is no evidence that council officers specifically turned their minds to relevant human rights before they prepared the decision and compliance notices given to each individual.

[26] On 17 March 2025, compliance and decision notice under the laws were issued to Mr McKinlay,[1] Mr Bobeldyk and Ms Richardson. These notices required the contraventions to be remedied by 31 March 2025.

[27] On 9 April 2025, the following compliance and decision notices were issued:

(a) Mr Bobeldyk - compliance by 11.55am on 9 April 2025.

(b) Ms Richardson - compliance by 12.15pm on 9 April 2025.

(c) Mr Jenkinson - compliance within 14 days.

[28] On 10 April 2025, Mrs Bobeldyk was given notices requiring compliance by 4pm on 11 April 2025.

[29] On 24 April 2025, council officers attended Eddie Hyland Park and had dealings with several of the applicants. Some of their property was impounded and some was disposed of.

[30] On 6 May 2025, Mr Eichin was given decision notices requiring compliance by 20 May 2025.

[31] On 7 May 2025, Ms Bobeldyk was given decision notices requiring compliance by 21 May 2025.

[32] On 18 June 2025, Mr Lugge and Mr Carbone were given decision and compliance notices requiring compliance by 3 July 2025.

[33] Most of the applicants moved on and many ended up at a site at Goodfellows Road Kallangur.

[34] Mrs Bobeldyk says that she was homeless from May 2022 until 28 June 2025. She was living at Eddie Hyland Park from September 2024 until 10 May 2025.[2] She describes living in a tent where she stored personal items. The notice she received on 10 April 2025 only gave her 24 hours to remove herself from the park. She and her husband were very distressed trying to pack their belongings. It was raining over the next few days.[3]

[35] On 24 April 2025, important personal items were impounded and destroyed without her consent. She says her belongings from 42 years of marriage were in her tent and disposed of, including the following:

[37] After 24 April 2025 they were left without a proper tent and lived under a tarp with their dogs in the rain.[4] She had nowhere else to go. They were able to get a new tent.

[38] On 9 May 2025, she threw her remaining belongings over a fence to prevent the council from taking them.

[39] On 10 May 2025, they were forced to leave by council officers. They moved to the Goodfellows Road site. On 30 June 2025, she and her husband were offered housing and moved there.

[40] Due to the actions of the council, she felt worn out physically and mentally. She injured her shoulder while moving her belongings. The rain saturated their remaining belongings without a proper tent. She feels they were not treated with respect or dignity and not as humans. It made it harder to connect to her family. Due to the council's actions, there was much uncertainty.

[41] Mr Bobeldyk had also been homeless since 2022 until 28 June 2025. He lived with his wife at Eddie Hyland Park for eight months since September 2024.[5]

[42] He describes how on 9 April 2025 he received a notice and was told he had one hour to pack up.[6] After he started to pack his belongings he fainted and was taken to hospital. The next day his wife was given a notice to move by 11 April 2025. He still felt very weak, but they attempted to pack their belongings. For the next few days, it rained.[7]

[43] On 24 April 2025, he and his wife were told they had a couple of hours to remove all their belongings from the park. They were told to put their items in three piles - one to take, one to be impounded and one for rubbish. He recalls telling the officers what was rubbish and what they were to keep. He told them that he wanted to keep one of the tents yet that ended up in the rubbish. His wife was told they had five more minutes to take their belongings, or council would be taking them.

[45] He says they lost items they had collected over 42 years of marriage.

[46] He corroborates his wife's version that they were left to sit under a tarp in the rain with their dogs.[8] They were never given a raincoat to protect them and their remaining property.

[47] They stayed at Eddie Hyland Park as they had nowhere else to go. On 10 May 2025 he and his wife were forced to leave the park and they went to Goodfellows Road.

[48] It was only on or around 30 June 2025 that he and his wife were offered housing.

[49] He felt worn out and tired due to the actions of the council. He was constantly fearful and he felt disrespected. They were not treated with dignity and respect and it affected his family.

[50] Angela Bobeldyk says she had been homeless for over a year (from September 2024). She says she lived at Eddie Hyland Park from September 2024.[9]

[51] On a day she cannot identify she had gone to visit a friend. When she returned, she had found that all of her belongings had been bulldozed by council officers. She did not consent to this. The property includes the following:

[52] She says that a friend filmed this, but she has no copy of the video.

[53] She says that she received the notice decisions on 7 May 2025. After this she moved to Goodfellows Road.

[54] Her only income is from Centrelink, and she cannot afford a private rental property to live at. She has no choice but to be homeless. She has not been offered any housing. She refuses to part with her dog as it is part of her family. She felt violated by the actions of the council. Even her photos were lost. She could not charge her phone as the charger was lost.

[55] Mr McKinlay had been homeless for about three years because of mental health issues. These issues worsened after he lost his mother. He lived in a tent with his partner Ms Richardson under the PEH Camping Framework at Eddie Hyland Park from April 2024. He says he never received the compliance notices.

[56] In April 2025 he says that after being in the watchhouse, he returned to the park and was given one hour to move out. Despite this, they stayed at the park as they had nowhere else to go.

[57] Between 9 April 2025 and 7 May 2025, he stored his items across the road, pushing them around in a trolley.

[58] He returned to the park with his belongings on 7 May 2025. The next day he was told to move his belongings. He managed to move some items out of his tent but before he could remove all his personal belongings the council bulldozed his tent and personal belongings. He did not consent to this. He also says that council officers disposed of many other homeless residents' belongings as well. They left most of these at the park, but everything was completely destroyed.

[60] He was left with no shelter and limited resources. He was devastated to lose so many sentimental items belonging to his mother. He has been unable to recover any of his personal belongings. He estimates the value of the items at between $8,000 to $10,000. After the trauma of losing his belongings, he left the park and moved to Goodfellows Road.

[61] Due to his mental health conditions Mr McKinlay is unable to work and had no income. He cannot afford rental accommodation.

[62] On 10 April 2025 he was unable to be referred to supported accommodation because his partner Ms Richardson has a dog and the dog is part of the family.

[63] On 8 May 2025 he was told that pet friendly accommodation was available in Esk, but they declined due to Ms Richardson's caring obligations.

[64] The council's actions made him more depressed and more worried. He felt like he was unequal, worthless and a nobody. He was not treated with dignity.

[65] Ms Richardson says that she is presently sleeping in a Gazebo at 99 Goodfellows Road Kallangur. She has been homeless for around two years. She lived with her partner in a tent at Eddie Hyland Park from around August 2024. They had been living at the Aspley Caravan Park but were asked to leave.

[66] She had lawfully been residing there under the PEH Camping Framework until the repeal. She suffers short term memory loss due to trauma from domestic violence.

[67] She received a compliance notice on 9 April 2025 giving her until 12.15pm the same day to move out. This did not give her much time to sort out her belongings or where she was going to live.

[68] On the second occasion the council officers came in April,[10] they advised her and her partner that they were illegally staying on the property. Council officers told them they would be getting accommodation, but this did not happen.

[69] The following items of property were bulldozed:

(a) Tent - value $799

(b) Bed - value $199

(c) Items for dog - value $150

(d) Other belongings - value $300

[70] She did not consent to this. She was desperately pulling items out of her tent to stop them from being taken. She and her partner were left with nothing.

[71] On 8 May 2025 council officers came and took her tent and cut down her tarps.

[72] She and her partner then moved to Goodfellows Road. The Bobeldyks helped them to get back on their feet after the trauma of losing their items.

[73] Her only income is from Centrelink. It is $750 per fortnight. She cannot afford a private rental property because of the expensive Brisbane market. She has no choice but to be homeless.

[74] On 10 April 2025, Ms Richardson was unable to go into supported accommodation as she has a dog. The dog is part of her family and keeps her motivated.

[75] On 8 May 2025, she was offered pet friendly accommodation in Esk, but this is too far away from her adoptive parents and her community.

[76] On 8 July 2025, she was offered 3-day IHR[11] accommodation. The Department has told her they could not give a time frame for suitable housing.

[77] She is feeling a lot more depressed because of the council's actions. Her dignity was taken away and she was made to feel inferior.

[78] Mr Lugge had been homeless for about 18 months. He had no other option but to be homeless. He does not have permanent accommodation and has been living in a tent at 99 Goodfellows Road Kallangur. He has been living at Goodfellows camp for about 10 months.

[79] On 18 June 2025 he was given decision notices by the council.

[80] About 10 to 15 years prior, he was in a car accident and injured his hand. He was ultimately placed on a disability support pension. The pension he receives is insufficient for him to rent a private property hence he is homeless.

[81] On 6 August 2024 he was offered 72-hour accommodation but was scared someone would steal his property. He has never denied assistance and would like help getting an ID.

[82] He is on a housing list with the Department of Housing. On 26 September 2025 he was told he was still on the housing list. To date he has not had any offers of accommodation.

[83] Mr Jenkinson has been living in a caravan at 99 Goodfellows Road Kallangur. He has been homeless for about five years. He became homeless after he and his wife separated. He struggled to find work and cannot afford to rent a property because of the expensive rental market. He lived at Eddie Hyland Park in his Toyota Prado for about 12 months and then in his caravan. He kept his Prado, Caravan and other personal items at the park.

[84] He recalls receiving the notice decisions. When he was given it, he felt very intimidated. He was given an extra two weeks to move on. He recalls watching council officers tear up tents and seize the belongings of the residents around him.

[85] Only two residents were offered alterative housing. None of his belongings were taken.

[86] During the two-week period, he stopped all employment as he was fearful his belongings would be seized. He left Eddie Hyland Park in around May 2025. He is presently living at Goodfellows Road.

[87] Mr Jenkinson's only income is $780 per fortnight through Centrelink. He found it difficult to keep employment while living at the park. He also does odd jobs. He has no choice but to be homeless.

[88] He was offered refuge accommodation by the Department of Housing on 13 February 2025 but declined this as he is seeking long term housing.

[89] He felt that the council's actions segregated them from the rest of the community. At times they dealt with him in an undignified way. He was intimidated by the QPS presence. He feels like he has lost his privacy. His life was impacted.

[90] Mr Eichin says that he lives at the Goodfellows Road site. He has been homeless since 28 March 2024 and has been unable to find a property due to the cost of rent. He lived at the Sweeny Reserve next to Eddie Hyland Park from 28 March 2024 until May 2025. He now recalls that he received the decision and compliance notice on 6 May 2025.

[91] He moved to Goodfellows Road as he was fearful of what would happen to him and his belongings if he did not comply. His only income is from Centrelink benefits. He has no choice but to be homeless.

[92] He has not been offered affordable housing. He says that his phone was stolen. He now has a new phone. He would go anywhere to have a place to live. He has accepted referrals to Rothwell and Encircle. On 26 September 2025 he gave his ID to the department, but he is still waiting to receive an offer of housing.

[93] The move from Sweeney Reserve took a lot out of him. The council's actions impacted him in a negative way.

[94] Mr Carbone has been homeless for about 22 years since he was 17. This is due to his struggles with drug use and because he cannot read or write. He lived at Eddie Hyland Park from around April 2024.

[95] He does not recall receiving any decision and compliance notices.[12] He recalls having a brief conversation with someone who asked him to move on from the park. He is aware that his tent and belongings at Eddie Hyland Park were bulldozed by the council, but he was not present when this happened. This included the following items:

(a) Tent - value $500

(b) Clothing - value $250

(c) Petrol generator - value $7500

(d) Washing machine - value $50

(e) Other belongings - value $500

[96] After he lost his belongings, Mr Carbone moved from Eddie Hyland Park on foot and found an abandoned house where he stayed for about two months. He then moved to the Goodfellows Road site.

[97] He was given a notice on 18 June 2025. He has just had Centrelink payment restored. He cannot afford a rental property in Brisbane.

[98] He has accepted referrals to Rothwell and Encircle. He is waiting for an offer of housing.

[99] What happened to him was horrible. He felt like they had nowhere else to go. It was like getting kicked out of home. He was heartbroken when he found his items were destroyed.

[100] Mr Simon Tracy from Basic Rights Queensland has provided an affidavit enclosing a number of reports.

[101] Professor Cameron Parsell has 18 years' experience concerning poverty, homelessness, and domestic and family violence. In his report dated 21 July 2025, he opines:

(a) The demand for specialist homelessness services has increased significantly in 2024.

(b) Between 2018 and 2022 housing affordability stress surged by 27 per cent.

(c) The demand for services for homeless people far exceeds supply. The greatest challenge is the paucity of affordable accommodation

(d) The Department of Housing has a complicated assessment process based on criteria which are not always clear. People can wait months or years for availability.

(e) If the applicants were required to leave Goodfellows Road, the problems faced by the applicants will be exacerbated.

(f) When people are evicted from a public space, this perpetuates a feeling of a lack of connection and exclusion from the broader society. It can add to isolation and stigma and creates fractures in society.

(g) Forcing homeless people to move on does nothing to address their homelessness and can lead to exclusion. The risk of violence is greater.

[102] Mr Herbert, the CEO of Full Circle Projects, in a letter dated 21 July 2025 notes:

(a) People sleeping rough often present with complex needs including mental health and substance use disorders, as well as co-morbidities. They are highly vulnerable and face significant stigma.

(b) If the applicants are moved on without alternative accommodation the outcome is likely to be further hardship. The psychological toll on the individuals could be severe and they could experience further deterioration in mental health.

[103] Ms Karyn Walsh of Micah Projects in a letter dated 21 July 2025 notes:

(a) In the Brisbane City Council area there are some 2486 homeless individuals and 1230 homeless families.

(b) Services are not adequately resourced to meet the goal of making homelessness rare.

(c) They are constantly dealing with short term interventions but there is not enough housing.

(d) Those on Centrelink benefits are reliant on social housing. Motels are being used.

(e) Public housing has very few vacancies and to get an allocation can take years.

(f) There are not enough options for crisis accommodation in Southeast Queensland and there is a lack of co-ordinated support for homeless people.

(g) As Australia is experiencing a housing crisis, there are no options available other than for people to sleep rough.

[104] Mr Jake Sheehan from Basic Rights Queensland in his affidavit notes as follows:

(a) As to Mr Eichin, he had never been offered accommodation. He would go anywhere to live. His phone had been stolen. He has four children living in Kallangur. If he moved to another area he would have to use public transport.

(b) As to Ms Richardson, she had declined the Esk accommodation as it was too far away. She does not have a car. She would have no support there. Mrs Bobeldyk is her "Mum" and her community is in Kallangur. The Esk option was only for six weeks. She assists with the care of Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk. Her dog assists with her mental health.

(c) He was not able speak to Mr Jenkinson, Mr Carbone, Mr McKinlay or Ms Bobeldyk.

(d) As to Mr Lugge, he said he was offered accommodation at Morayfield for two nights. He was called at 8pm so by the time he packed up it would not be worth it. He said he always wanted help with his ID and he has never declined assistance.

[105] Kate Draper, Chief Legal Counsel for the respondent, swears that on 8 November 2023 the council resolved to make the Camping Law and the PEH Framework. The framework sets out the general principles for how authorised persons would approach and interact with persons experiencing homelessness. PEH camping was defined as camping in a public place in tents or vehicles; the person informs an authorised person they were homeless; they agreed to share their information with the Department of Housing, and they complied with their responsibilities whilst on public land.

[106] Authorised officers would visit the location at regular intervals to ensure it remained clean, safe and accessible to the public. Persons experiencing homelessness needed to maintain engagement with the Department of Housing and keep the area clean, safe, and tidy.[13]

[107] On 12 December 2024, the council resolved to amend the framework which changed the definition of PEH camping, prohibited the keeping of animals and prohibited the use of caravans, camper trailers and other vehicles in public spaces.

[108] On 26 February 2025, the council resolved to repeal the PEH Framework. Ms Draper swears that she is instructed that as part of council's staff general training requirements, they are required to complete human rights training.

[109] Mark McCormack, the General Manager of Community and Environmental Services at the council, says that he is responsible for administering the council's housing and homelessness policies and programs.

[110] He says that following the adoption of the PEH Framework on 8 November 2023, the council had received a significant number of complaints by residents, businesses and staff concerning the camping by people experiencing homelessness in public spaces. This included illegal drug use, excessive consumption of alcohol, the use of weapons, increasing aggression, animals, public toileting, vermin harbourage, used syringes and drug paraphernalia. As a result, an officer's report was prepared on 26 February 2025 regarding these issues. The report recommended that the council repeal the Framework. Human rights implications were considered and were referred to at page four of the report. Mr McCormack swears that the 99 Goodfellows Road site is land owned by the council. Exhibit MM2 is a complaint report regarding this site. Exhibit MM3 is an investigation report dated 9 July 2025 regarding this site. This report noted that the structures on the site were, or were likely to become, a breeding ground or source for designated pests or harbouring designated pests. There were piles of waste, discarded mattresses, and discarded food. There was waste, used syringes and drug paraphernalia. There was active rodent activity and mosquito breading. There was also a lack of showers and toilets at the site. It was concluded that there were a range of issues at the site which presented an escalated public health risk.

