Relevant facts
17 The following is a summary of the relevant facts stated in the SOAF.
18 Austal's securities were listed on the ASX at all relevant times, making it a listed disclosing entity within the meaning of s 111AL(1) of the Act that was subject to and bound by the ASX Listing Rules.
19 From 4 April 2016, Mr Singleton was the CEO of Austal and a member of Austal's Continuous Disclosure Committee. Prior to that time, he had been a non-executive director of Austal from December 2011 until 3 April 2016 and, from January 2016 until 3 April 2016, the CEO designate of Austal.
20 Austal, through its subsidiaries, carried on the business of designing and building defence and commercial ships for governments, navies and ferry operators worldwide.
21 AUSA was at all material times a wholly owned subsidiary of Austal Holdings Inc, which itself was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Austal. During the Relevant Period, AUSA's business operations comprised:
(a) Ship building operations - consisting of the Expeditionary Fast Transport program and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program;
(b) Systems - combat systems and integration of combat systems with vessels; and
(c) Sustainment operations - maintenance of completed vessels.
22 During the Relevant Period, Austal, AUSA and the US Department of Defense were party to a Special Security Agreement (SSA) with the Unites States to protect US national security interests against foreign influence. Under the SSA, certain restrictions were imposed on the ability of Austal to control or influence the operations of AUSA, the access of Austal personnel to AUSA and the information that could be and was reported from AUSA to Austal, though the SSA did not ultimately preclude Austal's CFO from working with the AUSA finance team in undertaking the review described below once approvals had been obtained to facilitate this.
23 AUSA was the largest contributor to Austal's revenue and earnings in both the financial years ending 30 June 2015 (FY2015) and FY2016. During FY2015, AUSA derived approximately 82% of its total annual revenue from its shipbuilding operations. The substantial majority of AUSA's revenue since the financial year ended 30 June 2014 was obtained from the LCS program.
24 The first ship built by Austal as prime contractor as part of the LCS program was LCS 6. It was delivered to the US Navy in August 2015, although AUSA's obligations to the US Navy were not complete at the date of delivery. In FY2016, AUSA was constructing seven additional vessels as part of the program (LCS 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20).
25 Financial forecasts for the Austal group were prepared by Austal's Financial Planning and Analysis (FPA) team, under the supervision of Austal's Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Greg Jason. The group forecasts incorporated forecasts for AUSA, which were prepared by AUSA and analysed by the FPA team each month. The extent to which the FPA team was able to analyse the forecasts prepared by AUSA was affected by the SSA.
26 Austal used an estimate to completion (EAC) approach to forecasting the total construction costs of, and recognising the revenue derived from, AUSA's ship building operations, using forecasts prepared by AUSA. Austal and AUSA used a "percentage complete" method to recognise revenue on AUSA's ship building operations for the purposes of preparing Austal's statutory accounts. In general terms, this meant that Austal recognised revenue and profits earned to date on vessels under construction in the same proportion as costs incurred to date relative to the EACs. Where EAC forecasts increased significantly, adjustments had to be made to Austal's accounts to reflect the changes. The relevant accounting standards (AASB 111 Construction Contracts and AASB 108 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors) required EAC increases to be recognised in the current reporting period so that profit recognition reflected current EACs. When there was a change in estimate, the relevant adjustment was a writeback on previously recognised profit in the period of the change.
27 In an announcement to the ASX on 10 December 2015, Austal announced that:
(a) Austal's ability to apply lessons learnt and productivity enhancements from LCS 6 to vessels in advanced construction, namely LCS 8 and LCS 10, had been more limited than anticipated. As a result, FY2016 earnings from Austal's US shipyard were expected to be lower than in FY2015, with US shipbuilding EBIT margin expected to be in the range of 4.5% to 6.5% (EBIT Margin Guidance); and
(b) Austal CEO, Andrew Bellamy, said:
(i) while there were flow on effects from LCS 6 onto LCS 8 and 10, vessels at earlier stages of construction would benefit from the lessons learnt on LCS 6 to increase future US shipbuilding margin (Margin Growth Representation);
(ii) the LCS program was maturing more slowly than Austal had expected, and Austal was working hard to manage the risks and expected an improvement across the program after delivery of LCS 10; and
(iii) the ongoing strong performance of the US$1.6 billion Expeditionary Fast Transport at Austal's shipyard was a great illustration of the efficiencies Austal could deliver once a vessel program reached the mature production stage, and that Austal was confident that the LCS program would be no different.
