Bevilacqua v Telco Business Solutions (Watergardens) PL No.2 (Human Rights) [2015] VCAT 693

1. The Respondent shall, within 28 days of Supreme Court of Victoria Proceeding SC 2015 01569 being determined, pay to the Applicant the sum of $10,000 unless the Court vacates this order.
2. Costs reserved.

1. In early September 2013, Ms Stephanie Bevilacqua discovered she had been pregnant since early August. Her recent ill health was then identified as symptoms of morning sickness. She was employed as a full time Sales Consultant at a Telstra Store owned by Telco Business Solutions (Watergardens) P/L (TBS).
2. She advised TBS. Her morning sickness continued. She asked TBS to reduce her hours of work to 28 a week. TBS refused. On 7 October 2013, Ms Bevilacqua tendered her resignation and left two weeks later.
3. Ms Bevilacqua applied to VCAT under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (the Act).
4. As reported in Bevilacqua v Telco Business Solutions (Watergardens) PL (Human Rights) [2015] VCAT 269 (Bevilacqua No. 1), by orders dated 11 March 2015, VCAT found TBS breached s 18(1)(d) of the Act because it directly discriminated against Ms Bevilacqua (comments about taking sick leave and comments about toilet breaks) (the Discrimination). VCAT otherwise dismissed the proceeding.
5. VCAT invited further submissions as to the amount VCAT should order TBS to pay Ms Bevilacqua to compensate her for loss, damage or injury suffered in consequence of the Discrimination. VCAT also said unless a party sought a further hearing to hear oral submissions, it would decide that issue, without further hearing. Neither party sought a further hearing.
6. Submissions for Ms Bevilacqua dated 22 April sought general damages between $30,000 and $100,000 and damages related to psychological treatment expenses of between $1,575 and $2,985. TBS submitted damages should be at the low end of the scale, with reference to various court and tribunal decisions.
7. By letter dated 24 April 2015, VCAT was advised Ms Bevilacqua had appealed Bevilacqua No.1 to the Supreme Court of Victoria. It remains appropriate to decide the amount TBS must pay.[1]

Bevilacqua No. 1 - Direct discrimination findings

1. In Bevilacqua No. 1, VCAT found TBS breached s 18(1)(d) of the Act in that it:

... directly discriminated against [Ms Bevilacqua] as set out in paragraphs 160 to 168 of the reasons for decision (comments about sick leave) and paragraphs 171 to 176 (comments about sitting and toilet breaks) of the following reasons the decision.[2]

1. Under s 119 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998, I correct an error in the above order by amending "(comments about sitting and toilet breaks)" to "(comments about toilet breaks)".
2. As will be seen in the quote below, while paragraphs 171 and 172 record a finding of direct discrimination concerning toilet breaks, paragraphs 174 to 176 dismiss the allegation relating to sitting.

1. Paragraphs 160 to 168 (comments about sick leave) said:

I found TBS, through actions of Mr E. Rovas directly discriminated against Ms Bevilacqua in breach of s 18(1)(d) of the Act:

1. On one occasion in late September 2013, Mr Rovas subjected Ms Bevilacqua to unfavourable treatment when he texted her saying "I'm fucking sick of this" and "You better fucking come in Steph" (see paragraph 89);
2. This caused her detriment being hurt, humiliation and anxiety; and

1. He subjected her to the unfavourable treatment because she was taking leave which was a result of pregnancy/disability.

Under s 109 of the Act, TBS must be taken to have contravened the provision. The exception at s 110 was not relevant.

I do not accept there was other such discrimination by way of text messages. Contrary to submissions on Ms Bevilacqua's behalf, the text messages on record between her and Mr Rovas were not out of the ordinary.

To place the text messages while Mr E. Rovas knew Ms Bevilacqua was pregnant in the context of her employment, I examined text messages between them from September 2012 to 4 September 2013. They record 15 incidents of Ms Bevilacqua saying she would not be coming to work, mostly due to ill health, a couple for family reasons and one as she was on jury duty. Where Mr Rovas replied (he often did not), the general tenor was calm acceptance, sometimes reminding her to bring a medical certificate. He took (polite) exception on 27 December 2012 when she said she was at the hospital with her mother, on 1 January 2013 (concerning work on 2 January) when he was told she had been at the beach 12 hours earlier (she promptly denied it) and on 4 October about the CT Scan.