[111] With respect to Eddie Hyland Park, exhibit MM4 is a complaint report. Exhibit MM5 is a complaint report concerning the Sweeny Reserve.

[112] Mr McCormack refers to other locations in respect of which complaints had been received.

[113] On 19 February 2025, Mr McCormack delivered a confidential council briefing to provide an overview of the camping Framework. He also raised that the council was required to consider human rights implications. On 25 February 2025 he received legal advice from legal counsel as to the effect of the repeal of the camping Framework on human rights. Ms Nipperess in her advice referred to the limitations the Framework brought on various human rights and noted that the repeal of the Framework would not leave a gap in support, as there was a Department of Housing intensive case management process and the homelessness safety and public amenity executive interagency. If the Framework was repealed with no notice or lead time, it was arguable that the council were treating PEH in a degrading manner. Therefore, the council may wish to consider having a notice period to the community. It also stated that the council may wish to consider working with the state to the full extent possible to find viable alternative housing for PEH.

[114] On 26 February 2025, the council ultimately resolved to repeal the camping Framework. This decision was published in the media.

[115] Mr McCormack is also aware of the interactions between the council and PEH and the services made available to such people. Once the council was made aware of PEH, dedicated rangers are tasked to visit the location of the persons and to engage with them. If they consent, council rangers will collect their personal details and pass them on to the Department of Housing and Encircle. Encircle is the state government funded and appointed specialist homelessness outreach service for Moreton Bay.

[116] Shane Mansfield is the local laws manager at Moreton Bay City Council. He says that the camping Framework came into force on 8 December 2023. Council had received approximately 4,455 complaints in relation to camping by PEH. With respect to Eddie Hyland Park, Mr Mansfield produces compliance and decision notices under the Alteration Law and Camping Law on 17 March 2025. He also produces other notices and body worn camera footage and photographs. In a second affidavit, Mr Mansfield provides more notices. In a third affidavit, Mr Mansfield says that following the repeal of the PEH Framework, a number of meetings occurred regarding implementation. Stage one of the plan was for rangers to visit the 137 known PEH to advise them that the Framework would be repealed on 12 March 2025, to explain the implications of the repeal, reconnect them with housing services, and to verify their personal details. He refers to the details of this. Stage two of the plan was with respect to the issuing of compliance notices and subsequent action.

[117] Renea Strathie, a customer service manager of the housing outreach mobile engagement team within the Department of Housing and Public Works, has provided an affidavit. Her role is to manage an outreach team which engages with people experiencing homelessness to provide support and assistance. The specialist homelessness service provider in the Moreton Bay Region is Encircle. She has prepared two documents. The first relates to Goodfellows Road and is a summary based on outreach with certain customers. The second document is 72 pages of file records taken from the departments management database. The department's primary role is to provide long term social housing and individuals may be placed on a waiting list for this without necessarily accessing temporary housing first. The department also funds specialist homelessness services such as Encircle to offer accommodation options.

[118] With respect to Mr Eichin, he was ineligible for immediate housing response as he had no current ID. He accepted one referral at Rothwell, although declined supported accommodation referrals to the hub in the park because of distance and being away from friend's support. Encircle unsuccessfully tried to contact him 18 times.

[119] With respect to Ms Richardson, on 8 July 2025 the department completed referrals to a specialist homelessness service. She has a pet which makes it difficult to find accommodation in the region. She declined pet friendly accommodation in Esk because it is too far away. She has been exited from housing before.

[120] With respect to Mr Jenkinson, in February 2025 he declined immediate housing response assistance. The department unsuccessfully tried to contact him in May and July.

[121] With respect to Mr Lugge, on 6 August 2024 he accepted immediate housing response assistance but declined to go. On 8 July 2025 he was ineligible because he had no current ID and had declined assistance.[14]

[122] With respect to Mr Carbone, as at 8 July 2025 he was ineligible for immediate housing response because he had no current ID. He was also aggressive.[15]

[123] With respect to Mr McKinlay, as at 8 July 2025 he declined supported accommodation because his partner owned the dog and Esk was too far away.

[124] With respect to Ms Bobeldyk, she declined exploring accommodation options which were not pet friendly.

Respondent's evidence on the disposal decisions

[125] Liam Cooney says that on 24 April 2025, he and other council officers attended Eddie Hyland Park to issue compliance notices to certain people. Council rangers disposed of waste as confirmed by these people. Before doing this, officers would collapse the tents and check that nothing was left inside. Excavators would scoop up the remains for disposal. If items were abandoned and items could not be impounded for sanitary reasons, they would be disposed of.

[126] Mr Cooney in his third affidavit refers to the team he had on site on 24 April 2025. He says that when they arrived at Eddie Hyland Park that day, Mr Bobeldyk had already formed a pile which was deemed to be rubbish that was to be disposed of. Mr Cooney told Mr Bobeldyk that he had one hour to sort through and organise their belongings and to decide what they wanted to keep, what was to be impounded or disposed of. White bags were provided to assist them.

[127] During the course of interactions, he discussed with Mr Bobeldyk various items he wanted to take with him. He asked Mr Bobeldyk to specifically check certain piles to ensure the belongings were in correct piles for keeping, impounding and disposal. All council rangers were polite and treated them professionally. He did not recall any officer threatening them with time limits except to say they would like all of it done that day. I prefer Mr Bobeldyk's version on this as it is consistent with the times in the notice and the body cam footage.

[128] With respect to the items Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk allege were disposed of, Mr Cooney says as follows:

He saw this in the rubbish pile. He says that in the footage Mr Bobeldyk said he was not keeping the unit.

One was mouldy and Mr Bobeldyk said this could be disposed of. He kept one tent and one was impounded.

He does not know if Mr Bobeldyk wanted this. It was not impounded.

[129] Mr Steve Milovale is a council ranger. As at 24 April 2025 his role was to assist PEH rangers with transporting and impounding goods from PEH sites.

[130] On 24 April 2025, Mr Milovale attended Eddie Hyland Park to assist PEH rangers. He also has body cam footage. He says that Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk indicated what they wanted to keep, what they wanted to take and what they wanted to dispose of.

[131] With respect to the items Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk allege were disposed of, he says as follows:

He saw this next to the tent. He does not know what happened to this.

They impounded one tent. It was a larger one. On the video footage one was ripped and Mr Bobeldyk said it could go on the rubbish pile.

He saw this on the ground. He does not know what happened to this.

[132] Craig Mitchell is a general council ranger. On 24 April 2025 Mr Mitchell attended Eddie Hyland Park to assist. He also has body cam footage. With respect to the items Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk alleged were taken, he says as follows:

In the footage Mr Bobeldyk said it was rubbish and could be disposed of.

One large tent was impounded. He is not sure if it was a storage tent.

[133] Liam O'Callaghan is an engagement patrols coordinator with the council.

[134] With respect to items which are alleged to have been disposed of without Ms Bobeldyk's consent, he has reviewed council records and body cam footage. He cannot locate any record that council officers seized, impounded or disposed of Ms Bobeldyk's kitchen, camper cooker, cutlery table, lounge, cupboard, gazebo, lights, solar panels, batteries and other personal belongings. He says that on 8 May 2025 council officers attended and her campsite was not there.

[135] Mr Mansfield in his first affidavit said that there was no record of the council removing or disposing of Ms Richardson's or Mr McKinlay's items. However, he now says that items of Ms Richardson were removed on 10 April 2025, 24 April 2025 and 8 May 2025. He says that for 10 April 2025 there is body cam footage from Mr Standring. He says that for 24 April 2025 Mr Cooney informed him that various items of Ms Richardson were disposed of at her direction, and none were impounded. There is also body cam footage. He also says that on 8 May 2025 certain items belonging to Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson were disposed of by the council at their direction.

[136] On 10 April 2025 Mr Steve Milovale attended Eddie Hyland Park to assist rangers with transporting any items. He produces body cam footage from that day. He says the body cam footage shows Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson packing their belongings and an excavator disposing of the rest. He alleges that Mr Standring asked Ms Richardson to sort out items she wanted to keep and ones she wanted to dispose of. He was not involved with sorting any of Ms Richardson's items. He agrees her tent was disposed of. He said that council rangers were friendly and professional.

[137] Mr Cooney says that he interacted with Mr McKinlay on 10 April 2025 and there is body cam footage. He said that no items were impounded or removed from his camp. Standring told him that in half an hour they would be moving back to this side of the camp and "starting here."

[138] Mr Cooney says with respect to 24 April 2025, he and other council officers attended Eddie Hyland Park to issue compliance notices to certain people[16]. He says those people were given time to pack up their belongings. Council rangers disposed of waste as confirmed by these people. Before doing this, they would collapse the tents and check that nothing was in left inside. Excavators would scoop up the remains for disposal. If items were abandoned and items could not be impounded for sanitary reasons, they would be disposed of.

[139] With respect to Ms Richardson, he recalls speaking to her and her partner about collecting their belongings. He helped them pack their tent and put it in a trolley on a date he cannot recall. He recalls that an excavator was used to dispose of her rubbish.

[140] In his third affidavit, Mr Cooney says that on 24 April 2025 he attended Eddie Hyland Park with a team of rangers to enforce compliance notices. He had a conversation with Ms Richardson about a blue tent and she said she did not want it, but they would have to get Mrs Bobeldyk a new tent. Mr Bobeldyk said he did not want the tent. He does not recall the tent being disposed of. He considered he had consent to dispose of it.

[141] He says that council officers treated Ms Richardson and Mr McKinlay professionally.

[142] Sam Van Der Vegt is a council ranger and on 8 May 2025 he went to Eddie Hyland Park and kept body cam footage. He recalls interacting with Mr McKinlay on 8 May 2025 and recalls that he already had his belongings packed up on a trolley, apart from a small tent which he helped him pack up. He returned the tent to the woman claiming to own it. He is unable to provide information as to Ms Richardson's belongings.

[143] As to Mr McKinlay's allegations, he has no recollection and does not believe he or his colleagues disposed of any items.

[144] It is his understanding Mr McKinlay gave consent to the collapsing of a tent. He recalls an excavator was used at Eddie Hyland Park on 8 May 2025 but does not believe it was with respect to Mr McKinlay's belongings. He has no recollection that an excavator was used in relation to Ms Richardson's belongings.

[145] Council officers acted respectfully to Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson.

[146] Mr Cooney says that on 8 May 2025 he attended with other rangers at the park. He recalls that Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson were not packing up any of their items. In his opinion they were being obstructive and ignoring ranger's directions. He said to Mr McKinlay that if they did not pack items up now, they would be getting impounded. He recalls rolling up Mr McKinlay's tent and another ranger placing the tent on his trolley. He does not recall their items being disposed of using an excavator on 8 May 2025.

[147] He claims he has no knowledge of the bed, gazebo, laptop, camera, two phones, phone charger, batteries, clothing, cooking equipment, general camping equipment, portable drills, small refrigerator, generator, watch, jewellery, paperwork, cheques and other belongings. He was more frustrated at them because he felt they were frustrating the process.

[148] He admits he was more frustrated with Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson on 8 May 2025 but claims they were treated professionally and with respect.

[149] Mr Mansfield said there is no record of the council disposing of any of Mr Carbone's items.

[150] Exhibit 4 in this proceeding is a USB containing several folders of videos, namely body worn camera footage taken by the council officers. These videos are also variously exhibited to affidavits or other documents in this proceeding.

[151] There is no footage of them receiving compliance notices on 17 March 2025 or on 9 and 10 April 2025.

[152] On 24 April 2025[17] council officers told Mr Bobeldyk he had one hour to remove his items. He was told that he could take as much as he wanted. He had to sort out what was to be impounded or disposed of. He was then told they would be back in half an hour.

[153] Also on 24 April 2025,[18] officers filmed Mr Bobeldyk. He asked for a hand dismantling his tent. The officers then discussed getting an excavator in. Mr Bobeldyk said they were going to keep the tarps. The officers removed these and cut the ropes. One of the tarps was folded and put into a bag. It was agreed that the bed be kept and placed in storage. Mr Bobeldyk wanted to keep another tent. At one point Mr Cooney pointed to a pile saying it was rubbish, but another officer said, "I think he wants to keep the tent." The bed and tarps were placed on a truck. At one point Mr Bobeldyk was again directed to sort out items. Mr Cooney said they would not take mouldy blankets. Mr Bobeldyk wanted to keep storage shelves. He said the fences were "neither here nor there." The toolbox was to be kept. Mr Bobeldyk said he was happy for the blue tent to be disposed of. His large tent was ultimately impounded. The grassy items were not impoundable.

[154] Also, at one point Mr Bobeldyk was asked if the large tent was to be impounded or if he would like to take it with him. Mr Bobeldyk said, "We don't have anywhere to go so I guess it can go to storage."

[155] In another recording on 24 April 2025,[19] Mr Bobeldyk said he wanted to keep the mattress. At one point an officer said, "The media want a bit of crying." A couch was taken out of the tent and placed next to the rubbish pile. The officers folded up the tent. Mr Bobeldyk said he did not want to downsize to a smaller tent. He was told by officers that he could not keep two tents. He was told that council could hold the impounded property for 20 days and then it could be disposed of. At one point an officer said it was not a good look that it would be "pissing down" rain and the media would love that. At another point an officer noted Mr Bobeldyk was struggling. Another officer said they would not hit all sites that day in "this water."

[156] In another recording on 24 April 2025[20] the excavator was at the rubbish pile. Mr Cooney confirmed Mr Bobeldyk could not take the tents as he had one. One tent was mouldy. Later Mr Cooney noted they were about to be rained on and they needed raincoats. The fencing was to be disposed of. Mr Bobeldyk was given an impoundment notice.

[157] The recordings by Mr Milovale[21] and Mr Mitchell[22] also shows the dealings on 24 April 2025. In Mr Mitchell's recording an officer said, "We're making a bit of a judgment call on some of it." In footage 19 at one point an officer said he did not know if stuff was in the tent.

[158] On 8 May 2025 Mr Cooney was told by Mr Bobeldyk that he was not sure when an owner was coming back. Mr Cooney said they would "take it all."[23]

[159] On 9 April 2025,[24] in a recording with Mr Jenkinson, an excavator can be seen being used at a campsite. There was reference to "abandoned sites."

[160] On 7 May 2025,[25] council officers issued a compliance notice to Ms Bobeldyk.

[161] On 17 March 2025,[26] a compliance notice was issued to Ms Richardson. Mr McKinlay was asleep. Ms Richardson said that she had spoken to housing and was waiting for them to get back to her. She was told that in two weeks council would come back for another chat. She was told she could not camp on any public land in Moreton Bay. Ms Richardson asked what she could do. The officer said, "I can't say." Ms Richardson was happy to be in contact with housing.

[162] On 9 April 2025,[27] Ms Richardson was reminded that a notice had been issued on 17 March 2025. Officers gave her one hour to pack up and to cease camping. Another compliance notice was issued giving her one hour. If she did not comply, items would be impounded or disposed of. One of the officers said, "they're the ones with the lawyers." A notice was filled out for Mr McKinlay.

[163] In a recording on 10 April 2025,[28] Mr McKinlay said that Ms Richardson was not there. Mr McKinlay was given 1 ½ hours to remove his property.

[164] Also, on 10 April 2025,[29] Ms Richardson was given until 1.10pm to move out. It is clear that Ms Richardson and Mr McKinlay were attempting to move items from their tent. Ms Richardson said they needed two tarps. She started pulling a tarp off the tents. An officer can be seen cutting a rope. Officers started dismantling the tent.

[165] In another recording on 10 April 2025,[30] one officer noted "Media's not recording now." There were discussions between officers about getting the excavator in. Ms Richardson "thought" she had everything out of the tent. Ms Richardson said "You can have it" when asked if everything else could be removed. Officer Standring then directed residents to remove themselves and not to come into the area where officers were dismantling tents. There is footage of an excavator removing tents and other items.[31] I conclude this included some of the Richardson and McKinlay property.

[166] On 24 April 2025,[32] Ms Richardson said that the tent was hers as council had taken the other one. She was told she had half an hour to an hour to pack everything up or it would be impounded or disposed of. She had to pack up as many things as she could or they would remove the rest of it.

[167] Also, on 24 April 2025, Ms Richardson told Mr Cooney that the tent was her mum's tent and she was not giving permission to remove it as it was not hers.[33] She also said the "stuff" there was not hers. The officers spoke to Mr Bobeldyk who said they could take the tent.[34]

[168] On 24 April 2025, there is footage of council workers piling up rubbish and an excavator removing items.[35]

[169] On 8 May 2025,[36] Mr Cooney told Ms Richardson and Mr McKinlay they would impound their trolley even though he was pushing it. He also said they would impound their tent. Mr McKinlay said he was pushing his trolley. Ms Cooney said if it was not moved in five minutes it is "out of here". He said it was their last chance.

