Declarations of contravention of s 47(1)(a) and (e)
47 ASIC also seeks, and ANZ consents to, declarations in respect of the admitted contraventions of ss 47(1)(a) and (e).
48 During the relevant period, ss 47(1)(a) and (e) were not civil penalty provisions. As a result, s 166(2) of the Credit Act has no operation. However, the Court has a wide discretionary power to make declarations under s 21 of the FCA Act. ASIC relies on this power in seeking declarations in respect of the ss 47(1)(a) and (e) contraventions.
49 While the discretion conferred by s 21 of the FCA Act is broad, it should only be exercised where the question is real and not theoretical, the person raising it has a real interest to raise it, and there is a proper contradictor, being someone who has a true interest to oppose the declaration: see Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 437-438 (Gibbs J).
50 The fact that the parties have agreed that a declaration of contravention should be made does not relieve the Court of the obligation to satisfy itself that the making of the declaration is appropriate: Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 258 CLR 482 (FWBII) at [59]. The role of the Court is not merely to "rubber stamp" orders agreed between a regulator and a person who has admitted contravening a statute: Re Chemeq Ltd; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Chemeq Ltd [2006] FCA 936; 234 ALR 511 at [100] (French J); Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v De Martin & Gasparini Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] FCA 1395 at [74] (Wigney J); see generally FWBII at [31], [48], [58].
51 The making of declarations should have some utility: see Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2003) 216 CLR 53 (Rural Press) at [95] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). However, this does not necessarily require a litigant to seek consequential relief in connection with the subject matter of the declaration: see, e.g. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Lending Centre Pty Ltd (No 3) (2012) 213 FCR 380 at [271] (Perram J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AMP Financial Planning Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 69; 377 ALR 55 (AMP Financial Planning) at [143] (Lee J). In the context of proceedings brought by a regulatory body, declarations relating to contraventions of legislative provisions are likely to be appropriate where they serve to record the Court's disapproval of the contravening conduct, vindicate a regulator's claim that the respondent contravened the provisions, assist a regulator to carry out its duties, and deter other persons from contravening the provisions: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2006] FCA 1730; ATPR 42-140 at [6] (Nicholson J), and the cases there cited.
52 I am satisfied that it is appropriate to make a declaration in respect of the admitted contravention of s 47(1)(e) of the Credit Act. As noted earlier, s 47(1)(e) stipulates that a licensee must take reasonable steps to ensure that its representatives comply with the credit legislation. Thus, in contrast to s 31(1), s 47(1)(e) is concerned with the processes and procedures implemented by a licensee to ensure that its representatives comply with, amongst other things, the Credit Act. ASIC alleged, and ANZ admitted, that ANZ contravened s 47(1)(e) because ANZ did not have adequate processes in place in connection with the HLIP to ensure compliance with s 31(1) of the Credit Act. At the hearing on 10 March 2023, I made a declaration to that effect.
53 Conversely, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to make a declaration in respect of the admitted contravention of s 47(1)(a) of the Credit Act. As noted earlier, s 47(1)(a) stipulates that a licensee must do all things necessary to ensure that the credit activities authorised by the licence are engaged in efficiently, honestly and fairly. The admitted contravention, and the proposed declaration, was to the effect that ANZ contravened s 47(1)(a) by:
(a) contravening s 31 of the Credit Act; and
(b) failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that its representatives complied with s 31(1) of the Credit Act contrary to s 47(1)(e).
54 In other words, the admitted contravention of s 47(1)(a) and the proposed declaration merely repeated and relied on the contravening conduct admitted (and declared) in respect of ss 31(1) and 47(1)(e).
55 In ASIC v NAB, ASIC also invited the Court to make what could properly be described as repetitive or duplicative declarations. Justice Lee explained his concern with ASIC's approach as follows (at [112]):
I remain aporetic about making the "repetitive" declarations sought by the regulator. As with all discretionary remedies, if no good purpose will be served by granting it, it should be refused: see Dillon v RBS Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 896; (2017) 252 FCR 150 (at 158 [39] per Lee J); Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 (at 582 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). As NAB submits, the declarations sought add nothing in the quelling of this controversy. In circumstances such as this, the cautions recalled in Ibeneweka v Egbuna [1964] 1 WLR 219 (at 224-5 per Viscount Radcliffe, Lord Guest and Lord Upjohn) become relevant: "declarations are not lightly to be granted. The power should be exercised 'sparingly', with 'great care and jealousy', with 'extreme caution', with 'the utmost caution'". Gibbs J in Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Limited (1972) 127 CLR 421 (at 438, with whom Walsh J agreed at 427, at 448 per Stephen J, at 450 per Mason J, and at 426 per McTiernan J), referring to Ibeneweka (at 225), said that "the undoubted truth" was "that the power to grant a declaration should be exercised with a proper sense of responsibility and a full realisation that judicial pronouncements ought not to be issued unless there are circumstances that call for their making."
56 At the hearing on 10 March 2023, I questioned ASIC as to the utility of making what appears to be a merely repetitive declaration. ASIC submitted that the declaration had utility in establishing case law to the effect that conduct that contravenes the Credit Act (in this case s 31(1)) is also a contravention of the statutory licensing obligation in s 47(1)(a). I am not persuaded by that submission. First, a declaration of a contravention that is based only on an admission by a party has little if any precedential value, as it is not a decision that resolves a concrete dispute after contest in argument: see Rural Press at [62] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). Second, it is uncontroversial that conduct that contravenes a provision of the Credit Act is also a contravention of the statutory licensing obligations in s 47(1). Section 47(1)(d) stipulates that a licensee must comply with the credit legislation. However, ASIC did not seek a declaration that ANZ had contravened s 47(1)(d).
57 It cannot be doubted that the stipulation in s 47(1)(a), that a licensee must do all things necessary to ensure that the credit activities authorised by the licence are engaged in efficiently, honestly and fairly, is important. There is a body of case law in respect of the analogous provision in s 912A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), although there has been limited appellate consideration of the provision (there was limited discussion in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Westpac Securities Administration Ltd (2019) 272 FCR 170). In my view, the question whether ANZ's conduct in this case constitutes a contravention of s 47(1)(a) is not free from doubt. The relationship between each of the paragraphs of s 47(1), and how paragraph (a) should be construed in light of the other paragraphs, may need consideration. An overly broad construction of paragraph (a), as propounded by ASIC, may render otiose the other paragraphs. In the circumstances of the present case, I am not willing to make a declaration of contravention of s 47(1)(a) solely on the basis of ANZ's admission and without contest. The admission has no practical consequences for ANZ as the admission, and proposed declaration, would be merely duplicative of the other admissions.
58 At the hearing, ASIC did not ultimately press for that declaration to be made.