[2025] FCA 737
General information, not legal advice.
Federal Court of Australia
2025-07-04
Derrington J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
List of exempt customers at Cooranbong Gardens Retirement Village
Notification of rights relating to the New South Wales Energy & Water Ombudsman Scheme
Supply of electricity to residents of the Cooranbong Gardens Retirement Village
CAM Engineering Pty Ltd (ACN 611 016 570) (CAM Engineering) was the developer and electricity seller for the Cooranbong Gardens Retirement Village (Village) during the period 11 March 2021 to 21 July 2022 (Relevant Period). The Village is serviced by an "embedded network" - that is, a private electricity network that serves multiple premises.
During the Relevant Period, CAM Engineering held a retail exemption from the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), pursuant to which it was entitled to sell metred energy to residents of the Village via the embedded network. It was a condition of CAM Engineering's retail exemption that it must be a member of the New South Wales Energy & Water Ombudsman scheme (EWON).
EWON deals with complaints from New South Wales electricity and gas customers, and some water customers. EWON is a scheme that enables consumers (like you) to make complaints, and have those complaints investigated and determined (in a binding way) by EWON. This assistance from EWON is only available if your electricity seller is a member of EWON.
Despite being required to do so, CAM Engineering did not join EWON until 22 July 2022 and was not a member of EWON during the Relevant Period.
On 19 October 2023, the AER commenced proceedings against CAM Engineering in the Federal Court of Australia. On 12 June 2024, CAM Engineering admitted that it had not complied with the condition of its retail exemption requiring it to join EWON, contrary to section 112(1) of the National Energy Retail Law.
On [## insert date], the Federal Court of Australia:
Because of the Federal Court's orders, if you had any complaint about the sale of electricity by CAM Engineering during the Relevant Period, you can now seek assistance from EWON in relation to that complaint. Otherwise, because CAM Engineering was not a member of EWON during the Relevant Period, EWON would not have been able to assist. Under the orders, CAM Engineering cannot object to any complaints arising within the Relevant Period on the basis that the time for making complaints has expired.
You may also complain to EWON if you have any issues arising after the Relevant Period. CAM Engineering ceased to hold its retail exemption on 13 January 2025 but was replaced as exempt seller by Cooranbong Village Management Operator Pty Ltd (ACN 642 399 442), which is also a member of EWON.
Details about EWON and its complaint process can be found on their website (https://www.ewon.com.au/page/making-a-complaint).
Please contact [insert contact name and details] if you have any questions in relation to this.
(a) to be a member of, or subject to, an energy ombudsman scheme for each jurisdiction where it sells energy to exempt customers; and
(b) to comply with the requirements of that scheme.
(a) CAM is an "exempt seller".
(b) During the Relevant Period, CAM sold energy (electricity) to "exempt customers" in New South Wales.
(c) During the Relevant Period, CAM was not a member of, or "subject to", the EWON scheme.
(d) During the Relevant Period, CAM was permitted, and therefore required, to join the EWON scheme.
The making of declarations should have some utility: see Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2003] HCA 75; (2003) 216 CLR 53 (Rural Press) at [95] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). However, this does not necessarily require a litigant to seek consequential relief in connection with the subject matter of the declaration: see, e.g. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Lending Centre Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 43; (2012) 213 FCR 380 at [271] (Perram J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 69; 377 ALR 55 (AMP Financial Planning) at [143] (Lee J). In the context of proceedings brought by a regulatory body, declarations relating to contraventions of legislative provisions are likely to be appropriate where they serve to record the Court's disapproval of the contravening conduct, vindicate a regulator's claim that the respondent contravened the provisions, assist a regulator to carry out its duties, and deter other persons from contravening the provisions: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 1730; ATPR 42-140 at [6] (Nicholson J), and the cases there cited.
44AAG Federal Court may make certain orders
(1) The Federal Court may make an order, on application by the AER on behalf of the Commonwealth, declaring that a person is in breach of:
(a) a uniform energy law that is applied as a law of the Commonwealth; or
(2) If the order declares the person to be in breach of such a law, the order may include one or more of the following:
(a) an order that the person pay a civil penalty determined in accordance with the law;
(b) an order that the person cease, within a specified period, the act, activity or practice constituting the breach;
(c) an order that the person take such action, or adopt such practice, as the Court requires for remedying the breach or preventing a recurrence of the breach;
(d) an order that the person implement a specified program for compliance with the law;
(e) an order of a kind prescribed by regulations made under this Act.