[170] Further on 8 May 2025,[37] Mr Cooney said to Mr McKinlay that they had been pretty fair to him. He was then told he could not go the way he was pushing the trolley as it was a construction site. Mr Cooney told him that unless they saw the trolley moving it would go on to the trailer. Mr Cooney asked him if he was keeping the tent. Mr McKinlay said they were and he would have to pull it down.

[171] On 8 May 2025, Mr Van Der Vegte told Ms Richardson not to set the tent back up. Ms Richardson said she knew this, but it was raining. Mr Van Der Vegte told her to keep pushing for housing.[38]

[172] On 7 July 2025,[39] Ms Richardson told officers he was happy for her details to be given to the Department of Housing.

[173] On 9 April 2025,[40] Mr Jenkinson was issued with both a Camping Law and vehicle notice. He was given 14 days to find accommodation. He agreed for unwanted items to be disposed of.

[174] On 7 May 2025,[41] a compliance notice was issued to Mr Eichin. Mr Eichin told the officers he was on the list for housing. An officer told him that the whole point of issuing the notices was to put pressure on the [Department] of Housing to get housing [for them].[42] Mr Eichin willingly gave his mobile phone number to council officers to pass onto housing. He did not decline to speak to liaison officers. The officer told him that a small group of homeless people had ruined it for all of the others.[43] Mr Eichin told officers how he had a motorbike accident and had lost his job.

[175] On 18 June 2025,[44] Mr Lugge was served a compliance notice. He was told that police officers were present for safety. Mr Lugge was told he had to comply with the notice by 3 July 2025. He told officers he would deal with the Department of Housing himself.[45]

[176] On 7 July 2025, Mr Lugge again confirmed he was happy for his details to be given to the Department of Housing.[46]

[177] On 18 June 2025,[47] Mr Carbone was issued a compliance notice. He was told he could not camp on council land. He told the officers that the Department of Housing had not been to see him.

[178] On 7 July 2025,[48] Mr Carbone told officers he was happy for his details to be given to the Department of Housing.

[179] The submission is that the court would accept the evidence of the applicants.

[180] The respondent submits that the evidence of the applicants would not be accepted as compared to the evidence of the council officers and the body worn footage.

[181] As to Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk, it is submitted that although notices were given to Mr Bobeldyk on 17 March 2025 and 9 April 2025, and Mrs Bobeldyk on 9 April 2025 no further action was taken until 24 April 2025. It is submitted the evidence reveals that that council officers worked with Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk and the process was explained to them. Mr Bobeldyk was asked to check the piles to ensure they were correct. Once this process was complete an excavator disposed of piles of rubbish. It is submitted the council made a real effort to ensure that the only property disposed of was not wanted or could not be impounded.

[182] As to Ms Bobeldyk, her evidence would not be accepted as she does not have the video she alleges exists, the items were not "bulldozed," she was wrong about Cyclone Alfred and council has not record of her being at the park until 7 May 2025.

[183] As to Ms Richardson and Mr McKinlay, compliance notices were given to Ms Richardson on 17 March 2025. On 9 April 2025 further compliance notices were given. Ms Richardson's evidence is inconsistent with the other evidence. The video footage on 10 April 2025 shows that council officers explained the process of impoundment and belongings being packed up. Ms Richardson thought she had everything and said everything else could be removed. Ms Richardson has confused 8 May 2025 for 24 April 2025. On 8 May 2025 officers assisted them pack up a tent. Officers removed items abandoned at the site. As to Mr McKinlay's property the only day this was disposed of was 10 May 2025, but they were given every opportunity to save their possessions and Mr McKinlay's account is not plausible.

[184] As to Mr Jenkinson it is submitted that he was never given a notice under the Camping Law or Alteration Law.[49]

[185] As to Mr Lugge, he was given a compliance notice on 18 June 2025. It is submitted he declined a referral to housing support.[50]

[186] As to Mr Eichin, he was given a compliance notice on 6 May 2025. Mr Eichin declined to speak to a Public Space Liaison Officer.[51] He left the Sweeney Reserve a couple of days later.

[187] As to Mr Carbone it is submitted that it would not be found that council destroyed his belongings. It is submitted that housing found engaging with Mr Carbone difficult as he was aggressive.

[188] I generally accept the evidence of Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk as to their backgrounds. I accept that they were lawfully residing at the park for about six months before the repeal of the laws. It is clear to me that they treated the tent and the park as their home. Indeed, the video evidence shows that the campsite did resemble a home with mats and grass used as flooring; there was a large tent broken into rooms; there was a bed, an air-conditioning unit, table and chairs, pot plants, shelving, a clothesline, TV antenna, brooms and mops and gardening equipment.

[189] I accept that after 24 April 2025 they sat under a tarp with their dogs and rain saturated their belongings. I also accept they had no permanent accommodation arranged at the time of the notice decisions. I accept their evidence that they felt they were not treated as humans, and they were left in a state of uncertainty.

[190] I generally accept the evidence of Angela Bobeldyk as to her background. I accept she was lawfully residing at the park for about six months. I accept her evidence that her belongings disappeared. I accept her evidence she was devastated as to this. I accept that she felt violated by the council's actions. I conclude she treated her tent and the park as a home also. Her evidence is that she had the accoutrements of a home including a kitchen, cooker, cutlery, table, lounge, cupboard, gazebo and lights and solar panels.

[191] I generally accept the evidence of Mr McKinlay as to his background. I accept he was lawfully residing at the park for about 11 months until the repeal of the PEH Framework. I accept his evidence that he was left with no shelter and limited resources. I accept that he became more depressed as a result of the actions of the council, and that he believed himself to be worthless, without dignity, and a nobody. I conclude he regarded their tent and the park as their home. His evidence is he had the accoutrements of a home including a tent, gazebo, clothing, cooking equipment, camping equipment, a bed, a fridge, a generator and other important personal property. There was also flooring for the tent visible in the footage.

[192] I generally accept the evidence of Ms Richardson as to her background. I accept she was lawfully residing at the park until the repeal of the PEH camping Framework. I accept she suffered trauma after losing their items. I accept she was more depressed after the council's actions, and she felt inferior. I conclude she regarded their tent and the park as their home. Aside from the items she shared with Mr McKinlay she had a tent, a bed and items for her dog.

[193] I generally accept the evidence of Mr Lugge as to his background. I accept he was residing at Goodfellows Road lawfully for about 10 months until the repeal. I accept his evidence that he has not denied assistance. I accept he had not had any offers of accommodation. I conclude he regarded his tent and the park as his home.

[194] I generally accept the evidence of Mr Jenkinson as to his background. I accept he was residing lawfully at the park for about 12 months before the repeal. I accept his evidence that he saw the council tear up tents and seize belongings. I accept his evidence that only two residents were offered alternate housing. I accept he was not offered long term housing. I accept that he felt that the council's actions segregated them from the rest of the community. I accept he felt like he lost his privacy. I accept he regarded the park where his caravan was kept as his home.

[195] I generally accept the evidence of Mr Eichin as to his background. I accept he was residing at Sweeney Reserve lawfully for about 12 months until the repeal. I accept his evidence that he was fearful about what would happen to him. I accept he would not refuse accommodation and that he was not offered permanent accommodation. I conclude he regarded the reserve as his home.

[196] I generally accept the evidence of Mr Carbone as to his background. I accept he was residing at Goodfellows Road lawfully for about 11 months until the repeal. I accept his evidence that he was heartbroken as to the loss of his property. I accept he had no offer of permanent accommodation. He felt like he was getting kicked out of home as it was his home. His evidence is he had the accoutrements of a home including a tent, clothing, generator and washing machine.

[197] Generally, with respect to homeless people in the position of the applicants, I find:

(a) The demand for homelessness services has increased since 2024.

(b) Where people are evicted from public spaces this perpetuates a feeling of lack of connection and exclusion from society.

(c) It can add to isolation and stigma and can create fractures in society.

(d) Forcing homeless people to move on does nothing to address the problem.

(e) Homeless people are vulnerable and face stigma.

(f) Most Centrelink benefit recipients are reliant on social housing.

(g) Often there is no other option than to sleep rough as there is a housing crisis.

(h) Services are inadequately resourced.

[198] As to the notice decisions, I find that although the intention seems to have been that the authorised officers were to consider the circumstances of each PEH and the impact of the structure and belongings on public space before deciding how to respond,[52] this is not what happened in practice.

[199] The memorandum from Mr Mansfield to the rangers dated 26 February 2025 required the rangers to issue compliance notices to cease the camping as part of Stage 2 of the council's approach. The only discretion allowed to the rangers was as to compliance date extensions.[53] In the memorandum as to Stage 2, Mr Mansfield noted:

(a) All rangers were to provide compliance notices.

(b) The date could vary if Queensland Housing could confirm a housing date. To my mind this meant that those who did not have a confirmed date were significantly disadvantaged.

(c) The only discretion was as to compliance extensions.

(d) The compliance would be issued under the Camping Law to stop the camping.

(e) They were all be pre-prepared, excluding the date of issue and the compliance date.

(f) If the PEH did not stop camping, then a new notice would be issued with up to two days for compliance.

(g) All items other than a tent were to be seized and impounded.

[200] I find that the authorised officers did not independently exercise their discretion as to whether an offence had been committed or that an exemption applied. This had been pre-filled in the prepared notices.

[201] As to the council working with the Department of Housing to find accommodation for PEH, the local law guidelines stated that the council was committed to finding pathways to move PEH out of homelessness.[54] The authorised officers would notify the council who would then refer PEH to the Department of Housing.[55] Yet in practice this did not seem to be the case. The memorandum from Mr Mansfield required the officers to issue the notices and for shorter time frames if housing had not been organised.

[202] In light of the fact that all of the applicants had been living in situ for some time, I find that there was no urgent reason to evict them from the parks before accommodation could be arranged or an applicant unreasonably refused offered accommodation.

[203] Any findings are made on the balance of probabilities and generally it is for the applicants to prove their case (except where otherwise indicated.)

[204] It is submitted that the respondent was in error by impounding and disposing of the chattels. The power to seize and impound items was only exercisable if, in the reasonable opinion of the authorised person, the immediate removal of the item was necessary in the interest of public health or safety or to prevent environmental harm, property damage or loss of amenity or the person had not complied with the compliance notice.

[205] It is submitted that the evidence of the applicants is their belongings were bulldozed and destroyed by the council. It is submitted that if the applicants did not commit an offence under the Alteration Law or Camping Law then any action by the council to seize or dispose of the belongings was unlawful and the goods were of some value.

[206] It is also submitted that the applicants did not freely and voluntarily consent to the disposal. Some were not even present when the disposal occurred. The consent which may be evident in the footage was obtained by pressure placed on vulnerable people.

[207] Council officers were generally accompanied by members of the QPS who carried weapons. Mr Bobeldyk was so distressed he was taken to hospital on 9 April 2025. It is submitted the pressure placed on the applicants was unlawful and unconscionable. It was no true consent.

[208] It is submitted that when council officers arrived on the morning of 24 April 2025, they gave Mr Bobeldyk white bags to assist with storing items they would take with them, or which would be impounded. The conversations are recorded in body worn camera footage. Council rangers worked for about three hours to help them clear the site. Once the belongings were checked, the council used an excavator to dispose of piles of rubbish. Impounded items were later collected. It is submitted that the rangers made real efforts to make sure they only disposed of items Mr Bobeldyk said he no longer wanted. On 29 April 2025, solicitors acting for Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk sought a review of the compliance and decision notices. On 2 June 2025, the original decisions were confirmed.

[209] As to Mr Eichin, he camped at Sweeny Reserve from around 28 March 2024. He was given a compliance notice under the Camping Law on 6 May 2025 to stop camping by 20 May 2025. He left after being served with the notice.

[210] Stacy Richardson and Nicholas McKinlay camped together at Eddie Hyland Park from some time in 2024. On 17 March 2025, decision notices and compliance notices were given to Ms Richardson. On 9 April 2025, Ms Richardson was given further compliance notices with a one-hour time frame. The body worn camera footage of 10 April 2025 shows council rangers explaining to her that she could pack what she wanted to take with her and that other items could be impounded, and the items not impounded would be disposed of. Mr Richardson confirmed that she had taken everything. The only day on which Mr McKinlay's property was disposed of was 10 April 2025. It is submitted that both Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson were given every opportunity to save their possessions before council officers disposed of what was left.

[211] As to Ms Bobeldyk's and Mr Carbone's property, there was no evidence that council destroyed their property.

[212] With respect to the allegation that the property was disposed of unlawfully, it is submitted that the applicants' evidence would not be accepted. It is submitted that council rangers disposed of any property lawfully because the applicants had given their consent and the applicants were given the opportunity of taking property with them or having it impounded and collected on a later date.

[213] It is submitted there were no "disposal decisions" in this case such that the JRA applies. There was a statutory power to dispose of the items which the council did under s 26(2) of the Camping Law and 24(2) of the Alteration Law.

[214] Section 23 of the Alteration Law permitted an authorised officer to seize, dismantle and impound an item if the item's storage contravened a local law and a person had not complied with a compliance notice to remove the item. Also, under s 24, if the impounded item was perishable in the reasonable opinion of the authorised person or of negligible commercial value, then the local government had the power to immediately dispose of it as the Chief Executive directed. Similar provisions are contained in ss 25 and 26 of the Camping Law.

[215] There is no doubt that Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk would have been intimidated when the council officers arrived on 24 April 2025.

[216] Despite this, I find that Mr Bobeldyk did consent to the disposal of some items but not others. The law to be applied as to the issue of consent is the common law. In Johnston v Carroll[56] Martin SJA was concerned with the specific wording of that particular section.

(a) Consent at common law means genuine consent.[57]

(b) Mere vulnerability as to another's influence does not negate consent.[58]

(c) Undue influence such as unlawful threats or unconscionable conduct can undermine the reality of consent.[59]

(d) However, it has been held that the mere fact that a person was in prison and received medical treatment did not mean they could never give effective consent to such treatment.[60] Likewise, difficult issues as to the reality of consent arise when permission is sought by a police officer. In such a situation knowledge of a person's rights is to be considered.[61]

(e) In a case of trespass to goods, the onus is on a defendant to prove consent.[62]

One was disposed of with consent one was impounded.[63]

Some were impounded and some were disposed of with consent.

[219] The value of the items disposed of without consent was about $1000.

[220] I therefore find the disposal decision unlawful relating to the items disposed of without consent.

[221] I note that the respondent did not challenge the fact by way of cross-examination that Ms Bobeldyk's property went missing. I find on the balance of probabilities that Ms Bobeldyk's property was disposed of. It is also clear on the material that a number of other campsites were disposed of by the council. A number of the applicants give evidence of this. There is video evidence supporting this on 9 and 10 April 2025.

[222] It is likely one of these was Ms Bobeldyk's. There is no evidence that anyone other than the council disposed of property. I find she did not consent to this disposal.

[223] The respondent did not challenge by way of cross-examination the fact that they lost their property.

[224] It is of concern that there is an admission by Mr Cooney that the council took possession of Mr McKinlay's tent on 8 May 2025 and yet there is no record of any goods being impounded according to Mr Mansfield. It is also of concern that no record was kept of goods disposed of. For example, there is no impoundment record produced for his property.

[225] I accept Mr McKinlay's evidence on the balance of probabilities. I consider that the 18 items of property were most likely disposed of without his consent. This was unlawful. The property was not of negligible value.

[226] As to Ms Richardson's property and in light of Mr Cooney's evidence, I am not certain whether or not consent was given as to the disposal of the blue tent. I therefore make no finding this was unlawfully disposed of. I find she did not give consent to the disposal of the bed, dog items and other belongings.

[227] I note that Mr Carbone was not challenged by way of cross-examination as to the fact he lost his property. I find on the balance of probabilities that Mr Carbone's property was disposed of. It is also clear on the material that a number of other campsites were disposed of by the council. It is likely one of these was Mr Carbone's. There is no evidence that anyone other than the council disposed of property.

[228] I find that Mr Carbone did not consent to this disposal.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER SECTION 48 OF THE HRA REQUIRES THAT THE CAMPING LAW AND ALTERATION LAW BE READ TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

[229] The applicants submit that s 48 of the HRA requires the local laws to be interpreted in a way which is compatible with human rights.

[230] The respondent submits that s 48 of the HRA only operates where there is a constructional choice and there is no such choice here as the meaning of the local laws is not ambiguous.

[231] The Attorney-General submits that s 48 of the HRA does not assist the applicants with the construction of the provisions of the Alteration Law or Camping Law. It is submitted that if there is no constructional choice then there will be only one reading consistent with the statutory provision's purpose. Section 48 of the HRA cannot lead to a different reading. Section 48 of the HRA does not apply where there is doubt about how the law should be applied. The question in such a situation is whether the exercise of the discretion is compatible with human rights under s 58 of the HRA. If there is no incompatibility with human rights, then the ordinary meaning remains unaffected. It is submitted that the words in the Alteration law and the Camping Law do not permit a reading which ignores the word "urgent." The state of homelessness lacks the requisite urgency for the provision. The fact that there is a separate exception where camping is PEH camping under s 9(1)(h) of the Alteration Law and s 13(1)(i) of the Camping Law shows that this exception would have no work to do if s 9(1)(b) and s 13(1)(g) covered camping due to homelessness. There is therefore no constructional choice where of the HRA is needed. Similarly, the use of the word "reasonable" provides no constructional choice.

