Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland

Crime and Corruption Act 2001 s 38, s 40

Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Award - State 2015 cl 14.3

Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Certified Agreement (No.6) 2022 cl 10, cl 12.4

Alexander v State of Queensland (TAFE Queensland) [2020] QIRC 096

Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health) [2021] QIRC 59

Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18

Department of Corrective Services v The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees [2006] QIC 30; (2006) 182 QGIG 152

Elford v State of Queensland (State Library of Queensland) [2015] QIRC 176

Enco Precast Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Ors [2021] ICQ 015

Ganly v Queensland Audit Office [2015] QIRC 108

O'Sullivan v Farrer [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210

Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 35; (1998) 194 CLR 355

Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Brisbane City Council [2018] QIRC 042

Re MEAA; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1993] HCA 18; (1993) 112 ALR 193

Re Queensland Electricity Commission; Ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia [1987] HCA 27; (1987) 72 ALR 1

Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) [2024] QIRC 271

Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees v Minister for Industrial Relations and Retailers' Association of Queensland Limited, Union of Employers [2003] ICQ 33; (2003) 173 QGIG 1342

State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006

State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Misiura [2015] QIRC 030

State of Queensland v Shankar [2014] QIRC 159

State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Misuria [2015] QIRC 30

State of Queensland (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) v United Firefighters' Union of Australia, Union of Employees, Queensland [2014] QIRC 120

• [1] On 11 July 2025, Queensland Health ('the Respondent' in the substantive industrial dispute) filed an Application in Existing Proceedings in relation to a Dispute Notification which was brought by the Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees ('ASMOFQ') ('the Notifier').

• [2] For ease of reference I will continue to refer to ASMOFQ as the 'Notifier' and Queensland Health as the 'Respondent' in this Decision.

• [3] The Notice of Industrial Dispute ('the Dispute Notice'), which was originally filed in the Industrial Registry on 1 April 2025 is in relation to an ASMOFQ member, Dr Brar. In the Dispute Notice, the nature of the dispute is set out in the following terms:

• This application is submitted in relation to an employment dispute arising from an allegation of 'corrupt conduct' made against Dr Keshminder Brar by Ms Lisa Blackler.

• The basis of this allegation is that Dr Brar was required to work 20 days within a 28 day period and instead worked fewer than 20 days during the latter part of 2024 and early 2025.

• ASMOFQ submits this arrangement (14 days on, 14 days off) was agreed to by Dr Brar's managers, and it complies with the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Certified Agreement (No.6) 2022 (MOCA6) and the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Award - State 2015 (Award).

• The allegation of corrupt conduct is incorrect as it is based on an erroneous interpretation of these industrial instruments.

• [4] The background to the dispute is that on 4 March 2025, Ms Lisa Blackler, Chief Executive of the Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service ('CQHHS'), sent correspondence to Dr Brar which noted: [1]

• Serious concerns relating to Dr Brar's professional conduct arising from Dr Brar only working 14 days out of the required 20-day period on a 7 days on 7 days off roster from September 2024 resulting in an overpayment.

• Given the serious nature of the concerns, the information was assessed against the provisions of the s 40 agreement between CQHHS and the Crime and Corruption Commission ('the CCC')[2] and was referred to the CCC for assessment.

• On 11 February 2025, the CCC provided their finalised assessment of the information to CQHHS, including that the matter be referred to the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') to consider.

• [5] The contents of that correspondence remain at this time untested allegations and there is evidence available which (if accepted), may establish that the reduction in Dr Brar's hours occurred with the knowledge of, and at the direction of, his line managers, because of fatigue management concerns.

• [6] The dispute was then set down for conference before me on two occasions, however, the matters in dispute were unable to be resolved. Therefore, I requested that the parties confer and provide the Registry with mutually agreed questions for arbitration. On 3 June 2025, the parties advised my chambers by email that they could not agree on an appropriate question for arbitration.

• [7] The Notifier proposed that the following questions should be arbitrated:

1. Is there a requirement under the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Certified Agreement (No.6) 2022 ('MOCA 6') or the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Award - State 2015 for Medical Superintendents with Private Practice (MSPPs) to work exactly 20 days within a 28-day period?

1. Was Dr Brar acting in accordance with a direction or agreement from his employer at the time the alleged conduct occurred?

1. Was it reasonable for the Health Service Chief Executive, Ms Lisa Blackler (or the employer), to allege corrupt conduct in this context?

1. Did Ms Blackler (or the employer) possess any evidence indicating dishonesty or impropriety by Dr Brar, or was the concern solely related to the number of days rostered?

1. Was it reasonable or proportionate for this matter to be referred to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC), based on the facts available at the time?

• [8] Following receipt of the Notifier's contended questions, the Respondent raised concerns regarding threshold issues for determination by the Commission. Specifically, the Respondent considered that the following preliminary questions needed to be answered prior to the matter proceeding:

1. Whether the Commission has the power to determine matters governed by separate legislative frameworks and to make orders regarding the decisions made by a decision maker under separate legislative frameworks (including whether the decision was reasonable having regard to the requirement of the separate legislative framework), being the decision by the decision maker to make a notification to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) under the Crime and Corruption Commission Act 2001, in circumstances where the notification was accepted by the CCC.

1. Whether the matters raised in the dispute have been resolved such that it is now trivial, unnecessary and not desirable in the public interest to proceed to arbitration; and

1. The resolution of the precise question, if any, to be answered in arbitration.

• [9] The matter was then called on for a further conference where the Respondent confirmed their intention to file an Application in Existing Proceedings addressing their concerns in the matter. That Application was filed on 11 July 2025 and sought the following orders:

a) That the Form 10 - Notice of Industrial Dispute filed 1 April 2025 (Industrial Dispute Application) be struck out or dismissed.

b) That the Commission decline to exercise jurisdiction over the matters raised in the Industrial Dispute Application pursuant to s 451 (2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 on the basis that:

1. the questions posed for arbitration by the Notifier do not give rise to an 'industrial matter' as defined under s 9 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016;

1. the Commission does not have jurisdiction to determine the questions posed by the Notifier for arbitration; or

1. the Commission does not have jurisdiction to make the orders sought by the Notifier in the Industrial Dispute Application.

