Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited

Solicitor for the Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills

BETWEEN: AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION Applicant

AND: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED (ACN 005 357 522) Respondent

INTRODUCTION 1 On 15 February 2018, the Court made the following declarations and orders:

PURSUANT TO SECTION 166 OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT 2009 (Cth) THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

Contraventions of s 128 of the Act (1) The Respondent ('ANZ') contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 1 (as identified in the Statement of Agreed Facts and Admissions that is annexure PDK1 to the Affidavit in Support ('the SOAF')) on 30 July 2013, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (2) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 2 (as identified in the SOAF) on 6 January 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (3) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 3 (as identified in the SOAF) on 25 March 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (4) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 4 (as identified in the SOAF) on 10 April 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (5) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 5 (as identified in the SOAF) on 3 July 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (6) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 6 (as identified in the SOAF) on 29 September 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (7) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 7 (as identified in the SOAF) on 8 November 2014, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (8) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 8 (as identified in the SOAF) on 29 January 2015, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (9) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 9 (as identified in the SOAF) on 4 March 2015, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (10) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 10 (as identified in the SOAF) on 15 April 2015, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (11) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 11 (as identified in the SOAF) on 29 April 2015, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. (12) ANZ contravened s 128(a) and (d) of the Act by entering into a credit contract with Consumer 12 (as identified in the SOAF) on 12 May 2015, without having first taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation, as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act. Contraventions of s 130(1) of the Act (13) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 1 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 30 July 2013 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (14) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 2 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 6 January 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (15) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 3 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 25 March 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (16) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 4 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 10 April 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (17) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 5 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 3 July 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (18) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 6 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 29 September 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (19) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 7 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 8 November 2014 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (20) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 8 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 29 January 2015 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (21) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 9 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 4 March 2015 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (22) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 10 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 15 April 2015 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (23) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 11 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 29 April 2015 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. (24) ANZ contravened s 130(1) of the Act by failing to take reasonable steps to verify the income of Consumer 12 (as identified in the SOAF), as required by s 130(1)(c) of the Act, before making the assessment required by ss 128(c) and 129 of the Act on or before 12 May 2015 in respect of the credit contract entered with that consumer. THE COURT ORDERS THAT: (25) Pursuant to s 167 of the Act that ANZ pay to the Commonwealth of Australia pecuniary penalties in respect of the declared contraventions of s 130(1)(c) of the Act, in the total amount of $5 million. (26) ANZ pay the Applicant's costs of and incidental to the proceedings, fixed in the sum of $120,000. 