[232] Section 9 of the Alteration Law provides:

"9 Offence to undertake an alteration of public land

(1) Subject to subsection (2) and subsection (3), a person must not undertake an alteration of public land, unless -

(a) the alteration arises from cutting or maintaining grass on a road; or

(b) the alteration is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety; or

(c) the alteration is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious risk of environmental harm or property damage; or

(d) the person is authorised or required under an Act to undertake the alteration and does so in accordance with any conditions of that authorisation or requirement; or

(e) the person is an employee, agent, contractor or volunteer of the local government and undertakes the alteration in the course of their duties for the local government; or

(f) the alteration is allowed under a contract with the local government; or

(g) the person has an approval to undertake the alteration; or

(1) A person must not camp on public land, unless -

(a) the person camps at a camping ground in accordance with the camping conditions for that camping ground; or Camping on Public Land Local Law 2023 8

(b) the person has an approval to camp; or

(c) the person camps at a caravan park controlled by the local government; or

(d) the camping is authorised or required under an Act and complies with any conditions of that authorisation or requirement; or

(e) the person is an employee, agent, contractor or volunteer of the local government and camps in the course of their duties for the local government; or

(f) the camping is allowed under a contract with the local government; or

(g) the camping is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety; or

(h) the camping is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious risk of environmental harm or property damage; or

(i) the camping is PEH camping."

[234] I accept the submissions of the respondent and the Attorney-General.

[235] Both sections provide for an exemption if the conduct is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety. I do not consider there is any constructional choice here. The words are to be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of the provision itself. Also, the context of the provision is to be considered.[65]

[236] In Momcilovic v R[66] French CJ said that (in the equivalent of s 48) there was nothing in the text which says that there should be a departure from the rules of statutory interpretation. The section operates on constructional choices.

[237] This was the approach taken in Bell v Queensland,[67] Innes v Electoral Commissioner (No 2) [68] and Chief Executive Department of Environment v Wangan.[69]

[238] When one considers that PEH camping is contained in a separate provision in both laws, in my view, there is no constructional choice and s 48 of the HRA has no work to do. Likewise, the provisions as to reasonableness of time are defined and there is no constructional choice there. There is a difference between constructional choice and the application of the laws.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER NATURAL JUSTICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCORDED TO THE APPLICANTS BEFORE THE DECISION NOTICES WERE ISSUED

[239] It is submitted that the principles of natural justice should have applied here. It is submitted that the respondent was obliged to afford the applicants with an opportunity to deal with relevant matters adverse to their interests. In this case, this did not occur. With respect to the notice decisions, the applicants were not afforded the opportunity to deal with any relevant matters adverse to their interests prior to the decisions being made. The same reasoning applies to the bulldozing decision and conduct. It is submitted that the respondents seized and disposed of chattels belonging to Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk, Ms Richardson, Ms Bobeldyk, Mr Carbone and Mr McKinlay.

[240] It is submitted that the power to issue a compliance notice was not conditioned by a requirement that the applicants first be given the opportunity to respond to the proposal to issue them with a notice. It is submitted that the issuance of a compliance notice provided the person the opportunity to change their conduct, but it did not adversely affect legally recognised rights or interests. It is further submitted that the requirement to observe procedural fairness before a notice is issued was displaced by the statutory scheme which provided for the applicants an opportunity for review.[70]

[241] Even if there was a requirement to observe procedural fairness before the issue of the notices, the failure to do so was not material. The reason for this is there is no real doubt the applicants were in breach of the relevant local laws, and they cannot establish there was a realistic possibility that the outcome of the decision would have been different if provided procedural fairness.[71]

[242] When a statute confers a power to prejudice or destroy a person's rights or interests, it must be assumed that the principles of natural justice apply.[72] For example, in Badari & Ors v Minister for Territory Families and Urban Housing & Anor[73] the relevant minister made a determination as to the method of calculating rent. No notice had been given before the issuing of these determinations. The High Court held:

(a) Whether a statutory power is conditioned by a need to accord procedural fairness is question of statutory construction.

(b) There is a strong common law presumption that a statutory power which has an effect on legally recognised rights or interests implies conditions on the need to observe procedural fairness.

(c) Section 23 of the Housing Act (NT) attracted the common law presumption.

(d) What is fair and reasonable depends on the nature of the power to be exercised, the statutory requirements and the interests involved.

[243] In the present case, one needs to consider the terms of the local laws. The Alteration Law provided in s 18 for an authorised person to direct a person to cease conduct or activity contravening the local law. Section 19 provided for the issuing of compliance notices. The compliance notice had to be accompanied by a decision notice. Similarly, s 21 of the Camping Law provided for an authorised person to direct a person contravening the law to cease any conduct or activity contravening the local law. Section 22 provided for the issue of compliance notices.

[244] An important aspect of the laws is that they contain rights of review. Section 44 of the Alteration Law permitted the applicant to apply for a review within 15 days of receiving the decision. Section 44 of the Camping Law contains a similar provision.

[245] Section 45 of both Acts requires the local government to review the original decision and it could confirm it, amend it or substitute another decision for the original decision.

[246] In Rucker v Stewart & Anor[74] the Queensland Court of Appeal was concerned with a situation where a police officer challenged a decision by a Deputy Commissioner of Police to stand him down from duty for a breach of discipline. There would be a later substantive hearing on whether the grounds were established. It was held that the nature of the legislation led to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend that at that first stage of the process the officer should have a right to be heard. It was noted that there was an avenue of review on the merits at which the officer could put forward material and be heard. This told "strongly against the existence of an opportunity to be heard at the earlier preliminary stage."

[247] I consider the case of Rucker is similar to the present case. I consider the rights of review tell against the right to be heard before the issuing of compliance notices. I consider that by necessary implication the right to natural justice at this preliminary stage is excluded.

[248] By way of example, if a council parking inspector finds what he or she believes to be an illegally parked car, one cannot imagine a requirement to accord natural justice before the issue of the ticket. Any right to be heard comes after the person receives the ticket.

[249] I accept the respondent's argument and do not find any error of law concerning a breach of the right to receive natural justice prior to the issue of the notices.

[250] On the other hand, I find that procedural fairness ought to have been accorded to the applicants who had property disposed of without consent. It was an error of law not to do so.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE TIME FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICES WAS REASONABLE

[251] It is submitted the compliance notices failed to state a reasonable date and time by which the applicants needed to stop or remedy the contravention. Both s 19(5) of the Alteration Law and s 23(5) of the Camping Law provide that the date and time by which the person must stop or remedy the contravention must be stated on the compliance notice and this must be reasonable. It is submitted that on 17 March 2025 the respondent issued compliance notices to Mr Bobeldyk, Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson which required the individuals to stop the contraventions no later than 31 March 2025. On 9 April 2025, compliance notices were issued to Mr Bobeldyk and Ms Richardson. This required Mr Bobeldyk to stop the contraventions no later than 10.55am on 9 April 2025. Ms Richardson had to stop by 12.15pm the same day.

[252] On 10 April 2025 compliance notices were issued to Mrs Bobeldyk which required her to stop the contraventions by 4pm the next day. The one to Mr Eichin issued on 6 May 2025 required him to stop by 20 May 2025. A further notice to Mrs Bobeldyk on 7 May 2025 required her to stop by 21 May 2025. On 18 June 2025 Mr Lugge and Mr Carbone were issued with compliance notices requiring them to stop no later than 3 July 2025.

[253] It is submitted that where the applicants had no other reasonable alternative to sleeping rough, the time periods were not reasonable.

[254] It is submitted that the compliance notices stated a reasonable time for compliance. It is accepted that some of the compliance notices provided a short time frame for compliance. But the reasonableness of the timeframe needs to be assessed in context. For example, Ms Richardson had been given an earlier notice on 17 March 2025.

[255] A two-week timeframe for the other notices was reasonable.

[256] Section 22(5) of the Camping Law provides:

"(5) The date and time under subsection (4)(c) must be reasonable having regard to -

(a) the action required to remedy the contravention; and

(b) the risk to public health and safety, the risk of impacts

on fitness for use of public land, the risk of damage to property or loss of amenity and the risk of environmental harm posed by the contravention; and

(c) how long the person has been aware of the contravention."

[257] Section 19(5) of the Alteration Law provides:

"(5) The date and time under subsection (4)(c) must be reasonable having regard to -

(a) the action required to stop or remedy the contravention; and

(b) the risk to public health and safety, the risk of impacts on fitness for use of public land, the risk of damage to property or loss of amenity and the risk of environmental harm posed by the contravention; and

(c) how long the person has been aware of the contravention."

[258] It has been held that what is reasonable depends on the context and the circumstances of the particular case.[75] Also, a reasonable period of time is determined by reference to the context and purpose of the statute.[76]

(a) Mr Bobeldyk had lived at Eddie Hyland Park for eight months since September 2024.

(b) Ms Richardson had lived at Eddie Hyland Park for nine months from August 2024.

(c) Mrs Bobeldyk had lived at Eddie Hyland Park for eight months from September 2024.

[260] The effect of the April 2025 notices was that they were fresh notices with respect to that contravention.[77] I did not consider the fact that the March notices had been issued to be relevant to that particular contravention. Also, any argument relying on the March notices does not apply to Mrs Bobeldyk as she did not receive one then. It seems wholly unfair that such a short time frame would be given for compliance bearing in mind the length of time they had been there and the fact their residence had been tolerated before the repeal. The length of time in the notices effectively rendered nugatory any right to review the decision. I find the April notices invalid as the time stated therein was not reasonable.

[261] As to the other notices, for reasons I come to later, I find they were issued without consideration to and in breach of the applicants' human rights and as such were unlawful.[78]

ISSUE 5: WHETHER THE OFFICERS ISSUING THE NOTICES ERRED IN FAILING TO DETERMINE THAT THE EXEMPTION APPLIED I.E. WHETHER THE CAMPING AND STORAGE OF GOODS WAS URGENT AND NECESSARY

[262] It is argued by the applicants that the respondent failed to take into account relevant considerations in issuing the notices and determining the length of time for compliance.

[263] It is also submitted that the respondent failed to accept that the applicants' alteration of and camping on public land was necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent or serious threat to personal health and safety for the purposes of s 9(1)(b) of the Alteration Law and s 13(1)(g) of the Camping Law. It is submitted that courts elsewhere[79] have held that statutory provisions and conduct which have the effect of preventing the homeless from erecting shelters to protect them from serious harm are a violation of their right to life. In this case, as the applicants were homeless and sleeping rough at the time of the decisions, it was necessary for them to do that to lessen or prevent serious threats to their health and safety.

[264] The respondent submitted that it was entirely appropriate for more senior officers of the council to develop a policy position and provide directions to the Rangers about how to exercise the power to issue the notices.

[265] It is also submitted that s 13 of the Camping Law provides that it is an offence for the applicants to camp on public land. It is submitted the camping was not necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety.

[266] The council may enforce the laws under s 13 by a penalty infringement notice and an authorised officer may direct that conduct cease. An authorised officer may also issue a compliance notice under s 22. A person issued a compliance notice has 15 days to apply for a review of the decision.[80] Once a review is applied for, the council has 20 days in which to confirm or amend the decision.

[267] The Alteration Law's object is to ensure that any alteration of public land does not unreasonably impact the fitness of use of public land, the amenity of public land and public health and safety.

[268] As to the alleged errors of law, it is submitted that s 13(g) of the Camping Law and s 9(1)(b) of the Alteration Law did not apply. It is submitted there is no evidence that the camping was necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety. It is not accepted that persons experiencing homelessness necessarily come within this exception. The Canadian case of The Regional Municipality of Waterloo v Persons Unknown and to be Ascertained[81] is to be distinguished.

[269] It is submitted there is insufficient evidence to find that the applicants come within this exception.

[270] Again, it is submitted that even if there was an error in the making of the decision, the correct decision would be no different.

[271] The QHRC submits (contrary to the respondent's submissions) that it was for the individual officers to make a decision in this matter. The officer had to determine whether there was a contravention of the Local law and as to the reasonable steps to remedy the contravention. The officers had to independently turn their minds to the decision. This did not happen here.

[272] All of the decision notices claimed that the camping of each of the applicants did not meet an exemption under s 13. However, as I noted earlier, this was in a pre-prepared notice given to the rangers.

[273] On 29 April 2025, Hall & Wilcox on behalf of Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk sought reasons for the decisions to issue the April 2025 notices.

[274] On 1 May 2025, Hall & Wilcox sought an internal review of the decision and compliance notices issued to Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk. It was submitted that:

(a) Their clients were experiencing homelessness. They had nowhere else to go.

(b) They were vulnerable people. Mr Bobeldyk's only income was a disability pension.

(c) The notices should be withdrawn as the defence of reasonable excuse was available for the contraventions and that human rights applied.

(d) It was submitted that a number of human rights were breached.

[275] On 23 May 2025, the council replied, stating:

(a) The April notices were issued correctly.

(b) None of the exemptions in the Camping Law or the Alteration Law applied.

(c) Experiencing homelessness was not a reasonable excuse.

(d) The council considered human rights and any limitation was reasonable and justifiable.

[276] The memorandum attached to Mr Mansfield's affidavit makes it clear that a pre-determined course of action was to be taken concerning the notices.

[277] On my assessment of the evidence, no real discretion was given to the authorised officers on:

(a) Whether to issue the notices.

(b) Whether he or she formed the view that an offence was committed.

(c) Whether he or she formed the view that the exemption applied.

(d) That the first notice period would be 15 days for a PEH who did not have housing confirmed.

(e) That the second notice period would be up to 2 days for a PEH who did not have housing confirmed.

[278] Section 22(2) of the Camping Law and the section 19(2) of the Alteration Law provided that there was a discretion in an authorised officer to issue compliance notices. Such notices could be issued if a person contravened the Local Law. In order to contravene the local law, a person needed to camp on public land and an exemption in section 13 of the Camping Law did not apply. Section 9 of the Alteration Law contained a similar provision.

[279] It was also for the authorised officer to determine the notice period.

[280] An authorised person was a person appointed under s 202 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld).

[281] It has been said that a decision maker must make up his or her own mind as to the exercise of a discretion and not do the bidding of others.[82] Such discretion should not be unlawfully fettered.[83] In my view an error has been established here as the discretion of the individual officers was fettered.

[282] I also add that if the officer was right that the notices were issued to put pressure on the Department of Housing to find accommodation for the applicants this would be of considerable concern as it would be arguable the notices were issued for an improper purpose.

[283] The next question is whether the decision would have been the same in any event. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration[84] the High Court noted that an error will only be jurisdictional if the error was material to the decision to be made. It was also noted that a reviewing court does not engage in a merits review and rewrite the reasons for decision. I now turn to the materiality of the error.

[284] Section 13(1) of the Camping Law provides that is an offence for a person to camp on public land unless the camping is necessary to lessen or prevent an urgent and serious threat to personal or public health and safety. Section 9(1) of the Alteration Law is similar.

[285] The first thing to observe is that PEH camping is a separate category. As the respondent and Attorney-General submit, the camping in section 13(1)(g) is different.

[286] The first aspect is that the camping must be necessary. "Necessary" means "requiring to be done; requisite, essential."[85]

[287] The term urgent means "requiring immediate action or attention."[86]

[288] The aim is to lessen or prevent a serious threat to personal health and safety.

[289] In Victoria (City) v Adams[87] a significant amount of expert evidence was lead on the health effects of the inability to shelter overnight in the City of Victoria. It was established that exposure to the elements without adequate protection was associated with significant health risks, even death. Likewise in Regional Municipality of Waterloo v Persons Unknown[88] there was similar evidence. The evidence does not reach such heights here.[89]

[290] Having said this, it is not for this Court to rewrite the reasons. The applicants may wish to put further evidence at the review process if notices are issued again. The situation of each applicant may be different. Each applicant's position needs to be assessed individually by the decision maker.

[291] I am not prepared to find that the error was immaterial.

ISSUE 6: WHETHER THE DISPOSAL DECISION WAS LAWFUL -

DID THE APPLICANTS CONSENT TO THEIR PROPERTY BEING DESTROYED

[292] I have already made the findings of fact in this regard earlier in the judgment. I find that some of the disposal decisions were without consent and therefore not lawful.

ISSUE 7: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SECTION 59 OF THE HRA

[293] The applicants submit that s 59 of the HRA allows them to "piggyback" on their judicial review claims and, even if they are unsuccessful on those, then s 59(2) of the HRA still permits the court to grant relief under the HRA.

[294] The applicants accept that if they consented to the disposal of items then there is no reviewable decision.

[295] The council accepts that the challenge to the notice decisions is a valid one under the JRA as the applicants are "aggrieved" under s 7 of the JRA.