1. Further, or in the alternative, that the Commission exercise its discretion pursuant to s 541 (b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 to decline to arbitrate the dispute on the basis that it is now trivial, unnecessary and not desirable in the public interest to proceed to arbitration.

d) All questions of costs of and incidental to the proceeding be reserved.

e) Such further or other orders that the Commission deems appropriate.

• [10] I have concluded that this industrial dispute should be dismissed under both s 451(2)(b) and s 541(b)(ii) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act'), as further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

• [12] The dictionary contained in Schedule 5 of the IR Act defines the phrase "industrial dispute" in the following terms:

(a) a dispute, including a threatened or probable dispute, about an industrial matter; or

(b) a situation that is likely to give rise to a dispute about an industrial matter.

• [13] The IR Act in section 9 defines an "industrial matter" as:

(1) An industrial matter is a matter that affects or relates to -

(ii) persons who have been, or propose to be, or who may become, employers or employees; or

(c) a matter the court or commission considers has been, is, or may be a cause or contributory cause of an industrial action or industrial dispute.

(2) However, a matter is not an industrial matter if it is the subject of a proceeding for -

(3) Without limiting subsection (1) or affecting subsection (2), a matter is an industrial matter if it relates to a matter mentioned in schedule 1.

• [14] Section 261 of the IR Act provides a power for parties to bring an industrial dispute by giving notice of the dispute to the Registrar. The Notifier has in the present matter lodged the Dispute Notice.

• [15] Section 262(3) of the IR Act relevantly provides:

(3) The commission may take the steps it considers appropriate for the prevention or prompt settlement of the dispute, by -

(a) conciliation in the first instance; and

(b) if the commission considers conciliation has failed and the parties are unlikely to resolve the dispute - arbitration.

• [16] Section 451 of the IR Act relevantly provides:

(1) The commission has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of its functions.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the commission in proceedings may -

(a) give directions about the hearing of a matter; or

(b) make a decision it considers appropriate, irrespective of the relief sought by a party; or

(c) make an order it considers appropriate.

• [17] Section 541 of the IR Act relevantly provides:

The court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following -

(a) make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;

(b) dismiss the cause, or refrain from hearing, further hearing, or deciding the cause, if the court or commission considers -

(i) the cause is trivial; or

(ii) further proceedings by the court or commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest;

(c) order a party to the cause to pay another party the expenses, including witness expenses, it considers appropriate.

• [18] The Respondent filed submissions in support of their application on 12 August 2025.

• [19] Within their submissions, the Respondent outlines four grounds which support their application. These are as follows:

• Ground 1 - No Industrial Dispute exists
• Ground 2 - Lack of jurisdiction to determine questions posed
• Ground 3 - Lack of jurisdiction to grant relief sought
• Ground 4 - Dispute resolved; Arbitration contrary to public interest

• [20] The Respondent submits that s 541(b) of the IR Act empowers the Commission to dismiss a matter if further proceedings are 'trivial' or 'not necessary or desirable in the public interest'. The respondent further submits that the High Court in the case of O'Sullivan v Farrer[3] ('O'Sullivan') considered the meaning of 'public interest' and determined the expression to mean:

Indeed, the expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view'.

• [21] The Respondent submits that the decision of the High Court has been applied in various jurisdictions, including the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission in State of Queensland (Queensland Fire and Emergency Services) v United Firefighters' Union of Australia, Union of Employees, Queensland,[4] and State of Queensland v Shankar.[5]

• [22] In relation to Ground 1 as above, the Respondent contends that in order for there to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the IR Act, it must be about an 'industrial matter' as per Schedule 5 of the IR Act. The Respondent contends that the types of 'industrial matters' relevant to this dispute are those prescribed under section 9(1)(b)(i) of the IR Act, being matters affecting or relating to the privileges, rights or functions of employers or employees.

• [23] The Respondent cites a number of Commission decisions such as Ganly v Queensland Audit Office[6] and Elford v State of Queensland (State Library of Queensland)[7] to establish that a dispute is only 'industrial' where it has a direct and proximate connection to the employment relationship, typically concerning rights, privileges, or functions under the employment contract or industrial instruments.

• [24] The Respondent submits that no disciplinary decisions have currently been made by the Health Service Chief Executive regarding Dr Brar's alleged conduct which would enliven the Commission's jurisdiction. The Respondent instead contends that the subject matter of the dispute is compliance by them with mandatory statutory reporting obligations under the Crime and Corruption Act 2001 ('the CC Act'), and compliance with those statutory obligations do not constitute an 'industrial matter' which means that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine the matters.

• [25] The Respondent contends that the Commission has no jurisdiction to determine whether the actions taken by the Respondent under the CC Act were correct.

Ground 2 - Lack of Jurisdiction to Determine Questions Posed

• [26] In relation to Ground 2, the respondent submits that the Notifier's proposed questions, specifically 2-5, require the Commission to assess whether the Respondent correctly complied with the CC Act.

• [27] The Respondent contends that Question 1 is the only question that arguably touches on an industrial matter, however, the Respondent submits that it still falls outside the jurisdiction of the Commission because:

• The alleged conduct involved concerns that Dr Brar was not meeting his full FTE requirements each fortnight while still receiving full pay.

• Following this, a decision was made to refer the alleged conduct to the Crime and Corruption Commission ('the CCC') based on a reasonable suspicion that the conduct may have resulted in an overpayment.

• Since the time of that referral, Dr Brar began working on a reduced FTE. Therefore, the Respondent contends that there is no live industrial dispute about hours or entitlements.

• [28] Regarding Question 2, the Respondent contends that the Notifier seeks a factual finding relating to Dr Brar's alleged conduct in circumstances where no disciplinary process has been considered by the Department, and further, will not be contemplated whilst a QPS investigation is on foot. Therefore, the Respondent submits that Question 2 is premature and inappropriate.

