Overview of the respective positions of the parties

1. The Applicant concedes that he does not pass the character test under s 501 of the Act. However, he submits that his criminal history must be viewed through the lens of 'criminogenic'[18] factors, specifically substance abuse and emotional dysregulation, which he contends have been effectively addressed through rehabilitation. The Applicant submits that he was a heroin user in the 1990s but has achieved 12 years of abstinence from opioids, and while he admits his index offending was driven by alcohol and cannabis use, he contends that he has now implemented strict abstinence from those substances.[19]
2. In support of his rehabilitation, the Applicant submits that he has completed twelve individual counselling sessions and six comprehensive educational courses in January 2026, including Anger Management, Domestic Violence Awareness, and Emotional Intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on his practice of Vipassana meditation in the S.N. Goenka tradition,[20] which he argues has provided him with deep self-regulation skills and the capacity to move from unconscious reactivity to conscious choice. He asserts that he has accepted full responsibility for his actions, rejecting any minimisation of his conduct, and acknowledges that while substance abuse influenced his behaviour, it does not excuse it.

1. The Minister submits that I should affirm the decision under review, contending that the Tribunal should not be satisfied that there is another reason why the decision to cancel the Applicant's visa should be revoked. The Minister emphasises the Applicant's lengthy criminal history spanning from 1990 to 2024, which includes convictions for stealing, assault, burglary, and traffic offences. Particular emphasis is placed on the 'index offending' of 7 August 2023. The Minister notes that during a domestic altercation, the Applicant pulled his victim by the hair, threatened to stab her, and inflicted a penetrating wound to the rear of her neck with a knife. The Applicant was also convicted of assault occasioning bodily harm and property damage arising from this incident.
2. I note the Minister's submission regarding the Applicant's historical offending, including multiple terms of imprisonment between 1994 and 2012 for burglary, motor vehicle theft, and unlawful wounding. The Minister draws my attention to the formal warning issued to the Applicant by the Department on 5 February 2009 regarding the migration consequences of further offending, arguing that his subsequent conduct demonstrates a disregard for the law.

1. Section 501 of the Act deals with decisions to refuse to grant a visa on character grounds. Relevantly, s 501(3A) of the Act provides that the Minister must cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:

(a) the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:

(i) paragraph (6)(a) (substantial criminal record), on the basis of paragraph (7)(a), (b) or (c); or

(ii) paragraph (6)(e) (sexually based offences involving a child); and

(b) the person is serving a sentence of imprisonment, on a full-time basis in a custodial institution, for an offence against a law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory.

1. The 'character test' is provided for in s 501(6) of the Act and provides, to the extent relevant, s 501(6) provides:

(6) For the purposes of this section, a person does not pass the character test if:

(a) the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by

subsection (7));

...

1. The definition of substantial criminal record in s 501(7), to the extent relevant, is as follows:

(7) For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if:

...

(c) the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more; or

...

1. If a visa is cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act, the Minister must give the person a written notice of the decision,[21] particulars of the relevant information[22] and invite the person to make representations about revocation of the decision.[23]
2. Section 501CA(4) of the Act provides that, the Minister may revoke the cancellation of the visa if representations have been made by the Applicant for review in accordance with an invitation to make such representations[24] and the Minister is satisfied that either the person passes the 'character test'[25] or there is 'another reason' why the cancellation of the visa should be revoked.[26]
3. Accordingly, a decision to revoke the cancellation of a visa under s 501CA of the Act involves two steps:

(a) the first step requires the decision-maker to determine whether the person passes the 'character test' under s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act. If the person passes the 'character test' the cancellation may be revoked. It is only if the person does not pass the 'character test', that it is necessary to consider the second step; > > (b) the second step requires the decision-maker to decide whether there is 'another reason' why the cancellation should be revoked.[27]

4. A decision under s 501CA(4) of the Act is an evaluative exercise.[28] I am required to determine whether there is 'another reason' to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant's visa. It requires that I weigh the factors for and against revoking the visa cancellation.[29] This assessment must be conducted on a correct understanding of the law and without legal unreasonableness.[30]

1. Section 499(2A) of the Act requires that, in conducting this review, I comply with any written directions given by the Minister pursuant to s 499(1) of the Act.[31]
2. In this respect, on 7 June 2024, the Minister issued Direction No 110, Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA ('Direction 110'). Direction 110 applies to this review. Direction 110 replaced the previous Direction No 99 which previously applied.[32]
3. For the purposes of deciding whether to refuse an application for a visa or whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of a visa, the Direction sets out several principles that must be considered in making a decision under s 501 of the Act[33] These principles are expressed as follows:

(1) Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non­citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.

(2) The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government.

(3) Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.

(4) The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measureable [sic: measurable] risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.

(5) Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa Applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time.

(6) With respect to decisions to refuse, cancel, and revoke cancellation of a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.

(7) Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non­citizen's conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation.

(8) The inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the non-citizen does not pose a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.

1. Where relevant to the decision, I must take into account the considerations identified in Direction 110, namely the 'primary considerations' set out in paragraph 8 of Direction 110, and the 'other considerations' set out paragraph 9 of the Direction 110.[34]
2. In taking into account those considerations, Direction 110 provides that:

(a) primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations set out in the Direction;[35] > > (b) the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations;[36] > > (c) appropriate weight is to be given to information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources;[37]

1. Direction 110 provides that a decision under s 501CA(4) of the Act involves five 'primary considerations' that I must take into account.[38] Those 'primary considerations' are:[39]

(1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct: > > (2) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence; > > (3) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia; > > (4) the best interests of minor children in Australia; and > > (5) expectations of the Australian community.

1. Direction 110 also provides for 'other considerations' that I must take into account, so far as they are relevant. Those 'other considerations' include, but are not limited to:[40]

(a) legal consequences of the decision; > > (b) extent of impediments if removed; and > > (c) impact on Australian business interests.

2. Direction 110 also provides the following additional guidance:[41]

(1) In applying the considerations (both primary and other), information and evidence from independent and authoritative sources should be given appropriate weight.

(2) The primary consideration at 8.1 below (protection of the Australian community) is generally to be given greater weight than other primary considerations. Otherwise, primary considerations should generally be given greater weight than the other considerations.

(3) One or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations.

1. Whether a person passes the character test is a question of law.[42] A person either passes the character test or they do not. The Applicant concedes that he does not pass the character test.[43] In view of the material before me, I am satisfied that the Applicant's concession was properly made and supported by the evidence. Accordingly, I find that the Applicant does not pass the character test as contained in s 501(6) of the Act.
2. In those circumstances, the sole issue for determination before me is whether there is 'another reason' why the cancellation of the Applicant's visa should be revoked under s 501CA(4) of the Act.[44]

IS THERE 'ANOTHER REASON' WHY THE CANCELLATION SHOULD BE REVOKED?

1. I have found that the Applicant does not pass the 'character test'. Therefore, I must now determine whether there is 'another reason' to revoke the visa cancellation[45] by undertaking an evaluative assessment guided by the 'primary considerations' and 'other considerations' contained in Direction 110.