[296] However, it is submitted further that as there was no reviewable decision as the property was disposed of with the consent of the owner, there is nothing onto which there can be a piggyback claim for a relief of noncompliance with the HRA.

[297] The QHRC submits that as authorised persons exercised a discretionary power to seize and dispose of property then the HRA claim may be piggybacked.

[298] It is conceded that the applicants are able to challenge the notice decisions on human rights grounds because they have satisfied the piggyback clause in s 59 of the HRA.

[299] With regard to the disposal decisions, it is submitted the applicants cannot challenge these on human rights grounds because they have not satisfied the requirements of the piggyback clause.

[300] The effect of s 59 is that if a person has an independent ground available to them, they can claim the relief available for that independent ground to vindicate their human rights ground (apart from damages). The independent ground need not ultimately be successful, but it must still be "non colourable" and sufficient to survive a strike out application. It must be sufficiently arguable. In this case, the applicants cannot challenge the disposal decisions under the JRA because they are not decisions made under an enactment. If the court did go on to consider whether the authorised persons complied with s 58(1) of the HRA when making the disposal decisions, the presence or absence of consent is determinative of whether any human rights were engaged. There is a dispute between the parties on this question. If the decisions were made with consent, it follows the disposal decisions were compatible with human rights.

[301] Section 59 of the HRA provides:

"(1) Subsection (2) applies if a person may seek any relief or remedy in relation to an act or decision of a public entity on the ground that the act or decision was, other than because of section 58, unlawful.

(2) The person may seek the relief or remedy mentioned in subsection (1) on the ground of unlawfulness arising under section 58, even if the person may not be successful in obtaining the relief or remedy on the ground mentioned in subsection (1)."

[302] In Chief Executive Department of Environment v Wangan_[90]_ it was noted that the rights identified in the HRA are not freestanding but may be enforced if the independent relief sought is bona fide and arguable.

[303] In Innes v Electoral Commissioner (No 2)[91] it was noted that in order to claim that a public entity breached the HRA, it is necessary to bring a claim arising independently of the HRA. Such an independent claim must be a reasonable cause of action.[92]

[304] In this case, I consider the claims for relief under the JRA in respect of the notice decisions and the disposal decisions constitute reasonable causes of action.

[305] With respect to the notice decisions the applicants were aggrieved by decisions made under enactments namely the Alteration Law and the Camping Law[93] and their interests were adversely affected.[94]

[306] Specifically with respect to the disposal decisions, I have found a lack of consent to disposal of some items. The disposal decision power is contained in s 24(2) of the Alteration Law and s 26(2) of the Camping Law. The applicants' legal rights were affected by the decisions under an enactment.[95]

[307] I find that both sets of decisions may be "piggybacked" by the HRA claim.

ISSUE 8: WHETHER SECTION 58(2) OF THE HRA IS ENGAGED

[308] The applicants submit that the power to issue the compliance notice is one of a range of mechanisms available under the Local Laws. It is submitted that as the power is discretionary, the authorised officers should have turned their minds to relevant human rights. The fact that authorised persons may have received direction to issue the notices is irrelevant. The issuers had the duty to consider the merits without their discretion being fettered.

[309] It is submitted that s 58(2) of the HRA provides that s 58(1) of the HRA does not apply to a public entity if the entity could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision because of a statutory provision or otherwise under law.

[310] It is submitted that the Camping Law and Alteration Law were made by the council as an elected body with responsibility for making laws for the local government area. It is submitted the rangers could not have acted otherwise reasonably because of the provisions of s 13 of the Camping Law and s 9 of the Alteration Law. The rangers' task was to enforce the law which involved issuing the compliance notices.

[311] It was entirely appropriate for more senior employees of the council to develop a policy position and provide directions to rangers as to how to exercise the power to issue compliance notices.

[312] It is also submitted that the decisions did not limit human rights. It is submitted that where the human right is already limited by the operation of a law or decision, then the impugned decision will only limit human rights if it imposes additional limitations or restrictions on those rights.[96] There was no incremental burden here. The fact here is the applicants were already prohibited from camping on public land and from storing their possessions there.

[313] The respondent relies on the decision of Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba.[97]

[314] The QHRC submits that the Alteration Law and the Camping Law provided a range of discretions in the authorised officers. The use of the word "may" in the sections vested a discretion.

[315] The officer needed to determine whether there was a contravention and the reasonable steps necessary to remedy this. The officer needed to determine a reasonable time. A decision notice also had to be served. Engagement in this process required a s 58(1) HRA assessment. There was more than one course reasonably open.

[316] On the "incremental burden" point, it was submitted that because there was more than one enforcement mechanism and a discretion, then there was an incremental burden by the action of issuing the notices.[98]

[317] Public entities may be relieved of their human rights obligations under s 58(1) of the HRA by section 58(2) of the HRA.

[318] The purpose of s 58(2) of the HRA is to avoid a conflict of duties. Section 58(2) is designed to ensure that public entities do not part from their legal obligation in pursuit of compatibility with human rights.[99] In this matter, the laws are valid, and it is important that public entities such as local governments comply with the law. Public entities must give effect to legislation even if incompatible with human rights.

[319] Section 58(2) of the HRA will apply if a public entity did not have a reasonable choice available to it. The question is not whether the public entity could have acted differently because of a law but whether it could have "reasonably" acted differently.

[320] It is submitted that the council did not have a reasonable choice not to enforce its laws. The Crown has a duty to enforce the law. For example, in Bowie v Queensland Police Service[100] the Land Court found that the Queensland Police Service was not subject to s 58(1) of the HRA when executing a warrant as it was compelled to act according to law.

[321] In the Victorian case of DPP v Kaba[101] the police exercised their statutory powers to stop a vehicle and request the driver's name and address. The exception applied as there was no choice.

[322] It is submitted the authorised persons have no choice but to enforce the Alteration Law and Camping Law. In those circumstances, s 58(2) of the HRA applied.

[323] It is further submitted that if no human rights were engaged, then there were no human rights the council was required to consider. The applicants' human rights were already burdened by the offence provisions. The impact on their human rights was not being able to camp in public parks, not the issue of the notices.[102]

[324] Section 58 of the HRA provides as follows:

(a) to act or make a decision in a way that is not compatible with human rights; or

(b) in making a decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a public entity if the entity could not reasonably have acted differently or made a different decision because of a statutory provision, a law of the Commonwealth or another State or otherwise under law.

A public entity is acting to give effect to a statutory provision that is not compatible with human rights."

[325] The first point to be made is that s 58(2) of the HRA does not apply to the disposal decisions. The human rights of the applicants needed to be considered when making a decision to dispose of items without consent.

[326] The below discussion relates to the notice decisions. It is necessary to consider the statutory framework.

[327] Section 8 of the Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) (LGA) provides that a local government is an elected body responsible for the good rule and local government of a part of Queensland.

[328] Section 9 of the LGA provides that a local government has the power to do anything that is necessary or convenient for the good rule and government of its local government area. It may exercise its powers within the local government area.

[329] Section 13 of the LGA provides that local government employees must:

(a) Carry out their duties in a way that ensures the local government discharges its responsibilities under the Act.

(b) Observe all laws relating to their employment.

[330] Section 28 of the LGA provides as to the power to make and enforce any local law that is necessary or convenient for the good rule and local government of its local government area.

[331] Section 2 of the Alteration Law provides:

"The object of this Local Law is to ensure that any alteration of public land is undertaken in a way that does not unreasonably impact -

(e) properties near public land; and

(f) infrastructure or property of the local government or the State government."

[332] Section 3 of the Alteration Law provides:

"The object of this Local Law is to be achieved by -

(a) establishing the concept of undertaking an alteration of public land; and

(b) prohibiting the alteration of public land, except in certain circumstances; and

(c) providing mechanisms for enforcement where there is non-compliance with conditions of an approval or provisions of this Local Law; and

(ii) other activities where a Local Government Act authorises the local government to grant an approval, but does not make any provision, except a provision that is consistent with part 3, about the process for the local government to grant the approval."

[333] Section 2 of the Camping Law provides:

(a) facilitate camping on public land for community benefit; and

(b) ensure that camping on public land does not unreasonably impact -

(ii) the amenity of public land; and (iii) the environment; and

[334] Section 3 of the Camping Law provides:

"The objects of this Local Law are to be achieved by -

(a) establishing the concept of camping on public land; and

(b) prohibiting camping on public land, except in certain circumstances; and

(c) providing mechanisms for enforcement where there is noncompliance with conditions of an approval or provisions of this Local Law; and

(d) establishing a Framework for the local government to declare certain areas of public land as camping grounds where camping is allowed subject to certain conditions; and (e) establishing a Framework to grant approvals to camp on public land."

[335] Section 8 of the Alteration Law notes that Part 2 of the Act outlines offences, enforcement mechanisms, offence proceedings and defences.

(a) Section 9 is the relevant offence provision.

(b) Section 18 provided for the power in an authorised person as "may direct a person contravening this Local Law" to cease any conduct or activity which contravenes the local law and to take action to ensure they do not contravene it.

(c) Section 19 provided for a power in an authorised person as "may give" a compliance notice.

(d) Section 20 provided for a power in an authorised person to "may give" a stop notice.

(e) Section 21 provided for a power in an authorised person to give a remediation notice.

(f) Section 22 provided for the power in local government if a person failed to comply with any of these notices.

(g) Section 23 provided for the power of seizure and impoundment.

(h) Section 24 provided for the power to deal with impounded items.

[336] Section 12 of the Camping Law notes that Part 2 of the Act outlines offences, enforcements mechanisms, offence proceedings and defences.

(a) Section 13 is the relevant offence provision.

(b) Section 21 provided for the power in an authorised person as "may direct a person contravening this Local Law" to cease any conduct or activity which contravenes the local law and to take action to ensure they do not contravene it.

(c) Section 22 provided for a power in an authorised person as "may give" a compliance notice.

(d) Section 23 provided for a power in an authorised person to "may give" a stop notice.

(e) Section 24 provided for the power in local government if a person failed to comply with any of these notices.

(f) Section 25 provided for the power of seizure and impoundment.

(g) Section 26 provided for the power to deal with impounded items.

[337] The purpose of section 58(2) of the HRA is to avoid a conflict of duties.[103] Public entities still have to apply the law.[104] The explanatory note to the Human Rights Bill 2018 (Qld)[105] noted:

"Public entities must give effect to legislation (interpreted in accordance with interpretative rules under the Bill) even if incompatible with human rights."

[338] The QHRC relied on the decisions in Bare v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commission[106] and SQH v Scott.[107]

[339] In Bare, the Victorian Court of Appeal was concerned with a case where an immigrant from Ethiopia complained to the Director of Police Integrity that he had been seriously assaulted and racially vilified by police. A request was made that the complaint be investigated independently of the police, but this was rejected. An application for judicial review was brought alleging the decision was contrary to the right of equality and the right not to be treated cruelly, inhumanely or in a degrading way. It was held that the decision maker failed to give consideration to the relevant human rights and the decision should be quashed. The Attorney-General of Victoria argued that there was no need to engage s 38(1) of the Charter[108] as this section did not allow the police to act contrary to their powers.

[340] Warren CJ rejected this argument. Her Honour held that in some instances the only possible way to construe the provision would require the public authority to act in breach of s 38(1), hence the exception, but in most cases s 38(1) acts as a constraint on the exercise of power. Her Honour noted that the Director had a discretion to investigate if it was in the public interest.

[341] Tate JA also rejected the Attorney's argument. Her Honour held that the term "public interest" was a broad expression which was intended to permit the decision maker to take into account all of the matters that arose as relevant to the circumstances of the individual case. The breadth of the expression "public interest" intended a malleable and not fixed meaning. The term did not exclude a consideration of human rights. Her Honour held that the exception in s 38(2) applied where after the relevant statutory power has been construed, it is clear that the power could not be exercised consistently with the performance of the obligations in s 38(1). It applies where the legislation requires the act in a certain way and thus could not have acted any differently. The exception is directed at conflicts of duty.

[342] In SQH v Scott[109] Williams J was concerned with a case where the applicant had been directed by an officer at the Crime and Corruption Commission to answer a question as to his knowledge of the trafficking in dangerous drugs. He declined to answer. The officer ruled he did not have a reasonable excuse to decline to answer. He claimed the decision was incompatible with his human right under s 32 of the HRA not to be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. Williams J held that s 58(2) of the HRA is not engaged where there is than one course open to the decision maker. In that case there was a real discretion such than s 58(2) of the HRA did not apply.

[343] I turn to the case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Kaba.[110] In that matter s 59(1)(a) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) provided that drivers had a duty to stop a vehicle and produce a driver's licence for inspection and state their name and address if required by a police officer. Section 59(5) provided that "A member of the police force may give reasonable directions to a person driving a vehicle..."

[344] The applicant was stopped by police officers for a random check of his licence and registration. He refused to provide his details, used offensive language and allegedly assaulted the police. At trial, Mr Kaba's counsel objected to the evidence of the police under s 138(1) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), submitting the police actions amounted to a breach of the Victorian Charter which enshrined a right to freedom of movement. The Magistrate excluded the evidence. On appeal, Bell J quashed the Magistrate's decision.

(a) The submission of Mr Kaba that the power to stop and request could not be attacked as breaching his human rights. The provision conferred a power for the purposes of the administration of the Road Safety Act. The police could not have reasonably acted differently.

(b) There were no human rights interfered with, beyond those involved as an ordinary and natural consequence of the due exercise of the power. The right to freedom of movement was restricted as a natural consequence of the due exercise of power.

[346] When I consider the authorities and the local laws, I accept the argument made by the QHRC. I consider the authorised officers had a choice in the way in which they exercised the power to issue the compliance notices.

[347] Whilst it is true, as the Attorney submits, that there is an obligation on the part of the Crown to enforce laws[111] under article 1 of the Bill of Rights 1688[112], the submission ignores the discretion in the way the power could be exercised and whether the power will be exercised at all.

[348] First, the sections contain the word "may." To my mind, that provided a discretion on the part of the authorised officer to issue a compliance notice or indeed to prosecute somebody for committing offences contrary to the Alteration Law and the Camping Law at all. It is entirely for the Crown on whether to prosecute matters or not.[113] Indeed the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion is not reviewable by the courts.[114] Likewise, it is entirely within the discretion of the council and its officers as to whether or not to take action.

[349] Second, in this case the authority to issue the compliance notice was vested in an authorised officer. This is someone appointed under s 202 of the Local Government Act. The laws in their terms required the officer to turn his or her mind to the circumstances to decide whether or not an offence had been committed and whether an exemption applied. The law in its terms did not oblige the authorised officer to act.

[350] Third, aside from the discretion on whether to issue the compliance notice, discretions existed on the way the power was to be exercised. The laws provided a number of enforcement options to which the officer had to turn his or her mind. Not only this, a crucial matter to be considered was the determination as to the "reasonable" date and time by which compliance with the notice was to be achieved. In other steps the officer had to turn his or her mind as to the reasonable steps necessary to remedy or avoid the contravention.

[351] Fourth, critically, in determining what date and time was "reasonable," the authorised person had to engage in a balancing exercise under ss 19(5) and 22(5). This required a consideration of the action required by the applicants; the risk to public health and safety and the risk of impacts on fitness for use of public land; the risk of damage to property or loss of amenity and the risk of environmental harm posed by the contravention and how long the person had been aware of the contravention.

[352] Fifth, a compliance notice required the issuing of a decision notice which provided the authorised officer's reasons for decision and permitted a review of that decision.

[353] Overall, the officers had to independently turn their minds to a number of matters before the issuing of a compliance notice. I find that there was more than one course open.[115]

[354] As I later find, there was a justified and reasonable option open here for the authorised officer to exercise the power of eviction only after accommodation had been secured for the homeless applicants or one or more of the applicants unreasonably refused an offer of accommodation or to extend the time for compliance to allow the applicants time to find accommodation.

[355] I consider Kaba may be distinguished as that power did not require the steps for decision as in the present case. Kaba is more akin to the situation I posed to counsel during argument. It is hard to see that a police officer who is exercising an arrest power under s 365 of the Police Powers of Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) should consider a person's human rights when he sees that person committing an offence or he reasonably suspects the commission of another one. The police officer could not act reasonably differently.[116] But that is not the case here.

[356] In this case the existence of the discretion may be seen in the difference of approach for those PEH who had accommodation arranged and those who had not. Those who did have accommodation were able to obtain longer timeframes to move.[117]

[357] I consider the reasoning in Bare applies in the present case and it cannot be shown that the officers could not have been reasonably expected to have acted otherwise.

[358] I accept the arguments of the QHRC as to the application of s 58(2) of the HRA in this case.

[359] The next point relates to whether the issue of the notices created an additional burden on the applicants.

[360] In Wallace v Tannock[118] Callaghan J was concerned with a situation where Mr Wallace was the subject of a Supervision Order under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). He was given directions that he could only have male NDIS support workers, he could not have female support workers, and further that he must have approval for visitors. He argued that these directions were not compatible with his human rights. Callaghan J noted that the applicant's human rights were already limited by the supervision order and the directions made under it. The relevant concern is to identify the "incremental burden" in the case.