His reply on 15 September 2013 (see paragraph 84) is of a manager coping with a staff member taking frequent sick leave. It was direct and showed some frustration but was not out of the ordinary. In response to the following six texts from 23 September to 18 October saying she would not be in, he either replied "OK" or did not reply.

While I accept Ms Bevilacqua perceived several of Mr Rovas' texts as ill treating her from sometime after mid-September, I do not rely on her perception as accurate. It is striking that after the 15 September exchange of texts concerning her not being available on 15 and 16 September, according to her witness statement;

The tone of Manny's message seemed threatening to me, based on my knowledge of him and his personality. My impression was that I was not allowed to be sick and that if I continued to experience morning sickness, I might lose my job. Manny said in this text message that he would tell John about my pregnancy. I knew that John was aware of it from that time, however I had not spoken to John directly about it. I felt worried about how John would react.

This appears to be a significant over-reaction. There is no evidence of any indication that her job was at risk. There have been many instances previously when she had taken sick leave for a variety of issues without incident. Even where there were suspicions, they were not pursued. There appeared to be no basis to think Mr J. Rovas would react negatively to the news of the pregnancy.

The evidence does not persuade me Mr E. Rovas, in his treatment of Ms Bevilacqua while she was at work, treated her unfavourably as a result of her taking sick leave due to morning sickness. In the context of the, but for the exception cited above, reasonable text responses by Mr E. Rovas, I do not prefer Ms Bevilacqua's evidence to the contrary evidence.

On the basis of Ms Bevilacqua's evidence, corroborated by her mother and aunt I found TBS, through actions of Mr E. Rovas directly discriminated against Ms Bevilacqua in breach of s 18(1)(d) of the Act:

1. Over approximately seven working days after mid September 2013, prior to 4 October 2013, Mr Rovas subjected Ms Bevilacqua to unfavourable treatment related to her taking frequent lengthy toilet breaks (see from paragraph 94);
2. This caused her detriment being hurt, humiliation and anxiety; and

1. He subjected her to the unfavourable treatment because she was taking leave which was a result of pregnancy/disability.

Under s 109 of the Act, TBS must be taken to have contravened the provision. The exception at s 110 was not relevant.

I accept at times when Ms Bevilacqua returned from the toilet, Mr E. Rovas was displeased with the length of time she had been gone and indicated this to her. ...

I accept Ms Bevilacqua's mother's evidence that by 25 September, Ms Bevilacqua perceived that she was being ill treated by Mr E. Rovas and relationships with the team had deteriorated, because of her absences from work. As recorded in texts that day between them, her mother suggested Ms Bevilacqua ask Centrelink about her benefit entitlements if she left work, which she did. She discovered the financial support would be inadequate. Her mother said this was in case she was dismissed.

I also accept her evidence that about this time Ms Bevilacqua would often come home from work and go straight to bed, often appearing upset. She was trying to get 12 hours sleep so that she would be able to work. She told her mother she would go to work in the morning and straight away feel sick because of the morning sickness.

I also accept her aunt's evidence that she visited the Store and Ms Bevilacqua saying she had just finished crying in the toilet after Mr E. Rovas refused her request to take a quick break because the Store was too busy, another time visiting the store and Ms Bevilacqua with tears in her eyes asking her to leave, saying she would be yelled at again. Ms Bevilacqua started became depressed and anxious, perceiving she was being bullied at work.

I prefer this evidence to that of Mr E. Rovas and Store staff. Concerning the staff, while they may believe all was as normal, clearly all was not. Shortly after Ms Bevilacqua told Mr E. Rovas she was pregnant, she went from a happy staff member to a very unhappy one because of her perception as to how she was being treated.

1. In Bevilacqua No. 1, I accepted the opinion of Mr Ives, Forensic Psychologist (at paragraph 148):

... that at October 2014 Ms Bevilacqua developed post traumatic stress disorder accompanied by depression and anxiety, "central to the mental and emotional distress Ms Bevilacqua experienced, during and subsequent to the last two months of employment with TBS."

1. Returning to Mr Ives report for the purposes of this decision, I quote the full paragraph from his report, partially quoted above:

I am of the opinion that central to the mental and emotional distress Ms Bevilacqua experienced, during and subsequent to the two months of her employment with [TBS] was the development of [PTSD] accompanied by depression and anxiety.