First 'primary consideration' - protection of the Australian community

1. The Applicant contends that the protection of the Australian community does not mandate his non-revocation when proper weight is given to the 'higher tolerance' principle under paragraph 5.26 of Direction 110.[46] He submits that having arrived in Australia at age eight and resided here for 46 years, he falls squarely within the category of non-citizens to whom Australia affords a higher level of tolerance regarding criminal conduct.[47]
2. Furthermore, the Applicant argues that the risk he poses to the community is manageable through less restrictive means than permanent removal.[48] He proposes that community safety can be assured through strict conditions, including mandatory drug and alcohol testing, community supervision, and engagement with mental health services.[49] He submits that permanent removal is disproportionate where risk can be mitigated, especially given that he has maintained sobriety and good behaviour in detention.[50] He further argues that the risk of reoffending has been significantly reduced by his engagement with evidence-based interventions targeting his specific 'criminogenic needs'.[51]
3. The Minister contends that this consideration weighs determinatively against revocation.[52] It is submitted that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Government and against this context the Minister argues that the index offending is objectively very serious, involving family violence, and that the sentence of imprisonment reflects this gravity.[53]
4. In relation to the risk of reoffending, the Minister submits that the Applicant poses an unacceptable risk. The Minister contended that the Applicant attributes his offending to substance abuse but (at the time) had failed to provide independent evidence of completed rehabilitation programs or verified counselling outcomes.[54] In response to the subsequent provision of evidence, the Minister submitted that the weight to be afforded to those courses is to be 'tempered by the fact that they were all undertaken following the cancellation of the Applicant's visa and where they are all short courses of between 5 and 10 hours'.[55]
5. The Minister points to the Applicant's history of failing to comply with community-based orders, specifically the cancellation of his parole in 2009 following a positive urinalysis for cannabis.[56] Consequently, the Minister argues that even if the risk of reoffending were assessed as low, the serious nature of the potential harm, physical and psychological injury to the community, renders that risk unacceptable.[57]
6. In relation to the resumption of contact between the Applicant and his daughter, the Minister submitted that:[58]

(a) There is no evidence before the Tribunal detailing the therapies or treatments [K] is presently engaged with or the manner in which the Applicant's presence would be necessary for her to access or receive those services. > > (b) Any claimed therapeutic benefit is tempered by the Applicant's own evidence that he only recently resumed contact with [K], with whom his relationship has been 'almost nonexistent' for the preceding 10 years: paragraph 8.4.4(a) of Direction 110. > > (c) There is no evidence before the Tribunal regarding [K]'s views on reunifying with the Applicant in light of their extended period of estrangement and the sensitive nature of the reported assault: paragraph 8.4(4) of Direction 110. Nor is there any evidence from [K]'s aunt, who fulfills the parental role, that any contact with [K] is either supported or necessary. > > (d) Neither the Applicant nor Ms Taylor currently fulfil a parental role for [K], who resides with her aunt, such that any claimed burden for supporting her recovery could not be more than minimal: paragraph 8.4(4)(e) of Direction 110. > > (e) The Applicant has not provided [K]'s exact date of birth, such that the maximum period of time before she turns 18 is 3 years: paragraph 8.4(4)(b) of Direction 110.

1. The first 'primary consideration' focuses on the protection of the Australian community and instructs decision-makers:[59]

(a) to keep in mind that the safety of the Australian community is the highest priority of the Australian Government; > > (b) to that end, the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm because of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens;[60] and > > (c) that entering or remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law abiding, will respect important institutions, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.[61]

2. Paragraph 8.1(2) of Direction 110 also provides that decision-makers should also give consideration to:

(a) the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date; and > > (b) the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.

Nature and seriousness of the Applicant's conduct

1. The nature and seriousness of an Applicant's conduct to date and the weight which should be attributed to this factor are matters for me, sitting as the Tribunal, to assess.[62] That being said, whilst I am obliged to 'take into account the view of the Australian Government and the Australian community about the seriousness of such crimes and conduct', I am not bound to consider the convictions as either 'very serious or 'serious'.[63]
2. In assessing the nature and seriousness of conduct to date, paragraph 8.1.1(1) of Direction 110 provides:

(1) In considering the nature and seriousness of the Applicant's criminal offending and other conduct to date, decision-makers must have regard to the following:

(a) without limiting the range of conduct that may be considered very serious, the types of crimes and conduct described below are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community:

i. violent and/or sexual crimes;

1. crimes of a violent and/or sexual nature against women or children, regardless of the sentence imposed;
2. acts of family violence, regardless of whether there is a conviction for an offence or a sentence imposed;

(b) without limiting the range of conduct that may be considered serious, the types of crimes or conduct described below are considered by the Australian Government and the Australian community to be serious:

1. causing a person to enter into or being party to a forced marriage (other than being a victim), regardless of whether there is a conviction for an offence or a sentence imposed
2. crimes committed against vulnerable members of the community (such as the elderly and the disabled), or government representatives or officials due to the position they hold, or in the performance of their duties
3. any conduct that forms the basis for a finding that a non citizen does not pass an aspect of the character test that is dependent upon the decision-maker's opinion (for example, section 501(6)(c));
4. where the non-citizen is in Australia, a crime committed while the non-citizen was in immigration detention, during an escape from immigration detention, or after the non-citizen escaped from immigration detention, but before the non-citizen was taken into immigration detention again, or an offence against section 197 A of the Act, which prohibits escape from immigration detention

(c) with the exception of the crimes or conduct mentioned in subparagraph (a)(ii), (a)(iii) or (b)(i) above, the sentence imposed by the courts for a crime or crimes;

(d) the impact of the offending on any victims of offending or other conduct and their family, where information in this regard is available and the non-citizen whose visa is being considered for refusal or cancellation, or who has sought revocation of the mandatory cancellation of their visa, has been afforded procedural fairness;

(e) the frequency of the non-citizen's offending and/or whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness;

(f) the cumulative effect of repeated offending;

(g) whether the non-citizen has provided false or misleading information to the Department, including by not disclosing prior criminal offending;

(h) whether the non-citizen has re-offended since being formally warned, or since otherwise being made aware, in writing, about the consequences of further offending in terms of the non-citizen's migration status (noting that the absence of a warning should not be considered to be in the non-citizen's favour)

(i) where the offence or conduct was committed in another country, whether that offence or conduct is classified as an offence in Australia.

1. I am satisfied that the Applicant's index offending falls squarely within the categories of conduct that the Australian Government and the Australian community view as 'very serious' pursuant to paragraph 8.1.1(a) of Direction 110. Specifically, the offences of unlawful wounding and assault occasioning bodily harm are, of themselves, inherently violent crimes. Furthermore, as the violence was perpetrated against a woman - a former intimate partner - it constitutes a crime of a violent nature against a woman, a category which the Direction mandates must be viewed as very serious 'regardless of the sentence imposed'. That the index offending involved a weapon further underscores the seriousness of the offending.
2. As I explain in more detail below, I also find that the conduct constitutes an act of family violence under paragraph 8.1.1(a)(iii). While the Applicant sought in his oral evidence to characterise the relationship as non-domestic by citing sleeping arrangements and the infrequency of them being 'intimate', I have already rejected that evidence as an opportunistic reconstruction. The violence occurred within the home against a female with whom he was, or at least had been, in an intimate personal relationship with, and acts of this nature are viewed very seriously by the Australian Government and the Australian community.
3. Regarding the frequency and trend of offending under paragraph 8.1.1(e), I find a concerning trajectory of increasing seriousness. The Applicant's criminal history, spanning from 1990 to 2024, demonstrates a progression from property and dishonesty offences to acts of significant interpersonal violence involving weapons. This cumulative effect of repeated offending indicates that the Applicant has not been deterred by previous sentences and suggests an entrenched disregard for the law.
4. I attach significant weight to the fact that the Applicant has re-offended since being formally warned. The evidence establishes that the Department formally warned the Applicant on 5 February 2009 about the consequences of further offending for his migration status. The Applicant's oral evidence about this warning was that he did not take it as seriously as he should have. In any event, despite the warning, the Applicant continued to offend, culminating in the index offending. I accept the Minister's submission that the Applicant has a further 53 offences since the Applicant was formally warned about the possible cancellation of his visa. However, more concerningly is that since the Applicant was formally warned his offending has become more violent in nature and his index offending has, as I explain below, involved family violence within the meaning of Direction 110. The cumulative nature of his offending is something that I do not overlook because it also is suggestive of an entrenched disregard for the law.

Risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct

1. When considering the risk to the Australian community should the Applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious misconduct, I am to be guided by paragraph 8.1.2 of Direction 110 which provides, to the extent presently relevant:[64]

(1) In considering the need to protect the Australian community (including individuals, groups or institutions) from harm, decision-makers should have regard to the Government's view that the Australian community's tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. Some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so serious that any risk that it may be repeated may be unacceptable.

(2) In assessing the risk that may be posed by the non-citizen to the Australian community, decision-makers must have regard to, cumulatively:

a) the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and

b) the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account:

1. information and evidence on the risk of the non­citizen re-offending; and
2. evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken).