2 These are the reasons for the declarations and orders. 3 In this proceeding, the Applicant ('ASIC') has alleged that the Respondent ('ANZ') contravened s 128 and s 130(1)(c) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ('the Act'). 4 Between 25 July 2013 and 12 May 2015 ('the relevant period'), ANZ was a provider of "credit", as defined in s 5(1) of the Act, and was licensed under the Act as a credit provider. 5 Throughout the relevant period, ss 128 and 130(1)(c) of the Act (both of which are civil penalty provisions) prohibited ANZ, as a licensed credit provider, from entering into a credit contract with a consumer unless it had first: (1) made an assessment in accordance with s 129; and (2) before making that assessment, taken reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation. 6 During the relevant period, ANZ entered into the 12 credit contracts specified below ('the relevant contracts'), each with a different consumer. 7 ASIC has alleged, and ANZ has admitted, that before entering into each of the relevant contracts, and before making an assessment in respect of each of the relevant contracts, ANZ failed to take reasonable steps to verify the financial situation of the consumer it contracted with. 8 More specifically, in each case ANZ failed to take reasonable steps to verify the income of the consumer (an essential component of the consumer's financial situation). In summary, that was because, in each case, ANZ relied for income verification solely on a document (or in one case two documents), which appeared to be the consumer's payslip(s), in circumstances where ANZ: (1) knew that payslips were a type of document that was easily falsified; (2) received the document(s) from a third party intermediary who introduced the application which resulted in a credit contract being entered into by ANZ; and (3) by reason of knowledge held by one or more employees within the organisation, it had reason to doubt the reliability of information received from that third party intermediary. 9 In respect of ANZ's conduct in entering into each of the 12 credit contracts, ASIC sought, and ANZ consented to: (1) a declaration under s 166 of the Act that ANZ contravened s 128 of the Act; (2) a declaration under s 166 of the Act that ANZ contravened s 130(1)(c) of the Act; and (3) an order under s 167 of the Act that ANZ pay to the Commonwealth pecuniary penalties for the declared contraventions of s 130(1)(c), in the total amount of $5 million. 10 Those orders were sought on the basis of the Statement of Agreed Facts and Admissions, agreed by the parties and filed in this proceeding, a copy of which is Annexure 1 to these Reasons.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 11 During the relevant period: (1) s 128(a), (c)(i) and (d) of the Act relevantly provided that a licensee could not enter into a credit contract with a consumer who would be the debtor under the contract on a day, unless the licensee had, within 90 days before that day: (a) made an assessment that was in accordance with s 129 of the Act; and (b) made the inquiries and verification in accordance with s 130 of the Act; (2) s 129(b) of the Act relevantly provided that, for the purposes of s 128(c), the licensee had to make an assessment whether the credit contract would be unsuitable for the consumer if the contract was entered in the period covered by the assessment; and (3) s 130(1)(c) of the Act relevantly provided that, for the purposes of s 128(d), before making the assessment, the licensee had to take reasonable steps to verify the consumer's financial situation. 12 The statutory purpose of the obligation in s 130(1)(c) is to ensure that the assessment under s 129(b) is made on the basis of appropriately verified information about the person's financial situation. 13 Income is one of the most important parts of information about the consumer's financial situation in the assessment of unsuitability, as it will govern the consumer's ability to repay the loan. The core connection between the obligation under s 130(1)(c), the consumer's ability to repay and the assessment of unsuitability is evident in the terms of ss 131(1) and (2)(a) and (4) of the Act. 14 Section 166(1) of the Act provides that, within six years of a person contravening a civil penalty provision, ASIC may apply to this Court for a declaration that the person contravened the provision. 15 Section 167(1) of the Act provides that, within six years of a person contravening a civil penalty provision, ASIC may apply to this Court for an order that the person pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty.