[361] The Attorney-General also relied on R (Fuller) v Chief Constable of the Dorset Police.[119] In that case a group of travellers set up an encampment on a rubbish tip. They were tolerated for a time. However, a decision was made by the police and the council to give them 48 hours' notice to vacate the site. A direction was given under s 61 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) directing them to leave the land. Four of the travellers sought judicial review of the directions on the grounds their human rights were infringed. It was held that the exercise of the power under s 61 would not necessarily infringe human rights as article 1 preserved a state's right to enforce such laws as it deemed necessary to control the use of property. The judge noted:

(a) The decision to require the travellers to leave the land was made by the council who owned the land. No proceedings had been brought to challenge that decision. It had to be regarded as valid.

(b) Proceedings against the police carrying out the decision are not a proxy means of challenging the decision itself.

(c) The present proceedings relate to the means chosen to enforce the decision and not the decision itself. The decision by the police was an operational one.

[362] I consider Fuller may be distinguished. In Fuller, it was the police who could not have been expected to act otherwise. In this case, the authorised officers were agents of the council. As I have already said, in exercising the powers the officers could have acted otherwise by delaying the evictions until the applicants had accommodation (or unreasonably refused it).

[363] I have my doubts that the "incremental burden" aspect is a matter to be considered at the s 58(2) of the HRA stage. I consider it is more appropriately considered at the s 13 of the HRA stage. However, I find that the issuing of the compliance notices at a time before the applicants were able to secure other accommodation was a burden over and beyond the ordinary exercise of the power.

[364] The officers could have acted differently regarding both the notice decisions and the disposal decisions, particularly bearing in mind the applicants had originally been living lawfully at the parks and it was important they find long-term accommodation due to the repeal of the PEH framework.

[365] The fact they could have acted differently comes from the respondent's own material:

(a) Ms Nipperess in her advice as to the human rights issues noted that it was necessary to ensure the council worked with the state to support it in finding alternative housing.[120] Given the impact of the repeal, the council should provide reasonable timeframes for compliance.[121]

(b) The memorandum from Mr Mansfield to the rangers dated 26 February 2025 noted that compliance periods could be extended depending on Queensland Housing.[122]

(c) The further memorandum from Mr Mansfield noted that the discretion as to compliance extensions is contingent on the PEH individual circumstances.[123]

(d) The date for compliance could be extended if Queensland Housing could confirm a housing date.

**ISSUE 9: DID THE COUNCIL GIVE CONSIDERATION TO RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 58(1)(**b) OF THE HRA

[366] It is submitted that under s 58(1)(b) of the HRA the respondent had an independent obligation to give proper consideration to the relevant human rights when making the decisions and engaging in the conduct. It is submitted that proper consideration required more than simply balancing the impact of the decisions. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the relevant officers engaged in a proper consideration of the human rights in any meaningful way. As a result, the decisions and conduct were unlawful.

[367] The Respondent submits that the council developed a two-stage plan for the implementation of the law designed with the circumstances of PEH is mind. This approach was informed by a consideration of human rights which had been considered prior to the repeal. The plan involved that PEH had notice of the changes and would be provided with the opportunity to speak to Public Space Liaison officers to help them engage with the Department of Housing about housing options.

[368] It is not accepted that an authorised person needs to personally turn their mind to relevant human rights. Both s 19 of the Alteration Law and s 22 of the Camping Law provides for a power of an authorised officer to give a compliance notice if a person contravenes the local law. This is an objective jurisdictional fact. It was appropriate for the council to develop a policy provision and provide directions to rangers as to how to exercise the power to issue compliance notices upon the repeal of the PEH Framework.

[369] The QHRC submits that it is unlawful under s 58(1)(b) of the HRA for a public entity in making a decision to fail to give a proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision.

[370] It is a question of fact as to whether there was a proper consideration of human rights. The public entity has the onus of establishing that the procedural limb has been complied with.

[371] It is submitted in this case that there is no evidence that the authorised officers considered the relevant human rights at the time of making the decisions. Indeed, the decision notices do not refer to any human rights. The QHRC relies on a memorandum from Mr Mansfield to Mr Ditchburn which specifically states that it is not always practicable to carry out a human rights assessment on a case-by-case basis. Also, the council material had a "blanket" stage 2 enforcement program.

[372] The same applies to the impounding and disposal decisions as this was a discretionary power under ss 23 and 24 of the Alteration Law and ss 25 and 26 of the Camping Law.

[373] The Attorney-General accepts that the council has the two obligations under s 58(1) of the HRA. However, a decision will be compatible with human rights as defined in s 8 of the HRA if it did not limit any human rights or, if it did, it did so in a way that was justified in accordance with the proportionality test in s 13 of the HRA. Section 58(1)(b) of the HRA provides for the need for proper consideration of human rights. Section 58(5) provides guidance onto what amounts to proper construction. The public entity must turn his or her mind to relevant human rights and genuinely attempt a compatibility assessment in a common sense and practical manner.[124]

[374] Section 58(1) of the HRA requires a public entity in making a decision to give proper consideration to a human right relevant to the decision. Section 9 of the HRA defines a "public entity" as including a local government employee.

[375] This procedural limb is additional to any obligation imposed under the primary legislation.[125]

[376] In Mizner v State of Queensland[126] it was said:

(a) That the use of the word "proper" requires a standard of consideration higher than generally applicable at common law for taking into account relevant considerations.

(b) It is an exercise that must be approached in a common sense and practical manner.

(c) It involves an understanding in general terms of which of the rights of the person affected by the decision may be relevant and how those rights will be interfered with.

(d) It will be sufficient in most circumstances that there is some evidence the decision maker seriously turned his or her mind to the possible impact of the decision on a person's human rights and implications thereof and the countervailing interests or obligations.

[377] A sophisticated legal exercise is not required because sometimes decisions must be made in circumstances of urgency. Some flexibility is appropriate.[127]

[378] However, the provisions of the HRA must be construed as widely as their terms permit and is consistent with a model which is intended to have a normative effect on the conduct of public authorities.[128]

[379] This for example might well include questioning each of the applicants to find out their individual circumstances prior to the issuing of the notices. There is no basis to exclude s 58 of the HRA because of difficulty. But in any event the video evidence shows there was no difficulty in questioning each of the homeless people before notices were issued.[129]

[380] There is also no basis for deference to the views of the decision maker in determining whether there has been a proper consideration of human rights.[130]

[381] The onus of proof is on the public entity to satisfy the court that the procedural limb was complied with.[131]

[382] I accept the submissions of the applicant and the QHRC.

[383] I am satisfied that prior to the issuing of the notice decisions and the disposal decisions, the authorised officers did not give consideration to the human rights of each of the applicants.

[384] First, the identity of the authorised officers who issued the compliance notices is largely unknown.

[385] Second, the decision notices made no reference to any consideration of relevant human rights.

[386] Third, there is no evidence from the authorised officers that they turned their minds to these rights when issuing the individual notices. The decision notices make no reference to relevant human rights and the memoranda from Mr Mansfield do not suggest they were given consideration.

[387] Fourth, the memorandum from Mr Mansfield to Mr Ditchburn makes it clear the consideration of human rights was before the repeal of the PEH Framework and it was not practicable to consider human rights on a case-by-case basis. Further, Phase 2 involved "blanket" pre-prepared compliance notices.

[388] There was an obligation to consider the human rights at the time the respective decisions were made, having regard to the circumstances of the individual case.[132] This did not happen here.

[389] Equally, I accept the submissions of the applicants concerning the disposal decisions. Nowhere in the affidavits of the council officers does it say that any human right was considered with respect to these decisions. The respondent has not discharged the onus required of it.

ISSUE 10: WHETHER RELEVANT HUMAN RIGHTS WERE BREACHED BY COUNCIL OFFICERS

[390] It is next submitted that the respondent's failure to comply with its obligations under the HRA rendered the decisions and conduct unlawful. This was in breach of s 58 of the HRA. It is submitted the relevant human rights limited by the notice decisions and the disposal decisions and conduct are:

(a) The right to life (s 16).

(b) The right to protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (s 17).

(c) The right to property (s 24).

(d) The right to not have one's privacy, family or home unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with (s 25).

(e) The right for families and children to be protected (s 26).

[391] It is accepted that s 13 of the HRA provides that a limitation may be placed on such rights but in considering this the Court must consider the values and principles essential to a free and democratic society, including respect for the inherent dignity in the human person and commitment to social justice and equality.

[392] The decisions and conduct were not rationally capable of achieving their intended purpose because they completely disregarded the rights of people experiencing homelessness.

[393] It is submitted that the Court has a limited jurisdiction concerning the HRA. In those circumstances, the international decisions considering the compatibility of laws or policies prohibiting the erection of shelters by homeless people must be approached with discernment. The applicants bear the burden of establishing a limit on human rights which has not been discharged. It is not accepted that any decision placed a limitation on or interfered with the human rights of a person. Prior to the compliance notices being issued the applicants were already prohibited from camping on or storing their possessions on public land by the local laws. Their human rights were already limited and there is no complaint that those laws are incompatible with human rights. The compliance notices therefore had no effect on the applicants' human rights.

[394] The council did not bulldoze the applicants' possessions without giving them the opportunity to save those possessions. If there was consent, then the human rights were not limited.

[395] In any event, none of the rights relied on by the applicants were limited by the notice decisions. The decisions were substantively compatible with human rights. The decisions to give the applicants compliance notices which gave them time to comply with the law did not deprive them of dignity. The applicants have not shown the decisions caused any life terminating harm or injury or a life-threatening situation.

(a) The relevant exercise of powers under the local laws by authorised persons readily lend themselves to obligations under s 58(1) of the HRA.

(b) The QHRC supports the applicants' position as to the human rights that are engaged by the relevant decisions and actions of the respondent and submits the right to equality under s 15 of the HRA may also be engaged.

[397] Whilst the eviction of individuals from public land may in some cases be justifiable, a range of international and domestic courts and human rights bodies have emphasised:

(a) The potentially severe impacts on a person's dignity, security, and physical and psychological integrity arising from eviction and exposure to rough sleeping and/or penalising life sustaining activities such as occupation of public land when no alternative exists.

(b) The need for individual circumstances to be taken into account on a case-by-case basis to ensure that otherwise lawful action is not arbitrary in the circumstances and does not give rise to a real risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

(c) The difficulty in justifying evictions from public land without urgent pressing need where suitable or alternative accommodation is not available.

[398] It is for the respondent to demonstrate that any limitations to the above rights are reasonable and justified within the meaning of s 13 of the HRA. It is submitted that the rights which have been identified are some of the most fundamental rights recognised in international human rights and by the common law. It is said that the effect of the challenged decisions and conduct to effectively evict the applicants from their homes, albeit on council land, was in circumstances where they have been left to live between four years and six months. The limitation of their rights was very serious. Whilst the council's evidence suggests the action was taken due to concerns about public health and safety and amenity of public land, it is unclear if the speed and nature of the enforcement action was proportionate to meet the identified risk. In addition, it may well have been appropriate to delay enforcement until suitable alternative accommodation was available.

[399] If s 58(1) of the HRA applied, but if no human rights were engaged, then there would have been no human rights the council was required to consider, and the notice decisions would have been compatible with human rights. It is accepted that human rights should be construed broadly in light of the beneficial provisions of the Act. The applicants bear the onus of establishing the limit on human rights. In this case, the Court needs to take into account the fact that the applicants' human rights were already burdened by the offence provisions in the Alteration Law and Camping Law. It is submitted there are no additional or incremental burdens on human rights attributable to the notice decisions.

[400] It is noted that the Ontario Superior Court said recently[133] that questions of general policy about how to address homelessness are best left for policy debates within legislative bodies and elections.

(b) to help build a culture in the Queensland public sector that respects and promotes human rights; and

(c) to help promote a dialogue about the nature, meaning and scope of human rights."

[402] Section 4 of the HRA provides as to how the main objects are to be achieved and s 5 notes that the HRA binds all persons.

[403] The HRA is intended to apply to a plethora of legislation and it is intended that a consideration of human rights becomes part of the decision-making process at all levels of government.[134]

[404] The construction of the provisions of the HRA should be construed as widely as their terms permit.[135]

[405] The council and its agents are required to act and make decisions compatible with human rights under s 58(1) of the HRA.

[406] Section 8 of the HRA sets out what is meant by this. The section provides:

An act, decision or statutory provision is compatible with human rights if the act, decision or provision -

(b) limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with section 13."

(1) A human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.

(2) In deciding whether a limit on a human right is reasonable and justifiable as mentioned in subsection (1), the following factors may be relevant -

(b) the nature of the purpose of the limitation, including whether it is consistent with a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;

(c) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, including whether the limitation helps to achieve the purpose;

(d) whether there are any less restrictive and reasonably available ways to achieve the purpose;

(e) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;

(f) the importance of preserving the human right, taking into account the nature and extent of the limitation on the human right;

(g) the balance between the matters mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f)."

[408] It has been said that there is a three-stage inquiry involving engagement, limitation and justification.[136]

[409] The onus of proof is on the party alleging a contravention of their rights. However, the onus rests on the public authority to establish that the limitation of the right is justified and proportionate. [137] The evidence needed to justify the limitation needs to be cogent and persuasive.[138]

[410] I should say something briefly about the parties' reliance on international decisions in this matter. The explanatory notes to the HRA record that the human rights protections are primarily drawn from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Section 48(3) of the HRA permits the court to consider international law and foreign judgments in interpreting a statutory provision. However international and foreign domestic judgments should be consulted with discrimination and care and it remains a question of relevance and weight.[139]

[411] This right was not relied on by the applicant.

[412] As to s 15 of the HRA, it is submitted that the submission by the QHRC is really a complaint about the operation of the local laws, not the decisions to issue compliance notices. In any event, there is Canadian authority that this right does not relate to a law prohibiting the erection of shelters by the homeless.

[413] As to the right to equality under s 15 of the HRA, the Commission submits this section is engaged also. It is submitted the section provides for the right to equal enjoyment of human rights without discrimination.

[414] It is submitted there is conflicting authority of whether this right is limited to attributes contained in the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). Even if a narrow approach is taken, a number of the applicants describe having an impairment.[140]

[415] It is submitted there was indirect discrimination here.

[416] It is submitted that the QHRC has not identified how this human right has been affected in a discriminatory way.

[417] It is submitted the right to equality in s 15(3) of the HRA is a right to have existing laws applied in the same manner to all those subject to them. The authorised officers had objective justification under the unchallenged laws to issue the notices. The right to equal protection of the law can be put to one side.

[418] The right to protection against discrimination in s 15(4) of the HRA is directed at both the content of the legislation and its enforcement. "Discrimination" is defined in the HRA as direct or indirect discrimination within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) on the basis of an attribute listed in s 7.

[419] Whilst there is conflicting authority on whether this extends to discrimination on an analogous ground, courts have previously held that homelessness does not qualify as such a ground.

[420] With respect to the allegation that several applicants have an impairment and have raised the possibility of indirect discrimination, the compliance notices apply equally to people with or without an impairment. There is nothing to suggest that people with an impairment are less likely to be able to comply with the notices compared to others.

[421] Section 15 of the HRA provides:

(1) Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.

(2) Every person has the right to enjoy the person's human rights without discrimination.

(3) Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination.

(4) Every person has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.

(5) Measures taken for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of persons disadvantaged because of discrimination do not constitute discrimination."

"discrimination, in relation to a person, includes direct discrimination or indirect discrimination, within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 , on the basis of an attribute stated in section 7 of that Act.

The Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 , section 7 , lists attributes in relation to which discrimination is prohibited, including, for example, age, impairment, political belief or activity, race, religious belief or religious activity, sex and sexuality."

[423] Section 7 of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) provides:

"7 Discrimination on the basis of certain attributes prohibited

The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of the following attributes -

(q) association with, or relation to, a person identified on the basis of any of the above attributes."

[424] There is conflicting authority as to whether the section extends to discrimination on analogous grounds.[141] I incline to the view taken in Johnston v Carroll[142]. The fact is homelessness is not listed in section 7.

[425] The fact is that the notices applied equally to persons without an impairment or with an impairment. It is hard to see that the applicants have proved a breach of this right.

[426] Likewise, the disposal decisions applied to both categories of individuals equally.

[427] In several Canadian cases, the courts have come to the conclusion that city bylaws prohibiting homeless people from camping in public parks did not discriminate on the basis of disability.[143]

[428] I accept the submissions of the respondent and the Attorney-General that this right was not breached.

[429] If I was wrong as to my interpretation of section 15 of the HRA there is an arguable case that the homeless without accommodation being arranged were treated unequally with those who had accommodation arranged as those who had it arranged could obtain longer notice periods.[144]

[430] It is submitted that the right to life in s 16 of the HRA is a fundamental one. The decisions and conduct have caused the applicants to encounter risks to their own personal health and safety due to the removal of the shelters and had a considerable adverse impact on the applicants' ability to enjoy life with human dignity. It is submitted that the limitation on the right to life was not reasonable and justifiable.