• [29] The Respondent contends that Question 3 is a direct challenge to the reasonableness of a statutory referral made under the CC Act. The Respondent submits that once a referral is made and accepted by the CCC, the Commission cannot retrospectively review the reasonableness of that referral. The Respondent contends that:

• the review jurisdiction lies with the courts, via judicial review; and
• to arbitrate this question would be to improperly substitute the Commission's view for that of a decision maker discharging a mandatory statutory function.

• [30] Regarding Question 4, the Respondent contends that this requires the Commission to audit the sufficiency of the evidence that underpinned the CCC referral which is not an arbitral function and is inconsistent with the legislative framework.

• [31] Similarly for Question 5, the Respondent submits that the Commission has no power to declare a CCC referral 'disproportionate' or 'unreasonable', particularly in circumstances where the CCC have already accepted the referral.

Ground 3 - Lack of Jurisdiction to Grant Relief Sought

• [32] The Respondent contends that the Commission's remit is confined to its arbitral power as opposed to judicial power.

• [33] The Respondent notes that the relief sought by the Notifier is set out in Schedule 1 of the Dispute Notice, however, the IR Act does not confer power to the Commission to grant remedies of the kind sought by the Notifier.

Ground 4 - Dispute Resolved: Arbitration contrary to the public interest

• [34] The Respondent submits that the factual circumstances underpinning the dispute no longer exist and to the extent there is a broader question arising around interpretation of the Agreement, this would be better dealt with in the course of MOCA7 negotiations.

• [35] The Notifier filed their submissions along with an Affidavit sworn by Dr Brar on 29 August 2025.

• [36] The Notifier submits that the Commission would not be satisfied that it is appropriate to dismiss the original Dispute Notice pursuant to s 451(2) of the IR Act because it cannot be reasonably characterised as "one which might not succeed on any view of the facts or law".

Ground 1 - There is a Dispute about an "Industrial Matter"

• [37] In support of determining whether there is a dispute about an industrial matter, the Notifier cites the decision of Justice Davis in Enco Precast Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union & Ors[8] where the Industrial Court was tasked with determining whether there was a current dispute for the purposes of enlivening the jurisdiction of the Commission to deal with the dispute. The Notifier records that His Honour President Davis J stated, "Whether there is a current dispute is a matter of fact".[9]

• [38] In relation to the Notifier's proposed Question 1, they contend that the Respondent has not conceded that the arrangement as agreed to by Dr Brar's managers complies with MOCA6 or the Medical Officers (Queensland Health) Award - State 2015 ('the Award'). Further, in his affidavit Dr Brar[10] states:

On or about middle of February 2025, I signed a document agreeing to a change in my working hours.

I state that I signed this change in hours under duress as I felt pressured to do so following a call from the Director of Medical Services on 23 January 2025 stating that the Chief Executive has made a referral to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) and then later to Queensland Police Service (QPS) on 11 February 2025.

At the time of signing, I did not believe I had a choice to discuss the matter further as I was only given 2 options either to continue a 1 week on / 1 week off roster with reduction of pay and hours to 0. 7 FTE or to work 20 days on and 8 days off. I signed the change before contacting my union representative from the Australian Salaried Medical Officers Federation Queensland (ASMOFQ).1 have requested the hospital to have a discussion with union and myself prior to signing the document however no reply was given.

The dispute with regards to my hours and conditions of work remains unresolved until this day.

• [39] The Notifier submits that section 9(3) of the IR Act states that "a matter is an industrial matter if it relates to a matter mentioned in Schedule 1".

• [40] Citing the decision of Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority[11] the Notifier contends that the terms 'in relation to' and 'related to', are terms of wide import when used in statute. The Notifier specifically notes the following matters outlined in Schedule 1 of the IR Act (which contains a list of matters which are considered to be "industrial matters"):

2. a person's entitlements under the Queensland Employment Standards, a modern award, a bargaining award or a certified agreement, unless this Act otherwise provides

19. the interpretation or enforcement of an industrial instrument or a permit, unless this Act otherwise provides

20. the subject matter of an industrial dispute, and a matter that has caused, or the court or commission considers is likely to cause, disagreement or friction between employers and employees.

• [41] The Notifier contends that the narrow construction of s 9 of the IR Act urged by the Respondent is not supported by the well settled principles of statutory interpretation and cites the decision of the Full Bench of the Commission in Self and Bishop v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) at [68] - [69] where the Full Bench stated:[12]

The first question: Is the controversy an "industrial matter"

[68] The grant of jurisdiction upon the QIRC is to hear disputes over "industrial matters" or questions concerning "industrial matters". That term has been the subject of consideration in many cases, although not always in the statutory context of the IR Act or legislation equivalent to it.

[69] In Re Cram; Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association Ltd, the term "industrial matter" was held to catch matters that were "connected with the relationship between an employer in his capacity as an employer and an employee in his capacity as an employee in a way which is direct and not merely consequential ...". The definition of "industrial matter" in the IR Act is wider than was considered in Cram. In Minister for Police v Western Australian Police Union of Workers, the Industrial Appeal Court of Western Australia considered a definition in similar terms to the IR Act. That court considered, in determining whether a dispute was an "industrial matter", that the first step was to identify the "work, privilege, rights or duties", which are said to be affected by or related to the alleged "matter". Once that is identified, the second question is whether "the matter in issue does, as a matter of fact, affect or relate to the identified work, privilege, right or duty"...

Ground 2 - The Commission does have jurisdiction to determine the Questions posed

• [42] In relation to the Notifier's proposed Question 1, the Notifier notes the concession made by the Respondent that arguably this is the only question that touches on an industrial matter within the meaning of the IR Act, was a concession properly made. The Notifier then submits that Question 1 is plainly about an industrial matter, and as a consequence, the Commission's jurisdiction is enlivened.