RELEVANT FACTS 16 The relevant facts (including reference to the relevant contracts) are included in Annexure 1 to these Reasons. However, it is useful to refer to what is referred to as the intermediaries. 17 During the relevant period, ANZ, trading as "Esanda" received offers from consumers to enter into a "credit contract" with ANZ, as that term is defined in s 5(1) of the Act, that were provided to ANZ by third party intermediaries, including: (1) Combined Motor Traders Pty Ltd (ACN 127 915 404) trading either at or out of 180-182 High Street, Cranbourne, Victoria ('CMT'); (2) Motorcycle Finance and Insurance Pty Ltd (ACN 122 338 809) trading either at or out of "The Gateway Centre" at Suite 4, 320A Camden Valley Way, Narellan, New South Wales ('MFI') pursuant to an agreement between ANZ and F + I Management (ACN 074 537 036) trading as Westcorp Capital; and (3) United Financial Services Pty Ltd (ACN 072 442 445) trading either at or out of the Best Buys Auto car dealership at 296 or 323 Hume Highway, Cabramatta New South Wales ('UFS Best Buys').

penaltIES 18 As I have indicated, under s 166 of the Act, the Court may declare contraventions of civil penalty provisions in Chapter 3. Sections 128 and 130 are both civil penalty provisions. The maximum penalty stated for each of those provisions is 2,000 penalty units. A single penalty unit at the time of the contraventions was $170. 19 Section 167(2) empowers the Court, if it has declared under s 166 that a person has contravened a civil penalty provision, to order the person to pay to the Commonwealth "a pecuniary penalty that the court considers is appropriate". 20 Where the contravention is committed by a body corporate (such as ANZ), s 167(3)(b) allows the Court to order a pecuniary penalty in respect of that contravention which is up to five times the maximum number of penalty units referred to in the civil penalty provision (10,000 penalty units: $1.7 million). 21 Section 167 of the Act is in Chapter 4, which contains the remedies available for contraventions of the Act. The nature of the power to impose pecuniary penalties for contraventions of the civil penalty provisions in Chapter 3 of the Act, and the correct approach to the exercise of that power, must be determined having regard to the text, context and purpose of the provisions imposing civil penalty obligations and the provisions empowering the Court to impose pecuniary penalties for contravention of those obligations. 22 In the Joint Submissions prepared by Mr E Nekvapil of Counsel for ASIC and Mr A C Archibald QC with Mr J Kirkwood of Counsel for the ANZ the following accurate and useful summary was provided as to the approach to be taken by the Court in assessing the appropriate pecuniary penalty, which I adopt (omitting footnotes and references to authorities): (1) First, in assessing an appropriate pecuniary penalty under s 167, the Court must keep in mind the essential character of the balance the provisions seek to strike between the interests of the credit provider in providing the relevant services, on the one hand, and the protection of the interests of the consumer in being a party to only those contracts that are not unsuitable, in the statutory sense, on the other hand. (2) Second, the question of what amount constitutes an appropriate penalty in all the circumstances is a matter which Parliament has left for the Court to answer, having regard to its own independent opinion. Neither s 167 nor any other section of the Act sets out considerations that inform the appropriateness of a particularly pecuniary penalty. Ultimately, this will be a matter of judgment, not susceptible of scientific or mathematical formulation, but rather requiring an intuitive or instinctive synthesis by the Court of all relevant factors. It follows that the penalty imposed in other cases, especially under other legislative schemes, can only be of limited analogical value, and must even then be treated with caution. (3) Third, the power - although exercised in the Court's civil jurisdiction - is exercised to impose a "penalty". This distinguishes the power both from an order in the exercise of the civil jurisdiction for the payment of money "to prevent or redress a civil injury" (because "the whole and avowed object of the proceeding is the infliction of the penalty"), and from an order imposing a fine in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Although the power to impose a pecuniary penalty is in one sense "protective", it may also be distinguished from the administrative powers available to ASIC for contravention of the obligations in s 47: see, for example, s 55(1). (4) Fourth, as their description suggests, pecuniary penalties are punitive in nature. From this characterisation, it follows that "the object of the penalties is general and specific deterrence. That is, the deterrence of those who might be tempted not to comply with the law and the deterrence of the particular contravenor who might be tempted to re-offend". (5) Fifth, the object of deterrence and penalisation must be understood by reference to the specific civil penalty provision of the Act that has been contravened, in light of its context and purpose and the objects of the Act as a whole. Guidance as to the appropriate penalty may be derived from the elements of the civil penalty provision declared to have been contravened and the maximum penalty set by Parliament for its contravention. (6) Sixth, in order to achieve a penal effect of this kind, the power should be exercised in such a way that the penalties imposed do not come to be seen as a cost of engaging in Credit Activities without complying with the responsible lending obligations. It must be a sum that members of the public will recognise as significant and proportionate to the seriousness of the contravention. (7) Seventh, the penalty must also be proportionate to achieve the objective of specific and general deterrence, because the punishment should reflect what the offender has done. It should therefore be no greater than necessary to achieve that objective. Nor should it be oppressive. Nor should it punish a person twice