294 Matters for which there must be regard in determining amount of civil penalty
Every civil penalty ordered to be paid by a person declared to have breached a provision of [the Retail Law (NSW)], the [Retail Regulations (NSW)] or the [Retail Rules] must be determined having regard to all relevant matters, including -
(a) the nature and extent of the breach; and
(b) the nature and extent of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the breach; and
(ba) without limiting the operation of section 4A(1)(c)(ii)(B) or (C) - the value of any benefit reasonably attributable to the breach that the person or, in the case of a body corporate, any related body corporate, has obtained, directly or indirectly; and
(c) the circumstances in which the breach took place; and
(d) whether the person has engaged in any similar conduct and been found to have breached a provision of [the Retail Law (NSW)], [the Retail Regulations (NSW)] or the [Retail Rules] in respect of that conduct; and
(e) in the case of a regulated entity - whether the person has established, and has complied with, policies, systems and procedures under section 273.
The approach to the determination of an appropriate penalty
[it] is, like any discretionary power conferred by statute on a court, to be exercised judicially, that is, fairly and reasonably having regard to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the legislation.
... I extract the following factors relevant to the level of penalty for contravention of the continuous disclosure provisions. The list is non-exhaustive:
- The extent to which the information not disclosed would have been expected to and (if applicable) did affect the price of the contravening company's shares (s 674(2)(c)).
- The extent to which the information, if not generally available, would have been discoverable upon inquiry by a third party (s 676(2)).
- The extent (if any) to which acquirers or disposers of the company's shares were materially prejudiced by the non-disclosure (s 1317G(1A)).
- The extent to which (if at all) the contravention was the result of deliberate or reckless conduct by the corporation.
- The extent to which the contravention was the result of negligent conduct by the corporation.
- The period of time over which the contravention occurred.
- The existence, within the corporation, of compliance systems in relation to its disclosure obligations including provisions for and evidence of education and internal enforcement of such systems.
- Remedial and disciplinary steps taken after the contravention and directed to putting in place a compliance system or improving existing systems and disciplining officers responsible for the contravention.
- The seniority of officers responsible for the non-disclosure and whether they included directors of the company.
- Whether the directors of the corporation were aware of the facts which ought to have been disclosed and, if not, what processes were in place at the time, or put in place after the contravention to ensure their awareness of such facts in the future.
- Any change in the composition of the board or senior managers since the contravention.
- The degree of the corporation's cooperation with the regulator including any admission of contravention.
- The prevalence of the particular class of non-disclosure in the wider corporate community.
The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act.
(a) $10,000,000 (default maximum);
(b) if the Court can determine the value of any benefit reasonably attributable to the breach of the civil penalty provision that the body corporate, and any body corporate related to the body corporate, has obtained, directly or indirectly - 3 times the value of that benefit (benefits test);
(c) if the Court cannot determine the value of the benefit - 10% of the annual turnover of the body corporate during the 12-month period ending at the end of the month in which the body corporate breached, or began breaching, the civil penalty provision (turnover test).
... Considerations of deterrence, and the protection of the public interest, justify the imposition of the maximum penalty where it is apparent that no lesser penalty will be an effective deterrent against further contraventions of a like kind. Where a contravention is an example of adherence to a strategy of choosing to pay a penalty in preference to obeying the law, the court may reasonably fix a penalty at the maximum set by statute with a view to making continued adherence to that strategy in the ongoing conduct of the contravenor's affairs as unattractive as it is open to the court reasonably to do.
... The High Court drew attention to two important considerations that emerge from the reasoning of the Full Court in Reckitt Benckiser [1927] ArgusLawRp 88; (2016) 34 ALR 25 at [155]- [156]. The first was their Honours' recognition that the maximum penalty is "but one yardstick that ordinarily must be applied" and must be treated "as one of a number of relevant factors, albeit an important one": Pattinson at [54], quoting Reckitt at [155]. The second was that the maximum penalty "does not constrain the exercise of the discretion" under s 546 of the Fair Work Act (or its analogues in other Commonwealth legislation), beyond requiring "some reasonable relationship between the theoretical maximum and the final penalty imposed": Pattinson at [54]-[55].