1. Returning to Bevilacqua No. 1, I continued at paragraph 150:

He described Ms Bevilacqua as having lost self-esteem and self-confidence and being pessimistic about the future. In his view she had formerly viewed the world as benign and helpful but now saw it as callous and unjust. She was apprehensive about seeking employment in case dramatic events occurred again. She tends to be suspicious of others. He described her as feeling very bitter because, if she had been allowed to stay in employment and take maternity leave, her personal and financial circumstances would now be very different. She feels she lacks the capacity to be a good mother. She is unable to resolve or "move on from negative feelings of anger, stress, frustration and disappointment resulting from her experience. He described her as experiencing irritability, outbursts of anger and feelings that life has treated her badly. She experiences transient thoughts of suicide.

1. Again returning to Mr Ives' report, he reported on his interview with Ms Bevilacqua. Much of her negative recollections of experience related to this proceeding seemed to relate her view as to how TBS treated her:

- she considers that the actions of their employers were callous, bullying, and threatening, and when they were informed she was pregnant, with related health problems, deliberately set out to make her employment with the company untenable, the end result of which was to place her in adverse personal and financial circumstances. (page 21)

1. Mr Ives records Ms Bevilacqua reporting to him symptoms of PTSD which appear at least in part related to the Discrimination:

- she has intrusive, involuntary and distressing memories and recollections of the events. She can be just sitting and talking, and some aspect of the way she was treated and is regarded while it works comes into her mind, and she feels as sad and miserable as she did at the time (approximately 3 to 4 times a week):

- she dreams about aspects of the work experience, and while the contents are difficult to remember, she believes a initially consist of the dreaming about some good part of the job she liked, but it was being bullied and frightened, and when she wakes up she is "sweatie" and anxious (approximately once that twice a week);

1. He also gave his opinion that the cumulative impact of the "disparaging and bullying conduct, unreasonable requirements and the refusal to accommodate", in combination, would have had an interacting and compounding effect and contributed to the development of her post traumatic stress disorder. He gave no weighting between the factors.

1. When providing the 22 April written submissions, Ms Bevilacqua's lawyers provided a further report from Mr Ives. He had been asked to provide a supplementary report addressing his opinion as to the likelihood of a causal link between the Discrimination and Ms Bevilacqua experiencing PTSD.
2. Mr Ives opined that the Discrimination falls within definitions of "verbal abuse", as used in the realm of psychology. In his view when a "victim" is in what is perceived as a generally hostile environment, a limited number of verbally abusive incidents can have a significant and sustained effect.
3. He wrote immediate effects from verbal abuse can include:

1. Having difficulty forming conclusions and making decisions; 2. Feeling or accepting that there is something wrong with them on a basic level (selfish, too sensitive, "crazy", etc.);

1. Analyzing and reliving abusive experiences to see where they made mistakes;

1. Doubting their ability to communicate; 2. Experiencing self-doubt, low self-confidence, and losing spontaneity and enthusiasm; 3. Entertaining false hopes that things will improve; and, 4. Lacking concentration.
2. He wrote this can lead to more pathological emotional effects, which in turn can include depression, fear and anxiety, obsessing about work, stress and PTSD. In his view the "verbal abuse" was likely to be particularly hurtful and threatening to Ms Bevilacqua given her heightened emotional state and changing physical demands placed on her body by her pregnancy in the context of hypothyroidism.
3. He concluded:

In addition, Ms Bevilacqua appears to have experienced this verbal abuse as emotional abuse, leading to symptoms of depression, high levels of anxiety and emotional reactivity - which caused her to remain obsessed with work on her day off - and posttraumatic stress disorder. At the core of her posttraumatic stress disorder appears to have been the perception (not necessarily the reality) that she worked in a hostile, discriminatory environment, and her hitherto held view of the world as benign and appreciative of her efforts was wrong. The verbal abuse she received certainly would have added credence to this view, and indeed would have appeared to have confirmed it, and to have caused her considerable emotional repercussions including anxiety and despair - and appears to have been a significant factor in the decline of her psychological condition and could have been a significant factor in the development of her Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD)

1. The following paragraphs from Bevilacqua No.1 concern Ms Bevilacqua seeing Dr Kaushik, a general practitioner:

[102] Also on 30 September 2013, Ms Bevilacqua saw Dr Kaushik at Caroline Springs Superclinic for the first time. Her mother went with her in support. He diagnosed her as suffering simple morning sickness, by which he meant, "vomiting of pregnancy". While she complained of nausea and vomiting, if she was suffering Hyperemesis Gravidarum at the time she would have been continuously vomiting. When he saw her she looked comfortable.