• [43] The Notifier submits that their proposed Question 2 and 3 also fall within the meaning of s 9 of the IR Act as they concern the privileges, rights or functions of Dr Brar. Specifically they contend that the questions relate to:

• Dr Brar's entitlements under MOCA 6 or the Award;

• The interpretation or enforcement of an industrial instrument; and

• A matter likely to cause disagreement or friction between employers and employees.

• [44] The Notifier does not press their proposed Questions 4 and 5.

• [45] The Notifier concedes that the relief originally sought in the Dispute Notice is not something the Commission can order in an arbitrated dispute.

• [46] The Notifier submits that this can be addressed by the Notifier amending the Notice of Industrial Dispute or alternatively, that it is the resolution of the questions for arbitration that will shape any final orders made by the Commission.

Ground 4 - The public interest ground is not made out

• [47] On the basis of the submissions summarised above, the Notifier contends that the Respondent's "public interest" ground is not made out.

• [48] The Notifier submits that the application should be dismissed.

• [49] The Respondent filed their submissions in reply on 12 September 2025.

• [50] In response to the Notifier's contention that there is a dispute about an industrial matter under s 9 of the IR Act, because the parties are in dispute about the interpretation of MOCA 6, the Respondent submits that Question 1 cannot be viewed in isolation because it does not exist in isolation.

• [51] The Respondent contends that their earlier concession that Question 1 is the only question that arguably touches on an industrial matter cannot be considered alone, devoid of its context.

• [52] In circumstances where the Notifier presses Questions 2 and 3, the dispute, including Question 1, must be about the CCC referral. Therefore, the Respondent submits that Question 1 is not about Dr Brar's privileges, rights and functions but whether the Respondent complied with mandatory statutory requirements under the CC Act. The Respondent contends that this is not an industrial matter.

• [53] Further, the Respondent contends that should the Notifier's characterisation not misconceive the dispute, then it must be premature as the QPS investigation is still ongoing.

• [54] The Respondent submits that subject to the QPS finalising its investigation, the Respondent may investigate the subject matter and assess the application and interpretation of MOCA 6 and the Award, in considering whether to take action that is adverse to Dr Brar's interests. The Respondent contends that it will only be at that point, when the Respondent chooses to take adverse action against Dr Brar, that the parties may be in dispute about the application and interpretation of MOCA 6 and the Award.

• [55] The Respondent suggests that the logic of that submission is borne out by posing the question, what the effect would be of answering Question 1 in the negative. It is contended by the Respondent that this outcome would not, and could not displace the subjective fact that the Respondent reasonably suspected Dr Brar's conduct, if proven, would amount to corrupt conduct. The Respondent reasons that it could only go to impact any investigation and subsequent process inquiring into Dr Brar's conduct, which is not the subject of the dispute and is premature for the Notifier to seek to ventilate in the Commission.

• [56] The Respondent further submits that the public interest would not favour the Commission dealing with Question 1 as it should have been raised in negotiations for MOCA 7.

Ground 2 - Lack of jurisdiction to determine the questions posed

• [57] In response to the Notifier's statements that Questions 2 and 3 relate to Dr Brar's privileges, rights or functions, the Respondent submits that the Notifier fails to articulate how or why they say this is the case. The Respondent contends that the examples provided by the Notifier in its submissions do nothing more than state, in a conclusionary way, the outcome they ask the Commission to reach.

• [58] The Respondent contends that Question 2 asks the Commission to make a finding of fact in relation to Dr Brar's conduct, and Question 3 asks the Commission to make a finding of fact on the reasonableness of the Respondent's suspicion that Dr Brar's conduct, if proven, would amount to corrupt conduct.

• [59] The Respondent concludes that rather than relating to Dr Brar's privileges, rights or functions, Questions 2 and 3 can only be intended to attack the correctness of the CCC referral and doing so does not fall within the Commission's arbitral power.

• [60] Further, in relation to the Notifier's decision to not press Questions 4 and 5, the Respondent submits that the Notifier has failed to establish how or why Questions 2 and 3 are any different to Questions 4 and 5, and the same logic that gave rise to the concession for Questions 4 and 5 must also apply to Questions 2 and 3. It is contended that the Notifier has not developed any cogent basis to rebut that submission.

Ground 3 - Lack of jurisdiction to grant relief sought

• [61] In relation to the Notifier's contention that the resolution of the questions for arbitration will 'shape any final orders made by the Commission in any event', the Respondent submits that this fundamentally misconceives the Commission's arbitral powers, which are designed to allow the Commission to address the discrete question put before it and no more.[13]

• [62] The Respondent goes on to submit that the Notifier's submission that they will simply point to relief which is within the Commission's jurisdiction at some later time if they are successful, rather than attempting to articulate what the relief may be is a wholly unsatisfactory approach and should be rejected.

• [63] On this ground, the Respondent concludes that in circumstances where the Notifier concedes the Commission cannot grant any of the relief sought in the Dispute Notice, and then makes no attempt at articulating any new relief if the questions for arbitration were answered in its favour, there is no utility in the dispute proceeding and to do so would be contrary to the public interest.

• [64] In response to the evidence lead by the Notifier that Dr Brar only signed a document agreeing to change his working hours 'under duress', because he 'felt pressured' to do so, the Respondent submits that it has not previously been on notice of this.

• [65] The Respondent contends it has been unable to ascertain the truth of the statement despite making endeavours to do so and further contends that it is a serious allegation which it would have expected Dr Brar to raise earlier in the seven months since February 2025.

• [66] Regardless of that unproven assertion, the Respondent maintains that the factual circumstances underpinning the dispute no longer exist as the alleged conduct was referred to the CCC as required by law and no further action has been taken and no decision findings have been made by the Respondent in relation to the alleged conduct of Dr Brar.

• [67] The Respondent relies on two provisions in the IR Act as providing a power to strike out or dismiss the Notifier's Dispute Notice.

• [68] In relation to s 451(2) of the IR Act, the Respondent submits that this provision confers on the Commission power to dismiss an application where the Commission considers that the application is one which might not succeed on any view of the facts or law.[14]

• [69] In relation to the second provision relied upon by the Respondent as a source of power to dismiss the matter, that being s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, the Commission and the Industrial Court have in recent decisions given consideration to what is meant by the phrase "in the public interest".