...

1. The Tribunal should consider the likelihood and consequences of further offending.[65] In doing so, the assessment of risk that I undertake must have a rational and probative basis.[66]
2. I have considered the Applicant's extensive criminal history. While I am prepared to accept that substance abuse has played a contributory role in his offending, I am not persuaded that his offending is primarily caused by addiction. The Applicant's offending has occurred over such a protracted period and has persisted despite numerous terms of incarceration and previous attempts at rehabilitation[67] that it supports a conclusion that the Applicant possesses a systemic disregard for the law. I am satisfied that his repeated recidivism demonstrates a lack of respect for the law.
3. In assessing the risk of reoffending, I agree with the Minister's submissions. While it is positive that the Applicant has expressed a desire to implement change and has provided a plan to this effect[68], his rehabilitation remains wholly untested in the community. Whilst there is superficial merit in the Applicant's contention that his rehabilitation cannot be tested in the community whilst he remains in immigration detention,[69] the Applicant has, on his own case, previously undertaken rehabilitation during, and after, his previous periods of incarceration. All previous attempts at rehabilitation have been unsuccessful and the Applicant has reoffended. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the protective factors he points to and relies upon are durable.
4. In the Applicant's statutory declaration, he said the following about the index offending:[70]

I acknowledge unequivocally that my conduct was serious and wrong. My index offence involved violence toward a person with whom I was in a de facto relationship. The offence involved: > > • Pulling the victim to the ground by her hair > > • Making threats to stab the victim > > • Inflicting a penetrating knife wound to the rear of the victim's neck > > • Threatening and damaging property > > Family violence is abhorrent. The seriousness of this conduct cannot be minimised. The magistrate in sentencing noted that 'it was luck more than anything else that meant that there wasn't a more serious injury and a more serious injury for [the victim].' > > I accept this assessment. My conduct was dangerously close to causing severe injury or death.

5. Contrary to that characterisation, I formed a clear view during the hearing that the Applicant sought to minimise the gravity of his conduct. In his oral evidence, he initially described the knife wound inflicted during the index offending as merely a 'nick'. He further sought to minimise the seriousness of his historical offending, specifically an incident where he sat on a victim's chest and threatened them with scissors, by asserting that the scissors were 'a pair of toe cutting scissors' that were 'no bigger than 5 centimetres' and that he did not intend to stab him just 'scare him' and that there was only 'a tiny little nick on him'. That is, on both occasions where the Applicant has been convicted of unlawful wounded because he has harmed someone with a weapon, I consider he has sought to downplay and minimise the injuries he inflicted.
6. Moreover, when the Applicant was asked in his evidence about the impact of the index offending on the victim, the exchange was as follows:

DIETRICH, MR: How do you think [the victim] would feel about that event today? > > JACKSON, MR: Knowing [the victim] as my friend. If I was allowed the opportunity to be able to apologise to her or even write her a letter or something like that, I'm sure we could move forward. I don't believe that she would have any fear of me after the event. > > When I was on bail, I actually ran into [the victim] at the at the local shops. I don't have any problem with Bronwyn, nothing but regret for what happened and one day I would like to regain a friendship with her. I don't know how she would feel. > > DIETRICH, MR: What impact do you think that this event would have on [the victim]'s day-to-day life? The event of the event for which you received your conviction? > > JACKSON, MR: Honestly, [the victim], knowing the person that I am and as in a statement she said that she believed I had a psychotic episode. I don't think it would change her life much whatsoever. She might be a little bit of people, but knowing [the victim] personally, I think I don't think it would have much impact at all.

7. Several observations can be made about this exchange.
8. First, I do not accept on the material before me that the applicant was having a 'psychotic episode' when the index offending occurred, although it may be the applicant is contending not that he had such an episode, but rather the victim subjectively believes he was having a psychotic episode.
9. Second, the applicant's evidence that he does not 'have a problem' with the victim is concerning and demonstrates a lack of insight. It appears to suggest that the applicant's thinking about the incident is that the victim is, somehow, to blame. Irrespective of what occurred between them in the lead up to the index offending, the applicant's behaviour was entirely unjustified.
10. Third, against that observation, the suggestion that 'I don't think it would have much impact at all' in relation to the applicant's index offending demonstrates an incredible lack of insight. In this regard, the Applicant's apparent minimisation stands in stark contrast to his written submissions and statutory declaration, both of which purported to recognise the gravity of his actions. Indeed, it was only when confronted with his other written statements where he appeared to accept that his conduct was dangerous and close to causing severe injury or death that the Applicant sought to retreat from the way he characterised the index offending in his oral evidence.
11. In relation to the rehabilitative steps taken, I note that, with one exception relating to a prayer course,[71] the course certificates tendered by the Applicant[72] all post-date the decision of the Delegate. Although the Applicant vaguely alluded in his evidence to having undertaken other courses for which he could not produce certificates or evidence, I am not persuaded that this is the case. I do not accept the Applicant's submission that the timeframe within which he completed the courses in Exhibit A4 demonstrates genuine engagement with rehabilitation, not mere compliance or 'going through the motions.'[73]
12. Rather, I accept the Minister's submission that the Applicant had ample opportunity from July 2025 to undertake such courses while in immigration detention but failed to do so until after the adverse decision was delivered on 5 December 2025. I am satisfied that the weight to be attached to these certificates is tempered by their duration and the timing within which they were obtained.
13. I am satisfied that, as submitted by the Minister, the Applicant participated in these courses primarily for the purpose of these proceedings, not because of a genuine desire to rehabilitate. In that regard, I place weight on the absence of any participation in rehabilitation courses, other than 'the prayer course',[74] whilst the Applicant was in prison or whilst he was in immigration detention prior to the delivery of the decision to not revoke the cancellation of his visa.
14. Given the Applicant's history, lack of genuine attempts at rehabilitation, minimisation of his index offending and the lack of insight that I consider he has, I consider the likelihood of the Applicant reoffending is high.
15. Paragraph 8.1.2(1) of Direction 110 provides that some conduct and the harm that would be caused, if it were to be repeated, is so 'serious' that 'any risk' that it may be repeated may be unacceptable. In this case, I am not persuaded that the risk is so serious that any risk of repetition is unacceptable. The consequences of such further offending are that if the Applicant were to reoffend, his history indicates that the offence would likely involve violence, potentially involving a weapon, and would likely be directed towards a romantic or intimate partner. I am, in those circumstances, satisfied that the potential harm to the Australian community is serious and significant.
16. Accordingly, I find that this consideration weighs very heavily against revocation.

Second primary consideration - family violence committed by the non-citizen

1. Paragraph 8.2 of Direction 110 requires consideration of any family violence perpetrated by the non-citizen when deciding whether to revoke a visa cancellation decision. It provides:

(1) The Government has serious concerns about conferring on non-citizens who engage in family violence the privilege of entering or remaining in Australia. The Government's concerns in this regard are proportionate to the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the non-citizen (see paragraph (3) below).

(2) This consideration is relevant in circumstances where:

(a) a non-citizen has been convicted of an offence, found guilty of an offence, or had charges proven howsoever described, that involve family violence; and/or

(b) there is information or evidence from independent and authoritative sources indicating that the non-citizen is, or has been, involved in the perpetration of family violence, and the non-citizen being considered under section 501 or section 501CA has been afforded procedural fairness.