[103] Ms Bevilacqua asked if it would be reasonable for her to reduce her working hours to 28 hours a week. He agreed it would, given her earlier miscarriage, her hyperthyroidism (overactive thyroid which can make symptoms worse creating a high risk pregnancy) and the morning sickness (nausea, headaches and vomiting) she was experiencing, which had caused her to have a CT scan on 4 September and to be hospitalised on 22 September, diagnosed with Hyperemesis Gravidarum. He also thought if she worked full time her work efficiency would suffer. He wrote a medical certificate ("the Certificate") dated 30 September 2013.

[106] In his report for this proceeding he commented:

In conclusion, Stephanie was suffering from morning sickness which was pregnancy related, migraine, back pain, pain in ankles, feet and lower back as result of pregnancy and possible [sic] some other causes as well. She was unable to cope with above and hence I supported her request to decrease work hours to avoid pregnancy related complications and decreased efficiency and performance at work. However I would have needed to assess it on more occasions and in this report is incomplete.

[133] On the evening of 7 October 2013, Ms Bevilacqua saw Dr Kaushik for the second time. He made no reference in the medical record to morning sickness. He recorded:

The employer refused to decrease hours, patient not happy with it, decided to quit the job, aware of consequences but determined to quit, needs a copy of certificate, feels pains in both legs and swelling at the end of 8 hour shift, very stressed hence happy to quit.

[134] While giving evidence, he recalled saying to her that her decision was premature in terms of loss of employment and income. However, she had decided. She said her priority was to ensure a successful pregnancy.

1. Section 125 of the Act relevantly says:

After hearing the evidence and representations that the parties to an application desire to adduce or make, the Tribunal may -

(a) find that a person has contravened a provision of Part 4, 6 or 7 and make any one or more of the following orders -

(ii) an order that the person pay to the applicant, within a specified period, an amount the Tribunal thinks fit to compensate the applicant for loss, damage or injury suffered in consequence of the contravention;

1. I have ordered TBS to pay $10,000 to Ms Bevilacqua to compensate her for the Discrimination.
2. McKenzie DP's words in Deckert v Victorian Institute of Dryland Agriculture (Anti Discrimination) [2006] VCAT 299 from [5] provide a useful guide in deciding damages. Section 136 of the Equal Opportunity Act 1995 is repeated in s 125 of the current Act:

The starting point must be s136 of the Equal Opportunity Act. This provides that, if the tribunal finds a complaint or part of a complaint proven, it "may" make any of a number of specified orders. One of these is in s136(a)(ii). It is an order that "the respondent pay to the complainant within a specified period an amount the tribunal thinks fit to compensate the complainant for loss, damage or injury suffered in consequence of the contravention". ...

It is clear from the words of the section and from the authorities that orders for compensation under s136 can cover economic and non-economic loss. For example, compensation can be awarded for psychological injury, humiliation, hurt feelings and so on. There must be a cause or link between the Institute's breach of the Act and Ms Deckert's loss, damage or injury. The question "would the loss have occurred but for the breach?" may initially be helpful but may not give a complete answer. It helps where one must choose one of a number of possible sole causes for the loss. It does not help where there may be multiple causes for the loss. The best approach is a practical and common-sense one.

Some authorities have suggested that the law of tort can provide guidance as to the approach to compensation in discrimination cases. Others have pointed out that the nature of the law of tort and of this statutory creation are different, and that any analogy is a very imperfect one. I have therefore been careful not to rely too heavily on cases in tort or, for that matter, on decisions under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), some of which were cited by the parties. The words of the section itself must be the most important guide.

As the authorities point out, non-economic loss will often be hard to quantify in monetary terms.

Each case must turn on its own circumstances. Reference to other awards, while it might provide some limited guidance, cannot be decisive.

The authorities have applied in discrimination cases the principle that a discriminator takes his or her victim as he or she finds that victim. This means that I cannot reduce damages on the basis that the complainant was a particularly susceptible person whose loss was greater than the loss of a person without that susceptibility would have been. But this is not a principle of causation. It does not make a respondent liable for loss which did not occur in consequence of the respondent's conduct.