• [70] The decision of Deputy President O'Connor (as his Honour then was) in State of Queensland v Lockhart provided the following observations regarding the expression 'in the public interest' (citations removed):[15]

In O'Sullivan v Farrer, Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Gaudron JJ considered the expression 'in the public interest'. Their Honours wrote:

'Indeed, the expression, 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only 'in so far as the subject matter and the scope and purpose of the statutory enactments may enable ... given reasons to be [pronounced] definitely extraneous to any objects the legislature could have had in view.'

In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, the Full Bench of Fair Work Australia in considering what constitutes 'the public interest' wrote:

'Appeals have lain on the ground that it is in the public interest that leave should be granted in the predecessors to the Act for decades. It has not been considered useful or appropriate to define the concept in other than the most general terms and we do not intend to do so. The expression 'in the public interest', when used in a statute, classically imports a discretionary value judgment to be made to be made by reference to undefined factual matters, confined only by the objects of the legislation in question**.**

• [71] A Full Bench of the Commission also observed in Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees v State of Queensland (Department of Health)[16] that:

It may also be the case that the ascertainment, in any particular case, of where the public interest lies will often depend on a balancing of interests, including competing public interests, and will very much be a question of fact and degree.[17]

• [72] The Full Bench went on to observe that s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act recognises that the public interest may displace a litigant's normal right to have a case heard and determined.[18]

• [73] The determination of what is "in the public interest" for the purposes of deciding a strike out application made in reliance on s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act will therefore involve the exercise of a broad discretionary value judgment informed by the relevant factual matrix.

• [74] There appears to be a significant overlap between the matters that fall for consideration in Grounds 1 and 3 of the Respondent's application which justify those two grounds being considered together.

• [75] The grounds for relief identified in the Notice of Industrial Dispute were set out in an attached schedule in the following terms:

1. ASMOFQ seeks the following relief from the Queensland Industrial Relations Commission for Dr Brar:

• A formal withdrawal of the allegation by Queensland Health and confirmation that it was made in error.
• Copies of the CCC and QPS referrals.
• Letters to the CCC and QPS informing them that the previous referrals were made in error, and that Dr Brar did not engage in any misconduct.
• Compensation for any damages caused by the allegation.
• An order preventing Queensland Health from taking any adverse action against Dr Brar based on the erroneous allegation.
• Any other relief deemed appropriate by the Commission.

• [76] Other than the catch all relief posited by the last dot point (which does not advance the Notifier's case), all of the other relief sought by the Notifier is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission to grant when arbitrating an industrial dispute. This has been ultimately accepted by the Notifier.

• [77] The manner in which the Notifier has cast the relief sought in the Dispute Notice is revealing in my view as to whether there was a genuine industrial dispute at first instance.

• [78] In Alexander v State of Queensland (TAFE Queensland)[19] ('Alexander'), Industrial Commissioner McLennan faced a similar scenario where the notifier in an industrial dispute sought remedies which the Commission did not have power to grant in arbitral proceedings. The respondent in that matter also applied to have the matter dismissed in reliance on s 451 and s 541 of the IR Act.

• [79] In determining to dismiss the matter pursuant to s 541 on the grounds that further proceedings were not necessary or desirable in the public interest, Industrial Commissioner McLennan observed:

[15] Even so, parties to proceedings in this jurisdiction are required to state their case in filed materials and are bound by those filings, subject to amendments. In many instances, the remedy sought in a proceeding speaks to the crux of the matter. Remedies are formulated to address the proceeding in question, and as such flow from the nature of that proceeding. S 451 is a discretionary power vested with the Commission. It does not obviate the requirement of a party to state their case, including the remedies they seek. That process of explaining one's case, including the outcome sought, is required to facilitate the orderly and fair conduct of proceedings.

[16] It is impermissible, and a distinct unfairness to a respondent party, to simply air a grievance and then wait to see what the Commission may provide. That is particularly true where the party bringing the proceeding has been directed to set out precisely what remedy he seeks, because such an outcome may not be available. I accept that Mr Alexander was self-represented, yet that does not alter the parties' obligations.

[18] That is particularly pertinent in this instance because where the remedies sought are beyond the power of this Commission, the efficacy of a proceeding continuing is doubtful.[20]

• [80] The observations of the Commission in Alexander are particularly pertinent and apply with equal force to the present matter.

• [81] Rather than casting the relief sought as related to the potentially relevant clauses from MOCA6 (clauses 5.10 and 12.4) or the Award (clause 14.3), the Notifier has, in the relief sought in the first three dot points, focussed squarely on the decision of the Chief Executive to refer the matter to the CCC. This is a clear indicator that the subject of the dispute is actually the decision of the CQHHS Chief Executive to refer Dr Brar's conduct to the CCC.

• [82] I agree with the Respondent's submission that in exercising arbitral power the Commission cannot examine or review the Respondent's exercise of its mandatory statutory reporting obligations pursuant to the CC Act. In my view this is not an "industrial matter" as that phrase is defined in s 9 of the IR Act.

• [83] In relation to the relief sought in the fourth dot point, it is not alleged that the damage which is to be remedied by compensation flows from some misapplication or misinterpretation of either MOCA 6 or the Award. To the contrary, the damage is said to arise from "the allegation", that being the subject matter of the referral to the CCC. This reinforces my finding above that the true nature of the Notifier and Dr Brar's concerns is actually the referral to the CCC, rather than some issue of construction or interpretation of MOCA 6 or the Award.

• [84] I also accept the Respondent's submission that when exercising arbitral power, the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to order payment of monies in the form of penalties, compensation or for unpaid wages.