(3) In considering the seriousness of the family violence engaged in by the non citizen, the following factors must be considered where relevant:

(a) the frequency of the non-citizen's conduct and/or whether there is any trend of increasing seriousness;

(b) the cumulative effect of repeated acts of family violence;

(c) rehabilitation achieved at time of decision since the person's last known act of family violence, including:

1. the extent to which the person accepts responsibility for their family violence related conduct;

2. the extent to which the non-citizen understands the impact of their behaviour on the abused and witness of that abuse (particularly children);

iii. efforts to address factors which contributed to their conduct; and

(d) Whether the non-citizen has re-offended since being formally warned, or since otherwise being made aware by a Court, law enforcement or other authority, about the consequences of further acts of family violence, noting that the absence of a warning should not be considered to be in the non citizen's favour. This includes warnings about the non-citizen's migration status, should the non-citizen engage in further acts of family violence

1. Family violence is defined in paragraph 4(1) of the Direction.[75] That definition provides:

family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful. Examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence include: > > (a) an assault; or > > (b) a sexual assault or other sexually abusive behaviour; or > > (c) stalking; or > > (d) repeated derogatory taunts; or > > (e) intentionally damaging or destroying property; or > > (f) intentionally causing death or injury to an animal; or

(g) unreasonably denying the family member the financial autonomy that he or she would otherwise have had; or

(h) unreasonably withholding financial support needed to meet the reasonable living expenses of the family member, or his or her child, at a time when the family member is entirely or predominantly dependent on the person for financial support; or

(i) preventing the family member from making or keeping connections with his or her family, friends or culture; or

(j) unlawfully depriving the family member, or any member of the family member's family, or his or her liberty.

1. Direction 110 also provides a definition of 'member of the person's family' which is in the following terms:

_member of the person's famil_y, for the purposes of the definition of the definition of family violence, includes a person who has, or has had, an intimate personal relationship with the relevant person.

1. The Applicant distinguishes the victim of the index offence from his daughter, K, noting that he has not perpetrated abuse against his child. He contends that while the family violence consideration is serious, it is outweighed by the competing primary considerations, particularly the best interests of his daughter and his lengthy residence in Australia. He further argues that his rehabilitation has specifically addressed the distorted beliefs about masculinity and entitlement that often underpin domestic violence.[76]

1. The Minister submits that the index offending constitutes family violence as defined in Direction 110, given the victim was a person with whom the Applicant had an intimate relationship. The Minister characterises family violence as abhorrent and argues that the Applicant has demonstrated limited insight into his conduct, noting a pre-sentence report where he apportioned blame to the victim.
2. The Minister contends that the Applicant's expressions of remorse should be given limited weight, suggesting they arise from a desire to remain in Australia rather than genuine acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, the Minister submits this factor weighs significantly against revocation.

1. In his written submissions, the Applicant appeared to accept that his index offence constitutes family violence as defined in Direction 110. However, he submitted that this consideration should not be determinative. He emphasises that he has pleaded guilty, expressed genuine remorse, and demonstrated insight into the impact of his violence.[77] He notes that he is temporally separated from the victim of the index offence by more than 12 months and that there is no ongoing threat to her.[78]
2. I accept the Minister's submission that the Applicant's index offending constitutes family violence. The conduct involved the use of a weapon against a partner in a domestic setting, an act which is objectively serious.
3. During the hearing, the Applicant sought to retreat from his prior concession that he and the victim were in a de facto relationship. In both his written submissions and his statutory declaration, the Applicant conceded the existence of a de facto relationship. However, in his oral evidence, he resiled from this position, asserting that while they had been intimate, the fact that they slept in separate bedrooms meant they were not in a de facto relationship. When pressed on the inconsistency between his oral testimony and his statutory declaration - which was filed in close proximity to the hearing - the Applicant claimed he had received assistance in drafting the declaration and had not read it carefully before signing it.
4. I find the Applicant's evidence on this point to be unsatisfactory. Quite apart from the apparent lack of care with which he attended to the preparation and signing of a sworn document, I consider his attempt to distance himself from the domestic nature of the relationship to be opportunistic. It appeared to me that the Applicant believed that by challenging the 'de facto' classification, he could lessen the objective seriousness of the offending or avoid a finding that his conduct involved family violence. I find that this was a calculated attempt to minimise his offending for his own benefit, mirroring his attempts to minimise the actual harm caused.
5. The Statement of Material Facts, to which the Applicant pleaded guilty, clearly indicates the gravity of his conduct. It records that the Applicant went to his bedroom to retrieve a pocket knife before returning to harm the victim. He grabbed the victim by the hair, pulled her to the ground, and threatened to stab her in the throat. He held a knife to her throat, and the victim sustained a penetrating wound to the rear of her neck on the hairline, which caused bleeding, as well as wounds to her hand sustained while trying to defend herself.
6. The Pre-Sentence Report relating to the index offending notes that the Applicant himself identified 'use of violence within a family domestic context' as a matter he needed to address. It records that while the Applicant stated they were not initially in a relationship, their intimacy developed over time into a de facto relationship. The report further observed that the Applicant's memory of the offending was fragmented due to drug use, that he accepted 'minimal responsibility,' and that he apportioned blame to the victim. It was also noted that he appeared to have limited insight into the impact of his offending. I also note that the report records the cancellation of the Applicant's parole in 2009, which directly contradicts his claim during the hearing that he has always complied with conditions imposed by authorities.
7. Ms Taylor gave evidence that she felt safe with the Applicant and that he had never been violent towards her. I am prepared accept that and take that into account. However, what is clear is that Ms Taylor has been separated from the Applicant (by virtue of her incarceration) during the period that the Applicant engaged in the index offending which included his engagement in family violence. Even so, the Applicant's evidence was that he had spent lengthy periods separated from Ms Taylor because she continued to use alcohol and other drugs and the evidence also demonstrated that Ms Taylor had spent not insignificant periods of time incarcerated.
8. In my assessment, the Applicant has continued to minimise his responsibility for the index offending and its impact on the victim. I am satisfied that he sought to reconstruct the nature of his relationship during his evidence in the hope of securing a favourable decision. Furthermore, I am satisfied that the Applicant has been far from proactive regarding his rehabilitation; there is no independent evidence of any courses undertaken between his release from prison into immigration detention and the Delegate's comments on the matter. This conduct does him no credit.
9. Accordingly, I find that this consideration weighs heavily against revocation.

Third 'primary consideration' - the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia

(1) Decision-makers must consider any impact of the decision on the non-citizen's immediate family members in Australia, where those family members are Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents, or people who have a right to remain in Australia indefinitely.

(2) Where consideration is being given to whether to cancel a non-citizen's visa or whether to revoke the mandatory cancellation of their visa, the decision-maker must also consider the strength, nature and duration of any other ties that the non-citizen has to the Australian community. In doing so, decision-makers must have regard to:

(a) how long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non-citizen arrived as a young child, noting that:

1. less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; and
2. more weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community

(b) the strength, duration and nature of any family or social links with Australian citizens, Australian permanent residents and/or people who have an indefinite right to remain in Australia.

1. The Applicant submits that his ties to Australia weigh significantly in favour of revocation. He relies on the fact that he first arrived in Australia in 1979 as a young child and has been resident in Australia for 46 years during which time he says he has integrated into the community through employment as a bricklayer.[79] He refers to the presence of his immediate family in Australia, including his partner Ms Taylor, his mother, brother, and two children, as well as various extended family.[80]
2. In relation to the impact of removal, the Applicant argues it would cause significant hardship to his family. He submits that his removal would deprive his partner, Ms Taylor, of a co-parent and financial support, and would sever his connection to his extended family and community. He characterises his life in Australia as being 'crowded with responsibility',[81] which he argues serves as a prosocial anchor against reoffending.
3. The Minister concedes that this consideration weighs in favour of revocation. It is accepted that the Applicant has resided in Australia for 46 years, arriving at a young age. The Minister acknowledges the Applicant's immediate family in Australia, including his mother, brother, and partner, Ms Taylor.
4. While accepting that the Applicant's removal would impact Ms Taylor, the Minister qualifies this by noting she is currently incarcerated. The Minister accepts that some positive weight is also attributed to the Applicant's history of employment as a bricklayer since 2016.
5. I accept that the Applicant has resided in Australia for approximately 46 years, having arrived as a child of eight. In accordance with Direction 110, I accept that the length of his residence means that the Australian community would generally afford him a higher level of tolerance regarding his criminal conduct than it would a non-citizen who had arrived more recently.
6. I accept that the Applicant's immediate family all live in Australia, including his partner Ms Taylor, his mother (and her husband), brother, and two children.[82] I further accept that the Applicant has other family members, including an aunty and uncle together with four nieces and nephews and two cousins.[83] The Applicant also appears to have been involved in the life of all of Ms Taylor's children, who other than K are all adults now.
7. I accept that the Applicant's work history, particularly his employment as a bricklayer, deserves some weight as evidence of his contribution to the community. However, I note the absence of evidence from his immediate family members, other than his current partner, Ms Taylor. The Applicant's adult son, his parents, and his brother did not give evidence to the Tribunal, that is even so in circumstances where the Applicant's mother was described as being a source of 'strength, stability, and unconditional support'.[84]
8. Nevertheless, given the significant duration of his residence in this country and the potential impact on Ms Taylor (notwithstanding her incarceration), I find that this consideration weighs in favour of revocation.