for effectively the same wrongdoing. In this regard, s 175 of the Act states that "[i]f a person is ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under a civil penalty provision in relation to particular conduct, the person is not liable to be ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty under some other provision of a law of the Commonwealth in relation to that conduct". (8) Eighth, it is appropriate to consider whether, and the extent to which, the contravening conduct should be regarded as the same single course of conduct and penalised as one offence in relation to each category of contravention: on the principle that a contravenor should not be penalised more than once for the same conduct. However, this "course of conduct" principle represents a "tool of analysis" which a court is not necessarily compelled to use. (9) Ninth, where there are numerous contraventions arising from separate acts, the starting point derived from the text of s 167 and the relevant civil penalty provision is that each contravention "should ordinarily attract the imposition of a separate penalty appropriate for [that] contravention". However, where the acts giving rise to the contravention are related, then the requirement that the penalty be proportionate entails the need for the Court to consider how to punish several contraventions more seriously than one, while ensuring that the "total or aggregate penalty is not unjust or disproportionate to the circumstances of the case" and that the offender is not punished twice for what is essentially the same conduct. This requires judgment as to what amount is required to fairly reflect the substance of the offending conduct, not the application of a mathematical formula. This may require the Court in an appropriate case to (a) characterise the contraventions as one multi-faceted course of conduct and set the penalty as if there were one contravention; (b) impose a penalty for only the most serious contravention; (c) characterise the contraventions as falling into several classes or categories of contravention, and set separate penalties for each class or an overall penalty by reference to the maximum penalty for that number of contraventions; or (d) determine an appropriate amount for each contravention and then reduce the sum of those amounts in order to determine an appropriate amount to reflect the contraventions considered together and in "totality". 23 I have also obtained assistance from the considerations undertaken by Beach J in Make It Mine Finance Pty Ltd in the matter of Make It Mine Finance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 1255, Davies J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v The Cash Store Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2015] FCA 93, Greenwood J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Channic Pty Ltd (No 5) [2017] FCA 363, Moshinsky J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Wealth & Risk Management Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCA 59 and the Full Court decision in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cement Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 159. 24 As far as legislative context is concerned, the relevant civil penalty provisions of the Act are contained in Chapter 3, which is headed "responsible lending conduct". They impose specific obligations on credit assistance providers and credit providers beyond the general conduct obligations imposed on licence holders by s 47. 25 Chapter 3 has a specific purpose to create and enforce a new norm of conduct for credit providers and brokers when entering into credit contracts. This context explains the very specific and detailed requirements of the provisions of Parts 3-1 and 3-2, and the very significant penalties to which those contravening those requirements may be subjected. Each of the requirements - providing a credit guide, asking for information about requirements and objectives and financial situation, and verifying financial situation - is a critical part of a sequence leading up to the credit provider or credit assistance provider making an assessment of unsuitability, by reference to the consumer's financial situation and requirements and objectives. 26 The civil penalty provisions in Chapter 4 of the Act are a key aspect of a regulatory regime imposing prescriptive procedural obligations on the credit provider under Chapter 3. The legislative intention for strict compliance with these prescriptive procedural requirements of Chapter 3 is reflected in the fact that a failure to comply with each of the requirements exposes the contravener to a pecuniary penalty. This makes it evident that Parliament intended for the credit providers themselves to follow in a step-by-step way the responsible lending obligations in Chapter 3 of the Act. 27 As mentioned in the Joint Submissions as a general proposition, in this situation the various penalties given in other cases are of even more limited assistance as comparators. This is primarily due to the size and financial standing of ANZ, which is in contrast to each of the other respondents in previous civil penalty cases commenced under the Act, and the other significant factual differences in those cases, including the number and circumstances of the particular contraventions. 28 Looking then to the circumstances confronting the Court in determining penalties, there are 24 contraventions in total. However, for each of the relevant contracts, the "particular conduct" giving rise to the contravention of s 128(a) and (d) is the same as that giving rise to the contravention of s 130(1)(c). Whether by operation of the common law, or as a result of the operation of s 175 of the Act, ANZ should be liable to be ordered to pay a pecuniary penalty only in respect of one contravention for each of the relevant contracts. 29 The maximum penalty for each contravention is $1.7 million. Thus, the total possible penalty is $20.4 million. 