• [85] In State of Queensland v Shankar,[21] Deputy President O'Connor (as His Honour then was) dealt with a similar strike out/dismissal application relating to an industrial dispute. In addressing a submission from the applicant that the notifier in the matter was seeking the Commission to exercise judicial power rather than arbitral power His Honour observed:

... In particular, it has raised that the powers given to the Commission under s 230 would not permit it to make the orders that the respondent seeks. In that regard, it was submitted to the Commission that the Commission is being asked to exercise what is, in effect, judicial and not arbitral powers. I accept that submission. The Commission does not have a power under s 230 of the Act requiring the hospital or health service to breach any contract between them and the successful candidates for a 2014 RMO campaign selection process; it doesn't have the power to order the Darling Downs Hospital and Health Services to release the respondent from his current contract, which will not conclude until February 2015; and it doesn't have the power to order the health and hospital services to create a temporary emergency medicine registrar position for the respondent for the remainder of the clinical year to February 2015.

It is submitted to the Commission that the remedy the applicant wants for the arbitration of his dispute is beyond the arbitral power of the Commission to make such an order. I accept that submission.

Section 230 of the Act is designed to answer the discrete question that's before it, to resolve a dispute between the relevant parties. It does not permit the Commission to do any more.[22]

• [86] Similar observations were made by Her Honour Vice President Linnane in Queensland Services, Industrial Union of Employees v Brisbane City Council[23] in the context of a similar strike out application. Her Honour confirmed that in arbitrating a dispute, the Commission did not have power to make an order for the payment of unpaid wages which involved the exercise of judicial power.[24]

• [87] In arbitrating the industrial dispute in the present matter, the Commission equally does not have the power to:

• Require the Respondent to withdraw the allegation.

• Require the Respondent to confirm that the allegation was made in error.

• Require the Respondent, or indeed, the CCC or QPS to provide copies of the referrals.

• Require the Respondent to provide correspondence to the CCC and QPS informing them that the previous referrals were made in error, and that Dr Brar did not engage in any misconduct.

• [88] In relation to the relief sought in dot point 5, as noted by the Respondent, the general protections (and adverse action) legislative provisions are contained in an entirely different part of the IR Act (Chapter 8) from that concerning industrial disputes.[25]

• [89] I have given due consideration to the Notifier's submissions in relation to Ground 1 and the submissions that it has made about the contents of Schedule 1 of the Dispute Notice and the first question for arbitration posed by the Notifier, and that because of those matters there continues to be a dispute between the Notifier and the Respondent about the interpretation of MOCA 6 and the Award. I do not accept those submissions.

• [90] Firstly, it is not clear to me that the Respondent has necessarily disputed the Notifier's construction of the relevant provisions of MOCA 6.

• [91] Secondly, in my view it is necessary to examine the factual background to establish what the actual basis of the "dispute" is. It is too simplistic to cast the dispute in terms of whether Dr Brar was, or was not, entitled to work less than the required 20 days pursuant to the relevant clauses in either MOCA 6 or the Award.

• [92] A failure to work the 20 days simpliciter was not the basis of the referral to the CCC. It is made clear in Ms Blackler's correspondence to Dr Brar, that the basis of the referral was Ms Blackler's belief that Dr Brar had been overpaid by $21,000.00 or more. [26] That is, the basis of the referral was working 14 days but being paid for working 20 days and that overpayment occurring for some time.

• [93] In relation to that referral, I note that s 38 of the CC Act obligates a public official (like Ms Blackler) to notify the CCC if they have a reasonable suspicion that there has been corrupt conduct. This is a mandatory obligation.

• [94] In addition, there is in place a direction issued by the CCC to CQHHS pursuant to s 40 of the CC Act.[27] That direction confirms that the CCC has issued directions to CQHHS in relation to three 'levels' of conduct. Level 1 complaints must be immediately referred to the CCC prior to the public official dealing with the complaint. Attached to the direction are tables setting out the conduct type that will fall within Levels 1 to 3. In relation to Level 1, paragraph (m) includes:

fraud, theft, misappropriation or unauthorised use of government resources or conduct that constitutes an offence relating to property and public monies in Part 6 of the Criminal Code where the value exceeds, or the value is unknown but is likely to exceed, $20,000.00.

• [95] In addition to those statutory obligations, both Queensland Health and CQHHS have issued policies regarding reporting suspected corrupt conduct. The Queensland Health Requirements for reporting suspected corrupt conduct Policy Number E9 (QH-POL-218)[28] notes:

• In clause 1, that where an employee becomes aware of or suspects wrongdoing, they must immediately report it.

Reporting matters involving suspected corrupt conduct

An employee who suspects another employee of engaging in corrupt conduct, has a duty to immediately report those matters to their manager. ...

Managers are required to immediately notify Ethical Standards Unit (ESU) ...

Alternatively, employees may report matters of suspected corrupt conduct directly to ESU or the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC), following any process established by the CCC for making corrupt conduct complaints.

To report suspected corrupt conduct, there does not need to be a formal complaint from an aggrieved person. Suspected corrupt conduct may arise from other information or matter such as the findings of an audit report or in the course of resolving a grievance.

Suspected corrupt conduct does not have to be serious corrupt conduct or show that it has actually occurred. Some complaints may appear minor, however may turn out to be quite serious, or an aggregation of minor issues can indicate a systemic problem.

• [96] CQHHS have a policy in similar terms to the Queensland Health policy which is entitled "Human Resources - Requirements for Reporting Corrupt Conduct".[29]

• [97] If Ms Blackler formed a reasonable belief or suspicion that there had been corrupt conduct, she was obligated to make a referral to the CCC pursuant to the relevant provisions from the CC Act referred to above, the Direction from the CCC, and the relevant policies from both Queensland Health and CQHHS.

• [98] Whether Ms Blackler had appropriately formed the necessary belief or suspicion, and whether the referral was lawful and appropriate are not matters constituting an industrial matter. As a consequence, the Commission does not have jurisdiction or power to consider those issues in arbitrating an industrial dispute. Dr Brar may have review rights in relation to those issues, but they do not arise from the arbitration of an industrial dispute in the Commission.