Fourth 'primary consideration' - best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision

1. Paragraph 8.4 of Direction 110 requires the Tribunal to consider the best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision. Under paragraph 8.4, the Tribunal must make a determination whether, relevantly, non-revocation under s 501CA is, or is not, in the best interests of a child affected by the decision.[85] Where there are two or more relevant children, the best interests of each child should be given individual consideration to the extent that their interests might differ.
2. Paragraph 8.4(4) of Direction 110 outlines the factors that a decision-maker must consider when determining the best interests of a child affected by the decision, where relevant, as follows:[86]

(a) the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the non-citizen. Less weight should generally be given where the relationship is non-parental, and/or there is no existing relationship and/or there have been long periods of absence, or limited meaningful contact (including whether an existing Court order restricts contact);

(b) the extent to which the non-citizen is likely to play a positive parental role in the future, taking into account the length of time until the child turns 18, and including any Court orders relating to parental access and care arrangements;

(c) the impact of the non-citizen's prior conduct, and any likely future conduct, and whether that conduct has, or will have a negative impact on the child;

(d) the likely effect that any separation from the non-citizen would have on the child, taking into account the child's or non-citizen's ability to maintain contact in other ways;

(e) whether there are other persons who already fulfil a parental role in relation to the child;

(f) any known views of the child (with those views being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child);

(g) evidence that the child has been, or is at risk of being, subject to, or exposed to, family violence perpetrated by the non-citizen, or has otherwise been abused or neglected by the non-citizen in any way, whether physically, sexually or mentally; h) evidence that the child has suffered or experienced any physical or emotional trauma arising from the non-citizen's conduct.

1. The Applicant has framed his case on the basis that this primary consideration is the central feature, relying on critical new circumstances that were not before the delegate. He now contends that his daughter, K, is a victim of sexual abuse and is currently undergoing trauma therapy.[87] He submits that K's therapist and family have identified his presence as 'therapeutically essential' to her recovery.[88]
2. The Applicant argues that at age 15,[89] K is at a critical developmental stage for identity formation and trust, and that the sexual abuse she has suffered has shattered her capacity for safety.[90] Relying on trauma recovery frameworks, including Trauma-Focused Cognitive Behavioural Therapy,[91] he contends that K requires a 'secure base' to explore trauma healing, and that his separation from her would constitute a 'secondary trauma' akin to abandonment.[92] He asserts that his presence would model trust in male figures and signal that she is worth protecting, whereas his removal would disrupt her active therapy.
3. Furthermore, the Applicant emphasises K's Aboriginal identity.[93] He argues that at her current age, she is in a critical period for claiming and internalising her culture, and that his removal would diminish the family support available to facilitate her engagement with the Aboriginal community. He submits that under Direction 110, the Tribunal must consider the specific vulnerabilities of Aboriginal children.
4. The Applicant also raises a significant procedural fairness argument regarding the delegate's decision. He notes that the delegate explicitly found that K's best interests weighed 'heavily in favour of revocation' but then gave this finding minimal weight in the final balance without explanation. He argues this constitutes a logical inconsistency and a failure to properly apply the primary consideration as required by the authority in Korat.[94]
5. The Minister argues that this consideration should be afforded neutral weight. The Applicant has identified one minor child, his daughter K. The Minister notes the Applicant's admission that his relationship with K has been 'almost non-existent' for the past 10 years due to his drug use. It is submitted that there is no evidence the Applicant would assume caring responsibilities if released, or that his removal would impact her, given the lack of current contact.