28 The US shipbuilding EBIT margin can be used as an approximate proxy for operating profit as a percentage of revenue from AUSA's shipbuilding operations.
29 In early 2016, Mr Jason identified in a paper provided to Austal's board and Audit and Risk Management Committee that the analysis of the AUSA forecasts typically generates many questions and that "[s]ignificant EAC changes could occur in FY2016 H2 which would perpetuate the pattern of continually resetting downwards". Mr Jason proposed to spend two weeks at AUSA during March 2016 "to analyse and quantify an error band around the USA forecast scenario".
30 In an announcement to the ASX released on 23 February 2016, Austal announced that its USA EBIT margin was in the middle of the range described in the EBIT Margin Guidance, while noting that:
(a) earnings had been reduced compared to the prior comparative period because of reduced shipbuilding margins in the USA and lower throughput and margin in Australia;
(b) earnings were impacted by reduced shipbuilding margins in the USA due to cost and schedule performance on LCS 6 continuing to impact on LCS 8 and 10 due to a concurrent build program, as previously announced on 10 December 2015;
(c) the speed at which the LCS program had matured since delivery of LCS 6 had been slower than initially expected, as announced on 10 December 2015, leading to lower earnings for the US shipyard in the half year; and
(d) it recognised there was significant work to be done to drive improvements across the program for subsequent vessels.
31 On 12 March 2016, the CFO of AUSA resigned.
32 In April 2016, Mr Jason flew to the United States for approximately two weeks to undertake a scoping exercise for the proposed review of the LCS EAC costs. Following this scoping exercise, Mr Jason prepared another paper, which was presented to Austal's board at its 28 April 2016 meeting and which outlined a plan of analysis to be completed for the LCS program to assess what was "the reasonable range of uncertainty for project cost EACs".
33 On 3 May 2016, Mr Jason returned to the United States to commence the proposed LCS EAC costs review (LCS EAC Review). In order to enable Mr Jason to undertake the review, Mr Singleton requested that the AUSA Board procure and provide Mr Jason with clearances under the SSA. Whilst in the United States, Mr Jason was in contact with Mr Singleton on average once or twice per week either by telephone, text message, email or Webex video conference.
34 On 6 May 2016, Mr Singleton gave a presentation to a Macquarie investor conference. The presentation slide pack was released to the ASX. It relevantly stated that "LCS first of class issues continuing with margin under review".
35 In early May 2016, Mr Singleton had a meeting with JP Morgan in which they discussed (among other things) market communications which would be appropriate if Austal was required to announce a material earnings downgrade relating to AUSA. The paper prepared by JP Morgan at the request of Mr Singleton (the first of three such papers) following that meeting included information that Austal was conducting a detailed internal review of costs associated with the LCS program and that it was contemplating a material earnings downgrade to its AUSA business. Mr Singleton and Mr Jason engaged with JP Morgan on at least four further occasions between early May 2016 and 30 June 2016.
36 By 11 May 2016, Mr Jason had learned that committed costs on LCS vessels from LCS 6 to LCS 16 were already higher than the total EACs for those vessels, and he had started conducting a validation exercise to check for credits and errors. He communicated this information to Mr Singleton.
37 On 3 June 2016, Mr Jason sent to Mr Singleton by email an early draft of a Powerpoint document, titled "FPA USA FY2016 (10+2) Forecast" (version 1.03), which recorded the current status of the LCS EAC Review (the LCS EAC Review Presentation). The Presentation went through a number of iterations before it was presented (in a revised form) to the Austal board on 28 June 2016. Mr Singleton, Mr Jason and Craig Perciavalle, the President of AUSA, had a Webex meeting on 3 or 4 June 2016 to discuss the Presentation. Mr Jason emailed further versions of the Presentation to Mr Singleton on 4 June 2016, 10 June 2016, 18 June, 22 June and 27 June 2016.
38 By 16 June 2016, Mr Jason had reached a concluded view that a profit writeback was necessary. The then-current draft version of the LCS EAC Review Presentation, which Mr Jason had sent to Mr Singleton on 10 June 2016 (version 1.10), indicated that the likely amount of the writeback (on the "Bull" case, that is, the revised EAC forecast that was most favourable to Austal) was at least US$90 million. Mr Jason advised Mr Singleton of his concluded view by telephone or WebEx meeting the same day.