• [99] I find the Respondent's contention more convincing that the basis of the "dispute" is not Dr Brar's privileges, rights and functions, but in fact the Respondent's referral of the matter to the CCC and the Respondent's compliance with its mandatory statutory reporting obligations. Consequently, I am not satisfied therefore, that the "dispute" is an industrial matter within the meaning of s 9 of the IR Act.

• [100] I further accept the Respondent's submissions that the issues surrounding Dr Brar's alleged conduct are still largely at their inception, pending confirmation of whether QPS intend to take any action. Other than the referral by Ms Blackler to the CCC, the Respondent has taken no other action against Dr Brar.

• [101] There have been no steps taken by the Respondent towards the commencement of a disciplinary process against Dr Brar.[30] A disciplinary process may or may not occur in the future, it is simply too early in the process to form any reasonable conclusion that there may even be a probable dispute in the future. Given that finding, there is also some force to the Respondent's submission that it is premature for the Notifier to seek to ventilate these issues in the Commission.

• [102] This in my opinion is a relevant factor as to whether further arbitration proceedings in this matter are necessary or desirable in the public interest.

• [103] Two final points need to be made in relation to both Ground 1 and Ground 3.

• [104] In relation to Ground 1, even if the Notifier were to receive a favourable finding as a result of the arbitration in relation to Question 1, I accept the Respondent's submission that such a finding would not, and could not, displace the subjective fact that the Respondent reasonably suspected that Dr Brar's (alleged) conduct, if proven, would amount to corrupt conduct. Once again this is a further indicator that further arbitration proceedings would not be in the public interest.

• [105] In relation to Ground 3, the continuing failure by the Notifier to articulate in the Dispute Notice, or an amendment thereof, forms of relief that the Commission has the power and jurisdiction to grant in the course of an arbitrated outcome is in my view an unsatisfactory approach to raising and conciliating what the Notifier maintains is an industrial dispute. I once again adopt the observations of Industrial Commissioner McLennan in Alexander excerpted above.

• [106] For the reasons set out immediately above I am not satisfied that an industrial dispute within the meaning of the IR Act exists.

• [107] If I am in error in that conclusion, and once again for the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that further arbitration proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

• [108] Ground 2 contends that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to determine the questions posed by the Notifier.

• [109] Ground 4 contends that the dispute has been resolved and further arbitration is contrary to the public interest.

• [110] In my view the only question which potentially raises an industrial matter is Question 1, but I will address this question last.

• [111] Question 2 as posed by the Notifier, raises a factual issue as to whether Dr Brar was acting in accordance with a direction or agreement from his employer at the time the alleged conduct occurred.

• [112] In the affidavit provided by Mr Bailey on behalf of the Respondent, he deposes that no disciplinary process has been considered, or will be considered by the Respondent, while the QPS investigation remains on foot.[31]

• [113] As a consequence, the Respondent contends that Question 2 is premature and inappropriate, and seeks to draw the Commission into a fact-finding role to assess whether the employee's conduct was authorised.

• [114] The Respondent characterises Question 3 as being a direct challenge to the reasonableness of the statutory referral made under the CC Act. The Respondent submits that the Commission cannot retrospectively review the reasonableness of that referral.

• [115] I note that the Notifier does not press Questions 4 and 5. Despite that proper concession, I accept the Respondent's submissions that Question 4 invites the Commission to audit the sufficiency of the evidence that underpinned the CCC referral. For the reasons set out above under Grounds 1 and 3, I am satisfied that this is not an arbitral function and further that this issue is not an industrial matter.

• [116] Regarding the proposed Question 5, I again accept the Respondent's submission that the Commission in exercising arbitral power has no power to declare a referral to the CCC under the CC Act to be "disproportionate" or "unreasonable", particularly in circumstances where the CCC have accepted the referral. This is simply not an industrial matter.

• [117] As noted in paragraph [43] of these reasons for decision, the Notifier contends that Questions 2 and 3 are about the privileges, rights or functions of Dr Brar within the meaning of s 9 of the IR Act. The Notifier then sets out three matters that it contends that the questions relate to.

• [118] The Respondent in its reply submissions, criticises the Notifier's response contending that the Notifier has failed to articulate how, or why, they say that Questions 2 and 3 relate to Dr Brar's privileges, rights or functions. Given the context of both questions, the Respondent contends that Questions 2 and 3 can only be intended to attack the correctness of the CCC referral, which does not fall within the Commission's arbitral power.

• [119] For the reasons set out in paragraphs [91] to [99] of these reasons, I am satisfied that the real issue that the Notifier disputes was the decision to refer the alleged conduct to the CCC and the basis upon which that referral was made. Given that finding, I am not satisfied that Questions 2 and 3 are in fact directed to Dr Brar's privileges, rights or functions.

• [120] On balance, I accept that Questions 2 and 3 are directed to a collateral challenge to the decision to make a referral to the CCC. For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that this constitutes an "industrial matter", nor am I satisfied that these issues can be addressed by the Commission in the exercise of its arbitral power.

• [121] As a consequence, I am satisfied that four of the five questions posed by the Notifier are not appropriate questions for arbitration. This supports the dismissal of the notification, or alternatively, a finding that further arbitration proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

• [122] This then leaves Question 1. Question 1 seeks the Commission to provide a finding on the proper construction of the provisions of MOCA 6 and the Award regarding the interplay between a number of clauses in MOCA 6, including clauses 5.10 and 12, and clause 14.3 of the Award.

• [123] This in my view is a valid question for arbitration, however, it is still necessary to address the Respondent's further ground of challenge to this question.

• [124] The Respondent asserts in its primary submissions that Dr Brar is currently working on reduced FTE status, following the amendment to his working hours. As a consequence, the Respondent contends that there is no live industrial dispute about hours, entitlements or interpretation before the Commission, in light of the change in circumstances.

• [125] The Notifier simply asserts that in light of the Respondent's acceptance that Question 1 arguably touches on an industrial matter, the jurisdiction of the Commission is enlivened. The Notifier does not engage with the Respondent's alternative position regarding there being no live industrial dispute relating to Question 1.