1. In GLS v PLP (Human Rights) [2013] VCAT 221, Garde J adopted three High Court judges' observations in I & L Securities Pty Ltd v HTW Valuers (Brisbane) Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 41: [3]

... it is now well established that the question presented by s 82 of the Act is not what was the (sole) cause of the loss or damage which has allegedly been sustained. It is enough to demonstrate that contravention of a relevant provision of the Act was a cause of the loss or damage sustained.

1. In Richardson v Oracle [2014] FCAFC 82, an order for general damages of $18,000 was substituted with an order for general damages of $130,000, Kenny J said:

... community standards now accord a higher value to compensation for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life than before.

1. In Tan v Xenos (No 3) (Anti-Discrimination) [2008] VCAT 584 at [556], Harbison J said:

In my view, there should not be a perception that awards of damages in this jurisdiction should be set at some lower rate than awards for comparable cases in the Courts. The purpose of the award of damages is to attempt to measure, in monetary terms, the hurt that has been done to the Complainant by the Respondent's act of harassment. My approach should mirror the approach that would be taken if this case were to be heard in a Court, instead of a Tribunal.

1. Turning to this proceeding, in Bevilacqua No.1, I accepted Mr Ives' evidence that at October 2014, Ms Bevilacqua had developed PTSD accompanied by depression and anxiety (the Illness) and the mental and emotional distress Ms Bevilacqua experienced during and subsequent to the last two months of employment with TBS was central to the Illness developing.
2. At that point in this proceeding, it was not necessary to further consider Mr Ives' first report.
3. Having now done so, it is evident from his first report that in very large part the Illness relates to her resignation and unemployment after that and associated financial hardship, putting aside the period where she could not work, due to pregnancy and childbirth. Mr Ives described Ms Bevilacqua as, "feeling very bitter because, if she had been allowed to stay in employment and take maternity leave, her personal and financial circumstances would now be very different." He makes other similar comments.
4. While I accept that is the case, I have not found that discrimination by TBS caused Ms Bevilacqua to resign. It is difficult to accept Ms Bevilacqua would have developed the Illness as a result of the discrimination found in this proceeding if she had remained employed by TBS.
5. In his first report Mr Ives also opined the cumulative impact of the "disparaging and bullying conduct, unreasonable requirements and the refusal to accommodate", in combination, would have had an interacting and compounding effect and contributed to the development of her post traumatic stress disorder.
6. In Bevilacqa No.1, I did not find TBS bullied Ms Bevilacqua. I did find she perceived she was being bullied (see paragraph 97). I did not explicitly say TBS disparaged Ms Bevilacqua. I did not find TBS imposed unreasonable requirements nor refused to accommodate. I did not accept the one email from Mr Rovas was either disparaging or bullying. That said, my findings related to toilet breaks implicitly accept some degree of Mr E. Rovas disparaging Ms Bevilacqua.
7. That said, I accept Mr Ives' evidence of Ms Bevilacqua reporting her re-experiencing her time at TBS, which in part led to his diagnosis of PTSD (see paragraph 18 above). While he does not explicitly say so, I understand him to be saying she re-experiences the Discrimination in the context of re-experiencing her experiences at TBS.
8. I now turn to Mr Ives' 19 April 2015 report. TBS submitted that given it was provided after the time for giving evidence in this proceeding had ended, I should not consider it. While I regard the provision of this latter evidence as far from ideal (because the issues explored could have been explored during the proceeding hearing), in my view not considering it would potentially be unfair to Ms Bevilacqua.
9. That said, Mr Ives' second report adds little.
10. First, Mr Ives listed potential immediate effects of "verbal abuse" (see paragraph 22 above). Very few of those effects were prominent in the contemporaneous evidence in this proceeding. It is striking that Dr Kaushik made no reference to such issues. Ms Bevilacqua's eloquent resignation letter (see Bevilacqua No.1, paragraph 131) shows no sign of the immediate effects on decision making Mr Ives describes.
11. Related to the above, Mr Ives said:

Judging by Ms Bevilacqua's reactions to these verbally abusive episodes they appear to have caused her great distress. As such, this abuse would have exerted a significant impact in the decline of her mental state in the short two or so months (August 2013 to October 2013) between the time she realised she was pregnant and the time she resigned from the company.

1. In my view, Mr Ives focuses on the Discrimination and does not convincingly differentiate between the distress the Discrimination caused (which I accepted occurred) and the distress she otherwise experienced which was not the result of discrimination. Again, Dr Kaushik did not observe mental health issues when he saw her twice in early October, before and after she resigned.