30 A total penalty of $5 million has been proposed by the parties, and is in my view appropriate, for the following main reasons: (1) ANZ did not completely fail to take steps to verify the financial situation of the consumers. However, to verify the income of the consumers, it inappropriately relied entirely on payslips received from the intermediaries. The conduct, independently of other factors, warrants a penalty towards or around the middle of the range for each contravention (around $10.2 million in total). (2) ANZ's co-operation, and the operation of the "totality principle", should be recognised, which ASIC accepted warranted a further reduction to $5 million. (3) A total penalty of $5 million is sufficient as a deterrent, and ensures that the penalty for contravening the Act is not seen as a "cost of doing business". 31 I have taken into account a number of contextual factors in determining an appropriate pecuniary penalties. 32 On the one hand, the contraventions represent significant failures to comply with ss 128 and 130(1)(c), and by reason of the following matters, they warranted significant penalties: (1) most importantly, the need for general deterrence, in circumstances where ANZ is a very substantial and profitable enterprise; (2) ANZ was aware of what was required of it and had the capacity to fulfil its obligations; (3) the effectiveness of the statutory scheme depends on lenders like ANZ taking their obligations seriously; (4) the obligation to verify a consumer's income is important in ensuring that lenders and consumers do not enter into contracts that may be unsuitable; (5) the contraventions were repeated and occurred over a period of two years; and (6) ANZ management did not ensure that relevant policies were complied with and, in the case of the contraventions involving MFI in particular, no action was taken despite management personnel having become aware of the issues affecting MFI. 33 On the other hand, by reason of the following matters, the contraventions are not the most egregious examples of contravening conduct: (1) ANZ took some steps towards satisfying its statutory obligation but failed to take reasonable steps in that respect; (2) ASIC does not allege that ANZ deliberately set out to breach its statutory obligations; (3) the involvement of individuals with management responsibilities was limited; and (4) loss or damage is not alleged. 34 Having regard to the above matters, I considered that each of the contraventions would appropriately be penalised by a figure towards or around the middle of the applicable range (about $850,000 per contravention, or $10.2 million in total), before the application of the "totality principle", and before recognition of ANZ's co-operation with ASIC throughout the investigation. 35 Having regard to the legal and factual overlap between the individual contraventions, and ANZ's co-operation throughout the investigation, a further reduction in the order of 50 per cent was appropriate. 36 It should be recalled, the determination of an appropriate penalty is a matter of judgment, not susceptible of scientific or mathematical formulation, but rather requiring an intuitive or instinctive synthesis of all relevant factors. Where there are multiple contraventions, there have been a range of approaches adopted by the courts to determining an appropriate penalty. 37 The table below sets out individual penalties that may be appropriate for each contravention, taking into account the differences between the contraventions and bearing in mind that the fixing of individual penalties is not susceptible of mathematical precision. 38 In considering the table below it is to be recalled that: The relationship between ANZ and CMT was such that, ANZ ought to have exercised particular care when dealing with information received from CMT. This supports the imposition of higher penalties for the contraventions involving CMT. Before entering into each of the five contracts with CMT, and each of the four contracts with UFS Best Buys, ANZ became aware of circumstances, or formed a belief, that gave it specific reason to doubt the reliability of the information it was receiving from those intermediaries. With each successive piece of information, the level of ANZ's awareness increased. This should be regarded as a progressively increasing aggravating factor through time, in respect of the set of relevant contracts entered into with each of the intermediaries. The MFI contraventions evidence a lack of attention by ANZ through the omissions by employees within the ANZ's Commercial Broker team, some of whom held positions involving management responsibility. This justifies the imposition of higher penalties for the contraventions involving MFI. 39 In general terms, taking into account these observations: (1) the starting penalty for each of CMT and MFI ($400,000) is higher than that for UFS Best Buys ($385,000); and (2) for each intermediary, the individual penalties for each intermediary increase by $20,000 as ANZ progressively became aware of each of the matters relating to that intermediary. Consumer Broker Date of contravention Penalty Amount Consumer 1 MFI 30 July 2013 $400,000 (First Contravention) Consumer 2 MFI 6 January 2014 $420,000 (Second Contravention) Consumer 3 UFS Best Buys 25 March 2014 $385,000 (First Contravention) Consumer 4 MFI 10 April 2014 $440,000 (Third Contravention) Consumer 5 UFS Best Buys 3 July 2014 $405,000 (Second Contravention) Consumer 6 UFS Best Buys 29 September 2014 $425,000 (Third Contravention) Consumer 7 UFS Best Buys 8 November 2014 $445,000 (Fourth Contravention) Consumer 8 CMT 29 January 2015 $400,000 (First Contravention) Consumer 9 CMT 4 March 2015 $400,000 (Second Contravention) Consumer 10 CMT 15 April 2015 $420,000 (Third Contravention) Consumer 11 CMT 29 April 2015 $420,000 (Fourth Contravention) Consumer 12 CMT 12 May 2015 $440,000 (Fifth Contravention) Total $5,000,000.00

CONCLUSION 40 Therefore, in my view the amount of the pecuniary penalties totalling $5 million sought by ASIC appropriately reflected the significance of the repeated distinct contraventions by ANZ of Chapter 3 of the Act, and gave effect to the purpose of the statutory scheme. I certify that the preceding forty (40) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Middleton.