[431] The council submits that this right is not engaged. It is submitted that it should not be accepted that the right to life extends to a right not to be deprived of dignity. In any event, the compliance notices did not deprive the applicants of dignity. The applicants have not shown that the compliance notices caused any life-threatening harm or injury. There is no evidence of this.

[432] It is submitted that this right was breached by the decisions. It is submitted that the right to life can be violated by a life-threatening situation even if there is no loss of life. It is submitted that homelessness falls into a category in which there is a duty to protect life.[145]

It is submitted, in reliance on the Canadian cases, that this right has been infringed.

[433] It is submitted the applicants are required to show an intentional or otherwise foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm or injury caused by an act or omission.

[434] The Canadian cases relied on by the QHRC show that the decision to take away a homeless person's shelter in the extreme weather conditions of the Canadian winter can present such a risk to life. In the case of Victoria (City) v Adams[146] a significant amount of expert evidence was called on the question.

[435] It is submitted the applicants have not put forward evidence about the health impacts caused by the notice decisions and therefore cannot rely on the Canadian cases. It is submitted that the applicants have not satisfied the element that the decisions presented a real and imminent risk of loss of life. As to the second element, "arbitrary," the applicants have not sought to discharge this onus. There is also no stand-alone right to dignity.

[436] Section 16 of the HRA provides that every person has a right to life and has the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life.

[437] Section 16 of the HRA is modelled on article 6(1) of the ICCPR.[147]

[438] It must first be noted that a council does not have a positive obligation to prevent homelessness.[148]

[439] In order for the applicants to show that this right was infringed, they would need to prove that there was a sufficient risk that they will be "deprived of life" and the deprivation will be arbitrary. In Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Youth Verdict Ltd (No 6)[149] it was held that an applicant must show an "intentional or otherwise foreseeable and preventable life terminating harm or injury caused by an act or omission."

[440] The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has explained that the risk must be "real and imminent" and a "serious, genuine and sufficiently ascertainable threat to life, containing an element of material and temporal proximity of the threat to the harm complained of by the applicant."[150]

[441] As I noted earlier when considering the exemption, there was insufficient evidence lead in this case as to the health effects on the specific individuals. Cases like Victoria (City) v Adams[151] may be distinguished. Indeed, later Canadian cases have noted that Adams is not to be taken as authority for a general right to shelter.[152] In other cases it was found that the right to life was not engaged where the weather was warm or where sufficient shelter facilities were available.[153]

[442] I accept the Attorney-General's submissions that the applicants have not satisfied the first element of the right to life as they have not shown that the notice decisions presented a real risk and imminent risk of loss of life.

[443] I also accept the Attorney-General's argument that there is nothing in s 16 of the HRA which suggests a right to live with dignity. Whilst the UN Human Rights Committee has said that a right to life includes the entitlement of individuals to enjoy a life with dignity[154], I do not consider that a right to dignity is stand-alone right. It is that life and dignity should be recognised as intertwined.[155]

[444] Finally, I did not consider the disposal decisions have been proved to be sufficiently serious and life threatening to breach the right to life.

THE RIGHT TO PROTECTION FROM CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT (S 17)

[445] The applicants submit that the decisions and conduct were in breach of s 17 of the HRA.

[446] It is submitted that the decisions and conduct caused the applicants to be humiliated and debased; to feel immense anguish as a result of dehumanising conduct and to be fearful for their future. The conduct targeted disproportionately persons in a state of homelessness. Although some of the applicants were offered accommodation, this was far from their families and support networks and required them to abandon their dogs. The context made the treatment cruel. The limitation of the rights was not reasonable or justifiable.

[447] The council submits that in most cases to prove this breach, there is a requirement for the decision maker to deliberately impose severe suffering or intentional conduct to humiliate or debase a victim.

[448] The fact is the applicants were offered housing and it was not reasonable to decline this. It is difficult to see how an offer of housing made to a homeless person could warrant characterisation as cruel, inhuman or degrading.

[449] It was not degrading or cruel or inhuman to give the applicants time within which to take steps to comply with the local laws.

[450] This section is based on article 7 of the ICCPR.

[451] With respect to s 17(b) of the HRA (the protection from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment) it is submitted that in practice, a justification under s 13 of the HRA has no role to play.

[452] It is submitted that cases decided by the UK House of Lords, the ECHR and the UNHCR confirm that deliberate state action which exposes a person to rough sleeping and exacerbates destitution may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. It is accepted, if proved, that the conduct and decisions may be relevant to determining whether the treatment amounted to or had the risk of resulting in cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment.

[453] It is submitted that the case of R (on the application of Limbuela, Tesema and Adam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[156] has application here.

[454] It is submitted that the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing has stated that removing people from public space by force without providing sufficient short-term and long-term accommodation and subjecting them to fines and imprisonment may constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading conduct in contravention of article 7 of the ICCPR.[157]

[455] It is submitted that the way in which an eviction is carried out can give rise to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.[158]

[456] On the evidence, it is submitted that the applicants were vulnerable and in a cycle of homelessness. There is evidence of anguish, personal distress and humiliation.

[457] As regards the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment, such treatment will meet this definition if it falls short of torture but still reaches a minimum threshold of severity to warrant the label.

[458] It is accepted, in reliance on Owen D'Arcy[159] that the scope of the right can be manifested in bodily injury or physical or mental suffering. Most cases involve intentional conduct on the part of the decision maker.

[459] It is submitted that when one considers some of the cases, the allegations in this case are far removed from those examples. Mere humiliation or distress is not enough. The Attorney relies on R (Fuller) v Chief Constable of the Dorset Police.[160] The Court should come to the same conclusion in this case.

"17 Protection from torture and cruel inhuman or degrading treatment

(b) treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way; or

(c) subjected to medical or scientific experimentation or treatment without the person's full, free and informed consent."

[461] Section 17(b) is based on article 7 of the ICCPR. Its aim is to prevent harm to both the dignity and the physical and mental health of the individual.[161]

[462] In Owen-D'Arcy[162] Martin J set out a summary of the factors to be taken into account when considering s 17(b) of the HRA as:

(a) The scope of the right contained in s 17(b) is conditioned by a minimum standard or threshold of severity or intensity that can manifest in bodily injury or physical or mental suffering;

(b) The combination of the adjectives - cruel, inhuman, or degrading - define the prohibited treatment or punishment;

(c) The assessment of the minimum threshold is relative, and it depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects, and the sex, age and state of health of the alleged victim;

(d) Most cases of breach will involve on the part of the decision-maker, deliberate imposition of severe suffering or intentional conduct to harm, humiliate or debase a victim; and

(e) The purpose of the decision-maker's conduct will, at the very least, be a factor to be taken into account, though the absence of such a purpose does not conclusively rule out a violation of the right.

[463] In Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children[163] it was noted:

(a) The particular circumstances of the individual are relevant and should be taken into account.

(b) Treatment is degrading if it humiliates or debases a person, causes fear and anguish or a sense of inferiority or is capable of possibly breaking moral or physical resistance or driving a person against their will or conscience.

(c) Degrading treatment is concerned with humiliation. Inhuman treatment must reach a minimum level of severity manifesting in a minimum level of bodily injury or intense mental or physical suffering. It depends on the age, sex and state of heath of the alleged victim.

(d) The use of force in law enforcement may constitute cruel or inhuman treatment if it is grossly disproportionate to the purpose to be achieved and results in pain and suffering meeting a certain threshold.

[464] The High Court in SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[164] held that "cruel or inhuman or degrading" treatment prohibited by article 7 of the ICCPR does not have to be intentionally caused.

[465] In Ukraine v Russia[165] the ECHR held:

(a) That article 3 of the convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and degrading treatment or punishment irrespective of the victim's conduct.

(b) Whilst ill treatment requires a minimum level of severity involving actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering; degrading treatment does not require this.

(c) Degrading treatment humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for or diminishing of his or her human dignity or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual's moral and physical resistance.

[466] The ECHR has also held that for treatment to be degrading it is sufficient if the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes even if not in the eyes of others.[166] It has also been held that there is a strong link between the concepts of degrading treatment and punishment and respect for dignity.[167]

[467] The dictionary definition[168] of degrading is "humiliating, causing a loss of self-respect." "Cruel" means "causing pain or suffering especially deliberately." "Inhuman" means "brutal, unfeeling, barbarous."

[468] In R (on the application of Limbuela, Tesema and Adam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department[169], it was said that where a public entity deliberately takes action or a policy position against an individual that causes or materially aggravates serious suffering through the denial of shelter, food or the basic necessities of life, this may amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.

[469] In that case the claimants were asylum seekers who had been refused support under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (UK). They were sleeping in the open with no money to buy food. They applied for judicial review of the state's decision to refuse to provide them support. The judge granted the application, but the state appealed. The House of Lords dismissed the appeals holding that the state conduct was in breach of article 3 of the European convention. Lord Bingham noted that:

"Treatment is inhuman or degrading if to a seriously detrimental extent it denies the most basic needs of any human being."

[470] The ECHR has found a state responsible for degrading treatment when administrative delays lead to adult asylum seekers being forced to sleep on the streets for several months either under bridges or in tents, lacking means for their essential needs and in fear of being attacked or robbed.[170]

[471] Also, the UN Human Rights Committee has found that there is a breach of the article where a deported individual is likely to be forced to live on the streets.[171] The means by which an eviction is carried out can also give rise to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.[172]

[472] In this case I find that some of the applicants were subjected to degrading treatment here by both the notice decisions and the disposal decisions. This is particularly considering they lawfully lived at the park to start with under the PEH Camping Framework. I note that the recordings show that council officers were aware of the rain and that it would not be a good look for the media evicting the PEH when it was "pissing down" rain on 24 April 2025.[173]

(a) They were vulnerable.

(b) There was a lack of alternative shelter available at the time of the decisions.

(c) All experienced homelessness.

[474] As to Mrs Bobeldyk, she was a homeless person for about three years. Important belongings to her that they had collected over 42 years of marriage were destroyed. The loss of their daughter's ashes was inhumane. I consider that being left to sit under a tarp in the rain when she had no other accommodation available was degrading.

[475] As to Mr Bobeldyk, he was also homeless for about three years. As a result of the actions of the council, he did not know what was going to happen from one day to the next and when his belongings might be destroyed. He felt constantly fearful and disrespected. He was also left to sit under a tarp in the rain. I find the council's actions were degrading in circumstances where he had no other accommodation available.

[476] As to Ms Bobeldyk, she was left with no shelter and her home was taken. I accept she felt violated. I find the council's actions were degrading when she had no other accommodation.

[477] As to Mr McKinlay, he had been homeless for about three years because of struggles with anxiety and depression. It prevented him from earning a living. He lived at the park with Ms Richardson since April 2024. He gave no permission to the council to destroy his items. His tent and important items for daily living. His mother's jewellery was destroyed. He was devastated to lose these items. I find the council's actions were degrading.

[478] As to Ms Richardson, she was homeless for about two years and lived lawfully to start with at Eddie Hyland Park from August 2024. She was forced to go to Goodfellows Road. She cannot afford rent. Some of her property was destroyed without consent. I find the council's actions were degrading.

[479] As to Mr Carbone, he had been homeless since the age of 17. He was left with no shelter and his home was taken. I find the council's actions were degrading as he was left without accommodation.

[480] As to Mr Eichin, Mr Lugge and Mr Jenkinson it is not the position that they were left without shelter. In their cases I do not find a breach of this human right.

[481] Despite the Attorney General's submissions,[174] it was the manner and timing of the eviction which placed an additional burden to the repeal of the PEH Framework.

[482] I do not consider there was any justification for the manner of the exercise of these powers when accommodation could have been arranged for each of the applicants prior to eviction, or at the least longer notice periods given so this could be arranged.[175] There was also no justification for the disposal decisions without consent.

[483] It is submitted the right to property under s 24 of the HRA was breached. This right serves to protect against arbitrary interference with property rights. Both the decisions and conduct caused the applicants to have their property removed through unlawful means and therefore they have been arbitrarily deprived of property.

[484] It is submitted the limitations were not reasonably and demonstrably justifiable. The respondent did not consider alternative options.

[485] Section 24(2) of the HRA relates to the right not to the arbitrarily deprived of property. The applicants do not explain how the notice decisions interfered with their right to property. The compliance notices themselves did not deprive the applicants of any property. If there was an interference with a right to property this did not extend beyond what was on a broad and general assessment necessary to achieve the purpose of issuing the notice. There is no complaint that the impounding limited the right to property.

[486] With respect to s 24(2) (the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property) it is submitted this was clearly engaged by the destruction and impounding of the applicants' belongings. If the property was impounded or destroyed contrary to law, this would amount to arbitrary deprivation of property. Even if lawful, other factors may indicate that the deprivation of property was arbitrary in the sense it was unjust or unreasonable as it was not proportionate.

[487] In this case, there was no free and informed consent as to the disposal of the property.

[488] As to s 24 of the HRA, this is in similar terms to article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[489] This section protects a positive or systemic right to own property. It includes food, clothing, and housing. It is difficult to see how the notice decisions could have impacted on personal property. Temporary interference with possession falls far short of deprivation.

[490] It is submitted the right to property was not engaged by the notice decisions.

(1) All persons have the right to own property alone or in association with others.

(2) A person must not be arbitrarily deprived of the person's property."

[492] The right to property is modelled on Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[176] The rights essentially protects a person from having their property unlawfully removed.

[493] It has been said that the values underlying the right to property are the need to ensure that human beings can supply themselves with food and other support. It is a valuable component of human dignity.[177]

[494] It has been held previously that this section should be interpreted liberally.[178]

[495] However, when it comes to the notice decisions, it is difficult to see how issuing a compliance notice could have any impact of property rights. As was said in R (Fuller) v Chief Constable of the Dorset Police:[179]

"It seems to me to be questionable whether a landowner who compels a trespasser to remove his possessions from his land interferes with the peaceful enjoyment by the trespasser of his possession within the meaning of article 1 of the First Protocol: the trespasser is free to enjoy his possessions elsewhere."

[496] The decision to impound the property is not the subject of challenge.

[497] However, I find with respect to the disposal decisions where no consent was given this right was breached. I find that there was a destruction of items of sentimental value (such as the daughter's ashes and the mother's jewellery) and some were necessary for survival and dignity (such as tents and camping equipment).

[498] I find that there was no justifiable limitation on the right.

THE RIGHT TO NOT HAVE ONE'S PRIVACY, FAMILY OR HOME UNLAWFULLY OR ARBITRARILY INTERFERED WITH (S 25(A))

[499] It is submitted that this particular right provides a protection of the domain a person calls their home. Home is described as a place where a person resides or carries out their usual occupation.[180]

[500] It is submitted that the interference here was arbitrary. It is submitted that both the notice decisions and the disposal decisions and conduct involved a disproportionate and unlawful limitation on the rights under s 25(a) as it was arbitrary and forced the homeless applicants to leave their homes when they were homeless and with nowhere else to go. The disposal decisions and conduct were capricious and stripped the applicants of their home, shelter and privacy. It is submitted that the conduct was not reasonable and justifiable in accordance with s 13 of the HRA.

[501] There were less restrictive and reasonable ways to achieve the purpose of the limitation, for example, giving the applicants a longer period of time to comply with the local laws and to allow them more time to find reasonable alternative shelter.

[502] Section 25(a) of the HRA relates to the right to have privacy, family or home not unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. It is submitted that the onus has not been discharged by the applicants. It would not be accepted that the places where they were living qualified as their home for the purpose of the section. To constitute a home, there needs to be sufficiently close and continuous links with a specific place.

[503] For example, in Hirtu v France[181] the ECHR found that the applicants did not have sufficient links with an unlawful encampment where they had been living for six months.

[504] None of the applicants have deposed to the fact they were living in a home. It is submitted there is insufficient evidence to conclude the applicants were living in a home.

[505] The compliance notice to Mr Jenkinson was under the Community Standards for Public Land and Roads Local Law requiring him to stop parking an unregistered vehicle there. This is not within the scope of the applications.[182]

[506] The QHRC submits that the challenged decisions and conduct engage the applicants' rights to not have their privacy and home unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with contrary to s 25(a) of the HRA.

[507] It is also submitted that the challenged decisions and conduct, as they related to Deborah Bobeldyk, Albertus Bobeldyk, Angela Bobeldyk, Stacy Richardson and Nicholas McKinlay, engaged the right to not have the person's family unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with contrary to s 25(a) of the HRA.

[508] It is submitted that in this case, the onus reverses to the respondent to justify the limitation in accordance with s 13 of the HRA. It is submitted that the interference with the rights was arbitrary as:

(a) The encampments were previously lawful.

(b) The applicants had been living for between four years and six months at the sites.

(c) There were only short periods for compliance.

(d) There was no suitable accommodation available at the time of the clearances.

(e) The authorised officers did not take into account the individual circumstances of the case.