1. There is no dispute that K is a child whose interests will be affected by this decision. However, at the hearing, there was a lack of clarity about K's present circumstances. There was even doubt as to K's age. The Applicant's material identified K as having been born in 2010 and being 15 years old, shortly turning 16. Yet his evidence was also that K was in her final year of secondary school. Ms Taylor, in her oral evidence, also identified K as being 15 years old, although said her birth year was either 2009 or 2010, she could not recall. Yet, Ms Taylor also gave clear evidence, which I am prepared accept, that in 2023 she attended K's 14th birthday. That would mean that K is presently 16 years old and will turn 17 in a few months. K will then turn 18 in 2027. K's age is, of course, relevant for the considerations identified in paragraph 8.4(4) of Direction 110 and, in particular, paragraphs 8.4(4)(b) and (f).
2. In terms of the nature and duration of the relationship between the Applicant and K, the Applicant's oral evidence is that he presently communicates with K via mobile phone, although that she has not visited him in detention. I draw no adverse inference from that lack of any visit, noting K's age and the practical difficulty that K would face travelling between her home and Yongah Hill Immigration Detention Centre where the Applicant is currently detained.
3. Otherwise, I found the Applicant's evidence regarding K's current circumstances to be confused and uncertain. I have already commented on the doubt about K's age. The Applicant was not able to identify what subjects K was studying and appeared to have a superficial, at best, understanding of K's life. This uncertainty regarding basic details of his daughter's life suggests a significant distance in their relationship.
4. In relation to the Applicant's submission that K is a survivor of sexual assault, the evidence before me was limited. I am prepared to proceed on the basis that K has been sexually assaulted. In relation to the present impact of that on K, the adults who are presently caring for K did not give evidence and there was no independent evidence from any person involved in K's direct care. The Applicant's own evidence was that K appears to be thriving in her current environment. When asked who was responsible for K being on track to complete Year 12 and pursue tertiary study despite the absence of both parents, the Applicant conceded that the credit in that respect belonged to Ms Taylor's side of the family.
5. Applying the considerations in paragraph 8.4(4) of Direction 110, I am satisfied that the Applicant has been absent from K's life for a long period and has had limited meaningful contact with her since she was five years old. I am not persuaded that the Applicant is likely to play a positive role in her life in the future. In this regard, I note that even on the Applicant's case regarding her age, K is close to attaining her majority.
6. It clear that the Applicant's prolonged absence would have had some impact on K. The Applicant accepted as much. However, the extent of that impact is difficult to assess on the material before me. It appears that despite the challenges of having both parents absent for most of her life, albeit for varying periods, she has done well and is hoping to attend University next year.
7. I have considered the submissions made about K's indigenous heritage. That heritage is derived from her mother and her mother's family. K is currently being cared for by her mother's family and, as such, I am satisfied that she will continue to be able to learn about and experience her heritage. In terms of her connection to the Applicant's heritage, I am satisfied that K can speak with the Applicant to understand that aspect of her heritage.
8. In relation to the submission that non-revocation will deprive K of cultural support during a critical phase of identity formation, given my finding that the Applicant has been largely absent from K's life for the past decade and has neglected his parental responsibilities, I am not persuaded that he has played, or will play, any material role in facilitating her connection to culture. I am not satisfied on the material before me that the Applicant has been the conduit for K's cultural engagement to date. I find that her cultural needs are, and will be, best met by her current support network, who are Aboriginal people, and who have commendably raised K in the Applicant's absence.
9. While I accept that the Applicant's removal from Australia would make in-person visits difficult, perhaps impossible, absent K being able to travel to the United Kingdom, I am nevertheless satisfied that the Applicant can maintain a relationship and continue to reestablish his relationship with K electronically, if, or even assuming, she chooses to do so, much in the same way as is presently occurring. The reality of the situation is that the Applicant's only contact with K over the past 10-12 years has been in the last few months and even then, only by telephone. Irrespective of the reasons for it, the nature of the relationship between the Applicant and K is such that he has, until very recently, been absent from her life for almost all of her life.
10. As noted previously, the evidence regarding K's current circumstances and, unsurprisingly, her wishes is limited. Both the Applicant and Ms Taylor suggested that K wanted a relationship with the Applicant. Ms Taylor's evidence is that she provided the Applicant's telephone number to K and it was K who reached out to him. I accept that. I infer from that that, at least, K has some interest in her father and the possibility of relationship with him. Whether K wishes are such that she intends to resume living with the Applicant (and Ms Taylor) as has been suggested throughout these proceedings is unclear to me. It appears on the evidence before me that K has not lived with either of her parents since she was very young. There is some suggestion in the letters exchanged between the Applicant and Ms Talyor that K wishes to return to living with her parents,[95] but I am not satisfied on the material before me that K's wishes are such that she wishes to, or intends to, resume living with the Applicant in the reasonably foreseeable future if the Applicant were to have the cancellation of his visa revoked.
11. I find that in the absence of her biological parents, it is Ms Taylor's brother-in-law, Ashley, who currently plays the primary parental role in K's life. The Applicant himself conceded during the hearing that the credit for K's educational progress and general wellbeing belongs to Ms Taylor's 'side of the family'. I am satisfied that Ms Taylor's family provide the stability and care for K that the Applicant has failed to provide for the majority of K's childhood.
12. Regarding K's own wishes, there is no evidence of her views before the Tribunal other than what has been asserted by the Applicant. I have not been provided with a letter from K, nor any independent report from a psychologist, social worker, or guardian ad litem that would articulate her feelings regarding her father's potential removal. Given the Applicant's demonstrated lack of knowledge about basic details of her life, such as her age and schooling year, I am not prepared to rely on his assertions. I agree with the submission of the Minister that these matters are self-serving statements, rather than reliable evidence as to K's views.
13. I accept that there is no evidence before me to suggest that K has been personally exposed to family violence or that she has been abused by the Applicant in any way. In my view, on the material before me I do not consider that K would likely be exposed to family violence between the Applicant and Ms Taylor, assuming they were to live together, because I am not persuaded that there is a realistic possibility that K would live with them in the reasonably foreseeable future or at all given that she is near adulthood.
14. However, a child's best interests are not served solely by the absence of exposure to family violence. The question of best interests is more complicated than that. However, I consider that the Applicant's choice to absent himself from K's life for extended periods, whether through incarceration, substance abuse, or a general failure to prioritise his relationship with K, involves neglect. Whilst the Applicant was quick to blame others for his absence from K's life, there is no evidence that the Applicant took proactive steps to put himself into a position to be an active participant in her life, whether by Court proceedings or otherwise. I am satisfied that the Applicant's absenting himself from K's life has likely caused K mental harm, by depriving her of the opportunity to know, and be cared for, by her father for more than a decade. That said, the material before me does not permit me to determine the severity of such harm which lessens the weight that I would place on this factor. However, on the Applicant's own case K has spent most of her life not knowing her father and the Applicant has denied his daughter the paternal support to which she was entitled.
15. Consequently, while I accept the general principle that it is in the best interests of a child to have both parents in Australia, the weight I attach to this consideration is significantly diminished by the history of the relationship and the fact that other people have effectively assumed the parental role in relation to K.
16. The Applicant identified four nieces/nephews in Australia. He did not provide any evidence as to his relationship with them. There was no real suggestion that is a participant in their lives. Therefore, whilst I am prepared to accept that their interests would be best served by a revocation of the visa cancellation decision, the absence of specific and detailed evidence about their relationship with him limits the weight that I am prepared to attach to their interests. There was no submission made that their interests differed in any material way and I am not satisfied on the material before that their interests do differ.
17. The Applicant's reliance on Korat v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 303 FCR 261; [2024] FCAFC 59 was also misplaced.[96] That decision involves a situation where the Full Court determined that the Applicant in that case was denied procedural fairness because, essentially, the Minister conceded that the fourth primary consideration weighed in favour of revocation but, in its reasons, the Tribunal found that the fourth primary considered weighed against revocation.
18. I am not, however, prepared to conclude that this factor warrants 'neutral' weight as submitted by the Minister. While I accept that it is generally in a child's best interests to have a parent in the country, given the evidence before me about the nature and extent of the relationship between the Applicant and K, and K's demonstrated resilience in his absence, I afford this consideration some weight in favour of revocation. I find that this consideration weighs slightly in favour of revocation.

Fifth 'primary consideration' - Expectations of the Australian Community

1. Paragraph 8.5 of Direction 110 provides that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Paragraph 8.5(1) also provides that that where a non-citizen has engaged in 'serious conduct in breach of this expectation', or where there is 'an unacceptable risk that they may do so', the Australian community, 'as a norm', expects the government would not allow them to enter or remain in Australia.
2. Paragraph 8.5(2) of Direction 110 directs that non-revocation of the mandatory cancellation of a visa, may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences is such that the Australian community would expect that the person should not be granted or continue to hold a visa.
3. Paragraph 8.5(2) notes that the Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they raise serious character concerns through conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, of particular kinds. The paragraph directs that the Australian community expects that the Australian Government should cancel a non-citizen's visa if they raise serious character concerns through specific conduct listed in paragraphs 8.5(2)(a)-(f) of Direction 110. Those particularised types of harm generally reflect the types of conduct identified in para 8.1.1 as conduct which is considered, by the terms of the Direction, to be 'very seriously' or 'serious'.
4. Paragraph 8.5(3) of Direction 110 directs that the stated expectations apply regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measurable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community. Thus, a 'measurable risk' of physical harm to the community is not required for the community expectation that the non-citizen not hold a visa to be engaged, where serious character concerns are raised through the persons conduct or offending.
5. In weighing this consideration, I am also guided by the principles in paragraph 5.2 of Direction 110 which records that the safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government. Notably, paragraph 5.2(3) directs that an Applicant, having engaged in criminal conduct, should expect to forfeit the privilege of staying in Australia. Paragraph 5.2(4) further records a principle not dissimilar to that referred to in paragraph 8.5(3) with respect to serious character concerns and makes it clear that those concerns are not restricted to circumstances where there is a measurable risk of physical harm to the Australian community.
6. While not explicitly using this heading, the Applicant addresses community expectations by arguing that the Australian community expects the Tribunal to honour Australia's international legal obligations and protect vulnerable children. He contends that the 'higher tolerance' principle in Direction 110 reflects a community expectation that long-term residents will not be removed lightly. He further submits that the community's safety concerns can be adequately met through conditional revocation, satisfying the expectation of protection without necessitating the disproportionate outcome of permanent separation.
7. The Minister contends that this consideration weighs heavily against revocation.[97] While acknowledging the tolerance for non-citizens who have lived in Australia from a young age, the Minister submits that the community would expect the visa to be cancelled given the seriousness of the violence perpetrated against a woman.[98] The Minister argues that the Applicant has not sufficiently mitigated the risk of causing further harm, leading to the conclusion that his continued presence is contrary to community expectations.[99]
8. I accept that the Australian community generally affords a higher level of tolerance of criminal conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age. The Applicant arrived in Australia at the age of eight and has resided here for forty-six years. I accept that he falls within the category of persons to whom this principle applies.
9. However, this tolerance is not without limits. Direction 110 instructs, by paragraph 8.5(1), that the Australian community expects non-citizens to obey the law while in Australia. Furthermore, the Direction makes clear that the Australian community also views acts of family violence as very serious. The Australian community expects that the privilege of holding a visa is conferred on the basis that non-citizens will respect the law and that where a non-citizen engages in conduct involving serious character concerns that, as a norm, the Australian Government can and should cancel their visas.
10. I find that the Applicant's conduct in committing unlawful wounding against a domestic partner involving the use of a knife breaches these fundamental expectations as articulated in Direction 110. While the Australian community can and does offer tolerance for the mistakes of a long-term resident, such tolerance is strained to the breaking point where the conduct involves serious interpersonal violence. This is particularly true where, as I have found in this case, the conduct is objectively serious and involves family violence, the non-citizen displays a lack of genuine insight by minimising the gravity of the wound as a mere 'nick' and by, opportunistically, attempting to re-characterise the relationship to avoid a finding that the conduct in question involved family violence.
11. Consequently, I find that the expectations of the Australian community as articulated in Direction 110 are such that notwithstanding the expectation of tolerance arising from the Applicant's length of residence, this consideration weighs against revocation.