... The verbal abuse she received ... appears to have been a significant factor in the decline of her psychological condition and could have been a significant factor in the development of her Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.

1. The Discrimination found in this proceeding was in the form of one short text and comments concerning toilet breaks over about a week. Mr Ives does not strongly put that it was a significant factor in the development of the Illness. He says, "could have been". I repeat it seems more likely that Ms Bevilacqua's experiences at work at TBS, apart from the Discrimination, resignation and experiences after that are the dominant cause.
2. While each case turns on its facts, other tribunal decisions provide useful guidance in deciding the amount.
3. In Halimee V Santarelli T/A Seaside Salon [2014] SAEOT 6 (23 October 2014), the Equal Opportunity Tribunal of South Australia awarded $5000 after finding:

Having regard to all of the evidence of the employment relationship between Ms Santarelli and Ms Halimee from 19 March 2012, when Ms Halimee told Ms Santarelli she was pregnant, until 4 June 2012, when the apprenticeship was signed off, we find that Ms Santarelli changed her attitude to Ms Halimee on account of her pregnancy. We find that, once she knew Ms Halimee was pregnant, she treated her, in the work context, with an element of suspicion and distance which had not previously been present between them. This led, ultimately, to the attempted termination of the employment relationship by Ms Santarelli. That change in behaviour, and the attempted termination, constituted unlawful conduct, contrary to s 85V(2)(d) of the Act. The actual termination of the employment relationship, however, did not occur solely on account of Ms Santarelli's attitude. Ms Halimee clearly decided in May 2012 that she would prefer to have her apprenticeship signed off, and her employment terminated, than to attempt to redeem her relationship with Ms Santarelli. It is clear from the records of the office of the Training Advocate that it was Ms Halimee's decision to seek the signing off of her apprenticeship which set in motion the ultimate, valid, conclusion of her employment.

1. I also considered decisions cited on behalf of Ms Bevilacqua:
   1. In Slattery v Manningham CC (Human Rights) [2014] VCAT 1442, VCAT awarded $14,000. However, the circumstances relevant to that proceeding and VCAT's finding that Manningham City Council's maintenance of a declaration prohibiting Mr Slattery from attending any building that is owned, occupied or managed by the Council over about two years constituted direct discrimination in the area of provision of services on the grounds of disability bear little relationship to this proceeding;

1. In Jemal v ISS Facility Services Pty Ltd (Human Rights) [2015] VCAT 103 (19 January 2015), VCAT ordered $3,000 damages relating to a finding that an ISS employee told Mr Jemal he "looked like a gorilla" and accused him of being homosexual was discrimination on the basis of race. That sum is perhaps the bottom of the range for damages related to hurt and humiliation caused by discrimination;

1. I do not regard Cobaw Community Health Services v Christian Youth Camps Ltd & Anor (Anti-Discrimination) [2010] VCAT 1613 (8 October 2010) as helpful here. Hampel J referred to ten people who were caused hurt and humiliation by the camp's refusal to accept a booking because of objection to homosexuality. She awarded what she described as a modest claim for $5,000; and

1. In Deckert v Victorian Institute of Dryland Agriculture (Anti Discrimination) [2006] VCAT 299, VCAT awarded $20,000 damages for non-economic loss, related to discrimination which VCAT found triggered Ms Deckert experiencing increased depression for a significant period after her employment ended. However, here I have not found the discrimination against Ms Bevilacqua triggered the decline in her mental state.

1. Considering this proceeding in the light of previously decided proceedings, I have decided $10,000 general damages are appropriate to compensate Ms Bevilacqua; for hurt and humiliation she experienced at the time of the Discrimination and in light of her re-experiencing the Discrimination.
2. I have declined to award compensation with respect to psychological treatment for Ms Bevilacqua. I was not satisfied the Discrimination was a significant cause of the PTSD, depression and anxiety Ms Bevilacqua suffers.
3. Finally, s 125 of the Act requires that VCAT order that payment be made within a specified period. Given Ms Bevilacqua's Supreme Court appeal, I have specified 28 days from the determination of that appeal, subject of course to the Court's decision.

[1] See State of Victoria v Turner [2007] VSC 362.

[2] Bevilacqua No. 1, page 1, Order 1.

[3] [56]-[57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) (citations omitted)