Earlier in that case, the High Court had considered proportionality in the context of a civil penalty regime. In observing (Pattinson at [10], [38]) that the "notion of proportionality", in the sense in which that expression is used in the criminal law, could not be translated coherently into civil penalty regimes, the Court (at [40]) approved the following statement of Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods at 293:
[I]nsistence upon the deterrent quality of a penalty should be balanced by insistence that it "not be so high as to be oppressive". Plainly, if deterrence is the object, the penalty should not be greater than is necessary to achieve this object; severity beyond that would be oppression.
The draft Notice also explained our final policy position to expand energy ombudsman access to residential customers. We consider this position appropriate based on the principle that exempt customers should, to the extent possible, have the same consumer protections as customers of authorised retailers. In addition, evidence from the consultation indicates the characteristics of some particular groups of exempt customers, such as those in caravan and residential parks, are such that they have the greatest need to access ombudsman schemes.
(Emphasis added.)
Circumstances in which the breach took place (s 294(c))
7. What to do if you are not satisfied
Please raise any matters of concern with the billing service provider (Network Energy Services: 1300 664 521 or 03 9807 5286) and if you are still not satisfied please contact the Village Manager of Cooranbong Gardens.
If your complaint has not been resolved to your satisfaction, you can lodge a complaint and seek free information and advice from the Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW (EWON) on 1800 246 545 (freecall), or lodge a complaint via their website at www.ewon.com.au.
The Client [Cooranbong Gardens Plus 55 Pty Ltd] shall comply with relevant regulatory and legislative requirements to ensure the compliant operation of their embedded network and exempt selling activities, which includes satisfying those stipulated by the AER and jurisdictional requirements.
Following the execution of the services agreement with NES, we can now move forward.
Here is a summary of actions to be followed up on:
...
- Cooranbong Gardens will need to sign up as a member of the Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW. Here is where you can apply (there is no rush yet as annual membership fees do apply): https://applications.ewon.com.au
... when you're running a business with nearly 40-odd invoices coming through monthly, and the responsibility to pay certain things on a certain period of time, you do prioritise payment and non-payment.
MR BATEMAN: Also you prioritise do I need to actually be a part of this?
MR PECKHAM: And even though you had been told in March 2021 that you did need to join EWON, you didn't regard it as a priority?
MR BATEMAN: No, because I get told I've got to be a member of certain bodies every month or two when I was running there, and I had to be a member of the Retirement Villages Association, I have to be a member of this, I have to be a member of this other association. They weren't regulatory bodies, but they were still memberships of associations or bodies that I get told monthly that I have to be. Now, I don't need to be a part of the Retirement Villages Association, it's just one of those priorities that you, as a business person, you look at and you go, do I need to spend this money? The EWON membership fell into that category that when it first come through, I thought it was a scam.
As you provide energy to residential customers via an embedded network, your organisation must become a member of the Energy & Water Ombudsman NSW (EWON).
You may have received an email recently from the Australian Energy Regulator https://www.aer.gov.au/ (AER)
Why Cooranbong Gardens needs to join EWON:
Under the National Energy Retail Law, any person or business who sells energy to another person for use at premises, must have either a retail authorisation or a retail exemption.
Under the National Electricity Law and the National Electricity Rules, any-one who engages in an electricity distribution or transmission activity must either be registered with the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) as an electricity network service provider, or have a registered exemption issued by the Australian Energy Regulator (AER). Under both the Retail Exempt Selling Guidelines, and Electricity Network Service Provider Exempt Guidelines issued by the Australian Energy Regulator, all such exempt entities are required to join the relevant State Ombudsman scheme, in this case the Energy & Water Ombudsman NSW (EWON). This requirement came into effect in March 2018.
(Emphasis added.)
that the Department of Fair Trading still governs the Retirement Villages Act ... our residents at any stage can go to the Department of Fair Trading and complain about the operator, being myself, for overcharging on electricity.
I would have taken it a little bit more seriously, that's for sure, but I just don't know how much credence is - at the time - at the time I was pulling people out of houses that were struggling to breathe, so this sort of stuff was very low on my priorities.