'Other considerations' - legal consequences of the decision

1. Direction 110 requires me to consider the legal consequences of a non-revocation decision on a non-citizen, including having regard to Australia's non-refoulement obligations in respect of unlawful non-citizens.[100]
2. However, while this consideration in Direction 110 refers to non-refoulment obligations, it also makes reference to detention and removal, highlighting that there are a range of legal consequences of a decision not to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant's visa. The consequences of a visa refusal or cancellation under s 501 or related provisions include:

(a) becoming, or remaining, an unlawful non-citizen; > > (b) the prospect, or likelihood, of becoming subject to detention and/or removal;[101] > > (c) refusal of other visa applications and cancellation of other visas;[102] > > (d) a prohibition on applying for other visas;[103] and > > (e) the imposition of periods of exclusion and special return criteria may apply.[104]

3. If a visa is cancelled its former holder becomes an unlawful non-citizen immediately after cancellation.[105] Under s 189 of the Act, an unlawful non-citizen must be detained and removed as soon as reasonably practicable.[106]
4. The Applicant makes extensive submissions regarding Australia's international obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). He argues that Article 9 of the UNCRC prohibits the separation of a child from their parents unless it is 'necessary' for the child's best interests. He submits that since the delegate found revocation was in K's best interests, separation cannot be 'necessary' and therefore violates Article 9.
5. Additionally, the Applicant relies on Article 10 of the UNCRC, which requires applications for family reunification to be dealt with in a 'positive, humane and expeditious manner' and ensures no adverse consequences for the family. He contends that his deportation would inflict severe adverse consequences on K, violating this provision.
6. Finally, the Applicant's submissions propose a specific framework for 'Conditional Revocation.'[107] He invites the Tribunal to impose conditions such as mandatory weekly drug and alcohol testing, engagement with substance abuse counselling, community supervision, and mandatory family therapy. He argues that this approach transforms the visa decision into a therapeutic intervention that protects the community while serving K's urgent need for family support. He submits that there are seven independent legal grounds for revocation, including the procedural fairness error, the UNCRC obligations, and the material change in K's circumstances.
7. The Minister submits this consideration should be weighed neutrally. The Minister contends that while the Applicant has expressed fear of returning to the United Kingdom, it is open to him to apply for a protection visa, which would suspend removal pending determination.
8. In relation to the impediments to removal, the Minister contends that any hardship faced by the Applicant in the United Kingdom would not be insurmountable. The Minister notes the Applicant is 53 years old, has no identified health issues, and possesses transferable skills as a labourer that would assist in securing employment. It is further submitted that he would face no substantial language or cultural barriers and would have access to social and medical support comparable to that in Australia.

1. I accept the Minister's submission that the consequences of a decision not to revoke the cancellation, principally, that the Applicant will be an unlawful non-citizen liable to detention and removal, are the intended results of the statutory scheme established by the Act and, in that context, are the method by which the primary considerations of the protection of, and the expectations of, the Australian community would be met.
2. I also accept that a legal consequence of a non-revocation decision would be that the Applicant would be unlikely to satisfy Schedule 5 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), in particular the Special Return Criteria and, as such, he will be excluded from Australia and, potentially, permanently excluded. While these consequences are, undoubtedly, serious for the Applicant, particularly insofar as they will isolate him from direct physical contact with family and, importantly, K, I accept that they are the effect of the intended operation of the Act as it applies to a non-citizen who does not pass the character test, such as the Applicant, and who does not have the cancellation of their visa revoked and, in that respect, are another instance of the way in which the primary considerations of the protection of, and the expectations of, the Australian community would be met.
3. I do not accept the Applicant's submission that a decision not to revoke the cancellation would place Australia in breach of its international obligations under the UNCRC, specifically Articles 9 and 10. The Tribunal's task is to determine whether there is another reason to revoke the cancellation decision, in accordance with Direction 110. The UNCRC is not incorporated into domestic law in a manner that creates independent, binding obligations on this Tribunal outside the framework of the Direction. Whilst I accept that the principles underlying the UNCRC may inform the 'best interests of the child' primary consideration, which I have already discussed, Direction 110 does not require the application of Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCRC or the UNCRC more broadly.[108]
4. Consequently, I am not satisfied that the legal consequences of a decision not to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant's visa involves, or would amount to, a failure by Australia to meet its international obligations. The balancing exercise required by Direction 110 is the mechanism by which the Tribunal ensures its decision is consistent with the requirements of the Act and proper administrative decision-making.
5. To the extent the Applicant fears harm upon return to the United Kingdom, I accept the Minister's submission that it remains open to him to apply for a protection visa. At the hearing the Applicant accepted that if he were returned to the United Kingdom he would likely have access to some social security (although expressed some concern about having not contributed to the United Kingdom pension scheme during his lifetime for his retirement) and, importantly, that as a bricklayer he would likely be able to obtain employment.
6. Moreover, as I discussed with the Applicant at the hearing, the Tribunal does not have the power to impose on an Applicant, as a condition of revocation of a cancellation decision, any conditions.
7. Having considered the legal consequences of the decision as required by paragraph 9.1 of Direction 110, I consider that the legal consequences of the decision should, in all the circumstances, weigh slightly in favour of revocation.

'Other considerations' - extent of impediments if removed

1. Paragraph 9.2 of Direction 110 provides that, taking into account the matters identified in paragraphs 9.2(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Direction 110, I must consider the extent to which the Applicant would face an impediment or impediments in establishing himself and maintaining basic living standards in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country. The matters identified under paragraph 9.2(1)(a) to (c) of Direction 110 are:

(a) the Applicant's age and health; > > (b) whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and > > (c) any social, medical and/or economic support available to the Applicant in their country.

2. I have considered the extent of impediments the Applicant would face if removed to the United Kingdom. I accept that at 53 years of age, re-establishing himself in a country he left as a child will present challenges. However, the Applicant is a skilled tradesman with a history of employment as a bricklayer, and he faces no language barriers. I accept the Minister's submission that he possesses transferable skills that would assist him in securing employment and accessing the social and medical support generally available to citizens of the United Kingdom. I find that while he will face some hardship, the impediments are not insurmountable.
3. I acknowledge the Applicant's submission that he fears he would have no way of making a living and that he may relapse into drug use upon return. However, I prefer the submissions of the Minister in relation to this consideration. I find that the Applicant is 53 years of age and, other than a history of addiction and substance abuse, the Applicant has no identified health issues that would significantly impede his resettlement. While he has resided in Australia for the vast majority of his life, I accept the Minister's submission that he possesses transferable skills as a bricklayer and labourer. I find that he would be capable of utilising these skills to secure gainful employment in the United Kingdom, which the Applicant himself accepted in his oral evidence.
4. Furthermore, I find that the Applicant would not face substantial language or cultural barriers in the United Kingdom. I accept that he would have access to the social, medical and economic support generally available to other citizens of that country, including any medical or allied health support he might require to maintain his abstinence from illicit substances.
5. I accept that the Applicant does not have any connections in the United Kingdom and will be returning to a country that he has never lived in as an adult and without any local practical support from family or friends. While I accept that the Applicant will inevitably face some practical, financial, and emotional hardship upon his return after such a long absence, I am satisfied that these obstacles are not insurmountable. Consequently, I consider that the extent of the impediments faced by the Applicant if removed from Australia weight in favour of revocation, but only slightly.

'Other considerations' - impact on Australian business interests

(1) Decision-makers must consider any impact on Australian business interests if the non-citizen is not allowed to enter or remain in Australia, noting that an employment link would generally only be given weight where the decision under section 501 or 501CA would significantly compromise the delivery of a major project, or delivery of an important service in Australia.