• [126] Further, Mr Bailey in his affidavit deposes to his understanding that in the negotiations for the seventh iteration of the Medical Officers Certified Agreement (MOCA 7) that are currently underway, that the interpretation of clause 5.10 of MOCA 6 has not been raised during the course of negotiations.[32]

• [127] The Respondent in its reply submissions contends that in those circumstances, the public interest would not favour the Commission dealing with Question 1, because the Notifier ought instead to have raised that question in the course of negotiations for MOCA 7.

• [128] After giving due consideration to the submissions of both parties about Grounds 1 and 4, I have formed the view that further arbitration proceedings by the Commission are not necessary or desirable in the public interest for the following reasons:

• Firstly, I accept the Respondent's submissions that the controversy, to the extent that it existed between the parties, about clauses 5.10 and 12.4 of MOCA 6 and clause 14.3 of the Award was effectively resolved by the amendment to Dr Brar's hours. In my view the Respondent's submission that the factual circumstances underpinning the dispute no longer exist should be accepted. I consider that there is no live industrial dispute about Dr Brar's hours, his entitlements, or the interpretation of MOCA 6 or the Award.

• Secondly, it would not be an appropriate use of the Commission's resources, and therefore not in the public interest, to conduct an arbitration solely in relation to Question 1 as proposed by the Notifier.

• Thirdly, as noted earlier in these reasons, I retain doubts as to the extent to which the parties are actually in dispute about the proper construction of the relevant provisions of MOCA 6 and the Award.

• Fourthly, for the reasons set out under Grounds 1 and 3 in paragraph [104] above, even if the answer to Question 1 was that sought by the Notifier, it cannot in my view have any impact on the decision of the Respondent to make a referral to the CCC, or to the CCC's acceptance of the referral. In light of this, the utility of the matter proceeding to arbitration is in my view limited.

• Finally, I consider that there is some force to the Respondent's submission that if there is a broader question surrounding the interpretation of the relevant industrial instruments, this was a proper matter to be raised in the negotiations for MOCA 7.

• [129] Neither party has provided submissions addressing the authorities which confirm that the summary dismissal of a matter should be approached with great caution. In Orchid Avenue Realty Pty Ltd v Percival[33] President Hall emphasised this point in stating:

I also accept that great care must be exercised to ensure that under the guise of achieving expeditious finality an applicant is not improperly deprived of the opportunity of having the case tried by the appointed Tribunal, compare General Steel Industries Inc v. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130 per Barwick CJ.[34]

• [130] In Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General),[35] His Honour President Martin J noted:

As the power given to the Commission by s 541 can prevent a party from pursuing relief otherwise available under the IR Act it is one which is to be exercised with due circumspection on a proper consideration of relevant materials.[36]

• [131] In approaching the application with the due caution noted above, and following a careful and proper consideration of the relevant materials, I am satisfied that the industrial dispute should be dismissed.

• [132] For the reasons set out above, I have determined to dismiss this matter pursuant to either the exercise of the discretion provided by s 451(2)(b) of the IR Act, or pursuant to s 541(b)(ii) of the IR Act, as further proceedings are not necessary or desirable in the public interest.

[1] Affidavit of Clay Warren Bailey filed 11 July 2025: Exhibit 'CB-07' - correspondence to Dr Brar dated 4 March 2025.

[2] Directions Issued by the Crime and Corruption Commission to CQHHS pursuant to section 40 of the Crime and Corruption Act 2001. The direction is Exhibit 'CB-06' to the affidavit of Mr Clay Bailey filed on 11 July 2025.

[3] [1989] HCA 61; (1989) 168 CLR 210.

[4] [2014] QIRC 120.

[5] [2014] QIRC 159

[6] [2015] QIRC 108.

[7] [2015] QIRC 176.

[8] [2021] ICQ 015.

[10] Affidavit of Keshminder Singh Barr filed 29 August 2025.

[11] [1998] HCA 35; (1998) 194 CLR 355, [87].

[12] [2024] QIRC 271, [68]-[69] per Davis J, Vice President, O'Connor VP, Pratt IC.

[13] State of Queensland v Shankar [2014] QIRC 159, [4].

[14] See: Department of Corrective Services v The Queensland Public Sector Union of Employees [2006] QIC 30; (2006) 182 QGIG 152; State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Misuria [2015] QIRC 30.

[15] State of Queensland v Lockhart [2014] ICQ 006, [21]-[22] per O'Connor DP, followed in Campbell v State of Queensland (Department of Justice and Attorney-General) [2019] ICQ 18, [24].

[16] [2021] QIRC 59.

[17] Ibid, [10] per Merrell DP, Pidgeon IC and Dwyer IC, citing Re Queensland Electricity Commission; Ex parte Electrical Trades Union of Australia [1987] HCA 27; (1987) 72 ALR 1, 5.

[18] Ibid, [11], citing Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees Association (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees v Minister for Industrial Relations and Retailers' Association of Queensland Limited, Union of Employers [2003] ICQ 33; (2003) 173 QGIG 1342, 1343 (President Hall) in respect of the s 331(b)(ii) in the Industrial Relations Act 1999.

[21] [2014] QIRC 159.

[23] [2018] QIRC 042.

[25] See by way of example, State of Queensland (Metro South Hospital and Health Service) v Misiura [2015] QIRC 030, [65] per Industrial Commissioner Fisher.

[26] Correspondence to Dr Brar dated 4 March 2025, (n 1).

[27] The direction dated 25 August 2022 is Exhibit 'CB-06' to the affidavit of Mr Clay Bailey filed on 11 July 2025.

[28] Exhibit 'CB-04' to the affidavit of Mr Bailey (n 1).

[29] Exhibit 'CB-05' to the affidavit of Mr Bailey (n 1).

[30] Affidavit of Mr Bailey (n 1), [15] and [16].

[32] Affidavit of Mr Bailey (n 1), [18].

[33] [2003] ICQ 47.

[35] [2019] ICQ 18.

[36] Ibid, [29] citing Re MEAA; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1993] HCA 18; (1993) 112 ALR 193 at 194.