(f) There was a lack of transparency in the procedure.

(g) There was a lack of procedural fairness.

(h) There was a lack of notice as to enforcement.

(i) The applicants were vulnerable.

(j) The clearance was conducted during the rain and before a long weekend.

(k) There was the destruction of important property.

(l) The decisions and conduct did not have to be carried out urgently.

[509] As to the right to privacy, family, and home under s 25(a) of the HRA, this is based on article 17(1) of the ICCPR.

[510] The applicants must show there is a home, the home is being interfered with and the interference was either unlawful or arbitrary. It is accepted that the word home should be read broadly. One to four years may be sufficient. It is submitted that the applicants' evidence indicates that most have been living at Eddie Hyland Park for about six months before the issuance of the compliance notices. One may have been living there for about four years. It is submitted that the fact they were living on public land unlawfully on a temporary basis is insufficient to establish they had a home for the purposes of the right. The Attorney-General relies on a number of international decisions. The applicants have not established the existence of a home for the purposes of s 25(a) of the HRA.

[511] Even if they could establish they lived in a home, they need to show that the notices were either unlawful or arbitrary. If it is established the notice decisions were unlawful on any judicial review grounds, then the interference with the home would have been unlawful. An interference may be arbitrary even if it is not unlawful.

[512] Here, legitimate aims were pursued to ensure amenity of the public land, public health and safety and the amenity of neighbouring properties. It is submitted that the two-week period of compliance fell within a range of reasonable alternatives.

[513] The applicants have failed to show that the right to a home is engaged.

(a) not to have the person's privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and

(b) not to have the person's reputation unlawfully attacked."

[515] In Director of Housing v Sudi[183] it was said that the purpose of this right is to protect the domain which a person calls their home and the intimate relations they have with their family.

[516] Interference will be arbitrary where it is capricious or has resulted from conduct which is unreasonable, unnecessary, and disproportionate to the legitimate aim sought.[184] The test for arbitrariness requires a broad assessment of whether in all the circumstances the interference extends beyond what is reasonably necessary to achieve the statutory or other lawful purpose being pursued by the public authority.[185]

[517] Even an interference provided for by the law may be arbitrary.[186]

[518] As to the meaning of "home," an applicant needs to show a sufficiently close connection and continuous link with a specific place.[187] It is to be approached in a common sense and pragmatic way. It is a place of refuge where one can develop and enjoy domestic peace, harmony and warmth without fear of disturbance. It is a question of fact and not law.[188] For example in Mizner v State of Queensland[189] it was considered that a prisoner's cell is his home.

[519] A home may be a home even if the occupiers are not the lawful owners of the land on which the home sits.[190]

[520] As to "privacy," this is broad and extends to a person's private life generally and protects the individual against interference with their physical and mental integrity.[191]

[521] The ECHR has considered the right to privacy to be engaged by the eviction of people from encampments.[192]

[522] The term "family" is not defined in the HRA but the explanatory note to the Human Rights Bill 2018 states that "family" should be given a broad definition "extending to different cultural understandings of family and small family units with or without children."

[523] In Director of Housing v Sudi[193] Bell J found that the right to protection from unlawful and arbitrary interference with family was engaged by the Department of Housing applying for a possession order to evict a man and his son from public housing.

[524] Even if a person is not living in a "home," a forced eviction may still interfere with the rights to privacy and family. For example, in Hirtu v France[194] the applicants, Romanian nationals living in a Roma community, were forced to leave an encampment where they had been unlawfully living for six months. Because of the absence of a continuous link with the place in question, there was no interference of the right to home but there was to the right to privacy and family.

[525] The UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing has emphasized that for persons in a street situation, their home may be a caravan, vehicle, makeshift shelter, tent or a sleeping bag.[195] It all depends on the facts of the case.

[526] The Attorney-General in her submissions has referred to a number of cases on the application of the term "home" to various factual situations.[196] But it is the facts of the case which are conclusive. For example, in Vandenberg v Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services[197] the Supreme Court of British Columbia regarded the tarps and tents used by homeless people were their homes and an order to remove these amounted to an eviction order.

[527] In connection with forced evictions, factors which may be relevant to the question of arbitrariness are:

(a) Whether, prior to the service of the notice to vacate, the landlord or public body considered the reasonableness of the decision in the circumstances of the particular case.[198]

(b) Whether the landlord engaged with the tenant in an effort to avoid having to apply for possession, including by referring them to external organisations.[199]

(c) Whether the likely effect would lead to homelessness.[200]

(d) Whether the person the subject of the eviction had failed to comply with a reasonable policy or request from the landlord or engaged in objectionable behaviour.[201]

(e) The age of the person at the time of the eviction.[202]

(f) Whether the decision was based on clear pre-existing rules or a transparent, predictable, and foreseeable procedure.[203]

(g) The proportionality of the action in view of protecting the human rights of vulnerable members of society.[204]

[528] The loss of a home has been regarded by the ECHR as one of the most extreme forms of interference with human rights even where the occupation is unlawful.[205] Factors the ECHR has considered include:

(a) The vulnerability of the particular individuals. [206]

(b) Whether there is an urgent need to carry out the evictions before the provision of adequate alternative accommodation.[207]

(c) Whether the occupations had been previously tolerated by the state.[208]

(d) The procedural safeguards available to the individual.[209]

(e) If the applicant is from an underprivileged group, then this will be a weighty factor and arrangements for alternative shelter need to be considered.[210]

(f) Whilst there is a "margin of appreciation" in the area of social and economic policies this will be narrower for Article 8 rights.[211]

(g) The proportionality and reasonableness of the measure.[212]

(h) Short notice periods have also been a relevant factor.[213]

[529] Despite the submissions made by the council and the Attorney-General, I accept the submissions of the applicants and the QHRC.

[530] I have already found that some of the notices were unlawful on judicial review grounds. When I consider the council's material, I find that the issue of the notices was also arbitrary.[214] It was arbitrary in being capricious, unpredictable, unjust, or unreasonable in the sense of not being proportionate to the legitimate aim sought.[215]

[531] I consider that each of the applicants in this case were vulnerable as homeless people.

[532] I consider that each of the applicants was living in a home[216] and that the human right of interference with the right to a home and/or privacy was breached for the following reasons:

(a) Mrs Bobeldyk was homeless since 2022. She had lived at Eddie Hyland Park for 8 months from September 2024. She was lawfully at the park before the repeal of the PEH Framework. She describes living in a tent where she stored personal items. The notice she received on 10 April 2025 only gave her 24 hours to remove herself from the park. It was raining over the next few days.[217] Important personal items were impounded and destroyed, some without her consent. She had nowhere else to go. They were left without a proper tent and rain saturated their belongings.[218] It was only on or around 30 June 2025 that she and her husband would be offered housing. A reasonable and proportionate response by the council would have been to work with her to get into housing, rather than just evicting her. It is hard to see that there would have been any detriment to the council by leaving them in situ until 30 June 2025. To work with her would have been a far more proportionate, reasonable and justifiable response.[219] This is particularly when one considers that they had been lawfully living at the park under the PEH Framework. I consider that the decisions and conduct were arbitrary and the notices unlawful as they did not specify a reasonable time in the circumstances.

(b) Mr Bobeldyk had also been homeless since 2022. He lived with his wife at Eddie Hyland Park for eight months since September 2024. He had also been living lawfully at the park under the PEH Framework. He describes how on 9 April 2025 he received a notice and was told he had one hour to pack up.[220] After he started to pack his belongings, he fainted and was taken to hospital. The next day his wife was given a notice to move by 11 April 2025. He still felt very weak, but they attempted to pack their belongings. For the next few days, it rained.[221] On 24 April 2025 he and his wife were told they had a couple of hours to remove all of their belongings. I accept they were told they had five more minutes to take their belongings, or the council would be taking them.[222] He corroborates his wife's version that some items of property were destroyed without his consent, and they were left to suit under a tarp in the rain.[223] It was only on or around 30 June 2025 that he and his wife were offered housing. A reasonable and proportionate response by the council would have been to work with him to get into housing rather than just evicting him. It is hard to see that there would have been any detriment to the council by leaving them in situ until 30 June 2025. To work with him would have been a far more proportionate, reasonable, and justifiable response. This is particularly so when one considers that they had been lawfully living at the park under the PEH Framework. I consider that the decisions and conduct were arbitrary and the notices unlawful as they did not specify a reasonable time in the circumstances.

[533] In summary, I consider with respect to these homeless people who were originally lawfully camping on council land, a reasonable and proportionate approach was to assist them in organising accommodation before they were evicted from council land and to specify reasonable time periods in the notices. If they declined reasonable offers of housing, an eviction from council land would then be justified.

[534] Indeed, the fact that council policy was that longer notice periods could be given to those who had organised accommodation shows that a more justifiable and reasonable approach could be taken to those who did not.

[535] Unless such an approach was taken then there would most likely be a situation where these homeless people were simply moved on which created the same problem somewhere else. That is not a reasonable or justifiable solution.

[536] Ms Nipperess identified these issues in her advice to the council when she said:

(a) Shorter or immediate time frames for compliance do not provide the opportunity for the Department of Housing to support PEH and connect them with housing.[225]

(b) The repeal of the framework has the effect of criminalising homelessness. Treating a person with no home and nowhere to go as a person contravening the law may be considered cruel treatment of a person who already has very little resources and support. It may cause mental suffering, fear and anguish.[226]

(c) The timing and roll out of the repeal of the framework can also have an impact on this human right. particularly in terms of degrading treatment. The timing ought to be considered carefully.[227]

(d) If it is unlawful for a person to camp on public land and where they have no alternative housing, it may force these persons to sleep in less safe or hidden spaces and less sanitary places. This may expose them to increased risk of exploitation and harassment.

(e) Council may wish to consider working with the state (to the extent possible) to find viable alternative housing for PEH.

(f) By its nature, the repeal of the framework will disproportionately affect PEH. It will be impossible for those persons to immediately comply with s 13 of the local law because their housing circumstances do not enable compliance.[228]

(g) Given the unequal impact the repeal of the framework will have on PEH, the council should provide reasonable timeframes for compliance.[229]

(h) It is open to the council to limit the human rights, provided the council ensures human dignity and equality when taking compliance action to pack up the belongings of PEH on public land and ensuring, to the extent possible, that the council works with the state to support it in finding sufficient alternative housing.[230]

[537] Similar issues were identified in the reports attached to Mr Tracy's affidavit.

[538] I considered the cases relied on by the Attorney-General may be distinguished:

(a) In Kay v Lambeth London Borough Council[231] the travellers occupied the council land without permission on 13 June 2024 and two days later the eviction proceedings commenced. Unlike the present case there was no original lawful occupation and the time period was far shorter. I also note that in the later ECHR proceedings the government conceded that Kay occupied a home for the purpose of article 8.[232]

(b) In Ward v Hillingdon London Borough Council[233] the applicant was always a trespasser and had occupied the plot in question from 16 October 2000 until the removal direction on 3 November 2000. That is a far shorter period than the present case and the applicant never lawfully occupied the site unlike in the present one.

(c) In R (Fuller) v Chief Constable of the Dorset Police[234] the occupation was only two months and again unlike the present case there was no evidence of any PEH framework.

(d) In Hirtu v France[235] the occupation was for six months[236] and again there is no suggestion that they occupied the site (in the Parisian suburbs) at any stage lawfully.

[539] Even if I was considered wrong concerning the right to a home, I find alternatively with respect to each applicant that their right to privacy was breached and this could have been avoided by a more proportionate and reasoned response as I have already indicated. This is consistent with the result in Hirtu v France.[237]

THE RIGHT FOR FAMILIES AND CHILDREN TO BE PROTECTED (S 26)

[540] It is further submitted that s 26 of the HRA was breached i.e. the right for families and children to be protected. It is submitted that Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk are the biological parents of Ms Bobeldyk and Ms Richardson considers them to be her adoptive parents. Their rights were limited and this was not justifiable.

[541] It is submitted that from the evidence it appears that Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk live with each other but not with either Ms Bobeldyk or Ms Richardson at Eddie Hyland Park. The notice decisions did not engage this right.

[542] With respect to protection of the family under s 26(1) of the HRA, the submissions of the applicants are adopted.

[543] The HRA sets out two rights related to families, namely privacy and reputation and protection of families to children. With respect to the allegation of "family," the Bobeldyk's and Ms Richardson must show there is a family, the family has been interfered with and the interference was either unlawful or arbitrary. It is submitted that Ms Bobeldyk is the biological daughter of Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk. There is no evidence they lived together or that she was dependant on her parents. Although Ms Richardson considers Mr and Mrs Bobeldyk to be her adoptive parents, there is no further evidence of the nature of their relationship. The evidence is not enough to engage the family aspect. Even if they can show a relevant family relationship the notices decisions did not interfere with that relationship. That did not prevent them from staying close to each other. It has not been shown that the interference with the family was unlawful or arbitrary. The applicants have not shown that the notice decisions engaged the right to non-interference with family.

"(1) Families are the fundamental group unit of society and are entitled to be protected by society and the State."

[545] I have already discussed the meaning of "family."

[546] For the reasons already given, I find that the Bobeldyks were part of a family unit and Mr McKinlay and Ms Richardson were part of a family unit. For the reasons already given, this right was breached with respect to these applicants and there were other means which were justifiable and reasonable which I already identified.

[547] There is insufficient evidence to establish a family connection between Ms Richardson and the Bobeldyks and a dependent connection between Ms Bobeldyk and her parents.

[548] The applicants agree that the form of orders is to be determined after the findings are made in this case.

[549] In the event the applicants succeed, any declaratory relief would need to be precisely identified. A permanent injunction should not be granted. The applicants' case is directed to the lawfulness and validity of specific decisions, not the local laws under which those decisions were made. There could be no basis in a court restraining the council from enforcing its laws in the future. The council will comply with the law as declared by the court and there is no need to restrain it from not complying with the law.

[550] The QHRC agrees with the applicants' position.

[551] For the reasons advanced, the application for review should be dismissed insofar as it is based on human rights grounds. Alternatively, if the applicants establish that the impugned decisions were incompatible with human rights or made without proper consideration to a human right, s 59(2) of the HRA provides the court may grant the relief sought on independent grounds even if they are not successful on those grounds.

[552] A breach of s 58(1) of the HRA is not a judicial error resulting in invalidity. Remedies such as a declaration of unlawfulness may be available.

[553] In conclusion, I have found that the notice and disposal decisions were unlawful and the decisions breached the human rights of the applicants.

[554] As the local laws were not the subject of challenge, it is inappropriate, as the respondent submits, to order a permanent injunction to restrain the council from acting upon a valid law. It may act on such a law provided it does so lawfully.

1. I will hear from the parties on the form of the orders to be made in light of the reasons I have given.
2. I will hear the parties on the question of costs.

[1] It was not served on him but given to his partner.

[2] She was lawfully at the park before the repeal of the PEH Framework.

[3] This is consistent with the Bureau of Meteorology data. It rained on 12, 13, 14 and 15 April 2025.

[4] This is consistent with the Bureau of meteorology data. It rained on 24, 25 and 26 April 2025.

[5] He also had been living lawfully at the park under the PEH framework.

[6] This is consistent with time stated in the notice.

[7] This is consistent with the Bureau of Meteorology data. It rained on 12, 13, 14 and 15 April 2025.

[8] This is consistent with the Bureau of Meteorology data (exhibit 3). It rained on 24, 25 and 26 April 2025.

[9] She had been living lawfully at the park under the PEH framework.

[12] There is one in his name dated 18 June 2025 for Goodfellows Road.

[13] I note that Mr Cooney swears that during a site inspection of 22 July 2025 areas of the Kallangur Park had been significantly cleaned up as compared to previous inspections (see [15] affidavit 31 July 2025.)

[14] This is contrary to Mr Lugge stating that he was happy for council officers to pass on his information and his phone number to housing on 8 July 2025 (see recording dated 8 July 2025 exhibit SM17).

[15] I note Mr Carbone was happy for council officers to pass on his information to housing on 8 July 2025 (see recording dated 8 July 2025 exhibit SM17).

[16] This conflicts with his later affidavit where he says the attendance was to enforce compliance notices.

[45] He did not refuse to deal with the Department of Housing - respondent's submission [61].

[49] This submission is inconsistent with the video evidence.

[50] As I noted above, this submission is not consistent with the video evidence.

[51] However, as noted above, the video evidence shows that he was happy for his details to be passed onto housing.

[56] [2024] QSC 2; (2024) 329 IR 365 at [332].

[57] Fleming The Law of Torts 10th ed [5.50].

[58] Fleming The Law of Torts 10th ed [5.50].

[59] Crescendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 19 NSWLR 40.

[60] Freeman v Home Office [1984] QB 544 at 556.

[61] R v Bossley [2012] QSC 292; [2015] 2 Qd R 102 at [17]- [22].

[62] White v Johnston [2015] NSWCA; [2015] NSWCA 18; (2015) 87 NSWLR 779 at [93]- [130].