1. The Applicant submits that he is a skilled bricklayer and has maintained consistent employment in that trade since 2016. The Minister accepts that the Applicant has contributed positively to the Australian community through this employment. I accept that the Applicant has worked and has good employment prospects in Australia if the cancellation of his visa was revoked.
2. However, there is no evidence before the Tribunal from any current or prospective employer suggesting that the Applicant possesses a unique or highly specialised skill set that is in short supply. Nor is there evidence that his removal would cause significant hardship to any specific Australian business. While I accept that the Applicant is a productive member of the workforce, I am not satisfied that his removal would have any material adverse impact on Australian business interests.
3. Accordingly, I afford this consideration neutral weight.

1. I now turn to evaluating the various considerations referred to above. In doing so, I am mindful of the observations of the Full Federal Court in CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs:[109]

...the Direction requires greater weight to be given to primary considerations unless there is some reason why that general approach should not be adopted. Further, the Direction does not confine the decision-maker to the primary and other considerations. It follows that part of the task for a decision-maker in complying with the Direction is to evaluate whether it is appropriate for a consideration that is not a primary consideration to be given greater weight than one or more primary considerations. In addition, when evaluating whether there is 'another reason' to revoke a visa cancellation in the exercise of the power conferred by s 501CA(4), the decision-maker must evaluate whether one or more primary considerations outweighs other primary considerations. > > In consequence, compliance with the Direction is not achieved by focussing upon individual considerations and attributing some form of 'weight' to that consideration viewed in isolation. The real burden of the task to be undertaken by a decision-maker who must comply with the Direction is to bring together the considerations as part of a single evaluation of their relative significance thereby weighing them all together. A task of that kind cannot be performed by fragmenting the consideration into an evaluation of individual considerations, attributing to each of them some form of individual abstract term purporting to be a measure of their significance, and then aggregating by some form of calculus each of those individual assessments. To undertake the task in that manner is not to comply with the Direction.

2. As the reasoning of the Court in CRNL makes clear, compliance with Direction 110 is not achieved by isolating considerations and assigning them weight in a vacuum.
3. In view of my findings and conclusions above, and in reference to each of the primary and other considerations in Direction 110, I find that:

(a) in relation to the first 'primary consideration', '[p]rotection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct', this primary consideration weighs heavily against revocation; > > (b) in relation to the second 'primary consideration': '[w]hether conduct engaged in constituted family violence', this primary consideration weighs heavily against revocation; > > (c) in relation to the third 'primary consideration', 'the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia' weighs significantly in favour of revocation; > > (d) in relation to the fourth 'primary consideration', 'the best interests of minor children in Australia', weighs slightly in favour of revocation > > (e) in relation to the fifth 'primary consideration', the 'expectations of the Australian community', weighs against revocation; > > (f) in relation to the first 'other consideration', 'the legal consequences of the decision', weighs slightly in favour of revocation; > > (g) in relation to the second 'other consideration', the 'extent of impediments if removed', weighs slightly in favour of revocation; and > > (h) in relation to the third 'other consideration', 'impact on Australian business interests' weighs neutrally.

4. Direction 110 requires greater weight to be given to primary considerations unless there is some reason why that general approach should not be adopted.[110] However, while certain considerations are designated as 'primary', my task is to balance the competing considerations and evaluate the relative significance of the primary and other considerations.[111]
5. The Applicant has resided in Australia for 46 years, having arrived as a child of eight. This is a matter of significance in his favour and I accept he is entitled to higher tolerance in his favour, recognising that his formation as an individual occurred almost entirely within this country. I accept that his removal will sever deep ties to the Australian community and cause hardship to him and, to a limited extent, his daughter K. These factors weigh significantly in favour of revoking the mandatory cancellation.
6. However, the higher tolerance afforded to long-term residents is not unlimited. It acts as a counter-balance. As Direction 110 makes clear the privilege of living in the Australian community carries with it the expectation that non-citizens will not cause serious harm to individuals. The Applicant has failed to meet this expectation.
7. The protection of the Australian community weighs heavily against revocation. The Applicant's history demonstrates a systemic disregard for the law and a propensity for violence involving weapons. I have found that the Applicant lacks genuine insight into his offending. Furthermore, the Applicant has committed serious family violence, including involving a weapon. As Direction 110 makes clear, the Australian community abhors and condemns such conduct. The weight of this consideration is substantial. It is not diminished by the Applicant's attempts to re-characterise his domestic arrangements; rather, those attempts highlight a failure to accept full responsibility for his actions and reinforce the need to give significant weight to the protection of the Australian community from criminal and other serious conduct.
8. Ultimately, I consider the heavy weight to be attributed to first, second and firth primary considerations significantly outweigh, by a considerable margin, the countervailing considerations (both 'primary' and 'other') in favour of revocation, and in particular the third and fourth primary considerations.

(a) I am satisfied that the Applicant does not pass the 'character test' under s 501(6) of the Act. > > (b) I am not satisfied that there is 'another reason' to revoke the cancellation of the Applicant's visa.

2. Accordingly, the decision under review should be affirmed.

1. The decision not to revoke the cancellation of the Class BF Transitional (permanent) visa is affirmed.

I certify that the preceding one-hundred and sixty five (165) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

........................................................................

[1] The relapse plan was provided by the Applicant to the Tribunal on 16 February 2026. Section 500(6H) of the Act applied to that document. On 17 February 2026, the Minister tendered that document as an Exhibit and in those circumstances the document was properly before the Tribunal and I have considered it and taken into account.

[3] Ex J1, pp 483-494. I say relevant adult criminal record because I consider I should not take into account the fact that the Applicant was charged with, or convicted of, any offences as a juvenile. In this respect, I agree with, and adopt, what was said by the Tribunal in Lynch and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2024] ARTA 452 at [52]-[65]. I have, essentially, approached the matter on the basis that the Applicant was neither charged with, nor convicted of, any offences as a juvenile.

[9] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501(7).

[11] Any such representations must be made within 28 days after the giving of the invitation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.52(2)(b).

[13] Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 2.52(2)(b).

[21] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(3)(a)(i).

[22] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(3)(a)(ii).

[23] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA (3)(b).

[24] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(4)(a).

[25] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(3)(b)(i).

[26] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(3)(b)(ii).

[27] HZCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 202; (2019) 273 FCR 121, 136 [66].

[28] CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138 [27]-[28].

[29] Gaspar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 153 ALD 337; [2016] FCA 1166.

[30] See, for example, FCFY v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 1990 [63] (Thawley J); Deng v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1456 [119] (Halley J).

[31] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 499(2A).

[34] Direction 110 [6]. The definition of 'decision-maker' in para. 4(1) of Direction 110 includes the Tribunal.

[42] Re Harrison and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 47; (2009) 106 ALD 666, 685 [63].

[44] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 501CA(4).

[45] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501CA(4)(b)(ii)

[53] Ex J1, pp 6-7. In this regard, the Minister quite correctly points out that sentences of imprisonment are a sentence of last resort.

[57] Ex J1, p 8, [35] citing Main v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 446 at [30].

[62] BNY23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCAFC 14; (2025) 307 FCR 150 [107].

[63] Price v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 301 FCR 484; [2023] FCAFC 171 [72].

[65] Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 225 FCR 424; [2014] FCA 673 at [95].

[66] See BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1181 [68] (Moshinsky J); Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7 [41] (Kenny J).

[67] As to which see, inter alia, Ex J1, 684.

[75] Deng v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 293 FCR 509; [2022] FCAFC 115; MVPF v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 1263.

[88] See, for example, Ex J1, pp 36; 44-46

[89] But see my findings about K's age below.

[94] Korat v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 303 FCR 261; [2024] FCAFC 59

[101] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 189, 196, 197C, 198.

[102] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501F.

[103] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501E.

[104] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 503.

[105] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 15.

[106] The Court in BHL19 v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2022] FCA 313 followed AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 1305 to find the Applicant's detention had, at all times, been lawful at [112]-[122].

[107] See, for example, Ex J1, p 45; pp 49-50.

[108] Guruge v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 233, [24]; Snedden v Minister for Justice [2014] FCAFC 156; 230 FCR 8.

[109] CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138 [27]-[28] (Colvin, Stewart, Jackson JJ).

[110] CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138 [27]-[28] (Colvin, Stewart and Jackson JJ).

[111] Lasalo v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCFAC 82 [22].