39 As a result of these matters, as at 16 June 2016, Austal and Mr Singleton were aware that:
(a) it was likely that a significant increase in LCS EACs and a profit writeback of at least US$90 million was required by FY2016;
(b) the reset and profit writeback would generate a loss of at least US$40 million in FY2016 for AUSA;
(c) the reset and profit writeback would generate a significant loss in FY2016 for Austal; and
(d) the EBIT Margin Guidance was no longer reliable and should be withdrawn,
(together, the Information).
40 The Information was not discoverable by inquiries by any third parties. Despite Austal's and Mr Singleton's awareness of the Information, Austal did not immediately inform the ASX.
41 In the period between 16 June 2016 and 30 June 2016, Austal and Mr Singleton sought to understand the following matters:
(a) the impact of the Information on Austal's cash position;
(b) the reaction of Austal's banking syndicate to the Information and whether Austal would be required to reduce its debt under its banking facilities;
(c) the extent to which the US Navy might be liable to otherwise agree to pay for any of the modifications that Austal was aware at the time would be required on the LCS; and
(d) the likelihood that LCS 6's performance in the second shock trial might necessitate further design modifications that could cause further EAC increases and exacerbate the extent of the profit writeback.
42 Between 16 June 2016 and 21 June 2016, Mr Jason, to the knowledge of Mr Singleton, met with members of Austal's banking syndicate regarding the LCS EAC Review and informed them of the need for a profit writeback.
43 On 17 June 2016 and 24 June 2016, Austal made announcements to the ASX in relation to, respectively, LCS 6 completing its first shock trial, and LCS8 being delivered to the US Navy, but Austal did not disclose the Information.
44 On 22 June 2016, Mr Perciavalle presented a version of the LCS EAC Review Presentation to a meeting of the AUSA board, which Mr Singleton and Mr Jason attended.
45 On 28 June 2016, Mr Jason presented the then-current version of the LCS EAC Review Presentation to the Austal board. The EAC Review Presentation was not circulated to the board in the board papers or separately prior to the board meeting. No decision in relation to the LCS EAC or the profit writeback was recorded in the minutes of meeting.
46 On 29 June 2016, Austal made a decision to call a trading halt and on 30 June 2016, the securities of Austal were placed in trading halt session pursuant to Listing Rule 17.1 at the request of Austal.
47 On 1 July 2016, there was a further meeting of the Austal board, which was attended by Mr Jason. There are no minutes or other contemporaneous written record of what was discussed or decided at the meeting.
48 On 4 July 2016, Austal released an announcement to the ASX entitled "LCS Program and Earnings Update", together with a presentation from Mr Singleton and Mr Jason entitled "FY2016 earnings and LCS program update". The announcement relevantly stated:
• A comprehensive review of Austal's ~ US$4 billion LCS block buy contract has been completed following delivery of LCS 6 & 8 and preliminary results of the first two physical shock trials of LCS 6.
• The contractual requirement to meet the military shock standard and US Naval Vessel Rules has driven a significantly higher level of modifications to the ship design and cost than previously estimated.
• Initial findings of the shock trials are that the implementation of the design modifications have been successful, providing greater certainty about the maturity of the revised baseline design and the cost of construction.
• Design modifications and significant re-work of construction already undertaken are being implemented across the 9 LCS vessels currently under construction (LCS 10 - 26).
• A US$115 million (A$156 million) one off write back of work in progress (WIP) is required to recognise an increase in the cost of construction (unaudited).
• Statutory Group EBIT is expected to be in the range $(116) - (121) million.
…
49 In the period from 16 June 2016 to the imposition of the trading halt on 30 June 2016, 19,178,880 Austal shares with a total value of $23,342,284.61 were traded.
50 After the disclosure was made on 4 July 2016, Austal's share price dropped from a closing price on 29 June 2016 (prior to the trading halt) of $1.21 to an intra-day low of $0.935, closing at $1.11. The trading volume was up on 4 July 2016 by approximately 5.7 million compared to the previous trading day (an increase from approximately 1.4 million shares sold on 29 June 2016 to approximately 7.1 million shares sold on 4 July 2016).