Value of any benefit reasonably attributable to the breach (s 294(ba))
Nature and extent of any loss suffered (s 249(b))
Has CAM engaged in any similar contravening conduct? (s 294(d))
Deliberateness and duration of the contravening conduct
If a contravention does not involve any state of mind then it is for the party asserting any particular state of mind (be it a deliberate flouting of the law, recklessness, wilful blindness, "courting the risk", negligence, or innocence or any other characterisation of state of mind) to prove its assertion. If, in the event, neither party discharges its onus to establish any particular state of mind in relation to the contraventions, the Court determines penalty on no more than the fact of the proscribed nature of the conduct. However, if any degree of awareness of the actual or potential unlawfulness of the conduct is proved then, all other things being equal, the contravention is necessarily more serious. Such awareness may be able to be inferred from the very nature of the conduct or representations constituting the conduct. However absence of such proof does not establish a mitigatory state of mind. It means only that the neutral state of mind required for liability has not been disturbed for the purposes of penalty. If a contravening party wishes to go beyond the neutral statutory state of mind for liability and positively assert a lack of consciousness of the character of the conduct for the purposes of penalty, that is a circumstance of mitigation which the contravening party must prove.
(Citations omitted.)
... through my dealings with certain things, especially managing a - or helping a - a friend of mine out, manage an engineer and - and construct a retirement - a manufactured-home estate, that the Department of Fair Trading and NRAS was the be-all, end-all to everything.
Plainly, such factors can be relevant to the penalty that is necessary to deter the company from contravening the Act in the future. Size may also be relevant to general deterrence because other potential contraveners are likely to take notice of penalties imposed on companies of a similar size. However, a contravening company's capacity to pay a penalty is of less relevance to the objective of general deterrence because that objective is not concerned with whether the penalties imposed have been paid. Rather, it involves a penalty being fixed that will deter others from engaging in similar contravening conduct in the future. Thus, general deterrence will depend more on the expected quantum of the penalty for the offending conduct, rather than on a past offender's capacity to pay a previous penalty. I therefore respectfully agree with the observation of Smithers J, referred to by Burchett and Kiefel JJ in NW Frozen Foods, to the effect that, a penalty that is no greater than is necessary to achieve the object of general deterrence, will not be oppressive.
(Emphasis added.)
... as deterrence (especially general deterrence) is the primary purpose lying behind the penalty regime, there inevitably will be cases where the penalty that must be imposed will be higher, perhaps even considerably higher, than the penalty that would otherwise be imposed on a particular offender if one were to have regard only to the circumstances of that offender. In some cases the penalty may be so high that the offender will become insolvent. That possibility must not prevent the Court from doing its duty for otherwise the important object of general deterrence will be undermined.
A clear signal should be sent by this court that, in circumstances where contravening conduct is admitted, the cost of litigation should be avoided by compliance with infringement notices.
(a) 2-3% of the available maximum penalty of $10 million;
(b) a multiple of 3-5 times the amount prescribed for the infringement notice; and
(c) roughly one-third to one-half of the sale price of a completed villa in the Cooranbong Gardens development, which contemplates 110 villas on completion.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and three (103) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Sarah C Derrington.
Australian Energy Regulator
CAM Engineering and Construction Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 737
Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson [2022] HCA 13; 274 CLR 450
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v High Adventure Pty Ltd [2005] FCAFC 247
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lactalis Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] FCA 839
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Le Sands Restaurant and Le Sands Café Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 105
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Leahy Petroleum (No 2) [2005] FCA 254; 215 ALR 281
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181; 340 ALR 25
Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8; 165 FCR 560
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2023] FCA 256
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Holista Colltech Ltd [2024] FCA 244
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Ostrava Equities Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1064
Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; 258 CLR 482
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2007] FCA 1607; 168 IR 368
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 1395
Flight Centre Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 53; 260 FCR 68
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; 101 CLR 298
Minister for Industry, Tourism & Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72; (2004) ATPR 41-993
NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [1996] FCA 1134; 71 FCR 285
Re Chemeq Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Chemeq Ltd [2006] FCA 936; 234 ALR 511
(2003) 216 CLR 53
(2016) 34 ALR 25
(2012) 213 FCR 380